07-F-0516 OPLAN SOVERIGN IRAQ 06-11-2004

FOR 01 I itmls t;Sfl 6Filsl l!l1il!lf IP'f filAJH IIU!i~ls8iitrM tfi'JIU!R 1*81' i tf ii ~ §iiii~R)ti) 66 Fl6'f IUJlsfJJ tSfJ ;11; I'fll6"8'f: t"8'fll6ftlif t 6F IPiifliilt\SfJPI @Y ifft:'tPI8Iifi6PI Pis' PIPIIPI651 ifl!l' f I ANNEXTTO OPLAN SOVEREIGN IRAQ 11 JUNE 2004 ANNEX T SUPPORT MEMORANDUM OF AGREEMENT 1. Situation. See attached Support Memorandum of Agreement between Department of State and Department of Defense. 2. Mission. See attached Support Memorandum of Agreement between Department of State and Department of Defense. 3. Execution. See attached Support Memorandum of Agreement between Department of State and Department of Defense. 4. Administration and Logistics: See attached Support Memorandum of Agreement between Department of State and Department ofDefense. 5. Command and Control. See attached Support Memorandum of Agreement between Department of State and Department of Defense. T-1 FOR OFFICIAL USE ONLI I!JXI!ll\lfT FR81\1 :BtS€h8S"8M t~PIBER ff!HA 5 H.S.e. §55~(BH5) :68 HOT M'!LI!JJltSI!l h l'fll8tfif Jlttfifii8M'f I 8F IHTEJttli:e:Ertt? t 'FRJltHSI'fi6H fMHHIHe: 'FI!JJltl\1 Version 3.0 MEMORANDUM OF AGREEMENT BETWEEN DEPARTMENT OF STATE AND DEPARTMENT OF DEFENSE FOR SUPPORT SERVICES IN IRAQ 1. PURPOSE: This Memorandum of Agreement (MOA) describes services, supplies and other types of support to be provided by the Department ofDefense (DOD) and the Department of State (DOS) to the US Mission in Iraq, sets forth procedures and responsibilities concerning the working relationships between the departments and their sub-agencies, pursuant to National Security Presidential Directive (NSPD) 36 of May 11, 2004 and the Emergency Supplemental (references 2.a and 2.d), and complements the Security MOAs between the Commander, US Central Command (CDR USCENTCOM) and the Chief of Mission (COM), US Mission Iraq (references 2.b and 2.c). 2. REFERENCES: a. National Security Presidential Directive (NSPD) 36, United States Government Operations in Iraq, May II, 2004 b. Memorandum of Agreement (MOA) between Commander, US Central Command, and US Chief of Mission Iraq Regarding Security Responsibility (June 2004) c. Memorandum of Agreement (MOA) between Commander, US Central Command, and US Chief of Mission Iraq Regarding Physical Security, Equipment and Personal Protective Services (June 2004) d. Emergency Supplemental Appropriations Act for Defense and for the Reconstruction of Iraq and Afghanistan, Public Law 108-106 e. Foreign Service Act of 1980,22 U.S.C. 3901 et seq. f. Federal Travel Regulations g. Foreign Affairs Manual h. DOD 4515.13-R, Air Transportation Eligibility (November 94) i. DOD Directive 4500.56, Use of Government Aircraft and Air Travel (April99) j. DOD 4500.36-R, Management, Acquisition, and Use of Motor Vehicles (September 1996) k. I. n. OPLAN Sovereign Iraq (June 2004) National Security Decision Directive (NSDD) 38 of July 2, 1982 m. Foreign Service Buildings Act (22 U.S.C. 292-302) Secure Embassy Construction and Counterterrorism Act of 1999, Title VI, Pub. L. 106- 113 3. GENERAL PROVISIONS: a. Except as otherwise specified by this MOA, support furnished by DOD pursuant to this agreement will be provided on a non-reimbursable basis in accordance with references 2.a and 2.d, until such time as Congress appropriates funds to DOS for such purposes. Subsequent support will be provided through agreement of the Parties. b. This MOA is not intended to be comprehensive or to prejudice the ability of the Secretary of State to make requests for support not specifically stated herein. Except in emergency circumstances! requests for additional support beyond that provided for herein will take the form of a written request, either from the Executive Secretary of the Department of State to the Executive Secretary ofthe Department of Defense or from the COM to CDR USCENTCOM's in-country designated representative. c. The responsibility for COM administrative and logistics services and support not specifically provided for in this agreement shall remain with the COM unless otherwise mutually agreed. d. The COM and CDR USCENTCOM may delegate their responsibilities provided for in this MOA. 4. AREAS OF AGREEMENT: a. Facilities Management and Administrative and Logistic Support: In accordance with Annexes A and D! DOD will be responsible to facilitate the provision of facility support within the Green Zone (GZ) and for regional offices. DOD will facilitate provision of these services on a priority basis to the US Mission for the Mission's facility support needs within the GZ. US Mission Iraq provides facilities to DOD elements, personnel and contractors (housing, office space, and related equipment and services) as agreed between the COM and the relevant military commander. b. Contracting Support: The Department of the Army (DA) will continue to provide a Head of Contracting Activity (HCA) and Principal Assistant Responsible for Contracting (PARC) in Baghdad after June 30, 2004. The HCA in Iraq will provide regional contracting capacity as needed. Support will be provided in accordance with Annex B. This MOA does not address Iraq Relief and Reconstruction Fund and other foreign assistance contract support. c. Medical Support: In accordance with Annex C, DOD will provide Health Service Support (HSS), hospitalization, patient movement, and dental services to all eligible beneficiaries. DOS will establish the US Mission Health Unit to provide Primary Care support services to eligible USG employees under the authority of the COM. At the time the Mission Health Unit is established, DOS will assume responsibility for primary ambulatory care for these employees. d. Information Technology (IT) Support: In accordance with Annex E, IT support will be provided by DOD/Communications Support Group (CSG). DOS/Inforrnation Resource Management (IRM) will coordinate support for and support the IT requirements of the US Mission, primarily through the direction of the Information Management Office (IMO). 5. SUPPORTED RECIPIENTS: a. US Mission Iraq b. Others as specifically identified in the Annexes to this MOA 6. ANNEXES: The following Annexes are included and made part of this MOA: ANNEX A FACILITIES MANAGEMENT ANNEX B CONTRACTING ANNEX C MEDICAL ANNEX D ADMINISTRATIVE AND LOGISTICS SUPPORT ANNEX E INFORMATION TECHNOLOGY 6. EFFECTIVE DATE, MODIFICATION AND TERMINATION: As ofthe date of signature, the Parties will begin to phase in support and support arrangements as contemplated in this MOA in order to enable this MOA to enter into full force and effect upon dissolution of the Coalition Provisional Authority (CPA). DOD and DOS will review this MOA semi-annually, or more frequently as circumstances indicate, for currency and applicability. This MOA may be amended in writing as mutually agreed by the Parties. Signed: Signed: -- Deputy Secretary Deputy Secretary US Department of State US Department of Defense Date: Date: ---- ---- O'Pl2AN SovereiQn ~ ~,"", Iraq v3~0 I nt~dgen<;y Transition Planning T earn _..• '>..:v, f "",,." ; One rTeam- One :Misszon~:\ r en m rre:mts "1'11!! etm 1 EXENli I I kbih DISLLOSORE UhbER FUM 5 U.S.C. §552(6)(5) R 9 JJQT AEislii t 1519 '''liiliiiQL''I' t 'n'IJQRIT'r QF INTER t CrNClT rg t t'S'T'Q}1 P' t ',{)!INC rp t ,, COPY_ OF COPIES OPLAN SOVEREIGN IRAQ 11 JUNE 2004 References: OPLAN SOVEREIGN IRAQ A Refer to CJTF-7, Operation Iraqi Freedom, Annex B -Intelligence B. Mission Performance Plan FY 2006 U.S. Embassy Iraq C. Security Responsibility and Security Services Memoranda of Agreement between Department of State and Department of Defense D. Support Memorandum of Agreement between Department of State and Department of Defense E. Foreign Service Act of 1980 P.L. 96-465 F. National Security Decision Directive Number 38, dated 2 June 1982 G. National Security Presidential Directive Number 36, dated May 11, 2004 H. Transitional Administrative Law (TAL) and TAL Annex I. UN Security Council Resolution 1483 J. UN Security Council Resolution 1511 K. UN Security Council Resolution 1546 l.S ituation a. General. Operation Plan Sovereign Iraq addresses the simultaneous dissolution of the Coalition Provisional Authority (CPA) in Iraq and the concurrent establishment of a US Mission Iraq that will. work in the closest coordination with the Multinational Force, international organization missions, the embassies of coalition countries, and the Iraqi people. (1) Current Situation. The Coalition Provisional Authority (CPA) has been the government oflraq since the overthrow ofSaddam Hussein and his Ba'ath Regime in April of2003. The CPA is responsible for the temporary governance of Iraq, consistent with international law and UN Security Council Resolutions 1483 and 1511, with coalition personnel provided immunity from Iraqi law. On Nov 15, 2003, the United States announced that the Iraqi Interim Government (IIG) would assume governance responsibility by 30 June 2004. The USG has initiated a detailed planning effort to timely ensure successful assumption of authority by the Iraqi Interim Government (II G). (2) In addition to the assumption of authority by the JIG, two significant transfers of authority will occur during May and June 2004: (a) The Coalition Joint Task Force-7 (CJTF-7) transferred authority to a new multinational headquarters, the Multinational Force-Iraq (MNF-J), effective on 15 May 2004. While the transfer of authority has been formalized, this new headquarters and its subordinate organizations, will continue to undergo adjustments before achieving its final organizational structure. (b) Once the Iraqi Interim Government assumes authority, the CPA will no longer have a legal basis for its existence as an occupying authority. At the same time, I OR 61 I IE BtL CJSE OICL I EJtEFUB I "PitOhl JISCLOSJit£ Ji46Eit I Obt 3 6.3.€~ §552(8)(3) DeiW I IULLRSE II iiiWb I llMTIIORITi Of Hd EittSEI4l!l Iftlti49ITWI4 I Llll4IIIFIS TtaP:I Version 3.0 ISCLOSURE UN EASE WIUIOUT AUTHORITY OF INTERAGENCY TRANSITION P the US Government desires to establish fonnal diplomatic relations with the new Iraqi Interim Government. Accordingly, OPLAN Sovereign Iraq addresses this transition period. As appropriate, some personnel and organizations from the CPA will transition to the new US Mission. (3) In perfonning its mission, the CPA operated according to a strategic plan that established priorities for the US Government, coalition partners and efforts for relief and reconstruction. The Plan outlined five core foundational relief and reconstruction sectors and their end-states and provided a critical starting point for the long term objectives reflected in the Department of State's Mission Performance Plan (MPP) FY 2006 U.S. Embassy Iraq. (a) 'Security End State Objective. A secure environment for the people and property oflraq that enables citizens to participate fully in political and economic life. The Iraqi government has the means to assume responsibility for external and internal security, including defense and police forces. Good relationships with regional states and with the international community have been established. The roles and accountabilities of organizations providing security are clearly defined within a legal framework. The legal framework also regulates the private possession and use of weapons. (b) Essential Services End State Objective. Essential services and infrastructure, particularly electricity, water, and health care, are provided to acceptable standards. Plans are in place, and where feasible, being implemented to improve the quality and accessibility by all citizens of all public services. (c) Economy End State Objective. Financial market structures and fiscal and regulatory conditions have been established that enable sustainable economic growth, the development of a dynamic private sector, and rising living standards for the Iraqi people. Measures have been taken to develop human resources and to eliminate corruption. Policies have been developed to use Iraq's oil wealth for the benefit of all the Iraqi people. (d) Governance End State Objective. Iraq has a representative fonn of government that promotes the rule of law, protects individual rights of all, including freedom of expression and religion, and is supported by a vibrant civil society. It is underpinned by a democratically-based constitution and transparent electoral processes agreed to and accepted by the Iraqi people. There is an accountable and responsive system of local governments. The effectiveness of elected local officials has been increased through training. (e) Strategic Communications End State Objective. Unity of effort is achieved among the Iraqi Government, Coalition nations and the international community. Negative Iraqi perceptions of Coalition activities have been mitigated into constructive support. Messaging efforts have created an environment where an aura of legitimacy takes hold among the Iraqi people leading to a sustained, engaged, and active participation in the democratization ofthe country. 2 FFICIAL USE ONLY EXEMPT FROM DISCLOS 5 U.S.C. §552(B)(5) DO NOT RELEASE WI OF INTERAGENC ANNING TEAM Version 3.0 URE UNDERFO ASE WI1HOUT AUTHORITY OF INTERAGENCY TRANSITION PLA (4) The US Mission Iraq Mission Performance Plan will succeed the CPA Strategic Plan and guide the activities ofthe US Mission Iraq. It identifies three mutually reinforcing strategic objectives in Iraq: eliminating terrorism, promoting economic development and supporting democratization and the rule of law. To accomplish these objectives, the US Government must rapidly build a well-resourced interagency U.S. Mission in Baghdad, working in the closest coordination with the Iraqi people, the Multinational Force, international organizations, and the embassies of coalition and other nations. (5) The CPA established the basis of an Iraqi administration that has taken the first steps to implement the three objectives: Iraq's security forces are beginning to develop their capabilities to protect the Iraqi people against terrorists and other criminals. Plans and some key staffing are in place for a proposal for a roadmap toward elections and the organizational infrastructure of central and local governments dedicated to serving the Iraqi people. Iraq's economy and infrastructure are rapidly improving after decades of neglect, corruption, and international sanctions. Much remains to be done, however. (6) The US Mission Iraq will have an exceptional scope and magnitude of responsibilities and resources. In the short term, it will function in one of the world's most unstable and violent environments. These circumstances pose unique management challenges and high human and financial costs, as we build a US Mission and country team with the resources and institutional capacity necessary to accomplish the extraordinary US national objectives in Iraq. While some personnel and structures will carry over from CPA, the Mission necessarily will be a very different organization, reflecting both a different political context and a different mission. (7) The assumption of authority will be formalized in a ceremony on 30 June 2004 when the transfer will be consummated. Following the ceremony, the US Mission Iraq will be established. The Coalition Provisional Authority will cease to function as the governing authority in Iraq, and the Department of State (DOS) Bureau of Near East Affairs, Iraq (NEAll) and the US Mission to Iraq will be established as the successor organizations to CPA, responsible for representing the interests of the US Government, less the military function which will be discharged by the Commander, Multinational Forces Iraq (MNF-1). b. Enemy Forces. See Annex B Intelligence. c. Friendly Forces. See Annex A- Command and Control. (1) The Transition Team. The Secretaries of State and Defense established an Interagency Transition Planning Team (TTPT) to develop a joint transition plan to dissolve the Coalition Provisional Authority (CPA) and establish a US Mission within a sovereign Iraq, ensuring a close and mutual partnership between the Chief of Mission (COM) and the Commander, Multinational Force - Iraq (MNF-1). The ITPT, which includes representatives of DOS, DOD, and the CPA (forward and rear), has developed and will continue to develop comprehensive and detailed plans concurrently. Furthermore, the team will continue the spirit of "jointness" as it supports implementation of the plan within the DOS and DOD. 3 DONOTREL LOSURE UNDER F ASE WITHOUT AUTHORITY OF INTERAGENCY TRANSITION PLA (2) The US Mission and the Near East Asia-Iraq element (NEA-D will constitute the successor entity to the CPA under the provisions of Section 2208 of the Emergency Supplemental Appropriations Act and National Security Presidential Directive 36, dated 11 May 2004. DOS maintains the funds available for establishing the US Embassy in Baghdad, including the balance of uncommitted FY 2004 appropriations for CPA operating expenses and the 1% Iraq Relief and Reconstruction Fund (IRRF) transfer. (3) Coalition Nations. Iraq relief and reconstruction has been the effort of a multination coalition. Future references to "coalition" are in this context. Coalition contributions have included military forces, donations, civilian reconstruction teams, and planning officers. The US Government provides the most significant leadership and a majority of the coalition forces, but successful prosecution of the war and reconstruction could not have been and will not be achieved without extensive coalition participation. While the US Mission to Iraq will be bilateral, the US Government will continue to encourage coalition participation and will develop appropriate channels for coordination with coalition nations. (4) Government of Iraq. As defined in the Transitional Administrative Law (TAL), the Government of Iraq will transition to a permanent, constitutional government in three phases. TAL Phase I will begin with the formation of the fully sovereign Iraqi Interim Government that takes power on 30 June 2004. TAL Phase II begins with the formation of the Iraqi Transitional Government after elections for the National Assembly occur not later than 31 January 2005. TAL Phase III begins with the formation of a permanent Iraqi government, pursuant to a permanent constitution. Elections for the permanent government will occur no later than 15 December 2005 and the new government shall assume office no later than 31 December 2005. Governance -Transition -- - 2004 I 08 M~r 2005 ·Law'"\:1""" I I~ TAL Phase I Iraqi Interim Government (IIG) Announced and (Interim I Governing Council dissolved Government) 1 I 4Jun > I Election Commission established J I 30 Jun ~ I Transfer sovereignty from CPA to IIG I National Conference convenes and selects Interim National Council I n Elections for the National NL T 31 Jan 05 I · I Early '05 I Iraqi Transitional Government takes power I (EI~~eted ~~~:~:: 111 I 15 Aug '""''"'' Auombly _,,..,, '"" of''~'"'"'"""'""''" I 150ct I Referendum for permanent constitution I I 15Dec_: I Elections for government completed I Elected government assumes office L TAL Phase Ill (Permanent Government) Figure 1. National Transition ~ 1 11 ~ 4 FOR OFFICIAL USE ONLY EXEMPT FROM D DO NOT RELEASE WITH CIAL USE ONLY (a) TAL Phase I - Iraqi Interim Government. On I June 2004, the Iraqi Governing Council was dissolved and the formation of the Iraqi Interim Government was announced. On 30 June 2004, the Iraqi Interim Government will be vested with governance authority. ( 1) Governance. The Interim Iraqi Government will govern according to the Transitional Administrative Law, administer Iraq's affairs, provide for the welfare and security of the Iraqi people, promote economic development and prepare Iraq for national elections to be held no later than 31 January 2004. These elections will select an Iraqi Transitional National Assembly. (2) Composition. The IIG will consist of a President, two Deputy Presidents, a Prime Minister and 31 Ministers. The President will act as the Head of State. The Prime Minister will preside over the Council of Ministers and oversee the administration ofthe government. (3) Interim National Council. There will also be an Interim National Council to promote constructive dialogue and create national consensus, to advise the new government, monitor the implementation of laws and approve the 2005 budget. The 1 00-member Interim National Council will be chosen by a National Conference, to be held in July, involving at least a thousand Iraqis from across Iraq. The Interim National Council will reflect Iraq's diversity. ( 4) The Transitional Administrative Law. The JIG will operate under the legal framework established by the Transitional Administrative Law (TAL), including the TAL Annex. The TAL will remain the supreme law of Iraq until a new constitution has been ratified, a newly elected government is in place and new laws are enacted to replace provisions of the TAL. Under the provisions of the TAL, the IIG will have the power to conclude international agreements in the areas of diplomatic relations and economic reconstruction, including Iraq's sovereign debt. The JIG will not have the authority to amend the TAL or to form agreements which permanently alter the destiny of Iraq. (b) TAL Phase II- lrag Transitional Government. ( 1) Governance. The Iraq Transitional Government (lTG) will govern according to the laws in force in Iraq on 30 June 2004 unless and until rescinded in accordance with the Transitional Administrative Law. The ITO will have exclusive competence in the areas specified in Article 25 of the TAL. (2) Composition. The lTG will consist of the National Assembly, the Presidency Council, the Council of Ministers, including the Prime Minister, and the Judicial authority. (3) The National Assembly. The National Assembly will be the legislative authority for the State of Iraq. Its mission shall be to legislate and exercise oversight over the work of the executive authority. The National Assembly will consist of 275 members who will be elected through elections to occur by 31 December 2004, if possible, and in any case no later than 31 January 2005. The principal 5 DO NOT RELEASE WITIIO NNINGTEAM objective of the Transitional National Assembly will be to prepare a draft permanent national constitution for Iraq and prepare for and conduct a national election under this constitution to elect a permanent Iraqi Government. The new constitution will be presented to the Iraqi people in a national referendum scheduled for the fall of 2005. Under this new constitution, Iraq will elect a permanent government by the end of2005. ( 4) The Transitional Executive Authority. The executive authority during TAL Phase II will consist of the Presidency Council, the Council of Ministers and its presiding Prime Minister. (a) The Presidency Council is formed by the President of the State and two Deputies elected by the National Assembly. The Council will oversee the higher affairs of the country. (b) The members ofthe Council of Ministers are named by the Presidency Council upon the recommendation ofthe Prime Minister. (c) The Presidency Council will name the Prime Minister by unanimous vote. The Prime Minister and the Council of Ministers will commence their work as a government only after receiving a vote of confidence by simple majority from the National Assembly. The Prime Minister will have day-to-day responsibility for the management of the government. (5) The Federal Judicial Authority. A Higher Juridical Council will replace the Council of Judges and will supervise the federal judiciary and administer its budget. The federal judiciary will include a Federal Supreme Court, the Central Criminal Court of Iraq, Courts of Appeal, the Court of Cassation and other courts established by law. (6) The Transitional Administrative Law. The laws in force in Iraq on 30 June 2004 will remain in effect unless and until rescinded or amended by the ITG. The Jaws, regulations, orders, and directives issued by the Coalition Provisional Authority pursuant to its authority under international law shall remain in force until rescinded or amended by legislation duly enacted and having the force of law. (c) TAL Phase III. - Permanent Iraqi Government: The permanent Iraqi Government and National Assembly seated at the end of 2005 will establish laws governing Iraq. Provisions of the TAL, with its Annex, will be rescinded as provisions in the Constitution and/or Iraqi Law direct. (5) United Nations. (a) On 24 March 2004, the U.N. Security Council adopted a statement supporting the new U.N. mission to help Iraq form an interim government and prepare for elections. This U.N. Mission, as well as an electoral assistance team, was dispatched to Iraq to lend assistance and advice to the Iraqi people in the formation Version 3.0 of the IIG, as well as in the preparations for the directelections to be held before the end of January 2005. (b) On 8 June 2004, the U.N. Security Council endorsed the formation of a sovereign Iraqi Government effective 30 June 2004, and the eventual dissolution of the CPA, through UNSCR 1546. It also endorsed the proposed timetable to eventual democratic government including: (1) Holding of direct democratic elections by no later than 31 January 2005 for a Transitional National Assembly to form a Transitional Government responsible for drafting a permanent constitution; (2) Holding of democratic elections by 31 December 2005 for a constitutionally elected Government oflraq. (c) The United Nations Assistance Mission for Iraq (UNAMI) wiil play a leading role in convening a national conference in July 2004, to select a Consultative Council; supporting the electoral process and conducting a census; and developing/delivering social services, humanitarian and reconstruction assistance. (d) The U.N. mission consists oftwo separate teams: a political team and an electoral team. The U.N. team is now in Iraq helping to form an Independent Election Commission that will oversee an orderly and accurate national election. The US has assured the United Nations that every possible step will be taken to facilitate the protection of its teams. (e) UNSCR 1546 reaffirmed UNSCR 1511 and the continued authority of MNF-J forces to operate under a unified command in accordance with letters of understanding annexed to the resolution by SECST ATE and Prime Minister Allawi, IIG. The letters provided a framework for a future security partnership and included the following: (I) The IIG will form a Ministerial Committee for National Security responsible for establishing Iraqi security policy. The Committee will invite MNF-1 to participate and will stand ready to discuss methods of coordination, cooperation, and consultation on fundamental security and policy issues (including those on sensitive military operations). (2) MNF-I and IIG will form national, regional, and local coordinating bodies comprised of Iraqi security force and civilian leaders responsible for ensuring that Iraqi security forces coordinate with MNF-1 on all security policy and operations issues. This will facilitate unity of command in military operations in which Iraqi forces are engaged with MNF-1. It will also help foster effective allocation of resources and use of personnel; regular consultation between MNF- I and JIG leaders; and the sharing of intelligence. (3) MNF-I will establish a separate brigade size force under its command dedicated to providing security for UN personnel and facilities in Iraq. Its missions will include static and perimeter security at UN facilities, and convoy escort duties. 7 ( 4) Though the MNF-1 is in Iraq at the request of the IIG, its mandate could be reviewed or terminated should the Iraqis ask, but will nonetheless expire once a pennanent Government of Iraq is constitutionally elected by the end of2005. (5) MNF-I will continue to train and equip Iraqi security forces. (6) Military Forces. (a) CJTF-7. CJTF-7 was responsible for military operations throughout Iraq, operating in support of the CPA, in order to establish and maintain a secure environment. CJTF-7 transferred authority to the Multinational Force-Iraq (MNF- 1) on 15 May 2004. (b) MNF-I. The MNF-I was established with interim operational capability (IOC) on 15 May 2004 and assumed responsibility for military operations throughout Iraq. Upon transition to a sovereign interim government of Iraq, the MNF-I will continue its mission to establish and maintain a secure environment, allow the continuance of relief and reconstruction efforts, and improve the training and capabilities of Iraqi security forces, including the Iraqi Armed Forces, Border Patrol, Iraqi Police Services, the Facility Protective Service, and the Iraqi Civil Defense Corps. As these Iraqi forces develop appropriate capabilities and the security situation improves, the MNF-I will hand off security responsibilities to them and assume a reduced presence in Iraqi cities and provinces. d. Assumptions. (1) The governing structures in Iraq will be established according to the time lines defined in the Transitional Administrative Law (TAL). (2) The concurrent dissolution of the CPA and establishment of the US Mission Iraq will allow for continuity of current relief and reconstruction operations. (3) Multinational coalition principles will be preserved in the post-transition environment. ( 4) The US government transition will be managed with currently available funds; there will not be an additional FY 2004 supplemental appropriation beyond the $258 reserve recently enacted. ( 5) The UN Security Council Resolutions 1511, 1546 and the TAL provide the COM and the MNF-I Commander with necessary legal authorities to carry out their missions. (6) Many functions now performed within the CPA will continue until 30 June 2004 and will be assigned on that date to the Chief of Mission (COM). 2.Mi ssion On 30 June 2004, the Iraqi Interim Government assumes authority and the CPA is dissolved; the US Government establishes a US Mission Iraq to ensure that the responsibilities and interests of AL USE ONLY the US Government are preserved and discharged effectively; and in concert with the Multinational Force-Iraq, the Iraqi Government and our Coalition partners and international organizations, continue uninterrupted relief, reconstruction and stabilization efforts. 3.Exec ution a. Intent. The Chief of Mission to the new US Mission Iraq will represent the interests of the US Government and will assist the people and government of Iraq as they take full ownership of Iraq during the transition period. Underpinning this goal are three priorities- sovereignty, security, and reconstruction and economic development. In terms of sovereignty, the COM will focus on supporting the Iraqi Interim Government and assisting the IIG in organizing national elections. With respect to security, the principal priority is training Iraqi security forces. The COM will work closely with the Commander, MNF-1 to ensure that security forces are trained to take over security responsibilities of their country. Finally, reconstruction and economic development assistance provided or coordinated by the COM will be directed toward giving the Iraqi people a stake in their own future. (1) Concept of Operations. OPLAN Sovereign Iraq will be executed in five phases (See Figure 1): Phase I (Establishing US Mission Advance Team), Phase II (Transition to US Mission), Phase III (Post-Transition Execution/Fiscal Year Close-out), Phase IV (Constitution /Election Support), Phase V (Post Election Normalization). Through these five phases, the US Government will effectively transition governance responsibilities to the Iraqi Interim Government (IIG) while maintaining ongoing relief, reconstruction, and stabilization efforts throughout Iraq. These actions will occur simultaneously with a shift in primary authority for prioritization of non-security related efforts from DOD to DOS. USG Phasev Monitor security and reduca MN F-1 presence Complete IRRF projects Figure 2. Transition Phasing 9 DO NOT RELEASE WITIIO J10R OFFICIAL USE EXEMP (2) Phase I (Establishing US Mission Advance Team). Phase I began 19 March 2004 when the forward planning cell of the Interagency Transition Planning Team (ITPT) arrived in Baghdad and ends when the US Mission Advance Team is fully established by I June 2004. (a) Purpose. The purpose of this phase was for the ITPT-Baghdad and CPA, with support from the ITPT-Washington and CENTCOM/CJTF-7, to plan and coordinate activities necessary to ensure that the US Mission Advance Team was prepared to function effectively and take over management oversight of select CPA functions. The US Mission Advance Team is a precursor organization to the US Mission, and began the process of standing up the full embassy. (b) Interagency Transition Planning Team. The DOD and DOS ITPT teams planned for the more complex handoff of missions, functions, personnel, logistics, communications, facilities and real property from CPA to the US Mission and finalize plans for other phases. (c) Coalition Provisional Authority. CPA worked to complete all necessary transition tasks to prepare for the US Mission Advance Team no later than (NLT) I June 2004. During this period, the US Anny assumed responsibility for the Project and Contracting Office (PCO). (d) Department of State. DOS conducted detailed planning and preparations for establishing and staffing the US Mission. During this time, DOS determined those additional capabilities, functions, and personnel currently resident in CPA that would transition to the US Mission Iraq and remain after the 30 June 2004 transition to sovereignty. (e) Department of Defense. Department of Defense (DOD) planned for providing security and other support to US Mission Iraq activities, direct administrative and logistical support to the US Embassy in the Green Zone, and general support to non-DOD US government agencies operating in the Green Zone and at other sites in Iraq. (f) Department of Justice. Department of Justice (DOJ) and DOD provided support to the Iraqi Special Tribunal, and the Commission on Public Integrity. Liaison teams to the Ministries of Justice and the Interior, the Council of Judges and the courts continued their missions. (g) Coalition Joint Task Force-7. CJTF-7 continued to establish and maintain a secure environment, continued to support the training of Iraqi security forces, and prepared for the transfer of authority to Multinational Force-Iraq (MNF-1). MNF- I achieved Initial Operational Capability (IOC) on 15 May and Full Operational Capability (FOC) on 15 July. (h) Phase I ends when the US Mission Advance Team commences operations by June 2004. 10 Version 3.0 EXE UNDER ITHOUT AUTHORITY OF INTERAGENCY TRANSITION PLA (3) Phase II (Transition to US Mission). Phase II began when the US Mission Advance Team arrived in Iraq and began to gradually assume certain CPA functions by 1 June 2004. Phase II will ends with the dissolution of CPA and the opening of the US Mission Iraq on 30 June 2004. (a) Pm;pose. The purpose of this phase is to establish the US Mission Iraq upon assumption of authority by the JIG. During Phase II, the US Mission Advance Team wiJI assume management oversight of functions from the CPA which are appropriate embassy functions as identified during Phase I. (b) US Mission Advance Team. The US Mission Advance Team will focus on the efficient and supportive transition of appropriate activities, responsibilities, and resources from CPA to the US Mission Iraq and will be in direct support of the CPA until 30 June 2004 for those functions that are transferred. (c) Interagency Transition Planning Team. The ITPT and CPA continue planning for transition of selected functions to the US Mission. (d) Department of State (DOS). DOS and the CPA establish the Iraq Reconstruction Management Office (TRMO) as a "virtual" organization to provide management oversight of those CPA functions and personnel under the authority of the Chief of Mission (COM) deemed mission essential after 30 June 2004, at which time IRMO will be established as a temporary organization under the provisions of Section 3161. IRMO will be comprised primarily of senior and technical liaison personnel and supporting staff, providing expertise and operational assistance to Iraqi ministries. (e) Project and Contracting Office. In preparation for its post-transition organizational structure, the Project and Contracting Office (PCO) will be established within the Army to provide acquisition and program management support to the US Mission for execution of contracts funded under the Iraq Relief and Reconstruction Fund (IRRF). It will be a temporary organization funded, staffed, and operated by the US Army, with the forward elements under the management oversight of the Chief (DCM designee) of the US Mission Advance Team until 30 June 2004 so that the transition will be seamless. (f) Regional Teams. DOS will establish four interagency Regional Teams at Mosul, Kirkuk, AI Hillah, and Basrah (Annex 0) and embedded teams with headquarters of five MNF-1 major subordinate commands, and CPA will begin to close sites not selected for an enduring presence. These teams represent one the most critical elements of our continued presence in Iraq as they will have direct contact with the Iraqi people. (g) Coalition Provisional Authority. CPA continues to conduct all activities not transferred to US Mission Advance Team and will continue to be responsible for those activities that transfer to the US Mission Advance Team for management oversight during Phase II. CPA restructures elements of the CPA that will transfer to the US Mission. 11 FOR OFFICIAL USE 0 EXE OIA 5 U.S.C. §552(8)(5) DO NOT RELEASE ITION PLANNING TEAM Version 3.0 (h) Department of Defense. DOD will establish Area Support Group Central to provide direct administrative and logistical support to the US Mission and general support to other US Government tenants in the Green Zone, as well as Regional Teams. It will achieve initial operational capability on 15 June 2004 and full operational capability of 30 June 2004. It will support operations for the Green Zone and US Mission Advance Team during Phase II. (i) Department of Justice. The Regime Crimes Liaison takes leadership of all US Goverrunent efforts in support of the Iraqi Special Tribunal, which will become part of the Regime Crimes Liaison Office. The US Mission Advance Team will convene a Justice and Law Enforcement working group to coordinate the activities G) Multinational Force-Iraq. MNF-1 achieved IOC on 15 May 2004, and continues to establish and maintain a secure environment through 30 June 2004 and beyond. MNF-1 will have operational command of the Office of Security Transition (OST) which has responsibility for training and mentoring Iraqi Security Forces (ISF). The Director of Detainee Operations and the Detainee Organization continue to support the Central Criminal Court of Iraq. (k) Phase II ends 30 June 2004 with the dissolution ofthe CPA and opening ofthe US Mission Iraq. ( 4) Phase III (Post-Transition Execution/Fiscal Year Close-out). Phase III begins 30 June 2004 with the opening of the US Mission Iraq and will end on 30 September 2004. (a) Purnose. The purpose of this phase is to fully establish all programs and procedures pursuant to the new US Mission, support the Iraqi Interim Government, and close-out or readjust all necessary contract work for FY 2004. During this phase, the US Mission Iraq assumes full responsibility for US interests in Iraq and responsibility for relations with the Government of Iraq under the authority ofDOS. (b) Department of Defense. DOD will close out all FY04 residual CPA financial transactions. CPA support contracts required by DOS, and coordinated with DOD, will be transferred to the US Mission NLT 30 September 2004. DOS will establish procedures NLT 30 June 2004 to use purchase order instruments when desired to leverage existing DOD contracts such as LOGCAP. (c) Project and Contracting Office. DOD will continue to provide acquisition and program management support to the US Mission for execution of contracts funded under the IRRF through the PCO, with the forward elements under the authority of the COM. (d) US Mission Iraq. The Chief of Mission (COM) will assist the Iraqi Government and UN representatives to prepare for elections, to be held no later than 31 January 2005 and will coordinate closely with Coalition Partners on these matters, as appropriate. The COM will also set requirements and priorities for all non- security-related requirements in his oversight of Iraq Relief and Reconstruction Fund (IRRF) programs which will be followed by the PCO. 12 . §552(8)(5) PLANNING TEAM E E 5 WITIIOUT AUTHORITY OF INTERAGENCY TRANSITION (e) Multinational Force-Ir<!9. Commander, MNF-I will set requirements and priorities for all security-related requirements to be implemented by PCO and will continue to establish and maintain a secure environment. (t) Other Nations. It is expected that respective diplomats in Iraq, together with diplomats from multilateral organizations, will establish inter-Embassy contact groups that would provide fora for discussion and coordination of all subjects of mutual interest, and provide a venue to compare and track progress. (g) Phase III ends with the U.S. fiscal year on 30 September 2004. (5) Phase IV (Election Support). Phase IV begins 1 October 2004 and is expected to end when the newly established transitional government is seated. (a) Purpose. The purposes of this phase are to finalize organizational changes in MNF-1 and the US Mission, and continue to assist in the transformation process of Iraq by supporting the execution of national elections in accordance with fair and internationally recognized standards. (b) Iragi Interim Government. The new Iraqi Interim Government's primary responsibility will be to administer Iraq's affairs, in particular by providing for the welfare and security of the Iraqi people, promoting economic development and preparing Iraq for national elections to be held no later than 31 January 2005. (c) US Mission Irag. The US Mission Iraq continues to ensure that the responsibilities and interests of the US Government are preserved and discharged effectively; continues uninterrupted relief, reconstruction and stabilization efforts in concert with the Iraqi Interim Government, our coalition and international partners and the MNF-1; and plans for establishment of the Iraqi Transitional Government after nationwide elections. (d) MNF-I. MNF-I continues to establish and maintain a secure environment, with Iraqi security forces taking an increasingly larger role as they achieve required operational capabilities. MNF-I also continues to establish base support operations throughout Iraq with area support groups, base support battalions, and area support teams to relieve tactical commanders of the base support operations requirements, including support to the US Mission, so they can focus on warfighting. (See Appendix I - BASOPS to Anrex A Command and Control) (e) Phase IV ends on or about 31 Jan 2005 when an internationally recognized elected Iraqi Transitional National Assembly is seated. (6) Phase V (Post Election Normalization). Phase V begins on or about 1 February 2005, after elected permanent Iraqi Government is seated. (a) Purpose. The purpose of this phase is to monitor and reduce presence of MNF-1 and other US Government missions necessary for a state of long-term stability and normalization pursuant to standards and wishes of the Iraqi government. During 13 OFFICIAL USE ONLY EXEMPT FROM DISCLO DO NOT TY OF INTERAGENCY TRA Version 3.0 this phase, all projects funded by the Iraq Relief and Reconstruction Fund Public Law 108-106 will be or will have been completed. (b) Iraqi Transitional Government. The Transitional National Assembly will draft a permanent constitution for the State of Iraq which should be ratified by October 2005. Nationwide elections will be held under this constitution to establish a Permanent Iraqi Government at the end of2005. (c) US Mission Iraq. The US Mission Iraq continues to ensure that the responsibilities and interests of the US Government are preserved and discharged effectively; and continues uninterrupted relief, reconstruction and stabilization efforts in concert with the Iraqi Transitional Government and our coalition and international partners, and the MNF-I. As the situation in Iraq normalizes, the US Mission may reduce its presence in the regions and move toward normal embassy operations. (d) MNF-I. As Iraqi security forces become more mission capable, they will assume responsibility for internal and external security from forces belonging to MNF-1. Additionally, as the security situation in Iraq becomes permissive and US Mission operations are normalized, ASG Central gradually hands off administrative and logistical functions to the US Embassy, and Green Zone management functions to appropriate Government of Iraq authorities. (e) This phase ends with the normalization of Iraqi local and national governance and a stable environment where the US and other Missions can operate under normal conditions. b. Tasks by Phase. (1) Phase 1-11. (a) Department of State (I) Establish real property facilities in the Green Zone to support a US Mission Iraq capable of performing expanded missions. Prepare to become successor organization to CPA under provisions of Article 5, Section 3161. (2) Establish a US Mission Advance Team by 1 June 2004 to begin the process of establishing a US Mission Iraq and assume management oversight of select organizations established as ''virtual" organizations with the CPA such as IRMO, PCO forward, STRATCOM (to be redesignated), etc. (3) Established four regional team sites with one in Basrah, AI Hillah, Kirkuk, and Mosul to coordinate the on-going relief, reconstruction and governance efforts for the USG. (4) Embed teams in the five MND Divisional areas, collocated with the military headquarters to support the military commanders and serve as extensions of the Regional Directors responsible for the Regional Teams noted above. 14 OR OFFICIAL USE ONLY EXEMPT FROM DIS DO NOT RELE RITY OF INTERAGENCY TRA Version 3.0 D (5) Develop and implement US Mission Iraq Mission Program Plan (MPP) FY2006. (6) Establish the Iraq Reconstruction Management Office (IRMO) that works under the management of the Chief, US Mission Advance Team on 1 June ~ in direct support and under the authority of the Administrator, CPA. (7) Determine post-transition internal organizations and staffing levels for the US Mission activities. (8) Determine staffing levels for all US Government activities in Iraq under COM authority. (9) Deploy DOS and other agency personnel assigned to the US Mission in order to be on station in the US Mission NLT 15 June 2004. (10) Support the development oflraqi Interim Government capacity to administer the Iraqi Justice System effectively and efficiently, through training, technical assistance, mentoring, certification, and advice. (11) Establish Near East Asia~lraq office to provide policy and operations support to the US Mission Iraq. (12) Assume authority over selected facilities in the Green Zone and other sites as determined by DOS in coordination with Administrator, CPA and Commander, MNF-I. (13) Establish a public affairs organization under the authority of the US Mission Advance Team and subsequently the COM NLT 1 June 2004, to design and implement a strategic communications plan to achieve the communication objectives of the United States. (b) Department of Defense. (1) CENTCOM exercise command and control over US and multinational forces. (2) CPA supports transition planning and transfers management oversight of select functions to US Mission Advance Team prior to 30 June 2004. Ensure smooth transition of these functions to US Mission Iraq on 30 June. (3) CPA prepares to transfer unobligated Development Fund in Iraq (DFI) funds to the Iraq Minister of Finance on I July 2004. (4) Establish, lAW NSPD 36, the Project and Contracting Office (PCO) as a temporary organization under Army executive agency authority. The PCO forward will be under the management oversight of the Chief (DCM 15 EXEMPT FROM DO NOT RELEASE WITHOUT ION PLANNING TEAM designee) of the US Mission Advance Team prior to 30 June so that the transition on 30 June will be seamless. (5) NLT 30 June 2004, develop and execute base support operations plan to provide administrative and logistics support to USG sites throughout Iraq, including the Green Zone. (6) Establish the Office of Security Transition (OST) under the operational command of the Commander, MNF-1 until the level of security and stability allows Iraq to assume the lead role in security. (7) Establish a Detainee Organization under MNF-1 responsible for detainees in Iraq whose director will report to Commander, MNF-I. (8) Establish ASG Central OPCON to MNF-I to provide direct support to the US Embassy and general support to other tenants of the Green Zone for specified logistics and administrative functions now supporting the CPA, NLT 30 June, 2004. ASG Central coordinates security with MNF-I and provides management for the Green Zone until security conditions allow it to be · transferred to the Government of Iraq or as directed. (9) CPA-West transfers select policy and operations functions to NEA-l in DOS and other US Government organizations NLT 30 June 2004 to ensure continuity of effort. (IO) DOD coordinates all issues associated with US Government contractors under DOD management on the battlefield, including accountability, force protection, privileges and immunities for US personnel, facilities, and contractors not covered under the Vienna Conventions, CPA Orders and other agreements (See Annex N- Contractor Security, Published in Separate Fragmentary Order). (II) DOD will designate the Secretary of the Army as the Department of Defense executive agent for the Project and Contracting Office and its functions. (c) Joint Tasks (1) DOD I DOS establishes command and control structures that will ensure a seamless transition upon assumption of authority by the JIG and establishment of the US Mission Iraq in coordination with MNF-1 and the regional teams. (2) DOD I DOS develops personnel transition plan for CPA personnel. (3) CENTCOM I COM ensure that every US Government employee in Iraq is accountable either to the US Mission or the MNF-I. DO NOT RELEASE WITII I6 R OFFICIAL USE 0 EXEMPT FROM DISCL .S.C. §552(B)(5) Y OF INTERAGENCY T Version 3.0 (4) DOS I DOD develops USG guidelines for screening standards of private security firms, protocol between CPAJMNF-T and COM contractors, rules for use of force and weapons policies. (See Annexes K and N) (5) DOD I DOS establishes a Support MOA NLT 15 June, 2004 that delineates each agency's responsibilities in ensuring adequate support of: (6) (7) (a) The Green Zone and other USG sites and facilities management and responsibilities. (b) ASG Central support of the US Mission Iraq and the Green Zone. (c) Information communication technology support to the US Mission and Regional Team sites. (d) Service support for Regional Team sites. (e) Medical support for the US Mission and Regional Teams. (f) Contracting support for the US Mission. DOD I DOS establishes a Security MOA NLT 15 June 2004 that delineates each agency's responsibilities in ensuring the success of: (a) MNF-1 security of Regional Team (RT) fixed sites and a consultative process to ensure that Regional Coordinator's requirements are clearly defined and supporting security commanders' plans are clearly understood. (b) MNF-I ability and procedures/processes to provide Quick Reaction Force support. (c) DOS/DOS cooperation and support in protecting COM activities in outside the Green Zone. (d) Transferring Personal Security Details from Criminal Investigation Division (CID) to the Diplomatic Security Service (DSS). DOD/DOS inventory and transfer all security related CPA equipment to the US Mission lAW contractual requirements and the Federal Acquisition Regulations to support the establishment of US Mission Advance Team and later, the US Mission Iraq. (8) DOD/DOS provide effective Health Support Service (HSS) system for all eligible US personnel in IRAQ to include an effective theater evacuation policy (Annex Q). 17 EXEMPT FRO E U DO NOT RELEAS AUTHORITY OF INTERAGENCY ANNINGTEAM Version 3.0 (9) DOD/CPA resolve budget shortfalls to ensure adequate funding is available to support acknowledged requirements of the US Mission Iraq in 4th Quarter FY 2004 (Annex L). (10) DOD/DOS establish financial management support to the COM by closing out CPA financial management actions, and establishing the DOS financial system in the US Mission Iraq on or before 30 June 2004, except for those transactions which, by agreement of both the DOS and the DOD, will be completed by DOD, or transferred to the Project and Contracting Office (PCO). (11) DOD, DOS and CPA coordinate information and communications technology (ICT) infrastructure and services contracts to be transferred to DOS and contractual and technical issues in the transition from DOD to DOS. Identify the residual capabilities of CPA and their disposition in the post 30 June 2004 environment and effect such disposition. (d) Other Agencies. (I) Other US Government executive branch agencies provide appropriate personnel to staff the US Mission Advance Team during June 2004 and the US Mission Iraq, post 30 June 2004 in accordance and coordination with DOS. (2) On 30 June 2004, CPA-IG becomes the Iraq Reconstruction Inspector General (IR-IG), reporting to DOD. (See Annex C) (2) Phase Ill. (a) Chief of Mission. (1) Reestablish diplomatic relations with Iraq and open the US Mission Iraq on 30 June 2004. (2) Coordinate, as appropriate, with the embassies of other coalition partners to advance coalition objectives in Iraq. (3) Oversee all activities of the US Mission and US personnel not under US Central Command's (USCENTCOM) authority, except those detailed to the staff of International Organizations. ( 4) Exercise authority over all assigned personnel to the US Mission through the NSDD 38 process. (5) Provide internal security for sites under his direct authority, and ensure coordination with Commander, MNF-~ for additional security requirements. (6) Support the Iraqi national political process and the work of the UN, as appropriate. 18 FOR OFFICIAL USE ON EXEMPT FROM D OIA 5 U.S.C. §552(B)(5) DO NOT RELEA ORITY OF INTERA PLANNING TEAM Version 3.0 EXEMPT FROM DIS RITY OF INTERAGENCY TRANSITION PLA (7) Support Iraqi civil society efforts and local Non-Governmental Organizations (NGOs), as appropriate. (8) Support development of Iraqi local media. (9) Support the efforts of the MNF-I. ( 1 0) Establish the Iraq Reconstruction and Management Office (IRMO) to initiate and oversee IRRF projects. (11) Coordinate with the international community and NGOs in Iraq. (b) Department of Defense. (1) Establish and sustain a secure environment in which relief and reconstruction tasks will be accomplished. (2) Provide security and support to the US Mission and other US Government agencies in accordance with the Support MOA and Security MOAs. (3) Coordinate through the Director of the Office of Security Transition (OST) with the COM on matters specific to policies associated with developing the capabilities of Iraq Security Forces and other security assistance. (4) Designate the MNF-I Commander as the principal military advisor to the COM. (c) Joint DOD!DOS Tac;ks (1) Establish MOA between COM and combatant commander to ensure every US Government employee in Iraq is accountable either to the US Mission or the Combatant Commander. (2) Provide effective Health Service Support (HSS) system for all US personnel in IRAQ to include a proper theater evacuation policy. (3) Resolve budget shortfalls to ensure adequate funding is available to support acknowledged requirements in 41 h Quarter FY 2004. (3) Phases IV-Y. (a) Chief of Mission. (1) Coordinate with the embassies of other Coalition Partners to advance coalition objectives in Iraq, as appropriate. EXEMPT DO NOT RELEASE 19 FOR OFFICIAL USE FOIA S U.S.C. §552(8)(5) ORITY OF INTERA NNING TEAM Version 3.0 EXEMPT FROM Dl ORITY OF INTERAGENCY TRANSITION PL (2) Oversee all activities of the US Mission and US personnel not under the Combatant Commander's authority, except those detailed to the staff of International Organizations. (3) Exercise authority over all assigned personnel to the US Mission through the NSDD 38 process. ( 4) Provide internal security for sites under his direct authority and ensure coordination with Commander, MNF-I for additional security requirements. (5) Support the Iraqi national political process and the work of the UN, as appropriate. (6) Support Iraqi civil society efforts and local Non-Governmental Organizations (NGOs) as appropriate. (7) Support development of Iraqi local media. (8) Support the efforts of the MNF-l. (9) Initiate and oversee IRRF projects. (b) Department of Defense. (1) Complete security force transition from US to Iraqi local control, when appropriate. (2) Transition selected contracts to the US Mission Iraq. (3) Complete security force transition to Iraqi Regional Control, when appropriate. (4) Complete security force transition to Strategic Overwatch, when appropriate. (5) DOD/DOS transition oversight of OST from CDR MNF-I to COM when security conditions permit. (See Annex A Command and Control) c. Coordinating Instructions. (1) DOD and other US Government agencies are supporting agencies; DOS is the supported agency. (2) Commander, MNF-1 coordinates fully with the COM on all matters regarding training and equipping the Iraqi security forces. (3) DOD/DOS establish formal procedures to conduct regular coordination meetings with multinational force, coalition partners, Iraqi government agencies, and others, as required, for force protection, financial, stationing, and property issues. 20 Version 3.0 (4) DOD/DOS establish procedures whereby security provided to COM fixed sites result from a consultative process where COM representatives define security requirements and the supporting security commander coordinates plans with the supported COM representatives and adjudicates concerns and issues through consultation. (5) COM, in coordination with MNF-1, establishes a US Mission Operations Center (MOC) in the Embassy Annex to oversee the daily implementation and execution of tasks and resolution of resource issues. 4.Adm inistration and Logistics. (See Annex 1- Logistics and Annex T- Sypport MOA) a. SuJ2port concept. This transition will be supported by DOD, DOS, CPA, and representatives of other US Government agencies as necessary. The primary funding source will be the parent organization operating budgets and operational expenses as defined in (Public Law I 08-1 06). Throughout the transition planning and execution, existing procedures, planning, facilities, materiel, technologies, and data systems will be used as much as possible. New systems, facilities, and technologies will be acquired only when no existing system is sufficient to fulfill the needs of the transition process. · b. Materiel and Services. (1) Logistics. The US Mission Iraq will require comparable logistics support from the MNF-1 that it currently provides to the CPA during and after the assumption of authority by the IIG and the establishment of the US Mission Iraq, in accordance with the Support Memorandum of Agreement between DOS and DOD (Annex T). The transition of support will be completed NLT 30 June 2004. DOS will become a customer of the Army LOG CAP contract and assume use of property formerly utilized by CPA. DOD will establish ASG Central under MNF-1 to provide direct support to the US Mission and general support to other US Government tenants in the Green Zone. ASG Central will also provide general administrative and logistical support to the Regional Team sites. (Annex 0 - Regional Teams). The Project and Contracting Office will coordinate the external logistical requirements in support of Iraq's reconstruction contracts. The end-state objective of this transition mission will be a functioning US Mission with the logistical and administrative support necessary to advance US government objectives in Iraq. Throughout, strict accountability of USG property will be an imperative during this transition period. (See Annexes I - Logistics and T- Support MOA). (2) Facilities and Real Property. DOS, within available funds and with the support and cooperation of DOD and CPA, established a transition office to phase in the occupancy of the C-135 building by 15 May 2004, and the interim chancery, the embassy annex compound, and the Chief of Mission Residence (CMR) NLT 30 June 2004. DOS will accommodate US personnel under the authority of the COM using existing housing units located on the Annex Compound, augmented by 75 additional housing trailers. DOS will acquire the property known as the lakefront site as the location for a permanent US Embassy compound through agreement with the Iraqi Government in exchange for relinquishment of claims to compensation arising from the 1971 expropriation of the former USG Embassy. The available budget for the interim facilities (approximately $60 million) will permit only limited renovations and 21 USE ONLY c. §552(8)(5) Version 3.0 EXE NDER FOIA 5 U.S. . THOUT AUTHORITY OF INTERAGENCY TRANSITION PLANNING TEAM improvements of the interim embassy facilities and will not meet all new embassy compound standards. The renovations will focus on providing secure, safe and functional facilities, in that order of priority, within funding constraints. Adequate physical security will be provided for the interim embassy facilities to support collocation and setback waivers as necessary under the Secure Embassy Construction and Counterterrorism Act of 1999, Title VI, Pub. L. 106-113. (See Annex F- Facilities and Real Property) (3) Contract Support. The Project and Contracting Office (PCO) will provide contracts management and program management authority over the construction and non- construction contracts awarded under the Iraqi Relief and Reconstruction Fund (IRRF). Following the intent to be fully operational on 30 June 2004, the PCO stood up on 1 June 04 as a "virtual" organization but continue to work within the CPA. On 1 June, it will transition to the US Mission Advance Team and be under the management oversight of the Chief (DCM designee) but be responsive to the priorities of the Administrator, CPA, through 30 June 2004. The intent is that the "PCO" would work under the management oversight of the Chief, US Mission Advance Team, during the month of June so that the transition on 30 June is seamless. The Department of the Army will assume responsibility for the PCO for funding, staffing, quality assurance, security, facilities, and life support consistent within this intent. Upon establishment of the US Mission Iraq, responsibility for the non-security project requirements definition and prioritization will be transferred· from the CPA to the US Mission, while responsibility for security related project requirements definition and prioritization will remain with the Multinational Force- Iraq. (Annex G Contracts and Acquisition) (4) Medical Services. DOD/MNF-I will continue to provide Health Services Support (HSS) to all eligible US personnel according to the standards already established and in place. DOD I MNF-I will coordinate with DOS to provide HSS beyond the capability of the COM for personnel under the authority of the COM. DOS will establish the US Mission Health Unit to provide Primary Care support services to eligible USG employees under the authority of the COM. As USG-funded contractor personnel deploy to Iraq to assume support functions, contractor organizations sourcing these personnel will provide organic primary care medical support or arrange such care from another contractor organization. (Annex Q- Health Service Support). (5) Personnel Support. CPA will remain the core headquarters for personnel management functions related to personnel assigned to CPA in Iraq until the dissolution of CPA on 30 June 2004, after which personnel management responsibilities for USG employees previously assigned to CPA and presently assigned to work in Iraq will be split between a number of organizations, including Department of State and the Department of Army. (Annex E- Organizations, Manpower, and Personnel Administration) (6) Reimbursements. Reimbursements by the US Mission Iraq to DOD will not be required subsequent to 30 June 2004. The CPA budget for the 41 h Quarter of FY 04 will be transferred from DOD to DOS on 30 June except for those funds withheld to pay for services provided to DOS "in kind". DOD will continue this practice through the first half of FY 2005 or until DOS has received supplemental funds for the second half of FY 05, at which time DOS and DOD will pay for their support services through appropriate reimbursable agreements. 22 D EXE . ITIIOUT AUTHORITY OF INTERAGENCY TRANSITION PL S.Co mmand and Control. (See Annex A- Command and Control) a. Command. ( 1) The Chief of Mission is the representative of the President of the United States. He will report to the President through the Secretary of State. All executive branch agencies under COM authority, and every element of the Mission, must keep the COM fully informed at all times of their current and planned activities. (See Annex D - Chief of Mission) (2) The chain-of-command for the Commander, MNF-I is through the Combatant Commander, CENTCOM, to the Secretary of Defense, to the President. (3) The COM has authority over every executive branch employee in the host country (other than those under the authority of the US area military commander or those detailed to the staff of an international organization). (4) The COM I CDR USCENTCOM Memorandum of Agreement (MOA) governs security responsibility for DOD elements and personnel in Iraq (Annex S). The MOA assigns security responsibility for all DOD elements/personnel in country to either the COM or the Commander, USCENTCOM. (5) All US Government activities and personnel in Iraq, except those detailed to the staff of an International Organization, will be under the authority of either the Chief of Mission or the Commander of the MNF-I. (6) Other executive branch agencies must obtain COM approval before assigning personnel to the Mission or host country. NSDD 38 governs proposals. b. Signal. See Annex H - Information Technology and Communications. xxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxx APPROVAL AUTHORITY ORGANIZATION AFFILIATION xxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxx APPROVAL AUTHORITY ORGANIZATION AFFILIATION ANNEXES TO BASE PLAN, OPLAN SOVEREIGN IRAQ ANNEX A Command and Control Appendix 1 Base Support Operations in Support of US Mission Appendix 2 US Mission Operations Center (MOC) ANNEX B Intelligence ANNEX C Iraq Reconstruction Inspector General ANNEX D Chief of Mission Appendix 1 Milestones Appendix 2 Legal Appendix 3 Milestones to Legal Appendix ANNEX E Organizations, Manpower and Personnel Administration Appendix 1 Milestones ANNEX F Facilities and Real Property Appendix 1 Milestones Appendix 2 Facilities ANNEX G Contracts and Acquisitions Appendix 1 Milestones ANNEX H Information Technology and Communication Appendix 1 Milestones Appendix 2 Military Postal Support ANNEX I Logistics Appendix 1 Milestones Appendix 2 Military Air Support Operation in Support of the US Mission ANNEX J Consular Appendix 1 Milestones ANNEX K Security Appendix 1 Milestones ANNEX L Finance Appendix 1 Milestones ANNEX M Not used ANNEX N Contractor Security (To Be Issued as a Fragmentary Order) ANNEX 0 Regional Teams Appendix 1 Milestones ANNEX P Justice Appendix 1 Milestones ANNEX Q Health Service Support Appendix 1 Milestones ANNEX R Public Affairs Appendix 1 Milestones ANNEX S Security Memoranda of Agreement between DOD and DOS ANNEX T Support Memorandum of Agreement between DOD and DOS ANNEX U Glossary of Terms 24 • CHANGE1 ANNEXA TO OPLAN SOVEREIGN IRAQ 2 JULY 2004 References: ANNEX A -COMMAND AND CONTROL A. 20 Feb 04 Secretary of Defense Memorandum on Iraqi Security Forces B. State/Defense Memorandum of Understanding (MOU) on Security, dated December 16, 1997 C. Foreign Service Act of 1980, P.L. 96-465 D. National Security Decision Directive Number 38, dated 2 June 1982 E. Map of Land Required for DOS Embassy Complex F. National Security Presidential Directive 36, dated May 11, 2004 G. Mission Performance Plan, FY 20-06, U.S. Embassy Iraq H. Transitional Administrative Law (TAL) with Annex, multiple dates I. Annex S - Security Services and Security Responsibilities Memoranda of Agreement between Department of State and Department of Defense J. Annex T- Support Memorandum of Agreement between Department of State and Department of Defense K. FRAG0-129 Establishment Of New Provincial Civil/Military Coordination Structure to MNC-1 OPORD 04-01 l.S ituation a. Current Situation. (1) The US Government has established a date of 30 June 2004 for the transfer of sovereignty of Iraq to an Interim Government. At this time, sovereignty will transfer to the Iraqi Interim Government, and the Coalition Provisional Authority will cease to function as the governing authority in Iraq. The US Ambassador to Iraq will present his credentials and establish a US Mission Iraq, effective I July. Department of State (DOS) Bureau of Near East Affairs, Iraq (NEAll) and the US Mission to Iraq will be established as the successor organizations to CPA and will be responsible for representing the interests of the USG, less the military function which will be discharged by the Commander, Multinational Forces Iraq (MNF-I). (2) DOS is implementing an organizational model for the US Mission similar to US missions in other countries throughout the world. However, Iraq presents a unique situation, and US forces and its Coalition Partners in Iraq are engaged in daily security, stabilization and reconstruction missions. Therefore, embassy functions will be performed in a non-permissive environment, and extraordinary security, administrative and logistics support will be required. The US Mission will require significant support from other USG agencies until the environment becomes sufficiently permissive to allow for normal operations. (3) The US Mission Iraq will have a number of additional command and control challenges beyond its normal functions: 1) It will assume CPA's responsibility for A-1 (Change 1) L USE ONLY DO Version 3.0 providing expertise to develop the capabilities within the Ministries of the Iraqi Government; 2) In addition to its normal public diplomacy functions, it will maintain the current broader, robust Public Affairs strategy in the context of not only the US Mission's functions but also the reality of a coalition military at war; 3) It will determine the requirements and prioritize efforts of the Project and Contracting Office (PCO) in implementing the $18.48 Iraq Relief and Reconstruction Fund (IRRF) for non-security related construction projects; 4) It will coordinate with the Commander, MNF-I, to implement enhanced security measures to protect the embassy and US personnel under the COM authority, and manage a range of other missions unique to the security situation in Iraq, and finally; 5) It will maintain a presence outside of Baghdad through Regional Teams to assist both the military commanders and local Iraqi authorities with the on-going transformation of their institutions and programs. b. (1) See Annex B - Intelligence (2) Enemy threats and commensurate security requirements differ significantly throughout the cities, provinces, and regions of Iraq. Most significant are internal insurgents seeking to undermine the new sovereign Iraqi government. (Annex B - Intelligence) c. Friendly Forces. See Base Plan- OPLAN Sovereign Iraq d. Assumptions. (1) The Iraqi Interim Government will ascribe to the Transitional Administrative Law (TAL) as the rule of law until a new government is elected, a constitution is written, and laws replacing them are enacted. (2) Coalition Partners will continue to participate in the spirit of the Coalition as represented in the combined operations under the Commander, Multinational Force Iraq. 2.Mi ssion The US Government establishes a management structure to exercise command and control of military forces, agencies, and activities required to ensure an orderly transfer of sovereignty to the Iraqi Interim Government; establishment of the US Mission Iraq; and conduct of military operations to establish a secure, stable environment in which a democratic government will be established and relief and reconstruction missions can be completed. 3.Exec ution a. Concept of Operations. (1) Intent. The USG will ensure a seamless transition of those functions to be assumed by the US Mission Iraq from the Coalition Provisional Authority. It will assure that command and coordination relationships between the US Mission, MNF-1, Coalition I international partners, and Iraqi authorities are clear and effective. Furthermore, the EXEMPTFR DONOTR AUTHORITY OF INTERAGENCY lNG TEAM Version 3.0 (2) USG will ensure that the responsibilities and interests of the US Government are clearly defined, preserved, and discharged effectively with the least amount of disruption to on-going security, reconstruction and relief operations. The end-state will provide a sound command and control structure is for the United States to include a fully functioning US Mission Iraq and a Multinational Command which operates effectively in close coordination with each other, Coalition I international partners, and Iraqi leadership. Over-arching Concept. To achieve this end-state, the transition between CPA/CJTF-7 and the emerging US Mission and MNF-1 must be completed by 30 June 2004. The US Mission Iraq and the Multinational Force must ascribe to the principles embedded in Unity of Effort and Unity of Command-in the context of the US Government' goals and objectives. In achieving unity of effort, both the Mission and Command must share a common and accurate picture of the changing environments throughout Iraq and the Region. Figure 1 depicts in the broadest sense the overarching concept for the command control relationship amongst the major stakeholders (US Mission, MNF- 1, and the Iraq Authorities), and these are described in the following sub paragraphs. - -- .... Adrnm Coutrol Figure 1. Overarching Command and Control Relationships (a) The Chief of Mission (COM) is tasked by the President with full responsibility for the direction, coordination, and supervision of all United States Government Executive Branch employees in Iraq, except those detailed to the staff of an International Organization, and personnel under the command of CENT COM. (b) The Combatant Commander, CENTCOMwill exercise command and control over US and multinational forces. (c) The Iraq National Command Authority will be established under the civilian control ofthe Iraqi Interim, Transitional, and Permanent Governments as they are established through the National Election process. (d) The COM and CENTCOM Commander will ensure that every US government employee in Iraq is accountable to and under the authority of either the COM or the CENTCOM Commander, except those detailed to the staff of an International Organization. (3) US Mission Command and Control. The US Mission Iraq will ensure that the responsibilities and interests of the US Government are preserved and discharged effectively; and in concert with the Multinational Command, continue uninterrupted relief, reconstruction and stabilization efforts in concert with the Iraqi Government and our Coalition and International Partners. MNF-1 REGIONS I US MISSION PRESENCE POST JUNE 30 NORTH- MNB N S Korea CENTER- 1st ID ANBAR -1 MEF South Center - MND SC SOUTH- MND SE MOSUL ERSIL KIRK UK KIRKUK HILLAH BASRAH NB Regional boundaries are the same except that IPAOs In Anbar will report to the Regional Office in Kirkuk, not Ramadi -see Figure 2. Regional Team Locations (a) Mission Structure. The US Mission will consist ofthe Embassy in Baghdad, four regional team sites of I 00-150 interagency, coalition I international partners, and contractor personnel (Mosul, Kirkuk, Hillah, Basrah), a large provincial team site in Baghdad, and five teams of approximately 5-I 0 personnel embedded with U.S. military major subordinate commands (MSCs) (currently planned for Tikrit, Ramadi, Baqubah, Najaf, Karbala) as shown above in Figure 2. DO NOT RELEASE WITHOUT A SITION PLANNING TEAM (b) Chief of Mission (COM). As noted, the COM has full responsibility for the direction, coordination, and supervision of all United States Government executive branch employees in country, except for those seconded to an international organization and personnel under the command of CENTCOM. He is in charge of all US Mission Iraq activities and operations and their conduct in accordance with the DOS International Affairs Strategic Plan and Mission Performance Plan (MPP). As the U.S. Ambassador to Iraq, he will lead the US Embassy which will include not only the normal functions of an Embassy, but also features unique to the Chief of Mission's responsibilities in Iraq. Figure 3 presents the unique organizational structure ofthe US Embassy in Iraq. Although not a part ofthe US Mission, the MNF-1 Commander has a special relationship with the US Ambassador, and this is noted in the solid double line shown between the two senior ersonnel. @ US Mission Iraq, Country Team I MNF-1 Commander 1'==~==, --------------~----~-------------------------- I • Management: includes CLO, FMO, GSO, HR, IMO, MED, 060 •• DoS/DoD Team: Legal Office: 2 DoS; 3 MNF-1; PAO: 7 DoS, 30 3161 (other DoS Units), 3 DoD, 1 USAID • Ministry Liaison includes Comm. Public Integrity (27). • • Includes 31 Army Corps of Engineers (USACE). Figure 3. US Mission Iraq The legend in the figure can be used to identify typical embassy functions. Other significant additions to a normal embassy staff, including the expanded participation of other USG agencies, are also depicted. Of particular note is the large presence of the Justice Department which will be significantly engaged in the Iraqi court system and training of its police forces. The Iraqi Reconstruction Management Office (IRMO) shown in blue and the Project and Contracting Office (PCO) are discussed below. (c) Iraq Reconstruction Management Office CIRMO). The IRMO will be established formally as a temporary organization by DOS NLT 30 June 2004. However, the CPA, in coordination with the US Mission ,Advance Team, will form the IRMO as A-5 (Change I) FOR OFFICIAL USE ONLY OM DISCLOSURE UNDER FOIA 5 U DO NOT RELEASE WITIIOU TRANSITION PLANNING TEAM Version 3.0 FOR OFFICIAL USE ONLY EXEMPT FROM D DON ORITY OF INTERAGENCY TRANSITION PLA a "virtual" organization as of I June 2004 within the CPA with a director selected by the DOS. Its primary task is to provide executive agency detailees and temporary employees hired under Title 5 USC, Section 3161 authority as senior liaison officers, technical experts, and staff to support the COM in meeting his objective to develop effective Iraqi Ministries. IRMO will also assist the COM in overseeing the Iraq Relief and Reconstruction Fund (IRRF) program and coordinate the spending requirements and priorities for the IRRF. (d) Project and Contracting Office CPCO). DOD will provide acquisition and program management support to the US Mission to execute contracts funded under the supplemental appropriations. DOD will establish the Project and Contracting Office, a temporary organization funded, staffed, and operated by the Army, with forward elements under the authority of the COM. Following the intent to be fully operational on 30 June 2004, the PMO will be redesignated as PCO on I June 04 as a "virtual" organization but continue to work within the CPA. On 1 June, it will transition to the US Mission Advance Team and be under the management oversight of the Chief (COM designee) but in direct support of the Administrator, CPA, through 30 June 2004. The intent is that the "PCO" would work under the management oversight of the Chief, US Mission Advance Team, during the month of June so that the transition on 30 June will be seamless. COM will set requirements and priorities for all non-security-related requirements in his oversight of Iraq Relief and Reconstruction Fund (IRRF) programs. Commander, MNF-I will set requirements and priorities for all security-related requirements to be followed by PCO and will continue to establish and maintain a secure environment. (4) MNF-I Command and Control Concept: (a) Multinational Force-Iraq. The MNF-1 will maintain one multinational brigade and two multinational division sectors under command of the UK, Poland, and the US. Additionally, the US has two divisional sectors commanded by division commanders. These five commanders will be subordinate to Multinational Corps Iraq (MNC-I) commanded by a three star general. The Corps will be under the operational command of the MNF-1 Commander. The Commander, MNF-1 will be commanded by the CENTCOM Commander and will serve as the principal military advisor to the COM. The Commander, MNF-1 retains command or operational control (OPCON) of all US military forces and other DOD personnel not under the authority of the COM. The Commander and his Deputy Commanding General (DCG) for political-military affairs will work with the COM on a day-to-day basis. (b) Office of Security Transition. The MNF-I Commander will exercise command of the Office of Security Transition (OST), a 3-star command. The OST will consist of both the Coalition Military Assistance Training Team (CMA TT) designed to assist with the manning, training and development of the New Iraqi Army, and the Coalition Police Advisory Training Team (CPATT) with a similar mission for the Iraqi Police Service and Department of Border Enforcement. A-6 (Change 1) FOR OFFICIAL USE ONLY NNINGTEAM Version 3.0 FFICIAL USE ONLY (1) The MNF-I Commander will exercise OPCON of these forces through CDR, MNC-I while the OST commander will have authority and responsibility for employing available resources effectively and for organizing, training, and equipping the Iraqi Security Forces as directed by Commander, MNF-1. (2) The Commander, OST, will coordinate with the US Mission and the Iraqi Ministries of Defense and the Interior concerning the Iraqi Security Forces. (3) While not a member of the US Mission Iraq, the Commander, OST, will maintain a special relationship with the COM for all policy matters concerning the Iraqi police and armed forces. The COM and Commander MNF-I will consult on policies governing the CMATT and CPATT and in rare instances, may submit matters to the Secretaries of State and Defense for coordination and/or adjudication. (4) Commander, MNF-I will continue to set the priorities for OST training and direction of Iraqi Security Forces until the level of security and stability and the capabilities of Iraqi Security Forces allow Iraq to assume a lead role, at which time it may be appropriate to change directive authority over OST from MNF-Ito COM. (5) At that point, the OST will transition to an Office of Defense Cooperation (ODC) and the Ministries of Defense and Interior will resume command and control of all security forces in Iraq. The COM will then resume normal on- going security assistance support through the US Mission's Office of Defense Cooperation (ODC). Throughout these events, the MNF-T works closely with the US Mission and coalition I international partners to establish a secure environment in which diplomatic, relief and reconstruction activities can take place. (5) MNF-1 Management of the Green Zone and Support to Regional Sites: MNF-1 will establish a provisional Area Support group, called ASG Central, in the Green Zone. It will provide direct administrative and logistics support to the COM and general support to other tenants in the Green zone and will coordinate security within the Green Zone. The Commander, ASG Central, will also provide general base operations support to the Regional Sites in Basrah and AI Hillah. However, in the fixed Regional Team Sites, security requirements and plans will be coordinated by the MNF-1 Liaison Cell, provided by the supporting security unit commander, through the on-site Regional Security Coordinator (RSO) (Annex 0- Regional Teams). ASG Central will transition its responsibilities to the COM when a sufficiently permissive security environment allows the US Mission Iraq to assume normal operations. Until the Iraqi Government assumes responsibility for the Green Zone, a facilities management office will be established within the ASG Central Command to coordinate space allocation and tenancy for the COM and coordinate support for all tenants within the Green Zone. Because of the sensitive nature of space within the Green Zone and the competition by other nations for prime space, the COMIDCM will approve property allocations within the Green Zone. The Commander, ASG Central will prepare staff recommendations for the COM in such instances. COM will provide office space within the Annex Compound for ASG Central augmentees to the US Mission. A-7 (Change 1) FOR OFFICIAL USE ONLY ISCLOSURE UNDER FOIA 5 U. DO NOT RELEASE WITHO PLANNING TEAM Version 3.0 (6) Coordinating Efforts: The requirement to have all major stakeholders coordinate effectively is a challenge requiring both conceptual and physical interoperability. Interoperability must extend to the execution of all contracted relief and reconstruction tasks as well as normal diplomatic and governance matters in a way that advances US objectives and minimizes security risks. Frequent communication and coordination between coalition I international partner Embassies and donors is critical to building a free, democratic, and stable Iraq. It is expected that respective diplomats in Iraq, together with diplomats from multilateral organizations, will establish multiple inter- Embassy contact groups in Baghdad and probably in the provinces. Such groups would provide fora - and, where and when desired, coordination to discuss subjects of mutual interest, and provide a venue to compare and track progress. Notwithstanding the establishment of such contact groups on the ground, it is expected that respective diplomats' reporting channels would accord with usual sending state practice for foreign assistance and all other programs. (a) US Mission Operations Center (MOC). To achieve this, the COM, in coordination with MNF-I, establishes a joint/interagency US Mission Operations Center (MOC) in the Annex. This organization will oversee the daily implementation and execution of tasks and resolution of issues. It will serve as an emergency operations center to coordinate security preparations and response and coordinate security requirements in advance of execution. It will provide the COM and the MNF-1 with the same common operational picture of unfolding events. US Mission Regional Teams will report directly to the COM I DCM through the communications capabilities found in the MOC. The Regional Teams will also align with the local commanders and establish habitual relationships for coordination of US Mission and MNF-1 operations. (b) Joint Coordination Centers (JCC). The MNF-I will establish JCCs in the provinces for coordinating Iraqi and MNF-1 First Responders to incidents that occur locally. These centers will provide necessary additional platforms for coordinating and controlling events to include administrative movements of personnel under COM authority within Iraq. (c) Civil-Military Operations Centers (CMOCs). In each province, MSCs will establish CMOCs to function as security and logistics coordination centers for civil agencies, contractors and subcontractors, non-governmental organizations (NGOs) and international organizations (lOs), and UN missions. Establishment of CMOCs will ensure the ability to coordinate local government development, reconstruction, and support for elections. CMOCs will cooperate with Regional Coordinators and IPAOs for provincial activities. (d) Provincial Support Liaison Teams CPSLTs). In each province, MSCs will also establish PSLTs. These teams will function, in consonance with policies established by the US Mission through Regional Coordinators and subordinate to the wishes of the sovereign Iraqi government, to support development and growth of the provincial and local governments and to provide liaison between multinational forces, provincial governments, and US mission elements in the provinces. (e) The US Mission and the MNF-1 will achieve unity of effort in administration and logistics support through the Area Support Group concept as well as the IRMO and the PCO. b. Command and Control Phases: The establishment of this command and control structure will be conducted in the following phases: (1) Phase L Phase I began when the Transition Team arrived in Baghdad on 19 March 2004 and ended when the US Mission Advance Team was established on 1 June 2004. During this phase, to the extent possible, all elements in CPA that were to transition to the US Mission Iraq will have been configured consistent with their post-transition structure and lines of authority, e.g. the IRMO, Public Affairs Office, ASG Central, and the PCO. ASG Central will be in direct support of the US Embassy and general support of other US tenants. It will manage the Green Zone and provide logistics and administrative support to the MNF-I headquarters located in the Green Zone and general support to Regional Sites in Basrah and AI Hillah. (2) Phase II. Phase II began on 1 June and ends on 30 June 2004. DOS will have begun to establish the offices and activities integral to normal US Embassy designs in mid-May. By 30 June 2004, the embassy will be of sufficient size and staffing to support the Chief of Mission in the performance of his duties. Figure 3 on page A-5 depicts the US Mission command and control relationships that will be in effect on 30 June 2004, the beginning of Phase III. During Phase II, the reconfigured elements assigned to the US Mission Advance Team as "virtual" organizations will be under the management oversight of the DCM designee but will remain responsible to the Director, CPA and under his authority. ASG Central will be OPCON to MNF-I who is the supporting commander; the Director, CPA remains the chief of the supported agency but the DCM designee will have management oversight of the support requirements during this phase. (3) Phase III. Phase III begins on 30 June 2004 with establishment of the US Mission Iraq. Selected functions and personnel of the CPA will have been transferred to the US Mission Advance Team during Phase II as noted above. These functions will either be resident in temporary organizations (IRMO or PCO) or absorbed into the embassy staff on 30 June 2004. Phase III terminates with the end of the fiscal year on 30 September 2004. Since the reorganization of the elements of CPA is accomplished in Phases I and II, there will be minimal changes to the structure of the US Mission during Phase III, other than closing financial activities of the former CPA, adjusting contracts at the request of COM, and managing redeployment, all of which will be completed through the IRMO or PCO. ASG Central will continue to support the US Mission and other US Government tenants in the Green Zone. The US Mission will provide assistance to the Iraqi Interim Government and the UN as it prepares for national elections. Phase III ends on 30 Sep 2004. ( 4) Phase IV. Phase IV begins 1 October 2004. US Mission continues representing the interests of the US Government, and prioritization of rei ief and reconstruction efforts. US Mission plans for post-election transition. MNF-1 continues to establish and maintain a secure environment. As the US Mission develops the capacity to manage DO NOTRE -_.~~~~~~~~~~~~~EU ELEASE WITIIOUT AUTHORITY OF INTERAGENCY TRANSITION PLA administrative and logistics support, the embassy will incrementally assume appropriate functions from ASG Central until the US Mission provides all required support functions. Green Zone management functions performed by ASG Central will begin to be transferred to Iraqi government organizations, as appropriate. Phase IV ends with ASG Central drawing down as the US Embassy or Iraqi government assumes some adminllog functions as security environment allows. (5) Phase V. Phase V begins on or about 1 Feb 05, after a transitional Iraqi government is seated. During this phase, most of the projects funded by the Iraq Relief and Reconstruction Fund Public Law 108-106 will be completed, and the US Mission will begin to assume normal operations as security environment allows. During this phase, ASG Central will be deactivated as the US Mission assumes responsibility for its own administrative and logistics support and will hand off its Green Zone management functions to the Iraqi government. c. Tasks by Phase. (1 ) Phase I-II. (a) Department of State (1) Determine, in coordination with other agencies, the functions now perfonned within CPA to be retained in the US Mission, including those duties and responsibilities established by the COM. (2) Establish the US Mission Advance Team by 1 June 2004, initially staffed with sufficient personnel to develop the organizational framework and enlarge the embassy staff to an effective operational level by 30 June 2004. (3) Establish the Iraq Reconstruction Management Office (IRMO) as a temporary organization with the primary missions to oversee liaison support to the Iraqi ministries and to identify requirements and priorities for IRRF funded projects. The IRMO will have Title 5 USC, Section 3161 hiring authority. The tenure of each element within the IRMO will be determined by the COM. ( 4) Provide management oversight of designated "virtual" organizations during Phase II so that each will transition seamlessly on 30 June to the US Mission (IRMO, PCO, PAO) (5) Establish four regional team sites. (6) Provide 10 Foreign Service Officers (FSOs) to act as LNOs and Iraq Provincial Action Officers (IPAOs) in support ofMSC commanders. (b) Department of Defense (1) Reorganize current organizations supporting the CPA and other US Government agencies into an Area Support Group (ASG Central). ASG Central will be assigned to the MNF-I and continue to provide general A-10 (Change 1) FOR OFFICIAL USE ONLY UTHORITY OF INTERAGENCY TRA Version 3.0 EXEMPT FROM DISCLOSU OF INTERAGENCY TRANSITION PLAN administrative and logistics support to US government tenants in the Green Zone and will be in direct support of the US Mission until the Mission can support itself. (2) Begin on 1 June 2004 to establish the ASG Central, manage the Green Zone and coordinate security of the Green Zone with US government and contracted security organizations. (3) Provide, through the MNF-1, security for the Convention Center in the Green Zone. Commander, ASG Central will manage the Convention Center. ( 4) Continue to manage the Green Zone during Phases I through III, and transition support/coordination for the Green Zone to the US Mission or other organizations during Phase IV or V. (5) Establish the Project and Contracting Office (PCO), a temporary organization funded, staffed, and operated by the Army, with the forward staff under the authority ofthe COM. Establish the PCO forward as a "virtual" organization under the management oversight of the US Embassy Advance Team. If required, estabiish an MOA to support non-security related projects and acquisitions for which the COM has responsibility for determining requirements and establishing priorities of construction/acquisition. (6) Establish, through the Commander, MNF-1, requirements and priorities for PCO programs related to the training and equipping of Iraqi Security Forces. (7) Command through the Commander, ASG Central those military forces providing administrative and logistical support to the US Mission in the Baghdad/Green Zone region, until the US Mission is capable of sustaining itself. (8) Coordinate with the COM on facilities management and recommend space allocation within the Green Zone for COM approval. (9) Establish the Office of Security Transition (OST), a three-star command, within the MNF-1. OST will consist of the Coalition Military Assistance Training Team (CMATT) and the Civilian Police Advisory Training Team (CPATT). (lO)Assist DOS in coordinating the transfer of functions, personnel, and support from the CPA to the US Embassy and MNF-1. (ll)Provide one (1) Foreign Area Officer to each regional site and to each embedded team. Priority of fill to regional sites. (12)Provide one (1) PAO to each regional site and to each embedded team. Priority of fill to regional sites. (13)Provide Civil Affairs support to embedded State teams. EXE A-ll (Change 1) FOR OFFICIAL USE ONLY RE UNDER FOIA 5 U. (14)Establish CMOCs and PSLTs in each province. (1 5)Establish at least one JCC in each major city. (I 6) Provide a Civil Affairs LNO to regional team sites in AI Hillah and Basrah to coordinate activities between Regional Coordinators and multinational CMOCs and PSLTs. (2) Phase III. (a) Department of State. DOS exercises COM Authority over the US Mission Iraq. (b) Department of Defense Develop criteria, in coordination with DOS, to determine when it is appropriate to change directive authority over OST from MNF-1 to COM. (3) Phase IV-V. (a) Department of State. DOS exercises COM Authority over the US Mission Iraq (b) Department of Defense DOD transitions directive authority over OST from MNF-I to COM. d. Coordinating Instructions. (1) The CPA Inspector General (CPA-IG) is the only USG entity established by Congress with a unique Iraq reconstruction mission currently supporting the Administrator, CPA. The CPA-IG, whose mission is established to not exceed a six (6) month period following the disestablishment of the CPA, is under the general supervision of the SecDefbut also reports independently to the US Congress. (Annex C). (2) DOD/DOS establish command and control structures that will ensure transfer of sovereignty to the Iraqi Interim Government and establishment of an effective US Mission Iraq. Ensure an orderly, seamless transfer of CPA functions as identified in this plan from the former CPA to the US Mission Iraq in coordination with MNFI. (3) DOD/DOS develop personnel transition and redeployment plans for current CPA personnel and implement them by the end of Phase II or Phase III as required. (4) CENTCOMICOM ensure that every US government employee in Iraq is accountable either to the US Mission or the Combatant Commander. A-12 (Change 1) FOR OFFICIAL USE ONLY ISCL FOR OFFICIAL USE ONLY EXEMPT F~O~Ti§l I I I TDE? § I I $ '-· ~nt;~(S) JIQ NOr IU!LiiJJll!m ;; ilhOuHORITY OF INTERAGENCY TRA;; 1 PLA141 UF IS 1Y1ii'"' (5) DOS/DOD promulgate USG guidelines for screening standards of private security firms, protocol between MNFI/CPA and COM contractors, Rules of Force (ROF), weapons policies, and licensing of contractors performing non-COM activities. (6) In accordance with "State I Defense Memorandum of Understanding (MOU) on Security," dated December 16, 1997, DOS and DOD develop a Security MOA unique to Iraq. (7) Identify those functions within the current CPA that will transition as integral to the US Embassy, those functions that would be residual as a part of the US Mission such as IRMO, PAO or APCO, and those functions that should be eliminated. 4.Adm inistration and Logistics a. US Mission in the Green Zone will be supported by the ASG Central, under command of MNF-1, until the US Mission is fully capable of self-sustainment. b. Regional teams (Annex 0) will be supported per the Security and Support MOAs (Annexes SandT). 5.Co mmand and Control a. Command. As specified in this Annex. b. Signal. See Annex H ~Information and Communications Technology. lNG TEAM APPENDIX 1 TO ANNEXA TO OPLAN SOVEREIGN IRAQ 11 JUNE 2004 APPENDIX 1 --BASE SUPPORT OPERATIONS TN SUPPORT OF US MISSION- TO ANNEX A -COMMAND AND CONTROL References: A. 20 Feb 04 Secretary of Defense Memorandum on Iraqi Security Forces B. Foreign Service Act of 1980 P.L. 96-465 C. National Security Decision Directive Number 38, dated 2 June 1982 D. Observations and Recommendations for Security of State Department Assets in the Green Zone E. Map of Land Required for DOS Embassy Complex F. Annex A Command and Control G. Annex K Security H. Annex S - Security Services and Security Responsibilities Memoranda of Agreement between Department of State and Department of Defense I. Annex T - Support Memorandum of Agreement between Department of State and Department of Defense J. Area Support Group-Central Function Brief to BG West, MNFI-C4, 9 June 2004 l.S ituation a. Current Situation. As the CPA transfers authority to the US Mission Iraq, requirements for MNF-I security and support will not be eliminated. Expectations are that security will remain an even greater need during the transition period. The Green Zone was designed to protect both the seats of the Coalition Provisional Authority (CPA) and the Iraqi Interim Government. Security of the Green Zone remains critical to the successful operation of the US Mission Iraq, the operations of the Iraqi Interim Government, the missions and embassies of other multinational force partners, and the Multinational Force-Iraq (MNF-I). In this respect, the Green Zone resembles a small city in a combat zone, with requirements for many of the same complex support functions that agencies residing within a municipality require. This set of circumstances creates complexity for organizations which provide security and essential service support to the Chief of Mission (COM), other US Government activities, multinational force partners, the Iraqi Government, and other tenants in the Green Zone. It places a premium on establishing standard operating procedures. Other sites throughout Iraq have been established which provide essential security and support for CPA personnel who are performing various functions. Tactical commanders now perform the base operations I "mayoral" mission for these other sites. b. Enemy Forces. See Annex B Intelligence c. Friendly Forces. See Base Plan- OPLAN Sovereign Iraq d. Assumptions. A-1-1 FOROFFJCIA ( 1) The security environment will not change in the near future. (2) CPA is in transition and will need enhanced base support operations (BASOPS) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8) support. The US Mission will require similar, increased support in the near term. Base Support Operations units may be staffed with personnel from all services. Logistics Civil Augmentation Program (LOGCAP) Task order 44 will be extended to Sept 30, 2004 and will add US Mission as customer. A new LOGCAP task order will be developed to be effective on or before 1 Oct 2004. Funding will be available for US agencies to carry out missions and to fund support. The commander of the ASG Central will be responsible for providing direct support to the US Mission Iraq. 2.Mi ssion Not later than 15 June 2004, the Commander, MNF-I, provides base support operations and facilities management support to the CPA and the US Mission Advance Team within the Green Zone and at designated locations throughout Iraq. On 30 June 2004, MNF-I provides direct support to the US Mission Iraq and general support to other US Government tenants in the Green Zone, and to US Mission Regional Teams in Mosul, Kirkuk, AI Hillah, and Basrah, in accordance with the Support Memorandum of Agreement Between DOD and DOS. Be prepared to support other agencies I organizations as directed. 3.Exec ution. a. Concept of Operation: (1) Intent. The US Mission Iraq lacks the resources to provide essential administrative and logistical support at sites in the Green Zone or the four Regional Team sites in Mosul, AI Hillah, Kirkuk, and Basrah. The Support MOA (Annex T) signed by DOS and DOD outlines specific support requirements and responsibilities. By 15 June 2004, base support operations (BASOPS) support and services will transition from the current CPA Headquarters Support Group to a provisional Area Support Group (ASG Central) established in the Green Zone. ASG-Central provides logistical services and coordinates military support to the U.S. Mission Iraq, including the Regional Team sites. ASG-Central also manages the Green Zone installation and provides logistical support as directed. ASG Central specified tasks include: (a) Provide services to the US Mission Iraq that exceed the Mission's capabilities; (b) Provide support to US Mission regional team sites in Mosul, Kirkuk, al Hillah, and Basrah; A-1-2 FOR OFFICIAL USE ONLY NGTEAM (c) Coordinate rotary and fixed wing air transportation for the US Mission Iraq; (d) Coordinate military support requirements for US Mission Iraq with MNF-1; (e) Provide human resource management services to US Military personnel under COM authority and augment the US Mission Human Resource Office as directed; . (f) Provide select services to tenant MNF-1 units within the Green Zone; (g) Coordinate between the commander responsible for security and force protection of the security zone and tenants within the Green Zone; (h) Coordinate support to USG facilities within the Green Zone as directed; (i) Manage the operation of the Convention Center and al Rasheed Hotel; (j) Coordinate law enforcement activities within the Green Zone; (k) Coordinate military support for UN Mission Iraq as directed. ASG-Central R<rms 0/H % flU Mil 111 66 60 Civ 12 8 75 Total 123 74 60 13 PRE·DECISIONAL V7.1,1.1-D4 Figure 1. ASG Central (2) The Iraqi Interim Government and embassies of other multinational force and international partners will be located within the Green Zone and will be responsible for their own administrative and logistical support. As relationships normalize between the new Iraqi Government and the embassies of various nations, the Green Zone will gradually come under the management and control of the Iraqis, most likely after A-1-3 FOROFFI . D Version 3.0 FOROFFIC national elections are complete, a new government is formed and a Constitution is b. adopted. Phasing of base operations support to the US Mission. ( 1) (2) Phases I~ II. Phase I ended on 31 May 2004. Phase II involves efforts to restructure, replace, or redeploy CPA organizations and personnel in preparation for establishment of the US Mission. During Phase II, the CPA Headquarters Support Group (HSG) will have transitioned into the ASG Central, with additional capabilities added to ensure no loss of functionality within the Green Zone, with initial operational capability on 15 June 2004, and full operational capability (FOC) not later than 30 June 2004. ASG Central will be subordinate to the Commander, MNF-1, but will have the missions of direct support to US Mission Iraq facilities and general support to other U. S. Government tenants in the Green Zone. In addition to other responsibilities, the ASG Central Commander will manage the Convention Center and al Rasheed Hotel in the Green Zone. ASG Central will also provide general administrative and logistical support to the Regional Teams, using the most appropriate means, including continuation of existing LOGCAP support to these sites. (See Annex 0 - Regional Teams) Phase II ends on 30 June 2004 at which time the CPA dissolves, the US Mission is established and ASG Central achieves Full Operational Capability (FOC) under the command ofMNF-1, but in direct support of the US Mission Iraq and general support of other US tenants in the Green Zone. Phase Til. Phase III begins with establishment of the US Mission on 30 June 2004. MNF-I will provide logistics and administrative support to US Mission regional sites using current BASOPS organizations and capabilities in accordance with the Support Memorandum of Agreement between Department of State and Department of Defense (Annex T - Support MOA). ASG Central will continue adminllog support to the US Mission and other organizations and agencies within the Green Zone, and regional teams, as stated above. In addition, a facilities management office will be established within the ASG Central to coordinate space allocation and tenancy for the COM and coordinate similar support for all tenants within the Green Zone. Because of the sensitive nature and competition for prime space within the Green Zone, the COM will approve property allocation within the Green Zone and will receive staff analysis and recommendations from the Commander, ASG Central. COM will provide office space within the Annex Compound for ASG Central augmentees to the US Mission. Phase III ends on 30 Sep 2004. (3) Phase IV. Phase IV begins on 1 Oct 2004. ASG Central will continue to provide direct support to the US Mission in accordance with the Support MOA and be in general support for other Green Zone tenants and Regional Team (RT) sites. General administrative and logistics support to RT sites in AI Hillah and Basrah will be provided by ASG Central. Admin/log support to US Mission Regional Team sites in Mosul and Kirkuk may be transferred to ASG North and AST Kirkuk when the ASGs are activated. Phase IV ends with transfer of authority between the provisional ASG Central and the OIF 3 ASG that has been sourced for the Green Zone support mission. (4) Phase V. Phase V begins with the establishment of the Iraqi Transitional Government o/a 1 Feb 2005 and ends when the US Mission and regional sites are fully operational Version 3.0 and conditions in Iraq allow for normalized embassy operations. As the US Mission develops the capacity to provide necessary administrative and logistics support, ASG Central will gradually hand off functions to US Mission staff and draw down. c. Base Operations Support. BASOPS providers will determine the most effective means to satisfy US Mission support requirements, using competitive contracts, as well as military resources or LOGCAP based on the ASG Central Commander's assessment of the best way to meet support requirements. ( 1) Support will be provided to sites hosting the following types of agencies/organizations. (a) US Forces (Military and DOD civilian) (b) Multinational forces on US bases other than the Green Zone. (c) US Mission Iraq personnel, including: (1) DOS personnel and other US government employees in the US Mission (2) Agencies under COM not in DOS-controlled facilities (i.e., PCO, Department of Justice Program facilities) (3) Agencies under COM located in regional sites (Mosul, AI Hillah, Basrah, Kirkuk) (4) Personnel under COM embedded in MNF-I units (5) Multinational Force - Iraq personnel collocated with US Mission Iraq (d) Non-DOD contractors and NGOs funded by the US Government, per contractual agreements (e) MNF-1 in US Mission facilities (Embassy Annex) (f) Locally Engaged Staff (LES) (g) United Nations agencies as directed on a reimbursable basis, as directed (h) Official International Organizations, Foreign Nations, and US delegations as directed on a reimbursable basis, as directed (i) Government contractors per statements of work that specify the provision of certain government support (j) AAFES per pending MOU being established with MNF-1. (k) American Red Cross DISCLOSURE • LEASE WITHOUT AUTHORITY OF INTERAGENCY TRANSITION PLANNING Version 3.0 (2) (3) E URE UNDER E Willi OUT AUTHORITY OF INTERAGENCY TRANSITION PL Anticipated BASOPS functions in accordance with the Support MOA include (For detailed support to the US Mission, see Support MOA at Annex T): (a) Water (potable and non-potable) (b) Shower and Latrine Facilities (c) Billeting and Office Space with Power and Environmental Control Units (d) Laundry Services (e) Food Service Operations (f) Communications/Director oflnformation Management (DOIM) Functions (g) Force Protection Coordination (h) Non- Tactical Vehicle Motor Pool (i) Retail Fuel Support (j) Equipment Maintenance (1) Generators and other infrastructure (2) Vehicle (3) Office Equipment (a) Postal Operations (Appendix 2- Military Postal Support Operations in Support of US Mission to Annex H- Information and Communications Technology) (b) Power Generation (c) Property Accountability and Supply Operations (d) Vector Control (e) Waste Management (f) Morale and Welfare (g) AAFES (h) Class V support All mobile teams will be assigned permanent housing at one base and will require the same type of support provided to the regional teams at their base sites. Mobile teams must billet at existing military facilities when not in Green Zone. L ASE WITHOUT AUTHORITY OF INTERAGENCY TRANSITION PLANNING Version 3.0 ( 4) Mobile teams preparing for travel in Iraq must submit requirements for logistical support prior to leaving base camps. (5) Individuals and mobile teams away from base sites may receive a different level of support depending on the capabilities ofthe supporting base support activity. (6) Regional offices not located on a US military base will receive a modified level of support services. (7) Individual personnel or teams embedded with MNF-I units will receive the same level of support services as the MNF-I unit. (8) Coalition I Multinational Force - Iraq personnel authorized by the COM to collocate with US Mission Iraq will receive the same level of support services as USG personnel on a reimbursable basis. The Acquisition and Cross Servicing Agreements (ACSA) will be the vehicle for logistical support and services to coalition I international partners. (9) Certain non-DoD contractors and assistance providers funded by the US Government collocated with US Mission Iraq will receive support services on a reimbursable basis as agreed upon by COM and CDR USCENTCOM. (1 0) Support services to Locally Engaged Staff (LES) will be in accordance with US Mission LES compensation plan. ( 11) Support services to official delegations and other categories of visitors will be provided on a reimbursable basis. d. Tasks. (1) Department of State: (a) By 15 May 2004, essential service support required post 30 June 2004 will have been identified. (b) By 15 May 2004, security requirements beyond the capability of DOS necessary for effective security of all personnel under COM authority will have been identified. (c) Identify sites and support requirements for Regional Teams. (2) Department of Defense: (a) Not later than 15 June 2004, establish ASG Central and be prepared to provide admin I Jog support to specified regional team sites in accordance with Support MOA (Annex T- Support MOA). M DISCLOSURE UNDER EASE WITHOUT AUTHORITY OF INTERAGENCY TRANSITION PLANNING TEAM Yersion 3.0 EXEMPT OUT AUTHORITY OF INTERAGENCY TRANSITION PLANNING TEAM (b) MNF-1, in addition to other security requirements provide security for the Convention Center and the AI Rasheed Hotel in the Green Zone. Commander, ASG Central will manage the Convention Center and al Rasheed Hotel. (c) Provide external security to US Mission Iraq beyond that for which the Mission has internal capabilities. (d) MNF-1/ASG-Central will coordinate with COM and non-U.S. embassies to develop an access policy that provides for controlled access oflraqi nationals into the Green Zone. e. Coordinating Instructions. (1) DOD and DOS enter into a Memorandum of Agreement on Security no later than 8 June 2004. (Annex S Security MOAs). (2) DOD and DOS enter into a Memorandum of Agreement on Support no later than 8 June 2004. (Annex T- Support MOA). (3) For both security and support arrangements, COM and Commander, MNF-I establish a mechanism to ensure information sharing regarding movement of personnel under COM authority, movement or activities of US government contractors in Iraq performing work under IRRF and other programs, and other categories of personnel not under COM authority but performing work for which COM has responsibility. (4) DOS will continue to utilize Federal Deployment Centers at Ft. Belvoir and in Kuwait until September 30, 2004 for preparation and deployment of personnel. (5) DOS will use commercial logistical services when available for staff and programs; DOD will provide external logistic support as a contingency. The priority of effort will be determined based on availability and mission. (6) US and UN will develop a separate MOA for support UN missions in Iraq as required when the decisions are made as to the extent of UN participation and presence in Iraq. 4.Adm inistration and Logistics Per this annex. See Annex .I Logistics, and Annex T- Support MOA. S.Co mmand and Control a. Command. See Annex A Command and Control. ASG Central is assigned to MNF-1. The ASG Central Commander reports to MNF-I Chief of Staff, and supports the US Mission Iraq in accordance with the Support MOA. b. Signal. See Annex H- Information and Communications Technology. Version 3.0 CHANGE ITO APPENDIX 2 TO ANNEXA TO OPLAN SOVEREIGN IRAQ 2 JULY 2004 APPENDIX 2- US EMBASSY BAGHDAD OPERATIONS CENTER- TO ANNEX A- COMMAND AND CONTROL Annex A- Command and Control-to OPLAN Sovereign Iraq References: 1. S ituation a. Current Situation. (I) The US Government transferred sovereignty in Iraq to the Iraqi Interim Government (IIG) on 28 June 2004, and the Coalition Provisional Authority (CPA) ceased to function as the governing authority in Iraq. DOS Near East Affairs-Iraq (NEA-l) and the US Mission Iraq were established as the successor organization to CPA and are responsible for representing the interests of the United States, less the military function, which will be discharged by the Commander, Multinational Forces, Iraq (MNF-I). (2) The Department of State is implementing an organizational model for the US Mission Iraq similar to US missions in other countries but modified to meet the challenges in Iraq. However, Iraq presents a unique situation for the US Mission in that the United States and other multinational forces are engaged in daily security, stabilization and reconstruction missions. (3) The security situation in Iraq severely limits the movement and productivity of personnel. Facilities in Baghdad and particularly those in outlying regions, present particularly difficult security and logistics support challenges for the Chief of Mission (COM). Freedom of movement by land or air is constrained, productivity is reduced, and the speed at which the COM's missions are accomplished is constrained. ( 4) The unique challenges brought on by the security situation require equally unique command and control relationships as well as a capability for synthesizing information flow, monitoring implementation of plans, and responding with appropriate resources in a timely manner across both the military and civilian sectors. (5) The Multinational Force-Iraq (MNF-I) operates a joint operations center at its headquarters through which it exercises command and control (C2) over its forces and responded to emergency situations throughout its Area of Operation. This operations center supported the CPA in discharging similar operational responsibilities in what could be viewed as a Joint Operations Center for the MNF-I and the US Embassy. b. Enemy Forces. See Annex B -Intelligence c. Friendly Forces. See Base Plan- OPLAN Sovereign Iraq Version 3.0 d. Assumptions. (1) The Regional Security Coordination Office came under the management oversight of the US Embassy on 28 June, 2004. (2) MNF-1 headquarters remained in Camp Victory, Baghdad. (3) The US Embassy will have regional teams located in four locations in Iraq and five State embedded teams (SETs) with MSC headquarters. (Annex 0-Regional Teams) (4) MNF-1 will maintain Joint Coordination Centers throughout the country, as required, to manage first responder support to both Iraqi and multinational military and non-military personnel. (5) The current joint operations center (JOC}-the MNF-1 Commander's Situation Room (CSR}-in the Annex Compound in Baghdad is available for restructuring as the nucleus for a US Mission Operations Center. 2.Mi ssion The US Embassy Baghdad, supported by the MNF-1, establishes a Baghdad Operations Center (BOC) by 30 June 2004 providing an integrated operations center capability to coordinate and synthesize essential information elements between those under the authority of the COM and MNF-1, and other interagency organizations, and providing common situational awareness to senior leaders to work crises that require their attention and decisions. 3.Exec ution a. Concept of Operations. The COM and the Commander, MNF-1, will establish a US Embassy Baghdad Operations Center (BOC) in the Embassy Annex, collocating representatives ofthe US Embassy Executive Secretary, Political section, Political-Military section, and Regional Security Office with MNF-1 operations representatives. (See Embassy Organization Chart in Annex A Command and Control) The Regional Operations section will provide the initial staff and be the Embassy lead in the BOC. The BOC will be linked electronically with the MNF-1 operations center at Camp Victory, providing continuous communications in an operational culture of rapid planning and response, coupled with continuous situational awareness, decisive execution and continuous tracking of events. The BOC will provide the COM positive command and control of his Regional Teams and other US Embassy activities deployed outside the security areas of the Green Zone, the Regional Sites, and other locations he might establish. The intent of the BOC is to provide the COM and the Commander, MNF-1 a common awareness and understanding of threats, operations, and activities throughout Iraq; to ensure an integrated political/military approach to issue resolution and emergency response; and to provide a forum for coordinated resource-management decisions to support COM operations. b. Conduct of Operations. The BOC must reach initial operational capability (IOC) NLT 30 June 2004 and full operational capability (FOC) NLT 15 July 2004. Activities during the five phases will include: OSURE lJNDER EASE WilliOlJT AUTHORITY OF INTERAGENCY TRANSITION PLA Version 3.0 (1) During Phase II, MNF-1 and CPA, in coordination with the ITPT Baghdad and CENTCOM, will identify the key functions and responsibilities of and complete the plan for establishment of the BOC. Initial studies recommend the use of the current CSR as the nucleus for the reorganization into the BOC. The MNF-1 JOC Forward will retain an adequate staff and command and control suite to perform the mission and will form the nucleus of the US Embassy BOC. The US Embassy Executive Secretary and Regional Security Office will collocate with the MNF-1 Operations Staff to complete formation of the BOC and by doing so, will establish immediate and continuous coordination of operations between the COM and the Commander, MNF-1. (2) During Phase II, CPA Governorate Teams (GT's) at Basrah, AI Hillah, Kirkuk, and Mosul (See Annex 0- Regional Teams), under the management oversight of the Chief, US Mission Advanced Team, will transition to become the US Mission Regional Teams. The RSO will plan for and begin to assume management oversight of select security functions. The CPA will transfer necessary security functions to the BOC as required so that the US Mission Advance Team's oversight will flow seamlessly into continuous operations on 30 June 2004. CENTCOM will assist the MNF-1 and the US Mission Advance Team in developing the BOC into an organization capable of meeting the COM's command and control requirements and ensuring that the COM and MNF-1 activities are synchronized to the degree required. (3) Phase Ill. Establish the BOC NLT 30 June 2004 in the MNF-I Commander's Situation Room (CSR) in the Embassy Annex. The BOC will be a fusion of POL/Regional Ops, the Exec Sec, RSO, and POL-MIL. Representatives of these sections will comprise an on-call or full-time Embassy staff representation in the CSR depending on the situation/crisis at hand, for a BOC Forward. (a) CSR. The CSR will include the Embassy BOC Forward, MNF-1 Force Operations Center Forward functional staff (FOC FWD), the MNF-1 CMO National Civil- Military Operations Center (NCMOC FWD), other US Government agencies, and international organization such as the UN. The MNF-1 Chief of Operations (CHOPS) is the CSR officer-in-charge (OIC), who is responsible for establishing the common situational picture. (b) BOC. The BOC is responsible to the COMIDCM and the CHOPS and serves as an operations/coordination center. (See Figure 1) The size and scope of BOC is situational dependent, for routine or crisis action coverage. Personnel in the BOC review Embassy cable traffic, Intelligence reports, and operational reports of Regional Offices and State Embedded Teams (SETs). The BOC receives: (1) Coalition and interagency situational awareness from the CSR, FOC FWD, NCMOC and Interagency watch desks; (2) Status of security operations, infrastructure security, essential services, reconstruction efforts and election developments; ( 4) Phases III-V. Continue support to US Embassy operations until the requirement is terminated as conditions in Iraq warrant. Version 3.0 The Integrated US Mission & MNF-1 Operations Center BOC: Baghdad Operations Center CMOC: Civil-Military Operations Center FOC: Foroe Operatiom; Center (Camp Victory) MND: Multi-National Division NCMOC: National Civil-Military Operations Center RSO: Regional Security Office RSCC: Regional Secunty Coordination Center SDOC: State Department Operations Center Figure 1. The Integrated US Embassy & MNF-1 Operations Center c. Tasks. ( 1) Department of Defense. (a) Through the CPA, coordinate with the US Mission Advance Team to develop the BOC, and support the Advance Team in developing its standard operating procedures and concept of operations. Plan for collocation of assets as noted above and establish 30 June as the IOC for the BOC. (b) Establish work space for the BOC in CSR. (c) Establish hotline connectivity. (d) Ensure that dear lines of reporting, command and control are established so that the COM has positive C2 of activities under his authority outside the International Zone. (e) Ensure that the BOC is linked electronically to the MNF-1 Operations Center and with those multinational force I international partners as required. Ensure that the regional sites have reliable communications with the BOC. (2) Department of State. (a) Initiate efforts to define processes and procedures to include staffing, requirements, products and relationship with the DS Ops Center, Embassy Sections, Regional Offices & SETs and CHOPS. CLO LEASE WITHOUT AUTHORITY OF INTERAGENCY TRANSITION PLANNI Version 3.0 E WllHOUT AUTHORITY OF INTERAGENCY TRANSITION PLA (b) Establish 24/7 operations. POL/Regional Ops attend shift-change briefings. (c) Ensure that communications capability and procedures are in place to manage requests for security and emergency response to incidents involving assets under the COM authority. (d) Ensure that sufficient space is allocated within the Embassy Annex Compound or other facility for collocating the ExecSec, RSO, and MNF-1 CSR (or FOC FWD). (e) Draft and release cable to key DS and DOD entities outlining the establishment and responsibilities ofthe BOC. d. Coordinating Instructions. (1) The BOC will be integrated into a broader command and control net for the COM, including the Regional Sites. (2) Requirements to support multinational force I international partners through the BOC or the operations centers at the regional sites must be determined in Iraq. It is clear that multinational force I international partners will request participation in COM activities at both the Annex Compound such as being in the liaison groups to Iraqi Ministries and in the regional sites where they may request presence. (3) COM will assess, in coordination with the MNF-1 commander, requirement for PCO staff in the BOC to ensure integration of their construction activities as they relate to security, convoy control, etc. PCO will have its own operations center outside (% mile north) of the Embassy Annex, co-located with the NCMOC Main. Coordination will be through the NCMOC FWD inside the CSRIBOC. 4.Adm inistration and Logistics US Mission Iraq will be supported by the Area Support Group (ASG Central), until the US Mission is fully capable of self-sustainment. Support requirements for the BOC, as defined in Annex T Support MOA, will be met by the ASG Central. 5.Co mmand and Control a. Command. As specified in Annex A. b. Signal. See Annex H Information Technology and Communications. UN LEASE WITHOUT AUTHORITY OF INTERAGENCY TRANSITION PLA ANNEXBTO OPLAN SOVEREIGN IRAQ II JUNE 2004 References: ANNEX B -INTELLIGENCE A. Refer to USCENCTOM, Annex B to OPORD II, Dated 27 FEB 04 B. Mission Performance Plan FY 2006, U.S. Embassy Iraq 1. Situation a. General. For a more detailed or current intelligence assessment of political, military or security conditions related to Iraq, refer to available classified reporting. (1) Current Situation. Attacks directed at Multinational Force~Iraq (MNF"I), Chief of Mission (COM), and other personnel associated with the political and economic reconstruction oflraq continue to disrupt the overall relief effort and threaten the future political and economic stability oflraq. (2) Threat Summary. Stability in Iraq continues to depend upon a secure environment supporting reconstruction across all internal institutions and infrastructure. Economic progress is required to create more jobs, establish a middle class, provide opportunities for further growth and investment, and forward movement in the political, social, media, religious, and educational arenas. Since the majority of the country's population is urban, the pace of reconstruction in Iraq's cities is key to establishment of security and stability. Until such time as Iraqis take control of local and regional security and governance, opposition groups will continue attempts to garner support against what they readily call the "occupying forces." High unemployment and a disgruntled urban population create recruiting and information operations targets for Coalition I multinational force I international partner opposition groups, particularly insurgents. Banditry, smuggling and criminal activity continue outside the cities, and violence inside cities undermines stability. This combination presents the highest probability for ethnic, tribal or religious based conflict. The central Iraq area, known as the "Sunni Triangle" and encompassing the area from Baghdad north to Tikrit, and west to Ramadi, Fallujah and AI Qaim, poses multiple problems. Former area leaders reject the Joss of their stature. Disenfranchised Sunnis, from tribal groups to former military and security forces, are concentrated in this area, along with many other Sunnis who benefited under the past regime. The disenfranchised and former regime beneficiaries, who see no B-1 E RE UNDE WITHOlJT AUTHORITY OF INTERAGENCY TRANSITION PLA Version 3.0 R 5 ASE WITHOUT AUTHORITY OF INTERAGENCY TRANSITION P future for themselves as Iraq progresses will continue to oppose the Coalition I Multinational Force- Iraq (MNF-J). Former regime loyalists, extremists, terrorists, and criminals abound, and are mixed amongst a population that resents what it perceives of its future. Former Regime Elements (FRE) and extremists will play upon Sunni fears of becoming an oppressed minority. Until such time as a majority ofthe population in this area perceive and understand the meaning of a fair and representative future in Iraq, and see personal benefits in the new Iraq, they are unlikely to oppose FREs and opposition groups. While passive support continues, the challenge will be in convincing more of this population that they will benefit by turning in those who intend or have committed violence. Notably complicating the situation are the human factors of pride and honor. Many former military personnel (who do not necessarily embrace Saddam) consider themselves professionals and patriots. As Sunnis, they believe they are the rightful rulers and the true protectors oflraq. These former military, unable to protect Iraq from foreign occupation most likely believe their duty and honor (and their personal future) requires them to fight the Coalition I MNF-1. Additionally, these personnel do not comprehend "democracy." There is an affinity within this group for the original Ba'ath principles. Key to countering these "groups" participation in insurgency will be the provision of jobs, conveyance of political re-patriotism I democracy through observable actions, some participation in new Iraqi security forces, and engagement through tribal leaders. (3) Theater of Operations. The IRAQI Theater of Operations (ITO) is defined by the total airspace, land area, and boundaries of Iraq, Kuwait, Bahrain, Qatar, United Arab Emirates (UAE), Oman, Saudi Arabia, Jordan, Egypt, the Arabian Gulf, the Strait of Hormuz, the Gulf of Oman, those portions of the Arabian Sea and Indian Ocean within the USCENTCOM Area of Responsibility (AOR) (less Seychelles), the Gulf of Aden, the Bab el Man deb, the Red Sea, the Gulf of Suez, the Gulf of Aqaba, and the Suez Canal system. The ITO also includes (in coordination with Commander, US European Command portions ofTurkey and (in coordination with Commander, US Pacific Command Diego Garcia. The ITO also includes Combined/Joint Operating Area (CJOA) Somalia and CJOA Yemen. (4) Applicability. Refer to OPLAN Sovereign Iraq. b. Enemy Forces. Groups and individuals opposed to successful achievement of objectives by the Multinational Force Iraq (MNF-I), CPA and Iraqi leaders recognize that stability depends upon security. These groups and individuals will continue efforts to undermine security and prevent stability. FREs, Iraqi extremists and B-2 FOR OFFICIAL Version 3.0 jihadists, transnational terrorists, foreign fighters (FF), and criminals all seek instability. While these individual's and groups' ideologies are not common or fully synchronized, they do seek a common goal: departure of the US I MNF-I, and they view the war in a long term perspective. (a) Adding to the threat from these aforementioned groups are the competing interests and self-serving power struggles by those who desire to attain dominance outside the legitimate processes being instituted in Iraq. These latter individuals consist of corrupt clerics, criminal opportunists, revenge seekers, and disenfranchised Sunni's. The disenfranchised Sunnis view themselves as a "new minority" with little chance for representation in the developing political, economic or social infrastructure. While very few Iraqi's desire the return ofSaddam, within these various groups and individuals, such as the disenfranchised Sunnis and radical clerics of both radical Shi'a and Sunni faiths, violence and criminal activity are methods that will be used by some to achieve their own interests. (b) The Iraqi security forces~ Iraqi Intelligence Service (liS), Special Republican Guard (SRG), Special Security Organization (SSO), military and militia~that blended back into the population as Baghdad fell during major combat operations now comprise an element of the FRE opposition to the US I MNF-I presence. This activity is widespread in Central Iraq with an operational leadership that relies upon former military, tribal, and family clan associations either for safe-havens or direct network support. While Saddam was involved to an extent in the insurgency, since his arrest, Iraqi patriotism I nationalism, fueled by calls for Iraqis to expel the MNF-I and US personnel, have gained appeal. Fear of Zionist, Iranian and Kurdish and Shi 'a influence assists in the nationalistic zeal. These elements in many cases believe they are fighting for Iraq, with some believing that the true ideals of the Ba'ath party are the true way ahead for Iraq. The FREs and FFs collude to some degree, particularly in the financing arena and in the use of the FFs by the FRE. There are some indications younger former liS, SSO, and SRG officers are migrating into the Islamic extremist camps of Salifists and Wahabbists in the North Babil Province. An AI Qaida (AQ) presence is emerging as well, manifesting itself using the existing FF leaders, their networks, and factions within AQ to migrate over to the Zarqawi and Salifist movements in the North, Northwest, and potentially in Baghdad. (c) Violence that appears ethnically or religiously motivated can incite sectarian and tribal fault lines, thereby creating additional negative impacts on stability. Smuggling, common crime, revenge attacks, and black- marketeering all create criminal conditions that can result in further violence (in addition to their negative impact on implementation ofthe rule of law). Violence that leads to fractures in emerging Iraqi political leadership along B-3 5 RELEASE WITHOUT AUTHORITY OF INTERAGENCY TRANSITION P Version 3.0 2 8 5) RELEASE WITHOUT AUTHORITY OF INTERAGENCY TRANSITIO sectarian (religious, tribal or ethnic) fault lines presents a danger to achievement of US I MNF-1 objectives and the establishment of a free, representative, modern Iraqi state. c. Friendly Forces. See Base Plan OPLAN Sovereign Iraq d. Assumptions. (1) If the anti-US I MNF-1 propaganda and conspiracy theory rumors are not overcome, and, if the tribal structure and reintegration of former Ba' athists are ignored as part of the solution in reinstating security, FRE will continue to conduct attacks. Vehicle-borne improvised explosive devices (VBIED), rockets, and mortars are favored as "standoff' techniques. Complex attacks that combine deliberate targeting and pre-attack surveillance have been noted more frequently in Ar-Ramadi and Fallujah as MNF-1 forces seek to eliminate FRE and extremists cells in those cities. (2) Insurgents and terrorists will continue to expand their assassination and intimidation campaign against the Iraqi population members ofthe new government and ministries, and new Iraqi security forces, especially as the date for transition of authority approaches. The size of the insurgency can fluctuate over time, and does not require a large size force to evoke the impression of a well organized and capable resistance. The attackers can choose the time and target based on their perception of the conditions. FRE will continue to exploit anti-Western propaganda, will call upon the populace's loyalty to Islam and Iraq's history as a unifYing platform under a nationalistic I Islamist platform. Insurgents echo this sentiment in continued attempts to recruit new active members. (3) Terrorists seek to cause US I MNF-1 failure in Iraq as a precursor to failure in the overall Global War on Terrorism (GWOT) and the Middle East Peace Process (MEPP). By attempting to prevent the establishment of a free, representative, modern Iraqi state, external terrorist groups view Iraq as a decisive point in the GWOT and the MEPP. e. Limitations. Penetration of these insurgency "networks" will require timely and accurate intelligence and cooperation by key national, tribal and local governance representatives. Success will depend upon popular support, with Iraqi's taking control of and securing their areas. B-4 Version 3.0 2. Mission Support the stabilization, relief and reconstruction of Iraq through the provision of timely, coordinated intelligence to key US leadership; the Chief of Mission (COM) Iraq; the Commander, Multinational Force Iraq (MNF-I); and all subordinate agencies, commands, or organizations, as approved by the appropriate releasing authority. 3. Execution a. Concept of Operations. During the five phases ofOPLAN Sovereign Iraq, support intelligence requirements for US interests in Iraq through a tasking, processing, exploiting and disseminating system that allows for timely reporting; multinational force access, when appropriate; interagency coordination; and continuous intelligence and threat reporting from Iraq uninterrupted by troop rotations, organizational re-alignment, and the overall transition to Iraqi sovereignty. ( 1) Phases of Operations: Transition from US I Coalition management to a sovereign Iraq will take place in the five strategic phases identified in OPLAN Sovereign Iraq, and will be supported through these phases by intelligence collection and analysis assets from across the US Government as well as foreign government sources, when available. (2) Assessed Centers of Gravity (COG) during the five phases ofOPLAN Sovereign Iraq include: (a) Strategic Centers of Gravity. Iraq's strategic centers of gravity in post- regime Iraq are the perceived legitimacy ofthe Iraqi Interim Government; international public opinion; Iraqi popular support for the development of the new Iraqi government and tolerance of continued multinational force presence; economic development; and the ability of Iraqi institutions to take over responsibility for establishment and control of a stable and secure environment. Anti-MNF-1 Opposition Groups' Perception ofMNF-1 Strategic COGs. Anti-MNF-1 opposition groups perceive MNF-I strategic COGs as the MNF-1 public will to maintain presence and operations; the Iraqi population's support ofMNF-1 presence; and international provision of forces, resources, and funding. (b) Operational Centers of Gravity. Iraq's operational centers of gravity consist of its hub cities (Mosul, Kirkuk, Baghdad, Fallujah, Najaf, Basrah); developing regional economies; regional governance, and defeat of opposition groups. Other factors in a post-regime environment Version 3.0 SE WITHOUT AUTHORITY OF INTERAGENCY TRANSITION PLAN include: Tribal leadership; Shi'a Clergy in the south particularly Ayatollah Ali al-Sistani; and a historical emphasis on higher education. Iraq's challenges include: malcontents; the poor state of critical life support infrastructure; poor environmental health and safety conditions; competing interests of tribal groups; and a high percentage of unemployment. As the country rebuilds and faith in the new government increases, many of these challenges will gradually dissipate over time, or become strengths. Other keys to success include isolating the insurgents from their sources of strength (funding, weapons, explosives, command and control, and the population). Anti-MNF-1 Opposition Groups' Perception ofMNF-I Operational COGs. Anti-multinational force opposition groups perceive MNF-1 operational COGs as Iraqi support and participation in security and stability; stability, credibility of forces, and legitimacy of a new Iraqi government (regional and in Baghdad); and improvement oflraqi quality of life. (c) Anti-MNF-1 Insurgent and Opposition Groups' Centers of Gravity (COGs). There are multiple anti-multinational force groups in and outside Iraq, and, because they have different goals, objectives, and interests, it would be incorrect to define them all as one and the same for COGs. Anti-multinational force groups include die-hard FREs, hard core terrorists, foreign fighters coming to Iraq for the specific cause of fighting Westerners, internal Iraqi extremist groups (formed along various lines, such as those under hard-line Shi'a and Sunni clerics), disenfranchised Sunni's who see no hope for their future, revenge seekers and criminals. The common action of these various opponents is to attack troops, police, cooperating Iraqis, key civil servants, facilities and infrastructure, and members of the Iraq Interim Government, the UN and aid agencies. The vast quantities of explosives and weapons in Iraq have offered the means to attack: from small arms, rocket-propelled grenades (RPG), and shoulder fired surface to air missiles (SAM), to explosives for individual suicide bombers, roadside improvised explosive devices (lED) and VBIEDs. The common goal of these groups is to force the MNF-I to leave. However, the groups do not share a common ideology outside Islam, and no positive future end state for Iraq has been espoused to appeal to the population across Iraq. Rather, insurgents use fear as a "motivator" in the population. Terrorists and insurgents want continued instability. However, terrorists seek to ripen Iraq for entry into AQ' s regional caliphate while many Sunnis seek government (secular) dominance. Some Iraqi oppositionists believe the West's intentions are to subjugate Iraq and Islam to Western control of the region, and do not trust that Version 3.0 Iraqi's will be given control ofthe government, resources and country. Other Iraqi's, especially the impressionable, unemployed young males, are lured by the rhetoric and propaganda of hard-line clerics, and desire institution oftheir leaders in the political scene. Some Iraqi's have a sense of injured pride and pseudo-nationalism that leads them to actively oppose the multinational force, especially if family members were killed in the war, or, if they perceive security efforts as heavy- handed invasive tactics to repress their family, tribe, or area. b. Tasks. Phase I V. Department of State and Department of Defense. Support senior leadership and USG interests through the timely dissemination of intelligence. c. Coordinating Instructions. As appropriate, ensure close coordination between all concerned USG entities in the exploitation and dissemination of threat assessments impacting US interests in Iraq. 4. Administration and Logistics Not Applicable. 5. Command and Control Intelligence collection and analysis elements attached to standing organizations or commands in Iraq will report through standard channels associated with that element (see Figure 1, "Command and Control Relationships," in Annex A to OPLAN Sovereign Iraq). B-7 FOR OFFICIAL DONOTREL ANNEX C CHANGE ITO ANNEXCTO OPLAN SOVEREIGN IRAQ 2 JULY 2004 OFFICE OF THE INSPECTOR GENERAL OF THE COALITION PROVISIONAL AUTHORITY References: A. US Public Law 108-106 (2004) B. Inspectors General Act ( 1978) C. U.N. Security Council Resolution 1511 (2003) D. Law of Administration for the State of Iraq for the Transitional Period, dated March 8, 2004 E. CPA-IG Memorandum, dated April21 2004 on Security and Support F. Memorandum of Agreement between the Inspectors General, dated June 25, 2004 1. Situation. a. Current Situation. (I) As of I May 2004, the Office ofthe Inspector General Coalition Provisional Authority (CPA-IG) consists of35 professional staff (auditors, inspectors and investigators) in Baghdad and 48 staff in Washington, D.C. The CPA- IG established an active and significant presence in Baghdad. Increasing workloads are anticipated from CPA-IG's expanded coordination with fellow Inspectors General, audit agencies, key stakeholders, and the Congress. (2) The Congress established the Office of the Inspector General of the Coalition Provisional Authority (CPA) through Public Law 108-106, Section 3001. Pursuant to that statute, the CPA-IG "reports directly to and operates under the supervision of, the Administrator of the CPA" in order to promote economy, efficiency, and effectiveness in the administration of CPA programs and operations and prevent and detect fraud and abuse in such programs and operations involving the use of US-appropriated, Iraqi and other funds committed to Iraq relief and reconstruction efforts, by coordinating and engaging in audits, inspections, reviews and investigations. (3) Section 300l(i)(l) of Public Law 108-106 requires the CPA-IG to submit to Congress, no later than 30 March 2004 and every calendar quarter thereafter, a report summarizing the activities of the CPA-IG and the CPA. In accordance with that statute, the CPA-IG submitted the first mandated report C-1 (Change I) FOR Version 3.0 F6R 6FFI€Il\t; tfSfJ 6Pit;Y I!!XI!!l'flf'f Ji'R6M BIS€t;6Stlltill tJNBf.!ft F6:hlt 5 6.8.€. §551!(8,(5, 88 !'18T l*lbFiASE WITII8UT AUTII81lH'i 8F Il"ITFlll:t'kEililf'i€¥ TH:I':PISITI8N Pb/tNNINEi TEA!If on 30 March 2004. Additionally, in accordance with Sec. 3001(i)(3), CPA- IG is required to submit a semi-annual Report to Congress, under Section 5 ofthe 1978 Inspector General Act. (Reference B) (4) On 28 June 2004, the CPA-IG will begin operating in accordance with terms of Reference F. (5) The CPA-IG shall terminate six (6) months after the authorities and duties of the Coalition Provisional Authority cease to exist. (6) Chief of Mission Authority: Any US Government personnel not under the military commander in the region will be under the Chief of Mission's (COM) authority. b. Enemy Forces. See Annex B - Intelligence c. Friendly Forces. See Annex A- Command and Control · d. Assumptions. (l) The CPA-IG will remain a DOD entity under the general supervision of the Secretary of Defense, consistent with Reference A. (2) US Mission Iraq constitutes the successor US government entity to the CPA under the provisions of Section 2208 of the Emergency Supplemental Appropriations Act for Defense and for the Reconstruction of Iraq and Afghanistan, 2004 (Reference A). (3) After 28 June 2004, the CPA-IG will be provided with appropriate and adequate office space at the central and field office locations of the CPA-IG, together with such equipment, office supplies, and communications facilities and services as may be necessary for the operation of such offices, and shall provide necessary maintenance services for such offices and the equipment and facilities located therein. (4) It is the position of the CPA-IG that Public Law 108-106 (Reference A), UNSCR 1511 (Reference C), Transitional Administrative Law (Reference D), and CPA Regulations and Orders provide sufficient legal authority to allow the CPA-IG to accomplish its mission, as defined in Reference A, after 28 June 2004. 2. Mission Coalition Provisional Authority Inspector General provides for the independent and objective conduct and supervision of audits and investigations relating to the 5 ASE WITHOUT AUTHORITY OF INTERAGENCY TRANSITION Version 3.0 programs and operations of the CPA to promote economy, efficiency, and effectiveness in the administration of such programs and operations; and prevent and detect fraud and abuse in such programs and operations involving the use of US appropriated, Iraqi and other funds committed to Iraq relief and reconstruction efforts. On 28 June 2004, the CPA-IG will cease reporting to the CPA and continue under the general supervision ofthe Secretary of Defense. 3. Execution. a. Concept of Operations. (1) The CPA-IG will continue to pursue an aggressive work plan through 30 June and beyond, making every effort to complete high-priority reviews and audits in FY-04. The CPA-IG established 16 preliminary focus areas which include the following potential areas of risk: (a) Security concerns and costs (b) CPA transition to Iraqi authority (c) Funding controls (d) Contracting irregularities (e) Logistics management and the safeguarding of assets (f) Acquisition planning and management (g) Iraqi involvement in reconstruction (h) Interagency relationships (i) Use of Continental US (CONUS) contracts for intended purposes (only ifiRRF or issued by CPA/PMO) U) Use of US Army support contracts (LOGCAP) (only if IRRF or issued by CPAIPMO) (k) Other focus areas include these potential areas for process improvement: ( 1) Corporate governance (2) Contracting processes Version 3.0 (3) Transition planning (4) Human resource management (5) Program management (2) Conduct of Operations: The five phases of OPLAN Sovereign Iraq will not affect the CPA-IG office transition. (a) Phases I and II, leading up to the transfer of sovereignty to Iraq on 30 June 2004, will be an intense work period for the CPA-IG staff. During Phase II, the Chief (DCM designee), US Mission Advanced Team, will establish initial operations on 1 June 2004. He will provide management oversight of the CPA-IG but under the authority of the Administrator, CPA until30 June 2004. (b) Phase III begins on 28 June 2004 with establishment of the US Mission Iraq. The CPA-IG falls under the direction, coordination and supervision of the COM in addition to the general supervision of the Secretary of Defense, consistent with Public Law 108-106. b. Tasks (1) Department of Defense (a) Department of the Army continues to act as the executive agent for CPA-IG for human capital and financial management. (b) Provide CPA-IG-Forward with logistics, support services, including provision and billeting, and funding, through Area Support Group (ASG) Central. (c) By 15 May 2004, transition plans will have been completed for the CPA-IG's operations post 30 June 2004. All activities will have been completed by 1 June to ensure continuity of programs and a smooth transition from CPA admin/log support to full support from the US Mission on 30 June 2004. c. Coordinating Instructions. CPA-IG will coordinate with DOS OIG and other OIG with Iraq relief and reconstruction oversight missions related to areas of responsibility for audits, inspections and investigations to avoid duplication of effort in accordance with C-4 (Change 1) Version 3.0 References A and F. CPA-IG coordination will primarily occur through the Iraq Inspector Generals Council. 4. Administration and Logistics. a. Material and Services. CPA will provide computers, desks, Internet support, etc. until the US Mission Iraq is established on 30 June at which time COM will assume that responsibility. b. Personnel Support. Hiring and funding of CPA-IG staff will be managed and provided by the CPA-IG. The Department of the Army will continue to be the executive agent for human capital and financial management to the CPA-IG after 30 June 2004. CPA-IG-Forward personnel will be housed by the US Mission Iraq. 5. Command and Control. Per Reference A, on 30 June 2004 and thereafter, the CPA-IG, will be under the general supervision of the Secretary of Defense. Prior to 30 June, the CPA-IG will report to the Administrator, CPA. C-5 (Change 1) Version 3.0 ANNEXO TO OPLAN SOVEREIGN IRAQ 11 JUNE 2004 References: ANNEX D- CHIEF OF MISSION A. Foreign Service Act of 1980 (P.L. 96-465) B. National Security Presidential Decision 36, dated 11 May 2004 C. President's June 30, 2003 Letter oflnstruction to Chiefs of Mission D. Foreign Affairs Handbook, Section 12 FAH-7 H-700 E. Diplomatic Security Act (P.L. 99-399) F. Security MOA between DOD and DOS, Annex S. G. Support MOA between DOD and DOS, Annex T. 1. Situation a. Current Situation. (1) The Coalition Provisional Authority (CPA) presides as the governing authority of Iraq, providing security and administrative functions under the authority of United Nations Security Council Resolutions (UNSCR) 1483 and 1511. This Annex supports the Operations Plan to transfer sovereignty to the Iraqi Interim Government (IIG) and establish the US Mission. This will be done in five phases. Phase I is the period from 19 March through 30 May at which point the US Mission Advance Team is in place. Phase II is the period of 1-30 June when the US Mission is developed and established on 30 June. Phase III is the period through the end of FY 04, and Phase IV goes through the Iraqi Elections in Jan 05. Phase V encompasses the period from the election until stability returns to Iraq. (a) At the return of sovereignty to Iraq on 30 June 2004, the CPA Baghdad closes and the US Mission Iraq is officially operational as outlined in the OPLAN Sovereign Iraq. During Phases I and II ofthis plan, CPA will organize the Iraq Reconstruction and Management Organization (IRMO), to include technical and senior liaisons, needed after trf!,nsition. Similarly, CPA will align and re-designate the current Program Management Office as the Project and Contracting Office (PCO). Both activities will be established as "virtual" organizations under the management oversight of the Chief(DCM designee), US Mission Advance Team. (b) During Phase II (I June 2004), IRMO and PCO will be transferred as "virtual" organizations to the US Mission Advance Team but will remain in direct support (OS) ofthe CPA. The Administrator will be Version 3.0 responsible for the performance of missions of both organizations until 30 June 2004. The Chief of Mission (COM) will have full responsibility for the direction, coordination, and supervision of the IRMO and operational control of the PCO, a temporary organization funded, staffed, and operated by the Army, under the authority of the COM after 240030 June 2004. (2) Applicability. OPLAN Sovereign Iraq. b. Enemy Forces. Enemy Forces: Terrorist threat to the relief and reconstruction effort remains the primary factor placing the successful completion of the relief and reconstruction effort at risk. (Annex B - Intelligence) c. Friendly Forces. See Base Plan- OPLAN Sovereign Iraq d. Assumptions. (1) Sovereignty oflraq will be established as of30 June 2004 and the responsibilities and authorities of the Coalition Provisional Authority will terminate concurrently. (2) The United States Mission will be accredited to the IIG. 2. Mission The United States Mission Iraq will open on 30 June 2004 with appropriate staff and organizations to enable the Chief of Mission to implement effective USG policies and to achieve US objectives in a sovereign Iraq. The Chief of Mission, on behalf of the President of the United States and under the guidance of the Secretary of State, shall be responsible for the direction, coordination and supervision of all US government employees, policies and activities in Iraq, except those under the command of the Regional Combatant Commander, or employees seconded to an International Organization. All executive branch agencies under COM authority, and every element ofthe Mission, must keep the COM fully informed at all times of their current and planned activities. 3. Execution a. Concept of Operations. Effective, 30 June 2004, the Chief of Mission will serve as the President's personal representative in Iraq. In addition to its other functions, US Mission Iraq will provide mentoring and governmental assistance to the government of Iraq, using resources from the IRMO and the PCO, while coordinating security requirements with the Commander, Multinational Force-Iraq (MNF-1). Version 3.0 EXE U 5 'WITHOUT AUTHORITY OF INTERAGENCY TRANSITION P (1) Conduct of Operations. The US Mission will carry out traditional embassy functions, taking into account the unique situations and missions in Iraq. The Mission will be staffed with personnel from those USG agencies whose responsibilities require a presence in country. b. Tasks. (1) Phases I and II (a) Department of Defense (1) Determine post transition internal organizations and staffing levels for the Area Support Group (ASG) Mission, including structure, hiring authority, and numbers of authorized personnel, military and civilian. (2) Determine post transition internal security organizations and support to the COM and establish command and control procedures to sustain at least the current level of security for COM after 30 June 2004 (See Annex S - Security MOA). (3) Determine and coordinate space requirements for DOD personnel within the COM facilities. (4) CPA supports the Chief(DCM designee), US Mission Advance Team, in planning and supports transfer of management oversight of functional and operational responsibility of select missions to the US Mission Advance Team prior to 30 June 2004. Functions remain under the command of the Administrator through 30 June 2004. (b) Department of State (1) Determine staffing levels for all US Government activities in Iraq under Chief of Mission authority. Review and make determinations on NSDD 38 staffing requests no later than dates listed below. In coordination with CPA, develop pre-transition flow ofDOS personnel into Iraq. (2) Determine post-transition internal organizations and staffing levels for the US Mission Iraq, including structure, hiring authority, and numbers of authorized personnel by 30 April 04. Version 3.0 ASE WITHOUT AUTHORITY OF INTERAGENCY TRANSITION L (3) Determine post transition internal organizations and staffing levels for the IRMO in Baghdad and in Washington, DC, including structure, hiring authority, and numbers of authorized personnel. (4) Establish systems for financial management with particular emphasis on contract management and reimbursements consistent with DOS policies. (5) The COM will establish appropriate communications to support the US Mission throughout Iraq (2) Phases III through V. Implement actions to achieve US Mission Iraq cited in paragraph 2. COM serves as the President's personal representative in Iraq. In addition to its other functions, US Mission Iraq will provide mentoring and governmental assistance to the Government of Iraq, using resources from the IRMO and the PCO, while coordinating security requirements with the Commander, MNF-1. c. Coordinating Instructions. (I) IRMO will be established by the President under DOS as a temporary organization authorized by National Security Presidential Directive 36. IRMO will manage those CPA functions and personnel under the authority of the COM deemed mission essential after 30 June 2004. IRMO will be comprised primarily of senior and technical liaison personnel and supporting staff, providing expertise and operational assistance to Iraqi ministries. The IRMO Director will serve in an oversight capacity and report to the COM, through the Deputy Chief of Mission (DCM). (2) Funding. Title 5, USC, Section 3161 appointees and detailed Embassy sections I agencies (e.g., ministry liaisons, PAO personnel, etc.) will be funded from the 1% IRRF budget. (3) DOD I US Army will establish the PCO as a temporary organization under COM authority to provide acquisition and program management support to the US Mission, for execution of contracts funded under the supplemental appropriations, using Title 22 authority through the US Army's Project and Contracting Office (PCO), a temporary organization funded, staffed, and operated by the Army, with the forward elements under the authority of the COM. Following the intent to be fully operational on 30 June 2004, the PMO will be re-designated as PCO on 1 June 04 as a "virtual" organization but continue to work within the CPA. On 1 June, it will transition to the US Mission Advance Team and be under the management oversight of the Chief (DCM designee) but be responsive to the priorities of the Administrator, D-4 CPA, through 30 June 2004. The intent is that the "PCO" would work under the management oversight of the US Mission Advance Team, during the month of June so that the transition on 30 June is seamless. COM will set requirements and priorities for all non-security-related requirements in his oversight of Iraq Relief and Reconstruction Fund (IRRF) programs which will be followed by the PCO. Commander, NINF-I will set requirements and priorities for all security-related requirements to be followed by PCO and will continue to establish and maintain a secure environment. ( 4) Coalition partners. The US Mission will work with the embassies of other coalition partners to advance coalition objectives in Iraq. 4. Administration and Logistics a. Security. The Chief of Mission will provide internal security for the sites under his direct control through coordination between the Mission's Regional Security Officer, and the Commander, MNF-1. The COM and MNF-I commander will establish a US Mission Operations Center (MOC) to assist in coordination and management ofthe USG Regional Teams, MNF-I forces, and US Mission Iraq, This will be done in consultation with coalition, Iraqi and other international forces and organizations in order to ensure an integrated approach to issue resolution throughout Iraq. The COM will also coordinate with the Commander, MNF-I, for other security requirements. (Annex A Command and Control) b. Logistics. Some logistics and administrative support will be provided by the Commander, MNF-1, through the Area Support Group Central (ASG) subordinate to the MNF-I. The ASG will support the COM until the US Mission is fully operational in a stable Iraqi environment. (Annex T- Support MOA) c. Finance. During the transition period leading up to 30 June 2004, DOD and DOS will complete analysis and transfer of residual CPA operating budgets to the US Mission, effective 30 June 2004. 5. Command and Control a. As of 30 June 2004, the Chief of Mission will have full responsibility for the direction, coordination, and supervision of all United States Government executive branch employees in country, regardless of their employment categories or location, except those under command of the Commander, MNF-1 or on the staff of an international organization. He will report to the President through the Secretary of State. All executive branch agencies under COM authority, and every element of the Mission, must keep the COM fully informed at all times oftheir current and planned activities. D-5 Version 3.0 b. The Administrator, CPA will retain his full responsibilities and authorities through 30 June 2004. c. The COM will establish appropriate communications to support the US Mission throughout Iraq. D-6 Version 3.0 APPENDIX 2 TO ANNEXDTO OPLAN SOVEREIGN IRAQ 11 JUNE 2004 References: APPENDIX 2- LEGAL TO ANNEX D- CHIEF OF MISSION A. U.N. Security Council Resolution 1483 (2003) B. U.N. Security Council Resolution 1511 (2003) C. U.N. Security Council Resolution 1546 (2004) D. Law of Administration for the State of Iraq for the Transitional Period, dated March 8, 2004 E. 22 U.S.C. §3927 and President's Letter of Instruction F. CPA Website: http://www.cpa.gov/cpa documents.html G. NSPD-ZZ, Subject: USG Operations in Iraq H. NSPD-YY, Subject: US Assistance to the Iraqi Special Tribunal 1. S ituation a. Current Situation (1) Legal Authority for CPA Operations. (a) United Nations Security Council Resolutions (UNSCR). It is the position of the US Government attorneys working group that language in UNSCR 1511 requiring "all necessary measures" is sufficient to allow the Multinational Force to accomplish its mission after 30 Jun 2004. (b) The Law of Armed Conflict (LOAC). LOAC will continue to apply after 30 June 2004. (c) Transitional Administrative Law (TAL), and CPA Regulations and Orders. Article 26(C) of the Transitional Administrative Law (TAL), signed by the Governing Council on 8 Mar 2004, provides that the laws, regulations, orders and directives issued by the CPA "shall remain in force until rescinded or amended by legislation duly enacted and having the force of law." CPA Order Number 17, Status of the Coalition, Foreign Liaison Missions, Their Personnel and Contractors, addressing privileges and immunities for coalition personnel and contractors, and CPA Order Number 16, Temporary Control of Iraqi Borders, Ports and Airports, providing exit and entry authority for Coalition personnel and contractors, and CPA Order Number 49, Tax Strategy 2004, exempting Coalition personnel and foreign contractors from tax or similar charges in Iraq, inter alia, currently protect USG personnel and their contractors operating in Iraq. These orders will remain in effect after June 30, unless or until rescinded or amended by duly enacted legislation. (d) MNF-lraqi Security Arrangements. Article 59 of the TAL provides that the MNF's rights and obligations under UNSCR 1511 shall govern the MNF's activities pending the entry into force of binding international agreements regarding the activities ofthe MNF with the elected Iraqi Transitional Government. Version 3.0 (2) Chief of Mission Authoritv. Any USG personnel not under the command of the military commander in the region or on the staff of an international organization wi II be under the Chief of Mission's (COM) authority pursuant to Reference D. b. Enemy Forces. Terrorist threats to the relief and reconstruction effort remain the primary factor placing the successful completion of the relief and reconstruction effort at risk. (See Annex B ·Intelligence). c. Friendly Forces. The following USG personnel and assets in Iraq are currently providing legal support to USG operations. Additional USG personnel and assets providing legal and law enforcement advice, training, or support to the Government of Iraq are described in Annex P- Justice. (1) CPA Office of General Counsel. Currently there are 24 attorneys working in the Coalition Provisional Authority (CPA) Office of General Counsel (OGC). The OGC consists of two Section 3161 appointees, seven detailees from other Federal Agencies, ten military attorneys (US, UK and AUS), one contract attorney (Bearing Point) and four Iraqi attorneys. The OGC is supported by teams of attorneys in the Departments of Defense, State, Treasury, Commerce, Justice and the NSC. (2) PMO/PCO. Army contract law attorneys within the current PMO provide legal advice on contracting and procurement issues. (3) CJTF~7/MNF-I. Judge Advocates within this command provide legal support to the command across all issues. These attorneys are neither under COM authority nor the supervision or coordination ofthe US Embassy Office of the Legal Adviser. d. Assumptions. The CPA wilt dissolve no later than 30 June 2004, following the transfer of full governance authority to the Iraqi Interim Government. The legal support required by the US Embassy, Baghdad, can best be provided from Washington agencies through a legal office headed by an attorney from the Department of State, and comprised of lawyers detailed from the Department of Defense and Iraqi national attorneys. 2.Mi ssion Provide legal advice to the COM and Mission personnel and oversee coordination among legal staff under COM authority as necessary to ensure a common position on issues of common interest. 3.Exec ution a. Concept of Operations. (1) The COM will establish within the US Embassy an Office of the Legal Adviser (OLA), which will be headed by the Legal Adviser to the COM. The OLA will assume its responsibilities on 1 July 2004. The OLA will provide direct support to the COM and Version 3.0 will be the COM's source of legal advice and assistance. The Legal Adviser will supervise all members of the OLA. (2) Although the CPA's legislative function will end when governance authority is transferred to the Iraqi Interim Government, the OLA will support the COM's continuing need for: (a) Counsel to the COM and Mission personnel on all legal issues affecting their responsibilities. (b) Scope of application of applicable Iraqi, U.S. and international law, including relevant United Nations Security Council resolutions, in relation to U.S. Mission activities and U.S. policy objectives in Iraq. (c) Counsel on the application ofthe Transitional Administrative Law and its Annex (See Reference C). (d) Interpretations ofthe regulations, orders and directives that CPA promulgated during the occupation (including those applicable to the upcoming election) and the authority by which they were issued. (e) Legal advice regarding the authorities and responsibilities of the various USG agencies and departments operating in Iraq under COM authority. (f) Continuing legal support for the negotiation of agreements with the new Iraqi government that may be necessary or desirable (e.g., agreements regarding diplomatic property, privileges and immunities, and bilateral debt). (g) Traditional embassy legal issues resulting from commencement of operations (e.g., lease and property issues, COM authority). (3) The Director, Project and Contracting Office (PCO), will be advised by PCO legal staff. This advice will focus on technical contract law issues and other administrative law advice necessary to complete the mission. Although the PCO will follow the priorities and requirements of the COM, and will be under COM authority, the office will have dedicated legal staff because of the unique technical aspects of contract law. PCO must consult and coordinate with OLA prior to providing any legal advice to the COM or Mission personnel. (4) The Senior Department of Justice (DOJ) Representative coordinating all DOJ programs in Iraq on behalf of the COM, will be advised by DOJ legal staff dedicated to Iraq DOJ program teams. DOJ must consult and coordinate with OLA prior to providing any legal advice to the COM or Mission personnel. (5) The General Counsel to the CPA (GC-CPA) will continue to provide legal advice to the CPA through 30 June 2004. Some personnel from this office may transition to the OLA or its precursor before or on 30 June 2004. b. Tasks. Version 3.0 (I) Phases I and II. (a) CPA. ( 1) Identify which members of the GC-CP A staff are willing I appropriate to transition to the US Mission and obtain approval of these personnel with the Department of State not later than 15 May 2004. (2) Determine NLT 15 May 2004 which functions and responsibilities should transition to the US Embassy Advance Team as of 1 June 2004. (3) Establish a plan NLT I5 May 2004 to retain or release remaining GC-CPA staff, including a redeployment plan. (b) Department of Defense. (I) Not later than 1 May 2004, identify contract attorney staffing requirements for PCO thru 30 June 2004. (2) Not later than I5 May 2004, determine contract attorney staffing needs for PCO post 30 June 2004. Recruit individuals, as required. (c) Department of State. (I) Not later than I June 2004, define composition of OLA, and reach agreement with agencies providing detailees. (d) Departments of Treasury and Commerce. (I) Continue to provide detailees as required to GC-CP A. (2) Phases III, IV, and V. (a) Department of Defense. Provide detailees as required to OLA in accordance with interagency agreement with DOS. (b) Departments of Treasury and Commerce. Provide detailees and technical assistance as required to OLA in accordance with interagency agreement with DOS. (c) Department of State. Establish OLA. c. Coordinating Instructions. (I) Redeployment plans for all personnel must be coordinated with CPA personnel office. (2) The Legal Adviser supervises the provision of all legal advice to the COM and other Mission personnel. The Legal Adviser oversees coordination among legal staff under COM authority as necessary to ensure a common position on issues of common interest. D-2-4 E 5 WITHOUT AUTHORITY OF INTERAGENCY TRANSITION Version 3.0 (3) The Legal Adviser and legal adviser counterparts, including the MNF-1 Staff Judge Advocate, will coordinate on a regular basis as necessary to ensure a common position on issues of common interest. 4.Adm inistration and Logistics a. This transition will be supported by the CPA, the Departments of Defense and State, and other US Government agencies as necessary. b. OLA. Workspace and life support for OLA will be provided by COM. c. PCO. Legal staff for PCO will receive logistical support from PCO. 5.Co mmand and Control a. The Legal Adviser shall report to the COM. Technical oversight will be under the Legal Adviser to the Secretary of State. b. Technical supervision for the DOJ legal staff will be provided by DOJ. This staff will coordinate any legal opinion on an issue with policy consequences or with implications for other agency equities with the OLA in advance. c. Technical supervision for the legal staff ofPCO will be provided by DOD (Army). This staff will coordinate any legal opinion on non-technical matters_with the OLA in advance. d. In the case of differing legal opinions and pending resolution in Washington, the views of OLA will govern in matters under COM authority. Version 3.0 EXE llHOUT AUTHORITY OF INTERAGENCY TRANSITIO ANNEXETO OPLAN SOVEREIGN IRAQ 11 JUNE 2004 ANNEX E-ORGANJZA TIONS, MANPOWER AND PERSONNEL ADMlNISTRA TION References: A. JCS RJB 1-0, 19 Nov 98, Doctrine for Personnel Support to Joint Operations, Unclassified. B. CJCSI 1301.01C, 1 Jan 04, Individual Augmentation Procedures, Unclassified. C. CJCSM 3150.13, 1 Aug 99, Joint Report Structure - Personnel Manual, Unclassified. D. Title 5, United States Code. E. Title 5, Code of Federal Regulations. F. US Office of Personnel Management, Guide to Processing Personnel Actions, undated but available at www.opm.gov. G. National Security Presidential Directive Number #36, United States Government Operations in Iraq, 11 May 04. H. DOD I 1400.32, DOD Civilian Work Force Contingency and Emergency Planning Guidelines and Procedures, 24 Apr 95 l.S ituation a. General. (1) (2) (3) The Coalition Provisional Authority (CPA) has a personnel management system that maintains accountability for personnel assigned and detailed to CPA in Baghdad or Washington, DC. The current CPA workforce is made up of DOD uniformed service members and· civilian employees, including personnel appointed under the provisions of title 5, United States Code (U.S.C.), section 3161 ("3161 personnel"), civilian employees detailed from other agencies including the Department of State, and personnel from the Coalition I international partners. Contractor personnel also provide services and support to the CPA. The provisions of 5 U.S.C. 3161 allow the temporary hiring of US personnel as well as non-reimbursable detail of employees from other Federal agencies into CPA since CPA constitutes a "temporary organization" under that statute. The current tour of duty for US civilian employees in Iraq, including detailees and 3161 personnel, has generally been from 3-6 months. However, most 3161 personnel have been appointed for a period not to exceed 18-months, which may either be extended or shortened depending on CPA requirements. ( 4) Lack of housing and a stable security environment have been problematic in recruiting the numbers and quality of personnel needed to occupy critical positions within the CPA. These conditions may persist for the foreseeable future. E ~R:E~U~N~~~~~;;~;;~~~~~~ WITHOUT AUTHORITY ~F INTERAGENCY TRANSITION PLA b. Enemy Forces. See Annex B- Intelligence c. Friendly Forces. See Base Plan- OPLAN Sovereign Iraq d. PCO. The Project and Contracting Office (PCO) was established within the DOD by ·Reference Gas a temporary organization to which the provisions of 5 U.S.C. 3161 apply. e. IRMO. The Iraq Reconstruction Management Office (IRMO) was established within the DOS by Reference Gas a temporary organization to which the provisions of5 U.S.C. 3161 apply. f. CPA I IG. The CPA IG, also a temporary organization to which the provisions of 5 U.S.C. 3161 apply, will become the IR-IG on 30 June 2004 (See Annex C). g. Assumptions. (I) The transition to Iraqi sovereignty will take place on 30 June 04. (2) Sufficient funds will be available in each fiscal year to support the personnel strategy recommended in this OPLAN. 2.Mi ssion United States Government will ensure appropriate staffing of the CPA to support missions through 30 June 2004, including redeployment of those personnel no longer needed in the US Mission Iraq, the MNF-I, and other US Government organizations and establish the US Mission Iraq effective 30 June 2004. 3.Exec ution a. Concept of Operations. ( 1) Employees, who are a vital strategic resource in Iraq, provide the basis for implementing reconstruction plans, coordinating diplomatic efforts, and providing security, stabilization and reconstruction support. The intent is to size the staff of all organizations commensurate with requirements. Expansion of the staff will depend also upon resources provided by the US, coalition I international or donor nations. (2) CPA, both forward and rear will remain the core headquarters (HQ) for management of personnel assigned to CPA until it is terminated on 30 June 2004. On I July 2004, personnel management responsibilities for USG employees previously assigned to CPA will reside with either the Chief of Mission (COM); Commander, Multi-National Force- Iraq (MNF-I); or Secretary ofDefense. (3) DOS will determine those CPA functional areas that will continue under COM authority and those that will end. DOS will also identify new functional areas that will commence on or about 30 June 2004. DOS will then identify those CPA functions and personnel for transfer to the US Mission. DOD will make similar determinations for E-2 Version 3.0 b. PCO. CPA will plan and coordinate the redeployment of all staff whose positions are not retained. Conduct of Operations. Upon the transfer of sovereignty to an Iraqi Interim Government and termination of the CPA, the US Government establishes a US Mission Iraq to ensure that the responsibilities and interests of the US Government are preserved and discharged effectively. This process will be executed in five phases that will discipline the transfer of specified CPA functions to DOS, US Mission Iraq, MNF-I and Department of Defense. (1) Phase I. (a) Phase I began with the arrival of the Interagency Transition Planning Team (ITPT) on 19 March 2004, and ended with the establishment of the US Embassy Advance Team on I June 2004. Actions taken during this phase will be significant in that the planning to establish IRMO as a "virtual organization" within the existing CPA structure will be completed. (b) On I June 2004, IRMO, in its "virtual capacity", will have been placed under the management oversight of the Chief, US Embassy Advance Team, and managed under the authority of the Administrator, CPA. The Project and Contracting Office (PCO) will have been established on I June 2004, in a similar "virtual" capacity, to coincide with establishment of the US Embassy Advance Team. (c) CPA will have transferred management oversight for the IRMO to the Chief, US Embassy Advance Team, and the Project and Contracting Office (PCO) to the US Army, but retain responsibility for them until 30 June 2004. Both agencies will assume management oversight to include staffing realignments and personnel management functions. With the establishment of IRMO, selected CPA personnel will be appointed to this new organization in accordance with applicable law, regulation and policy [including the Guide to Processing Personnel Actions, published by the US Office of Personnel Management]. CPA and DOS will identify by name personnel who will not transition to IRMO, PCO or to other staff sections within the US Mission in Iraq. These personnel will redeploy, and CPA will develop a redeployment plan for them. Prior to developing the redeployment plan for DOD individual augmentees (lA), the CPA will coordinate with USCENTCOM JI to determine if MNF-I has a need for their continued service in Iraq. (2) Phase II. (a) Phase II began when the US Embassy Advance Team opened on 1 June 2004 and ends with establishment ofthe US Mission Iraq and termination of the CPA on 30 June 2004. During Phase II, US Embassy Advance Team will provide management oversight of select CPA functions, including IRMO and PCO as discussed, but responsibility for execution remains with the Administrator, CPA. The intent is that all management oversight will migrate to the US Embassy Advance Team during June so that all realignments are complete prior to 30 June 2004. Version 3.0 (b) At the conclusion ofthis phase, all personnel assignments from the CPA to the U.S. Mission will be complete. Select CPA personnel may be redeployed or reassigned within theater, but those not needed in the US Mission, MNF-J, or PCO will be redeployed from Iraq. The redeployment plan will ensure that personnel are redeployed consistent with workload requirements and "overlap" with replacements when applicable. Therefore, the plan may cause personnel to be redeployed throughout the month of July and even beyond. During that period, such personnel will be assigned in an over-strength status to the Department of Defense for personnel administration, payroll, and associated costs as appropriate. Funds for payment of these personnel and their administration will be retained in DOD and not transferred to DOS on 1 July 2004. (c) By the conclusion of this phase, affected personnel will have been appointed to the receiving organizations or redeployed. USG Agencies with personnel assigned to support the above-referenced mission will ensure that all related personnel actions are consistent with the applicable law, regulation and policy including the direction below which address each category of personnel now assigned to the CPA. (1) Individual Augmentees (DOD). Uniformed detailees will be transferred to the US Mission, including IRMO and PCO, or MNF-I, or returned to previous I follow-on military command. All costs will be borne by the individual Service. Administrative and medical services for augmentees remaining in Iraq will be provided by the organization to which they are assigned/detailed. (2) DOD Detailees. DOD civilian detailees originally assigned to CPA will be assigned to the extent permitted by law to, US Mission, including IRMO and PCO, MNF-I, or returned to their home organization. All costs, with the exception of travel, will be borne by originating agency. CPA will fund travel costs. Administrative and medical services for detailees remaining in Iraq will be provided by the organization to which they are assigned/detailed (See Annex Q, Medical). For all civilian detailees, the Iraq tour will be treated as a TOY assignment. (3) llliQ_A,gency Detailees Other Than DOD. USG civilian detailees originally assigned to CPA and selected for retention by the COM or his designee will be assigned by their agency to the IRMO, US Mission, PCO, other agencies as designated by the COM, or returned to their agency. All costs, with. the exception of travel, will be borne by originating agency. Administrative and medical services for detailees remaining in Iraq will be provided by the organization to which they are assigned/detailed (See Annex Q - Health Service Support). For civilian detailees, the Iraq tour will be treated as a TDY assignment. ( 4) Contractors. Management oversight of select contractors will be assumed by the Chief, US Embassy Advance Team in the same manner as the "virtual" IRMO structure. ( 5) Section 3161 Personnel. By the conclusion ofthis phase, those 3161 personnel who have not redeployed will be appointed to IRMO, PCO, and DOS (including NEA-l). Personnel in an over-strength capacity will be assigned to DOD as discussed above. CPA will continue through 30 June 2004 to provide personnel servicing until such time as the individual is appointed to a subsequent agency/entity or is terminated from employment. After 30 June 2004, the Human Resources Office of the IRMO will manage those 3161 personnel assigned under the authority of the COM as well as those who will redeploy during July and later. The IRMO Human Resource Office will address other employment/redeployment issues for these personnel as they arise. (6) Area Support Group CASG). MNF-I's ASG Central will be established by 15 June 2004 and may be staffed by a combination of US military, DOD civilian and/or DOD contractor personnel and assigned to the MNF-I. The ASG will be responsive to the COM and provide support as specified in the DOD/DOS Memorandum of Agreement (MOA) for Support (Annex T). It will provide administrative and logistical support to the US Mission and subordinate organizations. The ASG may have DOD civilian employees who will be managed under existing policies and procedures. (7) USG advisors/members of boards and commissions will be employed by the USG Department or agency responsible for the board or commission but will be under the authority of the COM. Personnel actions will be processed using the appropriate rules and regulations as specified by the US Office of Personnel Management, agency policy or other applicable procedure. (3) Phases III. (a) Phase III begins with the establishment of the US Mission in Iraq on 30 June 2004 and ends with end of USG Fiscal Year (30 September 2004). USG personnel in Iraq come under the authority either of the Chief of Mission or the Commander, MNF-I. (b) At the beginning of this phase, the CPA and Coalition Joint Task Force-7 (CJTF-7) will cease to exist. The US Mission Iraq and the MNF-1 will assume those responsibilities. Personnel will be realigned accordingly. (c) 3161 Personnel. Any remaining Section 3161 personnel will have been appointed to a follow-on eligible USG agency or terminated from US Government employment. To be a 3161 employee, individuals must be employed by a temporary organization as defined in law. Payment of any residual salaries, benefits and overtime accruing up through June 30 2004 for all CPA 3161 personnel will be the responsibility of DOD. (d) Contractors. At the conclusion of this phase, administrative support and costs associated with transferring contract personnel will be borne in accordance with the terms of applicable contracts. ( 4) Phase IV. E-5 Version 3.0 URE UND 5 E WITIIOUT AUTHORITY OF' INTERAGENCY TRANSITION (a) Phase IV begins on 1 October 2004 and ends on the date of the elections for the Iraqi National Assembly now scheduled for no later than 31 January 2005. (5) Phase V. (a) Phase V begins on 1 February 2005 or the day after the elections for the Iraqi National Assembly and will continue until the US Mission can function under normal conditions. By the end of Phase V, IRMO and PCO will have been terminated, and the construction tasks will have been completed. c. (1) Phase I. (a) Department of Defense/CPA. (1) Establish PCO per the authority of the NSPD. (2) Develop a redeployment plan for CPA personnel not required in Iraq by the US Mission Iraq, IRMO, PCO <r MNF-I. (3) Identify CPA organizations and functions that will transfer to the DOS, U.S. Mission, MNF-I or the Department of Defense. (b) Department of State. (1) Establish IRMO per the authority of Reference G. (2) Establish the organizational structure for the Regional Support Teams. (3) Establish the organizational structure of the IRMO or accept the current one. ( 4) Establish the organizational structure of the new Public Affairs Organization (formerly STRA TCOM) or accept the current one. (5) Finalize hiring decisions regarding 3161 and other personnel. (6) Hire to fill all post 30 June 2004 vacancies in the US Mission Iraq. (7) Coordinate CAC Card requirements with DOD and establish procedures to provide names to the FDC on a timely basis. (2) Phase II. (a) Department of Defense. (I) Establish 'the "virtual" IRMO within the current CPA structure (Senior and Technical Liaisons and Management staff) as discussed earlier_ The intent is Version 3.0 E UND B S) A E WITHOUT AUTHORITY OF INTERAGENCY TRANSITIO that this organization would function under the management oversight of the Chief, US Mission Advance Team. (2) Transfer the organizational elements and functions of STRA TCOM to the "virtual" IRMO and establish its new name as Office of Public Affairs to operate in the same model as discussed above. (3) Transfer the organizational elements and functions of PMO within CPA to the Department of the Army where it will operate under the management oversight ofthe Department ofthe Army until the PCO is formally established on 1 July 2004, in the same model as the ''virtual" IRMO. (4) Transfer the organizational elements and functions of all remaining "CPA legacy" organizations that will become part of IRMO or the US Mission in the same "virtual" concept to the US Mission Advance Team. (5) Implement a redeployment plan for all applicable CPA personnel not required for further utilization by COM or MNF-1. (6) Issue CAC cards as a part of the responsibilities of the Federal Deployment Center to US Government employees under COM authority until such time as DOS makes other arrangements or the FDC closes. (b) Department of State. (1) Assume management oversight for IRMO on June 1 and total responsibility for IRMO on 30 June 2004. (2) Assume management responsibility for Public Affairs. (3) Assume management oversight for all "CPA legacy" organizations accepted by the COM and identified in the US Mission Iraq organization contained in Annex A Command and Control to OPLAN Sovereign Iraq. ( 4) Continue to hire personnel to fill vacancies. (5) Coordinate CAC Card requirements with DOD and establish procedures to provide names to the FDC on a timely basis. (3) Phases III-V. Department of Defense. (a) Manage redeployment of DOD personnel who transferred from CPA to MNF-1 during Phases I and II. (b) Issue CAC cards as a part of the responsibilities of the Federal Deployment Center to US Government employees under COM authority until such time as DOS makes other arrangements or the FDC closes. Version 3.0 d. Coordinating Instructions. The detailed definitions, descriptions of the policy and procedures are presented at Reference A. ( 1) Personnel Policies and Procedures. Personnel appointed to CPA, PCO or IRMO will be temporary employees. Any changes to an individual's employment, including reduction or extension in tour length, must be cleared by the chain of command or the USG agency concerned. During the period of transition between the CPA and Iraqi sovereignty, it is vital that all affected human resources offices are provided with the changes in personnel assignments early enough to gain necessary approvals for the transaction. (2) Pre-deployment and Pre-assignment Training Requirements. Any mandatory national pre-deployment training requirements are the responsibility of individual agencies. Personnel assigned to positions in Iraq will be required to attend pre-deployment training before arrival, subject to the guidelines established by the governing authority within the USG. DOS has established requirements for pre-deployment training after 1 July and those of the DOD will remain in effect. (3) Length and Rotation Policy. Personnel rotation policy is an agency responsibility. Generally tour lengths will be for a period of one year but may be specified by position and based on several factors, including planned duration of the position, the position's criticality and associated continuity requirements. The rotation of personnel must be carefully planned and monitored to ensure that the continuity and efficiency of operations are maintained. The minimum recommended period for staff handovers is five (5) working days; some appointments may require no formal handover, while some key appointments may require a longer period. ( 4) Identification (JD) Cards. All US Government personnel deploying on the operation must have valid military or civilian 10 cards in their possession. DOD has directed implementation of SMART card technology that shall be used as a department-wide Common Access Card (CAC). The CAC shall be the standard ID card for active duty and reserve military personnel, DOD civilian employees and eligible contractor personneL Contractors will be required to have identification as defined by the hiring agency and in the case of DOD, contractors will be issued a CAC card. All USG employees under the authority of COM will obtain DOS Global Look identification Badge (GLIB). DOD personnel will use the CAC card to transit Kuwait. U.S. Government personnel assigned to the U.S. Mission Baghdad and under Chief of Mission authority will also use the CAC card to transit Kuwait. (5) Security Clearances. All US military and contractor personnel must have the national security clearance appropriate to their position before deploying. Foreign Government personnel and contractors assigned to HQ positions are also required to report with the security clearance appropriate to their position. For USG employees under COM authority, the owning human resources or security office must forward copies of clearances to the DOS Regional Security Office through Diplomatic Security in Washington either in hard copy or electronically. All USG agencies requiring employees to have access to SCI material must identify the positions requiring .the access, and such personnel are required to have the clearances passed from the DOS or Version 3.0 OSUREU EASE WITHOUT AUTHORITY OF INTERAGENCY TRANSITIO DOD in Washington as applicable. Most other support positions in Iraq will not require security clearances; personnel assigned to these positions will not be required to hold security clearances. (6) Leave Policy on Operations. Leave accrual is in effect while government members are on active military or civilian duty. Component commands and agencies will develop their own leave policy IA W service policy. Leave accrual and use for USG personnel will be in accordance with applicable law, regulations and policy and reflect both the unique operational requirements of this mission and the security environment in Iraq. Eligible US military and DOD civilians will be afforded the opportunity to participate in the USCENTCOM R & R Leave and Pass Programs. Other Government Agencies will be covered by their own regulations and US Mission Policy. (7) DOD Civilian Employees. Civilian employees who are serving in emergency-essential (EE) positions, and who have volunteered for assignments must sign an employment agreement, similar to the EE agreement, that specifies conditions of employment, including type and length of appointment and requirement for deployment, chain of command, expected terms of transition from existing to successor organizations, and penalties for refusal or failure to perform assigned functions until relieved by appropriate authority. (8) DOD civilian employees deploying to support operations require travel orders prepared IA W Chapter 3, Part D, oftre Joint Travel Regulations (JTR), Volume II. (9) Other USG employees deploying to support operations will require travel orders prepared lAW their employing agency travel regulations and coordinated with DOD I DOS Travel Offices as applicable. (1 0) For employees in country or in-transit before 30 June 2004, DOS will accept a medical clearance approved by another USG agency. After 30 June 2004, civilian employees must receive DOS medical clearance prior to deployment. ( 11) Civilian employees deploying to Iraq must meet the applicable civilian personnel deployment criteria stipulated by the DOS/DOD regulations. Reference H and DOS policy and regulations. (12) Other Civilians. Standard DOS policies to hire Foreign Service Nationals (FSNs) will be followed by agencies under the COM Authority in Iraq. 4.Adm inistration and Logistics a. Morale and Welfare Recreation fMWR). Commanders and directors have an executive responsibi I ity for MWR in their areas of responsibility, without jeopardizing the operational integrity of the mission. b. Special Allowances. Special allowances for hazardous duty will be determined by applicable law, regulations and policy. Version 3.0 c. Postal Services. Postal services will be provided consistent with standard DOS policy (See Annex H, Appendix 2) unless changed by the COM. MNFI-1 policy may differ but will be consistent with policies established by DOD. The sharing of resources is encouraged. d. Discipline for civilian employees. For Section 3161 personnel, discipline is the responsibility of the organization to which the individual is assigned. For detailees, discipline is the responsibility of their home agency. In addition to Mission and/or DOD policies regarding reporting of misconduct or discipline, incidents which are likely to attract unfavorable media attention, should be forwarded promptly via the chain of command to the COM and/or Commander, MNF-1, as appropriate. e. Evaluation Reports. First line supervisors will provide performance evaluations consistent with applicable law, regulations and agency policy. If the head or commander of a participating agency requests an evaluation on assigned personnel, the immediate chain of command is responsible for ensuring that a report is submitted. 5.Co mmand and Control a. Reports regarding personnel accountability and other personnel metrics will be submitted in accordance with Reference C for military organizations and Department of State Policies for agencies under COM Authority. b. Casualty Reporting. Casualty reporting is the responsibility of the owning department/agency and should be processed according to agency policy and procedures. Any requirement to share DOD casualty information between MNF-I I USCENTCOM and the US Mission Iraq for the purposes of creating better situational awareness for the COM will be clearly defined in the Iraqi Security Transition Memorandum of Agreement between DOD and DOS (Annex S). c. Serious Incident Reporting. Alleged serious crimes and incidents of national or international media interest require special awareness for both DOD and DOS components in Iraq. Information sharing procedures and channels will be clearly identified in the Iraqi Security Transition Memorandum of Agreement between the DOD and DOS (Annex S). d. Application. This plan is applicable to all personnel assigned DOD or DOS organizations operating in Iraq. Version 3.0 ANNEXFTO OPLAN SOVEREIGN IRAQ 11 JUNE 2004 References: ANNEX F-FACILITIES AND REALPROPERTY A Title 10, Section 2675 B. DODI 4270-36 C. SECDEF letter of delegation to SECARMY, 14 Jan 04, Re: Assignment of Responsibility for Acquisition and Program Management Support for CPA D. AR 405-10, 405-45, 405-70, 405-90, 415-15, 420-10, 420-18 E. General Order #3, dated 9 July 2002, Assignment of Functions and Responsibilities within Headquarters, Department of the Army F. NSPD 36, 11 May 04 l.S ituation a. Current Situation. Facilities and real property are critical resources for accomplishing the mission of creating and sustaining a sovereign Iraq. Current facilities consist of both real property structures and modular units (personal property). Facilities are supported using both Iraqi infrastructure and DOD equipment (e.g., generators). Some facilities and real property currently used by DOD belonged to the former Iraq government and/or private owners. The Logistics Civil Augmentation Program (LOGCAP) Task Order #44 contract provides most facility services. Use, management and security of facilities and real property affect the success and safety of all personnel involved in the mission as well as the success of programs, projects and the transition. b. Enemy Forces. The security situation in Iraq will potentially reduce the effectiveness of contractor support by limiting the mobility of contractor personnel and the movement of materiel and supplies. (See Annex B -Intelligence) c. Friendly Forces. The Area Support Group (ASG Central) will provide direct support to the US Mission and general support to other US Government agencies and tenants in both the Green Zone, as well as regional sites in Iraq. The Gulf Region Division (GRD), US Army Corps of Engineers (USACE), will support the ASG Central through acquiring, managing, and disposal of real estate needed to support Multinational Force Iraq (MNF-I) missions. Security for the Green Zone is provided by the MNF-J, except for that provided by the Chief of Mission (COM) for the facilities occupied by the US Mission Iraq. d. Assumptions. (1) A procedural framework is established with the Interim, Transitional and Permanent Government of Iraq to authorize the acquisition, management, disposition and operations and maintenance of real property used by the COM and the MNF-I. (2) Documentation will be developed to identify agencies that fall under the COM and those that are responsible to the US Military Commander. F-1 EX RE U S WITIIOUT AUTHORITY OF INTERAGENCY TRANSITION Version 3.0 (3) No additional legislative authority will be required to carry out the real property and facility support to DOD and DOS missions. ( 4) Adequate resources (manpower as well as funds) will be provided to accomplish facility and real property mission requirements for all bases during and after transition. (5) DOD and DOS will establish a Support Memorandum of Agreement (MOA) to address mutual roles and responsibilities regarding occupied facilities and facility related costs, including utilities and environmental management, throughout Iraq. (Annex T) (6) For the purposes of this plan, all trailers that provide housing are identified as personal property, not real property. (7) Legal authority is currently adequate for USACE to perform the real estate mission, both in law and in delegated authority. Should additional delegated authority to execute the mission be needed, USACE Real Estate will assist in the preparation of the delegations and ensure their consideration and approval by the Department of the Army (DA). (8) Translators and interpreters are key components of DOD and DOS ability to accomplish the functional mission. The full-time availability and quality of these resources, to translate documents accurately into English, Arabic, or other appropriate language are critical to success. 2.Mi ssion United States Government establishes facilities and real property to support the US Mission Iraq through deliberate planning and execution, brings facilities to operational standards, and ensures maintenance and management of both facilities and real property during the transfer of sovereignty and the establishment of the US Mission Iraq. 3.Exec ution a. Concept of Operations. DOS will assume authority over four facilities or 'Sites' in the Green Zone, including building CII-35, the Annex Compound, the Ambassador's residence and the future New Embassy Compound. A fifth site will be designated at a later date. The COM will be responsible for facilities and real property management of these sites. DOD and other agencies I activities will be tenants in the DOS Chancery I Embassy Annex Compounds. (See Appendix 2 to Annex F). MNF-1 will establish an Area Support Group (ASG Central) organization to assume responsibility for facilities and real property management for DOD facilities and installations upon disestablishment of the CPA. The MNF-I I Combatant Commander will use a systematic stationing process that includes full consideration of facilities requirements and impacts. LOGCAP and other contracted facility services will continue until they are replaced by other contract services or non-contract services. DOD and DOS will have access to these LOGCAP and non-LOGCAP facility services, as required. DOD will identify an ASG to accomplish the base operations mission, including facilities management and operations. Gulf Regional Division (GRD) support will include acquisition, management and closeout of leases and Host Nation (HN) agreements, environmental management, and assistance to the local Staff Judge Advocate (SJA) in resolving claims arising from the use of real property by US Mission or US Forces. The Version 3.0 GRD Chief of Real Estate will remain as primary source of delegations regarding existing DOD leases, on-going DOD lease negotiations, on-going management of those leases, and monthly lease reporting to Headquarters, USACE as required by the Deputy Assistant Secretary of the Army for Installation and Housing (J&H) for DOD real property requirements. Prioritization of facilities and real property requirements will be coordinated among COM, MNF-~ and within DOD activities prior to funding and contracting. b. Conduct of Operations. ( 1) Phase I. Phase I begins when the Interagency Transition Planning Team (ITPT) arrives in Baghdad, and ends on 31 May 2004. Specific policies established in this phase provide a baseline for facility and real property issues that will then inform the respective responsible agencies executing this plan. These include: (a) DOD will be responsible for control, operation and support (to include funding) of real property and facilities used by DOD. DOS may be a tenant in select DOD facilities outside Baghdad. (b) DOD and DOS mission activities will be responsible for programming, budgeting and allocating adequate funding to finance the respective facilities needed to support their missions and in the case of DOD, to finance support of non- reimbursable tasks. The Coalition Provisional Authority (CPA) control of facilities and real property in the Green Zone not needed for DOS and DOD missions will be transitioned to a combination of the appropriate Iraqi authorities as soon as conditions allow. CPA management and support of Green Zone facilities required for DOS use will transition to DOS. (c) CPA management and support of Green Zone facilities required for DOD use will transition to MNF-1 logistics and engineer elements. DOD will appoint a commander of what is now called the Green Zone (Could be the Commander, ASG Central) as the unifying authority for MNF-1 security, facilities management, and logistics support within the Green Zone. DOD will establish additional subordinate Area Support Groups under MNF-I that will provide support to non- DOD U.S. government agencies operating at other sites in Iraq. (See Annex A, Appendix 2- Base Support Operations in Support of US Mission). A facilities management office will be established under the commander of the ASG Central to operate and maintain DOD facilities and manage space allocation and tenancy, and coordinate with Iraq ministry official within the zone. The Gulf Region Division (GRD) will provide support as required. (2) Phase II. Phase II begins when the US Office Baghdad opens on I around I June 2004 and ends with the disestablishment ofthe CPA and there-designation ofUS Mission Advance Team as US Mission Iraq on 30 June 2004. (a) MNF-1 stands up DOD facility and real property management capability via establishment of ASG's with subordinate Base Support Battalions (BSB) when available. Stationing, area master planning, facility space use assignment, and environmental management processes are established for all real property and facilities identified for support of DOD during the Iraqi Interim, Transitional and Version 3.0 URE UNDE E WITHOUT AUTHORITY OF INTERAGENCY TRANSITIO Permanent Phases ofGovemment. CPA transitions operation and accountability of facilities in Green Zone to DOS, MNF-1 and appropriate Iraqi authorities on 30 June. (b) CJTF continues with Global Information System (GIS)-based inventory of facilities and real property used or planned for use by DOD. Personnel, equipment and material needed by MNF-I to accomplish DOD facility and real property mission are transferred to MNF-1. GRD defines facility operation and maintenance requirements for new facilities and infrastructure to be constructed for MNF-I use. (c) GRD will continue to exist with a general officer commanding. Direction and control ofGRD will transition from CJTF-7 to MNF-1 on 30 June 2004. (d) GRD may provide supplemental support to MNF-I I ASG Central. (3) Phase III. Phase III Begins with the redesignation of US Mission Advanced Team as US Mission Iraq on 30 June 2004 and ends 30 September 2004. (a) MNF-1 assumes full responsibility for facilities and real property support to all DOD base operations activities in Iraq. Between Phase III and the end of Phase IV, DOS will assume full responsibility for all facilities and real property support for the DOS buildings in the Green Zone and the site for the future New Embassy Compound (NEC). Business processes are established and implemented for DOD stationing, facility planning, facility use, and facility work prioritization. (b) The "Convention Center" and the AI Rasheed Hotel will be secured by MNF-1 and the Center will be managed by ASG Central. (c) ASG Central provide needed facility and real property support to DOD's facility and real property activities (4) Phases IV & V. Phase IV begins 1 October 2004 and ends immediately after Iraqi elections have occurred. Phase V begins immediately after Iraqi elections have occurred and ends when a secure and stable environment allows US Mission in Iraq to function comparably to other US Embassies in the region. Iraq Reconstruction and Management Office (IRMO) and the Project and Contracting Office (PCO) will have phased down and I or been disestablished as their work is completed. Facilities and real property support of DOD activities are adjusted to reflect progress and problems oflraqi Interim and Transitional Government. MNF-1 completes GIS-based inventory of facilities and real property during Phase V. c. Tasks. ( 1) Phase I and II. (a) Tasks for DOS. F-4 Version 3.0 (1) COM provides facilities, real property, and environmental support requirements, including real estate to ASG Central, for both inside and outside of the Green Zone. (2) COM identifies US Mission activities I facilities requirements outside of Baghdad to DOD activity (where I when DOS is likely to be a tenant on DOD facilities). (b) Tasks for DOD. (1) Provide facilities, real property, and environmental support (to include real estate) to the COM and MNF-I I Combatant commander. (2) Establish organizational structure (ASG Central) within MNF-1 to meet DOD real property and facilities missions. ASG Central shaH identify what support is required from organizations such as GRD and verify that ASG Central support organizations are organized and equipped to support ASG missions. (3) Develop area master plans for the allocation and space use of facilities and real property (including ranges) for COM and DOD missions. (4) Integrate Anti-terrorism I Force Protection (AT I FP) plans and requirements with all facility plans. (5) Identify requirements for major repairs and construction for DOD missions. (6) Identify requirements for operations and maintenance (O&M) of facilities and real property for COM and DOD missions. (7) Identify furniture and fixture plans (requirements and funding) for DOD missions during and after transition. (8) Establish process for systematically defining DOD future facility and real property requirements to support DOD missions during and after transition. (9) CPA develops centralized Global Infonnation System-based inventory of facilities and real property used in the Green Zone. Planners for MNF-1 define DOD facilities management roles, responsibilities, and organizational concepts for the logistics and engineering elements ofMNF-I. CJTF I MNF-I develops inventory of existing facilities operation and support contracts, staffing, and equipment. (c) Tasks for DOD and DOS. (1) Identify all facilities and real property (including fo~er, current and future requirements) requirements and inventory and evaluate condition on existing assets to establish accountability and to manage and support DOD and DOS Missions. Inventory data should be kept to the minimum required to establish basic accountability and real property management. E UNO 5 ASE WITHOUT AUTHORITY OF INTERAGENCY TRANSITION (2) Establish a prioritization process for facilities and real property programming and execution. ASG Central shall establish a joint facilities utilization board representing all DOD elements to coordinate competing requirements. (3) Further develop and coordinate DOD and DOS transition plans for facilities. CJTF-7 I MNF-I and DOS define facility and real property requirements to support their missions during and after the transition. DOS establishes an inventory of facilities and real property it will assume in Baghdad. CJTF -7 I MNF-I develops multi-phased plans to create a centralized Global Information System (GIS)-based inventory of formerly used, currently used, and planned facilities and real property to support DOD. (4) Establish a Memorandum of Agreement (MOA) to address mutual roles and responsibilities regarding facilities and facilities related costs, including utilities, throughout Iraq. (Annex T, Support MOA) (5) Develop performance measures. (2) Phase III. (a) DOD and DOS finalize and transition operations and maintenance (O&M) responsibilities for regional sites, plus Baghdad, pursuant to NSPD 36 and Annexes 0 (Regional Teams) and T (Support MOA) for Regional Team support. DOS assumes responsibility for facility O&M for Interim Chancery Compound, Interim Chancery Annex Compound, and Chief of Mission Residence (CMR). (b) DOD and DOS establish a Memorandum of Agreement (MOA) (Annex T) to address mutual roles and responsibilities regarding facilities and facilities related costs, including utilities and environmental management, throughout Iraq. (c) DOD and DOS establish MOU /MOA for any utilities and related services to be provided by DOD to DOS or by DOS to DOD. (3) Phase IV through V. (a) Jointly continue to provide established mutual support in accordance with MOA as updated to reflect changing conditions. CENTCOM has DOD lead. ( 4) Coordinating Instructions. (a) Regular coordination meetings between DOD, DOS, Iraqi Governmental organizations, and others, as required, will be established to coordinate force protection, financial management, environmental management, stationing, acquisition and disposal of personal and real property to ensure effective facilities and property management to DOD and DOS missions. (b) On request, DOD and DOS coordinate to provide real estate assistance and management support to host nation (HN), US Government agencies, and F-6 Version 3.0 WITIIOUT AUTHORITY OF INTERAGENCY TRANSITIO international organizations, including emergency repair, restoration or improvements of I to HN infrastructure (c) Ensure effective coordination of facility construction schedules and turnover I start-up with facility owners I users. Maximize involvement of construction contractors in initial facility start-up for new facilities constructed for DOD. (d) The iYINF-1 I Combatant Commander's stationing plan (and updates) will include requirements for multinational forces. CENTCOM is DOD lead. (e) Systematic processes are essential for identifying and prioritizing facility and real property requirements prior to their execution. Plans, assumptions, and realities regarding DOD and DOS information technology, financial management, personnel, equipment, security, contracting, and human resources will greatly impact the facilities and real property plans and success. (f) Appropriate Status of Force Agreement (SOFA) or other Host Nation agreements will be developed as applicable to support use of real property for DOD and DOS missions after establishment of a permanent Iraq Government. 4.Adm inistration and Logistics a. Security. Provided per requirements ofMOA (Annex S) on security. b. Logistics. Support will be provided by the MNF-I's Area Support Group Mission within the Green Zone and, when required, other ASG elements outside the Green Zone. c. Contract Support. Provided by PCO and GRD, as required and appropriate. 5.Co mmand and Control a. Annex A Command and Control, OPLAN Sovereign Iraq. b. The Commander, GRD, will be under the operational control of MNF-1. For Iraqi reconstruction efforts, GRD will take direction and prioritization from the Project and Contracting Office (PCO). F-7 Version 3.0 APPENDIX 2 TO ANNEXFTO OPLAN SOVEREIGN IRAQ II JUNE 2004 APPENDIX 2- FACILITIES TO ANNEX F- FACILITIES AND REAL PROPERTY References: A Foreign Service Buildings Act (22 U.S.C. 292-302) B. Foreign Assistance Act (22 U.S.C. 2396) C. Secure Embassy Construction and Counterterrorism· Act of I999, Title VI, Pub. L. I 06- I 13 1. S ituation. a. Current Situation. (I) Department of State is authorized by Foreign Service Buildings Act (22 U .S.C. 292-302) to acquire property for use ofUSG diplomatic missions and to assign such property to the various agencies of the USG having a presence at such missions. Department of State (DOS) I US Mission will take control of three properties in the Green Zone on or before 30 June 2004. The C-135 compound will become the Interim Chancery. The Annex compound will become the Interim Embassy Annex. The Administrator's residence will become the Chief of Mission residence (CMR). The fourth site in the Green Zone, the New Embassy Compound, will be developed upon approval and appropriation of funds by the US Congress. The C-135 compound is currently occupied by U.S. military units that will have been vacated it in mid-April2004. An adjacent site is being developed as a residential compound by the United States Agency for International Development (USAID). The two properties will be combined into the Interim U.S. Chancery compound which will be the official US Embassy in Iraq, in which the Ambassador will have his office. Pursuant to its Foreign Assistance Act (22 U.S.C. 2396) authorities, USAID will retain control of the residential portion of the compound. The CMR is presently occupied by the Administrator of the Coalition Provisional Authority (CPA). The Am1ex compound currently houses the CPA, DOD Combatant Commander, Iraqi Reconstruction Management Office (IRMO), and other elements. A fifth site will be designated at a later date. (2) Another property, the lakefront site, will be dedicated to the building of a permanent DOS diplomatic complex within two years after congressional authorization and funding. The interim embassy properties will likely be returned to the Government of Iraq once this permanent complex is built and occupied. (3) The "convention center" will be secured by the MNF-I and managed by Area Support Group (ASG) Central. c. Friendly Forces. See Base Plan OPLAN Sovereign Iraq Version 3.0 EXE UNDE . IlHOUT AUTHORITY OF INTERAGENCY TRANSITION P d. Assumptions (1) The CMR, Annex, and Chancery buildings will be available for COM use until the future US Embassy compound is constructed. (2) Congress will approve and appropriate funds to construct a new US Embassy Compound. (3) Custody and control of the three interim properties will be obtained by agreement with the Iraqi Government or by CPA Order extending beyond 30 June 2004 and having the force oflraqi law under the Transitional Administrative Law (TAL). (4) The MNF-1 will continue to provide overall security for the Green Zone after 30 June 2004. The DOS will provide internal security for each of the three interim embassy compounds and the fourth and fifth when appropriate. (See Annex K: Security.) (5) Support services will be provided by an Area Support Group Mission and by the same service providers, principally LOGCAP, and will have been established by 15 May 2004 for the interim chancery compound and after 1 July 2004 for the remaining interim embassy facilities. Existing support facilities, e.g., generator plants, housing units, dining facilities, and warehouse, will remain available for the duration of the interim embassy facilities. (See Annex I: Logistics.) (6) The real estate required for the interim and permanent embassy facilities will be acquired at no cost to the USG, and no funds for real estate acquisition have been included in the allocation of the $60 million available for the interim facilities. 2.Mi ssion The Department of State establishes facilities to support a US Mission in Iraq through deliberate planning and execution to identify required facilities, establish construction and renovation standards and programs to upgrade them, and inventory, assess and accept property from existing assets required for the interim embassy. 3.Exec ution a. Concept of Operations. (1) The DOS, within available funds and with the support and cooperation of DOD and CPA, will have established a transition office in the C-135 building by 15 May 2004 and the balance of the Interim Chancery, the Embassy Annex Compound (Palace), and the Chief of Mission Residence (CMR) NL T 30 June 2004. Using existing housing units located on the palace compound, augmented by 75 additional housing trailers, the DOS will accommodate U.S. personnel under the authority of the COM, at no more than two staff members per trailer. (Each resident shall have a separate sleeping area with a shared bathroom.) The DOS will acquire the property known as the lakefront site as the location for a permanent embassy compound through agreement with the Iraqi Government in exchange for relinquishment of claims to compensation arising from the 1971 expropriation ofthe former USG Embassy F-2-2 (2) The Interagency Transition Planning Team (ITPT) (forward) which arrived in Baghdad on 19 March will perform initial surveys, audits and inventory of furniture and equipment required by the interim embassy, determine space requirements for the COM and other competing tenant demands, and prepare for transition of property and facilities during the Month of April and May (Phase I). Kellogg, Brown and Root (KBR) will retain control of the property book, and the COM will only be a recipient of property managed by the contractor. (3) During the month of June, after the US Mission Advance Team is established, the expanded staff will continue coordinating facility transfer with the CPA so as to effect a seamless transition on 30 June 2004. In doing so, the COM I CPA coordinating effort will bring together information, personnel, and resources necessary to perform these tasks and ultimately to design and construct a permanent, diplomatic complex on the lakefront site within two years after congressional authorization and funding. ( 4) The agencies and organizations that will fall under the COM after 30 June 2004 will be located in the two interim office compounds: the chancery and the annex. Any agencies or organizations under the jurisdiction of the COM not located in these facilities will be located in facilities provided by their agency or department, at no cost to the DOS. (5) The available budget for the interim facilities (approximately $60 million) will permit only limited renovations and improvements of the interim embassy facilities and will not meet all new embassy compound standards. The renovations will focus on providing secure, safe and functional facilities, in that order of priority, within funding constraints. Adequate physical security will be provided by COM for the interim embassy facilities to support collocation and setback waivers as necessary under the Secure Embassy Construction and Counterterrorism Act of 1999, Title VI, Pub. L. 106-113. (6) Conduct of Operations. (a) Phase I. Provide the physical security improvements and internal renovations to make the interim chancery available for limited operations by DOS transition staff by 15 May 2004. (b) Phase II. Complete limited improvements and renovations to the interim chancery, interim embassy annex and interim CMR by 15 June 2004. (c) Phase III. Complete final improvements and renovations to the interim annex by 12 September 2004. (d) The DOS will control the facilities that have been selected for the interim embassy facilities including all housing and support facilities on the Palace site. This will require transferring ownership of assets from DOD and CPA to the DOS and providing the COM with the authority to assign the housing transferred to the DOS. (DOS will augment the existing housing on the palace site by a total of 75 trailers, which will house 150 occupants at two per unit.) In addition, ownership of the furnishings in the palace and residence occupied by Ambassador Bremer will be transferred from DOD and CPA to the DOS (maintained by KBR property book officer), None of the $60 million available for standing up the interim facilities has been allocated for furnishing these buildings. (See Annex 1: Logistics.) b. Tasks. Required tasks are listed in general timeline sequence by Phases I through III ( 1) Phases I and II. (a) DOS. (1) DOS shall develop projects to renovate and improve the interim embassy facilities, focusing on security, safety and functionality, in that order of priority, by 24 May 2004. (2) Execute projects to renovate and improve the interim embassy facilities to provide initial transition offices in C-135 by 15 May 2004 and the balance of the Interim Chancery, Annex and CMR by 15 June 2004 to permit the interim embassy to be established by 30 June 2004. (b) DOD CCPA). ( 1) CPA shall coordinate with KBR by 1 May to ensure that an inventory of assets (real property) is available to support DOS. (2) CPA will transfer to DOS management and control of the C-135 compound by 15 May 2004. (3) CPA shall prepare real and personal property transfer documents and transfer the property in the C-135 compound desired by DOS to it by 15 May 2004, and property in the remaining properties NLT 30 June 2004. The intent of this action is to keep management and control of property under the current contractual agreement with KBR. (4) CPA will transfer to DOS management and control of the Palace complex and residence occupied by Ambassador Bremer, including all associated real and personal property assets, after inventory, NLT 30 June 2004. (c) Joint Tasks. (1) Develop a consolidated list of DOS, DOD and other agency and department missions I organizations planned to be accommodated in the interim embassy facilities. (2) Develop a master plan for allocation of office space and equipment in the interim embassy annex by 24 May 2004. (3) Develop and sign an MOD (done) to provide continuity of services essential to mission operations and maintenance by 1 May 2004. F-2-4 EXE NDER . ITHOUT AUTHORITY OF INTERAGENCY TRANSITION P Version 3.0 REU B 5) SE WITIIOUT AUTHORITY OF INTERAGENCY TRANSIT! (4) Develop plans for moving personnel into the interim embassy by 1 June 2004 (done) and commence movement when conditions permit. The intent is to have a seamless transition on 30 June. (5) Establish reimbursement procedures for unique maintenance and support requirements of tenants, such as IT after receipt of the FY 05 supplemental. (See OPLAN Sovereign Iraq, para 4.) (6) Compile all existing conditions, environmental, etc., assessments and complete on facilities outside the Green Zone but for which there are requirements. (7) Develop requirements and funding process adequately for operations and maintenance (O&M), major repairs and construction (including utilities) for DOS and DOD missions. (8) Develop legal agreements for use of Host Nation facilities (9) By 1 June 2004, tenants will have signed host I tenant agreements with DOS defining space and types of support each will provide I receive. (CPA lead) (2) Phases III through V. (a) DOS. (1) Remaining work in the Embassy Annex should be completed by 30 September 2004. (2) Complete moving personnel and equipment to accommodate embassy operations by 30 June 2004. (3) Coordinate facility support requirements with Base Support Unit. (b) DOD. ( 1) Provide facility support through the Base Support Unit. (2) Designate and transition excess Green Zone facilities to appropriate authorities as soon as possible. 4.Adm inistration and Logistics. See Annex F and OPLAN Sovereign Iraq 5.Co mmand and Control. Tenants within the Embassy Annex compound will report operationally to either the Chief of Mission (DOS) or DOD for those DOD elements not under COM authority. a. The IRMO will report to the Chief of Mission (DOS). The PCO will be subordinate to the Secretary of the Army as Executive Agent, but will be under the authority of the COM. b. See Annex F and OPLAN Sovereign Iraq for additional guidance. ANNEXO TO OPLAN SOVEREIGN IRAQ II JUNE 2004 References: ANNEX G- CONTRACTS AND ACQUISITIONS A Section 2207 Report to Congress, JAN04, Unclassified B. CPA Project List l.S ituation a. Current Situation. (I) The Head of Contract Authority (HCA) and the Project Management Office (PMO) or successor organization have been established to support the Coalition Provisional Authority (CPA). They have been designed to carry out the business of Iraqi Relief and Reconstruction for which the CPA establishes priorities and defines requirements. (2) The Department of the Army (DA) and the Department of State (DOS) have completed a joint review of over 2800 contracts that are available to support the CPA, and DOS has expressed specific interest in exercising the authorities of 32 contracts to support future Chief of Mission (COM) requirements. COM will define its requirements in a Statement of Work (SOW) which will be jointly developed with DA to provide required support. Identifying these 32 actions is not intended or does not limit DOS or DA from entering into other contract support relations in the future. (3) A DA contracting staff in Baghdad and in CONUS will support the PCO and COM contracts executed through the DA. The DA and PCO will use the "reach back" concept to the greatest extent possible to provide required support. ( 4) DOS and D A will develop a set of contract conditions describing contractor support and responsibilities to include but not limited to: security (Annex S), meals, housing, and medical and place these conditions in all appropriate contracts. (5) The DA will continue to inform DOS contracting of all future contracts awarded in support of the CPA as is the current practice. b. Enemy Forces. See Annex B -Intelligence. c. Friendly Forces. See Base Plan OPLAN Sovereign Iraq Acquisition Support Command (ASC). The ASC will serve as the administrative headquarters for the HCA and PCO upon assignment of the PCO mission to the DA. d. Assumptions. (I) The PMO (the PCO as a "virtual" organization on I June 2004) is the single agent and integrator with responsibility and accountability for reconstruction efforts funded directly by the Iraqi Relief and Reconstruction Fund (IRRF). EX Willi OUT AUTHORITY OF INTERAGENCY TRANSITIO (2) The Department of Anny (DA) is the executive agent for Department of Defense (DOD). (3) The HCA for all contracts under DOD will remain with DA. (4) PMO will respond to the US Mission Iraq to assist with the development ofiRRF- funded requirements and priorities with Iraqi Ministries. (5) Construction contracts awarded will progress according to plan. (6) All infrastructure reconstruction sites will be secured along with movement of construction material and equipment. -Cost driver -25% of Project Cost (7) PMO is not responsible for any FY03 Supplemental work. (8) All contracts under DOD will use Standard Procurement System (SPS) and the US Army Corps of Engineers Financial Management System (CEFMS) software. (9) A program office will be established within DOS to serve as the customer for acquisitions handled by DOS. ( 1 0) Adequate data will be made available regarding existing contracts and upcoming contract needs. (ll)US Government (USG) agencies in-country will rely on their own contracting offices to support programmatic acquisitions, following existing International Cooperative Administrative Support Services (ICASS) policy. The ICASS program is a program through which the USG provides and shares the cost of common administrative support at posts overseas. 2.Mi ssion The Head of Contract Authority (HCA) and the Program Management Office (PMO) continue to execute Iraq Relief and Reconstruction Fund contracts and projects as outlined in the report to Congress under section 2207 seamlessly through the transition from the Coalition Provisional Authority to an Iraqi Interim Government and the concurrent establishment of a United States Mission Iraq. 3.Exec ution a. Concept of Operations. The PMO, which will officially become the Project and Contracting Office (PCO), will provide contracts management and project management authority over the construction and non-construction contracts awarded under the Iraq Relief and Reconstruction Fund (IRRF). Following the intent to be fully operational at the time of transfer of sovereignty, the PMO will have been re-designated as the "virtual" PCO on 1 June 2004 but continue to work within the CPA structure. On 1 June, it will have transitioned to the US Mission Advance Team and be under the management oversight of its Chief, the CPM designee, but be responsive to the priorities of the Administrator, CPA, through 30 June 2004. The Department of the Army will assume responsibility for the PCO for funding, staffing, quality assurance, security (Annex S), facilities, and life support consistent with this intent. With establishment of the US Mission Iraq, responsibility for determining requirements and priority for non-security project requirements will be transferred from the CPA to the US Mission, while responsibility for deciding security related project requirements and priorities will remain with the Multinational Force- Iraq (MNF-1). (1) Conduct ofOperations. Scheme ofContracts and Project Management Operations is as follows: (a) Phase I. Phase I began when the Interagency Transition Planning Team (ITPT) arrived in Baghdad on 19 March 04. Phase I ends on 31 May and the US Mission Advance Team formally began operating on 1 June 2004. During this phase, HCA and PMO will continue support to the CPA in contracts and projects management while assisting the ITPT to identify critical processes and services needed during and post transition. The CPA, in coordination with the DOS, will have developed plans to establish a temporary organization called the Iraqi Reconstruction and Management Organization (IRMO) on 1 June 2004. Like the PCO, the IRMO will be formally established on 1 July 2004 but will have been established as a "virtual" organization as of 1 June. It will have two major responsibilities during and following the transition: Manage the personnel authorized under Title 5, U.S.C. Section 3161 and support the COM in identifying requirements and priorities for non-security related projects supported by the IRRF funds. It will also develop plans to place the current PMO under the responsibility of the DA and renamed the Project and Contracting Office (PCO), a temporary organization established by National Security Presidential Directive. The intent of these actions is to have provided both "temporary" organizations under the management oversight of the Chief (DCM designee), US Mission Advance Team and the Secretary of the Army as Executive Agent on 1 June 2004 so that operating procedures will be streamlined to support the concept of a seamless transition on 30 June 2004. (b) (c) Phase II began on 1 June 2004 when the US Mission Advance Team began operations. Phase II ends with the disestablishment of the CPA and the designation of US Mission Advance Team as the US Mission in Iraq. The IRMO and PCO will be placed under management authority ofthe Chief(DCM designee), US Mission Advance Team, but with responsibility being retained by the Administrator until 30 June 2004. HCA and PCO will support the US Mission Advance Team as necessary while continuing its support to CPA until30 June as it divests itself of responsibilities. HCA and PCO will support this transfer of responsibilities without a reduction in capacity or commitment. Phase III. Phase III Begins on 30 June 2004, with there-designation ofUS Mission Advance Team as US Mission Iraq. Phase III ends 30 September 2004. With the designation of the US Mission Iraq, HCA and PCO come under the authority of the COM for requirements, prioritization, and execution of non- security related IRRF projects. The HCA will continue under the legal authority of the Secretary of the Army. Version 3.0 (d) Phase IV. Phase IV begins 1 October 2004 and ends immediately after the Iraqi elections have occurred. By October 2004, PCO contract support for the US Mission may be phased out as the DOS establishes its normal US Mission contracting capabilities---with the exception of those services jointly determined by DOD and DOS as best provided under joint, new or existing agreements. (e) Phase V. Phase V begins immediately after the Iraqi elections have occurred. During this phase, all projects funded by the IRRF, Public Law 108-106, will be completed and turned over to the Iraqi Government or designated USG agencies. Phase V ends when a secure and stable environment allows the US Mission Iraq to function comparably to other US Embassies in the region. Both the HCA for the IRRF funds and PCO will be or will have been closed. b. Tasks. (1) Department of State: Phases I and II. Phases III through V support sustainment. (a) Complete Memorandum of Agreement with DOD (DA)to ensure continued contracting support. (b) Review existing contracts managed by the CPA and/or US forces and determine which contracts will be of value for use by DOS. Request that CPA/US forces transfer contracts to DOS or purchase required services through military contacts NL T 30 May 2004. (c) Establish a program office within DOS to manage IRRF requirements and priorities (IRMO). (d) Identify potential contracts to be awarded or administered by DOS. (e) Determine operational contracting personnel needed in Office of Acquisition Management. (f) Codify the finalized scopes of work for Facilities Management and Maintenance contracts completed in mid-April 2004 for execution during all phases. (2) Department of Defense. Phases I and II. Phases III through V support sustainment. (a) Establish the PCO with the Secretary of the Army designated as the DOD executive Agent. The PCO forward will be under the authority of the COM after 30 June 2004. (b) Document finalized program management plans among PMO and executing agencies on support and operating budget requirements completed by 1 May 2004. (c) Finalize definitions of construction and non-construction metrics by 1 May 2004. Version3.0 UND S E WITHOUT AUTHORITY OF INTERAGENCY TRANSITION (d) Ensure that in-country technical operating agreements among PCO, executing agencies and Iraqi ministry counterparts are developed and in place by 1 June 2004. (e) Plan and ensure contract personnel are adequately quartered, rationed, protected and have primary medical care and evacuation procedures for more serious medical conditions prior to country clearance. (Annex N -Contractor Security - TBP) (t) Establish procedures for processing contract companies' equipment and personnel to Iraq (country clearance). (g) Maintain accountability of contract personnel in Iraq. (h) Determine status of Federal Deployment Center task order and extend to September 30 for use by CPA redeployment. (i) Develop, in coordination with DOS (See Coordinating Instructions) a set of standard conditions to incorporate into contracts which require forward deployment of personnel and assets. (3) Tasks to Other Agencies (including USAID). Execute MOA(s) with DOS and other agencies regarding contracting workload and which agencies will manage or support specific contracts, by 30 April 2004. c. Coordinating Instructions. (1) NLT 30 April 2004, DOS coordinate with DOD to acquire required services using DOD contracts by 30 April 2004. (2) DOS and DOD jointly review current LOGCAP contract and oper~tions. (3) Ensure DOS has ability to utilize necessary LOGCAP operations by 30 April 2004. (4) DOS and DOD jointly will have finalized LOGCAP contract arrangement by I June 2004. (5) PCO will coordinate provincial relief and reconstruction efforts with the MNF-1 and the subordinate military commander in the area where projects are ongoing. ( 6) There are a number of issues related to contractors on the battlefield. The DOS and DOD will develop a set of policies and standard conditions to incorporate in each contract which requires contractors on the battlefield. These conditions (clauses) will address the responsibilities of contractors to secure themselves; the authority of contractors to carry weapons; limitations, if any on the type of weapons; the rules of force; housing and base support requirements; medical responsibilities; identification card requirements, physical condition requirements, and a broad range of other potential standard clauses. In this context, DOD and DOS will develop Version 3.0 communications strategies to inform the contractors and to deal with unintended consequences of policies derivative ofthis task. (Annex N Contractor Security TBP) (7) DOS/COM will be informed routinely of the country of origin of contractors employed on IRRF projects. 4.Adm inistration and Logistics Material and Services. Contract services for the CPA, US Mission Advance Team and the US Mission Iraq will be provided through current contracts and procedures established by the HCA until such time as DOS establishes other support contracts or determines continuation with DOD contracting is more advantageous. S.Co mmand and Control The PCO will be directed by the Secretary of the Army who will support contracting and acquisition activity in support of the US Mission Iraq and MNF-1. However, the element of PCO in Iraq will be under the COM Authority. It will be responsive to both the COM and Commander, MNF·I who will establish and prioritize requirements for construction and acquisition in their respective areas of responsibility. Version 3.0 ANNEXHTO OPLAN SOVEREIGN IRAQ 11 JUNE 2004 References: ANNEX H- INFORMATION AND COMMUNICATIONS TECHNOLOGY (ICT) A. Foreign Service Buildings Act (22 U.S.C. 292-302) B. Foreign Assistance Act (22 U.S.C. 2396) C. Secure Embassy Construction and Counterterrorism Act of 1999, Title VI, Pub. L. 106-113 D. Mission Performance Plan FY 2006 U.S. Embassy Iraq E. State I Defense Memorandum of Understanding (MOU) on Security, dated December 16, 1997 1. S ituation a. Current Situation. (1) US Government (USG) information and communications technology (ICT) currently in Iraq is characterized by four tiers. Tier I represents Department of Defense (DOD) military communications in support of the Commander, Central Command (CENTCOM). Tier II represents the ICT dedicated to the support of the Coalition Provisional Authority (CPA). Tier II consists of ICT assets purchased using both Defense Appropriations and Supplemental Appropriations. Tier II ICT is under the authority of the Communications Support Office (CSO) assigned to CPA, which will become the Communications Support Group (CSG). Tier III is the commercial telecommunications infrastructure of Iraq, and is administered by the Senior Liaison to the Ministry of Communications. Tier IV represents those ICT assets transferred from other tiers to the Department of State (DOS), or brought to Iraq by DOS, supporting USG and Foreign Service Nationals (FSN) currently assigned to CPA. (2) The Tier I ICT architecture has evolved from the wartime coalition structure to the developing Operation Iraqi Freedom (OIF) II structure. This developing architecture is characterized by the replacement of tactical US military communication assets with contractor-supported, commercial communications systems distributed throughout Iraq. The Department of the Army (DA) as Executive Agent (EA) for the ground force component in Iraq, along with the Defense Information Systems Agency (DISA) have supported both Tier I and Tier II ICT as separate architectures. (3) Tier II ICT capacity is characterized by a patchwork of initial communications systems acquired in support of the Office of Reconstruction and Humanitarian Assistance (ORHA) in the immediate aftermath of combat operations. The US military deployed initial communications capabilities in the immediate aftermath of intensive combat operations as it was the only organization capable of generating the magnitude of the capability required under the time constraints existing in April and May 2003. Under the authority of CPA, the Department of the Army (DA), as Executive Agent (EA) built this initial capability into today's current architecture supporting approximately 6,000 people in the Green Zone, three major communications nodes located in the north, south and west, and all regional teams. In addition, CPA provides ICT support H-1 EXE EU ITHOUT AUTHORITY OF INTERAGENCY TRANSITIO Version 3.0 .(,1 ~~~~~~E~X~E~f<fi~~~:,~ E UN 5 11HOUT AUTHORITY OF INTERAGENCY TRANSITION to non-DOD USG organizations and Non-Governmental Organizations (NGOs) within the Green Zone. A critical capability in this Tier II architecture is the GSM-based cellular system purchased from, and operated by the MCI Corporation. Covering metropolitan Baghdad, this system of approximately 10,000 phones and an international gateway remains the primary communications capability for both Iraqis and CPA. In addition, Continental United States (CONUS) dial tone is provided to the Green Zone via the CPA/CSO system using DISA long-haul services. Over the past year, the Intelligence Community and several Departments of the Executive Branch have established ICT infrastructure in Iraq. While not extensive, duplication beyond operational redundancy represents one of the primary areas for improvement in the existing USG architecture. ( 4) The capabilities of the civil telecommunications infrastructure of Iraq, Tier III, are characterized by geographic region. In the north, ten years of infrastructure investment has resulted in a nascent telecommunications capability including fiber, microwave, and cellular systems capable of supporting a significant percentage of Coalition I international partner ICT requirements. In the central and southern region, sanctions and combat operations have resulted in a patchwork of fiber, wire-line and microwave networks suffering from substandard pre-war construction and constant repair during the 1990's. With the exception of disparate ICT improvement projects fostered through the use of CENTCOM's local commander discretionary funding, the major infrastructure repair has been the $50M USAID effort through Bechtel Corporation repairing Class IV and Class V switches belonging to the Iraq Telegraph and Post Company (ITPC). These repairs were completed in March 2004. While significant, these repairs represent only a beginning in establishing wire-line service to the common Iraqi customer, systematically prevented access to such services by the previous regime. Moreover, authoritarian internal security policy prevented the establishment of cellular infrastructure throughout the regions under Saddam's control. Looting and sabotage following the cessation of combat operations further debilitated Iraq's civil telecommunications system. Post-war reconstruction has made moderate progress on restoring, and in some cases, improving this sector. In the area of cellular technology, there are now 5 cellular telephone companies offering services in Iraq: AsiaCell, Iraqna, and Atheer are providing regional services in the north, central, and south, respectively, but are also licensed to expand beyond their regions when regional standards are met. Korek and Sana Tel, both providing services in the north, have been given regional licenses only. Recent instability has resulted in system build-out delays for all cellular carriers. (5) An initial Tier IV ICT infrastructure was established in March 2004 as DOS established an initial communications capability at the Palace in the Green Zone. The expansion of DOS ICT support to the future Chief of Mission (COM) and those assigned to COM authority under National Security Decision Directive (NSDD)-38 has been the primary focus of the ongoing transition effort. Critical Mission staffing and space allocation decisions have yet to be made, delaying DOS efforts to expand initial installations of OpenNet Plus (similar but not identical to DOD's NIPRNet) and ClassNet (similar but not identical to DOD's SIPRNet) systems into the Green Zone. Simultaneously, DOS has been conducting extensive liaison with DOD facilitating the use of common ICT infrastructure. The lack of a Chief Information Officer for CPA, the pace of the US and multinational deployments into Iraq, and the relative difficulty H-2 EX E UNDE . WITHOUT AUTHORITY OF INTERAGENCY TRANSITION P Version 3.0 of conducting direct liaison in the current security environment in Baghdad have resulted in unnecessary duplication of ICT assets in Iraq. With the establishment of a Senior Steering Group in Baghdad comprised of the senior ICT representatives from CSO, DOS, CJTF-7, CENTCOM, the Intelligence Community, and the Senior Liaison to the Ministry of Communications, this duplication is being removed and efficiencies achieved. (6) This annex jointly developed by DOD, DOS, CENTCOM, and CPA, clarifies which ICT infrastructure and services contracts will be transferred to DOS, addresses contractual and technical issues in the transition from DOD to DOS, as well as identifying the residual capabilities of CPA and their disposition in the post 30 June 2004 environment. The goal of this Annex is to create a plan for obtaining an initial operating capability for the proposed US Mission population by 15 May 2004 so that it is fully operational when the US Mission Advance Team is established, while satisfying the residual ICT service requirements without interruption. b. Enemy Forces. The terrorist threat to the relief and reconstruction effort remains the primary risk factor for the successful completion of the mission. The ICT infrastructure is at risk from indirect fire from rockets and mortars and from direct action by saboteurs. The CSO/CSG must take actions to ensure alternate means of communications are available if a major telecommunications node is damaged or destroyed by hostile action. Continuity of Operations Plans (COOPs) must include the installation of redundant telecommunications systems. (See Annex B - Intelligence) c. Friendly Forces. US military forces falling under the operational control of the Multi- National Force Iraq (MNF-1) will be required to provide physical protection ofthe Green Zone. Military forces will also be required to perform convoy escort duties to protect telecommunications equipment and personnel in transit in the Iraqi Area of Responsibility (AOR). (See Annex A Command and Control Organizational Structure, and Annex K-- Security) d. Assumptions. (1) After transition, the Department of the Army will remain the Executive Agent for providing Communications Support to those areas of the CENTCOM AOR fur which it is now responsible. (2) Department of the Army will acquire funding to support existing communications contracts beyond 30 June 2004. (3) The US Mission and the Bureau of Near Eastern Affairs, Office oflraqi Affairs (NEAll), Department of State, will constitute the successor entity to the CPA under the provisions of Section 2208 ofthe Emergency Supplemental Appropriations Act. CPA property not transferring to DOS will be transferred to MNF-I before 30 June 2004. DOS and DOD will agree on the equipment to be transferred. ( 4) The official transfer of authority from CPA to US Mission Iraq, will occur on 30 June 2004. H-3 Version 3.0 (5) (6) (7) (8) DOS Information Resource Management office (IRM) will eventually provide all ICT support to organizations falling under COM. DOS will eventually provide all ICT support to Regional Team sites belonging to DOS. The Iraqi Government will provide ICT support for all Iraqi Government organizations operating in the Green Zone as soon as possible after 1 July 2004. The Iraqi Communications and Media Commission (ICMC) will be established and retained to allocate frequency spectrum for Iraq after sovereignty is established, and the US Government will continue to receive priority on and dedication to the frequencies required on a no-cost basis to support the US Mission and prosecute military operations. 2.Mi ssion The CSO/CSG mission is to install, operate, and maintain reliable seamless information and communications technology (ICT) for the United States Department of Defense organizations residing in the Green Zone of Baghdad, Iraq, as well as those DOD assets that are part ofthe regional teams deployed throughout Iraq. The CSO will also support other USG agencies and Non-Governmental Organizations (NGOs) as agreed upon. 3.Exec ution a. Concept of Operations. (1) (2) Commanders Intent. Upon transition or when designated by the Secretary of Defense, the CPA CSO/CSG will be transferred to be a subordinate organization to MNF-I, as specified by CENTCOM .. TheCSO/CSG provides communications support as directed by MNF-I and will provide communications support to DOD and non-DOD USG organizations and Non-Governmental Organizations (NGOs) within the Green Zone as directed by MNF-1. DOS will establish an Information Resource Management (IRM) function in Baghdad to provide communications support for the COM. There will be a period of time where organizations that fall under the Chief of Mission (such as the IRMO) will maintain communications support from the CSO/CSG while DOS IRM capabilities are being installed. CSO/CSG support will continue until the security environment becomes sufficiently permissive to allow for normal operations of the Mission ICT functions. Eventually, all communications support to organizations reporting to the Chief of Mission will be provided by the DOS IRM office. After transition, the Iraqi Government will assume responsibility for providing communication support to Iraqi Government offices operating in the Green Zone. Iraqi government offices and other non-DOD organizations that currently receive IT support from the CSO/CSG will transition to commercial telecommunications as soon as possible after 30 June 2004. The US Government, through the Department of State and the Department of Defense, will continue to refine the existing tiered ICT architecture in Iraq. The first tier, supporting US and Multinational military forces, will continue under the authority of H-4 E U 5 WITHOUT AUTHORITY OF INTERAGENCY TRANSITION Version 3.0 CENTCOM. Tmse Tier II assets transitioning from CPA that support US military assets both under MNF-I and COM authority will transfer to CENTCOM authority, under the MNF -I. This transfer would include the CSO/CSG organization. The third tier represents the build-out of the commercial/government networks oflraq. Tier IV, DOS IRM support of the US Diplomatic mission, will be developed by the Department of State. (3) An executive-level Senior Steering Group (SSG) will be formed in Baghdad to facilitate awareness of various ICT initiatives and to recommend prioritization of projects, equipment, training, and sustainment of Command, Control, Communications, Computers, and Intelligence (C4I) operations for USG. It will be comprised of senior ICT stakeholders from the DOS, DOD, CPA, CENTCOM, MNF- I, the Intelligence Community, and the Senior Liaison for the Ministry of Communications. The SSG will be co-chaired by the Department of State Information Management Officer (IMO) and the MNF-1 Communication and Information Services (CIS) officer. (4) The SSG will coordinate the sharing ofUSG ICT resources and contractual vehicles as practical in an attempt to find cost efficiencies, while capitalizing on technological synergies. The SSG will make recommendations concerning the implementation of the transitional architecture identified in this annex during transition and in the following phases of operations in Iraq. For those decisions beyond the control of the senior ICT representatives themselves, each member ofthe SSG will have the responsibility to staff the recommendations of the SSG through their respective chains of command, resolving these issues at the lowest level possible, e.g. MNF -1 Chief of Staff and the Deputy Chief of Mission. An Executive Level Transition Panel (EL TP) has been established in Washington, D.C. comprised ofthe Chief Information Officers (CIOs) of the Department ofthe Army, DOD, DOS, the Intelligence Community, and the Joint Staff J-6 to seek resolutions not obtainable in theater. The SSG will continue to coordinate the installation oflarge-bandwidth satellite downlinks in the Green Zone to prevent unnecessary duplication. The SSG will also work with the Ministry of Communications civil reconstruction effort to ensure that Iraq reconstruction priorities are synchronized, creating opportunities to shift some ICT services onto the Iraq civil telecommunications infrastructure. The USG will have achieved success if the USG has developed an integrated communications architecture that meets mission requirements, minimizes costs, eliminates duplication of assets, leverages the latest technology through technology insertion growth paths, and shapes a sustainable, flexible system which can adapt quickly to changing environments and missions in Iraq. (5) Conduct of Operations. (a) Current ICT infrastructure in Iraq includes equipment purchased with either US appropriated funds or assets belonging to the people oflraq. To achieve the goal of minimizing the impact to the existing USG user base, while maximizing the sharing ofiCT infrastructure assets in Iraq across the USG, an architecture is required that permits flexibility in the pre-30 June 2004 environment. This architecture also will require the specificity to successfully distribute all USG assets between MNF-1 and the Chief of Mission (COM) in the time period leading Version 3.0 up to 30 June 2004. This transition ICT architecture currently encompasses the existing CPA ICT infrastructure including wiring, computers, peripherals, and transport into and within the Palace compound. This infrastructure also includes the ongoing expansion of ICT services to other buildings in the Green Zone currently or soon to be occupied by ministries or liaison staffs, other DOD agencies, as well as other Executive Branch organizations. On 30 June 2004, several buildings within the Green Zone (such as the Government of Iraq Complex, GOIC) will no longer be associated with the USG, thus falling outside the transition ICT architecture. CSO/CSG, working with the CPA General Council, the COM incoming staff, and the Senior Liaisons to the Iraqi ministries, will determine which equipment will transfer to the future Government oflraq, and effect that transfer on 30 June 2004. For that equipment remaining USG property, the CSO/DSG will ensure that this equipment is accounted for, recovered, and processed using the procedures identified as part of the overall ICT inventory reconciliation between DOD and DOS. (b) DOS intends to utilize the current CPA Headquarters as the Interim Embassy Annex, designating the North Wing as a Controlled Access Area (CAA). DOS will utilize a villa within the Green Zone (previously occupied by C Company 1- 35) as the interim Embassy (aka Chancery). DOS will also utilize a residence currently occupied by the CPA administrator as the Chief of Mission's Residence (CMR). All of these areas either now or soon will contain wiring, computers, peripherals, and transport purchased by DOD. The transitional architecture described in this annex calls for the maximum use of this installed infrastructure. As DOS establishes an OpenNet and ClassNet presence in some of these three locations, maximum use of existing CPA-installed infrastructure will be used. The establishment of this presence will require additional equipment installations; however, to the maximum extent possible, DOS will avail itself of existing DOD contracts to complete this work. · (c) As of May 2004, the Iraqi civil telecommunications infrastructure is insufficient to support the U.S. Mission and MNF-1. (d) Senior Acquisition Officials from DOD and DOS will work to ensure that the communications requirements of all commercial contracts are appropriately accounted for: In addition, each contract must specify the requirement that contractors provide their employees access to COM Emergency Response Networks without cost to the USG. b. Tasks. ( 1) Department of State and DOD. (a) CPA will identify by number and location the non-CENTCOM USGconsumers of ICT assets within and outside the Green Zone. (b) CPA will notify the SSG, and in its absence the CSO/CSG and the senior DOS IRM representative in Baghdad, of any requirement to use additional office space in buildings within the Green Zone for CPA purposes. H-6 URE UNDE E WITIIOUT AUTHORITY OF INTERAGENCY TRANSITION PL Version 3.0 (c) CPA and COM will determine the structure, reporting relationship, and membership ofthe governorate teams to be deployed outside of Baghdad, to provide for COG/CSG planning. (d) Coordinate with Iraqi Ministries to accomplish the following: (1) Obtain information from the Ministry of Communications to facilitate the connection of the planned Green Zone fiber ring to the commercial Iraqi fiber network infrastructure. (2) Transition all ministries from USG ICT providers and support to non-USG JCT providers as soon as possible. (3) Transition ICT services for the Government of Iraq Center (GOIC) and the Convention Center I Forum to non-USG ICT providers as soon as possible. ( 4) Ensure that the Chief Information Officer within the Ministry of Science assumes responsibility for the provision of Iraqi Government domain presence and connectivity for the Government of Iraq. (2) DOS JRM. (a) Assume Co-Chairmanship of the ICT SSG. (b) Determine the ICT requirements for business units that will fall under the Chief of Mission on 30 June 2004. (c) Develop a plan to satisfy the ICT requirements for business units that will fall under the Chief of Mission on 30 June 2004. This plan will execute a deployment of OpenNet and ClassNet systems to satisfy these requirements as quickly as possible. It should include a transition plan to eventually move these offices off DOD-provided ICT services. (d) In the period leading up to 30 June 2004, DOS IRM will provide OpenNet and ClassNet services to those in the Green Zone requiring them. These services will be provided initially in common-use terminals; however, IRM will deploy these services to the desktop a rapidly as possible. DOS IRM will eventually provide all ICT support to organizations falling under COM. On 30 June 2004, DOS will assume responsibility for the provision of all Internet presence for organizations under COM authority. (e) DOS will develop the ICT capability to fully support regional teams deployed outside ofBaghdad. Until these services can be provided by DOS, DOD will provide these services. (f) Working with CSO/CSG, develop an inventory ofiCT equipment required by IRM to satisfy its requirements to support the COM. Version 3.0 (g) In coordination with the CSO/CSG, identify for retention on Task Order 44 the ICT equipment required by IRM to satisfy its requirements to support the COM. (h) Working with CSO/CSG, determine an ICT requirement satisfaction plan that provides for a smooth transition of ICT services from CSO/CSG to IRM for those offices and organizations subject to COM authority with minimal impact on services provided, while maximizing the sharing of ICT infrastructure assets. (i) Determine method to share Global Address List information between DOD and DOS domains. (3) CSO/CSG. (a) Assume Co-Chairmanship of the ICT SSG in preparation to transfer this responsibility to MNF-1 once established. (b) In the period leading up to Total Operating Authority (TOA), CSO/CSG shall provide all ICT support to USG cornumers in the Green Zone and to the government support teams located in the regions. (c) On 1 July 2004, CSO/CSG will provide NIPRNet, SIPRNet, CENTRIXS, commercial dialing, and long-distance wire-line telephone access to all non-DOD, USG personnel requiring these capabilities. In addition, CSO/CSG will provide NIPRNet, SIPRNet, CENTRIXS, commercial dialing and long-distance wire-line telephone access to all CENTCOM-subordinated consumers located in the Green Zone. The regional teams will be provided ICT services by CSO as required until which time DOS can assume full responsibility for the provision of these services. (d) Working with DOS IRM and the transition team, determine what ICT support will be required by new business units to be established in the support of the Chief of Mission. (e) Working with Defense Contract Management Agency (DCMA), develop an inventory ofiCT equipment required by CSO/CSG to s:ttisfy its requirements to support DOD personnel and those personnel subject to COM authority throughout the transition process. (f) In coordination with DOS, transfer all ICT equipment required by CSO/CSG to satisfy support to DOD and COM to the property book of Area Support Group Central (or designated DOD element) prior to 30 June 2004. (g) Working with IRM, determine an ICT requirement satisfaction plan that provides for a smooth transition ofiCT services from CSO/CSG to IRM for those offices and organizations under COM authority with minimal impact on services provided, while maximizing the sharing of ICT infrastructure assets. (h) Determine method to share Global Address List information between DOD and DOS domains. Version 3.0 (i) Complete pennanent wiring in North, Middle and South Embassy Annex. (j) Working with the Ministry Senior Liaison Officers and the US Mission Public Affairs Office, detennine and implement a transition strategy that ends DOD ICT involvement in Intranet and Internet web sites supporting non-USG organizations. (k) Working with DOS, detennine and implement a transition strategy that ends DOD ICT involvement in Intranet and Internet web sites supporting organizations subject to COM authority. (I) Develop and implement a management plan for USG GSM System cell phones that identifies the user, his or her organization, and validates the need for long- distance access. (m)Develop physical security procedures for DOS/DOD shared spaces in the Embassy Annex. (n) Develop and implement a data network migration plan. (o) Develop and provide network architecture to the MNF-I to facilitate Network status monitoring (NETOPS). (4) Multi-National Force- Iraq. (a) Be prepared to accept Co-Chainnanship of the ICT SSG, and assume these responsibilities once MNF-1 is established. (b) Co-Chair the ICT SSG facilitating development of a common ICT architecture that minimizes duplicative efforts. (c) MNF-I will accept OPCON ofCSO/CSG on 30 June 2004 or when designated by the Secretary ofDefense. (d) MNF-I will establish a property account in order to receive accountability for that CPA ICT equipment transferring to MNF-I. c. Coordinating Instructions. (1) Tier 1 (CJTF-7) Memorandum of Understanding on frequency assignments. CPA has enacted Order No. 65, which provides for Iraqi spectrum management responsibilities to be assumed by a newly created Iraqi Communications and Media Commission (ICMC). The Order stipulates the ICMC must coordinate its spectrum management activities with multinational forces (CJTF-7 and its successor entity, MNF-1), CPA (and its successor entity, COM), and DOS in order not to interfere with the operations of military forces protecting Iraq's national security. (2) In order to implement this mandate and ensure it is unimpaired by the transition to Iraqi sovereignty, a written document is required to codify current arrangements, rights and privileges ofMNF-I (and future commands) with regard to current and future H-9 EXE ND . ITHOUT AUTHORITY OF INTERAGENCY TRANSITION P Version 3.0 spectrum assignments, as well as the Iraqi table of allocations for spectrum, which has been updated to reflect the role of multinational forces in Iraq. This document, to be signed by MNF-1 and Iraqi civilian spectrum managers, will ensure the smooth transition oflraqi spectrum management authority to ICMC and compliance with Order No. 65's mandate on an operational level. This will help cement ties and remove regulatory uncertainties that might otherwise raise ambiguity for Multinational spectrum managers and I or their Iraqi counterparts. (3) MNF-T and the COM will identify resource requirements and determine personnel and equipment requirements to be provided by CSO/CSG. 4.Adm inistration and Logistics The COM will oversee and direct the communications staffs and requirements of the US Mission. The Iraq Base Operations Command, reporting to MNF-1, will provide augmentation support until such time as the security environment becomes sufficiently permissive to allow for normal mission operations. The Commander, MNF-I, will support the military architecture to include Tier I and those ICT assets transferred to MNF-I authority from CPA. 5.Co mmand and Control Upon transition, the CSO/CSG will be transferred CDR, US CENTCOM a. The requiremems., validation and resourcing of the CSO/CSG then becomes the responsibility ofCENTCOM and the Title 10 authority. b. DOS Information Resource Management (IRM) has appointed an Information Management Officer responsible to the current CPA executive staff. On 30 June 2004, this individual will report under Chief of Mission authority as specified by DOS. c. On 30 June 2004, the Senior Liaison for the Iraq Ministry of Communications (MOC) will be assigned to the Iraq Reconstruction and Management Office under COM authority. Version 3.0 E E UNDE . WITHOUT AUTHORITY OF INTERAGENCY TRANSITION P APPENDIX 2 TO ANNEXHTO OPLAN SOVEREIGN IRAQ 11 JUNE 2004 APPENDIX 2- MILITARY POSTAL SUPPORT OPERATIONS IN SUPPORT OF US MISSION- TO ANNEX H INFORMATION TECHNOLOGY AND COMMUNICATION References: A. NSPD 36, Dated 11 May 2004 and Public Law 108-106 B. DOD 4525.6-M, DOD Postal Manual, dated 15 Aug 02 C. Appendix 2 to Annex A - Base Support Operations in Support of US Mission D. Annex E- Organizations, Manpower and Personnel Administration E. 39 U.S. Code, Section 3401 1. S ituation a. Current Situation. The US Government (USG) has established a date of 30 June 2004 for the transfer of sovereignty of Iraq to an Interim Government. At that time, the Coalition Provisional Authority (CPA) will cease to exist, and the US Mission Iraq will be established. The Chief of Mission (COM) will be responsible for the direction, coordination and supervision of all USG employees, policies, and activities in country, except those under the command of the Commander, MNF-1, and employees seconded to International Organizations. The President has stated in NSPD 36 that the effort to build a strong, bilateral relationship with the Government of Iraq and to support Iraq as it makes the transition to democracy must have the full commitment of all agencies and directs the heads of US Departments and Agencies to provide assistance, services and other support. This appendix outlines the plan for continued military postal support to the US Mission Iraq by establishing a fully functioning APO in the US Mission Iraq to be used by authorized personnel assigned to the Mission. This APO will be referred to hereafter as the US Mission Iraq APO. b. Enemy Forces. See Annex B- Intelligence c. Friendly Forces. See Base Plan- OPLAN Sovereign Iraq d. Assumptions. (1) The US Mission will require military postal services. (2) The US Mission diplomatic pouch system, if available, will not be capable of providing adequate postal services. (3) The US Mission will not be able to provide all necessary manning for the US Mission Iraq APO until the situation on the ground in Iraq has substantially normalized and the US military presence has been substantially drawn down. UND ASE WITIIOUT AUTHORITY OF INTERAGENCY TRANSITION PL ( 4) The Department of Defense (DOD) under NSPD 36 will maintain the contract for APO services provided by the USG-servicing contractor (presently, Kellogg, Brown and Root (KBR)) or provide sufficient manpower to replace the KBR contractors. Properly cleared non-citizens can be hired as postal clerks, although they cannot handle official registered mail. (5) To the maximum extent possible, the Secretary of State will identifY for the Department of Defense the expected requirements for non-reimbursable APO support for DOD's use in preparing future budget requests. (6) Area Support Group (ASG) Central, outlined in Reference C, will provide sufficient postal services to authorized US Mission customers in the Green Zone who work both inside and outside of the US Mission Iraq compound. (7) Anyone authorized APO privileges is also authorized free mail privileges (personal correspondence) as long as that entitlement is in effect for Iraq. (8) US Mission Iraq will endeavor to fully protect all US Mail entering Iraq, both on the ground as currently managed and in future SOFA regotiations. 2.Mi ssion The USCENTCOM Single Manager for Postal Operations will provide reliable mail dispatch and receipt services to USG personnel, other authorized United States citizens in Iraq, and their authorized dependents on a non-reimbursable basis. 3.Exec ution a. Concept of the Ooeration. (1) This Mail Address Only (MAO) is currently operational. It only provides mail receipt services (i.e. customers can receive, but not send mail). Plans are underway to transition this mailroom to a fully functional APO by 9 June 2004. (2) Since the current servicing contractor KBR has denied a request to allow their personnel at the US Mission Iraq APO to handle postal finance, DOD has agreed to provide sufficient military postal finance clerks for this operation until civilianized, contracted out, or DOS assumes normal support in the future. There is no Military Postal Service Agency (MPSA) objection to contractors providing postal finance support if the contract calls for it and bidders concur. The servicing contractor would be responsible for financial losses. (3) The US Mission Iraq APO will provide services similar as other APOs in the area according to USCENTCOM and DOD regulations. These services will include, but may not be limited to, a full unit mail room with the exception of Official Mail service, and a finance operation to include numbered and unnumbered insurance, certified mail and return receipt for merchandise. The US Mission Iraq APO will not provide express military mail service. The finance portion of the APO will accept cash only, as E RE U 5 E WITIIOUT AUTHORITY OF INTERAGENCY TRANSITION Version 3.0 it does not have the capability to accept checks or charge cards. Requests to add additional services shall be made to the USCENTCOM Single Manager for postal services. ( 4) The Postal Officer at US Mission Iraq will determine the days and hours of operation of the US Mission Iraq APO. (5) The US Mission Iraq APO shall operate in accordance with all applicable instructions outlined in References A and B and USCENTCOM p:>stal regulations. (6) The USCENTCOM Single Manager for postal services shall appoint a Postal Finance Officer to provide initial stamp stock and future replenishment to the US Mission Iraq APO. (7) The US Mission Iraq APO will collect and provide all required mail metrics as directed by the USCENTCOM Single Manager for postal services. These reports may include, but are not limited to, mail transit time data, mail volume data and commerce data reports. (8) The authorized contractor shall pick up inbound mail from and deliver outbound mail to the Joint Military Mail Terminal Iraq (JMMT-1). The contractor shall also perform other APO operations at the US Mission Iraq APO that do not involve the handling of postal monies or stamp stock as detailed in the firm's contract with the USG. (9) Access to US Mission Iraq APO services shall be limited to personnel outlined in Reference B, Appendix 1. Normally, this includes only USG personnel and USG contractors in direct support of US Mission Iraq; however, all organizations providing direct support to US Mission Iraq at the time of CPA transition are hereby granted full APO access for their USG employees. Any group, not normally authorized APO access, and not covered by this exception at the time of CPA transition, must have a request made in writing from the Chief of Mission to the combatant commander, as outlined in Task 1 b below, within 60-days. The expectation is that such requests will be supported to the maximum extent practicable. b. Tasks. ( 1) Department of State. (a) Appoint a postal officer to oversee US Mission Iraq APO operations. This position may be an additional duty allocated to a permanently assigned DOS member. (b) Where such individuals may not be automatically authorized postal services by Reference. B, Appendix 1, they or their organization may submit a request for exception to user policy through the combatant commander to allow those individuals working in Iraq access to the US Mission Iraq APO. The combatant commander shall request services through the Military Postal Service Agency to the Office of the Secretary of Defense (OSD). Requests shall be made in Version 3.0 accordance with Reference B and should clearly outline which currently · unauthorized personnel are requesting postal support. (2) Department of Defense. Provide qualified postal finance clerks for the US Mission Iraq APO as needed to effectively accomplish the mission. c. Coordinating Instructions. ( 1) The USCENTCOM single manager for postal services will act on behalf of USCENTCOM. (2) Mail for the US Mission will be manifested (in and out) in such a way that US Mission mail may be accounted for separately from military mail. This action will allow MPSA and United States Postal Service (USPS) accounting offices to calculate the additional DOD funding required to provide non-reimbursable support and provide a basis for calculating required DOS budgets, once NSPD 36 is superceded. (3) Any contracts for postal services must be jointly reviewed by US Mission Iraq and the USCENTCOM Single Manager for Postal Services prior to implementation. 4.Adm inistration and Logistics The US Mission Iraq will provide the same level of administrative and logistical support to the US Mission Iraq APO as to other operations within the compound. This will include access to computers, phones, office furniture, office supplies, etc. 5.Co mmand and Control a. A Postal Officer, appointed by the US Mission Iraq, shall oversee and direct the US Mission Iraq APO operations. His/Her duties shall include performing monthly audits on the finance clerk accounts and quarterly audits on the Custodian of Postal Effects (COPE) account. b. The USCENTCOM Single Manager for Postal Services (presently, Air Combat Command Postal Services) shall provide policy guidance to the US Mission Iraq APO and assist in resolving any mail flow problems affecting this operation. In addition, the USCENTCOM Single Manager for Postal Services shall perform annual postal assessment of the US Mission Iraq APO in accordance with Reference B. c. The CENTCOM Single Manager for Postal Services shall maintain operational control of the US Mission Iraq APO until and if it transitions to a DOS Post Office. Version 3.0 E URE UND 5 E WITHOUT AUTHORITY OF INTERAGENCY TRANSITION CHANGE 1 TO ANNEX ITO OPLAN SOVEREIGN IRAQ 2 JULY 2004 References: ANNEX I -LOGISTICS A. Task Order 44 B. Army Regulation 710-2 1. Situation. a. Current Situation. The Coalition Provisional Authority (CPA) Headquarters provides logistical support to the CPA personnel and governance representatives. Primary life support is provided under Task Order 44 of the Logistics Civil Augmentation Program (LOGCAP) contract. The Defense Contract Management Agency assists the Contracting Officer's Representative to ensure the LOGCAP contractor meets the expected performance under the contract. Contracts with local firms provide supplemental support in addition to that provided by CJTF -7. The CPA C-4 is the office of primary responsibility to coordinate logistics requirements and support. After transition on 30 June 2004, the US Mission Iraq will receive support from the same sources; contracts and MNF -I as established in this plan, particularly in its annexes where the details of functional execution are outlined. b. Enemy Forces. The current security situation in Iraq is problematic for logistics support. It increases costs and time for security, movement and supplies, and this condition will likely exist throughout the early phases of the transition period and beyond. (Annex B- Intelligence) c. Friendly Forces: The CPA is supported by a number of contractors with the majority of the support coming from LOGCAP Task Order 44. DOD now manages the contract which provides logistical manpower, material, transportation, and other support functions. The US Mission will become a customer of LOGCAP and be entitled to use all T.O. 44 property formerly used by CPA. d. Assumptions. LOGCAP will be the primary means of life support for the US Mission Iraq until a permissive security environment enables the US Mission to utilize more economic sources. 2. Mission. Version 3.0 Not later than 30 June 2004, Department of Defense will transition specified logistics and administrative functions now supporting the CPA to the US Mission Iraq. This transfer of responsibility will be completed without disrupting ongoing operations, ensuring full accountability and protection of US Government property. 3. Execution. a. Concept of Operations. The Chief of Mission will assume primary responsibility for its logistics support, supported by DOD, no later than 30 June 2004. During this transition by DOD from its supporting the CPA to supporting the US Mission Iraq, it will ensure continuity of operations in its support. DOS will become a customer of the Army LOGCAP Contract and assume use of property formerly utilized by CPA. DOD will establish an Area Support Group (ASG Central) under MNF-1 that will provide direct support to the US Mission and MNF-I personnel in the Green Zone, and general support to other US Government agencies.operating in the Green Zone and at other sites in Iraq. (Annex A, Appendix 1 -Base Support Operations in Support of US Mission). It will provide specified support as established in an MOA between the COM and Commander, rviNF-I, and will do so until a permissive security environment allows normal embassy operations. The Project and Contracting Office (PCO), with its forward element under the authority of the Chief of Mission (COM), will coordinate the external logistical requirements in support of Iraq's reconstruction contracts. The end-state objective of this transition mission will be a functioning US Mission with the logistical and administrative support necessary to advance US government objectives in Iraq. Throughout, strict accountability of USG property will be an imperative during this transition period. (1) Conduct of Operations. The transition of logistics support from the CPA to the US Mission Iraq will occur during Phases I and II of the OPLAN phasing. Phase I from March through the 31 May 2004 culminated in establishment of the US Embassy Advance Team on 1 June 2004. Phase II culminates with establishment of the US Mission Iraq on 30 June 2004 and disestablishment of the CPA. Phase Ill terminates on 30 September as all financial and contract transactions I modifications are completed. Phase IV terminates with the elections of a Iraqi Transitional Government NL T 31 Jan 2005, and Phase V terminates when stability and normal operations of the US Mission are restored. (2) Mortuarv Services. DOD will provide Mortuary Services support to US Mission Iraq until adequate host nation mortuary resources are available and safe for the US Mission to use. In the event of a fatality of a US Government employee (who is a US national) under Chief of Mission authority, all efforts should be exercised to return remains in an expedient manner. The US Mission and MNF-I will coordinate in such cases. United States Central Version 3.0 Command (US CENTCOM) is the military's lead agent having the responsibility of evacuating remains. Mortuary services for other eligible US citizens are covered in Annex J Consular Affairs. b. Tasks. (1) Phases I and II. (a) Department of State. (1) Establish commercial air and surface lines of transportation to support US Mission Iraq's internal operations. (Appendix 1 -Military Air- to this Annex) In the absence of adequate DOS capabilities, identify requirements for US military assets. (2) Establish support relationships between US Mission and new and I or existing DOS support offices outside of Iraq. (3) Request US Army Head of Contracting Authority (HCA) to add US Mission Iraq as a customer of the current LOG CAP contract. (4) Identify capabilities ofthe current CPA Headquarters Support Group that will be required by the US Mission Iraq for specified logistics and administrative support. (b) Department of Defense. Ensure that all property used in CPA activities to be carried on by the US Mission Iraq will be available to the US Mission no later than 30 June 2004. To that end: (1) Upon receipt of request from DOS, US Army adds US Mission Iraq as a customer of the current LOGCAP contract. (2) Upon receipt of request from CPA property accountability officials (KBR), DCMA grants waiver of physical inventory since KBR will remain accountable for property after customer changes to US Mission Iraq. (3) CPA property accountability officials (KBR) modify property accountability records reflecting US Mission use of property formerly used by CPA. (4) Establish an Area Support Group (ASG Central) concept under MNF- 1, for support in Baghdad I Green Zone and other areas of Iraq (Appendix 1 -Base Support Operations in Support of the US Mission l-3 (Change 1) EXE UNDE . 5 , ITHOUT AUTHORITY OF INTERAGENCY TRANSITION P Version 3.0 to Annex A - Command and Control) with specified support requirements and commitments contained in the Support MOA (Annex T - Support MOA). Required logistics and administrative support to the US Mission Iraq will be supported through the ASG Central which has been designated within the ASG concept to support the US Mission in the Green Zone until a permissive security environment allows normal US Mission operations. (5) CENTCOM coordinate with DOS, CPA, the Joint Staff and DOD to define the roles and missions, size and organization of the Area Support Group Mission providing direct admin/log support to COM and general support to other tenants in the Green Zone. (6) After Army adds US Mission Iraq as a LOGCAP customer, DOD will audit Kellogg, Brown, and Root (KBR) property accountability records on an ongoing basis. (c) Department of State and Department ofDefense. (1) Establish a joint in-country synchronization cell to track all issues relating to the logistics transition. A smooth transition requires the accomplishment of some key tasks immediately. (2) Establish a joint DOD I DOS key events timeline which is critical to the logistics transition. Identify responsible parties to ensure that all USG entities as well as key contractors participate in transition planning and execution. Turnover will require careful consideration to ensure qualified individuals are available to perform necessary transition tasks. (3) Ensure that the CPA C-4 and the DOS Representative (US Mission Management Counselor) coordinate all logistics support during the transition to the US Mission. All ongoing support will continue during transition. Additional support required by the overlap of DOD and DOS personnel and functions must be identified immediately for resolution. (4) Establish within the Support MOA (Annex T- Support MOA) requirements for the ASG Mission to be direct support of the US Mission Iraq and general support to other tenants in the Green Zone until a permissive security environment allows normal US Mission operations. (2) Phases III through V. Continue Logistics support operations. Version 3.0 c. Coordinating Instructions. (1) Cost of LOGCAP services will not be reimbursed until such time as Congress appropriates funds to DOS or other USG agencies for such purposes. (a) At the appropriate time and as the situation permits, reliance on LOGCAP support will be terminated or reduced and replaced by other more cost effective means of support. (b) The Federal Deployment Centers in Virginia and Kuwait will be used by DOS through at least 30 Sep 2004. (c) All USG entities in the US Mission will be responsible for funding their own life support costs. (d) Any property refused by DOS transition team will be the responsibility of the LOGCAP Contractor and DCMA for disposition. These items should have been identified by 1 June 2004 to ensure proper disposition. (2) Autopsy Responsibilities. The Armed Forces Medical Examiner (AFME) is the lead agent for conducting death investigations of US personnel. The AFME or his designated representative, in coordination with the Regional Medical Officer of the US Mission, will determine the cause and manner of death for any US Mission death investigation. The AFME also makes the determination whether or not an autopsy will be performed or forensic pathology investigation will be conducted. The AFME is also the lead agent for working in cooperation with the Federal Bureau of Investigation and other investigative agencies in determining the cause of death. (3) The Commander, ASG Central, will develop procedures for reimbursement of costs, such as LOGCAP, for personnel who use services in the Green Zone but who do not fall under the authority of the COM nor command of the NINF-1. A similar procedure will be established by the Regional Coordinator, Regional Teams. 4. Administration and Logistics As stated in this plan and Annex A, Command and Control 5. Command and Control a. The Administrator, CPA, will remain the final decision authority on all relevant issues until transfer of sovereignty on 30 June 2004. Effective with transfer of sovereignty on 30 June 2004, decision authority as appropriate will shift to the Chief of Mission Iraq and to the Commander, MNF-I, as appropriate. b. Command of the ASG Mission will be assigned to the MNF-1 and responsive to the COM for direct support identified in the Support MOA (Annex T-Support MOA) and in Appendix 2 -Base Support Operations in Support of US Mission to Annex A Command and Control. Version 3.0 APPENDIX 2 APPENDIX 2 TO ANNEX ITO OPLAN SOVEREIGN IRAQ 11 JUNE 2004 MILITARY AIR SUPPORT OPERATIONS IN SUPPORT OF US MISSION - TO ANNEX I LOGISTICS References: A. OPLAN Sovereign Iraq B. Annex I - Logistics C. Support Memorandum of Agreement between Department of State and Department of Defense l.S ituation. a. Current Situation. DOD currently provides scheduled and special mission Military Airlift (MILAIR) support to CPA. Requirements are coordinated by the Headquarters Support Group within the Annex Compound. b. Enemy Forces. See Annex B- Intelligence c. Friendly Forces. See Base Plan OPLAN Sovereign Iraq d. Assumptions. ( 1) The security environment will not change in the near future. (2) The US Mission Iraq will require similar support in the near term. (3) The US Mission Iraq will use commercial air assets as the security situation permits. 2.Mi ssion. Not later than 15 June 2004, DOD makes available Military Air assets to support US Mission Advance Team operations in Iraq and, subsequently, the US Mission Iraq after of 30 June 2004. 3.Exec ution. a. Concept of the Operation. DOD through the MNF-1 will provide military air support for the COM on an as required basis for fixed wing aircraft and on an allocated basis for rotary wing support. The US Mission Iraq will seek to minimize utilization of aircraft for administrative purposes unless all other means of transportation have been analyzed and rejected. US Mission intends to use commercial surface and air carriers to move freight and diplomatic pouches into Iraq in support of Mission requirements provided it is safe and available. However, if commercial service is unavailable, DOD will provide Military Air support to move needed materiel. Until such time as commercial air transportation has been deemed safe, and remains so for a reasonable period of time, DOD will support DOS air transportation needs according to the following: {1) Fixed Wing. MILAIR Travel is provided by USCENTCOM Air Mobility Division (AMD) through Joint Movement Center (JMC) requests according to schedules and routes as requested. The initial Embassy request will be for a daily shuttle: Kuwait/Baghdad/ Amman/Baghdad/Kuwait. CENTCOM will coordinate with AMD to ensure that COM has appropriate air routes, at appropriate periodicities, to support COM business in-country and out-of-country. (2) Rotary Wing. Each day, USCENTCOM will allocate two UH-60 Blackhawk helicopters to be available on a priority basis, at the same level of priority assigned to Commander MNF-I. Daily (by 0900 if possible), COM will release these aircraft, if not needed for COM use. Even if the dedicated craft have been released back into the pool for the day, aircraft from the pool will be available for COM use upon request, at the same priority level as Commander MNF-I. (3) If additional helicopters are needed to meet mission requirements, requests will be submitted per the normal SOP, with as much advance notice as possible, in accordance with priorities based on principal passengers. b. Tasks. Department of Defense: (1) DOD provides Military Air support for official transportation of US Mission Personnel, including all official USG travellers in support of the Mission, between locations within Iraq until alternative transportation is determined to be safe and available. (2) DOD will provide Military Air support for official transportation of US Mission Personnel, including all official USG travellers in support of the Mission, into and out of Iraq until alternative transportation is determined to be safe and available. (3) DOD will coordinate Military airlift support requirements for personnel, goods and programs under COM. 4.Adm inistration and Logistics See Annex I- Logistics 5.Co mmand and Control See Annex I - Logistics Version 3.0 ANNEXJTO OPLAN SOVEREIGN IRAQ 11 JUNE 2004 References: ANNEX J -CONSULAR A. 7 Foreign Affairs Manual, Section 240- Disposition of Remains B. 7 Foreign Affairs Manual, Section 300 - Emergency Financial and Medical Assistance for US Citizens Abroad C. 22 C.F.R., Section 72.12- Proper Preparation of Remains l.S ituation a. Current Situation. Iraq is a war zone where some regions are permissive and others are not. American citizens, including people such as reporters and missionaries, who are not affiliated with the Coalition I international partners or with the US Government (USG), have been killed or injured. The medical system in Iraq is not currently capable of providing an adequate level of care for American citizens who become injured or ill. There is no commercial transportation system or company, other than the US military, capable of providing emergency medical evacuation for American citizens in Iraq. There are no mortuary service providers capable of meeting US standards for certifying deaths or preparing and shipping remains back to the US. The US consular officer's ability to perform his/her duties and assist private American citizens with emergencies outside of the "Green Zone" is very limited. These limits are a function of the security environment in Iraq and the absence or inadequacy of Iraq's local police, rescue teams, trauma facilities, disaster assistance agencies, transportation providers, and its mortuary/funeral industry. In the absence of local abilities to provide these services, the US military has been providing them. These arrangements have been informal to date. DOS receives no specific funding to provide for private citizens' medical care, medical evacuation, mortuary services, or transport of remains if the citizen is injured or killed in Iraq, and DOS receives very limited funding to grant loans in such cases. Moreover, those funds are available to support private U.S. citizens worldwide and are wholly inadequate to the ongoing situation in Iraq. b. Enemy Forces. See Annex B ~Intelligence c. Friendly Forces. See Base Plan- OPLAN Sovereign Iraq d. Assumptions. None provided. 2.Mi ssion The United States Government (USG) continues current consular capability and establishes a Consular Se […اقتُطع العرض هنا — النص الكامل في ملف التنزيل]