07-F-1010 CPA Dir Foreign Affairs DeBa ath II 03-16-2003

. , ~ -· . . ( - L · .. I ' • COALITION PROVISIONAL AlITHORITY ORDER NUMBER J DE-BAATIDFICAION OF fRAQJ SOCIETY Punuonl to my authority u Administrator of the Coalition Provisional Authority {CPA). relevant U.N. Secwity Council resolutions, and the laws and usage' of war, Recognjzing that the Iraqi people bave suffered large scale human rights abllSCS and depravation$ over many years at the hands of me Baa th Party, Noting I.he grave concern of Iraqi society regarding tbc threat posed by the continuation of Baath Party networks and personnel in the admmistration of Iraq, and tho intimidation of the people of Iraq by Bath Pu:ty officials, Conanw-' by the continuing threat to the 5CCUrity of the Coalition Forces posed by the Iraqi Buth Party, I hereby promulgate the following: . , Secttoa I Dbestah81hment of tlae Ba•th Part)' l) On April 16, 2003 the Coalition Provisional Authority discstabli$hed the Baatb Party of Iraq. This order implements that declaration by eliminating the party's structures and removing itS ICadcrship from positions of authority and responsibility in Iraqi society. By this means, the Coalition Provisioul Authority will emwc that representative govemmeut in Iraq ii not threatened by Baathist clements rctumiog to power and that those in positions of authority in the future are accepcab1e to the people of Iraq. 2) Full members of the Buth Party holding the ranks of'Udw Qutriyya (Regional Command Member), ' Udw Far' (Branch Member), 'Udw Shu'bah (Section Membor), and •uctw Firqah (Group Member) (togeth~ "Senior Party Members") arc hereby removed from their positions and banned from future employment in the public sector. These Senior Party Members shall be evaluated for criminal conduct OT threat to the security of the Coalition. Those suspected of criminal conduct shall bo investigated and. if dcer.ned a threat to security or a flight risk. detained or placed under house arrest. 3) Jndjviduals boldina J>O$itioos in the top three layers of management in every nation1l government ministry, affiliated corpotatfons and other govemment institutions (e.g .• univemtics and hospitals) shan be interviewed for possible affiliation with the Beath Party, and subject to investigation for criminal conduct CPA/ORD/16 May 2003/01 11111111111 02393 ' ,. ' . ••. ,, ~ .) ~. ' - "' . ,. . ...... ..:.:. ' ~ and risk to sci:urlty. Any-such persons determined to·be fu11 members of the Baath Pa,tty sbnlt be removed from their employment. This includes those holding the more junior · ranks of 'Udw (Member} and 'Udw 'Amil (Active. Member), as well as those determined to be Senior Party Members. 4) DisplaY,s in govqrun~tbuildings or public spac~ Qfthe image or likeness · of Saddam H':l85ein or other readily identifiable members of the form~r rc;gime 9r of symbols of tll~ Baath P.erty or, the former regime arc hereby prohibited. 5) R~wardS shall be made available for in(onnatian leading to the capture of senior memben of the Baath party ~d lndivi~als ~omplicit in the crimes of the former r.egime. 6) The.Administntor of the Coalition Provisional Authority or his dcsignees may grant c:xceptions to the abov _ c guidance on.a case-by-case basis. Section. 2 Entry Into Force This. Ord~;rsball enter- into force on the-date of. signature. (;(t. ( ~ vvi- rl 16{0'.J L Paul Bremer~ Administrator CoalitfonProvi•iomJ i.\\J~ty t'\ ... : ~:.: ~. ~i.', •. t !· - t .· CP AJORD/16 May 2003/tll 2 '. 'ff• COALITION PROVISIONAL AUTIIOIUTY ORDER NUMBER 2 D~SOLUl10NOFENTITIES Punuant to my authority as Administrator of the Coalition Provi1ionaJ Authority (CPA), relevant U.N. Security Council resolutions, including Resolution 1483 (2003), and the laws and usages of' war. Reconfvnting all of the provigion~ ofGenem FnnJcs• Preedom Menage co tbe Jraqi People of April 16~ 2003, Recognizing that tho prior Iraqi regime ·used cemtin .government entities to oppress the Iraqi people and u instruments of-torture, repression and oonuption, kajfinrting the Jnstrucnoos1o the C,itizens oflnq regarding Ministry of Youth md Sport of May 8. 2003, J hereby promulgate the foUowins: Secttoa l Diuolwd Entitles Tho coritiea (the "Dissolved Entities'1 listed io me attached Annex. are hereby dissolved. Additional entities may be added to this list in the future. SecUoa l Assets ud Fhtallclal Obll1adoo1 1) All assets, including recoi:Jk and data, in whatevq: form maintained and wherever located, of the Dissolved Bob°'ties shall be hold by the Administrator of the CPA ( .. the Administrator'') on ~:alf of and for the benefit of the lnlqi people and shall be used to assist the Iraqi people and to support the recovery of Iraq. 2) All fimncial obligations of the Dissolved Entities~ suspended. The Adminianitor of the CPA wtll establish procedures whereby peno111 c laiming to be the bc:Deficiarios of sucb obligations may apply for peyment. 3) Penons in possession of assets of the Dissolved Entities shall preserve those assets, prompdy infonn local Coalition authorities, and i mmediately tum them over, u clirectDd by those authorities. Continued possession, transfer. sale, use, conversion. or concealment oFsuch assets following the dale of this Order is prohibited and may be punisbcd. er AIOll0/23 May 1003/02 I f • ~ 1 I r __ ;.;....-______ ................. '"..._ ......... _., .......... or:i.;:;··~uriuac;;ci.;-.i;.lil .. >SIEl>."C.:c=:r:it.;•::;.;":....vl:.:.i .. Z""C:.;;.i;..:.;··.-· 1.-<i';:,,;j·"a;...· "'""'·..:·.,.··re.:.:";;..· ....;.l:·X:..,. • .;..· :.:..." ...., • .;::.·~...:.·:-.:· ·_.;..· ;;::+;~:;..;, .. ._i "'~":...;'~-;;...· .::.:.. · _..:.:... ·' !L_'i! ---·· _ .. 1 Section 3 Employees and Service Members l) Any military or other ~. tide, or status granted to a fonnm-employee or functionary of a Oi~lved~tity by the former Regime is hereby cancelled. 2) All con~rip~ arc released ftom ~eit service obligatio.os. Conscription is suspended , indefinitely,, subject- to-O: ec1sions by tbture Iraq governments concerning whether a free Iraq sliowa have conseription. 3) Any person employ~dL~y a D.i~lved Entity in any form or capacity, is dismi' ssed eff~ti~fS· o~ Apfil.lt. 2@3. Aiix-:1>~¥.n e.mplP~· ~Y a Di~olvcd Entity, in 11ny fohn. . ~r capacity~ r.CJ:naim: accoWitable tor acts committed during such employmen(. 4) A ~ationpaymentfilan81DQuntte be detettnined by the Administratorwm be paid to emplC?JCCS s. a. dismissed, except those who are Sen:i~r Party Me. ft!bers as ddined in·tbe A~~·s.·May· 16, 2003 Order o(tbe Coalition Provisional Autharity [)C ;.Baathifi~tion of.Iraqi Society ~ CPA/ORD/2003101 (4'Senior : Party Members") (Sec Section. ~6). S) Pension& being · pafd ~., or-on acGl)μnt of:servit;:o to, a Dissolved Entity ·before A. ptil l §. 200~ will . cOl,:tin~ · to>be .plicf. .fuehf~ to 'war wido· WS and disa.bled v.e~ acovided that-no-~~ pa)'IDCDr& will ht madci to any ~on who is a S-enior P~ Member {&ee·.&;eti~-l-61 · and tbaf tlte power js reserved tQ . the Administrator and, t9 fi.mqe baqi , gov~~~f:J t<> t~v.oke Qr teduce ~nsions- as a pe- nalty f'or past.or future .illegal conductor to madifypension atrm1ge;ments to eliminate ini-p.roper priVil!',g~ graqt~ Sy the Baathist re;gime pr for 4im:ilar reaspns. 6) Ncstwi~tandWglJ~Y:Pro~"i9 1l ctf •l'i~Qfd~~ <>T~Y oth~ Order. l~w. o~ regU'lauon, and ooiis~t - witlii ~e. A:dnii~~strator's. May 16, 20'0.3 Oider of the Pj)aliti9Jl ~ {> VisiQ,,W . Autb'.Qti'tY. ~&w.thifi~tiQn, of Iraqi S9C,ict}!. CYAIOROIJOO'.J/O'l, i:io· pa~ent, mclu~g , a teoni:nation or pension payment, will be riu'de t6 any peiSQ. n:whci·is·m:-.:was !t &nior Party Member. Any person holding the rank · Qndcr the.fonncr rcgit:ne of Colonel or above, OT its equivalent. wiU be deemed a Senior Part}" ~ember, prov.ided' that such persons may sec:k., _ under ptocedurcs to .be pfC$¢ri~ . ~o c5tablish to the satisfaction of the Administrator. that they WQre not a Seiii0r'Party Member. I ' t I r i CPA/ORD/'23 l)l[ay 2003/02 2 •• .. .. ·• .,, $st• ·3 -•<'""' - , '· tf.,..c 1 ~- _ _.. .. • .. __ ~ - :,.., J,_ · Section 4 J.nfQrmation The Administrator shQU prescribe procedures for offering rewards to person who provide information leading to the recovery of assets of Dissolved Entities. Section 5 New Iraqi.Corps The CPA plans to create, m the near future a New Iraqi Corps, as the .fitst step in (?rmin& 11 ~ti9nal self-defense o~pabilw for a>~ Iraq. Under civilian control, that CctpS will De-professional, noo-politin.1, militarily effective~ and representative of all Iraqis: The CPA will pr6mulg8fe procedures for participation in the Ne\V Iraqi Corps. Sectiot:a 6 Other Matten 1) The Administratoi='1l1Ar, delegate bis powers and responsibilities with respect lo this Qrder as he dC~m:Une.s appropriate. Rcferehecs Jo the Administrator herein include such delegateS. 2) The Administrator may grant exceprions any limitations in this Order at his discretion. Sectfon 7 Entry Into f'orce Thia Order sllall enter into force on tbc _ .date of signatun::. ip ._( ~ ~ ""L~l·r L. Paul Bremer, Admivi$.tratX>r Coalition Provisional Authority CPA/ORD/23 May 2003/02 l I I I t f I I I i , ' i l I ~ i I i ANNEX COALITION PROVISIONAL AUTHORITY ORDER NUMBER J DJSSO.LUTION OF ENTITl.ES lnstitutiooa diaaolved·by the Ordertcfercnced (the .. Dissolved Entities0 ) are: The Ministey of Defonce. ll:ae Minmry oflnfonnation Tho Ministry of State for Military Affairs The Iraqi lnte!ligence Service The National Sccuaty Bureau. The Directorate of'NJtional Security (Arnn al-' Am} The Special Se.curity ~tion All cmtffies ~ated with oreomprising Saddam H\lssein's bodyguards to inc.Jude: -Murafaqin (Companions) -Rima~ al Khasa (Special Guar~ TI» following m.ilitur organiZ.ations: .. The Anny, Air Fo'rc~ Navy,. the Air Dcf'ellce Force, and other ~gular military services -Tile · R~ican. GUard. -'fhe speejai R~~lican GUIUJl -The Director.le qf:Militazy Intelligence -The:,(J Quds ~oro~ . -Emcqericr Forces (QUwat al Tawan) The following,paramilitaries: -Saddam Fedayccn -ea• . am Party Milid. a -Friends of Saddam -Saddam"s Lion Cubs (As~b ... Saddam), Other Organ~ons : -Tbe Presidential 0jwan -The Pt'tiidentia.l Secretariat -The RevQltrtiona'ry. 'command, P,uncil -The National Assembly -The YQllth Otpni~on ,(a\-Futu.wah) •National O~pie C0mtnitf¥· -Revolutionary, S~al , and Jlf~tional ~urlty Courts ' I l • I ' l ' ' i r ! I i I t CP.MORD/23.Ma)'· 2003/0l 4 AJl organi.zatioqs suborilinatetothc Dis5olved Entities arc also dissolv.ed. Additional org&nizatioos may be added to this list in the future. f t f I CP A/ORD/l3 May2. 0Q3/0i s ·----·-------------. COALITION PROVISIONAL AUTHORITY ORDER NUMBER 3 (REVlSED) WEAPONS CONTROL Pursuam to my authority as Administrator o,f the Coalition Provisional Authority (CPA), and under the laws and usages of war, and consistent with relevant U.N. Security CounciJ resolutions, including Resolution 1483 (2003), Recognizing that weapons control is necessary in order to ensure a secure environment for the people of Iraq and to promote public order and safety, J hereby promulgate the following: Section l Definitions 1) "Coalition Forces,. includes any and all personnel, including contractors, from Coalition. Member States under the command or direction of the Coalition Provisional Authority or the Coalition Force Commander, 2) ' ''Criminal Proceedings law" means Criminal Proceedings Law No. 23 of 1971, as amended, including amendments contained in CPA Memorandum Number 3> Criminal Procedures, CPA/MEM/18 June 200, 3/03, 3) ... Firearms" mean automatic (7.62. mm {.308 caliber) and under) and non-automatic rifles, shotguns and pistols for personal use, and associated ammunition. Such fireanns are subject to licensing by the Ministry of Interior. Firearms do not include weapons re: ndered permanently inoperable, replicas, antiques or ceremonial weapons, 4) "l'raqi security forces0 include 8IllY and aH Iraqi personnel from the Iraqi Police Service, Iraqi Civil Defense Corps, Facilities Protection .Service, Iraqi Border and Customs Police or any organization whose mission includes physical security that may be established by the CPA or under Iraqi law subsequent to the signing of this Order. 5) "Iraqi Weapons Code 1992'' means the Law of Arms No. (13) of 1992, as amended by Law No. (15) of2000. 6) "Military Weapons" are a:oy weapons systems, ammunition or explosives or explosive devices of any type designed for use by any military forces but not including "Fir, eanns" as defined in this. Order, Military Weapons do not include weapons re. ndered permanently inoperable, replicas, antiques or ceremonial weapons. Military Wea,pons incJu.de"Special Category 'Weapons." CPA/ORD/4 November 2003/03 1 ., " 7) "Pen,al Code" means the Penal Code Law No. ( 111) of 1969, as amended, including Law (1) 2002 and CPA Order Number 7t Penal Code. CPAJORD/9 June 2003/07. · 8) aPublic places,, mean state-owned property, places of worship, holy sites, hospitals, schools, gathering places such as town squares and parks, streets and such other places that may be designated by the CPA, 9) "Special Catega· ry Weapons" are any cx, plosives, improvised explosives or iocendiary devices, grenades, rockets, shells or mines and any means of discharging such items, crew-served weapons of any kind, and Man Portable Air Defense Systems of any kind. Section l Relatio·o to Enstlng Law 1) Article 6.2 of the Iraqi Weapons Code t 992 is hereby amended to suspend the exemption set out therein for employees of the governmental and social sector. 2) Article 8.2 of the Iraqi Weapons Code 1992, concerning licensing requirements, is amended to allow possession of no more than 50 rounds of ammunition for any liceTised firearm. 3) ln all other respects, including the penalties provisions (with the exception of the death penalty) the Iraqi Weapons Code 1992 remains in effect unless specifically in.consistent with this Order, in which event this order will take precedence. 4) CP NORD/23 May 2003/03 is superceded by this Order. Section 3 Authorized. Possession and Use of Firearms and Military Wea. pons 1) The following individuals are authorized to possess and use issued Firearms and Military Weapons, including Special Category Weapons: a) Coalition Forces, b) Iraqi security forces. and c) groups and individuals who have been authorized to c. arry weapOJlS in the course of their duties by the CPA or Commander, Coalition Forces or their duly authori. zed delega~es. CP A/ORD/4 November 2003/0J 2 ,. ~ 2) Private security finns may be licensed by the Ministry of the Interior to possess and use licensed Firearms and Military Weapons, excluding Specia] Category Weapons, in the , course of their duties, including in public places. 3) Individuals may be authorized to possess Firearms for personal use by obtaining authorization from the Ministry of Interior, as described in Section 5 of this Order. Section 4 General Prohibitions 1) Unauthorized possession, transport, distributio~ or use of Firearms or Military Weapons, including Special Category Weapons, is prohibited. 2) Other than as provided for in Section 3, no person shall possess or use any Firearms o, r Military Weapons, including Special Category Weapons, in public pl.aces. 3) Other than by Coalition Forces and duly authorized Iraqi security forces :whose duty position requires. the carrying of concealed weapons in the course of their duties, the carrying of concealed weapons is prohibited. 4) All sales of Firearms and Military Weapons are prohibited, except as authorized by the CPA. Section S Weapons Authorization and Licensing Individuals not otheJWise authorized to possess or use Firearms or Military Weapons by this or any other CPA instrument may apply for weapons authorization. The licensing requirements for weapons set forth in the Iraqi Weapons Code 1992 and administered by the Ministry of lnterio.r remain in effect. Firearms for personal use located in homes or places of business under rescinded Order Number 3 (CP A/ORD/23 May 2003/03) are subject to these licensing provisions. The Ministry of Interior shall issue procedures and establish timeJines for licensing such Firearms. Possession of unlicensed Firearms in one's home or pJau of business for persvnal use, as pennitted under rescinded Order Number 3, will continue to be authorized until the new procedures for liicensing such Fireanns become effective in accordance with a Public Notice to that effect. CP A/ORD/4 November 2003/03 3 ~ . ~ .. . .. •,• ' Section 6 Penalties 1) Firearms or Military Weapons, including Special Category Weapons, possession or use of which is unauthotized, are subject to confiscation by Coalition For.ces and other relevant authorities. 2) Any person in violation of this Order may be detained., arrested., and prosecuted. If convicted, all lawful punishments may be acljudged, and the following terms of imprisonment wiU apply: a. For the conviction of unautho. rized possession, transport, dis1ribution, sa1. e, or use of a Military Weapon, excluding Special Category Weapons, a minimum tenn of imprisonment of 6 months and maximum tenn of imprisonment of life imprisonment. b. For the conviction of·possession, transport, distribution. sale, or use of a Special Category Weapo~ a minimum tenn. of imprisonment of 15 y~, unless the proviso at paragraph 3 applies, and maximum term of imprisonment of life imprisonment. Where a person may be convicted of another offense relating to the use of a Special Categoty Weapon, the mandatory minimum te. rm of imprisonment of 15 years, unless the. proviso at paragraph 3 applies, shall also be applied to that conviction. 3) The mandatory minimum term of imprisonment of 15 years is su'bject to the proviso that in excep~ional circumstances relating to the offender or the offense, the punishment may be reduced. The transport, distribution, sale or use of a Special Ca:tego.ry Weapon shall never consti. tute exceptional cirt:umstances. 4) Except as provided in paragraphs 2 and 3 of this Section. sentences for convictions of offenses under this Order or che Iraqi Weapons Code 199.2 and which involve Military Weapons, including Special Category Weapons, may not be reduced as a. result of mitigating excuse pursuant to paragraph 130 of the Penal Code. Persons convicted of committing tl'lese offenses shaJI not be eligible foT Conditional Discharge as set forth in paragraph 331 of the Criminal Proceedings Law. 5) For 1he putp<>ses of this Order, sentences of life imprisonment shaU mean the remaining natural life of the person. 6) Authorized officials of the CPA or Coalition Forces may grant a certificate of immunity from prosecution for offenses under this Order or the Iraqi Weapons Code 1992 to a person w.ho provides information that leads lo the apprehension and conviction. of persons in relation. to whom information is sought by the CPA and CPA/ORD/4 November 2003/03 4 ,.. ,, •· ; - .-· .. Coalition Forces, or that resu1ts in the prevention of a significant crime against public secwity, the CPA or Coalition Forces. Section 7 Administrative Instructions The interim Minister of the Interior, in consultation with the CPA Director of Interior Policy, may issue such Administrative Instructions as are necessary to carry out this Order. Section 8 Entry into Force r shall enter into force on the date of signature . .... 1~1\1~101 L. P u1 Bremer, Administrator Coalition Provisional Authority •. CP A/ORD/4 November 2003/03 s COALmON PROVISIONAL Al::THORITY MEMORANDUM NUMBER 5 IMPLEMENTATION OF \VEAPONS CONTUOL ORDER SO. 3 (CP A/ORD/23 May 2003/03) A.clcnowledging, that the CPA, relying upon Coalition Forces, is obligated to take all measw:es in its power to restore and ensure, insofar as possible, public order and safety in Iraq; Recognizing, that while the Coalitio~ Provisional Authority generally seeks to protect diplomatic premises in~~far ~ ~~ tht'! cuTI:"eot ~~urity environment permits, it is not requiNd to protect dipfor'la~~ fac~lities beyond the general oblig~1tion to restore, and ensure as far as possible, public order and safety; Noting, that foreign. liaison offich.ls may brin,t? into Iraq and/or maintain their own security forces only in full coordination with and with the agreement of Coalition Forces, including compliance with the procedures established pursuant to CPA Order Number 3 on Weapons Control, dated 23 May 2003; Implementing CPA Order No. 3, :;ecrion 5, which establishes a Weapons Authorization Program whereb ¥ .n<I.' l<l,'.~1s w11<.. Lt:ir. d.e.monstrate F~ n~,cssity to carry weapons may apply for rt.".1~.~;.a1) ;.-1~£.~ .• c.r1:> a-4!thorlzation cards (TWCs) in order to carry weapons, I hereby promulgate the follow~nr, Sec-tion ! J J t i":i 1 i;'j O~l . t "Foreign Mission Security Pe-.h -.:i:...~" ~··,\ ::r1.:; \. j ._.t.nirit: ~ersonnel '.f{ho are nationals of the country reprc;~c~r.- ~·.' t , .. : .. ~l r;:i ~-:n J :'!i<:>on :o:nission who are accompanying the mission a.r .. a .Pf'7i•;1ju1g s.ec1.11ity ~cIVice:s to such missions, (ii) employees of the United Nations or United Nations Specialized and Related Agencies designated in Annex..'\ ·;01:, ;1:·c JJtv :i:iiag se<"u:.ity services to the United Nations or the United Natiow•. ~~;:.~::i'.! L::!!:1 t"'..11( R~la•.xl Age11cies, aiid (iii) security firms authorized by the CPA to prn·;;; 1.f. ~·~..ui.ty service.> tv foreign :iiaison missions, the United Nations or tlw :_~J,;'.(/:I ·~~tic.~t& Specialized and Related Agencies. '"Small Arms and Defensive t/J·:t•·w1-·' -;~fnd ::::M.~Annsasdetir.!din CPA Order me u 3 . l din . ls "j. ' • • ·~ g plSto , Su''l'?t: ~>. ::. ·.~ •. ~l.~ ;;!; ;:.· .r.;: .YmnumtJ.on up LV an including 7.62mm ftlld Defet•< .,. ·-~'' :·-:-.. :•· i• c1 non-lethal weapons and t.ot i.:;c;;;:~··:-: · _;--:;x ... 1·-:!ir·~ c·;1:w--:~er1ed machine guns, ~~ct1on::? ~;·rpost• This Memorandum Spect . t' ,.. . . ' ~t ......... ", ... ' .... 1· . .... .i.. "·· .. ,~ .• ··" •. ·. ~-1;,.1 1mson truS:-.!(b.S, 11e ru . .. : - t• u 'ted Nations, and the United Nations Spedahzed and Related Agencies to enter into and execute contracts for security ~e-'."Vl~es .. and expressly pennits the providers of such services to petfonn tbo~i· •:'!I'~·' nw>. ar"' ner.cssarv t.o ensure _rrro~r security of foreign mission personne~ ~,.,; 1~::~ 'n·,~·;. 1; ·l:win~ the carrying of weapons. ~~~.-·:rton ~$ Authi>'." i ~:~.it .1 "'. ~~-~c~ir~·u C'.n~t .. acts Foreign liaison missicms ;n !~·;;~~ f!r.: ~·,e2c1>_; a11ihff'.ize<t to catry out any actions necessary to enter into and e'(t;cute c·;.nl·icts v.dth privat.e security firms for the purpose of providing approriri,·:· · ,;:.: .. :r ; »f f . .1.~d~n liaison mission facilities, personnel> and operations. 'Weapo.r::. ,.; t J•r :-i:lation Subject to the regulations. oi ', .: , :ir.•:: . .:::,. u"C l::.~ ~-.for~ .foreign. ~issio~ ~ecurity P ........ I so long as they .. · · 1 "· • 1· • · •• • • ·· -[ • • • ··h se,.., ··•·'· •Y ··'11n '"""""" etsu.u.&.MiiJ' t l<; •• :t ..... .._, '· ~· ... ,, .:.,, _ .. : .1...C .:."'4v 1.y._"'.._;,3: Y".lW .&.1.~t are hereby authorized to ciu:rr ~;me.ii ,~,tms ~-....r.d :~lcfo:1sive ·weapon~, \\'f.e:t providing security servicl'~S t.:.• :b·,·i ."1 l ... ;s,:"J: .,1h;.:l~:-.s, the United ·~fations and the United Nations Specialized : .. :· · ·.· . ' · :--.::-~ · 'l, :'•e~: r~.dlit~es, th~h personnel d th • an ell' operation&. UC l .d.:.. . ... : . , · S 1 .. • ·· • • · . ., · , · ·-- "'·'- .. - : · ... tn· 3 l · · .. fth · .. ,· .. v t Tu'',<.;" ..., CCh.lOllw 0 ell' facilities with armed personnel t') th:.: c ;J, A c)f foe-~dvising the Ministry of Foreign Affairs and the CPA office arlvisin~ :;·"~ .. · ;,:ii-'.ry of Interior. Any extant Iraqi law <1r t~r:..;.rv::. 1: .·: 1.1.fr~.;" • ·.,··tn ~his Mern~ .. ~mdmn is hereby suspended. ,.. ~;, .. 'h' 'I ls • '· \ . .. ,, lo·~.~ W "."' I f&vt-~ This. Memorandum shall ~11 ~. ; r in• · i --.d . : , ( ,. tnc date 0r' signature. L. Paul Bremer, Adminis1:i; •• . . Coalition Provisional Aut.h( ·d r· · CP J\1 :- M ... ,"L. I u ·~ .. l(J03/0S MEMORAN'DlJI\-i NUMB.ER S IMPLEMENTATION OF WEA.PONS CONTROL ORDER NO. 3 Security personnel audio.rized by the CPA may posse" Small Anns and Defensive Weapons to provide security for the following foreign liaison missions, the United Nations. and the United Nations Specialized and Related Agencies. their facilities, their personnel and their operations: ---·- Bulf!Bria Y.c".'l'!::t Tunis ~.;;;;.;,t;1=;;;;__-....._ ___ ~..;.;.;;_.-;....;_ ______ ... _______ China ~krr.~~c Turkey i--------.,..-----r--------·· ---·· --------i C2"A'Ch Reoublic 1'J~~b,~:'l:'l;;i:i;; UAE ~=.;:;..;:=-::.;;:;.ii:;.:;;;;.;::;:.;:;. __ ~--f-..:;.__;~~~~---~~----~-~~~~~--i De:omarlc • Pnlr.::~'.ne United Kin2dom. .... s.;;;;~2VD ........... 't _______ ...,._~~;~Jr~;1'.'!"... -· __ _ __ ... __ . rnited States France -:i :-i •~.--: c! ,___ _________ .. .. ····· ---·· -- ··---- --·------1 Germany i :•,.1 ':lania l ,_Grecce_,_ _ __...__ _____ -r.Lfi_~-~i:·;~~-· · ....... :-:=·· ... . '.. United Nations India !ki·ti:~1/Mont~negro (United Nations ! ! Specialized and Related ..._ ________ _...i ____ ... -·----······ ... _. _____ _j __ Agenc.;...i .... e .... s ---~------' Security personnel of additicr-~ ~;'.:'-:;.ons may be authori zec to possesses Small Arms and Defensive Weapow: ~-Y ·~::- r'PA oftice advisin@ the Mini<itty of Interior from time to time. United Nations Specializeci r ..... <i i< P:iat·:ci 1\.gencies ER: 1. Food and Agricultural Organfa·ation ofilie "JnitedNaf.ons (PAO) 2. The In1ctDational Bank :fo: :;- t.'. ·:.:~·:.di ~r. and Dl!vek;~ ~·.:~l!r:.~ (IBRD) and its affiliates, the International D,!\i;;; .. ,m • .;;,1t ;~;,. . .;.:,~ iJ.\JoH :)DA) and the fnu,'l'D8tional Finance Corporation (IFC) 3. International Civil Avia-:L.:;:~ .• :~;; .. ~ ':-:-.;.:'..~-,:~ ~~:Ae) 4. T~--..:onal 'Cl..-:.a ~or 1-.,. ·: •. ~ · , • i· · • ·~~" ' • •· --1 • .... , ., ·'IF.PD} J.ll~ .("UIJU I.• - C' ~ ......... _ .. , • "'"·""' .............. ' s. International Labour Org,•J' l • • I l,' , t'' Jj 6. Intema!ional Maritime 0: ·.:: _, -. .... ~. i . .i!.10) 7. .International Monetm:y F;, r U\. \ .. :I~. J 8. International Organ.izatio11 fr,r ~·ft:3Tation (lOM) 9. Intema!ional Telecommu11:-.;m~..:·n ,J.1 . ..:·: ,l'.'U) 10. United Nations Educatfan.' ~-. •• e:.:i.;i: m~d Culnm1l Organization (UNESCO) 11. United Nab.ODS lndustr!~1 ,-, ':· · · · ~ ·; : ... : : · ~ ~:u utio::. (UNIDO} 12. Universal Posial Union:~~.,·'-,: 13. World Health Organ.it.a~ i •.· 14. World Intellectual Pror~. e ·:···· :~~·-<0:1 {'J/TPO) 1 S. World Food Program (WFr>' 16. World Meteorological 0 ·:;-- i: ,. · · ·-7 '" "'\~ ,. ·' .. COALITION PROVJSIO~A L .\L.: ~'HORrTV i\fE)10RANDUM l\ -Ul\'IBE. R 7 DEL EGA fl.OJ'\ \ > f ~ I. T HORITY UNDER DE-BAATHIFICA TlO/\ ORDER NO. l (CP:\rORHtl 6 ~ :la y 2003/0l) Pursuant to my authority as Ad lllin,s :rm~1 <.'f hl~ l..'oalition Pi·ovjsional Authority (CPA), and under the Jaws and usages of war, ar~i c ·) r. ~i -: 1cnl '' i:h relevanl U.N. Security Council resolutions, including Resolution 1483 (2003 ), Recognizing that the Iraqi peopk 11.!'· - .;:! ··; t.: ~<i .n r&e !-'.:Jh.: l1 u .. 1an rit;,ht:> abuses and dep.ravations over many years Jt :h· :: 11.:.nd! of '. h.- ! Baarh P~lrty. Noting the grave concern of li:.iq. s0c1ct.:-:·.:pr~.fot.:i fr..: .kl'at posed by the continuation of Baath Party participation in e h:;: ll1..!J.;~ "'-'.:.,1.·, :.1u_..:!116 iu particular the education system, Observing that under lhe prior r..; giu;- :.:01•11! lr:.1q;.i m::J_y bl\ c bc:ccme afiiliati.:d with the Baath Party for · reasons not·prim..: ui1 ~ 1 e b!1;~ 11) tht>ir ideologica' heliefs, Recognizin. g that organizing an ... ~- ' j.) ~ ~:. !' 1 6 .: __ • ~-....c .:u 1:i.::di,;1. 1 s !In ,wg~n~ wsk that is necessary to put Iraq on the pa~ 1 : :r. ' , ... J_ ~ L·<.. :. · .} :·..; r:· ~ (•m o ad rcnc:w nl. Achiowledging that the Govern:ub : u..; .. c.i •. · • .:.s. ..;,·, •i.1.:J.:. .i Ht;i• \.. r N.itional De- Bnathification Com.mission in i.: t..:c ; .., ~ .h1~ •• .: .t~~ =~..: ;.;.; 11·t:, 'it.able environment that Y»ill sustain freedom and democrar.y for 1!.c l.r·:~i :><:cp!c. Recalling the steps already take .• .;.. :.. F ..... C· rd<... .:drn:..~r : , !Je-D:1athiftcat:on of Iraqi Society (CPA/ORD/16 May 20' , • 3 ~- } , ~ l hereby promul. gat.e the foltov. i . l~· ~ccrion .t ''•t' ~.~ h:h t l;. 1· .. J:.! I\: .-i .. y 1) The Governing Council i~ ~i.!: :'.Jy < .q:. ·; 1 ' ;..:~: ·t\:> ca _ ·ry out the de-Baathification of lraqi society consistent \V1tb L' P.~ Oc~cr ~"-<l. l , Dc-Baalhi.ficalion of tnqi Society (CPA/ORD/16 May 200_, ~ . ·> · ,·,, :· •• t.: ..:.,'t. .. l cv.!>.stct.i -,•:: ~ h CPA Order No. I (CP A/ORD/16 May 200.:. :.> t ;, l).;;; J:>.011; l aud 2 l>f th.: .-Iigher NatioJ1al Dc- Baathi.fication Commission, rnaclt'. <'n f;•'Nernber 14, 21if13. are hert!by ratified. Notwithstanding such r:u _ .... . -"- ~ .J1 .. t..1, ~'-•t<>u t;-:k:.;11 b) th~ A,iministrntor pursuant to Section 1(6) of CPA l.1'. , ' .: ! "v 1 \~', :\ 1 .• i-:.l.1.'h, 1 \1<ly ::?OCYOl . 1 shall remain in ~; - ·-·- .. .. ~ .. -.:. ,,. _ ..... _ .... _. -·h .......... 1..-.a. - ... t{, effect unless and until te1, !11 ::!'..~.: .:i.·, :-: ~ ... h:-o:;-._.1s·:e ba~;is 1:.y the Higher National De-Baathification Comn; i.,s. ~;: i. 2) The Governing Council 1~ .:' u1·; :er ; .• ilt<im:i..: J to s:;,z;c .md manage property and assets of the Baath Party ~·. t ·: ,,:··: ~ 1 ... ,. C "..~. ~k.h!,· ·:,J, 4, ;\fanagr.rnent of Property and Assets oft11t. ~ hni f-!, .. t·1 ?:.tr·~· . \fay 25, 2003. The Governing Council shall consult wiH ~ :L .•. '. ... :1·1 .,· ,,,_.(:11...r;-i11~~ pro..:tdures to ensure that such property is seized and man~~"'-.1 ·1it1t!'-~ .. n'1.:udkious·.y. The authority delegated under Se1:i ;rn· , ~ ' :· t•, ·:. '11 :·rm .., randur1 shall be suh_iect Lo the fomlowing ~~and CQndirions: 1) The Governing Council may t".1· ... • ~; ·L"): •• ': '; \I·~- : : ."~ 1 .:irit; cDnforred undec Section 1 of this Memorandum to th~;. :;i· ·:r :' :.~ ·~i'! ! [).:. < 3:t: . iU:: ii~ation Commission or other organization established by ·r h~ C· 1vc:·qu> :~ ·~ ';::.11nc:il 2) To the extent practicable, fa .. : : ~ ·: '. : :;.~. :!· :b.'-:~ .!~ . <!~; ... rding -.m rraqi cit1 L en 's affiliation with the Baath Party, or inVL» \1.:: • • un1 w Hh tt1e Sp~c i a l Security, National Security, Special Protection for the p,., .. ii :: : -.::~ .. ! 1. :: :-::' ':H·:::igem ~ ' fe<la'iyeer Saddam, General Security or Mukh1 1ba·: . . "1tr:.U ii.- 'ilZ :I::; t tl 1•::! g. 0 v~r.1 0rate (o,· equivalent) level of government or bek•-.'•. L;, .. ,l,. , v ; ~· '..-1 3 .;.:-u :: ~: •~cl on d 1e bas~:> of rheir ability to analyze information objectit ,., \ .. :i:: . : '" ·; _ ::i .: :i:. : .; ud.ic i ,)Uo dete.rminations. These factual determinations shc::J .: :: ;;_ :,;; •. 1 :;· -.;·:.~! =~·- • -·~fa F,Jidcs ~ md procedures to be established by the Goverr. .. n1 ·· .. •c. ;: ... ".i:.+· . ;~ ,,.:--~ : c :~~ion tl1rot1g:- ,o\1t Iraq. 3) The Governing Council, in 1~c .1~-i r ~ r· · · • ., !J'i-t~· :- ('onc: e:med Minister or equivalent official, may ~tablish > i;--'- : :_ .:;· ~: • . i.: ..... .:..1i·~ · ;i;o :~ ~.u:-.;:s fer ap?lication to particular professions or gr·::1.r:: ..> r' i·,-.d!··i~:..:a · ~ - :~u ch ;: >ro .. )tt.:dure.s may concern the process of making fa.en. · · .. . ~·= _ ::: :.1 .'!. ..: •• : :! ~~ .:ot.sequl:!·1ces of such determinari. ons. Consisten". '-'-'-i: .• t ,?,. ·;.-··~ ~.::-:.~ ! ·b,: <... ,,7-ning C\1:.:nc:, :>hall authorize the continued employmeut t..i u.r::..: :•: : .·;;~·:.:;/ ,b;.::b<..rged Jr3qi dd servants who were: a) held as a POW .J, L . 1, 2003; b) released and rcp,H. , ..... : ....... .. :·-! ··· · .. ~.~1.:111~er 4, ! 930 through June 2 c) granted 'Udw Fin1 .. , __ :... ' :1..1'.vi 16 r.: . .; GT rer release and repatriation to Iraq and because ( ... . . . ~I ! : .• _ " !~ r >l".J.~r POW. An Iraqi civil servant's cl:,_, . • '.~l.: ;:~:, i·: :·.•. ytii.:I! D :: 1~ dc-Banfl1ification policy under this provision may be ,, ' · i; " ; ' .1i-'ia: : ,_., u in~ntutbn i!;sued by the International Committee ol . .. , ::i·. !r r; ~' ~:end..::nt o r :~anization or government organization. !. · :i ••• Z:! [·.·....: :ud1if:~cliLm Commission determines that credible in ! ~ .~ ~ ' ~ i.' ~: ;!r, · 1qi civil sen·ant who seeks or has been granted an ex--=\~,. · . . .. t- . • .: ........ ~·•-~,,n -:.r rn1thv1 ity ""JS promoted to the rank of 'Udw Firqah' !:~ , . ,! • .! .. i:1 :-.c . ..>tatus as a fonncr POW, or that bis or her involvemt:t:, . n a: • ..: 3:.. .l;; I :t:: > .v-us · ;· : ~<.1.11pa t iblc with continued service as a civil servant, t!.'. T~ n~ ·.h... ! .... : : -·1aa• . J ficatio.n Coinrn.ission may deny or at any · time rescind ~:; . . . i ... ,.: . . ~ ... ! : •• , idt .. i 4) Any Iraqi citizen who is di:..i-.i-· . of the· exercise of the authc i .~ .. _,1 • .. . ... -\.,,. a) advance written notificz.~ . _ .· .. _ ... i· ·- procedures for appeah1~ 2 .... . . .! • ~..1., -·~ ., <~ : ... •• :.~ fL li~.:ni .. .;al .. ::i.<l the b) a reasonable op-ponuni':; ,v ::;:..r'_,11~. ~ •• 1 ..... ·-~ 111.;:.,;oh in ,;.r:~i~1g ur in person and present evidence; an.d c) a reasonable opporrunhy . .,., .c.::·t in person, to a fair a. nd ' .-.... . . ! : organization that renc ec; . ...... .~ writt.en decision in the c;:., ~. •"II :.;\', i.,i,.ll.v ct1l}' 111.l .~fS·! de\:l5lu1l. in Writing or ...... ~~:t .. ;, .~ '-'~ : .. \! iHJividJ4.. l tJ . . • • •• " ~ • ..::. iauC. 1 p. 0nipll} tender a 5) In any case in which a di~ r: • ..... .• , . ;""'-.~ u·::-. iu 1'• 1..:c...1;i:;:<l) Lhc dismissed employee shall have the ri[.;.. '" .. !·"··" ... :. (.,;\a; •• uJ :&1..: ;n,u:er hy the Higher National De-Baatbificatim. '- .::1.i~i..~.· .: 1. '• :.. i .... ~.orui .. ~ .. ~. :nal!-: ~ !-.U1!.>iisl:·!d by the Higher National De-Baach1 I .; __ ,; ~ . '· "1 , , 7 • .,,... •: .. • 11 .. ~ i ' •~tpo:;e. 6) lf an appeal result.5 in an ~ n 1 ! . J pay from the date of dism i :>: : ··~ 1;. 7) following consultation wii:·, !'·c · .n· ... 1 · , • • ··m .. :. ,;ic .--\..tmrnw :ator may reinstate an employee if he conclu de ~ . ., 1.. . • ,1. ..; , ;_ .' ,;. ! i1 ci· -'.ii i'>cop.-.. M that failing to reins· tate the employee ..>- •• , • 1 _ • .... :. • 1:·11 ; !. ~!r. 8) The Governing Council si.:t,! .:.. .... J .. ~· exercising the authority cvr. significantly affect the nano · . .... ! ·- , , -1 :1.g-ct 1.: • 1 ·H.1. •1. t..-.; :\ • ..i.J.~~~: .>fF.1u'i!1.:::: l:.cfore :T :.~ : .... ~il. :1 u1 .. l rna nuer tl1at wHI .. . : 3 . ..... .~ · ~ .. ... k ~ .. . , '· ~I ·i :;1· ~~ .. . . '\i -~1 9) The Governing Council 51 respect to the use of de-B.1 1 ,•,.- • • :·:· ··:~ 1.1 :m·.· ;ue-a identified by the AdmiDistrator where the .• ·. :1 ·1 .• • ;1. · i~.nt.ot, ~ ) .-h i s ~ks i gnee~ with •1· ..• ·~• v-. r~.111 ~1 . iL· ..: n:. .i.ffected by the procedures may raise si;, . · · 10) The Higher National De· . ~: · to the Administrator of1 h ~ which the authority delega . the names and positiom oi . :• · · • i , as a result of this deJegatfo ' ,., • . 1 '1! ·• dismissed employee. . • .1. ~ •: ··n s i::1tl provide :noathly reports • •, _ .,.,, ::, • ,011 .,_.il r:lescribing tile manner in " '\ ":".;~:.'!. S.ui:h rcpon; :;hall iaclude • i·' ·1; • ·F-'tl frc • . .., ~position Ctf employment · ·· · ~'"ll11 :it1n1•s hir..:~ci t() replnce o . . • • • t :.:; •• CPA Order Nu. mber 5, E::. · (CPA/ORD/25 Moy 200.; . · 'i .. •' emora~ · m shal: .:· . 1 v-{. ; Brem , Administr • r Coalition Provisional Au: . ~ ·~· • >~ . . -~ ~ ·~ .. . ..... . . t-; t .-:.. .J - c. ... .. l . - ,! '· .. ,/ fM e ,,, • ,,... _ _ _ "!"" _ _ . .., __ .. ~--- ....... --,-·----- ........ ; ._, COALITION PROVISIONAL AUTHORITY ORDER NUMBER 17 STATUS OF Tll£ COALITION. FOREIGN LIAISON MISSIONS, TIIEDl PERSONNEL AND CONTRACTORS Pursuant to my authority as head of the Coalition Provisional Authority (CPA), and under the laws and usages of war, and consistent with relevant U.N. Security Council resolutions, including Resolution 1483 (2003), Recalling that under international law occupying powers, including their forces, penoooel, property and equipment, funds and assets, are not subjece to the Jaws or jwisdiction of the occupied territory, Con.sciow that states arc contributing personnel, equipment and other resources to the Coalition in order to contribute to the security and stability that will enable the relief, ~overy and development of Iraq, Notmg that states arc sending Foreign Liaison Mission Personnel to Iraq, Co11.1ciow of the need to establish and confirm the status of such eo.Jition and Foreign Liaison Mi!3ion Pe~) in respect of the CPA and the local courts. I hereby promulgate the following; 1) 2) 3) 4) S) Section I Defiaitions "Coalition Pcrsooael" means all non-Iraqi military and civilian penonnel usigned to or under the command of the Commander, Coalition F~cs, or Ill forces employed by a Co&Jition State in.eluding attached civilians, as well as all non-Iraqi mUitary and civilian personnel assigned to, or under the direction or control of the Adminbtrator of the CPA. "Foreign Liaison Mission Personnel" means those individuall wno have been issued Foreign Liaison Mission personnel identification cards by the lraqi MinistJ)' or Foreign Affairs under the supervision of the CPA .. Legal Process" means any &JTCst, detention or Jega.I proceedings in the Iraqi couru or other Iraqi bodies. whether~ civil. administrative or other in nature. .. Parent State" mcaoa the state providing Coalition Personnel as pert of the Coalition in Iraq or dlc state providing FoRign Liaison Mission Personnel. '"Coalition contractors" m.eam non-Iraqi business entities or individuals not normally resident in Iraq supplying goods aad/or services tD oroo behaJ( of the Coalition Forces or the CPA under contractuaJ ammgemeots. CP AJORD/26 Jane 2003/17 6) 2) 3) 4} 5) "Coalition sub-i}ontractors" means non-Iraqi business entities or individuals not normally resident in Iraq supplying goods and/or services to or on behalf of Coalition contractors and in respect of Coalition or CPA activities under contractual arrangements Section 2 Coalition and Foreign Liaison Musion Personnel ) CPA, Coalition Forces and Foreign Liaison Mission. their property, funds and assets of shall be immune from Iraqi Legal Process. All Coalition personnel and Foreign Liaison Mission personneJ shall respect the Iraqi laws applicable to those Coalition personnel and Foreign Liaison Mission personnel in the territory of Iraq and the Regulations, Ordersf Memoranda and Publi<: Notices issued by the Administrator of the CPA. Foreign Liaison Mission personnel shall be immune from Legal Process. All Coalition personnel sha.11 be subject to the exclusive jurisdiction of their Pa.rent States and, they sha.11 be immune from local criminal, civil, and administrative jurisdiction and from any form of aJTCst or detention other than by persons acting on behalf of their Parent St.ates, except that nothing in this provision shall prevent Coalition Forces personnel from preventing acts of serious misconduct by Coalition personnel. or otherwise temporarily detaining Coalition persoilllel who pose a risk of injury to themselves or othen, pending expeditious turnover to the appropriate authorities of the Parent State. In all such circumstances the national contingent commander of the detained person shall be notified immediately. In respect of those Coalition personnel who commit an act or acts in Iraq for which there are no criminal sanctions in the Parent State, the CPA may request from the Parent State waiver of jurisdiction to try such act or acts under Iraqi law. In such cases, no Legal Process shall be commenced without the written permission of the Administrator of the CPA. 1) 2) Section3 Contractors Coalition contractors and their sub-<:ontractors as well as their employees not normally resident in Iraq, shalt not be subject to Iraqi laws or regulations in matters relating to the terms and conditions of their contracts in relation to the Coalition Forces or 1he CPA. Coalition contractors and sub-contractors other than contractx:>rs and su~nt:ractors normally resident in Iraq shall not be subject to Iraqi laws or regulations with respect to licensing and :registration of employees, businesses and corporations in relation to such contracts. Coalition contractors and their sub-i}ontractors as well as their employees not normally resident in Iraq, shall be immune from Iraqi Legal Process with respect to acts performed by them within their official activities pursuant to lhc terms and conditions of a contract between a contractor and Coalition Forces or die CPA and any sub-<:ontract thereto. CPA/ORD/26 June 2003/17 3) 1) 2) 3) l) In respect of acts or omissions of C<lalition contractors and suh-c:ontractors as well as their employees not normaJly resident in Iraq, which arc not perfonned by them in the course of their official activities pursuant to the terms and conditions of a contract between them and the Coalition or the CPA, no Ira.qi or CPA Legal Process shall be commenced without the written permission of the Administrator of the CPA. s~tion 4 Duration of Immunity Fn>m Legal Process The immunity from Legal Process provided by the present Order to Coalition personnel and Foreign Liaison Mission personnel as well as Coalition contractors, sub-contractors and their employees not normally resident in Iraq operates only in respect to acts or omissions by them during the period of authority of the CPA. Section 5 Waiver of Legal Immunity and Jurisdiction The immunity from Legal Process of Coalition personnel, Foreign Liaison Mission personnel, Coalition contractors and their sub-contractoa as well as their employees not nonnally resident in Imq is not for the benefit of the individuals concerned and may be waived by the Parent State. Requests to waive jurisdiction over Coalition personnel or Foreign Liaison Mission personnel shall be referred to the respective Parent State. Requests to waive the immunities with respect 'to Coalition contractors and sub- contractors and their employees not nonnally resident in Iraq as set forth in Section 3 of this Order shall be referred to the respective Parent Stare with which the contractor has contracted. Section6 Claim• Tiiird party claims including those for property loss or damage and for personal injury, illness or death or in respect of any other matter arising from or attributed to Coalition personnel or any persons employed by them, whether nonnalJy resident in Iraq or not and that do not arise in connection with military combat operations, shall be submitted and dealt with by the Parent State whose Coalition personnel, property, activities or other assets are alleged to have caused the claimed damage. in a manner consistent with lhe national laws of the Parent State. CP AJORD/26 June 2003/17 2) 'Third party claims for property loss or damage and for personal injmy, illness or death. or in respect of any other matter arising from or attributed to Foreign Liaison Mission personnel shall be submitted and dealt with. by the Parent S1Bte whose Foreign Liaison Mission persormel, property, activities or other assets are alleged to have caused the claimed damage, in a manner consistent with the national laws of the Parent State. Section 7 Entry Into Fon:e This Order shall enter into force on the date of signature. w.\. \~~ '(-z~") L Paul Bremer, Administrator Coalition Provisional Authority CPA/ORD/26 June 2003/17 ;. ; ~. -=.......;~·~ - ~ ·~· r ~•~.-w ...... ...-.i .... •n--=ra•c:emznmm~n~=s=;y;;r:.c~gq;~&MtN~~nas;~s~:a::m .. mr: .. n•ar.im .. zv~ ~~w~'~' a#fE •~BE1E!':Z~~ ·~·--~~~...! .. . . : . ' .... . . ....:. . •, .. " . . ..- '" ,. . •.: ... ·:,. .;. ~ . .. .. - ' •' .. . .;_ .... :,.. .! ;r •• - • ,! ........ .. .. .. . · .... ' ' : .. ; . • • ... II - I, .1 • :0"' ,·'-:- I • .. . ~. . . " . ~ ; "": .. "' . ~ ( ' . ,~ ,.. .; ;i· ... .·. :.: ,• ~ . .. :~:· . .... . , . -"':• , . .. ! ., ., . . , .... I .. '• . ' .. .. . . . . ., ' . . " ... - ... : ,:r • t . - . . . . ·, • ' 1 11 , : roemben of the lnqi Civil Defense Corps and shall have the authority to dismiss such members on such grounds as he determines to be appropriate. S) The terms and conditions of service and otganizatioo.. including rank structure, of the Iraqi Civil Defense Corps may be further defined by Administrative Instructions, isaued by the Administrator of the CPA or a desi111ee, as may be considered necessary to give effect to the terms ofthia Order. 6) Members of the Iraqi Civil Defense Corps may not; . !t. • .. · .. • - .. ,. LI. (a) be members of 1 political party, organization or asaociation; (b) participate in any activitjes of a political party, organization or association or rccnrit members for political parties or organizatiom; • (c) publicly st.ate any opinion of a political nature thal constitutes an etrort to indoctrinate members of the Iraqi Civil Defenae Corps or any other person with a political ideology or otherwise convince any person to adhere to a particular political ideology, { d) advocate racial, gender or ethnic hatred or intolerance; advocate, create, or engage in illegal discrimination based oo race. color, gender, religi~ or regional origin; or use> or advocate the use of; force or violence or other unlawful means for political purposes. whether internal or i.nlemational; or . i.. ' . -~J~' (e) participate in any manner in organizatiom or activities that involve~ · promote, or practice the conduct descnDed in Section 2(6)(c) and {d). ,... Nothing in this Section shall limit the right of a member of the Iraqi Civil Defense Corps to vote in elections for political office organized on a I~ regional or national level. Violations may result in the removal of the member from employment in the .haqi Civil Defense Corps . • I !. Sectioa 3 .: · Authority or the Iraqi Civil Ddeue Corps •. 1) Member9 of the Iraqi Civil Defense Coips may, while performing their official dutiee, apprehend persom who (i) they witness committing or attempting to commit a criminal o~ (ii) have escaped after bein1 lawfully a:rTCSted, or {iii) otherwise interfere with their lawful activities. Pcrsoos ipptehended by the Iraqi Civil Defense Corps must be turned over to the Iraqi police or Coelitioo Fmces within twelve hours of apprehension or be released. Members of the Iraqi Civil Defense Corps may not interrogate, except under the direct t ., ."··· ,. CP A/ORD/3 September 2003/28 3 . . , .. , •. .. .. 'I -· n - .. .. 1.. ,t~ ...... .. , " . ~ . - ,, .. :-.... ... ... '" .. ;:· . , .. . • , . ' I i I I · .. I : I ! . I ~~ ., . . • ! . • • o I ·' . . ,. supervision of Coalition Forces, or otherwise detain penona except u provided herein. ~ :.-.; .. ; 2) When actioa under the supervision' of Coalition Forces_ the lnqi Civil Defense v, ·: ; : Corpe may limit accea to certain area aa reasonably nec:"llary co euun; 1he • security of penou or popeaty coo&ai.ned in or pwina through IUCh areu. - 3) Members of the lnqi Civil Defemc Corpe may, while porformma their official dutiea, conduct reuonablc sc:arcbea for weapons or otbet- danproua or prolul>itl!d itam (i) on persons or vehicles enterins or in demptcd area, (ii) on crimiu1 1ulp0Ctl incident to apprehension, or (iii) when 8ID1i.Ds under' the supervisi~ of Coalition Forces, in areas or buildings w.~ dan~ . or · prohl'bited itcm1. incl•a .ProJul>ited ·weapon.I, anJ ~Y beli8ved to exist. Members of the Iraqi Civil Defense Corps may cxm4uct reatoaable - searches at establilhrxl cbeclcpoims anywhere witbia ln!q md llt other locatiom to prevent IUCh itmm fiom being canied into, transported within, or out of designated area. . . · . , 4) Members of the lmqi Civil Defeme COJP9 may, while perfonnina official • duties. \ISC force against· pcraona or thinp as ia reuonabk IDd DCCalSmJ.under the ~tan~ However. ~ uae of force that may be likely to e11.-e deada oi serioua bodily UUUIY ~ not Permitted unless the men(ber IMIOOably believes that Uling 111cb f~ ia nCce&sary to: (i) procect birmelf or others ii'om the. · ~l 111e ot dcadJ:y fon:c or force likely to cause serioul bodily injury, (i.J) prevent the eecapo oC a p:rBOD suspected of cai:lluitting nwdar or wau1t 0 1"CIUlting in terioaa bodily Uijury, or (iii) dofend CoUidon, miDimy or govemorai.:t offica, aoveiument or st=.owncd ~ and fixed sitee under the dlrecltion met control of Coalition or governmcmtal au~ to prevent their de81r\Jctioo 0r incapacitation • , " . ' Secdoa-4 Fuadl9Dlng of tile Iraqi ClvU °"6te Corp1 t) The lmqi Civil Defeme Corpa shall operate under the authority of the Administmor of tho CPA and shall be subject to the supervision of Coalition Fon:a. Tho Administrator of the CPA may dolep&c Co tbs SCDior militmy . eommancb of Coalitioa Forces in Inq respon111>ility and authority Cm the mcruitin& training. cqenizatioo, and control of the lnqi Civil Dehllo Corpe. Thia 1aponnl>ility and IU'diority may be rcdelepted punuut to Soctioo 7 below .. I • I r • # • :.. 2) ~onal or tacticaJ command of uniu of the Iraqi Civil Defense Corps ... '~ operating with Coelitioo Forces shall be vested in an officer of Coalition , J I .-. I I ' j ~ i d ,. I• 4 ·. .... I I - ~· ' i l . .:. ~'.; : ~ . .: . · .. • v, Forces designated by the senior military comm.Dder of Coalition Forces in Iraq pursuant to Section 7 below. -.. -·- 3) The Iraqi Civil Defense. Corps will not be deployed outside the tenitory of Iraq, except for training or exchange programs. • \o ,. '.~. :'..i., :,: .. : ~1; . ' " J:.i:i:. ; ~ .. _(•: . . 1) Members of the lnJqi Civ.il Defense Corps will be s. ubject to Iraqi law at all times and the civilian criminal courts of Iraq shall have jurlsdiction over off~cs alleged to ~,ve ~P: committed by members of the Iraqi Civil . . Defense Corp5,'.1 ~ AdminiStrator of the CPA may detennine that offenses .. ~;:~ alleged. ~ Qitve been,, QO~tte<\ by ir-~mbers of. the Iraqi Civil Defense Corps ·.~· {': while on duty may be submitted to the Central Criminal Court of Iraq in . .. · ~, ,:~ accordance with CPA , order Nu.mber 13 (Revised), The Central Criminal <;.ourt .. r',;.: of Iraq (CP A/ORD/13 July 2003/13). ·., · · ., .. ·'· ., ... •• •_,1. ... .. · .. "' 2) Members of tbc Iraqi Cml Defense Corps shall enjoy immunity from ·civil liability fol' acts or omissions arising within the scope of their duties and in the conduct of authorized ~ons to the · same degree as other govemmentaJ officials under the law of Iraq. - ~. ' •.. "" •• ~· .. • .-;<.:.. ' •' •"• ,."" h~I ; ... ,, · ···-~: · : Section 6 .• ... :;:{:..:~ .. "\ ;,' rf,,,;_ • ·: ,;._ I•."" . V.' I ;,,~-~~ ... :~~_. .. :Weapons :~·-::;_ , ' Y· · 1 • . h \· : !·~ .. . . The possession of weapotiS by members of th. e Iraqi CiviJ Defense Corps .is regulated by CPA Order Number~. Weapons Control Order (CPAIORD/23 May 2003/03). ;:·~;-~:.·~::. ;·:•· ·· .. .4'. ... •• '· ·• ~:: :::· ,.· • ·.:: ~ .. :-c7. ·~1 .:._.~~"~'r.'"'. "1 ~ ,': :'.~1 -; • '( Section. 7 · ·f ·:';!11l'4 :'·:, .:\ ~. ~-~ • '! •• - '-i:<-". ·. • ~ ·: Deletatton of Authority "· u •. .. •.. :~·, ·t· ·-.. ~ ~,r. 1 ::-:·~ The Adrninisb-ator of the Coalition ProvisionAl Authority may delegate · responsibilities under this ~, as determined by the Administrator, to the · ·: '" senior military cotDmander of Coalition Forces in Iraq. The senior military commander of Coalition Forces in Iraq may further delegate responsibilities . under this Order to tbOse under 'his command ..... 'I , ., .... •· • ••• ' - .. ' l ·- .. .'~ ~. ,;: ~:~\ /;~~~ :::~{ . . " . '• . '• . . . ~~; . , )'.: ... ~~ :-~~', Cl'A/ORD/3 September 2003128 s .• I I I • I ·i { ! l I ~· . ·1· · I• ! 'f I l· ··i . j ·I I • •f 'I ~ " ! :i ., r I I" ... . $ .• :. .... ·' ... ·"~·· '· ~. ·.~ . .. . ~ :h~r:-::~· .~ :.~ ":/ v-.f ~.:.. ... ,.~· ~ ~ ... "'."! .. ~· . -,..: .. ·:~".)".:'~ _. . :~ "' .~ " ' ... i '· ,I . ' "· - ··~ ·.: .~ .:;.· ''- "· ~··. ·" ~=:~;. · . '. . ·~ .. ,· I. ... ,.:- ....... . ( ! .. .. ; .~ .. ... ~:, : ~·. t{ ·~·· 1~ ' ?~ .. : \ :~ .f • .. :~. 'i\ . "'~ ~ ;:· ,' ... ~·· '.! .. .. .: ·~1~~: :,...~ ... :~~":, ... ..... 6 !S· ).': .. .... COALmON PROVISIONAL AUI".HORITY ORDER NUMBER 42 CREATION OF THE DEFENSE SUPPORT AGENCY Punvantm my authority u Administrator of the Coalition Provisional Authority (CPA), and under the lawa and usages of war, and consistent with relevant U.N. Security Council resolutions, including Resolution 148~ (2003), Recalling that U.N. Resolution 1483 {2003) celled upon the CPA to promote the wclfan: of the Iraqi people through the effective adminis1ration of Che territory, including in particular woddng towards the restoration of conditions of security and stability. Furtller Recalling that CPA Order Number 22 established a New Iraqi Army as the first step towards the creation of the national defense force which is essential to the security and stability of Iraq. Acknowledging that effective, centralfa:cd administrative and logistical support are vital to the success of the New Iraqi Army, I hereby promulgate the following: Sectlon l :Establbhment 1) This Order establishes the Dcfeasc Support Agency (DSA) u a civilian agency chmged with the administrative and logistical support of the New Iraqi Anny. 2) The DSA shall operate under the authority, direction and ccmtJOl of the CPA. 3) Tbc DSA shaJl operate pursuant to this order unless or until it is dissolved by the Administrator of the CPA {''the Administrator') or the internationally recognized, ~tative government established by the people of l:raq. Secdon 2 Duties I) The DSA shall be respon.n'ble for the following functions in support of the New Iraqi Army. a) Finance and accounting, including payroll, disbursements, and accounting for expenditures by the New Ira.qi Anny; b) Persoonel management; c) Training support; d) Recruitment; e) Procurement; f) Logistics support, including maintenance, supply, and transportation; g) Medical support; h) Legal affairs; i) Real p1operty management, including construction and repair of New Iraqi Army buildings and oversight of the management of military bases by their commanders; and - j) other duties in support of the New Iraqi Army as determined by the Administrator. 2) The DSA shall not eXercise any command authority or staff function over New Iraqi Anny military units, or be responsible for setting sceurity policy. Nor shall the DSA be resporunole for determining the requirements of the New Iraqi Army. 3) The DSA shall submit a quarterly report to the Governing Council detailing its prior quarter activities and plans for the following quarter. Section 3 __ .... _ ... ·-· .. ··--··-·--·-----·---~ Structure ___ .. - - ..... ,,/ __ . 1) The Administrator shall appoint a o· tor-General of the DSA. Until such appointment has been made, the A Director of Security Affaits (National Security anq Defense) shall serve.as · Director-General. ~.DifC'Ctor-General shall rePOrt di.rcctly to the A • • _ .. 2) The t>SA shall initially cons' ofsix·Dep~ents: a) Financial Management; b) Personnc:l Management, Recruiting, and Training; c) Procurement and Logistics Support; d) Real Property Management; CPA/ORD/19 SEP 2003/42 2 l e) Legal Aff.airs; and f) Medical Support. 3) The Director-General, with the approval of the Administrator or his designee, sball appoint the DUector of each Department. 4) The Director-General may establish, reorganize, or eliminate Departments by Administrative Instruction. Likewise, the Director-GencraJ may apportion, re- apportion or remove Department responsibilities by Administtative Instruction. Any such Administrative Instructions shall require the approval of the Administrator or his designee. S) Defense Support Agf:rlcy personnel shall be civilians and may include funner military personnel and civilian state employees. No person who was a full member of the Baath Party holding the rank of 'Udw Qutriyya (Regional Command Member), 'Udw Far' (Branch Member), 'Udw Shu 'bah (Section Member), or 'Udw Firqah (Group Member) shall be eligible for employment in the DSA except with specific permission of the Administrator. 6) Salaries of DSA pcnsoimel will conform to the salary structure applicable to Iraqi government employees. Section 4 Administrative lustrocdons The Dil:ectcr-Oeneral may issue Administrative Instructions, not inconsistmit with I.raqi law or any CPA Order, Regulation, or Memorandum, as necessary to cany out the duties described under this Order. Secdon S Entry into Force This 'order shall enter into force on the date of signature. ii~~~~ Coalition Provisional Authority CPAIORD/19 SEP 2003142 3 COALITION PROVISIONAL AUTHORITY BAGHDAD FOR: fROM: SCIJJECT THE IRAQI GOVER:'XIN<.r COUNCIL THE ADMll\ISTRAT0~1\~<>1. ~otification of Intent to Prumulgah: On.for Regan.ling Local Govcmmemal Powers l'lca~c tind attached 1hc iinal version of a J)roposcd CPA Order regarding local govcmmi!nl a~lthorilies, which l plan 10 sign into law on April 5. The onkr clarifies the authoritil!s and responsibilities or local govcmm~nt organi;rations and officials. The issuance of l his order concludes ;:m extensive consultation procc::.s with uur gov cmors. CPA Go,·eniorate l'oordinators, 1mwincinl councils. the Ministry of Interior, and rhe fJovernorales Committee of the lrnqi Governing ('ouncil. C'PA appreciates all the views expressed in this proc.css and sought lo accommodate as ninny l)fthosc <-IS Wi.;"!rc consistent wilh the principal of decentrali ?.ation, a cornerstone of the TAL. CPA recogni/es that some disagreements about the proper balance between the cemer and the govcrnorates remain. The order, however. is a temporary one thaf would remain in cllect only umil umende<l or re:;cindecl hy a sovereign Iraqi government. Thank )'l°'ll for )'Our intcrc5t in this process ~utL.I its \lllt1.:ome. COALITION PROVISIONAL AUTHORITY ORDER NUMBER XX THE IRAQI ARMED FORCES Pursuant to my authority as Administrator of the Coalition Provisional Authority (CPA). and under the laws and usages of war, and consistent with relevant U.N. Security Council resolutions, including Resolutions 1483 and 1511 (2003), Noting that Resolution 1483 appeals to Member States, among other things, to assist the people oflraq to contribute to conditions of stability and security in Iraq, Recalling that CPA Order Number 2 on the Dissolution of Entities dissolved the Army, Air Force, Navy, Air Defense Force, and other regular military services, the Republican Guard, the Special Republican Guard, the Directorate of Military Intelligence, the Al Quds Force, the Quwat al Tawair, Saddam Fedayeen, Ba1ath Party Militia, Friends of Saddam and Saddam's Lions Cubs (Ashbal Saddam) and other entities, Noting the establishment of the New Iraqi Anny (now redesignated as the Iraqi Armed Forces) under CPA Order Number 22 as the first step toward the creation of the national defense force of the new Iraq, Noting the establishment of the Iraqi Civil Defense Corps under CPA Order Number 28 as a security and emergency service agency for Iraq to complement operations conducted by Coalition military forces in Iraq to counter organized groups and individuals employing violence against the people of Iraq and their national infrastructure, Recognizing the Iraqi Counter-Terrorism Force operates as a component of the Iraqi Armed Forces to counter terrorists and individuals employing violence against the people of Iraq and their national infrastructure, Noting the establishment of the new Iraqi Ministry of Defence under CPA Order Number 67 to provide civilian control and oversight of the Iraqi Armed Forces, Further noting the adoption of the Law of Administration for the State of Iraq for the Transitional Period on March 8, 2004, Determined to bring aH Iraqi military forces under the unified command of the Iraqi Armed Forces and to provide for their legitimate use and regulation in service to the Iraqi people, I hereby promulgate the following: PART I GENERAL INFORMATION Section l Definitions 1) "Administrator" means the Administrator of the Coalition Provisional Authority and, unless otherwise indicated, the civilian head of government exercising national command authority following transfer of full governance authority to the Iraqi Interim Government. 2) "Code of Military Discipline" is the Code of Military Discipline promulgated under CPA Order Number 23. 3) "Commander in the Iraqi Anned Forces" means an Iraqi officer appointed from time to time in accordance with this Order to command positions in the Iraqi Armed Forces. 4) "Defense Areas" are defined as any land, water, or super~adjacent air space contained within the territory of Iraq. or any building or part of a building or any other building that is reserved or set apart, used or otherwise controlled for defense purposes, by designation under Part I, Section 6 of this Order. 5) "Exttemist Organizations or Activities" are organizations or activities that advocate racial, gender or ethnic hatred or intolerance; advocate, create, or engage in discrimination based on race, color, gender, religion, sect, tribal or regional origin; or use, or advocate the use of, force or violence or other unlawful means for political purposes> whether internal or international 6) "Iraqi Armed Forces" means the military forces of Iraq organized for the purposes set forth in this Order, to include the Army, Air Force, Coastal Defense Force, reserve components (when established), Iraqi Civil Defense Corps, Iraqi Counter-Terrorism Force. and associated headquarters. 7) "Member of the Iraqi Anned Forces" means a person serving in any component of the Iraqi Anned Forces from the time of attestation until the date of termination of service. 8) ''Military Offense" means an act or omission described in Section 3 of the Code of Military Discipline. 9) "Serious Offense" means a criminal offense under the criminal Jaws of Iraq or the Code of Military Discipline that authorizes, in the event of a conviction, confinement for a period in excess of three months as a punishment. Section 2 Respect for the Rights and Freedoms of the Iraqi Peop· le The I.raqi Armed Forces and its members shall at all times respect the rights and freedoms of the Iraqi people enumerated in the Law of Administration for the State of ]raq for the Transitional Period and, when adopted, those rights and freedoms set forth in the permanent Constitution of Iraq. Section 3 Civilian Control of the Iraqi Armed Force The Iraqi Armed Fornes shall at all times be subject to the control of the Administrator and civilian Minister of Defence. Section 4 Purpose and Mission of the Iraqi Armed Forces l) The purpose of the Iraqi Anned Forces is the defense of Iraq. 2) The tasks of the Iraqi Armed Forces include developing a military capability during the. period of authority of the Coalition Provisional Authority in order to provide the basis for militarily effective, professional, and non-political anned forces for the military defense of the nation after transfer of full governance authority to the Iraqi Interim Government. 3) Except as provided herein, the Iraqi Armed Forces shall not be used to perfonn domestic law enforcement functions or for any other domestic purpose. 4) The Iraqi Armed Forces shall consist of the active and reserve units; and elements thereof, to include associated headquarters. The components of the Iraqi Armed Forces and their missions are as follows: a) Army b) Air Force c) Coastal Defense Force d) Iraqi Civil Defense Corps (temporary) e) Iraqi Counter-Terrorism Force (temporary?) Section 5 Command Structure l) The Administrator is the Commander in Chief of the Iraqi Anned Forces. 2) Command positions in the Iraqi Armed Forces win be held by Iraqi officers only. 3) The Chief of Staff of the Iraqi Anned Forces shall be appointed by and report to the Minister of Defence. 4) Joint HQ? 5) The Administrator or Minister of Defence wiH designate officers to command the various components and principal units of the Iraqi Armed Forces. The specific assignments of subordinate officers shatl be made in accordance with procedures established by Administrative Instruction issued by the Minister of Defence. Section 6 Administrative Inquiries I) The Minister of Defence may, by Administrative Instruction, issue such rules made under this Section for the convening of an Administrative inquiry to investigate any matter regarding the operation of any part of the Iraqi Armed Forces. Reports of such inquiries shall establish the facts of the matter, draw conclusions, and make any recommendations as may be appropriate. 2) An Administrative Inquiry may be convened by an officer of the rank of Lieutenant Colonel or above who holds a command position with respect to any matter concerning a unit under his command and its operation or the Members of the Iraqi Armed Forces under his command, except that an Administrative Inquiry may not be convened to investigate a matter already under investigation as a criminal matter until such time as the criminal investigation is completed. In circumstances in which an Administrative Inquiry has been commenced and it discovers evidence of a Military Offense then it may refer the matter to a Disciplinary Officer in accordance with the Code of Military Discipline. Following referral of the matter to a Disciplinary Officer, the Administrative Inquiry will be completed in accordance with the rules governing such Inquiries. Section 7 Defense Areas The Administrator or the Minister of Defence may prohibit or restrict access by any person to any Defense Area and may make all appropriate provisions for the control and security of any Defense Area. In the event such prohibitions or restrictions limit access to privately-owned property. reasonable compensation shall be promptly paid to the property owner during the period of limited access. Section 8 Use of the Iraqi Armed Forces Abroad 1) The Iraqi Armed Forces shall not conduct or support military, peacekeeping, or humanitarian operations outside of lraq, or deploy in anticipation of conducting or support)ng such operations, except with the prior express approval of the Administrator or, following transfer of full sovereign authority to the Iraqi Interim Government, the approval specified in the Law of Administration for the State of Iraq for the Transitional Period or, when adopted, the permanent Constitution of Iraq. 2) Any such authorized deployment or use of the Iraqi Armed Forces shall cease, and all deployed forces shall be immediately recalled, when so demanded by two-thirds vote of the body vested with national legislative authority. 3) Nothing in this Section shaJ) limit the right of individual Members of the Iraqi Armed Forces to be sent abroad to participate in training, exercises, exchanges, visits, or similar non-operational activities. PART II TERMS AND CONDITIONS OF SERVICE Section 1 Enlistment 1) The minimum age for enlistment in the Iraqi Armed Forces is 18 years of age. 2) Citizenship requirement? 3) Service in the Iraqi Armed Forces will be voluntary and for a set term of enlistment. 4) Suitability for service in the Iraqi Armed Forces will be determined on several criteria including, but not limited to: a) demonstrated physical ability; b) demonstrated minimum scholastic aptitude; c) the absence of evidence of human rights violations or war crimes; d) the absence of affiliation with the security and political control organs of the former regime; e) the absence of association with Extremist Organizations or Activities or other groups that use or advocate the use of violence for political purposes whether internal or international; t) provided, however, no qualified person will be denied the opportunity to serve on the basis of race, color, gender, religion, sect, tribal or regional origin. 5) Prior military service is not required, but persons with military experience will be eligible to join the Iraqi Armed Forces~ subject to meeting the applicable standards,. including the criteria listed in Part II, Section 1.3 above. No person involved in Ba'ath Party activity within the leadership tiers described in CPA Order Number 1 shall be eligible except with specific permission of the Administrator. Section 2 Rank Structure I) The lraqi Armed Forces will consist of commissi-0ned officers and enlisted personnel with ranks that may include warrant officers and non~commissioned officers. 2) The ranks of officers will, in ascending order, be: Tilrneez Daabet Mulaazem Mulaazern Awwal Naqeeb Raaed Muqaddam Officer Candidate 2nd Lieutenant 1st Lieutenant Captain Major Lt. Colonel Aaaqeed Aameed Liwaa Fareeq Colonel Brigadier General Major General Lt. General 3) The Administrator or Minister of Defence may, in accordance with Administrative Instructions. by instrument in writing, commission persons to be officers of the Iraqi Anned Forces at a rank to be detennined by the person conducting the commissioning. It shall be possible for personnel to be commissioned on entering the Iraqi Armed Forces at a commissioned rank above Second Lieutenant 4) The ranks of enlisted personnel, non-commissioned officers and warrant officers will, in ascending order, be: t.S~ J_,l ~JC- ~\.j i.....a.;y:. Jun di JundiAwwal Naeb Aareef Aareef Aareef A wwal Wakeel Wakeel Awwal Private Private 1st Class Corporal Sergeant Sergeant 1st Class Master Sergeant Sergeant Major c,J.\jA J.Jl ~y. Muahhal Muahhal A wwal Warrant officer Chief Warrant Officer 5) The appointment of enlisted personnel and warrant officers wiH be made by the person authorized under Administrative Instructions issued by the Minister of Defence. It shall be possible for personnel entering the service to be appointed to an enlisted rank above that of Private. 6) Promotion of officers and enlisted personnel will be made pursuant to procedures to be established by the Administrator or Minister of Defence on the basis of merit established by reference to experience, demonstrated competence in the current rank and potential for exceptional performance in the next higher rank. 7) The Administrator or Minister of Defence shall appoint officers of the Iraqi Armed Forces at the rank of general or above. Following transfer of full lj~ J}~.;t~.J J)~.J governance authority to che lraqi Interim Government, the Council of Ministers or similar body shall appoint officers of the Iraqi Armed Forces at the rank of general or above and such appointments shall be subject to confirmation by the body vested with national legislative authority by simple majority of those of its members present. Section 3 Pay and Allowances l) Pay and allowances for members of the Iraqi Armed Forces will be established by and paid in accordance with Administrative Instructions issued by the Administrator or Minister of Defence. 2) Death and disability benefits for Members of the Iraqi Armed Forces shall be paid and administered in accordance with CPA Order Number 63. 3) A Member of the Iraqi Armed Forces will automatically forfeit a day's pay and allowances for each full or partial calendar day that the Member absents himself from his place of duty or unit without the permission of a superior officer authorized to grant such permission, and shaU in addition be subject to appropriate disciplinary action, including the commencement of Disciplinary Proceedings under the Code of Military Discipline. Section 4 Leave Members of the Iraqi Anned Forces may take leave subject to the needs of the service, upon receiving permission from a duly authorized officer. The period of leave and other relevant details are to be specified by Administrative Instructions. Section 5 Political Activities 1) Members of the Iraqi Armed Forces shall not: a) publicly state or suggest any opinion of a political nature that constitutes an effort to indoctrinate members of the Iraqi Armed Forces or any other person with a political ideology: b) advocate racial. gender or ethnic hatred or intolerance; advocate, create, or engage in discrimination based on race, color, gender, religion, sect, tribal or regfonaJ origin; or use, or advocate the use of, force or violence or other unlawful means for political purposes, whether internal or international; or c) participate in any manner in Extremist Organizations or Activities. 2) Members of the Iraqi Armed Forces may not hold or stand for election to political office or campaign for candidates. 3) A former Member of the Iraqi Armed Forces may not hold political office unless the individual has resigned his commission or rank or retired from duty at least eighteen months prior to serving. 4) Violations of the prohibitions contained in this Section may constitute a Military Offense under CPA Order Number 23 and may result in the removal of the Member from employment in the Iraqi Anned Forces. 5) Nothing in herein shall limit the right of a Member of the Iraqi Anned Forces to vote in elections for political office organized on a local, regional or national level. Section 6 Conflicts of Interest l) Members of the lraqi Armed Forces and thefr immediate family members shall not, directly or indirectly: a) Hold financial interests that conflict with the member's conscientious performance of duty; b) Engage in private financial transactions using non-public Government information or allow the improper use of such information to further any private interest; c) Solicit or accept any gift or other item of monetary vaJue from any subordinate, or from any person or entity seeking official action from, doing business with, or conducting activities regulated by the Iraqi Armed Forces, or whose interests may be substantially affected by the performance or nonpcrfonnance of the member's duties~ 4) Use public office for private gain; or 5) Conduct any private activity that might give rise to the appearance of a conflict with official status or responsibilities. 2) Violations of the prohibitions contained in this Section may constitute a Military Offense under CPA Order Number 23 and may result in the removal of the Member from employment in the Iraqi Armed Forces. Section 7 Conduct and Discipline 1) Members of the Iraqi Armed Forces shall comply with the lawful -Orders of the Administrator, the Minister of Defence. and those superior in rank to them, according to regulations and the Code of Military Discipline. 2) Members of the Iraqi Anned Forces shall comply with the lawful orders of those persons who are not members of the Iraqi Armed Forces who may be placed in operational command over them from time to time in conjunction with their duties, according to regulations and the Code of Military Discipline. 3) Members of the Iraqi Armed Forces are subject to the jurisdiction of the civilian criminal courts pursuant to the Criminal Procedures Code No. 23 of 1977, as amended from time to time~ for offenses under the Penal Code No. 111 of 1969, as amended from time to time, and to the jurisdiction for military offenses established under the Code of Military Discipline. 4) In circumstances where both the civil and military authorities have jurisdiction over an offense, the military authorities will have primary jurisdiction. In all cases, jurisdiction will be exercised, and allocated, as provided for in the Code of Military Discipline. Section 8 Weapons The possession of Military Weapons, to include Special Category Weapons, and Firearms by Members of the Iraqi Armed Forces is regulated by CPA Order Number 3, Weapons Control, as revised and amended (CPA/ORD/31 December 2003/03), which Order may be supplemented by Administrative Instructions. Section 9 Term and Termination of Service I) Volunteers for service in the Iraqi Armed Forces obligate themselves to an initial term of service for a period not to exceed 26 months, subject to a decision by the Iraqi Interim Government to continue the existence of the Iraqi Armed Forces following transfer of full governance authority. a) At the end of any tenn of service, a Member may extend service for a further tenn of 24 months, subject to agreement by the appropriate authorities and the needs of the Iraqi Anned Forces. b) No period of service shall be extended without the consent of the Member, except in national emergencies as officially declared by the Administrator or. following transfer of fuH governance authority to the lraqi Interim Government. according to law. c) Required minimum tenns of service in special situations, such as advanced training, may be specified in Administrative Instructions issued by the Minister of Defence. 2) Service in the Iraqi Armed Forces may terminate on the occurrence of one of the following events: a) Upon a determination that the Member's services are no longer required following the transfer of full governance authority to the Iraqi lnterim Government, without prejudice to the right of the Iraqi Interim Goverrunent to assume the command and control of the Iraqi Armed Forces and all on- going service obligations of its personnel. b) Upon a determination by a Commander in the Iraqi Anned Forces in the Member's chain of command, based upon credible evidence, that the Member is unsuitable for further military service in the Iraqi Armed Forces on the basis of one of the following: i) commission of a Serious Offense; ii) a poor disciplinary record; iii) medical unsuitability; iv) consistently poor perfonnance; v) failure to meet basic standards of performance; vi) unsuitability for military service; vii) commission of a Military Offense; viii) violation of Part II, Sections 5 or 6, of this Order. c) Within seven days of notification of tennination, a Member who has completed initial entry training may request that the decision to tenninate his service be confinned by the Minister of Defence. A detennination under this Section 9.2(c) shall be conclusive upon confirmation by the Minister of Defence, or upon the elapse of seven days from the time of notification of termination, if no request for confirmation is made. d) Service in the Iraqi Armed Forces shall also terminate upon: i) the granting of an application from a Member of the Iraqi Anned Forces for discharge based upon demonstrated need; ii) the granting of an application to resign; or iii) a determination by the Administrator or the Minister of Defence that such termination is necessary for the good of the service. PART III MILITARY ASSISTANCE TO CIVIL AUTHORITIES Section 1 Requests for Local Support (in support ofMOI forces?) Section 2 Suppression of Rebellions (under MoD control) Section 3 Immunities and Defenses Members of the Iraqi Anned Forces shall enjoy immunity from civil liability and be entitled to the justification of performance of duty under the Penal Code for acts or omissions arising within the scope of their duties and in the conduct of authorized operations to the same degree as other governmental officials under the law of Iraq. For purposes of paragraph 40 of the Third Edition of the 1969 Penal Code. members of the Iraqi Armed Foccs are "public officials". Section 4 Termination of Use (2/3 vote of national assembly?) PART IV TEMPORARY AUTHORITY FOR MILITARY OPERATIONS WITH THE MUL TJNA TIONAL FORCE IN LIGHT OF THE CURRENT EMERGENCY SITUATION WITHIN IRAQ Section 1 General Authorities for the Iraqi Armed Forces While Under the Operational Control of the Commander of Multinational Forces l) In light of the current emergency situation within Iraq, and consistent with lraq's stated desire to join other nations in helping to maintain peace and security and fight terrorism during the transitional period pursuant to the provisions of United Nations Security Council Resolution I 51 l) and any subsequent relevant resolutions, all trained elements of the Iraqi Anned Forces shall at all times be under the operational control of the Commander of Multinational Forces for the purpose of conducting combined operations and providing other support within Iraq as provided herein. 2) The Minister of Defence shall continue to exercise administrative control over elements of the Iraqi Armed Forces that are under the operational control of the Commander of Multinational Forces. 3) In support of Multinational Force operations to provide security and stability to the people of Iraq, the Iraqi Armed Forces are authorized to provide protection for critical instaHations, facilities, infrastructure, and lines of communication and supply. 4) Operational or tactical command of units of the Iraqi Armed Forces operating with Multinational Forces may be vested in an officer of the Multinational Forces of rank superior to that of the commander of such Iraqi units. 5) Members of the Iraqi Armed Forces shall adhere to rules of engagement or rules for the use of force as specified by the Commander of Multinational Forces. 6) Members of the Iraqi Armed Forces under the operational control of the Commander of Multinational Forces may use force consistent with rules of engagement or rules for the use of force, as appropriate, applicable to Multinational Forces to execute their assigned missions and taskings. Section 2 Special Authorities for the Iraqi Civil Defense Corps While Under the Operational Control of the Commander of Multinational Forces I) In support of Multinational Force operations to provide security and stability to the people of Iraq, the Iraqi Civil Defense Corps is authorized to perfonn constabulary and other duties, including the following tasks: a) patrol1ing urban and rural areas; b) conducting operations to search for and seize illegal weapons and other contraband; c) providing fixed site, check point, area, route and convoy security; d} providing crowd and riot control; e) disaster response services; f} searcn and rescue services; g) providing suppon to humanitarian missions and disaster recover operations including transportation services; h) conductingjoint patrols with Multinational Forces; and i) participating in otner activities designed to build positive relationships between the Iraqi people and Multinational Force authorities including serving as community liaisons. 2) The Commander of Multinational Forces may set the standards for manning, training. and equipping Iraqi Civil Defense Corps forces, as well as establishing their mission essential task list and operational employment. 3) Members of the Iraqi Civil Defense Corps may, while perfonning their official duties, apprehend persons: a) whom they witness committing or attempting to commit a criminal offense; b) who have escaped after being lawfully arrested; or c) who otherwise interfere with their lawful activities. 4) Persons apprehended by the Iraqi Civil Defense Corps must be turned over to the Iraqi Police Service or Multinational Forces within twelve hours of apprehension or be released. 5) Members of the Iraqi Civil Defense Corps may not interrogate individuals, except under the direct supervision of Multinational Forces, or otherwise detain persons except as provided herein. A member of the Iraqi Civil Defense Corps may stop any person for so long as is reasonably necessary in order to question him for the purpose of ascertaining that person's identity and movements or what that person knows concerning any recent explosion or any other recent incident endangering life or concerning any person killed or injured in any such explosion or incident. 6) The Iraqi Civil Defense Corps may limit access to certain areas as reasonably necessary to ensure the security of persons or property contained in or passing through such areas. 7) Members of the Iraqi Civil Defense Corps may conduct reasonable searches at established checkpoints anywhere within Iraq and at other locations to prevent weapons or other dangerous or prohibited items from being carried into, transported within, or out of, designated areas and may, while otherwise performing their official duties, conduct reasonable searches for weapons or other dangerous or prohibited items a) on persons or vehicles entering or in designated areas; b) on criminal suspects incident to apprehension~ or c) in areas or buildings where dangerous or prohibited items, including prohibited weapons, are reasonably believed to exist. 8) Members of the Iraqi Civil Defense Corps may: a) Recapture premises, places, means of transport, or other things (the "subject premises"); and b) In connection with any such recapture, do any one or more of the following: i) Free any hostage from the subject premises; ii) If the member finds in the subject premises a person whom the member has reasonable grounds to believe has committed an offense, the member may detain the person for the purpose of placing the person in the custody of the Iraqi Police Service at the earliest practicable time; iii) Evacuate persons found in the subject premises to a place of safety; iv) Search the subject premises for dangerous things; and v) Seize any dangerous thing found in such a search. 9) A member of the Iraqi Civil Defense Corps may issue and compel compliance with any one or more of the following directions in relation to a person (whether or not in charge of a means of transport): a) Direct the person not to enter a designated area or direct the person not to enter a designated area unless the person consents to a search of himself, any items in his possession, any means of transport under his control, and anything in or on such means of transport; b) Direct the person to leave a designated area; or c) Direct the person to move from one place in a designated area to another place in the designated area. Section 3 Special Authorities for the Iraqi Counter-Terrorism Force While Under the Operational Control of the Commander of Multinational Forces l) In support of Multinational Force operations to provide security and stability to the people of Iraq, the Iraqi Counter~Terrorism Force is authorized to perform counter-terrorism missions, including the following tasks: a) conducting operations to capture or kill terrorists; b) conducting operation against suspected terrorist facilitators; c) engaging in reconnaissance missions and other information-gathering operations as necessary for mission completion, except that members of the Iraqi CoWlter-Terrorism Force shall not engage in intelligence activities; d) conducting operations to search for and seize illegal weapons and other contraband; e) conducting operations to rescue hostages; f) participating in other counter-terrorist-related activities designed to increase security and stability in Iraq. 2) Members of the Iraqi Counter-Terrorism Force may, while performing their official duties, detain persons: a) whom they witness committing or attempting to commit a criminal offense; b) whom they reasonably suspect of being terrorists or terrorist facilitators; or c) who otherwise interfere with their lawful activities. 3) Persons detained by the Iraqi Counter-Terrorism Force must be turned over to the Iraqi Police Service or Multinational Forces within twe!ve hours of detention or be released. 4) Members of the Iraqi Counter-Terrorism Force may not interrogate detainees, except under the direct supervision of Multinational Forces. Section 4 Immunities I) A Member of the Iraqi Armed Forces under the operational control of the Commander of Multinational Forces who is conducting activities authorized under this Order, and acting within the scope of his assigned mission or tasking, and operating consistent with applicable Multinational Force rules of engagement or rules for the use of force, as appropriate, is immune from Iraqi criminal, civil, and administrative jurisdiction and from any form of arrest or detention. 2) The Administrator shall have the exclusive authority to determine when a particular act qualifies for the immunities set forth in Part IV, Section 4. l above, and such determination is binding on all governmental, judicial and administrative entities within Iraq. Section 5 Termination of Authority The command relationships, authorities, and immunities set forth in this Part IV shall expire and cease to have effect upon termination of operations by the Multjnational Force operating in Iraq pursuant to the provisions of United Nations Security Council Resolution 15 I I, and any subsequent relevant resolutions. PARTV FINAL PROVISIONS Section 1 Existing Law 1) The lraqi Military Law Code Number 13of1940, the Iraqi Military Procedures Code Number 44of1941, the Code of Legal Notification of Military Personnel Number 106 of 1960, Punishment of Military Deserters Law Number 28 of 1972, and the Penal Code of the Popular Army Number 32of1984 are hereby suspended. 2) Any laws or regulations inconsistent with the provisions of this Order are hereby suspended to the extent they are inconsistent with the provisions of this Order. Section 2 Effect on Existing CPA Orders, Regulations, and Memoranda I) CPA Order Number 22, Creation of a New Iraqi Army (CPA/ORD/7 August 2003/22), is hereby superseded. Any references in other CPA Orders, Regulations, or Memoranda referring to the New Iraqi Army or the Iraqi Armed Forces as established under CPA Order Number 22 shall be deemed to refer to the Iraqi Armed Forces as existing and operating pursuant to and in accordance with this Order. 2) CPA Order Number 28, Establishment of the Iraqi Civil Defense Corps, as amended (CP NORD/3 September 2003/28), is hereby superseded. Any references in other CPA Orders, Regulations, or Memoranda referring to the Iraqi Civil Defense Corps as established under CPA Order Number 28 shall be deemed t-0 refer to the Iraqi Civil Defense Corps as existing and operating pursuant to and in accordance with this Order. 3) CPA Order Number XX, Amendments to CPA Orders Number 22 and 28 (CPA/ORD/XX April 2-004/XX), is hereby rescinded. 4} CPA Order Number 23, Creation of a Code of Military Discipline for the New Iraqi Army (CPA/ORD/7 August 2003/23), Section l, definition of ·•commander of the New Iraqi Army,,' is hereby amended to read in its entirety as follows: "Chief of Staff of the Iraqi Armed Forces" means the Iraqi officer appointed by the Minister of Defence in accordance with CPA Order Number 67> Section 4, Article 6(c). to exercise operational command and control of the Iraqi Armed Forces," Section 3 Administrative Instructions The Administrator and the Minister of Defence may issue Administrative Instructions, not inconsistent with this Order, prescribing au matters that are necessary or convenient for giving effect to or carrying out the purposes of this Order. Section 4 Entry in to Force This Order shall enter into force on the date of signature. L. PauJ Bremer, Administrator Coalition Provisional Authority United Nations Security Council S1RESll51 l (2003) Distr.: General 16 October 2003 • Resolution 1511 (2003) Adopted by the Security Council at its 4844tb meeting, on 16 October 2003 The Security Council, Reaffirming its previous resolutions on Iraq, including resolution 148.3 (2003) of 22 May 2003 and 1500 (2003} of 14 August 2003, and on threats to peace and security caused by terrorist acts, including resolution 1373 (2001) of 28 September 2001, and other relevant resolutions, Underscoring that the sovereignty of h'aq resides in the State of Iraq, reaffirming the right of the Iraqi people freely to determine their own political future and control their own natural resources, relterating its resolve that the day when lraqis govern themselves must come quickly, and recognizing the importanc~ of international support, particularly that of countries in the region. Iraq's neighbours. and regional organizations, in taking forward this process expeditiously, Recognizing that international support for restoration of conditions or stability and security is essential to the well-being of the people of Iraq as well as to the ability of all concerned to carry out their work on behalf of tlte people of lraq. and welcoming Member State contributions in this regard under resolution 1483 (2003), Welcoming the decision of the Governing Council of Iraq to form a preparatory constitutional committee to prepare for a constitutional conference that will draft a constitution to embody the aspirations of the Iraqi people, and urging it to complete this process quickly, Affi,.ming that the terrorist bombings of the Embassy of Jordan on 7 August 2003, or the United Nations headquaners in Baghdad on 19 August 2003, of the Imam Ali Mosque in Najaf on 29 August 2003, and of the Embassy of Turkey on 14 October 2003, and the murder of a Spanish diplomat on 9 October 2003 e.re attacks on the people of lraq, the United Nations, and the international community, and deploring the assassination of Dr. Akila al-Hashimi. who died on 25 September 2003. as an attack directed aigainst the future oflraq, ln that context, recalling and reaffirming the statement of its President of 20 August 2003 (S/PRST/2003/13) and resolution 1502 (200J) of26 August 2003, Determining that the situation in Iraq, although improved, continues to constitute a threat to international peace and security. 03-56391 (E) ~ 21ili:;:::as;;W..,.... S/RESIJSll {2003} Aeling under Chapter VII of the Charter of the United Nations, 1. Reaffirms the sovereignty and territorial integrity of lraq, and underscores, in that context, the temporary nature of the exercise by the Coalition Provisional Authority (Authority) of the specific responsibilities, authorities. and obligations under applicable international law recognized and set forth in resolution 1483 (200.3), which will cease when an internationally recognized, representative government established by the people of Iraq is sworn in and assumes the responsibilities of the Authority, inter alia ttirough steps envisaged in paragraphs 4 through 7 and I 0 below: 2. Welcomes the positive response of the international community, in fora such as the Arab League, the Organization of the lslamic Conference, the United Nations General Assembly. and the United Nations Educational, Scientific and Cultural Organization, to the establishment of the broadly representative Governing Council as an important step towards an internationally recognized. representative governmen1; 3. Supports the Governing Council's efforts to mobilize the people of Iraq, including by the appointment of a cabinet of ministers and a preparatory constitutional committee to lead a process in which the [raqi people will progressively take control of their own affairs; 4. De/ermines that the Governing Council and its ministers are the principal bodies of the Iraqi interim administration, which. without prejudice to its farther evolution, embodies the sovereignty of the State of Iraq during the transitional period until an internationally recognized, representative government is estahlished and assumes the responsibilities of the Authority; S. Affirms that the administration of Iraq will be progressively undertaken by the evolving structures of the lraqi interim administration; 6. Calls 11po11. the Authority, in this context, to return governing responsibilities and authorities to the people of lraq as soon as practicable and Nqu~stl the Authority, in cooperation as appropriate with the Governing Council and the Secretary-General, to report to the Council oa the progress being made: 7. Jnvites the Governing Council to provide to the Security Council, for its review, no later than 15 December 2003, in cooperation with the Authority and, as circumstances permit, the Special Representative of the Seerete.ry-General. a timetable and a programme for the drafling ofa new constitution for Iraq and for the holding of democratic elections under that constitution; 8. Resolves that the United Nations. acting through the Secretary-General, his Special Representative, and the United Nations Assistance Mission in Iraq, should strengthen its vital role in lraq, including by providing humanitarian relief. promoting 1he economic reconstruction of and conditions for sustainable development in Iraq, and advancing efforts to restore and establish national and local instirutions for representative government; 9. Requests that, as circumstances permit, the Secretary-General pursue the course of action outlined in paragraphs 98 and 99 of the report of the Secretary- General of 17 July 2003 (S/20031715); SIR£S1151l (2003) 10. Takes note of the intention of the Governing Council 10 hold a constitutional conference and, recognizing that the convening of the conference will be a milestone in the movement to the full exercise of sovereignty, calls for its preparation through national dialogue and consensus-building as soon as practicable and ~quests the Special Representative of the Secretary-General. at the time of the convening of the conference or, as circumstances permit, to lend the unique expertise of the United Nations to the Iraqi people in this process of political transition, including the establishment of electoral processes; I l. Requests the Secretary-General to ensure that the resources of the United Nations and associated organizations are available, if requested by the traqi Governing Council and, as circumstances permit, to assist in furtherance of the programme provided by the Governing Council in paragraph 7 above. and encourages other organizations with expertise in this area to support the Iraqi Governing Council, if requested; 12. Requests the Secretary-General to report to the Security Council on his responsibilities under this resolution and the development and implementation of a timetable and programme under paragraph 7 above; 13. Determines that the provision of security and stability is essential to the suc~essful completion of the political process as outlined in paragraph 7 above and to the ability of the United Nations to contribute effectively to that process and the implementation of resolution 1483 (2003), and a11tlf.orizes a multinational force under unified command lo take all necessary measures to contribute to the maintenance of security and stability in Iraq, including for the purpose of ensuring necessary conditions for tb.e implementation of the timetal>le and programme as well as to contribute to the security of the United Nations Assistance Mission for Iraq, the Governing Council of Iraq and other institutions of the Iraqi interim administration, and key humanitarian and economic infrastructure; 14. Urges Member States to contribute assistance under this United Nations mandate, including military forces. to the multinational force referred to in paragraph 13 above: IS. Decides that the Council shall review the requirements and mission of the multinational force referred to in paragraph 13 above not later than one year from the date of this resolution, and that in any case the mandate of the force shall expire upon the completion of the political process as described in paragraphs 4 through 7 and lO above, and expresses readiness to consider on that occasion any future need for 1he continuation of the multinational force, taking into account the views o( an internationally recognized, representative government ofiraq; 16. Emphasizes the importance of establishing effective Iraqi police and security forces in maintaining law, order. and security and combating terrorism consistent with paragraph 4 of resolution 1483 (2003 ), and calls upon Member States and international and regional organizations to contribute to the training and equipping of h'aqi police and security forces; 17. Expresses deep sympathy and condolences for the personal losses suffered by the Iraqi people and by the United Nations and the families of those United Nations personnel and other innocent victims who were killed or injured in these tragic attacks; 3 SIR£Sl15l I (:!Oro) 18. Unequivocally condemns the terrorist bombings of the Embassy of Jordan on 7 August 2003, of the United Nations headquarters in Baghdad on 19 August 2003, and of the lmam Ali Mosque in Najaf on 29 August 2003. and of the Embassy of Turkey on 14 October 2003. the murder of a Spanish diplomat on 9 October 2003. and the assassination of Dr. Akila al-Hashimi, who died on 2S September 2003. and emphasires that those responsible must be brought to justice; 19. Calls upon Member States to prevent the transit of terrorists to Iraq, arms for terrorists, and financing that would support terrorists. and emphasi'zes the importance of strengthening the cooperation of the countries of the region, particularly neighbours of Iraq, in this regard; 20. Appeals to Member States and the international financial institutions to strengthen their efforts to assist the people of Iraq in the reconstruction and development of their economy, and urges those institutions to take immediate steps to provide their full range of loans and other financial assistance to Iraq, working with the Governing Council and appropriate Iraqi ministries; 21. Urges Member States and international and regional organizations to support the Iraq reconstruction effon initiated at the 24 June 2003 United Nations Technical Consultations, including through substantial pledges at the 23-24 October 2003 lntemational Donors Conference in Madrid; 22. Coils upon Member States and concerned organizations to help meet the needs of the Iraqi people by providing resources necessary for the rehabilitation and reconstruction of Iraq's economic infrastructure; 23. Emphasires that the International Advisory and Monitoring Board (IA.MB} referred to in paragraph 12 of resolution 1483 (2003) should be established as a priority. and reiterates that the Development Fund for Iraq shall be used in a transparent manner as set out in paragraph 14 of resolution 1483 (2003); 24. Reminds aU Member States of their obligations under paragraphs 19 and 23 of resolution 1483 (2003) in particular the obligation to immediately cause the transfer of funds, other financial assets and economic resources to the Development Fund for Iraq for the benefit of the Iraqi people; 25. Requests that the United States. on behalf of the multinational force as outlined in paragraph 13 above, report to the Security Council on the efforts and progress of this force as appropriate and not less than every six months; 26. Decides to remain sejzed of the matter. 4 Office of National Security Affairs January 14, 2004 Today 711/04 End State °""P<'Uon S0'1Ueign Iraq $overeivn Iraq .CPAGo11ama ~S·i.d MNF Sevate Infernal lntemaJ ••cutlly lnseeumy 5.,,.,. lntArnal . Partn....tilp and MNF pnal11e Insecurity Limited lraql capability Limited lraql relatlon$hlp capallllllv IW#~eJShlp wtth S-OK.fraql . Mol-MoO split Growing Iraqi Co<e antrllveMH orir-~to- . Iraq aa ~v• eiemant In U!Hed MHF •est Ion Iraqi forcea eommlned lnd•pendent lraqt vi- 1 Political Calendar January February Man:h Apri1 May June Ju11 .._'"""'~ ~Ct' ~ .... ,~ l~HT~ I """ flt 69o:u'V) ,.,, ~ ~ 1=~1 Fii lllpC"tll ~ ... ~- ' ~ iG . ,,_ "'•-.:t t"" ~I 2 UNCt.ASSIRED C3 Effects "New Iraqi Security Forces Update" Iraqi Security Forces - SITREP ••... , RtlCJ"'recl m .... c11 l11 - Tulnln1 Prc•IO tD W!l'rolnlng ShOrdall 8 490 5 541 638 l 848 75,000 67,205 l,590 2.758 146 1,590 7.502 l 704 40,000 J 7, 147 3.811 20.283 (SSO) 373 CM•wT"""" Felft 200 76 ~..., ......... S0.000 97.215** 0 +-17.151 s.rwtn(M~) (96,633)* Ntw ll"lql Army C"'IA) JS.000 l .113 2.047 33.071 ,. .. , flptn la ........ h_ 19146 ................... ~ • '6.6J.l b ,..J..,........., ~ 1t rrs - •• o.l) 14.r U )1illlM"'V fP"l1htt•-bcn.As of 1 t .Ian 04 JPS Local Co11tro'I S tat11s ..................... 1 100 90 ~=====~ 80 +-'--~ .... ====~::..-,.._..._.._ ...... __. ____ ........... __ ..... __. __ --f 10 -r-~~~~~-r~---=::::================:-1 60 +-~~~~~~b-=-~~~~~~~~~~~~~--1 so 40 ·1-""-""-'-------,.---------------'-------:==--=:;;-----,,..------t ~..---~----1 30 -1--r~~~-1-~~~--:,._......::;;....~"':"'T~~'-'-_,,,,, t.ntef,..UOOIJ P~U "" T~ l,,.,.•nN• 11'lt•<i 10 10 +---------------- . - - -- - ~ -~-~----=-'---4 - - .. ......... 0 +--~-r--- · -- -- - ~ - -·- - ----.---"T-----r---"T-----1 JA; '\; FEB MAR APR l\1A Y .JUN .JUl. 1 --Mannlog - Training - \lebtc:Ju - ~dios • • · TIP - • 8-Wtck I lBP Capability G'e11er11tio11 -----·--······ ••11 ~ ----------------------------------- · ~~~~~~~~~~~====~=""----~__; · -----------------:~---====~------------~~~ · --------:~;;_ ____________________ _....._ ________ ~~--~~ · ' -----~-------------.--c=~:=,..,,.,,=::=r--==~.:::.:.:.:;.;;.;::~r;._--------- · -----------~ • --'t"Vt!h'"nlt-eummtrn!VO'rnai~.t?====:;;::::;;z:~ ~t---------~ · --.i..;o.ll.lm~L----;,.,.n.,~--::~:.....::..--~~<if-<,....,;-~-:;vo;-r--;~~r.-::-::'T"1<,.,.-- · ----------'."'ft::-------=1b~-------:i....-------------------------~ · ~-=====:i'Ai=====(<S\....~~.,--j"'--'n-=~7'TT"'~'7'<"Tr=:':"'TO:"l'1..-~~-- 1 .--~~------~----~-----l1~~~~~--~~-.-~~~.--~~~ ' 2 Aa of03 Jan 04 IBP BN Equivalent Fielding Piao 1200) 1 lw! J1>ec l 1:...r1 lral 1~1 {Al'lll ,...,, ,..,. , 82d 2al IO llNs CGn'olel• MNO(CSI 2 0l4 BHI ctiti ~ MN ~ ' ..... FPS - New Process and Timings e·'Ol ___ JAM . 'CM --~~. ~ AA ~····11 I 1!> ! C""'PlotoTO-' TOA, 02 Jan 04 2900S.. 7!IO~ 1 000,.,,....m. 2!IO Hot Vlild ! Volld•t. MSC' • fl'S coun1, I ! 15JonCM ! MmHy Al t1!tnQ!: : Mnfl'Y rt t¥oA' • De..,q,6~ IG S)'>len1 CoGty ' FPSW..-.Pdc:y : ! M.T 11.lln04 I FPS no ~Uw NlT TBA I t I litnS141L : ! ve.,.....FPSS.. I · ~Pay~ l I M Ll 12JM\Ool I I MSC• Pay FPS I : 01~04 · .... -~ I s:.is 01 ,,..ci. °" I I i I Mlfllaltlu l'.y Ff'll I >1""1tfo.4 ~·sPayFPS f tf) Of 6 3 As of 11 Jan 04 /CDC BN Equit, alent Fieliling Plan 12!XOI !• I l!Xcl l.wil 1 .. 1 1 ~ 1 l.v11 l l•• I t.-..1 NIA ... ............,., .... .,. ~ ... '" An"* ...... : ~ Red: clD~ SYRIA • !Uy! "*fim ICDC a• HQ (tocatlOM TBDI NIA/ICDC 801!. HQ db ICOC8N HQ ri3 ICOC8DHQ ~ 4 /CDC Capability· Ge11eration ..................... , - ~~~!l.O..dJ~~~~:::;::~ i?:==~ji===============;~ - ~~~~~~~-_,_~~~-.,,,C----'=i.&.~ ......... ..,.,.na.c.......,-..-.u< ......... '1..>C~ - ~~~....;C.~~~1--~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~ - ~~~~~~--~~~--........... --=~~~~~~~~~~~~~ - ~~~~~~J.-~~-1-~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~ - ~~~~~--~~----.,__~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~ I - -== =r: - --- 1.--~~-.-~~.....-~~--.-~~~..-~~...-~~--~~--.-~~---. - - - • . - - • , ._._,. JCC Timel ine~· -----·--·····••11 Unit IOC&FOC No of JCCs 101" AA 4u. 10 82"" ABN 1AD MND CS MND SE •Subject to approval by 82"1 ' CG. 10 s • • • • • • • • Iraq Security Forces Assessment Team January 14 2004 Policy Framework Dimensions Macro-Structure Institutions Forces Roles Capabi'lities People Laws Command and Control (C2) 2 Current Stage Structure CPAJCJTF-7 supervision Institutions Mol. MoJ. MoFA developing, MoO being designed Forces i.- Roles Capabilities People Laws C2 IPS. IAF. ICOC, INIS, FPS, 08E being built. IAF battalions In trng: ICOC augmented to CF: IPS basic: law enforcement: FPS facillly protection; DBE border Patchy law enforcomont, ltd facility protection IAF small but deep. ICOC large but thin; DBE ltd Minister.; 1n Mot, MoJ MoFA. Ministers/CPA appoint olr1C1alslofficets in consultation MoO unoo.rway - Operating under CPA Orders & selected prev10us legislation CF In command excopl some IPS LE. partial Iraq! control l Structure Institutions Forces Roles Capabilities People Laws C2 ToA July 2004 TNA and Executive m1n1.strles control sea.inly sector Iraq Multlllational Sec.unty Partnership - NSC & NCA structuro Ltd MoO, Mol. MoJ, MoFA mgmVpohcy capacity. IMSP Contact Group?. IAF In progress: ICOC al FOC: IPS local police & spoclal unite; FPS, DBE stood up ICOC (mobili2ed) reserve component or IAF. IPS national law enforcement: some high end roles. Partial IPS IT1Ulll0pal socunty capability. Ltd IAF •ntemal sec:unty capablloly, esp ICOC TNA appointed mtmsl8f5 lraqt approved Head INIS, CHOO. IAF Commander, Oopubes. IPS ct\lefs. Transitional Admlnlstraltvo Law (Incl tMSF). IAF part of IMSF (US command). LE under lraqls • 2 Structure Institutions End state Sovereign state with permanent Constitution. Democratically elected Par1iament and Executive. NSC primary ~ecurlty policy decision maker. Ministries fully functioning. Forces Roles Dependent on decisionslresources or Iraqi Government (IAF 27 Bns +-ICOC 36 Bns ... JPS 71k capable during 2005) IAF to defend from extemat aggression; IPS LE and high end lntemal security; Domestic use of IAF restricted & rare. Capabilities IAF limited capability for external defense. IPS capable of handling majority of lntemal security. People Elected political leadersh1p. Iraqi appointments system. Laws Legislation passed by Par1Jament lntemallonal lreaties and security agreements C2 lraQ supporte.Q by enduring allied security arrangements. 6 Assessing Progress • Fortnightly reviews of security sector development against Strategic Plan • Monitoring of state of threat vector • Advisory consultations with National Security Committee of IGC and a small core group 8 3 COALITION MILITARY ASSISTANCE. TRAINING TEAM • Scope • Original Mission • Acceleration • Current Position • Transition Plan • 30 Sep and Beyond 1 • Overall Political Vision "The ultimate goal is a unified and stable, democratir c Iraq that: provides rep~ese1 ntative government for the Iraqi people; is underpinned by new and protected freedoms for all Iraqis and· a growing market economy; and is able to defend i.tself, but no longer poses a threat to the region." - - • Vision for Defense "Develop New Iraqi Armed Forces which are under political control, accountable to the nation and defensive in capability and intent. " CMA TT Mission "To man, train and equip nine Infantry Bdes with limited capability by Sep 04, a small coastal defense force, and the beginning of an aviation element in order to establish the foundation of the Iraqi Armed Forces run by /raqis.11 2 Endstate IAF comprising - Joint Force Headquarters - Land Component (27 Bns/9 Bdes/3 Regional Divs) - Maritime Component • Naval Squadron • Coastal Defense Regt - Air Component • Sqn of UH-1 • Sqn (·)of C-130 - SOF Component • ICTF (200) - National Reserve Component • Former ICDC • Tasks Man: screen, recruit (ethnic balance), establish structure, pay conditions .of service, selection of officer corps - moral component. Train: doctrine, schools, training base organized, professional mil education, general and specialist training - all ranks. facUities, training aids. programs of instruction. Equip: logistics, maintenance, storage, supply, infrastructure, training equipment, garrisons. Transition: to an Iraq MoD and Joint Mil HQ lnforma.tion operation to manage perceptions 3 0 Organizational Structure I o.p..i.y I ~- CG ~ ~ i!nlltled CG I Jlll'Cla•• C<>IS UiOs I ~;!.~J I c::r 11 PNl I I C1 c II Cl II Loge:.. cs c• 11 Cl II c!'.i.. II • .;'_, j ,...,. -- ·-· °"" l"lllM Comma Fa ca- Def-• Grouno t:nor .... ....... llKNKJnG _.. .. f1cilll ... Logltltlce ....,. Plans -- ... _ _.,. - L.,..nc.a ~.V-7~ Helot• .. - ""' ... ... M ....,lc'.ll T•11ning c....- ~ .U.nl ~ ""' CommD -.i.e ... ...... ....... -- ... ~--- ~· Ker l'WDMS rt .... Att FQ<CW LNO - \IOllJnle« - Oflkw ...... r.- -- ~· ~VCfHI [1r1~rt FM>OPS DSAl90U Dec- ltne<&tit ,.,. .. _ LHOo omc- ._, COfM'CI PllN ........ • Some Themes • Mor:al Component -values, ethos, attitude and culture. • Time - clear milestone=time driven schedule, but also need qualitative assessment - balance required. • Iraqi Owners, hip - what we do now is foundation for future success. • Certification - Hold on to the product to ensure success. 4 • In the beginnin1 g - 9 Bn • Establish recrolting - 3 stations; Baghdad, Basrah, Mosul 3262 recruited to date • Acquired materiel - Tables, cha/~, beds Uniforms, btanl<ets, boots. • 1000s of Iraqis back to worl< • 12 Manufacturers engaged • Infrastructure Three Brigade garrison sets currently under refurbf.shment • Average of 450 Iraqis employed per: contract • All contract funds to Iraqi """$ • Awarded training contract and established training site • Where we we're going • Progr.am as conceived was to produce 9 BNs by 1 AUG 04. • Re1:ruitJng trotlds are good ... • Garrison construction will keep paco with trllinlng. • 3 Divisions manned, trained and eql.J/ppe.d by early 2'106. l •.• ,r~• •••.,,Jee q@ , w 1e:0 +•>a ••:!, ! •1••!) •/!!t'P!( _,,,,,,,,.,.,.._aq . .-.: .... m .. 9.•·•' ct·t11•1~•u 41 .• J 5 • 6 • KMTB 8 Week POI CMATT oversees- contl"actors traJolng the ~A Units •AulH, Alghh &. ~""ecfoe~• ·&i.obl .. h~Wng Cflmol• •Equtpnwm i.a ... I matnleneftC.a •C1111lom.i- & COU11HI-. •L.aw of L;and CoPll~l (ttuman RJoht•) ·ROE •l'hyslcal fq(nlng •Fk'Wt Nd ·Drill and C•romony ·ul'.ldi H•lilptlon ·VV""P<I,.. T ralnl!'ll t Ou~Jl f'1!9A!il0o -Co- •!ICI Cone.alme<ll •G ... roDU(y •Contm:to• provided tr•lnln9 on the e ..... .,,-.ilill'- '°""'" , o.rty PE •TolctlcaJ-...t.PE ·l"n Combet IMpectlo,,. Pf •l\oac:t to Cortlact PE •Pol, ,,. s.curi~ •C-.,,. Sioc...wy ·Aoula SoKwtto, •Pall'Olllng •BcMd., l«...-Y ·h-ldCINllUp •Equipment Como(l<11uon •UlCO' Cb~- • IA Training Produces ... ··-= ....... ENO STATE (ENLISTED) "'"°' •An tndMdual 1olo lttr - Possnsu h1...S.m.n1al soldlot slUllt - FunctiOn• • • • tnernb•r of• rnult\ ·•dlnto w;am - i. orient.<! 10 1111111.aiy ••fllle• """ ffM¢• to - i. SC-frt l)Ult>an rfOl!t>, law of lond w- lr'oqlnatlo1' a!V:l -ptch ->1. - It ph)lalutly 1na menully pr e~reci to .,_gin ,_.,, ,.,.,... .-------..u. _______ ..., END STATE {OFFICER/NCO) • A loaderwllil pos-• .. , - l'<&Nla....,.UI IMdenJOllp elllla - Sltllla wM ~ IMdl!lg Jl(OC.clutft - sl.11 .. -ttJ> •-II unll llictle11, toc:ltnlq"'• """ P-•d"'9t 7 fl What we Realized • Situation has changed - security • Not the Afghan model - 400,000 trained military personnel pool - Existing <but corrupted> military tradition Establish the Cadre First • Many countries. train Soldiers p,.. ww11 us Arm Mobr1r z.t1on • Few countries train Year Total Offi~rs Enlisted Men Leaders very woll HMO U6.065 16.624 149,441 •Focus on the leadership 1941 1,4S4,634 u.112 1.361,462 • Modified Objective Change plan to man, train, equip ... • 9 Army Brigades, C2 • Nucleus of an Army Air Corps • Nucleus of a Maritime element Vice 9 ba. tta/ions under original plan ... BY CREA TING THE LEADERSHIP 8 0 Leader Training • Make up front investment in leader development and professionalism - Use former Iraqi officers and NCOs - Three main ideas • Leadership principles for a volunteer force • Military role in a democratic society • How to plan, execute performance oriented training - Jordanian Army trains most officers needed - Coalition trainers train NCOs needed 0 Training the Larger Force ·- -~, - The Generic Model 9 0 Jordan Officer Training I Dec l Jan I Feb I Apr I May I Jun Jul -lndvcllon period is 10 days • NCOA Training I Dec I Jan Feb I Mar I Apr j May I Jun Jul '~----. I .....coc-a.HO 10 • BNMETL • Conduct tactical road march • Attack • Defend • Conduct movement to contact • Conduct cordon and search • Integration Training • Duration is 4 weeks. • Follows light .leaders course model. • Emph, asis on team building, development of SOPs, and plan/prep/conduct training. 11 • BNIBDEIDIV Advisor Support Teams • CMA TT has requested teams to support each battalion, brigade, and division of the IA • The objectives tor these teams ;nclude: - supporting leader integration training - training management - oversight of both individual and collective training - providing na;son support (for gaining Coalition HQ) • Officer PME •Jordan - 2 IA L TCs attending CGSC - 2 IA COLs attending NDU •Australia - 2 IA MAJs attending CG SC - 1 IA COL attending NDIJ • ftaly - 3 IA .officers pending assignment to PME schools. •USA - 1 IA officer pending attendance NESA 12 • ICDF Training • Basic Training with Army Recruits under current or modified contract with Vinell Corp assisted by additional Royal Marine NCOs for JCDR Company • Specialist Training at Umm Qasr by Coalition Training Teams (CTT) • Patrol Boat I Squadron CO Training abroad • Senior Officer Training (Lt Cdr and Above) requires specific course to be developed • ICDF Commander to Undergo Training with Army Equivalents 13 • Iraqi Air Co. rps, TBD r-------------- 1 1-- - ---------- - - - ------- .-------'------. r------'"----~ "-CKlrtwtt a ~•hi : ~ CT•Jll , !! ~: !'!!.t.,:~ ~ - ~ ~~~ - ~: S111 Uff.t, we .... -..~ • Aviation Training • Start small: UH-18 Helos; C-1308 Transports • Principle: A small core of good people, trained in Jordan to train the rest: - 6 Senior Leaders (full Colonels) - Experienced Pilots, Rear Crew and Maintenance Staff - Aviation support staff (Base Ops etc.) - Specialist aircrew and engineering training in Jordan • Support Staff coming from IA and train in Iraq • All selected by Interview at CPA 14 • IA - 2· 7 Battalions lsEPI locrl [Nov] ioEcl !JANI IFeB!iMARI IAPRllMAvl!JuNll JUL llAuGl!sePI Ll 2 6 9 9 - SYRIA Total !A. FadJltlu EOY 2094 27 Inf 8nl9 Pde Garrisons 1 Navia! Inf Bn Base 1 Naval Force FaclUty 2 Arrnv Air Corps L()(;atlona Depot fa<;lllty JFHQ 2 lraql Mlllu.r:y Audemles 12 Recru1Ung Station• 1 l3000 'Soldier T reln. lng Ba H 15 Iraqi National Defense Force bySEP04 jJFHo j I I I 1 JULYQ.4 i j ! Deputy CG for Capability ~~~~ lxXI I South I - "'"'°......._. ...... ... _ ~~ ~ ,.,._~-- ,. .... ........ - -...... .............. ~ -·- ...................... .....,.,.,._ - - -·- ~r• ........ -· - ·- - -- - a_ · - .. _ 16 0 Where do we need to focus? TRANSITION NOW CPA 1JULY04 IRAQI TRANSITIONAL i-----------.. GOVERNMENT OSA CMATT ----....-i Security foroH· HAND OVER PLAN IA/ICDC • • Role ofOMC • Continued focus on leadership • Recommendation will be to consolidate gains. • Addition of combined arms • Heavy brigades 17 • Transition Schematic hlJu/)'04 i----ys"°"-+ ' --, UIOcf 04 t110«os I I I I INSTITllTIONS OP'rttlona• ~! tM esten.tlal el...,,.nta of lhe IAF 11nd•r pollUut conltol, ac.covnt~ble to th• nation and dftenslve In capablllty and 1n1tt1r OP£ RATIONAL CAl'A811.ITY ll'_l_ 'T"-"£.l:/ S1111tolc fl nc!•t11.!r. •a unified and stab ... <Hftlocntk lntq 11>11 pro•ld.a ••P'"• ntallve govetnment fo• the In.qi peosile: 11 unde rpinned I I I llY new and prolecfltd l~~I freecloms~ a Rlraqla 1't4ASE ' ,.._ • and a orowing -~•I llEHTOll U !R!!!H!l!!!lll!!Ulll economy; and It able to ~nd llself, b<,lt no lOflOat poM'S a thtUt to IN <lt!lion • Lines Of Operations ndstate - the establi• h"'9nt of IAF Leadership capable of ntegratlng Into democratic procesH• In order to manage IZ L'AOEllSHIP atlonal security. ndatate. the establishment of DefenH Institutions capable of anaglng the national Hcur1ty of IZ within a domocratlrc INSTrfUTIONS mework ndstat• • Capable of m:intaln ltle terrltortal lnt.9rlty of IZ and OP£.1tA'1lOHAL fdtfng Internal threats to national security when duly i...-;:CN' ;;.;.;. AD = IU ;.;. ".;__,.-,.uthortMd. whilst posing no threat to r9Qionm at9blllty or the I - FP<.ANCIAL ndstate • An IAF whoM operetlonal capeblllty and fnatftutlons ave been establlehed and c:ai rn.na119 progtamrMd funds ·the IAF. the people of 1Z. "'9lr region.t neighbors Md th9 Wider ln1lit•llonlll conwnunlty .. convinced of lhe (le~mac:v md ddlneM ulure of thew. of their control by rHd dlmocrlllc ~ ol IZ IDlllty to def9nd Itself and mt the IAF wlll not be used unlawtuffy ....... the a.w4blcffng oflZ.. 18 • Phase 1: Establish OPERATIONAi.. CAPABILITY FINANCIAL 8. Jf:fQIMOD IOC • Phase 2: Supervise 9. Effective 1,adershlp of IAF operational unit,a Trigger. Mandated TOA 1$1Oct04 m Oel os trained I date 10. Personnel rKJ"ul~ a<;cClf'dl,ng to plan Desired Endstate: IAF and JJ=HQ. at IOC, able "'"---,--,!21't--t Co d9ve1op through FY05 """""""----'"'tf ~ 12. N1t1ona1 Strategic Dehtnse Plan drafted •l'ld 1~. Adequate Funding for FY05 OM n Pr ram 1<4. Ef'leetlYe Higher F. onna on C2 est.abllahed 15. IAF Basic Trg has uced IA Bn IOC IOC 19 • Phase 3: Me· ntor lsUuly ~ '--~~ .. s;'!--.;'~~, INSTIT\1T10NS Trigger: EOFY04 fsf Oct04 1sl Oct05 Desired Endstate ; IAF I I I I reliance on CMATT suport slgniflcantly minimi:red. CMA TT •'-------.JtW· r...-..... ""'2·1'!-~ ready to disengage OPERJliTIONAJ,. I CAP A811.IT'r ' lace 1 20. Forcn FOC I I I /-- .. IU.S -- 1! - , ....... · ~~I ~§,') ESTA&LISl1 ~~ AD'Vl • Phase 4: Advise 21. CMATT Dl&en!J89ed Tr1gger: conditions set forCMATT 5 disengagement De.ired Endstate: CMA TT role limited to fNSTITl.ITIONS ~~~~~~1h'~......,-fl'l'T---t OPERATIONA. L CAPABILIT'I 0 20 • Main Effort • Overall - DP 5: Committed senior Leadership of MOD and JHQ ready to fulfill function in TNA • Phase 1 - DP 5: Committed senior L.eadership of MOD and JHQ ready to fulfill function in TNA • Phase 2 - DP 13: Adequate FY05 Funding for CMA TT Programme • Phase 3 - DP 18. Future Leadership Development Process in Place • Phase 4 - DP 21 : CMA TT Disengaged • End States • Operational - a professional, ethnically diverse, Iraqi Armed Forces, which are under democratic, political control, accountable, to the nation and defensive in capability and intent. • Strategic - a unified and stable, democratic Iraq that: provides representative government for the Iraqi pe, ople; is underpinned by new and protected freedoms for all Iraqis and a growing market economy; and is able to defend itself, but no longer poses a threat to the region. 21 • QUESTIONS? 22 MINISTRY OF DEFENCE • No MOD exists today. Former MOD abolished in May 2003. • Must be established prior to July 1 to: -- provide civilian control of the military; -- perform key role in national command authority; and -- provide support and sustainment to the Iraqi Armed Forces. MINISTRY OF DEFENCE Program to Establish the MOD • Recruit qualified people • Train senior- and mid-level civil servants • Select Minister of Defence • Conduct a budget analysis; prepare a budget • Draft legal authorities and regulations • Renovate buildings • Implement information campaign MINISTRY OF DEFENCE Training Strategy • Three-phased program - Principles, values, democratic ins1itutions, civilian control, counterpart visits - Leadership and supervisory skills, ethics - Specialized courses in functional areas • Training in U.S. (NESA Center, USIP) and Europe • Conduct training in Baghdad • : Mentor/advisors prograrn1 z Budget US Supplemental - $28M 16.5 Facilities 3.0 Equipment 2.5 Operations & Maintenance 6.0 Purchased International Training Iraq Budget $1.5M for MoD Salaries Requirements Review Board (Pending) $1.7M f'or interim construction work on Ministry buitdings January-February February 23 March 1 March April 1 April-Dec Mid-May July 1 MINISTRY OF DEFENCE Key Dates Recruit and hire ''critical mass'' of people Training in Washington, D.C. Establish new Ministry of Defence Select senior civil servants and military officers Appoint Minister of Defence Training continues Open MOD Building Transition to sovereign Iraq 3 °""- j Ool""5J -- .. _ · - · -" - - · -- -- . ..... t.- -- ...... - - - ~ - ~f .. ~ ... _ 4 5 COALlTlON PROVISIONAL AUTHOR.ITV BAGHDAD JNFO MEMO January 13, 2004 FOR: THE ADMINISTRATOR FROM: ~r ______ ___.jsenior Advisor for National Scc.urily & Defense SUBJECT: Introduction to DoD Security Assessment Team MG Karl Eikenberry will want an early substantive meeting witb you. A number of us here know Karl and coo sider him to be one of the most thoughtful, ab.le and enidite officers around. He will be straight, thorough, and balanced. Re may also have good ideas not thought of by us. In Afghanistan, Karl had the equivalent otj ·~jjob. Following a meeting with LTG Sanch· cz, CJTF7 and l will chair a full-morning session to orient Karl and his team and to present an overview oflraqi forces, institutions, capabilities, roles and missions, people. and command and control - based on the common CP A-CJTF7 view produced by our Security Steering Group. The team will then proceed with in-depth briefings with CMATT, my shop. CJTF7, Moland other organizations; each meeting will be attende· d by members of all key organizations. All briefings will be based on our common framework and views. (The team's schedule is attached.) I suggest that you make the following points: • We have made progress in developing a single coherent view of emerging Iraqi security forces and institutions. But we welcome a critique of that view. • As for lraqi capabilities, it is essential to look beyond numbers in order to get an accurate picture of where they are and where they can be, realistically, by July I: o Numbers mask limited training, for both !CDC and JPS. o The TAF (not "NlA") is being well trained but is building gradually o State institutions that provide for competent civilian control range from green (Mol) to green-field (MoD). Building them is a bi.gh CPA priority. • For these reasons, there will be a wide gap as of July I between the security challenges and the security capacity of Iraq. The Iraqis do not appreciate this. We have to educate them, even if it means calling attention lo the empty part of the glass, not just the full part. UNCLASSIFfED • Several big issues: o Do we continue to shin resources from lAF' lo those forces that come on scream faster? This is a legitimate question, as long as we recognize the trade-off. If we have a domestically secure lraq but an inadequate anny in a year or two, we will have a different problem on our hands (e.g., Iran). o Where should the ICDC end up? We fovor morphing ir into reserves of the JAF. Iraqis may feel differently because of their aversion to use of the MoD and anny [or domestic operations. o What to do about the militia? They musl be eliminated, and we have to establish this principle and get a process going. We have a strategy that is being looked at back in Washington. o Whal post-711 security arrangements do we want? We arc working closely wit11 DoD, which in tum is working interagency and with UK. • Guidance 10 CPA team is lo go the extra mile in providing information and judgments to the DoD team. We will be open with our views and open to the team• s views. • Critical sccunty institution and policy issues concerning the Iraqis should be discussed with Gompert. He has begun advisory consultations with GC. • Some issues best to avoid in direct contact with lraqis: post-7/1: militias; end- statc of the ICDC; filling top Iraqi national-security jobs; inrelligcnce. You may also want to impress on Kar.I how much we will value a detailed outbricf, giving us the chance to react but also to internalize new ideas. ATTACHMENT: Outline Program for Security Assessment Team COORDlNATlON: CJTF7 (MG Gallinen), CMA TI (MG Eaton). Mol (Mr. Casteel). Mrr" I Amb Jones, LTG (R) Kellogg UNCLASS[FJED OUTLl.NE PROGRAJ. '\L'\f.E FOR SECURITY ASSESSMENT TEAM 14-15 JAN SUBJECT TO MG EIKENBERRY CONFIRMATION 14Jan 0900 - 1000 - Office Calls for MG Eikenberry t 000 - 1230 - Theatre strategic context - a joint approach (CP NCJTF 7): • l000-1005 - Adminbricf(CS) • 1005 -1025- Opening remarks and mandate (David Gompert/MG Eikenberry) • 1025 - 1100 - OperatfonaJ environment - orientation. current situation and indicators out to TOA. (CJTF 7 -C2) • 1100-1110-Break • 1110 - 1145 - Operations and security apparatus ( CJTF 7 - C3 ): o Operational brief o Rotation o Emerging C2 arrangements o Multi-national dimension o fraqi Security Forces - current situation • I 145 - I 250 - 'Strategic, political, kgal setting: now, 7 /1 and end state.' (DO.I ... I l 250 - l 330 - Lunch 1330 - 1500 - Iraqi Armed Forces (CMATT) 1500- 1515 - Break 1515 - 17 t 5 - Development of ministries, notably MOD ~I ----·~wJ 1715- 1800 - Dinner 1800 - 1900 - National Security polky-01aking, National Command Authority, and militias ( DG) 15 .Jan 0700 - 0745 - Tactical Update (JOC) 0745 - 0830 - Breakfast 0830 - 1230 - Iraqi Security Fore.es (MOl/CJTF 7 C3/JSOTF-AP): o IPS o lBP o FPS o lCDC o ICTF 1230 - 1330 - Lunch 1330 - prep and insertion into div areas 16- 20 Jan Security Assessment Team visit MSCs 21 .ran Extraction from Div areas 22 - 23 Jan Team iJ1teroal work/outbriefs 24 Jan Depart Running Summary or Security IDstitutions Steering Committee Vie,vs Key Tenets of Iraqi National Secur'ity and Defe11se • Civilian Control • ProfcssionaJism • Collegial control of power • Jointness • Na:tiona.l unity • Broadly representative • Integrity • Proper treatment of people by and in all Iraqi security forces • Stewardship of public resources • Transparency • Outwardness (region and beyond) • Cost-effectiveness • Defensive • Effective N11tio11a/ Security ~I aero Str11c111re' • Assume: o Cabinet government, with head of government (PM) as ClNC o Singular or multi-headed chief of state is not CINC o A national assembly with political weight • National command authority: o External defense branch: CJNC -- MoD •• IAF command.er (not CHODS) o Internal security branch: CI.NC -- Mol -- police or other commander • National security policy-making mechanism: o Cabinet national security committee chaired by PM o Core members: MoD, Mol, MoJ, MoFA o CH ODS and national inteHigence service present as advisors o Strong apolitical national securi1y advisor and staff to advise cabinet national security committee and provide inter-ministerial coordination • National assembly to have a say in: o Use oflAF for domestic purposes o Use oflAF in intemational peacekeeping and humanitarian assistance o Appropriation of funds and passage of laws governing MoD and lAF • Key processes: o Inter-ministerial p<>licy coordination and decision-making o Crisis management and decisions on the use of force o Seu'ing, budgeting, and resourcing capabilities requirements Key Rules: laws, Regul<ltioris, Atitlwtities aml Comm/~ • All struc.1ures, forces and processes outlined in this summ:uy are meant as end states. Certin adjustments will be made tor period durrng which MFN forces will be active and US will have military command • Civilian control • National command authority and authorization of the use of force • Responsibilities of principal institutions and services • Proscription of militias and strict regulation of private security organizations • Control of commitment of funds, acquisition, and personnel policies • Rules. procedures aod authorities governing domestic use of the IAF • Executive-legislative responsibilities People • Key Positions: o Def ensc Minister o Interior Minister o National Security Advisor o MoD Chief Execu11vc and directors general o Chief of the Defense Staff o Commanding General JAF o Director of the national intelligence service o Mol directors general and senior police commanders • Principles: o Civilian ministers o Military and civilian merit-based assignment and promotion o Recruitment and retention through competitive pay o Conscription not envisaged but not precluded o Broadly representative within institutions, services, units, levels o Not top-heavy o Retired military may serve as officials Capabilities • IAF o Defining mission: defense against external aggression o Modest size; capable; well-trained o Motorized infantry; limited coastal defense; limited air o Interior lines of communications and mobility; no force projection o Limited logistics o Interoperability witb allies o Command and control of reserves o Scope for enhancements to capability in future, consistent with dcfcnsi\ c posture • Internal Security Services o Single national Iraq Police Service (IPS) o [PS primary missions: law enforcement, public safety, community service o Tiered range oflPS capabilities (public order, SWAT, Spedal Intervention Unit to respond lo tiered threats) o Specific intel.ligence functions linked to national intelligence service o Mol services other tha11 police: infrastructuTe and border security o National entities with regional/local connections and input 2 • fnfrastructu~ o Geographically distributed bases o Heavy reliance on civil infrastructure and support services o Coherent national security infonnation inftastmctu.re, including national command node.s (Mo! and MoD). crisis management center, and first responder necworks Roles and ft-fissions Fit • External security will be provided by combination of capable regular IAF, IAF reserves, growing regional security ties, and "Western" security ties • !AF active and IAF reserve (currently ICDC) components must be aligned and administered. together and made capable of operating t. ogether. (Transition of the IC'DC into IAF reserves should begin soon, with GC consultations, and be completed no later than 7/1/04.) • lnt· emal security will be the greatest challenge jn the years to come. o Insurgency, terrorism, ethnic violence, fanaticism • Iraqi government must be able to use whatever means are at their disposal to defeal major inlcmal threats to Iraqi state and society • Domestic use of the IAF, active or re!IOerve, is last resort and under tight control • Therefore, it is important to ensure that the IPS has ample capabilities (e.g., special intervention units) to handle severe internal challenges • Linc between law enforcement (clo:scly linked to criminal justice system) and forcible action against severe internal threats must be understood and obsenred • If Mol forces cannot handle internal threats, the CINC+cab]nct request MoD to <lctacb and assign specific capabilities from lAF (including reserves) to support Mol forces under Mol authority. MoD \.\'Ould be placed in control only if Mol command is inadequate to meet dire threat to Iraqi state and society F11111re IJ/ork Progra"' • Continued refinement of Mol capabilities and organization to meet high end domestic threat. including Mol control of lAF/reserves when duly authorized • Design of the MoD • Strategy for militia dissolution • Position of intelligence service(s) wit11in the national security sys1em • Defense ant.I security spending needs (out-years) • Iraqi role in regional cooperation and international security institutions • Coalition role in a sovereign Iraq • Transition plan for ICDC into reserve component of IAF • Infrastructure security plans • Criminal Justice s~tor development • Conflict prevention and management initiatives 3 Iraq: Political Timeline, November 2003- December 2oosa (U) 2003 2004 2005 *** •eased on the • Agreemen1 on Political Process" Signed . by the Coalition Pt'O\llSIOnal Authooty and the Governing Council on ts November 2003- UNCLASSIFIED 392072AI 1 t .Q.1 Political Calendar January February March April May June July Initiate advisory consultations on permanent, Iraqi security institutiom .... Influence TAL ti--1...i TAL Create Moo Appoint Def Minister Fill top Civil & Military slots Caucuses ~ To select TNA--111111 T!lllN1111 A---~ Transitional Government ~ en Si.- ·- C\1 <( ~ ~ ~ ........, ·- 5.- :J 0 ~ (.) 0 Q) N Cf) ... 'V - co . c 0 m ·- ::l +-' c co ro z J '+-.. 0 Q) (.)1 ·- 0 ~ ~ OUTLINE PROGRAMNlE FOR SEClJRITV ASSESSMENT TEAM 14-15 JAN SUBJECT TO MG EIKENBERRY CONFfRMATJON 14 Jan 0900 - 1000 - Orfice Calls for MG Eikenberry (0830 - 0930 - Tour CPA key offices~ RCO) l 000 - 1230 - Theatre strat~gic context - a joint approach (CP NCJTF 7): • I 000 - I 005 - Admio/Prolocol brief (C5/SJS) • I 005 - 1025- Opening remarks and mandate (David Gompcrt./J\.1G Eikenbe1Ty) • I 025 - 1100 - Operational environment - orientation, curreut situation and indicators out to TOA (CJTF 7 - C2) • l I 00 - I I IO - Break • l 110- 1145 - Operations and security apparatus (CJTF 7 - C3): o Operational brief o Rotation o Multi-national dimension o Iraqi Security Forc(s - current situation • I J 45 - 1250 - . Political framework - ' Stratcaic, political, legaJ setting: now, 7/J and end state.' (DG.r I 1250 - 1330 - Lunch 1330 - 1500 - Iraqi Armed Forces (CM A TT) 1500 - 1515 Break (MG Eikenberry office caB on CG) 1515 - 1715 - Development of ministries, notably MOD <r . ._ ___ _, l 715 - 1800 - Dinner 1800 - 1900- National Security policy-making, National Command Authority, and militias (DG} 15 Jan 0700- 0745 - Tactical Update (JOCj 0745 - 0830 - Breakfast 0830- 1230 - Iraqi Security . Forces (MOI/CJTF 7 C3/JSOTF-AP) - MOI lead: o rrs o DBE (Department of Border Enforcement) o FPS o ICDC o ICTF 1230- JJJO - Lunch 1330 - prep and insertion into div areas (RCO/C3 OpsfMSCs) 16-20Jan Elements of Security Assessment Team visit MSCs (MSCs) - extract PM 20 Jan (RCO/C3 Ops/MSCs) 21 Jan Team internal work/outbriefs 22 Jan Depart (RCO) • Cl) e ~ Cl) +-' ·- e '-- ca :J (.) 0 Q) L( CJ) ~ ,... - ~ c: ro (/) c '-- • !"Illa Q) a·- ....., ti= 5 e ·- ro u Cl) Cl) Cl) ~ Cl) Cl) 0 0- Cl) Q) Cl) u e ·- <( ti= 0 ....... ~<( Dimensions National Security Structure Security Institutions and Forces Capabilities - Roles & Missions People Laws, Regulations, Authorities and Controls Relationship to Coalition Forces Stages Current - Iraq under occupation; lr, aqi security sector as it has developed to date; Coalition Forces responsible for security ToA (7/1) - Sovereign Iraq with civilian control over security sector; Coalitio, n Forces with a leading role in externaJ defense and internal security; limited Iraqi security sector capacity End-state - Sovereign Iraq supported by allied security arrangements; Iraqi security sector with capacity for externar defense and internal security Structure Institutions Capabilities Roles & Missions People Laws · Relationship to CF Current Stage CPA/CJTF-7 supervision Mal, MoJ, MoFA being stood up; MoD being designed. IPS, IAF, IN l.S being built. Low level & patchy law enforcement; ltd facility protection 1st IAF battalion Operational IAF Battalions OPCON to 4JD, ICDC augmented to ,CF. IPS report to CF. Interim Ministers in ' MOI, MoJ, MoFA; some senior officials Operating under CPA Orders and previous legislation CF in command; gradual transition to local control Structure Institutions Capabilities Roles & Missions Pea. pie Laws Relationship to CF ToA July 2004 Sovereignty. TNA and Executive Ministry. Coalition partnership(s) to provide Security and stabilit, y. Civi.lian control over security se. ctor. National Security Council of Cabinet (NSCC) and National Command Authority (NCA) structure subordinate to primacy of CF? MOD and JHQ, · fAF, IPS and INIS at fuller capacity Developing IPS SWOT/SIU/CT forces, Partial IAF capability to combat internal security in times of emergency. Limited Iraqi security sector cap. acity IAF coalition partner under coalition command : ICDC reserve component (fully mobilized in emergency period) cornrnence augmentation to operational IAF HQ's, TNA appointed MOO, MOI, iMOJ, MFA. CP A/GC appointed NSA, Head INIS1 CHOO and IAF OP Commander to continue in trans.'itional period. Ope. rating under TNA legislation and CPA Orders which continue with effect (unless repealed by TNA) Freedom of action of CF. (CENTCOM) C2 of Iraqi forces, CF restore securit. Y increase Iraqi capabilities to permit CF reduction. Iraq partne.r (or part. ) of the coalition. End-state Structure Sovereign state with permanent Constitution agreed to by referenda. Democratically elected National Parliament and Ex. ecutive. Institutions NSCC and NCA primary security policy decision makers and authority for use of force by Armed Forces Capabilities IAF 27 Bns +llCDC 36 Bns +/IPS 71k + dependent on decisions/resources of Iraqi Government. Roles & Miss. ions IAF/(ICDC reserve) nationally dep'loyable to defend sovereign state of Iraq from external aggression (internal security in times of emergency) IPS law enforcement and high end internal security. People Democratically elected leadership, Official appointments (INIS· , NSA, CHOO) approved by NSCC/Parnament? Laws Operating under legislation passed by the National Parliament, International treaties and security agreements. Relationship to CF Iraq supported by allied security arrangements. Some (non-permanent) ba, sing of CF in ! Iraq. Measuring Progress Fortnightly reviews against Strategic Plan Dialogue with individual IGC members. Advisory consultations with Nation1 al Security Committee (NSC) of l: GC and. a small core group to progress decision- rnaking. ~ en (]) -c ·- en c.. :::J I (.) ro ([} National Security Structure • Assume: - C. abinet government, with head of government (PM) as CINC - Singular or multi-headed chief of state is not CINC - A national assembly with political weight National command authority: - External defense branch: CINC -- MoD -- I.AF commander (not CHOOS) - Internal security branch: CINC -- Mol. -- police or other commander 1 Nationat security policy-making mechanism: - Cabinet national security committee chaired by PM - · Core members: MoD, Mol, MoJ, MoFA - CHODS and national intelligence service present as advisors - Strong apolitical national security advisor and staff to advise cabinet national security committee and provide inter-ministerial coordination National Security Structure (2) National assembly to have a say in: - Use of IAF for domestic purposes - Use of IAF in international peacekeeping and humanitarian assistance - Appropriation of funds and passage of laws governing MoD and lAF Key processes: - Inter-ministerial policy coordination and decision-making - Crisis management and dec· isions on the use of force - Setting, budgeting. , and resourcing capabilities re-quirements Security Institutions and Forces • Cabinet Committee/National Security Council • National Command Authority • MoD • Iraqi Armed Forces (a.rmy, air component, coastal force) • Army reserves • Mol • IPS, DBE, INIS, FPS s, upervision • MoFA • MoJ • prisons Capabilities 'IAF f Defining mission: defense against external aggression 1 Modest srze; capable; well-trained • Motorized infantry; limited coastal defense; limited air r Interior lines of communications and mobility; nQ force projection J. Limited logistics 1 Interoperability with allies 11 Command and control of reserves Internal Security Services t Single natJonal Iraq Police Service (JPS) 11 IPS. primary missions;. law enforcement, public safety, community service • Tiered range of IPS capabHities (public order, SWAT, Special lnterv. ention Unit to respond to tiered threats) I: Speetfic intelligence functions finked to national intelligence service l' Mol services other than police: infrastructure and border security 1 National entiti.es with regional/local connections and input lnfrastructurie • Ge· ographica. lly dis. tributed bases 11 Heavy reliance on civil infrastructur$ and support services • Coherent national security information Infrastructure, including. national command nodes (Mol and MoD), crisis management center. and first responder networks Roles & Missions • External security will be pr, ovided by combination of capable regular IAF, IAF reserves, growing regionat security ties, and ''Western,, security ties • IAF ac. tive and IAF reserve (currently ICDC) components must be aligned and administered together and made capable of operating together. • Internal security will be the greatest challenge in the years to come. 1 Iraqi government must be able t· o use whatever means are at their disposal to defeat major internal threats to kaqi state and society • Domestic use of the IAF, active or re, serve, i. s last 1 resort and under 'tight control • It is important to ensure that the IPS has ampre capabilities (e.g., special intervention units) to handl, e severe internal challenges - 1 Line between law enforcement (closely linked to criminal justic, e system) and forcible action against severe internal threats must be understood and observed r If Mol forces cannot handle internal threats, the CINC+cabinet request MoD to detach and assign specific capabilities from IAF (including reserves) to support Mol forces under Mol authority. MoD would be placed in control only i. f Mol command is inadequate to meet dire threat to Iraqi state and society People Key Positions: •Defense Minister •Interior Minister ·National Security Advisor ·MoD Secretary General and directors general •Chief of the Defense Staff •IAF Commander •Director of the national intelligence service •Mol directors general and senior police commanders Principles: •Civilian ministers •Military and civilian merit-based assignment and promotion ·Recruitment and retention through competitive pay •Conscription not envisaged but not precluded •Broadly representative with ~ n institutions, services, units, levels •Not top-heavy •Retired military may se, rve as officials Laws, Regulations, Authorities and Controls • Civilian control • N iational command authority and authorization of the use of force • Responsibilities of principal institutions and services • Proscription of militias and strict regulation of private security organizations • Control of commitment of funds, acquisition, and personnel policies • Rules, procedures and authorities governing domestic use of the IAF • Executive-legislative responsibilities Security • Team Leader - MG Karl Eikenberry • Purpose: Review and recommend the mission, size, roles, and timing for deployment of Iraqi Security Force • Depart/Return dates: 11 - 23 Jan 04 • Outbriefs and report to Coalition Provisional Authority/ CJTF-7, CENTCOM and JCS/OSD by 27 Jan 04 • Overlap with Financial Assessment Team in Doha, Qatar 22/23 Jan 04 • Security , and1 Financial Assessment teams h. ave common mem1bers LP2 u t.S SEEN Iraq Security Forces Assess, ment Team MG Karl Eikenberry rl f 10 . ' Revised Mission Statement Mission: Assess the missions, composition, requirements, resourcing, and command and control of Iraqi S· ecurity Forces in order to transition internal security respons. ibilities from coalition forces to effective Iraqi forces as soon as possibl· e. Terms of Reference Assess and recommend c:hange. s to the roles, missions, and command and controt 1 procedures for lr:aqi Security Forces. [Include requirements to protect pipe lines and 1 t convoys] · 1 Determine the requirements for security forces (size, equipment, facilities,. compensation, \l standardi2ation). Determine whether we should increase and I or accelerate fieldin · of security forces and if so, whajt add1bona' resources un 1 1ng, trainers, · c11t1es, etc. w. ould be needed. - Develop an assessment . of the appropr' iate roles of CPA. the US Emba.ssy, a, nd USCENTCOM in ragard to: ·Security· force requirements determination oversight and training ·Funding res1 ponsibility and authorities ·Examine both areas above with a view of the situation now and after 1 July 04. Assess what. should hap.pen to ICOC and remaininf militia forces in the long-term (Form 7 an Iraqi Gendarme, Ira i · Devel~p an u11 rstandipa of 'ra;:' 1 rve force, etc ... and resolve ab. ~ut security s· eryices and ( assess how 'tllGiii may mfluen<G the d · opment of secunty forces over time. Determine transition iss es spedfic to security forces and propose mechanisms now that could facilitate transition uture minis'ter responsibilities, f1scar/funding transition, etc.). Assess current metrics that measure security institu1ions, regional and national secu_rity. Rec:ommend ctlanges if required. · Identify ~ey decision points, way points,, milestones, and off ramps for the building of security forces. ). As· se· ss turre· ot and future resource allocations for security forces. , Identify best busines~ .Pr8: ~tices within each security force examined and each region <... 7vislte· cf (for cross fert1hzatton) Methodology and Ti!!!'!Jine_ f:-/ Six-Step Methodology ..,,,/""" c-rl 1. Start by understanding CENTCOM, CPA and CJTF-7's overall strategic concept and t counterinsurgency campaign plan. 2. Understand size, mission, composition of each Iraqi security service within that concept and plan; and any models used for plannin, g. 3. Assess concept of employm. ent I operations for each service. 4. Observe training, equipping and ops for each service 5. Assess requirements for each service (personnel, training, equipment, ops, logistics, funding,, admin) 6. Make recommendations on the concepts of employment for each service, re,quirements, training, ops, and integ, ration· into coalition. Time line (~ 11 Jan Depart Washington DC 12 Jan Arrive Doha, Qatar, 13 Jan Meetings with CENTCOM, CJTF·7 D~pl~ into Baghdad 14 -23 Jan AssessmeQt _,) 24Jan RTN Qatar (AM) Depart for Washington DC Team Membership COL r l(JS, Middle East) CAP{ l(J8-PBAD) COLf" koso SO/UC) (Army Special Forces I Civil Affairs - original member of ORHA as Chief of Staff) L TC& 5th l(Jf>.ME) (Army Special Forces, OEF w/ pecial Forces. Middle East FAQ) LTtf ~JB-PBAO) Mr.r· I (OSD-P) (Middle East Expert. Extensive experience w/ Iraqi issues) Mr.[ j(CPA) (CPA Washington - POC for all CPA Security Forces - Police, Border Enforcement, Facility Protection Service) eaptr ..... __ ----lj(Admin> MG Eikenberry, PACOM J5- Team Leader cPf ~Aide) Mr. r joso Comptroller) Mrl: COIN Expert) KSpec Advisor OSD) (USMC retired -- ~r.j' !<Spec Assist DSO) M pee Advisor DSD) COLr._ ____ l{CENTCOM) CENT COM) ~::::::2:==::::::...._...:..., ·- ~ ~ E '-' ~ s (1.) J:;J H (1) 0 ........ ...... ~ ~ :..... ~ ~ == E - ~ '-' ~ ·~ ~ ~ ~ 0 ~ ~ ' ~ ~ ~ ~ ~ ~ ~ ~ ~ ~ ~ Revised Mission Statement Mission: Assess the missions, composition, requirements, resourcing, and command and. co. ntrol of Iraqi Security Forces in order to transition internal security responsibilities from coalition forces to effective Iraqi forces as soon as possible . . Terms of Reference ----~----------~~~--~ . Assess and recommend changes to the roles. missions, and command and control procedures far Iraqi Security Forces. {Include requirements to protect pipe lines and VOS _ 2. De: termine the requirements for security forces (size, equipment, f.acili'lies, compensation, standardization). 3., Determine wh~ther we should increase and I or accelera, te fieldin of . security forces and if so, what add1tiona resour-ce.s un · tngr trainers, r aci it1es, etc. wou1d be needed. 4. Dev. e_lop an assessment of the appropriate roles of CPA. the US Embassy, and USCENTCOM in regard to: -Security force requirements determination oversight and training -Funding responsibility and authorities -Examine both areas above with a view of the situation now and after 1 July 04. 5. Assess what should hap~en to ICDC and remainin -mi.litia forces in the Ion -term (Form an Iraqi Gendarme, Iraqi Army reserve orce, etc .... 6. Develop an understandin~ of f'ragi concerns and resolve about secur.ity services and assess how those may in luence the devefopmen: t of security· forces over time. 7. Determine transition issues specific to securi1 ly forces and propose mechanisms now that could facilitate transition (future minister responsibilities, fiscal/funding transition, etc.). 8. Assess current metrics that measure security institutions, regional and national security. Recommend changes if required. 9. fdentify key decision points, way points, miles', tones, and off ramps for the building of security forces. 10. Assess current and future resource allocations for security forces. 11. l~entify best busines~. pra;ctices within each security force examined and each region visited (for cross fert1hz:at10, n) Methodology and Timeli111e Six-Step Methodology 1. Start by understanding CENTCOM, CPA and CJTF-7's overall strategic concept and e-ounterinsur,gency campaign plan. 2. Understand size, mission, composition of each Iraqi security service within that concept and plan; and any models used for planning. · 3. Assess concept of employment I operations for each service. 4. Observe training, equipping and ops for each service 5. Assess requirements for each se,rvice (personnel, training, equipment, ops, lo· gistics, funding, admin) 6. Make recommendations on the concepts of employment for each service, requirements, training, ops, and integration into coalition. Time line 11 Jan Depart Washington DC 12Jan Arrive Doha, Qatar, 13Jan Meetings with CENTCOM, CJTF-7 Deploy into Baghdad 14 -23 Jan Assessment 24Jan RTN Qatar (AM) Depart for Washington DC Team Me1tibership MG Eikenberry, PACOM JS- Team Leader CP"f j(Aide) col.f .... l{Js, Middle East) Mr.(m: l(OSD Comptroller) CAPif:' tJB-PBAD) r·· j(Spec Advisor DSD) (USMC retired -- Mr.= C OLr- l(oso SOILIC) (Army Special Forces I COIN Expert) Civil Affairs - original member of ORHA as Chief of Staff) Mr.r l(spec Assist DSD) Lrcr ~J5-ME) (Army Special Forces, OEF w/ Mr.r I (Spec Advisor OSD) 5th Special Forces, Middle East FAQ) LTC IAil COL!~ l(UK) j(JB-PBAD) Mr.r I (OSD-P) (Middle East Expert, Extensive coLr ~UK-MoD) COL.r KGENTCOM) experience wl Iraqi issues) Mr.r I {CPA) (CPA Washington - POC for all MAJr ~CENTCOM) CPA Security Forces - Police, Border Enforcement, Facility M r{" Protection Service) g(DoS (INL) Rep j{DoS-PM) Capt.[ ~Ad min) OSD Intel 1 LTCD2 Total Team Members: 22 ,__ COALlTlON PROVISIONAL AUTI f()Rrl Y BA(jl lDAD ACTION MEMO January 6, 2004 FOR: THE ADMINISTRATOR FROM: David C. Gompert, Senior Advisor for National Security Affairs SUBJECT: Egyptian. Military Training Assistance to the IAF Background: Military training for the IAF has commenced in Jordan. Tbe National Security Committee (NSC) of the lGC has been briefed on the training program though not exact numbers: nearly 1300 officer candidates from December 29 to June 17. No training is planned beyond June. Australia (4 IAF officers). Italy (3) and US (I) are also contributing to IAF traini11g on a much smaller scale. There is intense IGC NSC scrutiny on and pressure against training in Jordan. Points of criticism include that exiled Baathists and others with connections to insurgents have gained a foothold in Jordan and would infiltrate and int1uencc IAF officers training there. Regardless of the validity of these complaints, members of the lGC are mounting concerted criticism of training in Jordan. The NSC bas formed a sub-committee to report on the issue and present alternatives. Egypt is able and willing to offer training assistance to the IAF. Training bases in Egypt, which replicate US training bases. may be utilized for advanced unit-size training (umwailab)e in Iraq), as well as officer training. As in Jon.Ian, inslrucrion would be in Arabic. Advantages of Egyptian Training Assistance: Pursuing !AF training in Egypt. even limited in scale, could have important poHcy advantages: • It could case JGC criticism by showing that not all training abroad is in Jordan. • It could earn greater regional acceptance of the !AF. • It might serve as a precursor to more formal regional security agreements with Egypt and others in the region. Recommendation: • That the roe NSC Subcommittee that is reviewing IAF training in Jordan be made aware of the prospect of Egyptian training assistance. and be given pride of ownership of the idea as they present alternatives to the JGC. UNCLASSIFIED UNCLASSlffED • that. with JGC PA begin negotiations with the Egyptian government to • investigate tTainillg options and re agrecml!nt. • That the IGC is brided throughout on~ progress of the negotiations. This initiative does not imply curtailment of t?aining in Jordan. Approve: Disappro\.e: Approve with modification: 1~ A TT ACHME?'\TS: None COORDINATION: CMATT (MG Eaton)/G v~mance · - l >' ~CL \SSLFIED r J(FS-02) From: Jones, Richard H. (AMS) Sent: To: Subject: Thursday, December 18, 2003 10:18 PM ~ l(FS-02) FW: Egyptran assistance to Iraq r I Please pass a hard copy of this to David Gompert. Thanks. DJ --- - -original Message---- - From: Jones, Richard H. (AMB ) Sent : Friday, December 19 , 2003 9 :17 AM To: Casteel Ste ven W. (SE:S - 6 - Egyptian assistance to Iraq r Steve Casteel is our ac· tion officer for th• e Ministry of Interior, David Gompert is his counterpart for nat.ional security affairs and MG Paul Eaton is in charge of the coalition Military Assistance Tr aining Team . All could have a role in this depending on what type of training the Egytpians provide. I •ve copied Casteel and Eaton on this e - mail and wi 11 see tba t a copy of your incoming i s passed to Gompert, whose name doe an' t appear in my directory. Dick -----orig inal Mes saqe ----- From: r"° ~a in State), ,State sent: Thursday, Decembe r l 8 , 2003 10:29 PM To: Jones, Richard H. (AM B ) c-1 - sub j e ct : Egy ptian assistance co Iraq Dick: We've been working for some time to encourage Egypt to provide military and security force training to Iraq. President Mubarak and Defense Minist:er Tantawi have several times confirmed their willingness to provide assiutance. In the Oecember 10-tl OSD-led military coordination meetings held in Cairo, the E:gyptians reiterated their off et of =issist:ance and asked for help in identifying specific needs to be fulfilled. We've urged the GOE: to send Qn assessment team to I raq to discuss potential needs with CPA, CENTCOM, a:ld the GC, and ;-.'e ha·..-e four five Eg·/ ptia n gener als idea.t i fied. Embass:/ Cairo is p • imed co accompany such a team, and the mission would be led by OMC Chief Major General Guy Bourne. Assuming that this all makes sense Erom CPA's point of view, we now need a CPA point of contact who can facilitate such a visit and serve as a near term liaison with Embassy Cairo and the Egyptians. We• d appreciate your help either directly or by pointing us in the right direction. Regards - D UNCLA~SH ILD// Fr-om: ou ~ MFl.cn : DKMFIH EF LU0·1 Sent. 20.08.03 12/24/2003 Cc. COALITION PROVISIONAL /\UTHORITY(UC). AL lf'-{AQ COLLECTIVE( UC) Cc Precedence: Routine Sub1ect: RESPONSE TO GEl~MAN OFt=EI~ OF POLICE TF~AININQ Message Type_ Other-Organizational Extended Au th: ·16-58: 00 12/24/2003 (UTC) 19: 58'. 00 12/24/2003 (Chen1./Loca\) Security: This rnessage has been digitally signed and encrypted l ~TT U ZYUVV RUEHCAA8185 3581714-UUUU--l·H-IMFIUU Z NR UUUUU ZZH r~ 2416582 DEC 03 F M SECSTATE WASHDC TO RUEHRU/\M E MBASSY DERLIN INFO IRAO COLLECTIVE RUEHDO/AMEMBASSY DOHA RHMFIUU/HQ COA.LITION PROVI SIONAL AUTI I BAGHDAD BT ;. UNCLAS STATE 348185 { j I ·I c . O . 12950: NIA TAGS KJUS. KCRM, PGOV. GM, IQ SUBJECT: RESPONSE TO GERMAN OFFER OF POLICE TRAINING f<E:F-: A . A BERLIN A692 13. B S TAT E 272314 ·1. IN RESPONSE TO REF A, DEPARTMENT (INL /\ND E ur~) 11/\S REVIEVVED THE GOG TRAINING PROPOSAL FOR IRAO POI I CE. /\NU HAS CONSULTCD VVITH Tl I E COAL\ flON PROVISIONAL AU 11 I O P.ll Y (Cf-'A) " lllNISTRY OF IN TFr..;:1of-~ (MOI) IN BAGHDAD. CPA VVASHINGTON, ANU I HE INTEr~AGENCY . UNANIMOUS CONSENSUS IS CPA MOI SHOULI) BF I lf~ EC TLY CONSUL T E D ON /\NY SUGH OFFEl~8 . WHILE n lE SUBS r· ANC E " ... - n I E OFFER APPEAl::;:s SOLID. ENSURING Tt-tAT THE. CON rENT AND I !MING or- THE SE PAHTICULAr-{ COURSES IS COOl~DINA ri- o VVITI t I /\1 - ~C~L: I-' P O LICF DEVELOPMENT ErFO l~ TS IS CRI rlC AL fH LOVV A.Hl: PC>INl s FOi~ DISCUSSl(}NS VVI 11 t CCJUN r1 l{l-'/\I~ rs IN I :r Sr-'ONDING I 0 Tl H::_ or-FEH C>F Tr{/\IN\NC',· r1 ll d \NCE:- K 13A~-;ic SKll I s 11-<AININ< I l'HOUl~/\M I I/\~-~ /\I 1{1-/\UY I I <..;UN/\ I I\ F/\C\I I I YIN .H )l{IJAN, /\.NU Tl II_ !5/\Mt_ ti Wl:.I K ! H/\ININ<_; Vvll I C<JM l\IH"fJCL Ar S I ! LS IN ll~f\{) IN r.:/\RLY 2l)04 /\LL OF n ICSE i ·,"di JING Cl ,.\SS E:S WILL L3E FOi !_OWED BY/\ Tl::N-MONT• I FIEL D l i-.'./\INING J-->l {OGRAM CONDUCT ro BY lJf::S TO 1 . 'JDO us /\ND OTI 11 I~ IN I I HNA rJON/\L POLICE ( C IVPOL) ADVISOHS IN IF~AQ. CPA IS CONCENTRA nNG TRAINING r~FSC>Un.CFS IN lf~/\O /\ND Jt l~DAN IN AN E FFORT l C> BUILD UNIFOr~MITY OF rRAININU 1-\ND TC) L1 VI l _ OP PHOFESSION/\L ,_-: /\MA.I !/\OrRIF rt,,- , 'I Al·!r I l\!llT1 ['F UND~ I\ i'JO c., 1 Jl\I I Fii D I 'F R ::-;C1NN r I \JV\ I<- J /\I ~I .r\V ,A.IL AOL\ _ 1 u O LLIVl~ I..:. I l ~ .• lf'JlNC_, rt--t EREF-ORE. IT I~ ESSEN rt/\L Tl IAT ALL POLICE I 1-'.L\lNING ACTI VITIES BE CLOSELY COORDINATED WI rt--1 er/\ TO RC DUCE I •UPLICATION OF EFFOr{T AND ENSUf<E CUflSlSTE NCY (") F rRAINING J N f L NT. /\.S PER REF l.:1, THE N EEDS tN IF~AQI F~EM/\.IN EXTENSIVE, /\ND 11 E USG VVELCOM ES GERMANY'S EXPRESSED DESIRE TO HELP ADDf~ E SS I l~ SE NEEDS_ IN ORDE R TO E NSUf~ E THAT THIS ASSIS rAl'-lCC IS OF 'l-/\TCST UTILITY IT I S IMPOl:.?.TANl fH/\T THE GOVERNl\Jlf ~ NT OF < -'MANY COOF<DINATE /\NY PL11 I C: ~ rRAINING ~"")I--{ D Fvi - 11..-:-:>1..>rvJEN rAL /\ _ .I S r/\NCE DIRE C rt y Wll H 11 IF ( : 1 '/\MI NI!: ~ r-Rv OF IN I I 1 ~ 101~ I JNCI /\SSIFILO// l JNGl /\SS IF I ED// _ IN IH/\C.l, I J IS CHUCl/\L n 1/\-1 /\LL 'H:/\INING BE PL/\NNLn \NITH CPA ro PRf~ VENT THE STl~ENGTH 01· 1111 IR/\QI POL ICL I OHCES FROM Bf IN! D E PLETED SIGNIFICAN rLY /\T ANY ONl- TIME. - - I HE CPA RECOGNIZ E S AND AGR EES THAT SPCCIALIZ ED AND ADVANCED TRA INING FOR SELEC r OFFICERS AND UNITS. INCLUDI N G MANAGEME N T A.NO LEADERSHIP PROGRAMS. ARE F UNDAME N TAL TO /\N 1::- rFE CTIVE POLICE DEVELOPMENl PROCESS. CPA IS D E V ELOPIN G A SPE C IALIZED AND ADVANCED TRAINING PLAN, AND I S PRIORITI Z ING K E Y N EEDS SUCH AS COUNTEHTE RRORISM. INTE L L I G E N C E . OF~GANIZ E D CRIM E. FORENSICS. AND INTERNAL A F FAIRS - - CPA EXPEC I S I 0 F INALIZE A COMPr-tE H E NSIVE PLAN I OH S P E CIALIZED TRA INING BY THE E ND u 1 = .. JANUA F~Y 20tM. A t \NHICH rlM E I T \NILL S ECK roJ~E IGN CONTRIOUTIONS F on rH E SC SPE CIFIC E F FO I~ rs. \NE \NE:l..-COME GERMANV"S OFFER TO ASSIST IN PROVIDING SPE CIALIZED TRAINING . - ... O N CE CPA HAS COMPLETED 11 S I DEN T IFI CATION OF SPECIALIZED THAINING NEEDS. \NE HOPE YOU \NI LL. IN COORDINAl"I O N WITH CF'>A. O F l- EJ~ TRAININ G TH/\T ADDRESSE S n I OSE N EEDS. \NI 11- 1 THE UNDERSTANDING 1 1 IAT IT MIGl- n B E OFFERED IN YOUH HOME COUNTRY SO AS TO DRA\N UPON DOMESTIC EXPERT RESOURCES AND TRAIN E RS. AND THAT YOUR OFrE R INCLUOLS COVE RAGE o r ::: ALL TRANSPOR IA I ION AND ON--l HE-GROUND HOUSING AND LOGISTICS COSTS FOR THE IRAO I STUDE N TS. - - IN ORDER TO B E MOST EFFECTIVE . SUC I I TRAI NINGS• IOULD Bl? D E SIGNED IN COORUINATION \NI n I , I I E CPA TO E N SUH E n-tAT TH E TRAINING AND a ~n I E R ASSISTANCC I S CONSISTE NT \NITH OVE RAI I . GO/\LS, AND CAN R E EFFECTIVELY /\nSORBED ANO APPLIED BY-YI I E IRAQl POLICE. VVI Al so \NISH ro Hf 1rr.::R/\rt- OUI~ INll Hf Sf IN GLl~M/\N POI lCI 1 1 ' /\Ir-JI HS P/\1~ TJCll>/\ rtNO IN Tl II CPI\ LEU I l~/\ININO I f I C>l~T IN I~ 11..: I _l f\f J /\ND \NOUl D \Nf I COMf /'\<If HM/\N CC>N l l~IHU t l<_)N I 1 I ; I //H l H!> UNCI /\S~IFI C D// lrar1i Se~urity Forces Generation of Capability: Reality as of 20 Jan 2004 1 c·nc Polici· U onkr A rm ~ F:u:ilitic' Pro1cctinn l\lis~ion Tas~ Force Structure Ttaining ~ ~ ~ Ec1uipping 1 '.! ~ ~ Fielding Sustainability :! 2 ~ Resource~ 2 II KE't : NOTF.S: I. CPA ~n· ices Through CMATT 2. MSC lniliali\• e 3. Dc~ol\cd lo Minbtrics C PA Lrad c.rrr-7 Al>MSI CJn "Lc.11J 3 3 COALITION/IRAQi C2 - TRAN ITIONAL ARRANGEM. ENT IRAQI TR L AUTHORITY HQ COALITION FORCE IRAQ NATIONAL SECURITY COUNCIL M.nisters of Defense, lntenor. Finance, Oil JL.stice and Foreign Affairs. Intelligence A;;11isor. l Coalition Commander a full member) NATIONAL JFHQ OFFICE OF ECURITY cd&i &id !!JON J OPER.ATlONAL COMMANDER COALrflON MILITARY ADVl ORY -SNG i 21 ii!! (NIA, ICDC) OP COM OPCON COO RD COALITION POLICE ADV! ORYTNG !St !Iii (Police, Borders) Joint Coordination Councilc=::> ·co-ords Local Gov. Arm~. ICDC Pohce. Borders, lnfruttucture Protection New Iraqi Iraqi Police ( Divisions Army- ervice Pr ~i ncial ) D1vision &&!dl:and NeJraqi r Brigades -Army Bngade -:: .. - .•. ---~. ·· .. ·. - NII .- • .. .. .-~::·::. . cw raq1 Battalions 0.::::::::::..Army Bngade ______ .::--- Iraqi Police ) entice Local 2 21 i!!JJ&lid PROVINCIAL LOCAL Notes 1) NSC provides a mechanism for co-oid and mt:ntonng by Coal1t1011 Commander 2)_ Iraqi Forces are delegated OPCON to CJF under the Securrty Agreement. 3). JFQ, once estabhsl'led. will prov1 Je ro-ord at Nat1onnl level with Coaltion HO. 4) As the Strategy of Local to Strategic 'handoff develops, and the Iraqi C2 structure ma:ures cor.•.ol .viii lie~ ·ogre s ~1vcly passed to the Iraq\ Transitional Authority via the JGC mechanism PCL Xl error Subsystem: IMAGE Error: Mj ss1ng[)ata Dperator: Roadl'Tl<Jge Po111 ti on: 864 Iraqi Armed Forces . · 1 $ Savings Personnel Residual Effects of As$umptions Reallocation Saving~ Deceleration Opportunities Requirements 27 Bn Level 9 Bn level tw , officer and NCO traln1119 conducted at the 27 an le11et) US Military 602 us pax 250 US paic CST Sl<lM S12.5M Pers-0n11el (requested 111 RFF submitted by CMATI 13 Oct) $1 ; 5M 352 us It all 602 are deployed, "$ 10 ma. n teams ·At a ratio of 1 hnfBn, 35 Savings" column goos to 0, but composed ol otticcr:r. of the proposed 43 ICOC 352 pa_1t available for mentoring and NCOs possess. Bm;. could be 111anned by !CDC, Pollce, ISP. Organized skill sets adaptable US mentor'$ toto 10 man teams. provides to mentonng of • -35 Border or Police -35 teams for reallocation ICDC. IBP units stations could be mentorod Iraqi Officers I 1350 Ofhc:crs 1350 Officers N o cha119c No E):cess officer!> \-900)/NCOs • 100 man team ca. 11 • 33 tms could conduct 2 NCOs 4000 NCOs 4000 NCOs lcontrao.;t change (-26!i-Sl available tc:> assist in tram 800 man Bn month training fc:>r 33 bcu 1 \co111ract traln1119 IAF, !CDC, IBP, or as • IC:OC trng "' 1 mo IBP Bns exl '<.utecJ, nelng shadow officers in US units to • IBP trng ,. 8 wks. • Officen.INCOs coming S Ulll\ CO">l) executeC1 gain e111posure to • Officer/NCO ratio = on line Mar 04; Off/NCO l>Unk cosl} professionalism of US 1:5 trng complete by Jun 04 officerslNCOs • Tmg Facilities avail. Iraqi Soldiers -35,000 -8100 NIA :26,900 Potentially avails 26,900 to •Recruits are willing Any recruits diverted serve m other security elements to serve in other security elements from IAF to other s.ecurity clements could not ti<! used to stand up future IAF battallons Sustainment S318.66BM S183.212M S135.456M • NIA Reallocate funds to ICOC, Police, IBP { Llfo support I GenO&M) Vinnell S48M (fo:ed S4a M tF1xed so None Excess NCO traJrwrs produced Training contract· contract- 1.>y V1nneU could bee available to Co11tract terminates Jun rerminates Jun 1ra1n ICOC, IBP (capturoo above 04) 04) 1n "Iraqi Offlcers/NCOs" ro"") $609.342 mlllton saved in first year only. If dtvened, other sources must be found lo fond Construction $ , 466M (9 $181M $285M NIA Reallocate funds to ICDC, remaining 18 battalions of ttte IAF during year . 2 bases (Reduced to 3 Police, ISP and 3. mcludlng bases while maritime, air, relam1n9 Addllional $40M saved if military maritim~ . air, military academy not tuooed academy, an<I milltary rocruitlng academy, anti requirements recruiting requ i feme i W~> Equipment $756.932M $585.546M $171 .:.H36M NIA Realloca1e funds to ICDC, Police, IBP Total $1.6198 $1.0108 I $6 U~.:"A2M NIA Reallocate funds to ICOC, Police, IBP Annex A Team Membership MG Karl Eikenberry, PACOM J5 - Team Leader CPTr l(Aide) COLL j(J5, Middle East) Mr.r· ·· j(OSD Comptroller) CAP Tr l(J8-PBAD) Mr.r !(Spec Advisor DSO) (USMC retired - COLr l(OSD SO/UC) (Army Special Forces I COIN Expert) Civil Affairs - original member of ORHA as Chief of Staff} Mr.r lcspec Assist DSD) Lrc[' l(J5-ME) (Army Special Forces, OEF w/ Mr.r I< Spec Advisor DSD) 5th Special Forces, Middle East FAO) COL.j l(UK) Lrcr kJ8-PBAD) cot.t:·· l(UK-MoD) Mr.r l<OSD-P) (Middle East Expert. Extensive CO Lr ~CENTCOM) experience w/ Iraqi issues) MAJr j(CENTCOM) Mr.r l(CPA) (CPA Washington - POC for all CPA Security Forces · Police. Border Enforcement, Facility Mr.r l(DoS- PM) Protection Service) Mrr· j(DoS (INL) Rep capt.rfil j(Admin) Lrcr .... l[OSD Intel ] LTCI ..... l(J2) Total Team Members: 22 - 1 Thru EYOS 2. 3. 4. Terms of Reference 1. Assess and recommend changes to the roles, missions, and command and control procedures for Iraqi Security Forces. [Include requirements t<» protect pipe lines, electrical infrastructure and convoys] Determine the requirements for security forces (size, equipment, facilities, compensation and benefits, standardization). Determine whether we should increase and I or accelerate fielding of security forces and if so2 what additional resources (ftt11ding, trainers, facilities, etc.) would be needed. Develop an assessment of the appropriate roles of CPA, the US Embas.sv, and USCENTCOM in regard to: -Security force requirements determination, oversight and training -Funding responsibility and authorities -Examine both areas above with a view of the situation now and after 1 July 04. 5. Assess what should happen to ICOC and remaining militia forces in the long-term (Form an Iraqi Gendarme, Iraqi Army reserve force, etc ... ) 6. Develop an understanding of Iraqi concerns and resolve about security services and assess how those may influence the development of security forces over time. 7. Determine transition issues specific to security forces and_ propose mechanisms now that could facilitate transition (future minister responsibilities, fiscal/funding transition, etc.). 8. Assess current metrics that measure security institutions, regional and national security. Recommend changes if required. 9. Identify key decision points, way points, milestones, and off ramps for the building of security forces. 10. Assess current and future resource allocations for security forces and the funding process. 11. Identify best business practices within each security force examined and each region visited (for cross fertilization) - Coalition Embassies ~· Key RECOMMENDED C2 STRUCTURE Security Structure Iraqi Government I Commander r- J CPA then US Embassy ....__ ______ _ I •·········· . Jo mt Forc e _ _ s _ ................... .. IRAQ Interim Governing Council then Iraqi Transitional Authority 1 Office of Security Cooperation (Force Pro\lider) [ I Coalition Military Advisory Tng T ~am (IAllCOC) '-----::.-~ I Coalition Police Advisory Tng Team (IPSJFPS) -········ ,__.:..&&....------, Ministry of Defense ............ Ministry of Interior C2 Coordination AN:\EX C :\f(, Eil..e11hcrn confill"h: CPA Ambi\S$4'd,"'lr I... P;iut Bremer. Adminisirator. CPA I I t 1 , Ri.:1 , Kc:llh K.ellogg, Chief Operating Officer \1T1hi1\,,1Ju1 J •llC\, D1-1pu1~ 1\Jrnini~tralor and Chit:f Poli~y Olliccr. CP/\ < P \ Pl1lil:) Director '-:-;::i _____ ._, IJ1rcd\'r,1f'la11011al s.: .. url\y \tl,nr-, Dm!4'lor ot AJm111 aml Lugi uc:. ._,....--..,.,i ..,cn1or h~1s1.111t fur l\.;Jt1onal ')i:curit\ \ lt.tu' ._:----~ Lh:p111) <..hiefol Station, UG D11c..tor of lhc lntcrior i.......,.....,..--.--w---' ''''' 1d \lush. Director, Program Management Offic.: li;;;;;::=====~ -' ">rn1u1 Ath ii.or. Gm,crnanc:-t> T i:.im • \J\ iwr 10 11.fini~tl) t"ll Oil ·1"""--"""'lr:-:--:~ t:>cni.ir dv1sor (0 Minl''ll') OI r ,~,rrl~ll) l.m ___ ....,1 "I \l11m.1~ ol the lntcri .. r Poh.::c \d\!1~or ---..----'GE'1 \Rel) Abadi. lrnq1 Arm.:J Fo~s l oun5do1 !or Iraqi f.:>r.:~s ........ --...:....:..;;_~ 1 lcJd ,,, c..urn) Fr in)., ln1ern.111onal, pro\ 1d 1ny training for Minisuy of Oil se<:uril}' ~-----.i..;,;. '- .;; c:n ;,;;•;,;; •1.;.,r INCC'I \tr .,...._..-----,! 1nu \tr ._r- _____ _,l 11.:ad CJ I '>c.:Unl) l<>r USl\IO \1 rr- !11.:dnd I '\ \ID lrdtli \llm\ll!r \Ir ' •'P fhllr:tn Ambassador\\ illiarn Oums. Assistanr Secretaf) of State for Near Eas1crn Affair; (i..:n.:r.ll \Iii-..: l.11.\...,,.n. 'i-..iLin~ I K .\mt) Lhi.:1 ,,,. i;;1.11T ( JI r:.; 1.1 G Ricartln "11nd1..:1. C'i'>mni.mding Genoeral. \JTF-7 \Iv fl.1ul l:a1<1n, Con1ma11<l1ng General, CMA r r IH1 11.11lw.1 I '''· c..::. u I r-7 11~1 '>kh' , , 1111 C5. VJ IT 7 BtJ I I l ••~ m I I 1 111111 llld,1 for Kcbu1ld1nc Iraqi H~c1rlci1~ I .. J:..,_ 11111111r.-:~l 11· l'ttm1n.111Jcr for /{.:l>uddm~ l1<1t11 Ori I I l f'!'t j I I 7 t< 'I H. 1>l.1n11in!; ulfo:,·r ~ u;:11.;1JI. I .\rm .. r IJl\l!>ILlll 18'1 '.\IP B11i;ad.: \dditiunal I tam tunt:ich: ( p \ \Ir \tr I 1l JI MG Run John~ori and 1111 .... ----~ I... h1cfor' Sm ff. P\10 CPA Di:partment of Border Enfor..;emcn1 cnmr \ d\ i~or • 1or Ad\tsor lor Na11onal Sc.:urir) J\ ffair~ 1 LP . .\ F. mfHi~s l'ro1ee11011 l!r\ic.:'\ CPA P"rr!Jc~l Management Offi(•e t P \ lt1lril'>lr11, 1 11r~ \..:~mil) t->r0h:d11in ( 11 11up e :I 1111r~tru c 1ure A.dv1c;or Gro\1p·H IW- "41lr 1 ll.iJr .1111, r.11111s11.:r uf ln1c11or '-m..---....,..,=-----1 Director o f l31>rder f'o ltct! o~ Ul\ 0 1 Uo rder Pollet! .;;;.i.i----"I'"""""::--' T ..isk force Shield ..;;;,;..;i...---r:----'' Iraq Reconsirucrion and Development Corps·Ministry of Science .i...---,.-1 lrnq Rccum lrucuon ilnd D~i.elopment Corps ....,,__ __ ... c =..:.... P:...;· S ccurtr)· Ad ,· i~or .-.-------I O aghd:t<l C. enlral Dih:Chlr ._ _____ _., Go v.:rnan.::e Team Director L------...J...,Go'w 1:mam::l' 1 .:.1m M.?mber ..,;,:,w. ____ _J M mi~ i.r) u f lntorror \ < h isor ._ ____ ..&.;..; linistf) o f Elecirich) CPA MOL Direc1or of Police, Polite training issues L PA MOI. Director of Policy, S1anding up the Mol '-------.-JCPM VIOJ, ~e 111o r Ju.,1ice Dept Advisor: Iraqi justice system, couns, legal reform L-----~...u. ·\ ,\!OJ. S¢nror Advtsw for Prisons .;:.:;:.:.J. ____ _.,CP V MOJ, enior 1 \ dvisor i....,~.-,-----\ CPA IM O f Policy Advi5or lonf---.r---'(. , 5 I fl I l \Ir p.:1n 1 l!altt. Ran1JJi uo~c.:rn11i.:11r Cc(lll!r .__.....J.,Commnnd..-r 1)1,•put~ Cum111:u1<lc.:r Dirc.:..:wr CMOC f) .I, 'JI t i r f.11 Puhhi: l k,1\\h .• 111d Rcli!l ious/Cohural \If.sirs lh ~. u 1",-" V.-tt:1.1n·~ .-\tlJir~ Fiddcd for.:•·~ Llc ._r'_~~--"'l u 0 1 F-AP i...------';;;;.; BaghdaJ Polii:e l i.i1 son Oftkcr • .._ _________ ..,ia ,3 ll~ • 1 Airborn1: "'" 1~1un I\ H 1 "" ,11111.u;k \ Ci I h f1l M \ l1 3 f>l.m~ I rt \,_ \I \J ll) I 1t..:ch (Re:>J'Or!!.1blc 1or JP\ 1n1111ini;J ~~~ (j; (IT.:,b tR.,.)PQn)tbl.: h>t 81 rJcr 1'.11wl tr,1111111.il 111,_.,._. r, ;;,: ,; - r ui:~l~ { R e~pon • 1bk• for IC'OC' 1ramin!t) .liill!iiii!!i~-W.CP \ Go\crfldn,c Tc.mi Jlliiir;;;a.i• {I'\ \IOl tP ltcc) l '\l> Cl'A \ JOI (Police) L' O IUI \I .\ l 0 ~O> \II' H.J1t.1)1,,n .:.: 1>1c<<:lor \ bilr PN\ m~.: lr.aq ... J.:r <;n ~ r3r.i R~t lh1g1d1.:r KJm11n Abdul 1\ttar ~d.Jwn. Comm:sndtr I" tJOl:. K.1r Ku<h \Iii I.If" I 1Jn11r:. Ra,e. l.\F Rrcrt11I I~"'"'"~ ll: a-t I. It R.:t 1 lu!N ,,,-.: Cr~J..er - Ch1..:f tr~1n1ng h.?.11n Vi nil( II Corp 1-1 - F \ B.atnhon Comm;i.nder ~ ID I ~f- I r,1.mrn~ Cdl •i..-..11-1 ~ f A 'i-3 I It. t..hon L' rr.m.mJ.-r (I\• 1 It II( Ul. I ·~ ll.l 1 r.11111n~ I t.1~1111~ I ! t .,.----i I \ " l!....__J 1 - ~ L\ -..:; lPI ~- f-.\ ll IJC framing l>irC\:IN c 11 1 ~ ' 11.1,11 ll rx: ua11.1l1 •111 lbghdad C11:- lwncrl. Pubhc Safi:t) Cumm11tee Or ·,11 ..11 ~ \mir1 ;ind lloJm.:J B4J.Jw11 G.:u J;wf;ir Al'Jul R<b\IUI , \~. BaihJ..t Poli.:.: A.:tmg C1ucf(•)) \ nhi r f'r \ ~;114 LA Bde r 11JnJ"r I· l.24'! lnfantr) tl-lorid<J Nauornsl GuOlfdJ MG l.1ad.in. PC\hcc Chief. Al .\nlrnr PrN incc ~trl.uk 1'1111.:.· 1 IU BG f urhJn. "-trl.11._ PohccH_hic=f lOl -1~; \O!\ OnttaJcC-ommander \ll, \l olt.1nt~'\l lh• •I Jfl.: \fo!>ul Ch1d Qfl•ot. .. c re: :P!ii : r !<. f'11h1.o.: 'iclllt>r •\J\IWr, Uaghd.ul P\llicc .<\1:.1J.:m)' 11 I I Pl I ,:!.,J i\IP CO, 18'1 \1P BDF. Baghcfod IH.1 t\frl ,\t>uul f(,i1111h111 l>m:ctor ol Plan~ RortJcr rolin· \Junth.:T).i B 11J.:1 ~it" COi ilillliiii .. • r.i41 Comm.mJi:r \lunthcry,.:i Border Sue tP I lh:I"\ (t>mma.nd.:r , I 1- FA ( 01 lf\.l r1111111 ml.:r C\lulam .. h.:h hordcr cro:.~inl! f. >Jc1lities Prokchun '>en ice (\I\ Ir I llf e;.;;.r;:_...,) \ STRA TF.GIC Pl.AN STATUS CHECK (as of 6 Feb 04) Summarv by Core Foundation Sec.uritv • ONSA update ongoing • MoJ plan being revised Essential Service- s • No plan update from Electricity • Oil revised (oil company plan)? • Rewrite ofTndustry & MineraJs orJgoing • OFF Milestones presented - awaiting Key Tasks Economy • Re-assessing SOE strategy in light of recent political decisions. Governance • No change to Database .. Strat Comms • Focus remains Governance - Electric, Education and Health campaigns will start when more resources currently working governance are available. Significant Reds Communications - Objective 2-5, Rcstmcturc lTPC and its Business Operations Assessed as RED as a result of current/likely resistance from the mjoisteriaf level. Allltough Dr. Haider al-Abadi bas agreed in principle to the establishment of an lnspeclor General, there has not been a corresponding Jevel of action. The san1c challenge applies for the appoin:uneut of a female de.Puty as recommended/directed by Ambassador Bremer. The second reason this objective 1s coded red overall is because the premise of restructuring the ITPC involves putting into ))lace external controls (auditinglfG) and a clivesture of business units (postal, transmission, networking, ere.) from the c.urrent stru. cture that have been or will very likely result in resistance from the Minister. Beyond the physical efforts required to spin~off individual units, it involves. perhaps more di ffkult intangible factors such perceived loss of power, control, and resources that have been slowed-rolled to date. The mechanisms, pJanning, and soon lhe resources, are in place and underway for each of the supporting tasks, but overall objective success will depend upon the ability to break through the barriers posed by the impact of the intangible factors on the mfoistcr. Transport - Objective 10-2,Enabte Iraqi Pon Authority (IP A) to administer a port of call with intennoda1 capabilities and inland container distribution. While Iraq-funded dredging and supplemental-funded dredging will commence in February, there has not been any maintenance dredging since September 2003, when Great Lakes Dredging Co. completed their work. This is partly because the Iraqi dredge fleet of 7 ships (6 ships non-operational, 1 ship operational) is in disrepair. Also, with 2 operational container cranes, limited waterside transpor1ation capacity is restraining the amount of goods coming through the Pon of Umm Qasr. In addition, because the cranes are not powered by tbe electrical grid, they arc relying on diesel-powered generators for the power supply- which has reduced crane movement capadty down to 70%. Each crane at Urnm Qasr moves 8 containers per hour, while the industry standard for the crane ranges between 20-30 containers per hour. Significant Ambers bv Trend Security MoT expect to have BIAP ready for commercial flights prior to Transition although this wi11 be conditions based, subject to security. Personnel No change to personnel issues rajsed 30 Jan 03. Justice will present to Exec Board 8 Feb 04. • Securil)• Obj 3, KT 2, ST 1 - B y mid-February, staff will be down to 7 Coalition personnel in the Ministry of Justice. No replaceme11ts ide11tifietl despite repeated req11ests, i11cl11di11g requests~hy-11ame of la•iryers euger to come to Iraq as justice advisors. • Sect1rity Obj 3, KT 4, ST 1 ·January 2004: Long-awaited contracted civilian prison experts are slowly beginning to arrive and being assigned duties as correctional trainers and facility-level adrrtinistrators beginning in the greater Baghdad area a.nd then expanding nationwide. Extreme lack of qualified Iraqi staff s11ggests ha11d-over of operational co11trol on J(1ly 1 cot1id have severe adl•erse co11seque11ces. 2 Security Obj 2, KT 3 - Create an EITective and Accountable Polioe System TJ1e CJV POL police J1a11e been .flOH' to arrive ilt couJJtry. 14 i11 Ja11uary. Recr11itme11t held 11p due to contract issttes a11d avuilability of Sttppleme11tal Budgetfimds. Discussion at the Jordan mee1ing is still ongoing and may impact this task. Some delays in trai11i11g due tire difficult)I of niovi11g i11ternatio11al trai11ers illto Iraq. 14 new trainers in January. The details of the revised way forward on international trainers is being worked out in Amman Jordan between MOI leadership and State INL. It will be directly linked and related to the Adnnan Palace move. Essential Services (Comms) Obj 2, KT 7 - Expansion of Wireless Capacity: Awaiti11g arrival of new CPA staff to fucilittUe project. Funding Security Obj 2, KT 1 - Develop and apply consistent vetting policies and processes: A review of options has been written by MOI policy and PRB f11ndi11g will 1101 f1111d tlte project. No 11ew funds lia11e been iJe11tified at tlris time. Security Obj 2, KT 3 - Create an Effective and Accountable Police System R.ecruitniellt /ield up due to co11tract issues a11d <n•ailability of Supp/en• ell/a/ B11dgetfunds. Discussion at the Jordan meeting is still ongoing and may impact this task. The times for delivery are hei11g pushed to the rig/it because of slo•" release of money am/ contracti11g slow-downs to meet "fair and ope11 "policy. Essential Services (Housing) Obj 4, KT 2 - Increase Housing Supply: The Housing shortage is in the magnitude of in excess of l .4 miJlion units No f/ousing ftmds were provided in t/ie Suppletnelltal. A tender was issued in August for l 3 projects of 504 flats each that would have been funded from the supplemental. The bid date for the tender was extended in hopes that Donor's Conference money wouJd be<:ome available to fund the contracts. However, it d.id not, and Amb Brcmcf made a special allocation for housing to get this critical infrastructure and social met. Jnitial al location was I 00 mi Ilion housing proper, and 30 million for "mortgage banking". Bids opened 10 Jan 3 There is 110 i11dicatio11 of wlrllt will be provitied for Housing from t/le Dtmor's Co1tfere11ce. Three low income housing projects ( 1,320 flats) are underway with FY 03 Iraqi funds. Six projects (3.024 flats) re-started in OFF. There is 011~v euo11gl1 ftmds iii tire FY 04 Iraq budget f'Dr ht10 new projects of 504 flats eacll. Capacity Building Essential Services (Water Resources) Obj 8 KT 1 - Create Viable org to deliver water, sewerage and municipal services: New Institutional Development and WatSan Advisers to start December and January; ( WatSa11Adviser11ot yet ill place at 29 .fan, expected witliitt tutti 10 days) Civil Ser••ice Reform 11eeds assessment stlld)' by DFJD - Jam1ary team .start. (Visit sig11ulled start of CSR Team i11 Bagltdad hy end February) DFlD-MMPW Support Project to be detenuined by January DF ID visit (resulted i11 p1itti11g D FrD-MMPW Support Project i11 aheya11ce 11111/ placing all decisions on tlte scope of support umler the CSR pF<>ject ratlter t1un1 as origilially e11visaged tts a sta11d-alo11e project) Essential Services (Water Resources) Obj 8, KT 3 - Develop fu11 range of Municipal Services and inclusive delivery mechanisms ...... : Development planning processes are still at an early stage but have the potential ofhi-lateral (DFID) capacity building and support. (DFID-MMPW S11pporl Project now ill abeyatrce, .but CSR P1·ojectfortl1comillg wliiclt can accommotltlte some of these requireme11tJ,) WitltdrawaJ of all UN expatriate staff lra111peri11g progress 011 global tec/Jnicn/ coordi11atio11. (New UN analysis underway for potential return; new UN Strategy Document highlights Urban Management and Planni11g as a priority input). 4 Essential Services (Water Resources) Obj 9, KT 4 - Capacity Building within the Ministry: Approximately 120 employees from the defunct Defense Surveying group are now under the Mo WR. This group needs to be retrained to operate and function utilizing modem equipment and techniques. This effort cannot be started u11til the 11ew Mo WR orga11itatio1tal structure is completed. IG lde11tified for selectio11 11111 was later selected by a11otlter Ministry. Essential Services (MoLSA) Obj l l, KT 3 - Convert Social Service Programs into Economic Development Tools: 76,629 jobs have been created under an initiative, the National Employment P-rogram, that seeks to create 100,000 new public work jobs. Over 150 personnel who were identified for jobs, but lacked tlte proper skills, started vocational training courses at the Baghdad training center (3 / 17 centers are open). 5 /l Develop Iraqi defense capabililies and oversight mechanisms. Key Task POC 1 January • 31 March (01) 2004 f April · 30 June (02) 2004 1 July· 30 September (Q3) 2004 ·Onwards Slatus Narrabve 4 Develop Iraqi defense capabilities and oversight mechanisms 1 tional Security System Development ) PJar. for national secunty A[>pOLrtl Secretary General (by policy/defeose strategy !'Ind early Apn 1 04) lnstltullons. Through interaction w1lh Iraqis e~pcrts in dosed seminars. NSAC and GC Security Committee. Appolni New Defense Minister (by 1 Ar>rl! 04) 2 DSA funcllons integrated Into MOD and JFHQ, partial move into new building March LTCr ~.., ____ _, Compos•llOO role and function of the NSAC being <letennlred • likely to have begun conaullation process. 3 Continue lo reQ"Vd senior leaders. managel'$ and staff. Goat 1s to recru!I 50 lrSQI MOO clvlhans Conduct training for MOO dvihan ol'l:cials: programs 10 be conducted In Iraq and abmad Consldcratlon of lnilial placement of candidates into provislonal positions for tnslltutlon ae~eloprn~nl ami ptennlng. N!A Slalf lramlng and fu11clion1og. 4 lmplemeol FY2004 budgel to sopport MOD 5 Interaction with Iraqi officials lo gain underslandlng and Conlinue • placemen! ol candidates Into provisional posllions for lns\ltotion development and planrilng. Continue trafnlng senior civilian and rnllltary 1rainlin11. Initial cadre DSA st.ood up October 18 • Iraqi s(<lff currently employed. providing admJnlstrahve and logistic support lo Ille 1st Battalion or the NIA OSA.INSD and CMATT seek to find a quallly pool of candjdates at the sen!Of cxccu011c levels lo form the corps of Iraq's provlstonai national defense ln5t1\1Jl1ons a& well as 1oinHy assist in their development S«turda,·, f:rluu«r)' 07, 2001 P1111r ]} a/ .11 St>curity Develop Iraqi defense capabilities and oversight mechanisms Key Task POC 1 January • 31 March (01) 2004 1 Apnl • 30 June (02) 2004 1 July • 30 September (03) 2(1()4 ·Onwards Status Narralive acceptance Seek approval for MOD organization/mission/Policies 6 Consultation with GC Security Committee. Iraqi experts, strateoic seminars re NCA T 1.___.....,..._,..., r ""•sfer responsibility lo Iraq 10 anage, mak.ing payment thro h the banks lo individual accounts. Policy decision on routine stipend p{ogram and double.dipping.. Job matching program ln Iraq[ hands. 2 !OM registration fOOTIS in MOL possession and being processed 3 4 5 6 Develop Iraqi defense capabilities and oversight mechanisms Key Task POC 1 January • 31 Marcil (01) 2004 1 April - 30 June (02) 2004 1 July· 30 September (031 2004 • Onwaflis Status Narrative 3 • Iraqi Defence Capacity Building JFHO lead staff mov rnto M OD Annex (Mar) 1st Bde HO operational In Mosul (Jan) Draft !AF Force Development Plan 2 Define NIA employment concept 3 Bns 3 & 4 graduate (Jan and Feb) Pl & Coy Comds Cse (560) In JOR(lo Mar) Bn & Bde Comd and Staff Cse (138) in JOR NCO Cses (1250) at t<MTB 4 UH-1 Pilots course (19) in JOR (until May). UH-1 Malnt Cse (28) In JOR (until May). C-130 pilots course (10) IN JOR (uniU July), Air Corps Ops Spt Trg 1n JOft 5 Stand up lnrrastruoture. Establish HO ICDF & CMA TT (Marilime) HQ in Umm OBST commission vessels and craft. Conduct specialist trsJrong for Patrol Boat Squadron and Coastal Defence Regiment Produce medium tenn tCDF plan. IAF Senior ldrs Dev Cse (Apr) IAF Join! Ops Planning Cse (May} JFHQ mo¥ into MOD 61dg (Jun) JFHQ IOC (Jun) HO 1sl 3fd & 5lh Divs established. HO 2nd & 3rd Bdes establistied (AP!) Draft Iraqi National Defense Plan Prepare and approve FY 2005 (Iraq!) budget 6th· 15th Bns graduate (Jun) Pl & Coy Comds Cse (560} in JOR (to Jun) Bn & Bde Comd and Staff Cse (160) ln JOR (May-Jun) NCO Cses (3000) al KMTB UH·1 Pilots cou~e (19) in JOR (Unlil May), UH-1 Maint Cse (28) in JOR (until May). UH-1 Sqn IOC (30 Jun) C-130 pilots course {10) IN JOR (uniU July}. 2 x ICDF Ptl Craft delivered (Apr} 10 x ICDF RIB boats delivered (Apr) 3 x ICOF Ptl Craft delilll!fe<! (Jun) tCOR move to Umm Qasr and commence Spec Trg (Apr). tCOF commence maritime trg (Jun) HQ 4th • 9th Bdes establsihed (July) Note By 30 Sept 2004, 27 lighl motorised battalions operational, fOflTled into 9 BQes, 9~ting 1111lhi11 3 adminsitrative divisions. Dtafl Issued 16th . 18th Bns graduate (July) 19th - 27th Bna garduate (Sep) C-130 Sqn IOC (30 Aug) JCDF IOC (Aug) S•truday, F~bnuuy 07, JfXJ4 P11geU of JI Sec11rir)' - - Develop Iraqi defense capabilities and oversight mechanisms Key Task POC 1 Januart • 31 March (01) 2004 1 April • 30 June (02) 2004 1 July· 30 September (03) 2004 - Onwards Status Narrative 6 Solie!! PME requirement. quotas. eq1J1prne11c. contribulions and tralnlDg support Establish bHateral professlona1 contact With coalillon and regional COtfflteiparts and lns11111l10ns. JFHO Senior ldrs auend NESA Executive Seminar (14) Cemmence Miiitary Academy 1mplemenra1!on 9 io; Snr Staff atlllnC! overseas ·Staff colleg, es. 7 Bn individual eqpl issued on arrival at KMTB Bo vehicle sets ordered for del1>;ttry Mar-Apr 8 Plans made for Integration of most military suppoct Into civil ecxinomy and ln confunctlon with other minlslries. Refurblshmenl underway or baslrig infrastructure to support eJ(pandecJ force, harmonised with graduation plan Train the Trainers Pr<>gramme (May-A1,19} May-Sep open haql Military Academy Selection of Mllitary Academy cad els 3" Snf Sta!f attend overseas s1aff colleges. Slv<lents already oep!oyed· to JOR aJlll AUS. SP and 11 considering offemng places UK. has ottered officer cadets places. t.Allll&ry academy locatlon oonflnned et Ras!lm~ah g 10 StUu.rday, Felir•ll'J' 07, 200' P11gt 15 o/.11 Sec11ril,I' • Develop Iraqi defense capabilities and oversight mechanisms Key Task POC 1 January • 31 March (01) 2004 1 April • 30 June (02) 2004 1 July· 30 September (03) 2004 - Onwards Status Narrative 4 • MoD HQ lnfrastucture Development Establish and exercise civilian control over national security resources. Inventory MIC asselslpersonnel. Interim Minister for MIC appoint~. Resolve MIC WMD. Responsibility transrerred from SA(NSD) - to be dealt with under general SOE policy. 2 3 4 5 6 5 • Post 711 Secu. rJty Planning 2 3 4 5 6 St1t11rda)•, F«>ruary 07, 1004 Securit)' February \, 2004 MINUTES Meeting of the CPA Executive Board February t, 2004 Baghdad, Iraq General Kellogg called to order an Executive Board session to review Electricity and the Strategic Plan. ELECTRICITY SECTOR UPDATE: LtColr... lseoior Advisor for the Ministry of Electricity (ME), updated the Board oa the Ministry's Strategic Plan. (N.B., This oral update has not yet been incorporated into the CPA Strategic Plan itself.) r !briefed that four key tasks support ME's overaU objectives: a.) Improve generating capacity to 6,000 MW (from 3,200 - 3,500 MW in July 03) by July 1; b.) lmplement fully policy on allocation of electric.al power, through fair load shedding for domestic and commercial customers~ c.) Publish Electricity Sector Strategy document; and d.) Minimize sabotage and improve security. [""" !reported peak generation is at its highest since October and overall generating capacity has reached record levels with much Jess variability. The Ministry's generation capacity goal o( 6000MW seems achievable by July 1. Total demand is increasing with economic growth, but the current measure of7000MW should be met by year-end. The plan to increase generation is a three-pronged approach - add new generating plants, enhance the output of ex1stillg units through maintenance and rehabilitation, and increase imports. The MB, the C01:ps of Engineers and USAID/Bechtcl are now executing projects to increase generation. Add.itionally, Early Action projects funded through the Supplemental are being tasked through CPA 's Project Management Office (PMO) and wiU commence in February. Tbe Board heard tha. t load shedding will decrease as generation, transmission and distribution systems are strengthened. A revised allocation policy wilt be submitted for approval by the end of February. Revisions are necessary to account for the increasing level of generation, the growing demand from and importance of industrial sites, and speci fie political realities across various regions in Iraq. Reporting systems are being strengthened to enhance intelligence of power on/power off hours nationwide. The Ministry is making progress in distributing power to areas with little or no generation capacity. Ongoing projects to rebuild high voltage power lines and rehabilitate distribution systems in Baghdad are also contributing to more balanced and predictable load shedding. UNCLASSIFlED The Board noted the Electricity Sector Strategy document includes both a technical Master Plan and a "soft side" strategy for sustaining the Ministry post-CPA. The final consolidated document will be published prior to June 15. The appointment of an Inspector General by the end of . February is an important component to ME capacity- building efforts. The Board agreed that the infom1ation campaign should stress Coalition generating capacity goals are much higher than under Saddam, and that )ncreasi.ng demand is a positive economic indicator. It should also manage expectations with the most accurate schcduJe and rate information possible. ME is trying to familiarize Iraqi customers with their personal demand statistics by reading meters and issuing statements of usage. Payments from April to December 2003 have been forgiven, but the Ministry' s plan to begin actual bHHng in March 2004 raised concerns from some Board members who believed no billing should occur until electrical service is more reliable. LtCol r ~ountered that it was critical to have billing and collection mechanisms firmly in place before the June transition. Revenue would be nominal since rates wm remain at extremely low pre-war levels - no tariff increases or special fees are planned in the short term. [ r !advised a comprehensive electricity infrastructure security plan will be developed before t11e end of February. He noted that three meter readers already have been shot, and sabotage of electricity infrastructure remains a ctitical concern. The plan wilJ combine the efforts of the Electrical Power Security Service (EPSS), Coalition military forces and contracted security teams. Additionally, aH Force Protection Service (FPS) Transfers of Authority wi 11 be complete by the end of March. r boncluded that the Minjstry of Electricity has suJlicieot capital and seems Oil track for transition. The biggest challenge would be training its 42,000 employees in everything from turbine operations to senior management. CPA has been working toward this end with USAID and Bearing Point and hopes to develop a partnership with a western utility. STRATEGIC PLAN STATUS CHECK: r I Office of Po~icy Planning and Analysis (OPPA), reviewed the updated Strategic Plan. Most elements of the phm bad been updated aside from Electrici.ty. Mo I, ONSA, CJTF-7, Communications and Ministry of Industry were revising their updated plans. A new plan is being developed for the OFF program. Key findings of the updated plan included: • No tasks had worsened to Red • The strategic communications program remains focused on Governance; Police, Electric, Education an<l Health campaigns wi11 start when more resources become available; UNCLASSlFIED • Across the plan, personnel shortages are delaying programs and pushing them into Amber. This applies to min of Finance, Mjn of Trade, Min of Justice, especially prisons, and Min of Human Rights. Ambassador Jones said it might be useful to document those cases in which personnel shortages were preventing CPA from meeting its strategic objectives. CPA should recruit internally first, but if critical positions could not be filled by existing CPA Staff, we could request personnel by cabJe. The Ministries of Finance and Justiee seemed to be facing the most critical shortages. The Board agreed to initiate internal CPA trawls for personnel and lo invite the new Senior Advisor for Justice to review his Ministry's Strategic Plan at the February 8 meeting. The Board approved minutes from the January 25 Executive Board meeting. PENDING ACTION ITEMS FROM THE FEBRUARY l, 2004BOARDMEETING: Attendees: Ambassador Jones (co-chair} Ambassador Greenstock COO Kellogg (co-chair) Ambassador Rfohmond r' I MG Gallinetti [ General Figgures E:\EitecScclEitccBoard\Mmutes I FEil O.t UNCLASSIFIED Message Page l of 3 From: Executive Secretary Sent~ Saturday, February 07. 2004 9: 17 PM To; L kGS-13) Subject: FW: ExBd Agenda for Sunday February B, 8: 15am. Ambassador's Conference Room Importance: High Follow Up Flag: Follow up Flag Status: Flagged r Forwarded to you per Mr....._r __ ___,lrequest. He wfU need them printed for tomorrow's Executive Board Meeting v/r r r· ITsgt. usAF Executive Secretariat, Special Projects CPA Baghdad -----Or!9!,naf Message---- From:C:: I (FS-l) Sent: Friday, February 06, 2004 6:12 PM T'o: Executive Board Cc: Executive Secreta~i Schmults, Edward c. {SES6)r l(OV)L l<0-2);[ (OTHER)r j(0-5); DepAdm Subject: ExBd Agenda for Sunday February 81 8:1Sam, Ambassador's Conference Room Importance: High ._ __ ...... AGENDA CPA E xecutive Board Meeting Sunday, February 8, 2004 8. :15-9:15am Ambassador's Conference Room 1) General Business - Ambassador Jones (5 min) Please review Minutes from February l meeting, first attachment above. Minutes will be considered approved if no objections received. Please submit any revisions m advance to the Executive Secretary. Subjects suggested for 11ext week's meeting include a) property/facilities review procedures, and 21 812004 Message Page 2of3 b) Iraqi visa policy. 2) Building Justice Update -C lcPA. Sepior Advisor, withr jhead of CPA Prisons Department (20 min) Handouts anached above: Outline(•• asterisks on outline indicate topics to be briefed), priority milestones. and timeline. Schmults will also address MOJ personnel concerns. 3) CPA Policy for Post-Transition Role ofSenior Advisors (15 min) Revised February 3 Memo, Ministry Transition Status Assessment, is attached above in tbree parts. 4) Strategic Plan Review Update r lo 0 min) Status checkJ!st is the last attachment above. Board will need to suggest next strategic issue to be discussed. Board members are asked to confirm attendance to Executive Secreta~~J.L.:.hard c.QP.ies of the J1ttachments will ngt be _~~ _,_ Members of the Executive Board attend the entire meeting, per Administrator's 11/18/03 memorandum, "Reorganization of Coalition Provisional Autborifl'·" These members are Deputy Administrator and Cbief Policy Officer, Chair Deputy Administrator and Chief Operating Oflicer, Vice Chair U.K. Special Representative U.K. Depury Representative Director, National Security Affairs Deputy Commander, CJTF-7 Chief of Staff, CJTF-7 Senior Counselor Director, CPA Execulive Secretariat CPA General Counsel The Chair has also invited ttz.....,,. ---....-------'j(OPPA) an~'-' ='-==-__,;Jl (OGA), or their designee, to aHend each meeting. The Cbai~as iovjtedr land r lto make special presentations on the Ministry of Justice. a I to make a specia'\ presentation on ministry transition issues related to senior advisors. at the February 8 meeti_og. The Chair bas invited Human Resources to have a representative present at the Fcbmary 8 and February 15 meetings. Attendance is restricted to members and invitees only. Requests for afte,ndance should be submitted in advance to the Executive Secretary. Executive Assistant. CPA Administrator 2/8/2004 C11~o ry Suppktt•. t. fl t•l Fands Milliury St r .tl~ 1 S1n.(tllJ'f' Sl.IU• Sys, c ,-..s S•PP.r1 SO'l intt)I Atrv<l!UT 51.:WJ $'\~ ... " '' ~11 ppon Alloollrd b id c ~u. 1uty1 lttrtrd t"tr· INTERIOR $2,061.0 ~ AR OEJ'ENCE $1.& re.c UK AR Policy JUS'llCE $S1.: o USJoi GO/JH f'lAAtolCE 1J(),Q USI! AA Pl.ANNING & 0£V COOP AUS AA E'. LECTfUC1TY SS 56-0.0 USA KK MUNJC, & PUBLIC WORKS s~ 002.0 U K GOIJH OIL $1,10 1.C USA Kl( HEAL1li S79l.O US.0. GO/JH TAANS!>O!U.4 TlON 1!>45.0 USI\ KK AGRICUl TURE $2&.>,0 AUS GO/JH COMMUNIClff!ONS S!3S,0 USA. KK HO USJNG $130.Q Ust, KK T~chr\ i c:il LABO R ANO SOCIAL Af'PAlRS s1oe.o IJSll GQfJli Advisor O ISl'lACEMENT & t.ltGAA TION $105.0 PR'l' GO/JH EUUCATION $93 ,.!l USI\ GDIJ11 CE.NTRAL BANK $1611 rot A ~ WAl'ER R!: SOIJRCES $7:>.0 USA Kl< l!lGllER H lUC ATION USA 0 0/Jtl FOREIGN .o,A;AJRS u~ GO/ JB INOUSlRY & MINERALS USA Kt< TliADE USA, AR HUMAN RIGftrS I.Ill GOI JH E.. NVIE<ONMHITN. USA GOIJH CULTURE 11 GOfJH SQIENCE ANO TECH. "I AA YOUTH ANO SPOR'TS IJSA GDIJ!i BAGHDAD CENTRAL U SA - ~ ~ - CPA Groundwork I.rot f E mrnremem and Proercss M INISTRY I P JUSTIC E PRESENTATII N T l EXECUTIVE 13 1~0 r E IWAU C. SCHMUL TS, SENI I~ A JVISIR ~ o FE l lWA l'tY I, 2H 4 ~ ~ ~~ I. Personnel Witness protection o Court-appointed defense counsel o *1'ransfet of judicial administration and Justice to Council of Judges *Central Criminal Court of Iraq ExpediLc detention-to-trial time Court- police- prisons communications system Judicial. prosecutorr;r.' at~y training o *Property rights o Legal Gazette • Post-June 30 issues o Judicial review and judicial independence o Ministry receptivity Lo Embassy advice o llow to cult ivata due process, human rights, rule-of- law norms I I I. Prisons • Personnel • Status overview • wWar-stoppers·: o logistical support o bed space for reclassified security detainees O fundin~ for OPW prisons • Post-June 30 issues o Ministry acceptance of responsibility for Prisons o Ministry acceptance of Embassy authority, assistance; coercion must bo codified in Fundamental Law? Draft of February 4, 2001 Pagt- 1 of l COALITION PROVISIONALAUTllORITY BAOllDAO INFO MEMO DATE February 3 2004 FOR: THE ADMINISTRATOR FROM: ..... r _________ __, SUBJECT: Ministry Transition Status Assessment As requested, we attach a note outlinfog our proposed approach to assessing the readiness of ministries for transition to a sovereign government. The approach proposed here has been developed from discussions wilh CPA advisory teams (e.g. Health, Public Works and Security Affairs) who have already undertaken some transition planning. To ensure a seamless transition, we propose that we work with CPA advisory learns to detennine: • Ministerial readiness for transition • Resource (support) requirements post-transition • fdcnti fzcation of risk areas for risk management We propose to implement this assessment by undct1aking reviews of the readiness of all ministries through an interview process. We will ask for qualitative responses to the questions trntlincd on page 2 of the attached note and grade each ministry on a green-amber-red scale for ease of reference. CO-ORDINATlON: ._ r ___ ___,JN SA Version February 4 2004 PREPARING FOR TRANSITION TO IRAQI SOVEREIGNTY OVER THE MINISTRIES Overview 1. The Transfer of Authority (TOA) on I July will terminate CPA 's current role and that of its Senior Advisers. Planning for the transition needs to address two key objectives: • To consolidate and extend progress made in establishing stable, functioning. effective Iraqi ministries. • To minimize the risk that the TOA interrupts critical services or processes 2. In planning to manage through TOA, it is assumed that • Transition to Iraqi sovereignty on I July means a fondamentalJy different relationship between Coalilioo partners and the Iraqi government. Specifically, future Coalition engagement with M inistries will need to have Iraqi consent. The Coalition win also wan! to demonstrate clearly the changed relationship with a. sovereign nation. • Ministers and some high level mjnistry officials will be political appointees subject to electoral change10 - potentially turnover soon after I July. At lower levels (ceiling to be decided) civil servants will be retaine.d to ensure competent support for seujor ministry Je.adershiJJ'. 3. This paper suggests an approach to manage our planning for a successful transition. We need lo assess lhree factors: Readiness for transition • Immediate check of each Ministry's status against seveTal key development criteria; which not only measure objective position but also the level oflraqi ownership • Senior Adviser assessment of minimum progress needed by I July and actions to deliver Resourcing posi-tra11sicio11 • By l April, development of detailed proposal for level and type of support likely to be needed by eacb Ministry after 1 July, based on a common set ofprindples Risk ma11ageme111 • Early identification and regular review of essential services or processes which are at greatest risk because proposed levels of external support are both high and are like1y to be rejected by the relevant lraqi Ministry or may not be available • Executive Board should focus on minimizing the risks in these Ministries Version F cbruary 4 2004 Readiness ()f l\Unistries 4. An assessment of each Ministry's goals. organization and capabilities should be carried out by its Senior Advisers. using the following five headings. The assessment should have two categories. The first on groundwork pr· ogress and the second on the level of Ministry engagement and operationalization (e.g. with Minister. DGs, their direct reports etc). The Senior Advisers for Ministries . WJder development need only assess against the first axis, but should explain their approach to securing Iraqi engagement. (Some Senior Advisors have in fact undertaken much of this assessment already in response to earlier guidance· .) Strategi1 • Written strategy for Ministry. \vhich covers organization purpose and plans for implementing prioritized list of shorHenu (1 year) and Jong-lenn (2-5 years) goals (first category). Ownership down through Ministry (second category). Structure • Ministry structure and staffing levels designed, whfoh support organizational goals (first category). Progress in makin.g appointments at DG level and tiers beJow. Inspector General offices established (second category). Skills • Analysis of training/capaeity needs completed (.first category). Roll out in Ministry of consequent management training programs down through senior a.nd mid-level staff (second category). Systems • Principles of coordination and communication with govemomtcs clear (first category). Basic connectivity - phones and c~mail links in place for key Ministry staff in regions (second category) • Financial control and budgeting systems developed (first category). Consistent capabiltty to pay all staff salaries (including pensions), get n1oney from operating budgets to govemorates and execute competifrve contracts in a transparent manne: r (sooond category) • Existence of personnel policies. ideally based on central template developed by CPA (first category). Propon ion/level of Ministry staff with agreed job descriptions (second category). • Adequate security plans (first category). Ministry payment of its FPS staff in agreed numbers and locations (second category) Support • Outline of areas where support will be needed by Ministry afier 1 July or when Senior Adviser stands down. whichever is earlier (first category). Level of agreement down through Ministry (second category). 5. This assessment eould be summarized in various ways using stoplights. One possible layout is attached as Annex l. More detail could be provided on a sheet for each Ministry. 2 7. 8. Version February 4 2004 Resourcing External Support to t\linistries after 1 ~ July 6. The actions suggested are to: • Develop common principles across mi11islries to gujde placement of "advisersJ' who will continue past tl1e transfer to Iraqi sovereignty, and oullJn~ range of models for this • Invite Senior Advisers to refine areas in which they and Ministries believe they need assistance aller 1 July and recommend models and amount of that assistance. (An outline example for d1e Ministry of Defence is at Annex 2.) • Win CPA/coalition cabinet level approval to staff these .. new" staff requirements. Possible Principles • Arr::mgernents must recognize lrnqi sovereignty after 1 July, and be based on a common understanding of wbat this means (technical advisors are providing a service to the lraqi ministries). • Arrangements should be based on a needs analysis agreed with current Iraqi ministers and senior officials. • Advisers should be there to help the Iraqis do their jobs, and should not replace top level Iraqi civil service advice to Ministers. 111 Advisers placed in Ministries should not take permanent posts i.e. Iraqi jobs. • While advisers will understand the aims and values oflheir sending govcmmem, rhey wiJJ generally operate with some independence (with some exceptions such as in the MoD). • Foreign Governments should pay the total costs of providing and supporting their advisers. Models • embedding advisers in ministries to sun:ive iransition to lraqi sovereisnty • oiTering external support from non~Jraqis employed elsc· where e.g. embassies • inputs based on specific project management e.g. USAID Marwgemem • Each member of the coalition should decide for itself the relationship between its embedded advisors and its mission here in Iraq. • ~t.rY~ eaCl;'rr.>inistry by ministry, makes sense, based on comparative advantage. Similarly. tnegroup of countries that can and wjsh to support advisory work will vary from ministry to ministry. • Senior Advisers should make rec-0mmendations as to which countries should be involved. by ministry. and which should have the lead. From the plans, the Executive Board should assess the risks that: • lraqis m~ 'Y reject Coalition presence i.n some Ministries afl.er 1 July • Iraqis will value patronage appointments over merit appointments and tum over Ministry staff to a lower levcJ chau is healthy to Jong term success • Coalition home agencies will not support these personnel requirements These risks may be mitigated by early action to: 3 Version February 4 2004 • Plan with flexibility e.g. Iraqis may accept non·US or non·westem advisers • Champion a "new phase w. ith new requirements" for the .Iraqi effort, - using US State Departmcm . • UK FCO etc for liaison. Risk Management for Essential Services and Processes 9. As well as carrying out these assessments for a.IJ Ministries, it will be important to identify those individual Minisrries (or processes n•ithin all Ministries) where there is both a high risk of service interruption after l July and \\there this would lead to serious na.tional or international consequences. 10. The Board and the Administrator will decide which Minislrics or processes carry lhc most severe consequences of sen•ice failure. These Ministries are likely to include those responsible for Finance, Infrastructure, Security and some of the essential Public Services. The processes may include the establishment of secure mechanisms to pay salaries and to tackle corruption. 4 Version February 4 2004 ANNEX 2 EXAM.PLE OF TRANSITION MODEL FOR M l NrSTRY OF DEFENCE Cot\te):t • Ministry of Defense will be staffed with Iraqis n. o earlier than laJe March. For a ministry which has undergone such significant change, longer than three months of support in the form of mentoring wilt be necessary. • Visiting US Department of Defence Security Assessment Team discussed this issue with CPA Director of Security Affairs on 17 January 2004. Approach Suggested by Director National Secu r ity Affairs: • Provide a small number oftbe Iraqi MoD civil servants each a mentor (advisor). Place these as mentors to secoud or third tier ministry leadership. • Recruit these mentors Crom sitting or retired appropriate levels within respective coalition ministries/departments. Not to be contracted. • These advisors (mentors) need to be in place by late March/early April to minimize the chance they will be removed after June and provide the needed continuity through the transition period. • Provide advisors for key positions such as National Security Advisor, Finance, Acquisition, Personnel. • Move quickly to request personnel to fill these new manpower requirements. • Develop a central body to administer this program (reporting, adm.in/log support). • Use a lead country (UK) model with multinational advisory team (e.g. UK, Spain, etc) as 5 · · Build Justic~. Key Task - · · - · . - POC 1 January - 31 Marcil (01) 2004 1 April - 30 Juoe (02) 2004 1 July • 30 September (03) 2004 • Onwaros Status Narrative 3 Build Justice 1 • Establish independent judit:iary ProVlde ildv!ce regarding judicial independence and structure. Ctimtnal procedural rights, and other constilulionat advice as requtred. 2 Transfer administration .ind pay of judges from Ministry of Justice lo Council of Judges. Assess needs by March 1. Provide advice regarding Judioat Independence and slrucrure, criminal procedural rights, and other constltuUooal adl/Jce as required. Effect t. ransler by June 1. ..... r ___ __,jMoJ Provide advice regarding judicial independence and ~tructure. criminal procedural rigl'lts. anc:I other constilutlonal advice as required. Awaiting opportuniry to input re fundamental transitional law and constdution. Saturtla)'. ftbruor.v 07, 2004 Stcuriry Key Task 1 January • 31 Marth (01) 2004 2 0 Reform Judicial System Central Cntnina· 1 Court of traq seff. sufflClency; Incorporate CCC into Transitional law. with altemauve case referral mecMnism 10 enable referrals by either the Coalition or a designated Iraq!. Increase CCC throughput, Produce lestlmony frorn redeployed soldle.rn 11ia VTC. Add 30 Coalltlon lnvesllgators to assist In assembling eVldence for variQus ca.ses. 2 Physical security for cnmlnal courthousu; lde!llify for tortilli;;atfO(l or rel-xation appro,Wnalely t2 prtority courthouses by Feb. 21. Ascenain current FPS presence on courthouses by March 1. FPS TOA complete on March 1. Prepare to a. ssume FP·S payroif by April 1. 3 Judicial Re..,_ Committee: Complete initial wiling and reappointments by March 1. Build Justice POC 1 April , 30 June (02) 2004 1 July· 30 September (0.3) 2004 ·Onwards Status Narrative By June 30. CCC shcxild handle 10 investlgallons. 5 tnais pet' week PtOVJde such assistance as ne.r Iraq) gov't desires, Continue to provide evld. ence and testimony. Addition of 30 in11eSliQators wWd be Vf!IY helpful, Physical security for courthouses: TIW U.S. Mar&hals should amve by Aptil 1. lo begin a!lsessing oourthouses 10< seOJnty and rettimmeod fortlficatton plans or r. elocation. By June 30. the assessments aod SllCIJri\y recommendattons should be complete and Implementation begi.fn. By April 5, break ground on first priority courthous. e fortificalion projects identified ln prev1ous quarter. Throughout 1l11s quarter, continue 10 h1crease FPS force and presence to replace Iraq! police. Judoda1 Review COmm1 t1ee: All appeals rrom removal by tne Committee will be ad)udlcated b)' June 3o. The Comm.illee wi!J rematn available. during this quarter f0< special cases. review Continue lo fund and superinlend 1mpleme11tation 01 U.S Marshals' oovf!MU~e fonifloaUon and telocallOll plans. We are seeking to oonclude a mem0!'3J'ldurn of unde.rstanding with tile v.s. Ma1$11als service to supply 7 Iola! marshals. of whom 2 would WXk on courthouse security. S75M avalla. ble ffom supp, for courthouse and /udiclal security, Ju<he1al Rev\eW <A>mm1ttee fundiOl\S W'ltl 1>e assumed by Iraqi Judicial SupervillOfY Council. About 90% of estimated 850 judges and prosecutors relliewed. As ot' 2J'6/04, hearings have been held on 509. About 160 have been removed, ol which 141 have appealed. Pag' 16 o/31 St•c'lrit)' Key ' Task 1 January - 31 Mard'l (01) 2004 4 C-Ourt-appointed defense counsel: Work with Council of Judges and mointor court. s to ensure appointment or defense counsel for aH misdemeanor and felony defendants. 5 Training for judges and prosecutors to inculcate nonns of due process, human rights. and rule of law: During this quaner. classes from the International Law Assistance Consortium {II.AC) will be held regarding international humatl rights law (Feb. 28), judicial independence (March 19). 6 Establish organization in Ministry Saturtla,1•, Feb111ar')' 0(, 200.J Build Justice POC 1 April • 30 June (02} 2004 1 July • 30 September (03) 2004 · Onwards Status Narrative of judges as to Whom new evidence or complaints arise. Court-appointed defense counsel: Design and conduct lwo- or lhree- day training courses for defense counsel. Work with Council of Judges to design and implement mandatory qualification test. Court-appointed defense counsel; Continue training defense counsel, providlng advice to Council of Judges regarding qualification standards, seleclion processes. etc. CPA Order 52 promulgated in January enables the Council of Judges to Increase defense counsel fees and pay retroactive defense-counsel fees. which should Increase the number or de!endants represented. Appointments still sporadic but this should improve as rees Increase and amounts due for services already rendered are paid. Implementation beyond Baghdad will depend largely on regional Ministry of Justice perao!lnel. IL.AC courses already scheduled, attendees slaled. Training for judges and pn:isecutors to inculcate norms of due process. human rights. and rule of law: !LAC courses on intematlonal humanitarian law (April 10), intemational human rights law (April 30). One additional ILAC course on intemational humanitarian law will be held during this quarter. Additionally, the U.S. Department of Justice Overseas Prosecutorial Development and Assistance Training program {OPDAT) Will conduct five •qufck-start• training courses on CPA directives. due pn:icess. human rights, and rule of law beglnnlng April 1. each with about 40 cnm1nal judges and prosecutors. Two U.S. Marshals should anive Devise a comprehensive training curriculum with the Council of Judges and begin to implement; OPDAT "quick-start" classes continue; ILAC am! other NGO classes lo continue also. By January 1. 2005. all 400 criminal judges and prosecutors should have· received at least some lrainnig. Continue providing technical We are seeking to conclude a Pagc/7ofJI Key Task 1 January - 31 Maid\ (01) 2004 ot JusUCl!l to prolll(!e personal secuoty for 400 criminal judges and prosecutOl'S: 500 PSO guards trained. 7 Expedite detention-lo-trial lime by consolidating police lock-up and pre-lrlal detentlon center$, hlring more court investigalor$, 8 Establlsh witness-protection organization ln Ministry of Justice: Conclude memorandum or uoderstanding with U.S. Mar.ihals to provide 3 marshals lo se! up thlsservtce. 9 Implement basic court-po{~ pnsons comm. unications Sy$1em. Sat11t diO'i Fd1r11ar)' 07, 200./ Bulld Justice POC 1 April - JO June (02} 200C 1 July - JO September (03) 2004 - Onward$ S!ah.1s Narrattve by Apot 1 to to help sel up Jud1c1at protection service lo Ministry of Justice. By June 30, \tle servire should be establfslled al\d protecting several dozeri Judges asS1stanoe. By January 1, 2005. all 400 !U<.tges and criminal prosecutDrs should be protected. memorandum of undersland1ng Wilh the U.S. Mal'S/131. S Sel'\llce ID supply 7 total marshals, of wham 2 wou~ wor1! on per&onal Judicial security. $75M a11ailanle from supp. ror counhouse and J udicial seC\Jnty. Continue· to shorten detention-lo· trial lime significantly· (on the o<der of 1 month) by consolidaling poffce lock-up and pre·lrlal detention centers. hiring more court lnvesligalors. Formut<tte tong-term plan, By April 1, three U.S. marshals should arrive to help set up ltns organization. By June 30, the organlzalloo should be capable of temporanly protecling Wllnesses and should nave fOlmufaled a plan lor long-term prolectfon. Including re1ocalion By April 15, formulate plan and begln lniplementahon ror Instantaneous comrn.unlcahons between pollce. courts. and pnsons. Offer such assistance as the Ministry and Council of Judges request av January 1, 2005, tile willless- protectlon service should be operallng at fl.Ill capacity in suppoit of I.he Iraqi Special T ribtlnal, the Commission an Public Integrity, and ordinary criminal courts. Continue assistance Wtlh supp!ementat funds. By January 1. 2005. a fully functioning system should be operaUng withool Coalition suppc;rt. We are seel<illg to conclude a memorandum of understandlog With lhe-U,S. Marshals ~el'Ylce 1 . o supply 7 total marshals. of Whom 3 'll!OUld wort( on wilness pmtection. $4QM available In supP. Ex1et1s1ve cootdinallon Wllll M1rntry of tnlelior, Pn!IOl\s Dept. requi~ Paf:I!/ 8 of JI Key Task 1 Jarn.Jary • 31 March {Q1) 2004 3 D Improve the penal system Continue to implement strategy: Assign up to one hundred tl"lree (103) cpntracted civilian prison experts to direct operations at multiple prison sites nationwide. Develop national policy orders to Implement inmate wotl<, exercise, and education programs at all facilities. Institute a specialized departmental inmate transportation system 10 enhance prisoner transportation functions. Develop worlc-release. probation, parole pr0grams. 2 Complete renovations of six facilfties initiated during 4th quartel' of CY03 using remaining CY03 construction/major renovations budget funds. adding approKimately 5,000 beds and creating more than 1,800 prison· rel. aled jobs. Initiate renova{lon of multiple prisons and detention centers with anticipated CY04 supplemental funds. 3 Initiate construction of three new secure prison facilities with a total or 3.000 beds to be completed by December 2005 creating at least 800 prison staff jobs. Satu1dll.V, February 07, 200.J . - Build Justice - - - - - - . , ~ 1 April - 30 June (02) 2004 1 July • 30 September (Q3) 2004 • Onwards - Status Narrative P OC Contracted civilian pris_on experts provide on-site direction. training and supervision to Iraqi Corrections Service staff members In operating prisons. Coordination with courts enhanced by the operation of a centralized inmate transportaUon system within the Iraqi Corrections Service. Iraqi Corrections Service staff members assume control of prison system With intense monitoring and technical oversight by contracted civilian prison experts. January 2004: Long-awaited contracted civilian prison elq)erts are slowly beglnnlng to arrive and being assigned duties as correctional trainers and facility-level administrators beginning in the greater Baghdad area and then expanding nationwide. Extreme lack of qualJfied Iraqi staff suggests hand-over of operational control on July 1 could have se-vere adverse consequences. Refurbish 22 facilities with a capacity or 5,600 and create at least 4,000 prison staff Jobs. Maintain a professional presence to assist the Iraqi Corrections Service in keeping facilities operating at an International standard. Renovation~ are on.going and new projects are dose to initiation at various facilities nationwide. Oversee the ongoing construction projects for three secure prisons. Target date for completion of these projects is December 2005. Provide project management of new prison constnJclion to ensure FY04. Supplement funds are expended properly and in a timely manner to provide 3. 000 prison beds. $100M in US Supplemental funds were approved in FY04 for maximum- security prisons for the Iraqi Corrections Service. Project development is underway and the initiation of actual construction is anticipated by May 2004. Pagl! 19o/3/ S<.'CUTilJI Key tas/f 1 January • 31 MatCh (01)2004 4 Mareh 2005, 50% of existing prii;ons compliant with UN standanjs: Sept 2007. all prisons compliant witn UN standards. 5 Conlinue to provtde security equipment and vehicles for renovate<! detention and prison facilities. Receive new equipment pun:hased and/or donated for the Iraq! Corrections Service (ICS) and ass1mdate new items !01o operational pcactfces. Specialized equ1pme11t and operational components, for eitample, Lnma!e transportal1oo s-el'\'lce.s, are incorporated Into datJy operational ae11viiies. 6 Continue to recruit and train Iraq! officers to operate reacUvatea laclllties as well as actively Involve the on-site civilian prison experts 1n employee menlorship and directed training of leader:;hip staff. Renovate a new headquarters for the ICS and national department- Sarurd11y, Ffbruar;• 07, 200./. Build Ju&tice --- --- POC 1 ~I - 30 June (02) 2004 1 July - 30 September (03) 2004 - Onwards Status NarralNe June 2004: 75% of e'6shng pnsons compliant with international prison slandaltls Continue activities of on-sile civilian pri$00 experts and facilfty renovations- to ensure facilities are operated and maintained In accoroance with acceptable rntema(ional standall1. s, Conllnue lo enhance training of staff rne01bers on tedmologie:al capabllilies and use of new sec-urity eQuipmenl Contioue to install integrated communications as well as data aaiui· sil!on and storage systems. Ensure appropnale maintenance capablhty remains functional and the ICS retains the capabillty to use security equipment throughout lhe national system. Project ma.nagemenl activities are Oil" going to ae<:0mpjlsh major renovations In e)(lsting prisoris and plan new construction in accordance with intemallonal pnson standards. All Iraqi Corrections Service staff members receive Initial pre-service as well as on- going in-service training In human rights standards. On-site civlttan prison experts monitor activities within prison facilities and advise ICS leadership on proper operational policies, procedures and pracllces ro ensure continual cof'!lpliance. Bolh purchased as well as donateCI vehid,es and security equipment are arriving regularty and allocailon to the required locations ls on-going Acf'ueve a total of 10.000 ICS staff. Con~nue the· process f0t rectUillng, lraimng and Cle\lfltoping a professional corrections ofticer and senior admlnlsiralive sta.ff at all levels of the organization. This is an by-product or \he mls~ion of the oversi!Jhl and mentorship of the civlrlan correctional experts program , Renovation of the new national l)eadquarters budding complelt for lhe Iraqi Corrections Se'"'1ce is close to completion wil.h a target completion elate of 01 FEB04. The !raining ac.-t4emy is In operation and exparisio!1 of this process is In lhe developmental stage. Paxe20ofJJ Build Justice Key Task POC f January • 31 March (01) 2004 1 April - 30 June (02} 2004 1 July- 30 September (03) 2004 ·Onwards. Status Narratl11e level staff operations. 7 Expand tile core curriculum for the training academy program and lnst. itute mid-management training program for selected supervisors. Implement additional professional training opportunities for existing Iraqi Corrections Service stall members. Complete the app0lnlment of the ICS senior executive management team and Institute a specialized mentor tralning program. 4 • Establish Commission on Public Integrity 1 legislation establishing Commission passed by Governing Council in tate January. Name Commissioner as soon as possible. Acquire personnel and programmatic materials from INL, OPDAT, lCITAP. Begin hiring, vetting. training Iraqis by Ma· rch 15. Begin first ln11esligalions by April 15. Make first arrest by April 30. Begin first trial by June 1. Ensure the continuation of professional training via the expertise of the civilian prison experts throughout the Iraqi Corrections Sel'lice operation. The first professional prison trainers and curriculum directors began arriving in early Jan04 and developments are steadily lmpro11ing the Qualily or training. Continue to provide training and lechnical assistance. Crisis personnel shortage: Only two of approved 31 Coalition personnel have ani11ed: none have been Identified in the pipeline. Critical to get Commission up and running before June 30 test ii be abolished. A handful of potential nominees for Initial Commi$Sioner have been presented to Governance to discuss with the Governing Council. Without an immediate emergency influx or reallocation of staff. the Commission will not get off the ground, 5 D Solidify real property rights Assess status of property ownership, records, quieting and transferring title by end of March. By April 15, propose changes needed to ensure firm real property rights; seek required equipment and technical assistance. By May 15, enact needed changes into taw. Offer technical assistance to modernize property ownership records. Lacie of qualified staff had prevented significant action on this front CPA Mlnislly of Justice has now assigned a staffer to this subject, and hopes to make significant progress before the lransifion. Saturday, fi!hrr1aq 07, 20fll Pflge.21 o/31 M111i111ry of J1.1stice strategic . pnontie$. February S. 2C04 Min1Stry of Jostoce Coalihon pet$onf'lel fulldl"I) rfqui'rod Oltter S'l.!pport fjmellne through Juoe 30, 2004 F-ollow-on . go;als (hro\igtl Ja11<nry Tlmellne 01.cl Priorities l!lrough June JO, 2004, req1.1tre.d required 1.2005 June 30, :1.004 • strate;gic< Janlijlry 1, 2005 pl<1111 I ESl;lbl<Shftie Comnli55IO<l on Mic 31 ( t.t miitary, f7 S:aoM e<!i'!11arked Imm $Urvei:113nce lrlEQfCf'IO~afK!'pr~e· d'viQ!i. 0 en rW1t- f'M(I Q lfllqi b!Xl\iOI. J~ro.lil'Y :ia: CQmmilliOtl eSliltlliIDed by Qr.e<Tl1"9 Cou;;cil ti~ corf\ll]!lofl 31 311 lC>~t of Q()ll!)llJOlCnl 1Nl31l<I OPOAl to $& M 110.n S1JP!kmenlal ~$~'" !rolners lt>r Pr'l!ll lor CQa!!lloo 5l<ffl, ~.IA for r..\rueh t~ ~;,,Wig, lfillffir!ll lraql$ M\lleSS j.Jfotect(WI flO'n supptcnl<!lltat obtratnlr\!I i>,pid 1s· 0c.'gln invos119atk>ns f'iQVlile · teocllnital ad\loc:e 31\d ejemQnt 31.i , ~lr.!1'l>fl9 eu'oiit~iit.1~ ~l JO F•Jt a:rl!JI JuN 1! ~t lri.1fbt-Q-0s 2 J<ldielal Ro11;e"'C~nm"1e« COtnple•e 3 {lrt l°A<J<lll} litlli Jlif1e Mi!r~~ f °"'1pie{l! lrrllal •t\11/lg, r•~pportlltti'llll$ Pl'OViilil ~ aJlli-co>Upto(lll ll!IW & proseculof\;;I ve~. rema•QI, 30, 1 ~tier JurKI 30 f•!IShed ado,i\;e IQ ttie lraqo JudlCial ralnilat.amen:s Suriet'<\$\ot\ CCMTirNlell, tl:il!C \WI M~cl> 2 • June JO. JRC n1101'kible ror new ell~, Cl)mml.s<;iOll co PU* ~fl(egffly ·~;uwtp" of l¢o!i8 etld$ !t2ll Jullel 30 AU ~ppeals rtso!VtO. JP.C d<>5o1Veo. b 1\tt\ioni iuwrned by lt;,qi Jlldic:ial Supt•J\l'dio<> O!<nmr.:M C<>mpletO<f. Trainit19 l\OO PSO gllafdS. ~ . E'$talJllsll ll!ganlu<1001n Mon•SlfY of 2 U.S M,a•shal:s S75M (l!lCMllllg pll'jSicaf $25M In li&l>it:k);, Coo!Jnue to 1mplemcn1 sectucy plan J~ruary 1. 200s· AJI 400 3,2.7 ""''ice l.O pt'Q\fde l)IHllOM.'11 ~ ~ (Sl!D(~ JIC""-11)' A1J11 ¢:.Ilse ·~iy. pRWi:lecl ... ~arm or , ~ I« juc!ges aod ~s ctlmlnal j(j(!ges ariu '400 ~ tlJdilU I) ;UlJP.) June.30 &-11 pe<Sllll31 $1.'CU<«yetg31l<.t;lti0n ~ClfS '70(.,..te<l by ~' M~tl)'; 511vcrlil dozen Jlldg~ ~ua<ded by PSOguard& Ps.Os 4 P!tfS'>eal &ectJ'•l:Y for ClMlirl.'ll 21.J S Mar&ltJll, OQ1"1hou$U (shnoHd arr~ ~Y A(Y~ $76M i..:lud1n9 pliys'ic'al S10Mln~~;s, F'e!lf\laf)l 21 l de~1ify lix lort1lc:a00<1 Qt felQC(JIJOn COnl.1rue I!) lmptemtrt FPS and l.:n Clhse "8Clriy, pr O\lldetl It ~r""" ~c ~IJtPIQJ<lno:i\ely 11 r •loray cQUrthi:»Jso~ rllfU!blshfnont or rO!iQColbn C'll 1) SUW.) aiTiinal dl1t.& Apr d 5: 6r1'~k gl'O\InO on 1 :1 ptl()(ay C burtho\lks "pr' 6 8"lQln "''~ >CJl~'lOUSe ltMeu- with U.S M.arS/falf .Mit30 ~J>Jl~FPSQft•a~ctM~ . retu<blstimcnt Of rolOcatiol> oss!!Ssnfents comple!~ 5 E~~n > .v.>$11y 10 lUS.I .~ ptofect "'1~sa (5~ atrfvi: 'by Aprl ~ (p'O~ ... llf;lll) W•<k'poOOllpl)ll Jl#'e 30 Or118nllill iOn est.dl$hto c..pa!llt OI CcllhJll ookl~ ""'reu jlt(llecllOl J~ 1 , :ZOOS: wttM>oa ' 3.2.2 M3"''13h an.11;1>1$ lemllPJ'lllti prQl'eding 'Ml•~. $1.Jn forr11Wiletl piOgfall1 li«lledot rrogran'I 1) fer lrll1Q•le!m prOIQc:liotl, i>ciJdlng •t!IOc:alit'Jll ~al IU1I caP3l:l(y 1or flllon\t """ IS1 case& e Court ~!ld oofen.<;$ eoonsel 1 lo Bagtid;)(J {rl S2.1M fprovtltd i'1 tr:>ql NGO iiSSlsl&OliO. e 0 Jure 30· · cM"-"" OlllJft·~l1!>Qlllle<1 111lQ ·!uOO«I e&sr.rioe Dulldlng IJ'Qgra"1; Ja/Uaf}' I, 2005· Ally 3 2.4 10>•,11a!J,e.te ;l!f tl!b1y and. ~Jl!lf pia<$J. pl!J .l 18 OIJ00<.-11 C£riU, !LAC d.:-~ <;(luns.it av~•:illl« IO 31 (t!llllly ancf 1n1!lit!mK t maroa:uy q1SSJJo:;;al<on 1u...:rtlAOI) ~ogr.im ""'" .(!eftmda flllt g011QrnorM~ 1or four 1•11'Sdeme:onor aolundant$~ ' ""°'a c hree-<lay lC~l wrnten, 1111 pat1J<il se~ rl!QoOn.111) ildviaa$-· tt'aillilo~o~...ay oilldeliws ard a pomf)'LSO q);lodatllry qualif'C.ll<Jll 1 Tratlll(l!r ~~~~pay Cl jU<!g;e$ !t'Om "'11<'dllY 10 Coll~ of J<Jd9es ~1;1roti t; Needs#~ Ji1f'l£l 1 Transf er crlected P!Oll•~name s ~~(\~ r~ ~I Page 1 or3 l\Al . n lslry of Just,lce Coalition per$onnel Fundln',g requln>d Other support Prionlin ll!roug11 Ju f>l> JO. 2oo.I tfl<t\l lr~ required nmellne lnrough Jim!> 31) .. 200'4 s Sokfay rt.ll prooeny r1g1 11$ F ollow-on goals lhrobgh Januaty Ti!Tl"ll. M Old 1, 1005 June 3i), 2QO.I • Stral. '9tC J~n~riry 1, 2005 plan elemtnl 3 !1 .1 9 Central Cl\tnloal Coun •elf-sume1en1 3 (Ill pt;icn) OQmpo.ner eq,ulpmeN. /\prjl t: A.sse5l sbtus Cl ~ o..-n«sr.p, 1ec ~ll\lca1 1ra"11<19 fCCO<dS, qui<! ~ .and t/MSf~ll'llQ title Aprl 15 Propose ch;lnges needed lo ftl~ure tr'lil r-itai IJl'Ollt'iY llf<llts; Mil rl'Ql.llt'ed eQUIJ:lment and 1e<mca 1 as1lSl!mce trwe$hQ•trve, ltanspditibO•'I eooperaiJoo from Co31Ki0n IO< CC$, lraql Pd<ac May 1~· ~ec<lecl~to.~ed ir1141aw Feo 1 5 CCC •100tpomtea 1nlD Trans~IQnal Law. CCC opernlklQ 1 nuei)ell!hlntly, wltll ;,tematlve C3S<I ntll!lr.ll rnech3!Ws!n so ca~ fllOOMill Qse ref6trals frOm can bO te>'etred by ~Of <1 d~s09n.1ted lr;iql a:..NflOl'I a'1tl lraQl3, $1JpPOrt evlclelltiary l>nd S0111~ lr1·1c51iQat!Vi! Ju<>r.30 CCC~ l<l~. 511~ ~,...,.~ per "''Ct" PAAGO req<1~ .m1 $mr<I¥~~ Coa1nJ011 Cllll~tton. m ~ 1lr14~0I ~ Al'l»I"~ Ti1111oli "9 C)lf.cer lO J Olfit Intel f us!M C d 30 !1'!W 1r:1q1 ffldlilJll!l!Yt VTC(;l(:f'tl<ici 10 ln!ll:lle p!311 lo ~ped'~e detMIJo!l..to. Un ijol.~imd (1 in C'.oo<dinalioo \NHh J\11111 JO. ~n lonnut.Jtc<i ~nd implementation lml)k>meru plan 1t1a111me pl.ace). jllus , 8 pr\sons ln~\ed 10 dccrea~ "1/esl\jutiQn-lo--11\at lim& m pl;ln sJg~ to go>....-<ite (or four s~. on tho OltlEF of a mQfll.'I Cool ~ 101i)lome1r ,,;J11Gii 3.2.7 ~.\El W!"OSl~a~IC>- reglorol) advl50(s-- T r:a~~J>O<lal .io!l &Uppat triallJme pos~yLSO li1lm lrA«a lt:iql Poli!\e CQ'llpl.:atu $75M (inCllll.llng pe1s. <incl R fl(JIQs, t.'lr>dilnes, 11, lml)k<ment basie io'Jlt- poloc:t\ - Ar<4 IS: Pl~n lor m~la .ted a110 knplemeril<ltiOn 1 mp1emcn1 p4an Pi50ll'I t;Ommurii;:a:.,'n S)'S.'l!Jll OOysc:,! dl)o;e~ rJ'~ rat inStll/1lll~oomlTlll~ >d'cjl'e ~-,,met11 l)nlVlclellirJsupP.) oeiwoen courtl!ou~. !Xifr». pri3qns prl$OllS communic<rt(l!1' J31'1\W)' 1, 2005: f11Jly 377 ~ ciourl- DC>ICe . . 3.45 ~ystam QPlln11irl9 'wi:hOOl Coil!"Oll~ Page2 of 3 Ministry or Jusll ~ Co.tllJlon f>Ot11<>111tOI FIJTIOlng roqu)roo Olner suppor1 Tllll~ll J>e t!l!ough June 30, . 2004 Pr1 orl1fes lllrougti June 30, 200<! roqlJ!r.-d r.qulroll follow-on 11<nts throu{lh January Tlmollno 01<1 1, 2JJ05 ,)11, llO )0, 2004 • Sll'•lefllO Jar.uary 't. 200S pr.n el....,.n1 1 :l CCo\p'fit!llf!llvO !IP~ l:WP ~MC tll'>rdlld:l l<I' Qll )UdOel ~old flltltO(t/!Jn 2 \111 plau). ~t IL.AC A ~ m.llon $ -~y Ftb 1a ' ll>C~lrl~~ri\lf115 ~tr~ J!JJWl('f '. ~· μ i.u ClPD,_T,Qll'lo.f l!Wf' ~llYOl'IO~ LJw IQf 17 fll®et j) IWO&~in. jlnCI • 1 ~ c:rilf\fW~iind I US"10) cvmrfell'!I ~~h \G, 11.A.Ceotnt! kl.~ fndepe:~e IOr .f!I )li<IQO.t co mJlle14Jd, Allr~ 1 OPOAT '(l<Ji<;t. ,illlll" ll1!~ llei)nis, eocti CW.Swill> fO crJmlnal jud!)~ and J)IO$e(:u\0<$, 10 1atl11•"1u '*'I.ii CPA dir®We:J, il'!11 dl/e ll<QCeU lll!d MMlt-norms lf1ll 10 llAC traWoc in ~ hul!l~o I~ tor U .. 7'0Wll fU!lbe'. of Judl)et. mi"- ,,l(j Ol!llo'tllly,f comPet«I Aftl 30• !LAC ciune In ir~i;nA!Jor.,I human rogtu 1 • .,,. /<lt 10 /Udqes. S μrosculllo's. ~nd ~1lomeys CO<l'lpl\llud Jl/flll lO AOM~ILAC t'OllJ<> t:llr114111';lt~ ti-.!~"1aNll ~ cmlP'Citd. 11.,i\C tr.if1.ll•~ fl'<llil""'' IQ< \Jnklpi!m ruir:o.t cl fuO!l~t. li'~ . .. 1111~~,~.1v.e ~~t~ ti>Jlot"ll JJUV\J90 10 l<l1QI ~ 11,.aocial>Of\, ~ OPD.AT '11Wc:k>t1.1!1 ' ttlil.q iJtt$lolis ccndticte<l 4"" n>Qr~ K:tllld~. each Wilh~O ~miln.iJ lu<:ltlQJ "nd l"<»N:IJW•: ex>111p<elilir1'Ne !fakilno p O(ll'ilm d@V•IQJllld ~~ tc!Wl11111ea 13 Le:!)31 Guea:e ~ ll"i8rl' ewo 1 11;>\llOfl ftOm l ~W ..,,,.,..., by 11'41(1! M OJ I'- OI J\Kllet , I llC!lbn Olfi<.~flOll!Off ... Ooi Tr.msla \ion suppotl M~b If> G;ueite pi!1nted kJ1rW,1l1dy w ~ lrom Sl:llo l><'pt "' C;»!,11(1'1~~ ~!Oaft1ll ~or·~~ltia 'Qlilclt.s!ac!"~ . c;oriiwel1ani<lv• Ira ""V μruoram dcvlllOIJed, •¢11g(lv<tl(I, !Ind dr·~ bJlti;stoQ, \ncll!(l~'l) tlv• a1>d COlll,,,.ercl.ij law . Gau:tte pul>l~ ""1h ro eo;t1Mn Wu1ibl'l!:e ~· ~~ ~ •~. Conlt!hlJIQll;ll (!Cll/lte t~~ld<l~f ~ ao:Mco reg;iidJ'111 lod!ci:d 11.iooordenc-e :l 1 , "r«J •llllcll.111! , ctlmh!t l)<~r;i! tlph!~ , arid otli&f 'Ofl'lfk\Jlfuf\;JI ndvtie 8-S la'll!<l.l'.lNl PllQe 3 of 3 l PRIORITY FEB MINISTRY OF JUSTICE TilllE Ll~E OF PRIORITY MILESTONES APR MAY JUN • .. JAN '05 1 EstabliSll ltlll Commlss!Oll on Public I ntegrity !O lnvestigale .,.., .pl1)$«llle. 000\lphon at all le"91s cl 1 5': 8egt0 hiring, traJ nlng lraqls 1 Flfsl tllal Degins ·------- 2. Jlidicl;;I R- t: ~tete <01hal 30 All ~eats rusolvod, JRC d•$$Ol\fl!S, 11:$ Comtri11"8 ~Ille ~IU~g; (ul'ldf on,s aSSiJmed by lraQf Judicial iUdlc;ial & PfOscaJlortol le.'lPPO•nt~nlS Supe!Visico Committee vel!lllg. -•· fll!lshod re!tlstatemefts 3 Esta~i sh organiZB!ion •n M lristty ot Jusllce 10 ~ pertlll\al •ocvnty 30; Establfsll ))efSOnal seconty organl231l on in M1n1s1ry: 511M!(af doZen Judges guarded by PSOs fol ~()() C11mlnal ludll"S 90. ~ ve _ rnme .,...,...~ ~ =--,...-,...-,...--1-,...-,...-,...-,...-,...-,...-,...---,;--.,.-,...-~-,---,...---1 ! ~,...-,...-,...-,...-,...-,...-,...-,...-,...-,...-~-,...-,...-,...-,...-,...-,...-,...-,...--f.=--,,.~ ~~ ..,_..---- -- 1 , AU 400 criminal )txlge• and Jl'OSl!CIJUl<S PfO!«"od by PSO guards - --- ' · Prlylbl Sl!Wli!Yb: 21 ldeotify for fortlfalion cnminal COUil/iouses or roj(lca1Klll approx1m.1tely 12 pr1&ity coun . houses 30; Adequate FPS ot1 a!J amnal cth.ses. refurblsl\men1 or reJoc.a11on assessments C00'4iloted •Ui--,...-~,...-,...-~ 1. 2 U.S. Marshals amve to perlorm as~ssmen~ and rerw:lef technical 6$8 slaf'C& 5; 8~ ~on 12 pOont)' W11rthouses 6: Begin nat~ide courthQUse usessme!'lts with U .S. l.4a~ti.a lt I: 2 U.S. Marshals amve to perloon assessmenls and r~r IQchrlical 3$Sls!aJ'lC9 5:"Esiaiiii ll/J organizallon in Ministry 10 P<010ci W11.ne5!19S 6 CQlrt~poil:lled d&~oounsel e•ailable lo all lelony and mi.Jdt!l'll!l!allll< defertlants ~: 01ganizatlo'1 established wpable of 1. wiloeu pmlectlon ~Y proledlng witnese; pian program opemino ~ IOffflulaled r o( !OriQ·lefm protect!on, ofldudinl) liJl apadly '°' 18100\' ---l----------tre "'locatloo - ... ~st casel -·---1 30' enSIJf1l COIJlt.;ippolnled and ·h.lrded de"'1>M I F!Aly lunc1Jo111ng CGUnMI a.ajalJle 10 an l!!lony ..i mi-a00< program"'"" ..rine<l, deloro:lanrs, two· 0< 111n!,e-<laylr.!!n1og CQ!Jne~ lmparli~ :soileaion unde,...ay guklel1nes and a rnandatay qual~JOll 7 Transfer admlnis!JlJllon and J»Y of j<lclgn (JOOl Mlnl~1ry ID Council of ·~,...-,...-,...-,...-,...-,...-;-,...-,...-,...-,...-,...-,...-,...--1--,...-,...-,...-- ---j c--,...--,...-,...-,...--,...--,...-~+-,...-,...-,...-,...-,...--,...-~1~-- -,...---,...-..,_--,...--,...-,...----1•" tft1 1 • Needs assessed 1; Transfer effected i_ Ju _ c . g~o - $ ------;.---,...--,...--,...-___,;-- ~-,...--~•---,...--,...---,...-,...-~-+~-,.----,...-,...-,...-,...-+-,...-,...-,...-,...-,...-,...-,...-,...-,...-,...-,...-,...-,...---1 ~ ·1--,...-,...---~~i 8 Soll<ljfy rea1 PfOPCrtr rigtU ._,...-_ 1 Assess status al property f 1 5. ~ ¢anges 0M1etsh1p, recon:ls. qyie11no and enacied into law lransfemng [JU& 15: Propose dlanges needtl\I to ensure firm real property nghts; sool< required equlporent am1 ___,_,...-_,...-,...-_,...-,...-,...-,...-,...-,...-~,...-,...-,...--,...-,...-~ toch ~ n - lca ~· · - 1 ~ aS80 ~ S - ta _ nc.e ....... ,...-,...-,...--~-,...-,...-,...-,...-,...-,...-,...--~-,...-,...-,...-,...-,...-,...-,...--,...-,...-,...--~ .., ~,...-,...-,...-___,_~ Pag& 1 <12 MINISTRY OF JUSTICE TIMEUNE OF PRIORITY MILESTONES PRIORITY FEB APR MAY JUN .. JAf-1 '05 9. Central Criminal Coon 15: CCC lnrorporated into 30; CCC hanclilng 10 1ovesti9ations. 5 tnats se!f-sulfloent T ransltional Law. with per....eel< alternative case referral mechanism so cases can be refe!Ted by CoobtlOO or a de.signaled Iraqi ... 10 Inmate plao lo e•pedrte cletenOon-\CHJW 1tme 11 ilqllemete bilSIC CIU'I • pollal • pnsons 30: Plan fomivt<iled and implementation 1111uated ro decrease 111vestigal10n·t<>lnal lime !i)!f11ficanlly, on the ordef of a mo11th ... 1~ Plan lormlAm:ed arod 1· l\Jty ~l'G coun· lmpl!!mentllloo inillated f!J< poea · pnsons cornruntcalioos 5ystem trcslatMneou$ collllllUnlcaUons comrrunlcatlor\S ~QOU<1~. police, prisons: $~em Ope<allng without Coalition '1.lppol'I ... 12 Compretiensl\'ll 26: !LAC lrainlng axirsc In 19. IL.AC CQUJSI! •n 1: OPD. AT •quick·start• training tfaini!lg . ~~ international human nghls Judicla! be9 'lS. each dass Wl(h 40 cnminal and !idied.uled for all law for i 7 jud!llls. 9 •ndependencc for· 49 'udges and prosecutors, to ~and~ prosecu!OIS, and 41 ~. uctges ccmpleted tamllarize with CP' A diredlltM, lot1 atlomeys completed due prooess and ru1e-or-taw norms 10 IL.AC 1rau1!119 1n lntemal. JOOal humanitarian law 10( unk11own nurrber ol judges, prosecutors, and attorneys completed 30: ILA.C training course in lntemati011al human riQhts law for 10 judges, 5 prosaltors, Md· attorneys completed. 00: Addollonal lLAC <XX!rsa in international humanllarlan law ~led; I. LAC train-the- trainer program for unknown nun-tier of judges. prosewtors, and attorneys ~teied; ILAC professional AlQulation training provided lo Iraq! bar associatloo. ~ve OPOA T ·quidi- sh11t" training sessions ronduded arid more schedlJled. each wfth 40 criminal judges and proseortors; comprehensive training program dovelopod and scheduled . .. l 3 Legat G.aielle prim!ed 15. Gale1te printed e~ry two weclts by 1raq1 lonnlghlly wlllOJI Mo.Jpn:n Co.lliloon aurstance t 4. Conslrtilt.onal ad\11\:e ... Pi'Oiiid(i advice regarding judicial lndepeiideoce and st!UClurc. cr!ITlloaJ procedural rights, aro other conslltulional advial . as reouested Page2 ol 2 STRATEGIC PL.AN STATUS CHECK (as of 30 Jan 04) Summarv bv Core Foundation Securitv • Mor and CJTF7 update ongoing Essential Services • No plan update from Electricity. • Rewrite of Comms and Industry & Minerals ongoing. • Anticipate OFF Milestones and Key Tasks Economv • Re-assessing SOE strategy in light of recent political decisions. Govemance • No change StratComms • Focus remains Governance - Electric, Education and Health campaigns will start when more resources currently working governance arc available. Reds bv Trend No change to Reds as reported last week - see attached Significant Ambers by Trend Personnel • Trade loosing critical personnel no replacements - docs this apply across other Ministries? • Sec·urity Obj 3, KT 1, ST I - By mid-February, staff will be down to 7 Coalition personnel in the Ministry of Justice. No replace11u?11ts ide11tifietl despite. repeated requests, i11cl11dil1g req11ests-hy-11ame <if lawyers eager to t•ome to Iraq as justice advisors. • Sec11rity Obj 3, KT 4, ST 1 - Jauuary 2004: Long-awaited contracted civilian prison experts are slowly beginning to arrive and being assigned duties as correctional trainers and facility-level administrators beginning in the greater Baghdad area and rben expanding nationwide. Extreme lock of q11alifietl Iraqi staff suggests ltand-over of operatio11al co11trol on July 1 co11ld lun-e severe ad•1e. rse coriseq11e11ces. • Gol1erna11ce Obj S, KT3, ST/ - ............. lntemational forensic teams to exhume evidentiary sites to arrive in early Feb. Need more i11tematfrmal teams to commit. • Gover11ance Obj 5, KT2, ST1 - Evidence storage facility under construction; evidence custodian to arrive in Jan. 011ly 2 internario11al im•estigators - atlditio11al are 11eede1t. Se.curity • Governa11ce Obj 5, KT2, ST6 - Physicians for Human Rights was supposed to provide such counseling in Oct. Nov and Dec bltt ca11celted ...... . Status Report by Key Tasks Objective Key Task Security 3 Build Justice 6 Standardize and modernize land ownership records and tracking system Develop and implement plan. Objective Status Key Task Status Amber Amber Red II Lack of qualified staff prevents significant action on this front. CPA Ministry of J. ustice trying to hire an expert in this field currently assigned to the Ministry of Trade. Fol' Official Use 01'(l' Fritlo.1" JaPUDl'J' 30, 1004 Page I o/3 Objective Key Task Objective Status Key Ta.sic Status Essential Services 2 Reconstruct Communications and Postal Systems and Introduce Advanced Technologies 7 Migrate ITPC to GAAP with Pilot Enterprise Systems Capability Amber Green Red II Issue Tender for Postal System Automation First Iraqi stamps issued and distribution initiated 1115. Facilities Protection Setvices roll-out for ITPC Mo/ identified need to provide equipm~nt ., salaries, and training for ITPC FPS personnel. Currently identifying and verifyin,g iota/ requirements. MoC Is attempting to work with MoF at1d MoC to Identify necessaty fJmmclal resources. Initiating Planning for Zip Code System for Iraq Acquire automated sorting and delivery equipment. SOW expected to be completed this quarter: awaiting supplemental funding for procurement action. r"r Ojjfriul l l.\ 't• 011~r Frid11y, .l11111111ry .IO. 21!fJ.I Objective Key Task Objective Status Key Task Status Strategic Communications Amber 1 Foster a professional Iraqi media industry which operates under the conventions of unbiased reporting and freedom of speech. 1 Establish /MN as the popular, professional and reliable media network that Iraqis support Amber Red II - Prepare for contractor hand-off from SAIC to Ha"is Corp. Contract newly awarded. Estimate some initi.al lag as new contractor (Harris Corp) transitions from SAIC. • On going polling and audience assessment efforts 2 Support Security with a robust communications campaign 2 Police communication and information campaign Develop recruiting campaign for Police and FPS Materials distribution for recruitment campaign Red Red II Task is Red due to diversion of assets to <Governance communications campaign. Will shift back into Police effort approx 1 FEB 2004. F11r Official list• 011(r Muiistrv ofElectriciIT, Milestones JAN '04 FEB '04 MAR '04 APR '04 MAY 104 JUN 104 JUL '04 l~ M~i ~ n~is~try~ . ~o~f~E~lec ........_ tri~c~ity~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~----. ~ USAID II awaroed. TFRIE transitions Into Gulf Region Division. Eady ActiQn PMO projects dellned, lundmg requests completed. Generation exoeeds 4 .,000 MW and 88,000 MW-hours. Spring Maintenan~ Program begins. Plan for main Pt.ro projedS canplele ~n tes!dential b1lling. Generation matntatned &l4.200 MW and 90.000 MW-hOurs Complete TOA from FPS IOEPSS. through Spring Maintenance. Spring Maln1enance Program ends. Pablish long term strategy. Complete TOA from FPStoEPSS Generation exceeds 6.000 MW. 120.000 MW-hours. Prehminary Master Plan development reviewed. PMO conttactors selecte<l. Main PMO conlractors begin · W011i1 on sites. Bechtel ccmpleles rebuild of N1:1slriyah· Khor ZUbalr 400kV hne. lnspeclof General In place. Five 400kV lines completed by GRD. Generation maintained Publish infraslrUcture Secur'ily Plan. at 4-1200 MW and 90,ooo MW-hours Revised AllocaOon through Spring Maintenarn;e. Policy published. Generatlon e>loeeds 4,500 ~. 94,000 MW.floors. Develop and initiate infoonaliO!'l ca"11)illgn to support alloca~1on policy. Generation exceeds 4,200 MW and 90,000 MW-hours. Iraqi Government takes power. CPA dissolves. Task Status No. Now 1 A 2 A 3 A 4 A Strategit; Plan Key Tasks "Provide electricity serviees that 111eet 11atio11a/ 11ee1Js. " Recent Key Tasks Remarks Trend t Improve generating capacity to 6,000 MW (from 3,200 - 3,500 MW 4, 112 MW peak, 87,486 in July '03) by 1 July 2004 .. Generation for 28 Jan at MW-hours total. Fully implement policy on Focal points are t allocation of electrical power, Baghdad, southern through fair load shedding for govern ates. domestic and commercial consumers, . Publish Electricity Sector Strategy document. <==> Minimize sabotage and improve ontracted security for t se. curity. rebuilding transmission lines goes away in Feb and March. Expd Status June 30 A Crosstt•a, lk a11d StatHs lmprtJve, Generating Capacity ttJ 6,000 MW - - . . Task Status Recent Key Tasks Remarks No. Now Trend Expd Status June 30 Improve generating capacity to 6,000 MW (from 3,200 - 3,500 MW in July '03) by 1 July 2004. 1.1 A generation between January and generators now A t Bring online 900 MW of new June 2004. producing 64 MW. Northern Industrial site Increase capacity of existing units SOMO units now 1.2 A MW by June 2004 through A t (in place before January) to 5,000 maintenance and rehabilitation producing 145 MW. programs. Increase imports by 300 MW between January and June 2004. 1.3 A ¢=! Transformer repair/replacement required in Zahko. Work on new line from Kuwait beginning. Crosswalk tl' nd Stat11s Implement Fair ElectricityA/locatio11 Po./ic· E Task Status No. Now Recent Key Tasks Remarks Trend Expd Status June 30 Fully implement policy on allocation of electrical power, through fair load shedding for domestic and commercial customers. Rewrite, obtain approval and Policy revisions address 2.1 A prior to 29 February 2004. power, increased t publish revised allocation policy increases in available Accompany revised policy with industrial demand and information campaign. specific regional concerns. 2.2 A mechanisms and reporting systems survey of Baghdad t Improve intelligence-gathering Commenced detailed for power availability at the distribution system. customer !eve. I. 2.3 A governates primarily through t Enforce load shedding between Issues primarily in south. Ministry of Electricity channels. 2.4 A distribution systems and remote completed 24 Jan 04. t Improve Baghdad low voltage Ma'ari substation rehab controls. 2.5 A t Repair six key 400kV transmission One of six lines lines before June 2004. energized. Cross1•'alk a11d Stat11s Draft Lo11.g Term Strategy Key Tasks Remarks Task Status Recent No. Now Tr-end Publish Electricity Sector Strategy document. 3.1 A t Receive preliminary Bearing Point work before 15 Feb 04. Develop and publish technical Master Plan priorto 31 May 04. 3.2 A <==; 3.3 A <==; Develop and publish long-term strategy for the Ministry of Electricity prior to 15 Jun 04. 3.4 A <==; Establish the Ministry of Electricity Inspector General Office prior to 29 Feb 04. Work ongoing, concentration on transmission grid. Cost of service, billing structure, accounting practices. organizational structure. Looking at new , candidates. Expd Status June 30 Reviewed initial input. Crosswa· lk 011d' Status Minimize Sabo· tgge and l1nprove Sec11rity lask Status Recent Key Tasks No. Now Trend Minimize sabotage arid improve securHy. 4.1 A t Develop and implement electricity infrastructure security plan before 29 Feb 04. 4.2 A t Complete Transfer of Authority at FPS sites by Mar 04. Remarks Plan must combine E PSS/GJTF ~?/ contractor s. ecurity efforts. Verifying payroll for all MSC sites. Expd Status June 30 Status Report by Key Tll.\'ks Objective Key Tuk Security 1 Achieve a Secure and Stable Environment 4 Deter external aggression and subversion CotJtinue. (CJTF-1) Begin to transfer external ~ecurity responsibility rrom CJTF·7 to Iraqi Ministry of Interior. Border policy being further refined. Ar Ar border crossing online for Hajj influx. Objective Status Key Task Status Amber Amber Amber O CJTF-7 continued border security operatfons in December. Engagement wiU1 neighboring countries will lead to increasing cooperation on border eontrol. Hajj plan11lng continues to facilitate the movement of pilgrims. As of 1-25-04 4000+ people had been moved successfully across lhe border. Diplomatic efforts to discourage eJ<temal subversion. (CENTCOMIDOS) 5 Eliminate munitions caches,. unexploded ordinance and excess military equipment Transfer responsibility for munitions caches elimination to Iraqis. (CJTF-7) Have 6 sites operating at full capacity by end of January. Amber D Two demilitariration sites are fully operational (receipt, storage, a11d collection), two are partially functional (receipt and storage), and two have an Initial operational capability but are not operatintJ daily. fridaJ'. Ja1111ar;r JI/, 100./ Objective Key Task 2 Public Safe.ty: Develop Institutions that are Effective in Protecting Society and Constitutional Order 1 Develop and apply consistent vetting policies and processes Community based DeBa'athification pr;ogram ongoing. 3 Create an Effective and Accountable Police System Enforce Order t. hat holds police accountable for actions that violate human or civil rights. Continue to build community institutions that take effective actions to addrns acc· ount'ability issues. Establish a public infOnnation capability within the IPS by January 31 2()(U. Objective Status Key Task Status Amber Amber O A review of options has been written by MOI policy and PRB ft1nding issues are to be resolved by 1·27-04. Amber O Tripartite system adopted. Police regulation$ are being assessed by the Ge. Strategy for deployment ot international police advisors developed. Position identified in MO/ structure awaits appointment. · - 6 'ft . . ti f) - V 01 ~ CJ.hf ~4 ..\EJJ(i fridR)', Jaf1t10rJ' JO. !fl(}./. Paxr 1 o/31 Objective Key Taslf Train Iraqi counterparts to be responsible for quality control, evaluation and development of new courses to be offered. Continue to develop indigenous training capacity through delivery of IDC programs for IPS. Begin Command and Sup(NVision courses and plan advanced and specialized courses. Deploy additional international coalition police trainers to training academies in Iraq • 200+. Achfe, ve full training capacity in all three basic recruit training academy sites • a total of up to 5000 student~ in basic training at any one time. Have a minimum of 1,000 IPTF members in~country assigned with personnel in all regions of Iraq as dictated by deployment 'Scheme of new cadets. Strategic plans being adjusted to meet the evolving needs on the ground. Continue repairs, refurbishment of police stations. Acquire remaining equipment for IPS as funding is mad& available. rridllJ'• Jat111ary .io. 1001 Objective Status Key Task Status On Track Senior management and staff training is developing. Recruitment held up due to contract issues and availability of Supplemental Budget funds. Some delays in training due the difficulty of moving international trainers into Iraq. Statements of Work being developed by Centcom logistics team for the repair of police stations. In addition, the team is creating a sustainable purchasing and logistics plan that will facilitate contracting, delivery and distribution of equipment ordered for IPS, FPS and DBE. Pot:e J of JI Objective Key Task Confimr Iraqi policing legal framework by Ja_nuary 31; 2004; identify needs for reviews to e. nsure compliance wit/I human rights standards. Ass;st Iraqi MOI ia developing admf nistrative procedures to implement civil service procedures and work protection. Appoint IG and stand-up Internal Audit capability by end January 2004. Objective Status Key Task Status Work continues. Implement civilianization plan. Delayed but ongoing. Cour$'1 correction being considered and revised needs assessment completed. Ongoing consultation with COO office is contributing to a revised and focused plan. Amber D 7 Develop Effective Border Security Continue training. Transfer of Authority border control to MOI, OBE has begun and the upper mana,gement are going out to outlying areas and reporting back to the Baghdad authority. (CJTF-7/CPA). 4.5MS needed for construction to meet TOA dates. Amber D 8 Develop emergency management command and control system for Iraq that . can coordinate police, fire, rescue and emergency medical assistance in the eve. nt of a natural or manmade disaster. Install communications infrastructure and equipment, to include {but not limited to) hand·held radios~ base stations, re. peaters, communications towers, with associated installation, training, operations and mainteitanee costs. On track fritlar, Ja1111ar.1• 30, 100.S 3 2 Objective Key Taslc Build Justice Reform Judicial System Continue to implement and mollitor a,ppointment and compensation of attorneys for indigent crimioal defendants. Reform the curriculum and the admission procedures of the Judicial College to inculcate norms of due process., rule of law. judicial review. judicial ;ndependence, judicial ethics, human rights. Encourage and make more efficient the adjudjcation of major felonie$ through th~ tt?gtJ/ar court system. This entails providing .security for judges, prosecutors and witnesses (especially as regular courts are called on to adjudir:ate crimes against humanity), encouraging coordlnatic>n between police and courts, and appointing more investigative judges. J'rid11r, J111111ar)' .UI, 2004 Objective Status Key Tasl( Status Amber Amber D Defense co'unsel appointments being made sporadically because attorneys not being paid and defendants not physically appearing in court (withjudges conducting ·initial appearances• by reviewing only the defendant's paper file). Efforts underway to redress both problems. Discussions undertaken with director of Judicial College toward accomplishing this task. Discussions will continue. Guarded optimism is warranted that reforms will be implemented in 2004. For example, the director has agreed to · ins'titute a new course on human rights for the current group of 32 students. Underway. Security remains extremely problematical. Ther.e ha11e been approximately 300 cr iminal trials in Iraq since the end of the war, 70 of which were felony trials. The pace has quickened as more investigative judges have been appointed·-34 in Baghdad, versus a prewar 12. Pal(~ 5 of JI Objective Key TasJc Develop ability to investigate and prosecute terrorism and Olflllnized crime cases. Objective Status l<ey Task StatfJs Ministry of Justice llas formed a major crimes unit to cultivate special · expertise in investigating serious cr .fmcs, although investigations have not begun. The Central Criminal Court also investigates serious crimes. T11e Commission on Public lhfegrity will imtestigate corruption. Amber D ' Improve the penal system Complete renovations of six facilities initiated during 4th quarter of CYQ3 using rom~ining CY03 constrm;tlon/major renovation$ budget fufJds, adding approximately s,ooo beds and creating more than 1,800 prlsdf1 .. related jobs. l11;tiate renovation of multiple prisons and detenUon centers with anticipated CYO.f supptomental funds. Renovations are on-going and new p,.ojects are close to initiation at various facilities nationwide. Conti"ue to pr-'Jvide security equipment and vehicles for ren<:>vatecf detention and prison facilities. Receive new equipment purchased and/or· donated for the traql Corrections Service (/CS) and assimilate new items Into operational practices. Specialized eq(lipmant and operational components, for example, inmate transportation services, are incorporated into dally operational activities .. Both purchased as well as donated vehicles and security equipment are arriving regularly and allocation to the required locations is on-going. r. ' Q.(J· · . I (!C. &' ~ l ti Tf! le!ltWt , I · #h PaKr 4 of.JI Objective Key Task Continue to recruit and train Iraqi offlcers to operate reactivated facilitie. s as weJI as actively involve the on·sile civilian prison expert. s in employee mentorship and directed training of leadership s, taff. Renovate a new headquarlers for the /CS and national department•level staff operations. Obje.ctive Status Key Task Status Re.novaticm of the new national · headquarters buildi.ng compleK for the Iraqi Corrections Service Is close to completion with a target completion date of 01FEB04. The training academy ls In operation and expansion of this process is in the developmental stag~ . 5 Establish Anti-corruption Program Coalition personrrel arrive In Iraq, identify and vet Iraqi staff, assemble curriculum, have law esfab/l'shing Commission on Public Integrity enacted by Governing Counc. 11 1 b&gin training and operations. Ambe.r D Draft order under discussion with Governing Council Anti-Corruption Committee. Personnel plan and tfmefine complete, but timing for arrival of personnel in doubt. I bl :f CUh J Sth~t -· f!ifji. ·~ · fJ' Frida)', Ja"""'J' JO, 20(}.I Pat:i• .·of JJ Objective Key Task Objective Status Key Task Status Essentia1 Services Amber 1 Provide Electricity Services that Meet National Needs 1 Improve generating capacity to 6,000 Megawatts (from 3200-3500 in July '03) by 1 July 04 Amber Amber D USACE work br,ngs another 90DMW (derated) additio(la/ geQeratlon online: SOMO Rehab: 270MW (nameplate} N<tjaf 2 Rehab: 6JMW Khor Zubair 214 Rel>ab: 126MW North Industrial Sites: 76MW Dibls 4/5 Rehab: 68MW Beljl Mobile Units: 184MW Befj Unit 2: 159MW Hilla New Unit: 2SMW Oudu.s 5161118: 172MW Bu.zurgan Nfiw Unil; 43MW Peak Generation averaging near 3,600MW. TFRIE is executing its projects while transitioning into the new Gulf Regi'on Division. Transmission line installation generally progressing well, new generation projects generally delayed. SOMO generators coming on line mid-January with 2TOMW . Spring MaintMance Program begins in late Feb with aver 60 unit.s offline for scheduled maintenance. Amber D 2 Pully implement policy on allocation of electrical power, through fair load shedding 3 hrs on/3 hrs off for domestic and cornmen:ial consumers Objective Key Task Further Improve compliflnce with the nafJonal allocation policy. Investigate methods of monitoring and enforcement. Continue . to develop .SCADA system to better control electrlclly distribution. · Continued /QIJd shedding. but with decreasing levels of 'otr time. Major improvements to begin ln APR 04. Start evaluation of results for SCADA rollout. Governorates provide sub-allocation p/a(1S for power to industry and residential customers in their areas. 3 Publish draft document of long-term strategy for Iraqi electricity sector The long-term strategy will continue to be retrnect. Projects Identified 'llnd selected by the CPA shall be planned Jn detail by the e:1ecutlng party, be that Bechtel, the PMO or other organltation, A transition plan for the Ministry of Electricity, encompassing organizational strvcture, training, staffing levels, fina11cial processes, etc, shall be developed. Objective Status Key Task Status Power allocation policy development continues for both commercial and residential customers. Monitoring and enforcement methods continue to be assessed. TFRJE Installation of a SCADA system In Baghdad will greatly improve. load shedding through rnmote control of switching statiotrs. This system will eventually be fnstafled nationwide. Amber O Beari11g Point personnel are conduGting flmmalal aod revenue analyses, personnel reorganization pla11s, bWi"g and collection systems. over.all cloatrical system l11yout plans. Minimize 'Sabotage and improve securf(y Amber D eo. Hf{ . . t , tJ • Mn ry v 1t Jin .n ~n~t ,.ri1laJ'• J1m11arJ' ln, 10il4 P1Jt:<' fJo/JI Objective Key Task Deploy Ministry of Electricity EPSS 'Power Police' to taJ<e responsibility for security for fi1ted sites and for patrolling power fines. Expand communications capability to provide regional communications network. Additional communications equipment to be purchased to . enhance the current commtJnications' system. Base stations and mobile radios will provide this regional network. National communications will use phone services. Objective Status Key Taslc Status Current Power Police force of 2'350 officers. Transfer of a1Jthori1y with Facilities Protection Service Is complete in Baghdad and should be complete throvghout Iraq by the end of November. FPS forces will increase the number of Power Police by 14()(). The Power Police Training Program has graduated 2240. TFRIE will fund and equip 1500 Power Police for one year. Power police have received through the PRB proces· s 112 new vehicles and 1020 hand held radios for use in patrolling MOE sites. Patrols on transmission lines and key facilities will begin not later than 1 NOV, Alf personnel are in uniform and an irlentiffcation badge is being develaped. A .total of 600 weapons have been issued, 4-00 in Baghdad and 200 in Basra. 3 2 Provide Food Security for all Iraqis Assure supply of critical inputs Amber Amber D ·~ tJfT · · o " · i bl :f ltltli , Sth(i Friday. J1111111trf .UI, 2fJf'J.I l't1J:1! IO of J J 4 1 Objective Key Task Improve Quality and Access to Housing Increase Available Finance Implement residential housing financing program. Housing Refonn Program Plan is under deve/opmenl Complete 1st draft in March. Objective Status Key Tasl< Status Amber Amber D Available sources and mixes of financing are the Iraqi budget and the Oil For Food Program. There are three ongoing projects funded by the FY 03 Iraqi bpdget and six projects just re-started with OFF. Potential n~w sources are the Donor's Conference and priva re developers. CPA MoHC H<Jusing Progr~m ft111nager Advisor (Ms. r I is forming a committee with Ministry Hbusing staff to prepare a Housing Program who's go<tl · is to rransfom1 the state provision of housing to a sustainable market based system. Assistance from USAID will be s:ought to capitalize on tlleir years of lessons learned experience. Goals 1) Establish the team composition 2) Prepare a scope of worl:c anci identify funds to initiate a Housing and Shelter Sector Assessment and Analysis. J) /1;1itiate Housing Reform Program study consisting of tasks re/alive to the following: a.) Housing and property •· b) J,nfrastructure; c) Construction sector; d) Finance; and e) Property. 2 Increase Housing Supply Amber O - fJfj' .. b' (;J. TOI :f iUiifS'EIJl) f"ridfly, Ja1111t1?' JO. JOfU P111t;t 11 of JI Objective Key Task 10 Jan, open and begin review of over 700 bid$ for 13 separate Housing Complex Contracts. Objective: •shovels tu ming" . on at least one project by end of February. Estimate total extent of i;apablflty for private construction Bnd financing. Research optimum design and construction techniques for low cost housing. Begin test pilot programs Begin, based on LC's, 6 OFF housing projects Continue construction of ongoing funded new units. Objective Status Key Task Status The Housing shorlage is in the magnitude of in excess of 1,4 milllot1 units No Housing funds were provided in the Supplemental. A tender was issued In August for 13 projects of 504 flats each that would have been funded from the supplemental. The bid d;J/e for the tender was extended in hopes that Donors Conference money would become available to fund the contracts. However, it did not, and Amb Bremer made a special allocation for housing to get tllis critical i11lrastructure and social met. Initial allocation was 100 ml/lion housing proper, and 30 mi/lion for "mortgage bankin, g •. Bids opened 10 Jan there 15 no indication of what will be provided for Housing from the Donor's Conference. Three low Income housing projects (1,320 nats) are underway with FY 03 Iraqi funds. Six projects (3,024 fl~ts) re-started in OFF. There is only enough funds in the FY 04 Iraq budget for two new projects of 504 nats eai;h. 3 Increase Private Ownership Amber D r 9.ffi ' 'e' f)I ii Of A ?(.Ith Sli,fJ f'rida)', J1Jnuary .lO, lrlfl./ Objective Key Task Obj, ective Status Key Task Status These actions are ongoing and will be includad in the program. Determine infrastructure necessary to s~ppot1 subsidized housin. g ownership program arJd budget to support. Discuss with Baghdad council and ministries on-going housing privatization program. (ongoing) Develop programs, policies and procedures to introduce private investors to the housing market through a variety of methodologies Tracie program progress and adjust as necessary. 6 Improve Quality and Access to Education Rehabilitate 1000 priority primary and secondary schools Identify geographic-based needs for new schools; prioritize and develop plan for funding ($88 million provided by supplemental). Ministries of Education and Housing & Construction tiave. established a set of puilding standards against Which schools will be inspected. In some areas (for inst;mce Sunni Triangle) inspection and rehabilitation is difficult. Create . plan for distribution of computers to administrative offices and select schools. Amber Amber O Key to completing this task is completing by end of Fel:)ruary inspections basect on standards developed by Ministries of Education and Housing and Construction. 3 Refonn the curriculum Amber D c fJfT. 'b' 8 I 1 01 - J ,lith . ... ft ~•faJj; FridaJ". J1111uar)' .iO, 1011' PaJ:I! J .f of .11 Objective Key Task Continue National Dialogue on Education Reform In forums and the media throughout Iraq. Establish and announce Commission on Education and Curriculum Reform. Objective Status Key Task Status Beginning communicating with all sectors in Iraq. Amber D 4 lmprot1e the quality of education and lay the foundation for educational refofTfl by providing technical assistance for MOE capacity building Ensure systems and programs in place for financial marJagement, educational planning and Education Management Information System. (EMJS). Establish Inspector General posf(ion and appoint (February 1). Continue teacher training program with master trainers to train 32,000 secondary teachers by end of March. Develop plan for establishing TV programs for pre· school children and their families. Amber O 5 Deliver special programs for girls' education and for reduction of girls' illiteracy Begin expansion outside northern provinces. Friday, Jarwarr .JO. ]QIN Objective Key Task 8 Provide Water Supply, Sewerage and Municipal Services 3 Municipal Services Technical advisory team shifts to Ministry under bi-lateral support project. Plan developed to includf3 community representatives in developing plans and budgets in majority of municipalities. Plan for cost and program community-driven proposals for neighborhood improvement to be rolled-out over three year period. Objective Status Key Task Status Amber Amber O Development planning processes are still at· an early stage but have the potential of bi·lateral (DFTD) capacity building and support. (DFIO~MMPW Support Ptbject now in abeyance, but CSR Projet:l forthcoming which can ar:commodate s.ome of tlrese requirements) Wltl1drawal of all UN expatriate staff hampering progress on global technical coordination (New UN analysis underway for potential return; new UN Strategy Document hightlghts Urban Management and Planning as a priority input) 9 Improve Water :Resources Management 3 Facilities Improvements within (he Ministry Facilitate construction of MoWR headquarters building to be finished by end of May 04. Move the Minister and his immediate staff into the anne)( at the HQ site. Green Amber D The ministry's finance depalfment is presently located in an annex at the HQ site, The present plan is to move tliem into the first floor t1nd to relotated the M;nister and his staff in the vacated annex by Feb 7. Amber D 4 Capacity Building within the Ministry Nomination and Selection of IG by FEB 28th 2004 IG Identified for selection bμt was later selected by another Ministry. ... e(ff · · t::· e · · ro> ~ c1 u; 4Jt ,~111:.e Pagr T5of.H Objective Key Task Objective Status Key Task Status 10 Restore Economically-Strategic Transportation Infrastructure 2 Enable Iraqi Port Authority (IPA) to administer a port of call with intermodal capabilities and inland container distribution. Strengthen Water·side Cargo Transport Operations: Establish Port Task Force to coordinate suP'plemental funding. Restore grain facility to full operation. Reestablish full cargo handling capability by restoring two container cranes at Umm Qasr. \ Continued dredging at Khawr Az Zubayr. Complete perimeter fencing and .security lighting. Remove obsolete equipment and infrastructure to modernize port operati<;ms. Standardize crash/fire equipment at ports. Amber Amber D Strengthen Water-side Cargo Transport Operations: In early January 2004, Port Task Force, which consists of Mo T, Mol, PMO, USAfD, the military, and other organizations, will be ass. essing the Iraqi ports· situation and offering recommendations on port•related contracts. Currently, Ministry of Transport and Ministry of Interior have agreed to standardize fire protection procedures and equipment at ports and airpo.rts. 4 Repair Roads and Bridges Amber D itllft!J.fhStlU ... 9:9' · • e ' e ~ Frida;·, Jan11ary JO, W04 Pag~ 16 of JI Objective Key Task Con(inue to Tes tart, identify, and repair critical roads and bridges. SfJift priorities from national system to include prlorltif!ts of the govemorates. Develop viable working relationship with PMO Develop staffing requirements based on the most efficient organization concept. Adjust number of personnel according to requi~ments. Continue to develop stable and dependable supply system for construction supplies. Objective Status Key Task Status 23 road and bridge projects completed. 112 projects currently un. clerway. Have to re-negotiate construction contracts because of increases in construction material prfces. shortages of supplies, security, and maintenance. Maintenance projects are negatively affected by problems in bitumen supply. f<'rilla;•, lil11t1a"}' . JO , !OOJ Objective K'ey Tas1' 11 Convert Social Service Programs into Economic Development Tools 3 Developing a national employment and training initiative 20 emp/Qym&nt centets up and running to help facilitatfl relationships between those trained and employers that partner with the center and training institute. National Employment and Training Center Established: 6 VocatiOnal Training Centers Rehabbed. 5, 000 customers trained. 100, 000 personnel registered for employment services throughout Iraq. On the Job Training begins for 10,000 personnel 500 Staff Trained (300 in Jordan) Labor Law roview sent out for draft and review Ministry establishes joint partne~hip with ILO OSHA established In Labor Pillar Ministry established Labor Survey departmen. l/staff trained. Objective Status Key Task StafU$ Green Amber D 76,629 jobs hOJve been cre.atccl under' an lfli(i<ttivc, tlie National Employment Program, that seeks to create 100,000 . new public work jof)s. Over 150 personnel who were identified for jobs) but lacked the proper skills, started vocational tralnii1g cotJt-ses at the Baghdad training center (J / 17 centers are open). The country now has 11 I is employment centers fn operation in Iraq (Baghdad, lrbil, Mosul, Kirlwk, Baqubah, Khanaqin, Karbala, Najaf, Diwaniyya, Samawa, and Nasariyya). Over 25,0DO lraqls. found permanent jobs with the assistance of those. centers. 8sr{1 Objective Key Task Objective Status Key Task. Status 12 Reconstitute Oil Infrastructure Amber 4 Build guard fo~e to 14,500, Transfer responsibility for all domestic product Imports to tt1e MOO (Ministry of Amber o Oil). SOMO SOMO training to assume full responsibility for all imports. SOMO has begun impor1s of all fuels; 'full responsibility still some time away; SOMO training under DESC. 15 Improve and Optlmiz. e Use of Public Buildings 1 Repair public buildings to pr&-war quantities and standards Based on budget availability, initiate worlf on projects in priority order. Observe program and adjust as necessary. Amber Amber o This task. has been superceded by a new task: Develop Public Buildings Plan. This Plan is rolled' up in Key Task No. 2. Develop and Implement optimum mi" of public building utilization Task i$ re-defined as: Develop Public Building Plan Atnber D Estimate potential public income to be derived from appropriate U$, e of public lluUdlngs. Develop policy with 'f'egard to f1/temative use of public buildings in conjunction with Iraqi government lnstit. ufions, Determine optimum mix of benefits (Income, cultvral, other) to be1 derived from alternative uses. Schedule Public Buildings Plan for implementation. Public . Buildings Program Manager Advisor r t: I tias stifrted assembling tile MoHC Tea,_m _ t_o _ _. develop tile Public B'ulldings Plan. fJ.1n) f"ridtr)', )t1n11a~' JO, ](104 l'otr /II of JI Objective Key Task Economy 1 Build Financial Market Structures 3 Re..estabfish Bag. hdad Stock Erchange Reopen stock exchange at temporary /ocat)on Jn 01 2004 with CPA order. Install depository with direct tin#< to New York. 4 Res:tructure National debt ,..riJoy. Jottlltlf}' .H>, 1004 Objective Status Key Task Status Green Green Ambet O e.Statμs - on track for trading to begin in Q1 i.12123103 update - f1'pected opening reschedufed in 01 2004; we have expert from Philadelphia Stock Exchange coming in as an overs·eer in Ja.nuary. Ii. 12130/03 update - Reflects timellne movement to the right approximately one month. Ill 1/7104 Update-Assuming no unexpeet. ed holdups, trading could begin t'n tJ1e first week of February iv. 1126104 Communications system installe<J at site for e1'change, including higll·spced internet satellite connection. Tf1e stoch marl!et will re-open in 01 2004. Amber D Objective Key Task Begin coordination with USG agencies to obtain d~bt reduction. Objective Status Key Task Status Discussions with officials of debtor nations ongoing. • Former Secretary of State James A. Baker Ill secured pledges from four Persian Gulf nations (Saudi Arabia, Kuwait, the United Arab Emirates and Qatar) and members of the Paris Club to reduce their holdings of Iraq's debl MoF will issue a Request for Proposals (RFPs) for a private accounting firm or financial services firm to provide accounting and debt reconciliaUon services on Iraq's extemat sovereign debt. The purpose of the RFPs is to Identify a consulting firm that can assist lr<1q with rebuilding Its ledger of debt owed to foreign sovereign entitles and, potentially, other claims from inclividuafs, corporations, or other entities located outside of Iraq. 3 2 Develop Framework for Sound Public Sector Finances and Resource Allocation Increase International Cordination to Manage Foreign Assistance Continue plan .implementation. Green Amber D Fri day. Janttal')· JO, l()()J Pagel/ of JI 6 1 Objective Key Task Remove Subsidies/Develop Social Safety Net Develop Energy Subsidy Reform Plan. Continue to discuss approprlat& timing and parameters with Ministries and' · GC. Implement if appropriate Objective Status Key· Taslc Status Green Amber D a. 12123103 update - The proposal to address energy subsidy reforms has been rejected. However, we are assisting in an effort to ad'dress the current gasoline shortage. A memo was submitted to Amb. Jones, and will be .submitted to Amb. Btemer upon his return. b.1!1104 upd:Jte - A new proposal was submitted to Amb. Jones, reviewed, and prepared for (but not submitted to) Amb. Bremer. The. Minister of Oil reviewed the proposal, and is suggesting a different approach. We hope to work with the Ministry to discuss the different possibilities. THIS IJPDA TE IS FROM WORK THE PRIVATE SECTOR D£VELOPMENT GROUP IS DOING c.1126104 Discussed gasoline shortage issue with Minister of Oil. Agreed to discuss possible solutions/ideas once the Minister's ta.sk force finishes developing its own recommendation/proposal. ·- fJrft • I t ' ~ I l JJJ \Y*tlUJJt 4 hi/ f'ridaJ-. Ja111111ry· . lO, 200' Pax.1'21 of 3 I Objective Key Task 7 Implement Policy Towards State Owned Enterprises (SOEs} 1 Return SOEs to pre-war operatin,g levels, where appropriate Return SOEs to pre-war operating levels, when a,ppropriate a. Oontioued , progress of SOE.s standing up to normal operatJng levels.Salaries will be subsidized irtdirectly. Subsidies will not be remover/ Objective Status Key Task Status Green Amber D e .. On track. Private financing and possible ownership tr<msfers being discussed with respective mfni> stries. 1. 12123103 update- No ownership transfer options at this point although the CPA continues to uslst the ministries to evaluate leases 2.12130/03 update - Revised SOE action plan in development. Work continues on addressln9 barriers preventing SOEs from standing up 3.1!1104 update -Need to re-evaluate current SOE strategy based on current political constraints 4. 1126/04 Work continues. Pushing Iraq; Central Cement to apply for a ltOMM capital expenditure Joan tbrough SOE state banks Continued progtess of SOEs standing up to normal operating levels. Need to re-evaluate current SOE strategy based on curront pofitieal constraints SOEs are · facing flard budget constraints and are taking steps to alfevfate pressures. These steps include the pvrsrJit of leasing of property of many of unprofitable SOts, 'Need to re.ev11tuate current SOE strategy based cm current political constraints Need to re-evaluate cu.rrent SOE strategy based on current political constraints. Based on financial reports from s1 elected SOEs conducted by KPMG and Talat Abu-Ghazaleh & Co. International (TAGJ), the Iraqi Ce11tral Cement Company (ICCC) a.nd Najaf Tire could have loan packages completed within the month. CPA is working with ICCC to apply for a $10 million capital lfXP~nditute Joan through Iraqi state banks. Fns (f)f/Yc .. a/ L'se 9n~1 Frida)'• Ja111111ry 30, 10fJ4 Objective Objective Status Key Task Key Task Status 2 Find sources for financing their short term working capital and investment requirements • (leuing). Amb, er O lmpfove monitoring system to track performance of SOEs. Need to re-evaluate current SOE strategy based on cu"ent political constraints. 111 bidders are competing in a review process to lease 35 plants belongl11g ta 18 Ministry of Industry and Mineral SOEs. Of the 1, 11 bidders, 20 are foreign and 91 are Iraqi (many have opted ta form partnerships with internatiOJJal firms, a very positive step toward free enterprise). A committee process (in conjunction with Merchant Bridge consultants and IRDC staff) will whittle down the candid<Jtes and a short list will be invited to make a complete proposal which will begin the firms due diligence process. Do not anticipate a lease deal within the neJtt 3 months. 3 Hard Budget Gonstr1ints Need to re-evaluate cu"ent SOE strategy based on current political constraints Amber D Need to re-evaluate current SOE strategy based on current poli.tical constraints 1 126104 04 SOE Budgets being reviewed by OMB. Ten private Iraqi accounting firms and one international firm (KPMG) are preparing financial reports for some SOEs In order to help the stranger firms apply for liquidity loans, and assist the ministry in determining the viability of the remainin9 firms. ,-.. ~"!.~ • I ~ I 9 I l dfFj '.E -.fJfl ... 1($1Jj Fridit)'• Jan111Jl')' JO, 10/U f>llK~ U of JI Objective Key Task Examine restructuring state owned insurance companies. Need to re-evaluate current SOE strategy based on cul'J'ent political constraints Objective Status Key Task Status Need to re-evaluate current SOE strategy based on cu"ent political constraints 4 Develop Restructuring Plan for SOEs Amber O Plan presented verbally to AMB Bremer. Follow on memo outlining SOE plan to be submitted by the end of the week 9 Lay Foundations for an Open Economy 1 Provide IG Staff Capability Jan Identify candidates for CPA Review Feb Select and install JG Develop and lmplemen. t Program Green Amber 0 Waiting for the Minister to Select Candidate 3 WTO Observer Status, Amber D Fa1 @ffici11/ l ~ •c Bnl;'J Frida)'. January 30, 2004 Pag~ l5of 11 Objective Key Task February 1: Relevant Iraqi Offic;a/s {RIO) in each ministry , named February 15: Initial meeting/discussion with each RIO completed The WTO accession process requires every type of Iraqi law that regulates any part of commerce be brought into compliance with what will be Iraq's WTO obligations. This will involve audit and revision of laws under the umbrellas of nearly all of Iraq's ministries including; but not limited to, the ministries of Trade, Finance, Interior , Transportation & Communication, Industry & Metals, Agriculture, Foreign Affairs, NationJJI Standards, Oil, Justice, Culture, Central Bank, Public Works, and Planning. At the same time, much of Iraq's pre-waf law is not avai'labltt from any one central source. This is particularly true of regulatory law promulgated by the ministries themselves·· as opposed to statutory law promulgated by a legislature, or el<ecutive orders issued by the national e>cecutive. As a consequence, it wifl be necessary to have an Iraqi official within each ministry named to be the POC for information under audit, drafting of new laws, and for or_ganizing supporl within the ministry for enactment of the new laws. Objective Status Ke.y Tasl< Status Funding is in question right now and taslc may be deleted. Going to Geneva to submit letter for observer status the 18th of Jan. March 15: All relevant law and procedure assembled and translated As noted above, much of Iraq's pre-war law is not available from any one central source. Law from a myriad of disparate sources, including regulatory law promulgated ~y individual ministries will need to be assembled, after which much of it will need to be translated and put into an Frida)'. Ja1mar;r 30. 1004 Page Z6of JI Objective Key Tad electronic database. 10 Pursue National Strategy for Human Resource Deve1opment 1 Begin worf( to employ 100,0()() worl<.ers in Public Works p!Dgrams around the country. Conduct national survey. 11 1 Maintain and Strengthen Iraq's Science and Technology Base Energy Research and Development .~ 9fF .• e' 9 I ; ' "'' 9v1tlt1• ? J tff{) friJ11.y. Jt111tt1U)' _JO, 100J Objective Status . Key Task Status Amber Amber [J Amber Amber D Page 17of JI Objective Key Task Governance 2 Develop Civic Participation in Governance 5 Build capacity for civ;J society conflict prevention & mitig.,tion (CPM) Plan, approve, fund and implement programs; transition to Iraqi control Objective Status Key Task Status Amber Amber Amber D No progress 5 Promote Respect for Human Rights 2 Preserve doct{menJation of past atrocities, raise awareness, and promote reconciliation Begin nationwide use of CPA document database and witness testimony collection programs. Train Human Rights Ministry personnel in this function. Amber Amber D Many documents and much evidence preserved. CPA has collected over 700 summaries of past abuse and has developed a database for documents, which is ready for training locals and Ministry personnel. Training on documentation and memorials completed. Reconciliation programs beginning. Develop and seelc international funding for memorials. Once Supplemental funding arrives complete pl;mning for Abu Gharaib memorial with NGOs and Minist!y. Kurdish Human Rights Ministers have proposed a mass gave memorial on the North, and NGO has proposed a mass grave memorial at Mahawil. We are seeking funding from international sources for these. Develop Truth·revealing process. Iraqis generally do not yet see the value of Truth- Reveafing Process. Educatfon efforts will continue. Funding ;s allocat~d for tfris under the Supplemental and UK desires to play a role if Iraqis desire such a process. 1 ,_,, r ICIZIJ ~se \ Ill)' r fjff' . . ti ' • 1.-riday, Ja1111tlTJ' .10, 1004 Page !8 a/JI Objective Key Taslc Bring counseling programs to Iraq. Strengthen local capacity. Objective Status Key Taslc Status P/'fysicians for Human Rights was .supposed to provide sl.(Ch counseling in Oct, Nov and Dec but cancelled.. We are seekin. g proposals to provide traiaing to Iraqis in counseling. 8 Promote Durable Solutjons for Refugees and Internally Displaced Persons {IDPs) 2 Build national and local capacity to protect and assist refugees and /DPs. L.ocate permanent facility for Mfn;stry. Continue- to hire and train staff. Facilitate increasing responsiblllty for refugee and IDP policy making. Amber Amber D Interim building under rehabilitation - to be completed by February. Ministry still working to hlro adequate staff. Finalize locallons of four offices in regions of high refug. ee and /DP p(Jpulations. Open offices and hire initial staff. Funding from Portugal confirmed and available by lhe end of January. Ministry looking for location for Basrah office. ~ ~ ' 't' 9 I r o1 rcznr ? ., tt 1 ,1 •J 1:riJo)-. .la1111ary .10, }(){l.J Objective . Key Task Strategic Communications 2 Support Security with a robust communications campaign 1 New Iraqi Military communication ~nd information campaign Strategic eommuaications, especially Iraqi Media Network, to win popular support. (CPA) Iraqi Army Day (6 JAN 2004) 10 effort Objective Status Key Task Status Amber Red Amber D 3 Support Governance with a robust communications campaign 2 Constitution: .Support the pr:ocess by which the lr01qi citizens dev, elop their constitution. Materials production for Constitution campaign ramps up (late MAR 2004) Amber Amber D This Key Task is Phase /I of the cuffent' Strac Comms/Govemance Communications campaign. Once the initial efforts focused on participation and basic democracy education near completion, this effort will enter execution mode (about late April 2004) 4 Support Essential Services with a robust communications campaign 1 Electricity Campaign Reconc.ile task list to achievable objecti11es within currently shortened tjme frame. Refine plans Amber Amber D Currently reconciling task list to achievable objectives within a shortened time frame. Intend to use Governance transition plan as •shell" and refine Essential Services campaign from that ex. ample. Estimate plan completion NL T 1 FEB 04. frid11y, Jan11111·y .10, ]()fJ.1 Pllxe 30 of JI Objective Key Task 2 Education Cam,,.lgn Reconcile taslc list to achievable objectives within currently shortened time frame. Refine plans 3 Health Care CampaigfJ Reconcile task list to schievable objectives within currently shortened tim.e . frame, Refine plans Fritflly, Jan,,a1y JO, JINN Objective Status Key Task Status Amber D Currently reconciling task fist to achievable objectives within a shortened time frame. Intend to use Governance transition plan as •sfleU- and refine Essential Services campaign from that example. Es(imate plan completion NL T 1 FEB 04. Amber D Currently reconciling task list to achievable objectives within a shortened time frame. lnteJJd to use G. overnance transition plan as "sl1elr and re.fine Essential Services campa;gn from that example. Estimate plan completion NL T 1 FEB 04. Pt1~1! JI of 31 PENDING ACT ION ITEMS FROM THE JANUARY 25. 2004 BOARD MEETING: Member Attendees: Ambassador Jones (chair) Ambassador Greenstock COO Kellogg Ambassador Richmond MG Gallinetti [encral Figgures Regular lnvitees: Andrew Rathmell Andrew Dunn lnviree Presenters: E:\Ex.:cSec\b.cdloalll\Mmulcs 25 JAN 04 UNCLASSlFIED Page I of I LPS HAS SEE: l (CIV) Sent: To: Cc: Saturday, April 24, 2004 9 05 PM rx:cuti"e ~e~,t~4 ) , Smith. Frederick (SES-6) Subject: Order Tranferring ICDC to MoD On an action memo from OGC on this subject, LPB asl<ed· "Has this been coordinated with the Minister of Defense a.nd the GC Security Committee?" I have discussed it with the Minister of Defense. I also discussed with the GC Security Committee some time ago that the ICOC would be assigned to the MoO I will mention It again to Ayad Allaw1 Thus, LPB can rest assured that consultations with the lraQis have been completed r COALITION f>ROVISIONl\L AUTHORITY BAG!IDAD f LPB nAS SEE~ -- - ---- .. ..\CTIO~ \IE:\10 FOR: FRO\!: SCBJEL'T: .\ L \ - \ April 2~. ~OQ.4 < t \ 1c..<; \ ~ ( '\/'f:"'e~ C~<:- K' '.re~ THE AD'.\ll~ISTR.-\ TOR l..i\.\ \\ .... ~ \ t'"\rtr c \..; \Jc:._ ~._j S'> i' \. ~ ... . ? Offici: of th<! Gcnaal Counsd ""-l C--<-. i>"c.L"'V"\....'-1 ~-....._ .... ~ • '-L Order Tr:inst~rring the Ir-.iqi Ci\ ii De tense Corps ro lhe Ministry of Defense Cf { 2._J The .\tt::idwd Ord¢r tr:ins fers thr: IC DC to thr: >. (inistry of 01! t~ncc J..S 1.1 compon~nt of th~ lraq i :\rmeJ Forces. anJ amends CP.-\ Order >-rumbr:r 22. Creation of a .V~w Iraqi ..Irmy. <ind CP.-\ OrJer ~umber ~S. Establishmttm of £he Iraqi CM/ Dej~ns~ Corps, to includl! pro\·isions consis!~n! \Vith rh~ transfer. Changes to CP .-\ Order Sumber .28 also include aml!ndments !O makr: that order c<.msistl!nt with subsequent rele\ :int CPA Orders and the TAL. and to include: ch::rnges requc:'!sted by Commander. CJTF-7. With r~sp~ct to th~ latter. the attached Order amends Ord~r '.\:umbl!r :::8 to: • .lllu" C c-mmJndc:'!r. C JTF-7 tc set uniiied S[andard for manning. training. :md equipping th!! lCDC anJ to c:'!St~lblish thi:!'it missi0n ess~nti.:l.l task li:it . .111d l)pl!ration.il employmcnr: • Juth0rize m.:mbers 0f the;! ICDC und<!r the:'! operational control of a Coalition For..:es Dtlic~r to use force coosiscent \\ ith ruies of cngagcrn.:nt or rules for the u:;c of force applicable to Coalition fon:es in order to execure their a:.signed misskms and tasking,s: anJ • pro,·ide !CDC members. acting \<.irhir1 th.: scope of th~ir mission or tasking and consistl!nt "ith applicable C0alition rules of engagi!mem or ruks for the us~ of force. immunity from Iraqi criminal. d\'iL aml administrative jurisdiction and from .iny fonn L'f :mest er detention. nnJ give th!! Administrator the e:xclusi"e authori~: to determine \\hen a partkular :let qualities for such immunity. RECO:\IME'.\!D.-\TJO.'\': That the Administrator sign the Ordt!r lranst"erring che ICDC to th~ ~(inistry l)f Detence as a componeni of the Iraqi Armed Forces. 4,v - \pprv\ ~: ?'J /~1; Disapprove:'!: ___ _ Apprl'i\ r: \\\th modi fkation: __ _ v A TTACH:\ll::ST: CP.-\ Order ;-.;umber 73 C~CL.-\SSIFlED C O A LITION PHOVISIO.'.'IAL Al!THORITY O RD ER N U1 \JUER 73 TRA ~s1; EI{ OF T HE IRAQI C IV IL DEFENSE CORPS TO T HE MINISTRY OF .DEFENCE P11rs11a111 tom~ authorit) as Adminis!rator of the Coalition Provisional Authorit) (CPA). under thl! l.iws and usages of war, and consistl;!Ol with rd~\ ant Unit~d Nations Securit\· - . Council resolutions. indu\.iing Ri:solutinns 1 ~83 anJ I 511 l2003 ). Soring ch~u CP.-\ Onkr Sumb~r 22. Crl;C'ation of a NI!\\ lraqi Army. August 7. 2003. estahlishl;!d ~ militar~ forcl! for the national sdf-defonse of .i futur~ free Iraq. So£mg that CPA OnJer ~umber 13, Cremion of a Code of f\tilitary Discipline for tht' l\C\\ lr~\\.li Arm:. August 7. ~003. estabtish~d a syst~m of disciplinl.! to maint;.1in order in c hi! ~e\\ lrnqi Anny. Soring that CP.-\ Order Numbl.!r ~8. Escablishmem of the Iraqi Ci\ ii Defense Corps. Sept~mb~r 3. 2003. ~stablishec.J a temporary security anJ ernergenc) Sef\ h:.:- ngency for [r~q to c~'mplemem operations conducted b: Coalition milirnr;-. forces in lraq. Soling the adoption on March 8. 2004 of the La\\ of :\c.Jministrntion for the Stat~ of lr~q for ch.: Tr .m:;i[ional P1:riod. Funher 11orfng that CPA Ordr:r :"umber 6"". \[inistz: 0f Defence. promulgat~c.J l1n '.\Iar.:h :? l. ~00~. redesign;Jlr:c.J the ~e'' Iraqi Arm) as the Iraqi :\nnl!d For..:es. cs1ablishec.J J nt:" national ministry cu prm:id~ 4 . :i\ iliun ...:omrul of the lraqi Armed Forc~s .ind supporting organizations, and prO\:ided for the I!\ c:ntual mm5for of the Iraqi Civil Dcfrnse Corps to th~ \.Jinistr: L)f Defonce as a component or the Iraqi Armed Forces. Re1..~ogm=!ng. in light of .:urrenr .;ircum"t.lnces within Iraq. the need to tr:1nsfi:r the Iraqi Civil Defonse Corps to the ~Hnistry of Dd.:nce .l::> J ~omponem of the lraqi Anned F0r..:es and to pro\ ide additional cbrifo.:ation \\ ith respect to the status ond authority of thl! lrnqi Civil Dcfon..;~ Corp:; and i!s m ~ mb~r::;, l h~reby promuJg~te rhe follO\\ ing: Secrit>n 1 Transfer I) rhe Iraqi Ci\·il Dct'cnsl.! Corps. w ini.:lude all assodatl!d personnel. fai.:ilities. and equipmenr. c:stablishi:d pursuant co CPA Order 'Somber 2~ is hereby tran::.f~rrcd to the '.\linistr: of Ot!frnct: .. i:s .i complrnc:nt of th~ Iraqi Armed Forces. CP .. . \./OH.D/2.! April 2004173 :!) As a component of the Iraqi Anned Forces, the Iraqi Civil Defense Corps shall be subject to the terms of CPA Order Number 1~. as ametidcd; pro\'ided that in the event of :i contli.:r bet\\ccn the terms of CPA Order Numher 22, as amended. and CPA Order Number 28. as amended. the t¢rms of CPA Ordo;:r Number 28. as amended. shall go\'ern. 3) The transfer of administrative functions for the fraqi Civil Dd'~ns1: Corps shall be accomplished in ~ manner ~md on a timdine agreed to b) the interim :Vf inister of Ddence and rhc: st.!'nior military cornmamkr of Coalition Forces in [raq consist~nt \\ ith the M snislr: of Defence· s. capabi I ic: uo administer su~h responsibilities. Section :? Amcndmenc co CPA Order Number 22 Coalition Pro' isional Authority Order ~umber 22. Seccion 3. is hereby amendcJ by :Jdding a ne\\ Section 3. :-\rtide 5. as follows: .. 5) The- Iraqi Ch ii Defense Corps shall operate as a component of the [raqi Armed forces in a.;cord.:inLe with the terms of this Order. CP . .\. Order ~umber 28. as amended. CP:\ Order Number 67. and CPA Order Number 73: pro\·ided that in the ~v~m of a ~on tlict beC\\ ~en th~ reTm5 of this Order and CP . - \ Orda i'I umber 28. as amended. the terms of CP.-\ Order ~umber 28. as nm.ended. shall go\'em." Section 3 Amendments to CP-\ Order :\umber ::?S I) Coalition Prlwisional Authority Order >:umber 28. Section I. Article -L is hereby amended to reaJ in its entir~ty a.s folio\\ s: ··.+ J Tht! Iraqi Ci\'il Defense Corps is ;i .:omponent of the lraqi .·\nned Forces. The £raqi Ci' ii 01.!fensc Corps shall operate in ;.1ccordance with the terms of this Order. :is amended. CPA Ord~r Number ~~- as Jmended. CP.·\ Order :'-i\1mber 67. and CPA Order :--;umber 73: provided thar in the ~-.ent of a conflict bct\\.et:n thi: terms of this Order. as amended. and CP.-\ Order Nwnbcr ~2. as amended. the terms of this Order. as amended. shall govern:· 2J Coalition Pro\ isional Authorit~ Ord~r '.\:umber 18. Seccinn .::! •. .\rtick 4. is hereb~ dektL>d in its entirety and the exi:;ting Sc~ti0n :. Article 5. i:> h~r~b~ redt::signated as Sec[ion 2 . ..\nkk: 4. 3) Coalition Pro\ isional Authorit: Order '.'iumbcr 28. Section 2 • ..\.rtide 6. is hereb~ dekt~c.i in irs emireiy. CPA/ ORD/22 .-\pril 2004173 .., -i) Coalition Provisional Authority Order Number 28. Section 3, is hereby am~nded by adding. a new Section 3. Article 5. as follows: ·'5) Notwithstanding Section 3. Articl~ -l above. members of the Iraqi Civil Defense Corps under the op~rationaJ control of a Coalition Forces officer may use force consistent with ruks of engagement or rules for the use of force applicable to Coalition Forces ro execute thefr assigned missions and taskings." 5) Coalition Provisional Authoriry Order Number 28. Section ..+. :.\rtid\! l. is hereby amended to read in its entirety as follows: ··1) The Iraqi Civil Defense Corps shall operare under the authority of the Administrator of the CPA. Subject to the! authority of the Adminiscrat<Jr of the CPA. the inti::rim Ytinister of Defence shall be responsible for management and employment of the [raqi Ci\·iJ Defense Corps and shall exercise direction and control (including commissioning and appointments) OYer the Iraqi Ch·il Defense Corps and its organizational structure. During the period in which the Iraqi Civil Defense Corps is under the operational control of a commander of Coalition Forces for the purpose of conducting combined operations and providing other support. as provided for in CPA Order Number 67. the Administrator of the CPA may delegate to rhe senior military comm;mu~r of Co~lition f orccs in Irnq responsibility and authority for rh~ recruiting. training. organiz:nion. and control of the lraqi Civil Defrnse Corps. This responsibilic; and authority may be re-dekgat~d pursuant to Section 7 belo" :· 6J Coalition Pro\·isiona! Authority Order ".\umber 28. Secrion +. is her~by amended by adding ::i_ new Se~tion ../., Anide 2, us follows: .. 1) Whik the [raqi CiYi\ Defense Corps is under the operational control of Coalition Forces. the senior military ~omrn<inder of CoaHtion Forces in frnq ma~ set the standards for manning, training. and equipping Iraqi CiYil Defense Corps forces. as well a:> establishing their mission e:;s~ntial task list (METL) and operational employment ... 7) Coalition Provisional Authority Order 'umbl!r 18 ~xisting Section+. ,.\nicks 2 and 3 are hereby redesignated as Section -1-•. -\nides 3 and .. f.. Nspeccivdy. SJ Coalition ProYisional Authority Order \:umber 28. Section 5. is hereb)· amended b […اقتُطع العرض هنا — النص الكامل في ملف التنزيل]