07-F-1010 CPA Dir Foreign Affairs DeBathification 09-04-2003

- - ----~ Pagel of 1 Slocombe, Walt B. (SES) From: [~ ---...,_--" Sent: Monday, September 01, 2003 6:05 PM To: Slocombe. Walt B. (SES) Subject: Saddam's Services: numbers You asked on Friday whether 1 could give you any idea of the size of Saddam's Services. I have retrieved the foJl text of the document I previously drew on for the "Close Hold" paper, and can give you a partial answer, based on information known in - I should say- about 2001. Directorate General of Intelligence: reliable reporting (and more dependable, I suppose, than the yellowcake tosh) suggests around 2,000 employed in Baghdad, and another 2,000 in provincial stations and abroad. Special Security Organizatio. n (Saddam's Gestapo): unhelpfully quotes variolls reports placing the number of those employed at between 1;500 and 35,000 The Special Emergency Forces: Up to eight battalions. Directorate General of Security and Director.ate of Military Intelligence: The paper is mute. ____ .,.may provide an answer on the latter, in the augmented statis tics I have now asked him for. Special Republican Guard: also nothing in the paper.r ~--_,!{or, of course, the INC), may help on this, too. I hope that the INC may also be able to cough up some Ba'ath Party records, as I have the feeling, without being certain, that the ISG may not have much in this vital area. 1f you ever wanted to peer further into this murky area - into, for instance, the position within the apparatus of the MJC - you would be welcome to the document. Alternatively, I couJd try to extract from it answers to any further questions you may have. [ Deputy Director lntell\geJice Conversion Office of Secu rity Affairs Mobile:r' I I IHI 1111~11 IJ Ill I 02395 9/4/2003 CLOSEIIOLD IRAQ'S INTELLIGENCE AND SECURITY SERVICES: A DIGEST I. DIRECTORATE GENERAL OF INTELLIGENCE ('-..lall~l~l.Ml\~~) Mission: To monitor and suppress dissident activities at home and abroad To collect foreign political, economic and scientific intelligence To penetrate foreign intelligence and security services To provide operational intelligence and support for weapons procurement To disrupt and collect intelligence on foreign diplomats and intelligence officers, and United Nations personnel DGI Directorates (broadly, I suspect on the KGB model): The main offending Directorates seem to be: Directorate I.: Responsible for over-all management. Officers assigned to the Special Projects and Tasks section may have been instructed by their Director to carry out highly sensitive operations (or investigations) unknown to their colleagues working in other parts of the Service. Based in Al Mansur headquarters building. Directorate IV: Foreign Operations. Included supervision of Illegals operating under natural cover. Based at Al Mansur Headquarters. Directorate V: Counter Intelligence/Espionage. This involved inter alia the investigation of haqis suspected of collaborating with foreign intelligence services. Office in Karradat Sharqiyah/Masbah. Directorate VII: Investigations and judicial matters. Interrogation of Iraqis suspected of working for a foreign intelligence service. Known to have used physical torture in its attempts to extract information. Cooperated with Psychological Department which ran courses on the psychological techniques used for interrogation. Department IX: Scientific and Technical Support. Originally part of the Directorate General of Security and known as the Al Hasan ibn al Haitham Institute, transferred to the DGS in the 1980s. Probably in late 1980s appears to have been re-transferred to MIMI under Husain Kamil, to assist CB weapons programs. Part of the Directorate remained with MIC's Salam factory after the 1 CLOSEIIOLD Gulf War, and was responsible for work on clandestine communications devices, timing devices, radio transmitters and cipher equipment. This part continued to work closely with the residual Department IX. HQ in Palestine Street. Laboratories at Salman Pak. (destroyed by coalition bombing in 1991). Department XIV: Responsible for planning and mounting Special Operations (assassinations, assaults, kidnaps, bombings, break-ins etc) against oppositionists living in Iraq and abroad. Also tasked with planting and detecting eavesdropping devices, intercepting phone calls and conducting clandestine photography. Possessed a military-style training camp at Salman Pak. Directorate XL: Responsible for monitoring the activities abroad of groups and individuals opposed to the Iraqi Government. Divided into four sections: • Religious parties, such as Da'wa • Reactionary parties, such as the INA • Leftist parties, such as the Iraqi Conununist Party and the International Command of the Ba'ath Party (pro-Syrian). • Kurdish section Regional Directorates: Northern (Mosul), Eastern (Kirkuk), Southern (Basra) and Western (Ramadi). Broadly divided up into sections including commercial companies and hotels, counter-intelligence (eg political parties, Kurds, Turkey, Iran,Gulf States, Palestine and Syria), security (arrests, disruption, industrial plants), surveillance, technical operations. Activities; a note These included forcing Iraqi expatriates in Kuwait to act as cooptees and informants (1980s), efforts against opposition/exile communities in Europe. State enterprises such as Iraqi airways, Iraqi News agency and the Rafidain Bank were used as well as embassies abroad to provide cover. Eavesdropping equipment was reportedly installed in the Novotel, Rashid, Baghdad, Ishtar Sheraton and the Meridien hotels. 2 CLOSE IIOLD II. DIRECTORATE GENERAL OF SECURITY (r\al\u.-l\~~) Responsible for countering threats to Iraq's internal security from the civil population. Investigated and acted against any individual or group suspected of anti-state activity. Maintained paramilitary forces for quelling civil unrest, though these were under the control of the Special Security Organisation. Political Directorate: The principal operational part of the DGS. Branches cdedicated to monitoring foreigners and embassy personnel (Branch I), Shi'a oppositionists (Branch II), Kurds (Branch Ill), Political Parties (?Branch IV), and Religious Organisations, such as Da'wa (Branch V). Also monitored families belonging to Iraqis who lived abroad, and Iraqis who travelled abroad frequently, and businesses in Iraq dealing with foreign firms and individuals. Include the Prisons Security Department, cooperating with the Interior Ministry, the Ministry of Social and Labour Affairs and the DGS Security Directorate in running prisons. Recruited prisoners who might prove useful on release. III.DIRECTORATE OF MILITARY INTELLIGENCE (~~l.;~\'ll\~~) The activities of the DMI, generally characteristic of most military intelligence services, included maintaining links with Iraqi students abroad who had access to overt specialized military and military-industrial information. Interrogated civilians arrested by the army in prohibited areas. Supervised the areas holding detainees. IV. SPECIAL SECURITY ORGANISATION (uaWl<J.d.!Ulf+) Primarily involved in overseeing the security of the Saddam Husain, and monitoring and investigating the loyalty to the regime of other intelligence and security services - and of military units integral to the regime's survival (including the Special Republican Guard (SRG) and the Republican Guard (RG). Maintained records on all VIPs and senior commanders of the two Guards, and posted liaison officers into the other services. Also responsible for controlling the operational activity of the SRG and RG. Involved in monitoring UNSCOM and IAEA activity in Iraq and controlled pre-war efforts to hide proscribed material from both agencies. Controlled by Qusay Saddam Husain. One of the principal Departments within the SSO was the Department of Special Conspiracies. It was formed in 1992 to conduct a wide range of intelligence- gathering and security operations in Northern Iraq aimed at combating threats to 3 CLOSE HOLD the regime posed by Kurdish and Iraqi opposition groups. It recruited elite officers from the other services. It was actively engaged in mounting offensive operations in Kurdish-controlled northern Iraq, many involving assassinations, bomb attacks, break-ins and kidnaps. These probably included attacks on humanitarian relief efforts in northern Iraq. Subordinate to the SSO was the Special Republican Guard, of which Qusay Saddam Husain was also Commander. Its primary function was to protect Saddam Husain. It sought to achieve this, in part, by providing a security cordon around Baghdad and Tikrit to prevent any other Iraqi military units from entering the two cities. It also provided personal bodyguards for Saddam Husain and VIPs, and protected Presidential and sensitive military-related sites. The Special Emergency Force was reportedly made up of units from the SRG, the DGI and the DGS, all subordinated to the SSO. It consisted of up to eight battalions, primarily infantry, though there was some evidence that one or more battalions were equipped with armoured vehicles, used primarily to quell popular and prison unrest. 4 ... .,,.... . .., ... ~ .... __ .. • • 2ND.L fST.L CAPT , MA.I l.T.COi COL BG MG LG M.LG MAR 'TOTAL B4THDEGREE ' 1 2 1 8 10 7 40 7 1 65 ~_,,:.:. 10 2 1 3 12 16 100 4 1 1•9 ~J~. 3 ! 22 72 26 78 265 193 31 5 695 ~.,.:... 32 82 298 487 1019 ' 1302 1749 436 12 2 5429 .ijj,~ 32 91 3-22 560 I 1058 1.402 2037 773 SS 11 1 83-46 ~'J;i~ '.~· '·.,. , ............ , .· OTHER FRKA SHUBA FAREE MKTB QEADA TOTAL GROUP 5006 652 137 26 5821 - .... u.<1uu• 997 262 20 , 4 1 1284 ·'31 41 4 476 566 101 1 668 170 1 1 172 22 9 16 7 . 38 8 100 I 48 , 9 1 1 59 I I u,,34 5429 696 1'9 81 a U80 I - ' r • • r,~ . r Udw Firqa • Window of opportunity to co-opt their support - They promise to obey all laws of the CPA - They pledge to fully cooperate in serving Iraqi people and in building new Iraqi government • They represent a significant "swing" group - 6200 people mostly between L TC and BG - Acknowledged and respected as leaders • Can be very helpful to CPA's security goals in the future Public Affairs and media campaign • Shows that the CPA is humanitarian oriented - Recognizes needs of the family • Shieks at Conference in Babil supported the idea of humanitarian assistance to families of Udw Firqa members - Would receive wide acceptance among Iraqis Procedures • Wife or other family member picks-up check - Must present military and civilian ID cads of Udw Firqa member - Family member must also present his/her own civilian ID card to prove family relationship - Must present food ration (Ministry of Trade) ID card • List of Udw Firqa personnel affected by this decision provided to each site - Only families of those on list are eligible Pay Scale Rank Stipend Amt ($)/month Family Gets ($)/month BG-MG 120 100 LTC-COL 100 80 2LT-MAJ 80 60 WO/NCO 50 40 Only families of those Udw Firqa who did not commit crimes would receive money • Those in the intelligence organizations, Fedayeen Saddam, Special Republican Guard, senior advisors, and personal guard would be excluded .-.......... We should give their issue attention, or else it could escalate to the point where they feel that no one listening and they feel talking will not get them anywhere. In their culture, raking care o:f their family is paramount. Without work, they cannot provide for their families. This morning at 0900 I had a meeting with fonner lr:aqi military officers to discuss the stipend payments process. The men were all members of the Udw Firqa level in the Ba'ath Party. Tbe following is a summary ofthc meeting: • Pay these people or they will swing over to the side of those who oppose the --~------------' USA. • If someone bas no money, they arc easy targets to be swayed by those who are working against the USA. • The needy people will accept this propaganda because they need the money. • Udw Firqa and below in the Ministry of Education can keep their jobs, • Udw Sbu'ba can get their retirement • Deputy Minister ofHeaJth Dr. Ali Shanon (former military MG- Ba'athist?) • The military did not fight against the USA • They want to be friends • They have not been involved in the vio1ence. • They want to meet with Mr. Slocombe and/or Mr. Bremer • Families of Udw Firqa are without money • In Ambassador Brcmer's order, there is a provision for exceptions on a case by case basis • Human right means that you should not withhold from a family its ability for subsistence • Many of these officers were highly respected within their neighborhoods and communities and earned a good living. • They cannot accept the disgrace and insult of being forced to work, for example, as a laborer. This would disho11or them. • Officers cannot take a, cheap job because people know who they were and the responsibiHties and respect they commanded previously. To do so now would dishonor them. Tuey would lose face. and in their culture they would rather die than lose face. If they get to this point in their despair they will not care whether they take some Americans with them. • These men are used to fighting, while civilians are not. • Udw Firqa around the country are in a bad way because of no money. • Schools are opening, but they have no money to purchase their kids school supplies. • After the Najaf explosion, people blamed tbe CPA for lack of security • Lf you pay the Udw Firqa, security will be improved • Paying people money is needed to counter influence of opposition groups • Need to do it before start of Ramadan ------------ - --- ------·-- FW: De-Ba'ath Update for CPA Senior Advisors Page I of3 From: f jCIV To: Slocombe, Walt B. (SES) ;r~----~ k0-6 MoNSD) Cc: r I Subject: FW: De-Ba'ath Update for CPA Senior Advisors ~ Attachments: - Sent: Wed 912412003 3:20 PM This is a topic of consternation today, and I'll bet for a while. It's pretty clear what it all means (there's a contest of wills) except the end of Meghan's memo makes it sound like ~once we get this sorted out, we won't have to worry about de-Baathification anymore.• Riiiiiiggghhhhttttt!! --Ori~-From:~FS01) Sent: Tuesday, September 23, 2003 9:33 PM To: CPA Ministries Cc: Executive Secretary Subject: De-Ba'ath Update for CPA senior Advisors Governance has provi~e following update and interim guidance on De-Baathification. ----advises that CPA is meeting with the Governing Council tomorrow and she will update us afterwards, but Governance does not expect to resolve all outstanding issues. https://webmail.orha.centcom.mil/exchang~box/FW:%20De-Ba'ath%20Upda... 09/24/2003 FW: De-Ba'ath Update for CPA Senior Advisors Page 2of3 • To AH CPA Ministry Teams, The Governing Council recently established the Higher National De-Ba'athification Commission to assume responsibility for the formulation and implementation of de- ba' athification. This act was in response to pointed urging from Ambassador Bremer for the GC to take responsibility in this area. Iraqis, not foreigners, are best positioned to complete or refine the de-ba' athification process that CPA started. This Commission issued two "decisions" on September 14. In summary, the commission advanced: 1) The immediate dismissal from public positions anyone of the rank of "firqa" and above. All exemptions issued previous to this date were rendered immediately null and void. Those affected by this decision have the right to appeal. 2) A ban on people of the rank of"firqa" and above - as well as others who have committed crimes and plundered the country's wealth - "attaining special positions or responsibility in public positions or political activities or institutions of civil society, and the press and media." The word "decisions" is in quotation marks because the Commission's decisions cannot have the force of law unless and until CPA issues an order formerly transferring authority to the Higher National De-Ba'athification Commission and ratifies these two decisions. Ambassador Bremer intends to do this, but has first asked for clarification on questions such as: guarantees of due process (particularly mechanisms for appeal), further definition of parameters of de-ba 'athification of politics, civil society and the media, and a request to consider the revocation of exemptions on a case-by-case basis, rather than a blanket one. Once we resolve these outstanding issues, Ambassador Bremer will issue an order https://webmail.orha.centcom.mil/exchange~nbox/FW:%20De-Ba'ath%20Upda... 09/24/2003 .------- - FW: De-Ba'ath Update for CPA Senior Advisors Page 3 of3 .. . • transferring authority and ratifying the Commission's decisions. This will undoubtedly have implications for the ministries, although the exact nature of these consequences is difficult to predict given the number of unanswered questions. For example, it is still unclear whether the Commission intends to revoke all temporary exceptions, or only the ones that have been applied to people who are firqa and above. When the transfer of the power to enforce de-ba'athification occurs in the very near future, the Coalition will be relieved of the responsibility of identifying and removing Ba 'athists, although CPA ministry people are expected to be fully supportive in helping the Iraqis implement the policy as necessary. We will provide you with more details as soon as they are available. I https://webmail.orha.centcom.miVexcbang~box/FW:%20De-Ba'ath%20Upda... 09/24/2003 , • TO: Ambassador Bremer FROM: RE: Assessing De-Ba'athification DATE: 7 July 2003 Nearly two months have passed since you issued the May 16th De-Ba'athification order. The principle behind the policy - purging Saddam's supporters from positions of power and influence - has won wide-spread support within Iraq and abroad. Yet the implementation of the policy has been uneven at best. Moreover, it has generated considerable confusion among both Iraqis and military and civilian members of the coalition. We should not seek to amend the policy issued on May 16th. Doing so would be counterproductive, because it would both undermine our continued efforts to root out the worst Ba'athists and damage our broader credibility in Iraq. We should, however, identify the factors that have contributed to the confusion surrounding the policy and mitigate them where possible. Why the Confusion? There are five inter-related reasons why our de- ba' athification policy has generated confusion: 1. Complex Nature of the Policy and Revolving Door of Coalition Advisors. The policy involves various tiers of the Ba'ath Party and several layers of management in the ministries. Even ~ftP.r reading the policy closely, many of our implementers have questions about who is affected. The steady arrival of new advisors means that at any given time, there is a group unfamiliar with the basic parameters of the policy. 2. Uneven Application of Policy. No two ministry or municipal advisors or military corrnnanders have implemented the de-ba'athification policy in exactly the same way. For example, some of those requesting exceptions have allowed employees to continue working while their applications were pending; others have removed those requesting exceptions until further notice. Such inconsistencies between ministries and between governorates fuels confusion and the perception of injustice. 3. Difficulty in Squaring Competing Objectives. Particularly in the governorates where there is little policy guidance from Baghdad, local commanders have seen the de-ba'athification policy to be in conflict with their other responsibilities, such as maintaining law and order. In weighing these competing objectives, commanders have often chosen to soften the deb- ba' athification policy in its implementation, exacerbating confusion by adding to the uneven application of the policy nationwide. 4. Disconnect between the Stated Objectives of the Policy and the Reality of its Implementation. Our stated policy aim is to remove the worst Ba'athists, the supporters of Saddam, from positions of influence and power. In r.ea1ity, the policy has affected a significant number of Iraqis who were not active Ba'ath Party members or defenders of the former regime. Our ministry advisors report that either a majority or large minority of those who have lost their jobs (and pensions) under this policy were "average, hard-working Iraqisn who had joined the party either to avoid harassment of their families or maintain their jobs. 5. Slowness of Exception Procedures. The wait for the approval or disapproval of exception applications perpetuates uncertainty. This impedes operations of the ministries and creates the perception that the coalition is ambivalent about de-ba'athification procedures. Mitigating the Confusion We can and should take several steps to address the current confusion surrounding our de-ba'athification policy. 1 . Clarify the Policy and Guidelines for its Implementation. Attached is a draft memo which clarifies our objectives, spells out the parameters of the policy, and addresses common questions concerning its implementation. It should be distributed to all coalition ministry personnel and local commanders, as 2 well as translated for broader dissemination. This document will serve the dual purpose of providing guidance to those implementing the policy and squashing rumors that the coalition has reversed the de-ba'athification policy or no longer requires its full implementation. 2. Appoint a Person to Have Formal Responsibility for Overseeing the Implementation of De-Ba'athification. To date, I (and others no doubt) have sought to explain the policy to ministry advisors and answer their questions surrounding it on a fairly ad hoc basis. Neither I nor anyone else at a working level has had any formal responsibility for monitoring the implementation of the policy, has had the ability to hold people accountable for it, or has had any visibility over the de-ba'athification processes occurring in the governorates. Empowering a person to serve these functions would centralize our de- ba' athification efforts, facilitate the flow of information in both directions, and diminish current confusion. This person will play a key role in ensuring that the transition of responsibility for de- ba' athification from the coalition to Iraqis is a smooth one. 3 . Create an Expedited Mechanism for th~ Consideration of Exception Applications. It was important for you to be directly involved in the first round of exceptions in order to set the standard for approval. However, it is now possible to delegate this responsibility to someone else, preferably the de-ba'athification guru described above. You may wish to make small changes to the implementation guidance laid out below <*~and # ~- in particular) in order to both simplify exception procedures and ease some of the unintended consequences of the policy. 4. Facilitate the Creation of Iraqi Institutions to Deal with De-Ba'athification. While it is neither desirable nor politically palpable for us to make changes to the May 16th policy, Iraqis themselves are in a position to do so. While cracking down harder on criminal Ba'athists, Iraqis may wish to take steps to soften the impact on those largely innocent people caught in the net of de-ba'athification. They could, for instance, decide to offer pensions to those 3 dismissed from their job on account of full party membership. We should brief the Governing Council on our de-ba'athification efforts thus far and facilitate the establishment of the Iraqi De-Ba'thification Council in any way possible. Attachment: Clarifying De-Ba'athification Policy 4 The Dayton Accords Jeft Bosnia with two annies - a Bosnian Serb and Federation (Muslim-Croat) force. 11'1 reality there were three rnilitaries, since the Croats had independent formations within the Federation anny. Dayton also provided for a state-level Standing Committee on Military Matters to coordinate defense planning and work with international military presence (IFOR/SFOR). It was a powerless institution. Dayton provided for no state-level Ministry of Defense or General Staff; and the Serb and Federation entities (sub-national units in Bosnian parlance) retained theirs. Dayton was intentionally ambiguous on who had supreme military authority and command and control. The Bosnian Serbs asserted Dayton gave their Serb Republic President this authority. The High Representative (Amb. Bremer's equivalent) decreed later that Dayton placed this authority in the state level Tri-Presidency. but this had little impact on actual operations. The SCMM has a Serb, Croat and Bosniak member, and the chairmanship rotates and reports to the Tri-Presidency. Initially, the U.S. provided military assistance only to the FC{)eration, in an effort to redress the military balance. We more than did that to Serb distress. In the early years we were also pre-occupied with bringing down troop numbers and weapons stockpiles. Over the past two years we focused on building up a state dimension for defense. To overcome Serb resistance we opened our military cooperation to both annies, but channeled all programs through the SCMM. We have encouraged other NATO countries to do the same. Similarly, Bosnian participation in NATO's PfP program has been conditioned on a clear state-level command and control structure and these discussions have been worked through the SCMM. The Serbs recently accepted the principle of state-level C2. This will translate into a new state-level general staff and the removal of all war planning/ making powers from the entities. The Tri-presidency will have direct operational control over all military units throughout Bosnia. The entities retain administration (staffing, supply, etc.) of these units. The SCMM will function as an MOD for the state in all but name. Once Bosnia's in PfP we hope to further integrate the militaries. The Bosnian lesson: you can get where you want to go without imposing fonnal structures, by offering the right incentives to the politicians and military professionals. Page 1 of2 Slocombe, Walt B. (SES) From: Sent: Wednesday, June 25, 2003 11 :52 AM To: Slocombe. Walt B. (SES) Cc: -Col Subject: "Growing" the MOD/Things to Consider If you agree with these points, I'd like to disseminate them to the rest of the team to start generating more specific ideas, ultimately to form an action plan. Also, if we are convinced this is the direction we want to take. the CMA n planning team can begin to integrate some of these concepts into their deployment and sustainment planning for the NIA. vlr, TillNKING ABOUT MOD ORGANIZATIONAL REFORM AND MANAGEMENT' (MORM) l. Our task is qualitatively different from the other ministry advisory teams. Iraq had no Ministry of Defense, nor even a tradition of a Ministry of Defense, of the nature required to support a representative, participatory government. Where the other ministries' advisory teams may think in terms of "reconstruction" ond "reform" we need to think in terms of .. growth" and "development". 2. Traditional force development is an external top-down process. It requires a mature, disciplined bureaucracy to conduct the required analysis and implement the outcomes. lbat is exactly what we don't have. Our approach should be envisioned as working from the bottom-up and, in some respects, inside--0ut. a. As the New Iraqi Anny force is deployed. initial command and control and sustairunent support will be provided through CJTF-7. Over time, we will transition these command and control linkages to "Iraqi Owned and Operated". As we make these transitions, the Iraqi systems we put in place will grow to become the infrastructure of the new MOD. We should start thinking about them as the embryonic nerve-endings of a yet-to-be-born MOD as we develop them. b. We can build infrastructure from the bottom-up but where will we get top-level management? One approach may be to cultivated it from among the personal networks we are developing among the various Iraqi stakeholders in national security. An approach we may consider is to begin forming informal task/advisory groups among those we identify with common interests. For example, we could probably use a "Manning" advisory group to help us with recruiting and vetting and or a "Services" group to begin thinking through how we will support the NIA. 3. The Iraqi armed forces will not be expeditionary armed forces. Accordingly, there may be real advantages, and real efficiencies, in designing the future Iraqi armed forces to draw much of its logistical support from the other ministries. This would significantly change the nature of the infrastructure we would normally associate with the Ministry of Defense. As an example, in the area of health care, the new Iraqi defense force may develop an organic capability for emergency battlefield medicine but rely on Ministry of Health facilities for its in-garrison, readiness and treatment requirements (inoculations, physical exams, trelitment of disease and injury. We may need to work out some sort of HMO or other reimbursement scheme to pay the Ministry of Health for these services. Similarly, we should consider whether we are better served to obtain much of our mobility capability from the Ministry of Transportation and our commwiications capability from the 6125/2003 Page 2 of2 Ministry of Communications, etc. 6/25/2003 AQL.COM I Message View Page I of3 Subj: From: To: Cc: Fi1e: What political scientists have learned about demobilizing armed groups after internal wars Date: 7/7/2003 8:29:37 PM Eastern Standard Time Dear Walt: When I saw in the news that you were in charge of disarming groups in Iraq I took the initiative to ask my colleague, Barbara Walter, who has done serious research based on a large number of the previous cases of disarming groups after internal war, to summarize what she learned. I thought that her conclusions might be useful to you as you figure out how best to achieve this difficult objective in Iraq. I hope you find it useful. Let us know. Barbara's email address is above if you wish to communicate directly with her. The document is attached but also is copied below. Please· take good care of yourself. Warm regards, Susan July 7, 2003 Dear Mr. Slocombe: I am writing at Susan Shirk's suggestion. I am her faculty colleague at the UCSD Graduate School of International Relations and Pacific Studies, and Susan thought the findings. of my research on demobilizing armed. groups after inte.mal wars might be of some interest to you as you tackle this challenge in post-war Iraq. I should admit that I'm not an expert on Iraq. What I do know, however, are http://webmaiJ.aol.com/fmsgview.adp?folder=SU5CTlg=&uid=5711320 7110/2003 AOL.COM I Message View Page 2 of3 the problems that other countries have encountered demobilizing anned factions, and the policies that have worked and not worked in inducing factions to disarm. In a study of all demobilizations that occurred after civil wars oveT the last sixty years, this is what I found: • Across cases, ,enlisted soldiers and officers almost always refused to disann and demobilize unless a third party agreed to enforce or verify demobilizati9n. This was not because the soldiers wished to · re-new The war, or had malignant intentions. Disarmament in the absence of third party enforcement rarely occurred because soldiers had very real concerns about their own security and well-being once they disarmed. • Faction leaders almost always demanded some form of guaranteed representation in government in exchange for disannament. Leaders-were extremely reluctant to hanaovel'lhmweapons nnt-e!S-tney· knew that they would n..Qt be pennanently shut out of pnwer and possibly imprisoned as a result. Disarmament was intricately tied to the issue of Power-sharing, both in government and in the new national military. • Finally, there was an interesting relationship ~etw~!!_power-sharing gu~antees and the size of the intervening security force tnat was necessary to keep the peace. If you loOJC afilr c1vtl war seltleif2nts th'af'Jiave attempted to demobilize forces and reintegrate them into a new (usually smaller) military, you find an inverse relationship between how inclusivc;_~I)~ goy~ent_ ""..~and the number of peacekeepers ffiat were _nee~ -foranewgovemment to succeed . .!'he lessl.nc1U.Slveago'vernment - s0,-the Tewer power-sharing guarantees that were offered to key faction leaders - the more peacekeepers were required to ensure peace while this goverrunent got off the ground. Narrower power-sharing guarantees required larger peacekeeping forces. So what lessons can we take for Iraq? The first is that the decision to disarm and the degree to which factions will disann, will depend on how much confidence the disarming group has regarding its own securitr.!!i_!h~~_!>rt-tef!D, and its own political survival m the fong-term. For factions to willingly give up their arms, two conditiQllS...Dlust hold. An outside p~~~r must be ~11i.!!.g_ t.Q...8!J~t~~JMir..~ as they demobilize and prepare for peace.--aearfy;thls is wiiattlie U.S. has in mind with the 140,000 American and British troops that will serve as security guarantors in the region. American and British soldiers must also stay as long as it takes for the new government to grow strong enough to assert its own authonty and Wi.fiTrt can build '!.fld tram an effective non-partisan national ann~. J_(!}ley leave too earjy, competing factions within !rag will simply retrie~ea~ns or purchase new ones, and seek complete control over the country. http://webmail.aol.com/fmsgview .adp?folder=SU5CT 1 g=&uid=5711320 7/10/2003 AOL.COM I Message View Page 3of3 The .second lesson is that the disannament process will be made significantly more difficult if disannament is not tied to specific guarantees of political and military representation for key leaders. If the U.S. wants to exclude powerful E!_embers of the Baath e..m::tY as well as IDiltranking officers in the former Iraqi mi I itary, then 1t must also to be willing to provide a stronger mili!_~ presence of its own. Ifttie-U.'S. Isn't willing to mcorporate "bad-guys" into an interim and then a permanent government, then it must be willing and capable of containing thctm. Ifit does not contain them, and does not include them (which is exactly what has occurred in Afghanistan) renewed war between the competing factions is likely as soon as the opportunity presents itself. History teaches us one final lesson. Uncertainty is the enemy of disannament. Right now it is unclear to all those involved what type ofpOTitical instttuttons will be established and what checks l!Ild balances wilJ be in place to prevent backsliding into a one-party slate. What we do know is that whatever government is established will almost certainly be h.iased against the Baath party_. a fact that hasn't peen lost on mfluential and powerful members of that group. As long as the outlines of the new permanent govenunent remain unclear, and.as long as one particular group is likely to be excluded, th9se inQJ_viduals have strong incentives to refilse to disaan. Right now the U.S. has committed the soldiers necessary to address short-term security concerns. What still needs to be done is for the U.S. to commit to the more difficult and longer-term issues of political power-sharing. Sincerely, Professor Barbara F. Walter http://webmai1.aol.com/fin sgview .adp?folder=SU5CT1g=&uid=57113 20 7/10/2003 r kGBR CIV) From: Sent: To: .M::rut~mber 15, 2003 7:33 PM ._c_:_ __ ~ __ _.GBR CIV) Subject: RE: Confernce on Iraq Dea rr '----="-------' We are working on the new project outline, and you will get it by the end of the week. What we sho· uld know is h.ow many Iraqi and how many CPA re::esent.atives you would like to attend the seminar (minimum, maxiroUJtl each). Best regards.C: J -----Original Message----- From: L l<GBR crv1 (mailto r ,_~-~~ ~~-~ = ~~-~~-__J Sen -~ 6L 0 9:11 AM To: Slocombe, Walt B. (SES ) Cc . Sub _J_ e _ c ~ t ,...-~-:!R~ E ~ :---. C ~ o - n -f~e ~ r- n_c _ e _ o _ n _I ~r - a_ q ________ ___, I have just received a message from Walt Slocombe regretting that he will not be able to meet you Washington, since he has to be in Maine during the days you are there. Kind regards, Deputy Director. Military Organisational Reform and Management Office of Security Affairs r J ---- - Original Messa:----- From: r ~ Sent: Friday, Septe er 05, 2003 3:2S-PM To: Slocombe, Walt 8 . (SES): Slocombe, Walt B. (SES ) i Cc :r l<GBR CIV); Subject: RE: Confernce on Iraq Importance: High L--------' Dear Wa.lt, Thank you very much for your most valuable comments and suggestions re. conference on Iraq to be held on 3-4 November 2003 in Geneva . We will immediately startw orking on the issues you raised in your message. In this context. it would be most helpful if we could briefly meet next week in Washington {in case you are available); Arriving from New York, 'l'eddy and .r will be in town from • ruesday (9/9) evening thru Friday { 1 2) noon, and then be attending the IISS GSR conference at Lansdowne Resort until Sunday (14). In the meantime, please copy your reply message to who is coordinating our programme in the US. With best regards, -· Assistant Director I Head of Think Tank Geneva Ce. ntre for the Democratic Control o f Armed Forces lDCAF) Tei. ~r = ·....-s-~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~"-~~~~~~~~~ E-mai. l: Lt--------------~~~~~~~~~~~~~-------l -----Original Message----- From: Slocombe, Walt B. (SES) [mailto._l _______________ <ll_)(e_.)[ Sent : September 04, To :111111111111 Cc: ........ (0-6 MoNSDJ Policy; Slocombe, wa Subject: Confernce on Iraq Please see attached note. 2003 5:24 PM 2 CIV any files transmitted with it are the use of the individual received this e are the This ema use of the indivi email in error please noti any files transmitted with it are entity to whom they are stern manager. This footnote also confirms presence of compute~.-li..,.!""a:Se Agenda Over view International order and concept of comprehensive security Concept of security sector~ and various organs/institutions/for<:es, including intcragency cooperation) Security Sector Governance Meaning of"civilian control" - law based/recognitjon of military expertise not civilian ··commissars'' Constitutional/legal frameworks Civilian governmental oversight (C'.l(ecutive branch institutions) Parliamentary oversight Judicial oversight Popular oversight Specific topics - options available within. democratic framework National strategy - national interests, threats (external, external operating intema1ly, internal, transnational) National security/national defense policies - models for security ("nation in arms," "regional security," "alliance with great power."), role of anns control and other agreernents Organs, processes, and legal/institutional frameworks for national security decision-making and leadership, to include resource allocation Defense strategy options Missions/doctrine for armed forces Shape, size, components, structure, organization of armed forces, to include senior (general) staff Ministry of Defense organization issues Resource allocation/management issues I am very grateful that DCAF is willlng to contribute so generously to the Iraqi reconstruction effort. , and I look forward to working with you on the project. Walt Slocombe cc.),__ __ :___.j Message Page 1 of2 Sent: To: Cc: Subject: I rtance: High CIV Friday, October 10, 2003 4:23 PM Slocombe, Walt B. (SES) (0-6 MoNSD); _ fW: Conference on Iraq (GBR CIV) Do you have particular comments you want to insert in reply? I have annotated my reactions. Pis just annotate whether you agree/disagree or want to amplify and I esponse and send it. I draft up ober 02, 2003 5:58 PM To: GBR CIV) Cc: Slocombe, Walt B. (SES); SUbject: RE: Conference on Iraq Importance: High CV Dea- Many thanks for your reply. In the meantime, I have incorporated your suggestions/reactions into the project outline (see attachment). Before we finalize it and embark on the tasking of speakers and inviting the other participants, we would appreciate your comments on the following points in particular: • Do you agree with adding two more topics/papers: (1) "internal control" of armed forces (such as the German "lnnere FOhrung" model) and (2) defense planning (being a intermediary step between defense strategy and mission/doctrine of armed forces)? Do you want us to include an additional paper - on 'all volunteer vs. conscript force'? I think (1) sounds useful - we need these guys to think hard about "the role of the military in a democratic society" (they'll get another dose in the DllLS program). However, (2) sounds redundant, and too theoretical -we need as much "reality" In this agenda as possible. • Inviting is a good Idea - but what is he supposed to talk about: defense strategy (as suggested in th outline)? What about Inviting Academic Chair of the Near East-South Asia Center for Strategic Studies at NDU; he recently wrote an interestinQ.e2!jcy brief on "Building an Iraqi Defense Force"? Either of these would be excellent - personally, I prate~- ha has more '"vision" of the Implications of what has happened for the future of Iraq security strategy - we could give either of them more direct Insight Into what we've been doing, why, what we think we've accomplished and where we think this Is leading. • Do you agree that we should invite the UN Secretary-General's Special Representative in Iraq, Ramiro Lopes da Silva? If yes, who will invite him: CPA or DCAF? This is your call, Walt - personally, I think we should do It In the interest of transparency but I frankly don't expect much from this guy In terms of substance. • Do you agree that we should invite the Permanent Observer of the League of Arab States in Geneva, Ambassador Saad Al-Faragi? If yes, who will invite him: CPA or DCAF? Same as for the SecGen Special Rep 10/1112003 Message Page 2 of2 _:I am inclined to say yes, for sake of transparency plus, in the case of the Arab League, It contributes to the legitimacy of the GC and the NSAC to have this gentleman attend - however, the substantive contribution wlll be marginal. • Should we invite representatives from the capitals of selected Coalition member states, namely Poland? I think this rapidly becomes unbounded and we should not go there. We should include coalition reps among the CPA reps but not go outside - the theme should be "NSAC Offsite" and, as much as possible, all the people there should be present to act as resources and 'thought-provokers' for the NSAC - not as 'national reps' - and, this Is not a 'donors conference' • I look forward to hearing from you. All the best, Assistant Director I Head of Think Tank Geneva Centre for the Democratic Con • I !. .. 6 • I ~ I .!. Tel. E-m 10/1112003 --- - ------- Message Page J of 1 • Slocombe, Walt B. (SES) From: Sent: Thursday, October 02 .. 2003 5:58 PM To: r J(GBR CIV) Cc: Slocombe, Walt a. (SES);-r~-----~ J c1v Subject: RE: Conference on Iraq Importance: High Dear Many thanks for your reply. In the meantime. I have incorporated your suggestions/reactions into the project outline (see attachment). Before we finalize it and embark on the tasking of speakers and inviting the other participants, we would appreciate your comments on the following points in particular: • Do you agree with adding two more topics/papers: (1) "internal control" of armed forces (such as the German "lnnere Fuhrung" model) and (2) defense planning (being a intermediary step between defense strategy and mission/doctrine of armed forces)? Do you want us to include an additional paper - on 'all volunteer vs. conscript force'? ( u...c..A ") ~ oltC • ( t:.\ ~~ ~ ~ ~J t 1..~ ,~- • Inviting f* lis a good idea - but what is he supposed to talk about: ~se strategy~s suggested in th outline)? What about inviting ~ : J kademic Chair of the1 East-~out Asia Center for Strategic Studies at NDU; he receny wrote an Interesting policy brief on "Building an Iraqi Defense Force"? o IC ......., ~ - • '?o you agree that':"'~ s~oul~ invite the ~tary-General's Special Representative in Iraq, Ramiro Lopes da Silva? If yes, who will invite him: CPA or~ • Do you agree that we should invjte the Permanent Observer ~eague of Arab States in Geneva, Ambassador Saad AJ-Faragi? If yes, who will invite him: CPA or~ • Should we invite representatives from the capitals of selected Coalllion member states, namer~ " ~· ~· I look forward to hearing from you. C-u..... .............. ~ <J\-.f ~ ..P~ cu1 ! All the best. tJ' Assistant Director I Head of Think Tank Geneva Centre for th.e Democratic Control of Armed Forces (DCAF) Tel. -~----------------1 E-mail:.__ __ ..._.....,=-.......... ----------1 10/2/2003 [ IRAQ CIVIL DEFENCE FORCE (ICDC) FUTURE OPTIONS The current IC.DC charter (CPA Order 28) expires io September 2004. A decision has been made to renew the current ICDC charter for an additional l2 months. There are also plans for the ICDC to be increased from 20k-40k includiDg-e:guipment up to heavy machine gun, and to include battalion and/or brigade leadership. The objective of this ·expansion iS to engage more Iraqi security forces rapidly- the same objective which led to the accelerated force development concept fur the NJA. V"" For this extension and expansion of the ICDC to be successful issues of integrated command and control of I.raqi forces and the impact on the concept for developing the NIA - will need to be assessed. However looming over the horizon is the future withdrawal of the MSC's, the TCDC is tied. and intimately connected to the MSC' s and CJTF-7 - it cannot sustain itself therefore a decision has to be made on tb.e future force structure-and o:rganizati. on of the JCOC sooner rather than later to allow the necessary planning to take place to ensure viable force stmcture. organization and accountability whe:n · transition to a new sovereign Iraqi government takes place . _ .Y-~ c-t IV1'I. ~ c.:J ... M, . ~ - dul •~;t ~1A,~~ ............ - Mlv'•4•J , < We know that the MSC' s will leave the countrV'fbe transitionofi~ CDC units under s,c •. ..,.__ ' ~ \V \'-~ J lhe command of the 101 51 w . hich.is due to leave fi .· f'St wiH more than Hkely act as a model • \'"''<,.., 'l..,/ for the Transfer of Authority (TOA) of other MSC's around the country. To have an I "'..,.""_. .. ,o.., ~ .. ~ agreed upon plan will greatly aid the transitional points across the country . . -..' . .J ..,,.,. ..?/. Severa~ options for the future_ of the IC~C ~xist ~hich ~e not all. necessarily mutually ~ v exclusJVe. lnde _ ed there may be a combmatlon of the opt1ons suggested. Ambassador ~~'-, Bremer.will need to ~v~ a vision of wlra! is possible and favorable toCP A ~ates. ~'<. \(" ,.J- Underpmrung alJ oftb1s is the need for a legal framework (A Defence Force Ald to the Ciivil Authority legislation) in the form of a CPA order in the transitional period -whic~ delineates when/how/what the New lraqi Army (NIA) can be · called and used for by the dviJ authority in internal security and intemaJ defence roles and leg, al guidance for irs relationship with other security services. Most anned forces around the world are used by their governments for some internal security roles (e.g Atlanta/Sydney Olympics. some counter terrorism, humanitarian emergency assistance etc) but democracies usually have a solid legislative underpinning regulating these roles and ensuring accountability to the parliament and the people. There will be s.om.e ne.ed in the future fi r · · al fr ks for all the security forces~ but a er event farmfo th. e basis of future Ir i legislation) e eatmg NIA ai · to e civil authority is a priority. - - - · ~---- ICDC FUTURE OPTIONS 1. FEDERAL POLICE FORCE/GENDARMERIE. Duties . and functions A separate Gendarmerie/Federal Police type force established and trained for operations to fulfill the-specific internal security needs of [raq: coWlter terrorism, transnational crime, major narcotics/trafficking, interdiction of smuggling (oil and natural resources), interdiction of illegal aliens (i.e foreign fighters), riot control, and an emergency response capability. They will effectively be the first responders in internal security sjtuations. Tuey will necessarily be trained to operate effectively and accountably in urban areas and will mitigate the proposed use of the NlA in such areas. Orga11izational structure An important principle of its organiz.ation is that it be structured on a functional basis. that is. national divisional commands based on the above functions with regional commands at a level below and answerable to the national divisional commands. This will allay the force developing along geographic/religious/ethnic or political party lines. This essentially follows the sound principles behind the NlA - that is a professional volunteer force representative of all sectors of Iraqi. society operating with religiously/ethnically mixed units that are not tied to any political part y or regional alliance and are answerable to divisional/regjonal comm. anders. Their mandate is to protect the people and the nascent democratically elected government. There is an option of whether they are ultimately under the portfolio of MOD or MOI and this will be contingent upon the shape of command and conl(rol of the ICDC in its proposed expansion. This model has the advantage of aJJowing the CPA to be. proactive in planning viable security organizations to fill internal security needs and p. rovide a politicalJy sustainable security servic~ in the face of proposals such as the ''political party force" put forward by interim MOl Nouri Badran. Capability, recruitment, training and size Capability should be decided once again upon functionality - dependjng upon the division - but as a baseline light arms . soft skin vehicles and a basic light infantry capability (in times of emergency) will be necessary. Recruitment should include a mix of the best of the ICDC units, possible political party and tribal participation with the caveat that those militias wilJ be spread across the force, and general recruitment. Once again the NlA recruitment is an exceUent model. Training: There will be a need to begin specialized training courses to augment the !CDC training and field experience already achieved. Specialized training may be sought from coalition countries national police services - possibly FBI/Australian Federal Police. Training can be integrated into CPA MOI planning for these national type internal security functions The Size of the force will depend upon recruitment and training cycles however 40- 50k with the bulk flowing from ICDC units is a realistic estimate. Relationship with other security stl"Qctures There needs to be delineation of internal security operations between the NIA and such a f ederaJ type force. The proposed DF ACA CPA Order/ legislation will go some way to clearing this process. Govemance A policy detennining the relationship between regional command and the governors will need to be integrated into Governance's proposed interim politic.al chatter to go to Ambassador Bremer. For example, the determinations on the procedures allowing governors to call on both the national divisional command and the regional commanders to request assistance in times of national emergency, disaster relief or humanitarian assistance. needs to be robust enough so as also not to permit the national command to withhold assistance/forces when they are reasonably required by the governors. 2. NATIONAL GUARD Duties and Function Operating under the control of the governors they would provide a backup or "ORF'' capability to support local police and a capability to reinforce local emergency services when reguired. To the extent that the future Iraqi government may retain an authoritv to mobilize them for national-level missions. they could provide a light force to augment the national defense forces. Given the regional conunand and control, the role of the National Guard (NG) may be similar to cwrent ICDC operations- performance of duties as a constabulary, patrol in urban are.as, conducting search and seizure for illegal weapons, fixed point security/route convoy security, disaster relief. search and rescue and hwnanitarian assistance and disaster recovery. A NG capacity to fulfill counter terrorism, (counter-insurgencies), transnational crime, counter intelligence, narcotics trafficking/counter smuggling (oil and national resources), emergency response, intelligence gathering is limited by the structural organization i.e no national command. This will Jessen NG capability in effectively combating transnational crime or larger organized national crime. Organ il'..ational Structure: Under this model the MSC's would hand over command of the (expanded) ICDC units to the Govemates with some administrative oversight from MOD and with the requisite call up powers in times of emergency by the Commander in Chief. There will necessarily need to be some central command in place for the NG. At the ,1wvernorate level. wider this concept. they would be provided facilities and sustained by funds allocated from the centraJ government in tl1e govemorate,s operating budget. The NG will he paid by the: National govememnl and regional Governors will only be able to mobilize the NO with the approval of the National government. Capability, recruitment, training and size Drawn from current ICDC - the units will be more homogenous - there is a. real risk of reconstituting local militias if couimand and oontrol at the govemate level is ineffective. Further training to supplement the initial 2 weeks completed by ICDC recruits will be needed. The size of the. forc. e will equate with the current expansion plans for the ICDC. Relationship with other security stnictures LegisJatiou/CP A ord. ers will need to be drafted to determine the NG relationship with the national government, the NIA and the local police forces and the requisite call up powers of the Commander in chief. Governorates Several issues with gov.emates may iropede tbe band over ofICDC to them when lhc MSC's withdraw. Lack of quality and vetting of appointed g~veroors, imprecise relationships between these regional political structures, the central ministries and the OC. a lack of participatory democracy and the subsequent illegitimacy of 'appointed officials and the as yet undetermined funding distribution decis. ions based on a Centtal/Govemate forlhula all point to the conclusion that the Governates will not be capable to take on responsibility of ICDC. /NG units. If the ICDC were to become a NG force handed over to the Govemates to continue the operations TCDC have been used for in the regions, it would necessitate at the minimum the Govemates be legitimately established and durable enough to take on this civilian administrative control. There is a question mark from Governance as to whether the govemates will have the required capacity and legitimacy to allow a seamless transition. Governance is preparing for Ambassador Bremer a legal charter consolidating the interim (until a constitution makes a final determination on political structures) political structure of the Governors and Provisional councils (PC's) The success of the NG mod.el is dependent upon the relative success of Governance's proposed provisional politkal structure consistent across all Gover:nates pending constitutional decisions on Federation. Several interconnected issues indude the fact different ICDC units are used , differently by different MSC's and whether this practice would continue after handover. An example of the problems that such a transition ma~ face is the lack of consistency in lPS connection and reporting to these regional administrations. Thei.r current lack oflegitimacy means that CJTF-7 is effectively the authority local police report to. This raises real questions on whether Governates will be rea4y to take this on with ICDC when MSC' s withdraw. An analysis of the timelines for transition points suggests that the governates will not be sufficiently ready to accept this responsibilitY. As a result there exists a high risk of the lCDC units beQoming ethnic/political or religious militias. This NG option would be integrated. with the overall TOA as coalition units draw down their presence in Iraq,_ This will require the govemorates provide facilities, command and control and sustainment services. which are currently being provide bv the coalition units. It mav wel I . be true tbar tfil:re are no addili!>nal costs in transferrin2 the lCDC to the governorates, as long as the central government continues to allocate funds for their support as the CPA has. through CJTF. White this may be a viable option for future employment ofICDC. in the present securitv environment. s u. cb a TOA to the governora.tes is not feasible because, even if thev were given access to the funds, the governorates are completely unable to provide the sort of leadership and supervision the ICDC requires and recieves from the CJTF. 3. POLICE RESERVES '·Police Reserves~· are generally · equipped and. trained ideutieaJ to regular local pollo.e. They usually a.re iss11ed or reimbursed for the cost of purchasing their own individual weapons. When called into service. they use regular police vehicles and weapons and the. facilities and logistical. assets of the regular pobce, In most cases, the additional as~ets (vehicles, weapons, commurrications) are held as the moperty oftbe regular police, for use by ; the auxiliary when thev are called to service. Their operational use of supplies and consumables all has t() be paid for. Thus tbc "cost"' of '·police reserves''. roan-for-man is almost exactly the same as regular police whenever they are caJled to dutv. When thev are in an inactive .status. they are not drawing their wages. so this can be seen as a cost savings in that cootext {U.S.A.). We would. not , intend police auxiliaries to be inactive in our current contex· r (Iraq). There(Q!·~ as "Iraqi po.lice reserves", we must expect their cost to be very nearlv the same as regular police. Savings that we may achieve bv limiting their training or by reducing t11e distribution of tJ)<l'ir equipment must be seen as a proportiooal reduction in capabilhv. TI1e farther we go in limiting training and in reducing equipment distribution. the more this tvpe of ooLicc auxiliarv becomes indjstinguishable from FPS. INTEGRATION OF ICDC INTO "4c'IA The ICDC units would eventually be indistinguishabl~ from the NIA. Prior to the TOA points their wilt be a need to run ICDC personnel through a combination of training and cenification that would raise up ICDC to NIA standards which would then aHow their integration into NIA. DISBANDING ROLLOVER. OF ICDC INTO OTHER SECURITY SERVICES This will essentially ensure that ICDC personnel have employment after their enlistments ex:pire. Rollover into other security services may include the FPS e.g lCDC already doing FPS roles he~"Use there are not enough FPS and/or lhe fPSIBorder/customs Quards. • IGDC personnel with training and experience they have gained working with coalition forces and performing security missions woul.d provide a much needed personnel capability addition to the [PS /Border customs Guards. CONCl .. VSION The future options outlined above are not all mutually exclusive and an admixture of the proposed force structures and organizationaJ frameworks can be combined to suit the circumstances. However an option needs to be chosen so that the planning cycle begins well before the withdrawal of the MSC's. Roles of Iraqi Security forces [ I ISecur:fty Endstate There is a secure environment for people and property that enables citi~ns to participate fully in political and economic life. The Iraqi government has the means, includi.n. g its own defense and police forces, to assume it's responsibility for external and intern.al security, includjng policing of its borders. Relationships with regional stales and. with the international oommunity have been establisbed. The roles and acc-0untabilities of otganization.s p. rovid.ing security are clearly defined within a legal framework. The legal ITamcwork also regulates the private possession alld use of weapons. Coalition forces will belp Iraqis to eliminate the threats 10 their security and wi U remain in country for as Jong as they are needed. Over time the tra.rr.s{er of s.ecu.rity respoosi. bilities to local military and police forces will determine the speed with which we can adnnce reconstruction and build up institutions of good gqvernance. The Iraqi people are already contributing to that effort but must acquire the al:Jifity to assume full responsibility for meeting the country's security needs as soon as practicable - thus enabling the draw- down of coalition forces. Our priorities cherefore include: • Development and training of Iraqi security forces, including a new fraqi army, new civil defense corps and an effective police force • Development of civilian national security oversight mechanisms • Measures to ensure border s~uriry • Measures to build the justice system and improve che penal system • Ensuring that Iraq is free of weapons of mass destruction.) Role of Security Forces. An important element in the planning for seeu. rUy forc;es is achieving the . rig. ht. balance between the local, regional and nstional security forces and instituffons to ensure dear lines of authority, a delineation or duties and functions and planning for a legal kamework. tbat underpins security sery. i£eS around the country ensuring they ultimately . function account.abty and imp,art . ia.IJy in a ruture democratic !lta'te. Understanding and shaprnc the relationshi'ps between tbe security services and the link~ges with the$esecurity s~rvi£es and tbe.curre:n.t and provisional oolltical structures i s a kev ingr.edie.nt in successfoltv fulfillihg the §ecurUy endstate. 'Beyond the rapid o~rational Cemoo of nisiog and tndnh>g .security sen'lces, is the imeortaot task. of demarcating, their relatioosbios and linkages consistently and applying a workable and effectin security sector strudure duri .. ng the transitional phase. bot which at the same time does not impinge u,oon the pr. erogatives of a .fu. ture Iraqi 2-0vernme.nt to ddnmine the final compositions. functions and organizational. stroc• u ~ or. secllriry s.ervic . e.s .. The . following numbers are planned1 for: Pre•Supplemental Post SupplemeniaJ 1 Check for outcome of Supplemental Appropriation: Iraqi -Police Servic~: Facilities Protection Service; Burdcr Protcctioo Se · rvfce: (conslsti.ng of20,000 Border Guards and I 0,000 Customs Officers) Iraqi Correctional Service Iraqi Civil Defense Corps: New lt!lq Army 75,000 31,000 11,500 1S,OOO by January 2005 .50,000 30,000 10.000 22,000 40.000 10.000 40,000 ~(?·) Total 189,500 245,000 Jragi Police Service Under the ministry of· the interior, the Iraqi Police Ser.tice is responsible for law enforcement. Lightly armed (pisto'ls, shotguns, AK 47), the intention is to increase JPS !Tom a planned strength of 58;800 in early December to a full strength of some 75,000 by January 05, through a (Tc)training program beginning in November 03 that should progressively increase the quality of dt e police force over the I . 5 mont.h period. No decisions have bee .a taken about the final command structure of the Iraqi Po lie~ Serv. ice - at whai level control of J:PS forces w.ouJd be exercised - partly because de~isions on the powers of the Goveroates bave ytt 10 be t'aken. facilities Protection Service £st,abJisb . ed u. nder Ord.et no 37 as an organization of anned, unifomre.d ·l'ntiti~ : to provide security for ministry and govemale offices, gove .mment infrastnlcture, and fixed sires under I.he direction and coottol of governmental ministries · and govemate administrations. Untii now, planned to be ca 24000 strong. lncludes Oil. electricity police and port security. Anned with AK47. Vehicles as supplied by Ministries. Initially. the majority off PS guards -were employed and pajd by the various mnitary commands. Ministries are progressing with taking over responsibility f<>r employing and paying FPS guards on their respective sites. Final TOA is planned for mid.·lanuary 2004. Ministries are free . to c-0ntmct the provision of FPS guurd$ to priVare firms. lndividoal Ministries arc responsible for arranging training of their FPS. This can be condocted by the Ministry of Interior inStrUctors, lhtough coordination with Coalition units for 'rr.1in-the~traioer' programs. by the Ministries themselves, or cont:tacteli out fQ private finns. 1fl all cases the standard oftraU:iing is regulated and monitored by the Ministry of Interior (M<.>l). The current proposal is for FPS funding in 2004 · to~ ~nO"a llzc<I and included in Ministry of Interior's b'Qdget. . This provides for salaries, Mo! approved training, administration~ uniforms, equipment, vehicles, oonrmunlcations 1111d badging as weU as the establishment of Regional Opcrati'ons Centers in each Govemate. This 'figure also ac.0011nts for payments to tribes along the oil pipelines and electricicy lines. Bonier Proteet: ion Service Under the DepanrneJ:it of Border Enforcement, enfot.ces cu.st0ms and immigration laws. Lightly anncd, Extra Rorder Police trainfo ,g starts in December, with the a. im of progressively transf erring MSCs r~spo nsib ilities for border po~ of entry to tht B'P'S in February ( 101 '· ' A BN). March (MND SE), .1tnd April (MND SC)) concluding finally in May when the BPS should have rea .cbed its planned strength of some· 10,500. Iraqi Corrc-01jonal Service Under the Ministry of Justice, responsible for prison .security. welfare and security of prisoners and detainees. Conceived as a constabulary force, lCDC i.s authorized under the terms of Coalition Provi_sional AuihOrity (CPA) Order 28 lo carry out constabulary duties including patrolling urban and rural areas; conductrng operations 10 search for and seize illegal weapons and other contraband; providing fixed site, check point, area, route and convoy security; prov.iding crowd and riot contr-ol; disaster response services; search and rescue serv · ices; prioviding support to humanitarian missions and disaster recove. ry operations including tl:ansportation services: conducting joint patrols with Coalition forces; and panfoipating in other actMtle.s designed to build posit. Ive relationships between the Iraqi people and coaUtion authorities including community liaison. Jn practice, ICDC are deploying at individual, team, squad level, and tasks includ. e · fixed site security, convoy/ route protection, crowd and riot conr:rol, HUMlNT and linguistic support as well as humanitarian assistanee and disaster relief lnitial planned strength is 8 battalions of 846 personn. el eac:b, increastng to 18 battalions ( 15,000) by Jan 04. The current plan envisions each Govemate being allocated one !CDC battalion. Training is conducted by coalition units witbin their respective regions. The content of the training is determined by the unit's requirements; but certain mi. nimum training objectives have 'been laid down by CJTF-7. These minimum training requirements cover we11pon b.andljng, first aid, the, law of land warfare and rules on the use of foree. lCDC personnel ate armed. with KaJas'hnikovs, provided with body armor (jke the soldiers they inte. rpret for and serve, as well as some additional support., such as trucks for ope.rational mobility and to pick them up and return them to their l(>Cal homes each ev~ning. The main distinctions from other security forces are that ICDC: • Are intended. dir~tly to supj:>Qrt Coalition forces' operations. They are currently dependent ofi Coalition forces for training, openitional planning, command and conlToJ, mentoring, facilities. and operational support. They are very helpful in te.nns of"placing an lr.tqi face" on coatition forces' operations 'bul are· incapable as currently «~onsl i tuted of assuming coalition forces' missions. • Ace local and, 8l 18 battalions, originally siz.ed tp provide a battalion-sized force for each of the 18 provinces, conb'olled in detail at the company/squadron level or lower. • Have minimal training End-state: the cllJl'eot intention is to effect a rapid expansion of the !CDC so that, under the executive authority ofCJTF7, ICDC uoits fulfill the following requirements: • To provide a lrmited.number of provinces with a brigade-sized force each ofberweeo 4 and 6 battalioos, totaling 6 brigades with 36 battal. ions by March 2004 • To accefenite ICDC recruiunent artd training accordingly from the 12 battalions currently in service to 26 by January/February , and tl'lcm J6 by March • To provide a command structure of Iraqi officers t(l command battalions and brigades so that, in. doe course. ICOC units are capable of being self -:supporting, assuming the missions of Coalition forces In selected areas • And being equipped with heavier weapons (eg heavy m!!chine-gun) In other words, instead of being a force protection service for coalition units, they would become a series of local militia forces ha'lling some - depending on the degree of investment in training, equipment and infrastructure - of the characteristics of the NlA. Order No 22 sets out the NlA's purpose os providing the first step towards the creation of the national defense force of the fl'ew Iraq. Operating to a code of military discipline set oot in Order No 23, its mission is th.e m.ilitary defense of dle naiion, including defense Qfthe national territory and the milit<UY protection of the security of critical insta!Iations, facilities, infrastructure, tines of com _ municafioo and supply, and population. Jn an effort to distinguish it from Saddam's military apparatus (and the coup-'prone army of the monarch before him), the Order specifies that the NIA may not have, or, exercise. domesric law enforcement functions, nor intervene in the domestic political affairs of lhe country. lts tasks will also include par1icipation in domcsaic relief operarions associated with nalunLI or man-made disasters and humanitarian relief missions. The 40,000 New Iraqi army soldiers is planned lo be deployed in 27 battalions, orpniz.ed inro l divisions with a command and conttol structure, mobility, and minimal light armor and airlift capability to enable them to assume missions currently home by coalition forces. As the battalions complete training. they are being deployed as an Iraqi coalition component under the operational conttol of one of the major subordinate commands of the CJTF. When large enough, the NIA will be deployed as a coalition force component reponing directly lo CJTF HQs. As a coalition component, the NIA would be available, subject lo bitining and within their operational capabilities, to IWWne any mission c\lmlndy assigned to other coalition forces, which includes a wide 1'81\ge ofwks relating ro internal security. .----. - November 1, 2003 Calls to Jihad . Are Said to Lure Hundreds of · Militants Into Iraq : By DON VAN NA TTA Jr. and DESMOND BUTLER ONDON, Oct. 31 -Across Europe and the Middle East, young militant Muslim men are answering a call issued by Osama bin Laden and other extremists, and leaving home to join the fight against the American-led occupation in Iraq, according to senior counterterrorism officiaJ s based in six countries. The intelligence officiats say· that since late summer they have detected a growing stream of itinerant Muslim militants headed for Iraq. They estimate that hundreds of young men from an array of countries have now arrived in . Iraq by crossing the Syrian or Iranian borders. But the officials say this influx is not necessarily evidence of coordination by Al Qaeda or other terrori.st groups, since it remains unclear if the· men are under the control of any one leader or what1 if any, role they have had in the kind of deadly attacks that shook Baghdad on Monday. A European intelligence official called the foreign recruits ''foot soldiers with limited or no training." A senior British official, who was in Iraq in September, said most of the foreign men captured there were from the Middle East - Syria, Lebanon and Yemen - or North Africa. He. described them as "young, angry men" motivated by the ''anti- British, anti-American rhetoric that fills their ears every day.11 Signs of a movement to lraq have also been detected in Europe. Jean-Louis Bruguiere, France's top investigaUve judge on terrorism, said dozens of poor and middle-class Muslim men had left France for Iraq since the summer. He said some of them appeared to have been inspired by exhortations of Qaeda leaders, even if they were not trained by Al Qaeda. Mr. Bruguiere. who earlier this year opened. an investigation of young men leaving France to fight on the side of Muslims in Chechnya, said the traffic to Iraq was now a similar problem. He called the changing pattern "a new threat." The rising agitation in parts of the Muslim world over the American-led occupation in Iraq was· clear at Friday Prayers at Al Nur Mosque in a working- class . section of Berlin. Or. lzzeldin Hamad, the director of the Saudi-financed mosque, said political discussion was. banned there. But outside, a 21-year-old man who . identified himself as Akmed said that while Saddam Hussein was unpopular, now ''there are peopl' e who are angry about the American occupation." He and others said that inside the mosque, co!Jections usuaUy requested for Muslims in Palestine and Chechnya were now being offered for Iraq as well. An initial hint that Iraq would become a magnet for foreign recruits came just before the war began in March, with the ar:rest in Syria of four Algerian men, who had been living in Hamburg and attending a mosque frequented by three of the Sept. 11 hijackers. The authorities believed that the men jntended to fight in Iraq. -- -- ---· - ------------- One of them. Abderazak Mahdjoub, whom German investigators have linked to a Spanish-based terror network, is under investigation for alleged involvement in a planned terror strike on a tourist location on the Costa del Bravo in Spain. Syria deported the men to Germany, but none of the four men is in custody, since there is no German law against going to Iraq. A senior German intelligence . official, who spoke on condition of anonymity, said the authorities had detected other cases of immigrants in Germany trying to go to Iraq. 'We know that in Germany there are people in the militant Muslim scene who are willing to go other places to participate in jihad, including fraq," the official said. There are scattered reports from other places, including Saudi Arabia, where a senior Saudi · official said two Saudi militants, be1ieved ta have ties to Al Qaeda, were missing from the kingdom and believed by the authorities to have gone to Iraq. lntefltg. ence officials, who base their assessment of the traffic into Iraq on surveillance of mosques and Islamic centers and on interrogations of terrorist suspects captured inside Iraq, say they have found no connect1ons between the recruits. "Nobody is organizing this move fwm Europe to Iraq," a senior European counterterrorism official said. "At least it is difficult to analyze and know who is organizing this. lihis may be just the beginning of a new phenomenon." United states troops patrolling the long Iraq-Syria border have said they have not detained any foreign recruits entering Iraq, but officials investigating attacks on allied targets say they have little question that militant Muslims are being drawn to the country. "It's pretty clear their number is increasing," a senior American offidal said. The number of attacks is also increasing. In the last wee. k, the average number of attacks against a flied or international relief targets exceeded two dozen a day. from 12 attacks daily in July. This week's attacks produced some evidence of the role of foreigners in Jraq. One would-be suicide bomber who was shot and wounded by Iraqi policemen was later identified as a man of Yemeni descent who was holding a Syrian passport. In addition, Monday's multipfe, coordinated suicide bombings were a s· ign to some investigators that foreign terrorists may have added a level of sophistication to the attacks. Military officials say they suspect that a senior official in Mr. Hussein's government is recruiting foreign fighters to Iraq. They said lzzat Ibrahim, the "kjng of clubs" in the deck of cards of · the most-wanted members of the deposed government, was believed to be .a leading organizer and financier of recent attacks. But allied forces are still struggling to figure out the dimensions and composition of the opponent they now face in Iraq. 1 We are quite blind there," said the head of an intelligence agency in Europe. He added: "The Americans and Brtts know very little about this enemy. They are trying to fight an enemy they cannot see." As a result. alUed forces assume that the, y are fighting a loose conglomerate of like-minded opponents. Counterterrorism officials estimated that as many as 15 militant groups. , some with · 1oose ties to AJ Qaeda, might now be operating . in Iraq. "Al Qaeda, Ansar at-Islam. loyalists, disgruntled former army personnel-they are alf suspects, but there is no focus on a specific . group," said a senior American . counterterrorism official; Ansar is a terror g. ml:lp that had been operating in northern Iraq and is suspected to have had a ro· te in the attacks in recent months. Mr. Bruguiere, the French investigative judg. e, said there we.re signs of Al Qaeda's influence in Iraq. "Since we had no evidence of an Al Qaeda connection in Iraq before the war, this is worrying,'' he said. American officials closest ta the intelligence from Iraq say the definition of the enemy is blurry. "Iraq is a magnet for jihadists just as Afghanistan was/ ' a senior official said. "But the bigger question is whether leadership is evolving or coordination. So far we haven't seen it." For months, the role in Iraq of "foreign fighters" - particutarfy those of Al Qaeda - has been a matter of sharp debate among American officials and intelligence officials in Europe and the Middle· East. Before the American~ led invasion .in March, counterterrorism officials and terrorism experts warned that the military '. action would be used by militant Muslims to recruit a new gener~tion of terrorists, and that Iraq would draw them into the fray. Al Qaeda leaders have repeatedly invoked the struggle in Iraq. In an audiotape broadcast by AJ Jazeera satellite. network earlier this month, Mr. bin Laden cited Iraq as the newest'front in the ten:or networi<'s internaUonal jihad. ~·1 say to our brothers. the mujahedeen in Iraq, I share your concerns and feel your pain," Mr. bin Laden said in the 31-minute audiotape. He called on young Muslims to 90 to Iraq to fight, saying, "You have to go wage jihad and show your muscles." A day later, President Bush sought to draw a parallel between Mr. bin Laden's call to arms and the effort against terrorism. "The bin Laden tape should say to everybody the war on terror goes on, that there's still a danger to free nations.'' he said. But a senior European intelligence official said he doubted that Al Qaeda had established a strong enough organizatlon in Baghdad to pull off attacks, given how fractured Mr. bin Laden's network appears to be. "AJ · Qaeda would need a level of organization and sophistication that I don't think it currently has," he said. But he said he dki believe that some Qaeda members were now in Iraq ''trying to stir up trouble.'' There rs little debate that more and more people are stirring trouble in , Baghdad. Just who they are and where · they are from remains a matter of speculation. In September, the authorities in Iraq arrested nine men they suspected of having ties to Al Qaeda. But officials have teamed' little about them or their connectiOns through interrogations. 'They are not saying much," said one official knowledgeable about the arrests. "But they may just be foot sok:iiers who don't know that much. "' Don Van Natta Jr. reported for this article from London and Desmond Butler from Berlin. AddiUonal reporting was provided by Lowell Bergman and David Johnston in Washington. ----------- -- -- -- -- - Page l of 2 ES From: .... C _____ _.] (0-6 MoNSD) Sent: Friday, August 22, 2003 12:02 AM To: r I Es Subject: BookFW: !CDC To: ,L......~--~~~......1--=-"---~-~---~..,_------~~------, ;~-~~Cna1 Message-~-- lo-6 MoNSD) : Sen :Jbursday. A1JgusL21, 2003 11:58 PM CC! Walt B. (SES); (OV) Subject: ICD; ------' Fred, Traffic below from Mr Slocombe VR =============== ========;========= r ~ -We h. ave a report (quoted below) that Special Plans in NESA is circulating a briefing that shows ICDC tn much heavier form {i.e. organized units with mortars, light artillery, light armor, etc.) than any one wants, plans, or Intends to train or plan or pay for. Can you track down the paper and send us a copy. FYI, I believe the following accurately describes the ICDC: Coalition military are in the process of recruiting an Iraqi Civil Defense Corps, to work with, and under the close control of, coalition forces. The .ICDC will be locall.y recn1ited, receive a one- or two-week training course from coalition units in their area, ancl bebrin to serve with lhos1: units, receiving on the job training and mentoring from those units. They will be armed with AK-47s, not heavier weapons. As the system develops and funds become available, they may have non- tactical vehicles and basic comms. Initially they will work as individuals attached to coalition units. As such they will provide a source of infonnation about the local community, help conduct searches and man check points, and serve as interpreters for the coalition units. As they gain experience, the ICDC will gradually become able to operate at the squad level with coalition forces, doing convoy and route secur.ity a11d guarding fixed points, as well as continuing to serve in these individual capacities. Higher level unit organization will be for administrative purposes only. ICDC personnel will live at home and operate o:oJy in their immediate areas. Enlistment will be for one year only. Recruiting and training has begun, with some 1400 signed up as of 19 Aug. Eighteen battalions, one io each Iraqi province, totaling about 15,000 individuals, are scheduled to be on duty with ooalitjon units by October 2003. At tba( point, the program will be evaluated for decision on its longer term future, in.eluding whether to continue to add units. Thanks, Walt The report we monitored, KSir - I was having an interesting conversation the other day - I heard that OSO(P) - specifically NESA special plans was circulating a brief showing ICDC in much heavier form (i.e. organized units with mortars, tight artillery, light armor, etc.). This is not built into the budget numbers we're working now. 8/22/2003 - ------- - - - Page 2 of2 Thought you might find this interesting - I'll try to get a copy of the briefing." [ 8/22/2003 .. .,,- ,. Date of Name of Reqvestcr: co~ - - ~~~~~- CPA OfficefUait: MGNSD A'lbOwlt ol Request: 19.6M P'f"-Oject Lo<:atlon: MoNSD (Region) POCIPenoa Co111pleUag Fonn: t. 'Project Ca.tegory (cbeck aU that apply): Reconstruction Humanitarian Food Oisttibtrtion Wate:r l' Sewer Elccericity t Rule of ~w JGovem. Div. ConunanderoS fund Health Tra:n.<;p<>nation .£COtl<>Jl1ic Progl'AD\$ cdncarion. Mfoistry Pol:icc.' Securily Brig. Commanders 0 Fund Salaries Pen$iON B'udget'Ops. Support Other Public Services Social Programs Cultural Programs R,qional Dir, .Fund Olostn>c:tioa lniti.ati\'-C D Z:. Pro~ Ftuldlng Source: (?RB Staff Ooly) Vested AssetS Sc:izedAsseu f ... ~fuods l Iraqi Dcvelopmc:nt Fund 3. FDDdia1 Data: § D Bank Account Details: or N:amc /Tit.lc.oflraqi ~iviog Disbursement: CP.~ Repflfnil RC$p0nnl>lc for Oversight Engi.necri~ Oversrgbt Assigned to; Name oi C-ertlf< · Ofrlcial: 4,. ClealllDCes! Please lDdkate yoa laave obtaf11ed appropi1ate cleanutea, as applkable. (Xoic If~t ooordl.JUldoa eaaaot be doae at the ;r~Qal lev I, lt I~ done by f'ltC.) .Regional C.oordinator: Yes D. No 0 Name : Ministry Senior Ach.i:sor: Yes. f8l No 0 Name: Wal ' l....ili)~iM' OfficeDircc\'OtfUnit Com~r. Yes 0 No 0 ~« · kecon..~ttuction!USAID: Yes 0 No 0 Na.me: 1ntemationaJ Cooroination ~ik Yes 0 NoiO N&me: Proe•m Staff Use Only ~ No 0 l ~te Jt~uest Submil*l 10 Program Review C<Jmmittec: mm/dd/Y'l'fY . DtspOSlbon: = ------------ --- j Disposition: Date ~ Retumcd to Requesla1Submined tO Comptroller: mrn/dd/yyyY pi ition (including expenditure authorized : .A!!lbassador Bremer agm=d 011 It Joly to a CJTF-7 amoept to establish an ha.qi Civil Defense Carps o-fup to 18 Battalions. The per:sonoel assigned co this outfit Will operare as indi.,-idaa ls~ teams md . sqllads; Chey will pt"O\.'ide liaguisl support. conmbolc ro rebuildiftg in~ and communities. provide ~ty and drivt>rs foe Coalition Forces-. humanitarian a.ssl$t11nce teams • and international NG()s, co.ftduet li1nited cro)Vd and riot roatrol fixed site roate and con'"W security , disaster rapori~~eesiand ~h andn::s;reue. Jn fragme~ .. Otders 1u~μcnt to 11 J\lly. CJTF~ 7 bas directed its subordinate units 10 establish lhese. baitialions ia ~ following pa1ldll: 9 bettaliom by September, 1 m<n'by l Oct. S more by 1 Nov, Z more by 1 Dec. and the fioal bertalion by l Jan 04. The ~J in dae bettatiom must be pmd. feet, clocbcd, provided ~ith 1 minimum of field gear and amied with an rifle. Salary: S70K/monlh , for each.,.. on the establishment: To1al Salary (Aug ro Dec 03): S4,R30K Food Stipend: Subsisi-ence costs (0 oovtr 1 meat per man per duty day .. . $7 .95 taSt per MRE . -mon.lh1 .y ~18JK: Tolal Food Stipend (Aug to Dec 03): ' SJ2> 627K l>nifomis. : l5aob member rccdvcs ~ 2 hlou3CS, 2 tmu11ers, 2 i shirt&, 3 soob, and a pair of · boots> .. ,$90 ... and 2-00/. overage: Total U'nifonn Cost Sl650K(to beP11rchued from Jn.qi vendors) Webbing; Each member~ web belt. snspe!Dders, 2 can1eebS wl cov;cr, fu$1 a.id pouch w/ dtessln.g...$23 • . and 15% ovE:tage: Total Webbing Cost S438K. {to be puthcased from h:aqi ~) Weapon C leaning Kit and Sp.l:res: SIOOO pet bn ~ TQtal Cost SISK The touaJ cost of providing this level of support. based on the diroc:ttd sequence ofbui.b:ling 10 18 batallioa.s is S l9.$6JM for the remainder o(CY' 03. CJTF .. tJ (BG Hahn) and CPA (Mr Slooom~) agree ro this levd of suppon., which will be provided m CJTF - 7 &om the CPA. There will logically.be additional O&M costs to Coalition units as.they ~. mmsport md opcrale with ICT>C elements. (The CY~~.,. will be wodted into the National ~ri'Y and Dden.se budget) fotm P.RB-OJ \'er. 6119/QJ Who New recruits eligible, no previous military experience required. Screen out Former Iraqi Army (FIA) officers and soldiers. 1 f 'IA officers Colonel or higher are excluded. Reflective, of local Governorate Demogr. aphics. Recruited with assistance of local Iraqi leaders (linkage to CJTf .. 7 Iraqi leader engagement plan. Iraqi Civil Defense Corps What Cooperative initiative between CPA &CJff .. 7. A Security force designed to augment coalition forces individually thru platoon level with language and cultural knowledge, timely and actionable HUMINT, and contractor support (driver & security) Collective tasks: Joint patrolling, fixed site security, area security, convoy security, and natural disaster assistance. - Where Eight battalion equivalents initially 1x1AD (ME), 2x101AAD, 3 x 410, 1 x 1 MEF x 1 MND(SE). Goal: 18 Total: 1 per Governorate Why- Put an Iraqi face 011 daily coalition internal security operations When CJTF-7 Execution FRAGO 493 published 24 Jul03 25 Jul 03 Be in Recruitin & Re istration Jul - Individual train ng egins. 01 Aug - Eight Battalions stood up 07 Aug • First ICDC soldiers patrol, with coalition. 01 Sep - Fiv, e more Battalions stand up 01 Nov 03 - Las,t , Five Battalions stand up 18 Battalions by Jan 04. 30 • • Page 1 of 1 (0-8 MoNSD) From: Slocombe, Walt B. (SES) Sent: Sa'turday, July 26, 2003 10:12 PM To: ~r----~~0-6 MoNSD) Subject: CDC memo This is to remind me more than you, but I undertook. to provide Feith w/ a one-page summary of the CDC. The only source is thel 10X 0> lbrief (and ils direct derivative used at the Commanders Conf a day or so later). I don't think there is anything authoritative since then.but I am not at all sure that remains the, lodestone for the effort any more. Walt 7/27/2003 Bremer, Paul From: RSS - SecDef CablesESO Sent: Wednesday. July 09, 2003 2:23 AM To: Bremer, Paul; Cc: __ r ______ ic1v. oso Subject: Analysis of Recent Events in Iraq Classification: UNCLASSIFIED From: To: I l))xi;i l (CC) Amb Bremer (CC) Pat Kennedy (CC) Walt Slocombe Gentlemen, Please provide copies of the attachment from Mr.C receipt Thank you_ ~--~ Rerttuuv MA ] ESO, Cables 11912003 Page 1 of l I as listed in the distribution above. Please confirm r POJNT P.APER ---- L--·~ m s ~ ~ · to·. --- P · (_. c....:· .. c:t..t . c Su: bj: ANALYSIS OF RECENT EVENTS IN IRAQ . . ~- wtiif s~I 1. PROBLEM.. The recent attacks on coalition troops in BagMad and lhc Sunni @ Triangle are likely the results , of an alliance between Baalh Party .remnants and lslamic extremist.\. The oature of this p.toto-insurgency and its ultimate o.bje<..1ive s remain a m~mer of <:onj~turc. Ilowc.vcr , it can be assumed. th-at it is a temporary alliance, as the ultimate goals of the Baathists and ls' lamic extremists. arc uftimatcly C-Ofltradictory. It is a fact that this marriage of convenience . aimed at the coalition. but psu ti r.nl~rl)I the Americans. 2. .DISCUSSION a. There are three types. of insurg¢ncies: (a) coups (2) classic Maoist three , phase insJJrgencies (3) Attempts t. o foment a mass upri$iog such as the "People Power opnsing 1n U)C Pbllippines and the 1979 uprishlg tb,.t oYe.rthrew ~ Shah of lran. b. A coup is oot an option in this case. One would e_11.pcct that the best !Utc.mative for the Baathists would be a classfr: guerilla campa.i. ifl. Such operations are ~us tom made for l>arties ,such u - the. Baatbists because they can qu i ~Uy eliminate u:oubJesome partnen such as che Islamic extremisr:s over the course a long campaigrt. Fomenting mass. uprisjngs is a dangerous course because the ultimate results of such events cannot be oontroUed. The Iranian communisu were liquidated in the wue of the 1979 revolution despite participating in it c. The current pro.to-ins.urgent activity ap~ar,s to be attempting to move from the early stage of a cJassic three-· phase: suge ins~ncy to the popular uprising stage. When the Cbinese and Vietnamese attempted to prematllrely move &om one stage to the other debacles resulted. It would be easy to write this off to mere Baathist incompetence. but we would be wise to consider orher motives. d Th~R< are two ~en. arios that would explain I.he pre.sent activities beyond fldversary incompetence. Both scenarios cont.am ex.plotlablc opponun.ltle;i. DetM)'lin,i.n_g the feCl1 motivation of the currem situation should be identified a Commander's Critical Information Requirement (CCIR) if it is not one already. The two ~narios ~ J'lot ~es sarily mutu.ally eJ1.clusiv~: (I) We sh. ouJd consider the , possibllity that the jns !lf gent'i realit.e that they have a narrow windOw of oppmtunity . It is possible that they feel that a combination. of forei;gn presence and slow rate of infrastructure :repair' under the occupation reprcse. nt a flee-ting window of opportunity Chat will close if they do not act quickly. In this scenario, they WO Did ac-cept the danger of loss . of control jn order to exploir the opponunhy. • (2) The second pogsibiHty, and equally plausible scenario, ii that of compctitiu.11. Th~y may be vying for pixstigc: in lhc ''n11tiurwl msistance" leadenJh.ip" e. The Shiia should not be forgotten. A11 indication& m: th.at they are bidding their time. If they think they ce.n mate demOCl"BC)' work to lhefr advantaee, they will do '°· But we should not a&SWne benign jnleDl on their pan. 1beir view of democracy is decidedJy non-Jeffersonian. The Shiia are prickly and very honor oonstious. lncident4 lib the one last we.et with lhe l:lntish should be fo11owed up with good faith negoliatione to find out what wertr wrong and how lo prevent reocc:wrmces. Offering a nominal swn of money or a sheep as a condolence fee is comudered an act of good faith; it ia not conslnlad Ba en admiasion of c::ulpability. If !hey offer aomething in retum for d'le death of a coalition member, it should likewise be aooepced. f. We need to remember that we are an alien presence in a very old cultural landscape. No aood wm come of lhe cerception that our presence lhere is open ended, l. RECOMMENDATIONS a. 1be military should be encourngcd to give all possible assistance to ut:cupation 11.uthotity efforts to restore infnWructure and n:move the complaint thet things are wane chan they were under Hussein. b. The previously recommended establishment of a Provis.ional lraqi Constabu181')' and a road map for tnm11.ition to Traqi control and C"'.aalitinn disengagement should be implemented and widely advertised.. c. When an attack on a coaJition member occurs in a locality, all fmmer Baath Party members above the rank of m::cptionist should be rounded up and intemd.1bey should be given access to phor'IC8 with the following rneasage &o friends and family: (a) If no further attack.a occur within eight week&. we wiD be releued (b) lf attacks reoccur after we are ~Leased. we will be~intencd. LL Cl () 0 I- I- a::: , o a.. a.. :J en Cl 0 Cl (V) 0 a CJ N CJ) ~ o~ LO ~ Agreed Intent • Primary purpose of ICDF is to relieve coalition troops of point defense and • • presence m1ss1ons • Focus of effort is Sunni Triangle • Ink Blot strategy will be employed beginning in West Baghdad, and spreading north-west DOD Support Issues • Weapons: 650 available; delta of about 3,500 • Interpreters: a mix of Sunni and Shia to match the neighborhoods they will be assigned to • Human Rights and ROE lessons plans in Arabic • Uniforms distinct from NIA, police, and coalition forces • Associated funding issues Q) c ·- _J E 0 .+J .+J 0 cc Q) ..c. ...... c ·- en Q) ::::I en en ·- Q) en Q) ..c. ~~ > Q) - Q) ~ 3= ~ Q) 0 ~ ...... ..c. ~+j' ...... 0 = 3= ·- ...... 3= x Q) Q) s c • Remaining Local Issue; Who Provides Civilian Oversight? • Defense does not think it appropriate have defense set the precedent of getting defense involved in internal security • Interior does not want to militarize police functions • Both views are valid • One possible solution is to appoint a Minister Without Portfolio/Special Projects, and assign the ICDF to him as a first project en a.. => I ~ (.) <( OJ ' i . Recommendations From Constabulary Study • General rule of thumb is one platoon per neighborhood of 10,000 • Platoon is primary unit of action; companies and battalions are admin entities • Platoon Leaders should not be pre-ordained; should be selected from training cadre • Company and battalion commanders selected from best platoon leaders Recommendations (Cont.) • Platoons should undertake civic action projects ASAP • Companies should maintain civic action cadre of skill specialists in general support of platoons: - Carpenter - Electrician - Plumber/water sanitation specialist - Practical nurse (female) Key Points of Proposed Press Release (CPA/DOD/CENTCOM Coordinated) • ICDF is a transition mechanism for areas with security threats beyond normal police capabilities • Purpose is to free coalition troops from point defense and presence patrolling missions • It is designed a temporary fix to be replaced by police as the security situation allows • Training will include a heavy dose of human rights indoctrination and stress on civilian control I'. ,, ,. '; , ' '·i • ,. THE PROBLEM • The current security situation requires a paramilitary capability something beyond the police in some areas • The New Iraqi Army will not be capable of taking over security responsibilities in the near future and internal security is probably not a good precedent for them to set as a first mission. PROBLEM (Cont.) • The reduction of the American military profile on Iraqi streets would be helpful for improving the attitude of the Iraqi population if a replacement for their security contribution can be found • US military personnel need to know the OIF commitment isn't open ended THE PROPOSAL • Build a temporary Iraqi constabulary militia mentored by US forces in most troubled areas. • Until it is ready to assume urban patrol duties, the Iraqi constabulary militia will be accompanied by a US mentor force • Training for the force will include a heavy dose of democracy and human rights education • As the constabulary matures, US forces will withdraw to a reaction force mode • Constabulary platoons will conduct civic action projects DESIRED END-STATE • US forces in a supporting role and off the streets on a day-to-day basis • Once security situation allows, the constabulary militia platoons will be disbanded and their functions taken over by regular forces ADVANTAGES • A short run fix for the security problem • US forces can see their ''ticket out'' • A potential democratizing influence at the neighborhood level • US military can train militia type forces; cannot train police · .. DISADVANTAGES/ CHALLENGES • Question of who pays • Ensuring that these militia platoo· ns do not become a repressive political tool; a strong inspectorate system is required • RESOURCES • US Iraqi expatriates want to help as interpreters • Former members of USMC Combined Action program and retired SOF trainers are a potential source of training cadre • • RECOMMENDATION • Conduct a feasibility experiment in a troubled area (Fallujah is a good candidate) • Figuring the need for a fifty man platoon for every 10,000 residents. Fallujah would need a thousand recruits (Fallujah's population is 200,000) ~ e. ~ ~ 2 0 . - <& J ~ _) I ~ ~ -.) ~ i t .£ ~ ~ ~ ':) - 0_ u ~ VJ ( ~cs _, L L ...__ ~ ~ I '/) \ ~ ~ ~ ~ ~ (1) CJ ·~ ~ 0 ,. · p:'.:l 0 = N ~ Q) ·- = u ::s ~ ~ ~ ~ ·- 0 t"'- ,... u • Jllllllll ~ ~ ~ ~ ~ ~ ·- =- = - ~ - - ·- - -~--·--K --··--· - (""\ g N - t"'- --- ·t--- Agenda • Purpose • Needs Statement • Organization • C2 Relationships • Task List (Individual and Collective) • Concept • Milestones • CAP Policy Modifications • Approval/Decision 717/2003 2 Purpose • Obtain approval for the immediate establishment of five new Iraqi Militia Battalions with a short term goal of eighteen battalions (one per govemorate in one year) comprising three(+) Brigade organizations. Our long term strategic goal is five Iraqi Militia Divisions. • Resolve CPA policy that must either be developed or amended to support Iraqi Militia Battalion (IMF) concept. • Obtain approval for 60,000 force cap for IMF authorized manning. 717/2003 3 References • Verbal Guidance CJTF CDR- 4 July 03 • Draft CENTCOM PLANORD • FM 7-7J • FM 7-8 • FM 7-10 • FM 7-20 • FM 7-30 717/2003 4 Requirements Statement CJTF-7 requests CPA approval to immediately establish five Iraqi Militia Battalions. Approval of this initiative expedites the transition to a new Iraqi government, fosters a sense of Iraqi national pride, stimulates Iraqi economic recovery and creates the foundation for future U .S- lraq i military relations. 7/7/2003 5 Commander's Guidance • Prepare Concept/COA briefing for Mr. Solcombe ~ • Mr. Solcombe's briefing must include CAP IMF policy issues/IMF organization structure/IMF task list and Milestones. - TM/SQD/PLT/COMPANY - Battalion • CDR's intent for the IMF is to get former Iraqi officers and soldiers under coalition control and executing productive projects supporting the establishment of a safe and secure environment in Iraq. • Each coalition division immediately hires a battalion of IMF soldiers. • Five Iraqi IMF battalions form one IMF Brigade. 7/7/2003 6 Commander's Guidance (con't) • CG accepts IMF qualitative risk IOT expedite stand up of IMF Do not assume that SOF forces are unavailable for FID. Establish requirements document. • Coalition Divisions will assume responsibility for training IMF. • Consolidate and cross walk task list with division commanders.- LNOs received consolidated task list at OPT/WG 061500 July 03. • Define duration of individual service- one year enlisted, three year officers, with the caveat that exception officers and soldiers can be considered for service in NIA. • Publish FRAGO NLT 9 July. 7/7/2003 7 Organization Talking Points • IMF organization very similar to NIA organization IOT facilitate future compatibility with NIA. - NIA organization adheres to a modified American motorized/airborne/air assault TO&E. - IMF is a pure rifle infantry organization with four squad rifle platoons and four squad rifle companies. - All squad soldiers are equipped with AK-47's, no grenadiers or automatic riflemen, machine guns, mortars or anti-tank systems. 7/7/2003 8 IMF Rifle Squad and Rifle Platoon Organization IMF Rifle Squad IMF Rifle Platoon ••• IMF Rifle t Squad= 9 men t 9QO t I.DA 880 TM TM LDfll Left SGT SGT ft ft ft ft ft ft Fire Team A Fire TeamB 3 x Rifleman AK-4 7 3 x Rifleman AK-4 7 ~ HQ Section Platoon Leader Platoon Sergeant Radio Telephone Operator 4 x Rifle Squads IMF Rifle Platoon= 1/38 men 7/7/2003 9 IMF Rifle Company Organization Company Headquarters Commander First Sergeant Company Executive Officer Supply Sergeant Armorer Total Soldiers= 2/4 Rifle Squads 4 x 39 soldiers. Total Soldiers= 4/152 IMF Rifle Company Total Strength= 61156 7/7/2003 10 Notional NIA Battalion CDR XO CSM II 154 (6/148) 38 (1/37) 38 (1/37) 38 (1/37) 26 (1/25 .. .. - • Each Line Company: • 3 Line PLT, 1x MG PLT • 154 personnel w/ AKa • 7 medium trucks (2 Ya T) • Four utllltv vehlcl• 154 (6/148 38 (1/37 38 (1/37 38 (1137) 28 (1125) .. .. .. (1/5) (1/5) (2/10) (1/5) 154 (8/148 154 (8/148 125 (8/117) .. .. 38 (1/37 38 (1/37) 15 20 (1/14) (1/19 .. .. 38 (1/37 38 (1/37 30 20 (1/29) (1/19 - - 38 (1/37) 38 (1/37 20 20 (1/19) (1/19) 28 (1/25) 26 (1/25 ·NIA Battalion: 774 • 39 Officers • Each MG platoon: • 735 Enlisted • 6 Machine Guna (3 SQDa of 2 MGs) • 6 Utlllty vehJcles • Co has 2 utlllty vehicles and 2 medium trucks 11 C2 Relationships • The initial five battalions are TACON to coalition divisions currently serving in the Iraqi area of responsibility (AOR). - 1 AD MND- Central - 1 X IMF Battalion - 1 MEF MND- South Central - 1 X IMF Battalion - 1 U .K. MND- South - 1 X IMF Battalion - 4th ID MND- North-Central- 1 X IMF Battalion - 101 st MND-North- 1 X IMF Battalion • CJTF-7 assumes responsibility for the manning and training of the first IMF Brigade headquarters. • CJTF-7 Plan for C2 and training of Division structure- TBD. Anticipate habitual relationship with the Ministry of Internal Security and Defense. 717/2003 12 Task List • Individual Tasks: - Linguists -HUMINT - Civil Affairs Duties • Collective Tasks: Big Picture - Military Specific Fixed Site Security (i.e. Ammo Supply Points (ASP), military compounds) - Natural Disaster Assistance - Humanitarian and reconstruction work (Many of these projects may transition to the National Jobs Program). - ~oute Security - Convoy Security - Territorial Security/Border Security (Expect this task to 111Wlllsition to appropriate Ministry). 13 Small Unit Collective Tasks Squad Battle Drills Battle Drill 2 React to Contact Battle Drill 3 Break Contact Battle Drill 4 React to Ambush Def end Fixed Site Guard Military Govemorate Assets Conduct Presence Patrols 717/2003 14 Concept Coalitio, n divisional units execute immediate recruitment of soldiers and officers to man a light infantry Iraqi Militia (IMF) Battalion. Individual training begins immediately with in. dividual IMF soldiers integrated into coalition fire teams within 48 bo· urs (KA TUSA concept). Individual IMF soldiers initially augment coalition forces with lin. guistic, HUMINT and civil affairs skills. At the discretio, n of coalition division commanders IMF u. nits begin executing fire team, squad, platoon and company level missions. See milestones for proposed concept for adva, ncing to collective tasks. 717/2003 15 Milestones A day= CPA approval date + t t • A-Day A+2 A+7 Iraqi Militia Force First IMF Fire Teams soldiers (IMF) begin execute fire team patrolling with level fixed site coalition forces. security and fire Primary functions team patrols. include linguists, HUMINT and civil affairs duties. 71712003 16 Milestones A day= CPA approval date + t + .. A+14 A+21 A+28 First IMF units begin IMF units begin First IMF units squad level operations. platoon level begin company Collective tasks operations. In level operations. include fixed site addition to squad First squad security border check level tasks IMF units external point manning and conduct convoy evaluations by squad size patrols. security and route • sponsonng security operations. coalition division. 7/7/2003 17 Milestones A day= CPA approval date + A+42 First IMF units begin battalion level operations. First platoon level external evaluations by sponsoring coalition division. + A+56 CJTF-7 validates first IMF Brigade Headquarters. Coalition Divisions begin second training iteration of five new IMF Battalions. First company level external evaluations of initial five IMF battalions by sponsoring coalition divisions. 71712003 18 Milestones A day= CPA approval date + A+84 Second group of five IMF battalions begin battalion level operations. Third Group of five IMF Battalions formed. First five IMF battalions receive external evaluation by soonsoring coalition di~fs<>f6n. A+106 Last three IMF battalions begin training. (18 total/one per govemorate). CJTF .. 7 validates first IMF Brigade Headquarters. IMF Brigade level operations begin. 2nd Group of five IMF Battalions receive battalion level external evaluation from parent coalition division. CJTF-7 mans & trains 2°d IMF Brigade Headquarters. 19 Milestones A day= CPA approval date + A+148 All 18 IMF battalions trained and operating. Second Brigade Headquarters validated by CJTF-7. CJTF-7 mans and trains 3rd IMF Brigade Headquarters. A+l90 IMF is fully functional and established as a viable institution for the new Iraqi government. 7/7/2003 20 CPA Policy Implications • IMF adheres to all policies established for the New Iraqi Army (NIA). • Request concurrence with proposed task list. • Request guidance on authorized entitlements for IMF officers and soldiers. • Request that IMF units be allowed to be multi- ethnic organizations with demographics reflective of local Govemorate. 717/2003 21 Recommended IMF Policy Implementation • IMF Pay is IA W NIA pay tables. IMF soldiers will be in full time militia status. $50/week? • one year enlisted, three year officers, with the caveat that exception officers and soldiers can be considered for service in NIA. • Uniform, rank structure IA W NIA. IMF proposed transitional uniform is engineer tape around each upper arm. 717/2003 22 From: Sent: To: Cc: Sub)ect: G3 FUOPS Monday, July 07, 2003 3:45 PM •1 • 1 M AJ CJ:iilT·F7···C·5 .PLANS MAJ• ----- - -- - OL CJTF7·C3COL; RE: Notional NIA Battalion.ppt !lllJJll!lllCOL·--· OL C5CMG3FUOPS -~ ALCON .. ~is a new CS Planner. His project is working out the details for implementing the New Iraqi Militia Forces (IMF). More like the IMPOSSIBLE MISSION FORCE. 1111111.No. All I have is the pay tables for the monthly stipend payments. What you require is a policy decision from CPA that I think they have not made yet. . One more item for your laundry list when you see COLllllllllll -----Original Message----- From: MAJ CJTF7-C5 PLANS Sent: Monday, July 07, 2003 3:32 PM To:...._---~-_.~ G3 FUOPS Subject: RE: Notional NIA Battalion.ppt - Do you have a pay table for the NIA? The IMF pay tables need to correspond with the NIA tables and at this time I do not have a copy of the NIA pay charts. Thanks, - -----Ori inal Message----- ....._ _____ _. G3 FUOPS -..-"=.;.;..;;""""-.._""""'-...,....;;.,07"-I 2003 10:10 AM To: MAJ CJTF7-C5 PLANS Subject: Notional NIA Battalion.ppt 1 Page 1of1 Slocombe, Walt B. (SES) From: Eaton, Paul Sent: Monday, July 07, 2003 6:53 AM To: Slocombe, Walt B. {SES) Subject: Briefing: Iraqi Militia Forces (IMF) Sir Reviewed the CJTF 7 brief on IMF dated 5 July. This appears to be a CJTF 7 initiative, but can't confirm without review of stated reference-Draft CENTCOM PLANORD. Points Pro: Immediate - 48 hours - Increase In security personnel available to tf'le five division commanders Provides robust combined arms force with eventual brigade level structure Provides for embedded trainer or advisory role proven effective in previous cases (Vietnam) and what we went to see with the NIA Puts "an Iraqi face" quickly on military visibilitylpatrolling Points Con: Competes with NIA for scarce resources - weapons, transportation, communicalions, money Competes with NIA for CJTF7 support - embedded trainers, logistics Sends a "OIC'.1 Iraqi Army" message by hiring back the same men who brought you the fil'St two defeats and regime support Brief makes no mention of "psychological or leadership retraining" period Provides yet another initiative for security service, defusing tha NIA focus, and still does not address the concept of a Gendarmerie Seems to challenge an ear1ier policy issue on application of combined arms - anti-tank and mortars Recommend a formal briefing with policy issues addressed up front and the support details second. The policy issues should address the leadership aspects of this proposal and how to shift from the previous approach to fighter management. Hire back without retrain and you get the old system. The latter specifically addressing current challenges on recruiting methodology, weapons procurement, funding. I vote no or delay until NIA has at least two cycles graduated and fully resourced. VR/MG Eaton. 71712003 .. UTqCLA$Sff'reDffFOR: OFFICIAL USE ONLY Iraqi Militia Forces (IMF) Concept Brief 5 July 2003 Agenda • Purpose • Needs Statement • Organization • C2 Relationships • Task List (Individual and Collective) • Concept • M. ilestones • CAP Policy Modifications • Approval/Decision lft4CLA~fFfEDli'FOR: OFFICJAL USE Q~JLY UMCLA:SSff'tEDHFOR OFFICIAL USE ONf?l Purpose • Obtain approval for the immediate establishment of five new Iraqi National Guard Battalions with a long term goal of eighteen battalions (one per govemorate) comprising 3 ( +) Brigade organizations. • Resolve CPA policy that must either be developed or amended to support Iraqi National Guard (ING) concept. References • Verbal Guidance CJTF CDR- 4 July 03 • Draft CENTCOM PLANORD • FM 7-8 • FM 7-10 • FM 7-20 • FM 7-30 ill<iCLA:SSIFI:EDffli'OR OFFICIAL USE -eNL¥ 2 UMCLASSIFIEDtff10it Of'f'ICIAL USE O?H:l Requirements Statement CJTF-7 requests CPA approval to initiate fielding of five new Iraqi National Guard Battalions. Approval of this initiative expedites the transition to a new Iraqi government, fosters a sense of Iraqi national pride, stimulates Iraqi economic recovery and creates the foundation for future U .S- Iraqi military relations. Rifle Squad and Rifle Platoon Organization Rifle Squad •• Rifle Platoon Rifle Squad= 9men t TM - - ft ft ft t """ UIOI - t TM - llOT ft ftft Fire Team A FireTeamB Rifleman Rifleman Grenadier Grenadier Automatic; Rifleman Automatic Rifleman ~ _,_ =ts' ·-- ·-- - Rifle Platoon= 34 men ONCLASSIFIED//FOR: OPPICIAL USE ON.l.Y 3 UNCLASSff'IBf>tlf'Olt OFFICIAL USE Rifle Company Organization -- • ta -- -- & • II - ....... .........._ ·-- ·--- #"&.. • • Flgur• 1-1. Light lntantryf'ltle company. Total Strength= 130 Rifle Battalion Organization ~ ~ lZSJ [!]81mmbd 3 x Rifle Company Strength: 390 men UNCLASSIFHID//f'OR OFFICIAL USE ONL'l 4 UNCLASSlrffiDf/f'OR OFFICfAL USE QlqL·1· Light Division Organization OivHQ I I 3.x Bde HO.a I 9 x light lnfBN I I Div Arty Cbt Avn Bde I I HQ Coy HQCoy I I Tgt Ade.Hat Bn AcqutsitK>n I Coy Sp HelBn I I 3 x Fd Arty 2 )C CAC Coy Bns(106mm) I I AHC Cot 1 x FdAzty Bn (166mm) I I Div Sp Comd 1 x Engr Bn I HQ/Met Management Centre I AMCCoy I Sup&TptBn I MaintBn I Medical Sn I I I I I I I OW HQ Cqy Sig Bn ~r Def Bn NBC Coy Int Bn Div Band MP Coy C2 Relationships • The initial five battalions are T ACON to coalition divisions currently serving in the Iraqi area of responsibility (AOR). - 10151 MND-North - 4th ID MND- Central - l AD MND- CentraJ - 1 MEF MND- South Central - 1 U.K. MND- South • CJTF· 7 assumes responsibility for the manning and training of the first ING Brigade headquarters. UNCLASSIFIEOffliOR OFFICIAL USE Ot4IN 5 UNCLA:3Sff'l:ED//t'OR OFFICIAL USE -OtqLY Task List • Individual Tasks: - Linguists - Human Collectors - Civil Affairs Duties • Collective Tasks: - Fixed Site Security - Natural Disaster Assistance - Humanitarian and reconstruction work - Route Security - Convoy Security - Territorial Security/Border S~curity • Concept CoaHtion divisiona, J units execute immediate recruitment of soldiers and office. rs to man a light infantry Iraqi National Guard Battalion. Individual training begins immediately with individual Iraqi National Guard soldiers integrated into coalition fire teams within 48 hours (Katusa concept). Individual Iraqi National Guard soldiers initially augment coalition forces wi. th linguistic, human collection and civil affairs skills. At the discretion of coalition division commanders Iraqi National Guard units begin executing fire. team, squad, platoon and company level missions. See milestones for proposed. concept for advancing to collective tasks. UNCLASSIF:teDt!FOlt OFFICJA L USB 0NLY 6 UMCLASSfFffiDl'/FOR OFFICIAL USE OMLY Milestones A day= CPA approval date + + + Ill A-Day A+2 A+7 Iraqi National Guard First Iraqi National soldiers begin Guard Infantry Fire patrolling with Teams execute fire coalition forces. team level fixed site Primary functions security and fire include linguists, team patrols. human collectors and civil affairs duties. Milestones A day= CPA approval date ! ! ! ' ' ' A+14 A+21 A+28 First Iraqi National Iraqi National Guard First Iraqi Guard units begin units begin platoon National Guard squad level operations. level operations. In units begin Collective tasks addition to squad company level include fixed site level tasks Iraqi NG operations. First security border check units conduct convoy squad external point manning and security and route evaluations by squad size patrols. security operations. sponsoring coalition division. - - ~:bASS!fHIDl/¥0R OFFICIAL USE OMLY 7 UNCLASSIFIBDHFOR OFFICIAL USE ONLY Milestones A day= CPA approval date ' A+42 First Iraqi National Guard units begin battalion level operations. First platoon level external evaluations by sponsoring coalition division. ' A+S6 CJTF-7 validates first Iraqi National Guard Brigade Headquarters. Coalition Divisions begin second training iteration of five new Iraqi National Guard Battalions. First company level external evaluations of initial five ING battalions by sponsoring coalition divisions. Milestones A day= CPA approval date ' ' A+84 Second group of five ING battalions begin battalion level operations. Third Group of five ING Battalions formed. First five ING battalions receive external evaluation by sponsoring coalition division. i ' A+106 Last three ING battalions begin training. ( 18 total/one per governorate ). CJTF-7 validates first Iraqi National Guard Brigade Headquarters. ING Brigade level operations begin. 2nd Group of five ING BN's receive battalion level external evaluation from parent coalition division. CJTF-7 mans & trains 2nd Iraqi NG Brigade Headquarters. . ~ UNCLASSFFIEDHFOR OFFICIAL USB ffllfLY 8 • UMCLASSJFfED//FOR OFFICIAL USE ONLY Milestones A day= CPA approval date ' .l T ' A+I48 A+l90 All 18 ING battalions Iraqi national Guard is fully functional trained and operating. and established as a viable institution Second BDE for the new Iraqi government. headquarters validated by CJTF-7. CITF-7 mans and trains 3rc1 ING Brigade Headquarters. - ~ CPA Policy Implications • ING adheres to all polices established for the New Iraqi Anny (NIA). • Request immediate policy letter approving proposed task list. • Request immediate guidance on authorized entitlements for ING officers and soldiers. • Initial period of service for soldiers will be one year, officers three years. Exceptional soldiers and otlicers will be considered for service irt the NIA. • Request exception to policy for NIA requirement to ethnically mix units. ING units may be ethnically homogenous up to company echelon. l:J+lCL\SSfFIED/fFOR OffiCtAL USE O~a..Y 9 - Agenda • Purpose • Needs Statement • Organization • C2 Relationships • Task List (Individual and Collective) • Concept • Milestones • CAP Policy Modifications • Approval/Decision 7/10/2003 2 Purpose • Obtain approval for the immediate establishment of ·ti\'C new Iraqi Militia Battalions with a short tern1 goal of eighteen battalions (one per Govemorate in one year) comprising three(+) Brigade organizations. Our long term strategic goal is ti ve Iraqi Militia 01 visi<-)JlS. • Res<-)lve CPA policy· that must either be developed or amended to support Iraqi Militia Battalion (IMF) concept. • Obtain approval for 60~000 personnel authorization to support five Division IMF force structure as called for in CENTCOM draft PLANORD. 7/10/2003 3 References • Verbal Guidance CJTF CDR- 4 July 03 • Draft CENTCOM PLANORD • FM 7-7J • FM 7-8 • FM 7-10 • FM 7-20 • FM 7-30 7/10/2003 4 Requirements Statement CJTF-7 requests CPA approval to immediately establish tive Iraqi Militia Battalions. Approval of this initiative expedites the establishment of a safe and secure environment in Iraqi, facilitates the transition to a new Iraqi government, fosters a sense of Iraqi natit)nal pride, stimulates Iraqi econon1ic recovery and creates the foundation for future LJ.S-lraqi 1nilitary relations. 711012003 5 Commander's Guidance .I' ... • Prepare Concept/COA briefing for Mr. Solcombe ~ ". • Mr. Solc. ombe's briefing must includ· e CPA IMF policy issues/IMF organization structure/IMF task list and Mil es tones. - Fire Team/Squad /Platoon/COMP ANY • - Battalion • • Commanders intent for the IMF is to get former Iraqi officers and soldiers under coalition control and executing productive projects supporting the establishment of a safe and secure environment in Iraq. • Each coalition division immediately hires a battalion of IMF soldiers. • ' Five Iraqi IMF battalions form the initial IMF Brigade. 7/10/2003 6 Commander's Guidance (continued) • CG accepts IMF qualitative risk IOT expedite stand up of IMF Do not assume that Special Operations Forces are unavailable for FID. Establish requirements document. • Coalition Divisions will assume responsibility for training IMF. • Consolidate and cross walk task list with division commanders.- L,Nl)s rec~i\'L~d const)lidatcd task list at ()Pl)WG 061500 Julv 03 . .,, • Define duration of individual service- one year enlisted. three year t)tlicers'I \Vi th the c'1veat that exceptional officers and solciiers can be Ct)nsidered for service in NIA. • Publish FRAGO no later then (NL T) 9 July. i/10/2003 1 Organization Talking Points • CJTF-7 designs IMF organization to match NIA organization IOT facilitate future compatibility. - NIA organization adheres to a modified American motorized/airborne/air assault TO&E. - IMF is a pure rifle infantry organization with four squad rifle platoons and four platoon rifle companies. - All squad soldiers are equipped with AK-47's, no grenadiers or automatic riflemen, machine guns, mortars or anti-tank systems. - Long tenn goal (6-9) months is for IMF battalions to be self- sufficient. Hence HHC assets. - Brigade and Division IMF structures to be detennined (TBD). 7/10/2003 8 IMF Rifle Squad and Rifle Platoon Organization IMF Rifle Squad IMF Rifle Platoon IMF Rifle t Squad= 11 men SSG t sao t llJf1 TM TM LOii LDll scrr sar ftftftft ftft ft ft Fire Team A 4 x Rifleman AK-4 7 Fire Team B 4 x Rifleman AK-4 7 • • • HO Section ~ Platoon Leader ~ Platoon Sergeant Radio Telephone Operator 4 x Rifle Squads IMF Rifle Platoon= 1/46 men 7/10/2003 9 IMF Rifle Company Organization 1- i Company Headquarters 1 Commander j First Sergeant 1 \ Company Executive Officer I : Supply Sergeant ! 1 Armorer Total Soldiers= 2/4 -------- --· --- - ·1 Rifle Squads 4 x 4 7 soldiers. Total Soldiers= i '4/184 J ~- ·-~----·----- ·---------·--] IMF Rifle Company Total Strength= 192 (6/186) ·------·- ··---- .. ~-- __ .., ___ .. ____ ... _,.. ---~--~·-·- 7/10/2003 10 IMF Rifle Battalion Organization f-B~ ttalio~ Command Grou-;J' I Battalion Commander j Battalion Sergeant Major Battalion Executive Officer Special Staff I Chaplain i Total 4 Soldier (3/ I ) _J _________ ,. CT-~ IM r-f{itk C~ompany ( 192) -1 Total Strength: 768 men (241744) I ---- ----·---- ... ----~ ~MC Total St-;:;;~= 74 Soldiers l 0_ 9165) ·---- __ J IMF Rifle Battalion Total Strength= 846 soldiers (36/810) 7/10/2003 11 IMF Battalion Headquarters & Headquarters Company (HHC) ! Il !C TPtal Sui:ng.tlr: 7.+ 'il)ldi~E ••• B Long Term Goal 6-9 Months 12 x Trucks 2 x Jeeps 7 x Water Carriers Platoon Leader Platoon Sergeant 3 x Squad Leaders 15 Soldiers · 1 \ital 2 l ~t1ldii:r-; ( J.'20t 7/10/2003 ~-------- ! Company Headguarters I · ( Commander llliC First Sergeant Company Executive Officer ! Supply Sergeant . . l Armorer l lPlal 'i\)JdiL'r:-; 6 (2/-l l L-.--- --- - ------' . . --- -------- - ·--·- -· ---- Long Tenn Goal . Personnel Officer 6-9 Months 6 x ambulances 01 Personnel Sergeant i Personnel Clerk ·101al· :' S11Jdicr...; i I '-1-l Platoon Leader Awards Clerk Platoon Sergeant Reenlistment Sergeant Physicians Assistant 4 x medics battalion aid station 12 x medics company aid station 16 x platoon medics I dal J:' '-;ll\dicr~. (2/JJ} • • f .. Tr~i~i~~ Officer ·---- ·-- Assistant Training Officer I Training Sergeant I ntal -1 ~1\IJ1crs ( 2: 2) I f Training Clerk •• r ·-- ------ - ·- --~~=-~~·-- .. ----~ ---=-~ I Supply Sergeant 1 nrnl S1lld11.'I"' 3 (1 ·2) 0 1 Supply Officer ! ·- L~up~yC~rk _ .. _ __ _ _ _ · 12 ({}/()~) C2 Relationships • The initial five battalions are ·r:\C,lJN to coalition divisions currently serving in the Iraqi area of responsibility (AOR). - 1 AD MND- Central - 1 X IMF Battalion - 1 MEF MND- South Central - 1 X IMF Battalion - 1 U .K. MND- South - 1 X IMF Battalion - 4th ID MND- North-Central- 1 X IMF Battalion - I 01 st MND-North- I X IMF Battalion • On or about I January 04 CJTF-7 mans and trains the first IMF Brigade Headquarters. • CJTF-7 Plan for C2 and training of Division structure- TBD. Anticipate habitual relationship with the Ministry of Internal Security and Defense. 7/10/2003 13 IMF Task List • Individual Tasks: - Contractor Security - Linguists -HUMINT - Drivers Contractor Vehicles • Collective Tasks: - Military Specific Fixed Site Security (i.e. Ammo Supply Points (ASP), military compounds) - Natural Disaster Assistance - Humanitarian and reconstruction work (Many of these projects may transition to the National Jobs Program). - Route Security - Convoy Security ... 111~itorial Security/Border Security (Expect this task ttt tr:=tn~ition to annronri:=ttP. Mini~trv) Minimal Individual Proficiency • Weapons familiarization • Basic First Aid (Common Soldier Task List) • Human Rights Training • Rules of Engagement Training • Introduction to English • Basic Physical Fitness Level • Civics Training 7/10/2003 15 Minimal Small Unit Collective Task Proficiency Squad Battle Drills Battle Drill 2 React to Contact Defend Fixed Site Guard Military Govemorate Assets Conduct Presence Patrols Advanced Collective Training (Recommended not required) Battle Drill 3 Break Contact Battle Drill 4 React to Ambush 7/1012003 16 Concept Coalition divisional units execute immediate recruitment of soldiers and officers to man a light infantry Iraqi Militia (IMF) Battalion. Individual training begins immediately. Individual IMF soldiers initially augment coalition forces with linguistic, HUMINT and security skills. At the discretion of coalition division commanders IMF units can execute fire team, squad, platoon and company level missions. See milestones for example training concept. 7/10/2003 17 In processing Checklist • Vetting for used by NIA. • Registration of IMF soldier. • Registration of personal weapon. • Basic Medical Screening (IIlV, screening by coalition platoon medic). • English Language Proficiency Assessment. • Human Rights Class. • Rules of Engagement Class. • Assignment to sponsoring coalition squad. 7/10/2003 18 Example Training Concept/Milestones A Possible "Way Forward" I A day= Concept approval date I t t A-Day A+2 Iraqi Militia Force soldiers (IMF) begin patrolling. ROE & human rights Training n1andatory before accompanying coalition forces. Primary functions include linguists, HUMINT and security. assistance. A+7 In processing complete. IMF soldiers begin expanded individual task training. 7/10/2003 19 Example Training Concept/Milestones A Possible "Way Forward" I A day= Concept approval date • - l A+14 j First IMF units begin j l 1 first rifle team level operations. Collective 1 ' I tasks .include fixed site I security and fire team • patrols. ____ _ ___ _J 7/10/2003 I -·· --·-·· A+2·t--·----·· ·-·-··--·- !IMF units begin squad level I 1 operations. C. ollective tasks expand to squad size fixed site i security, border check point 1 • d d . 1 j manning an· squa - size patro s. In addition to squad level tasks . IMF units conduct convoy I I security and route security l_ ope~~!io~ _ s_ . ~-~--- .. ____ _____ __ _ 20 Example Training Concept/Milestones A Possible "Way Forward" I A day= Concept approval date ------------·------- ! r-·- ·--- A+28 First IMF units begin platoon level operations. First IMF squad external evaluations by sponsoring coalition division -- A -+- 35 - ----- First IMF units begin company level operations. First IMF platoon external evaluations by sponsoring coalition division ---- 7/10/2003 21 Example Training Concept/Milestones A Possible "Way Forward" I A day= Concept approval date + , A+50 I First IMF units begin ! battalion level operations. First . platoon level external · evaluations by I sponsoring coalition i division. I -·--- _______ __J ,--- ---- A ·- + - 60 -·----------·--~--- I Coalition Divisions begin second training iteration of five new IMF Battalions. First company level external evaluations of initial five IMF battalions by sponsoring coalition divisions._____ _ ________ J 7110/2003 22 Example Training Concept/Milestones A Possible "Way Forward" A day= Concept approval date r ,~- ----· ----··1 . A. +100 [ ----- --A+tso---·-- Second. group of five I La~t ~ee IMF battalions begin IMF battalions begin l tra1n1ng. (18 total/one per 1 battalion level I Governorate). 2nd Group of five IMF l operations. Third Battalions receive battalion level Group of five IMF external evaluation from parent Battalions fonned. j coalition division. "'------- -- - First five IMF battalions receive 1 external evaluation by SPfi1tW63ring coalition 23 division. ---~-- , . ~- Example Training Concept/Milestones A Possible "Way Forward" I A day= Concept approval date r. ----·----··--- + . ---- - . --- A+ 200 All 18 IMF battalions I trained and operating. _______ ,. ___ --~ + ---- --·--· - , ---~----- A+210 CJTF-7 begins training first Brigade ·Headquarters. j L --·--------·····--· ------ 7/10/2003 24 CPA Policy Implications • IMF adheres to all policies established for the New Iraqi Army (NIA). • Request guidance on authorized entitlements for IMF officers and soldiers. • IMF units will be multi-ethnic organizations with demographics reflective of local Govemorate. 7/10/2003 25 Recommended IMF Policy Implementation • IMF Pay is IAW NIA pay tables. IMF soldiers will be in full time. militia status. NIA pay tables are still under review, therefore IMF soldiers will initially receive $501 111011th stipend until publication of INA, pay tables. • Duration of service is one \·ear l()r enlisted. thr~~ \'Cars f(H· offi~crs. w • Reenlistment criteria TBD. Fxccptional officers l111d soldiers can he considered - l()r serYicc in NL'\. • Uniform, rank structure IAW NIA. IM' F proposed transitional unifonn is w: hite engineer tape around each upper arm. • Request additional CJTF-7 discretionary funding totally $423,000 to cover two month's stipend payments. • Ptioritization of resource allocation to support national programs, in.eluding the Facility Protection Security Force (FPSF), the National Jobs Program, and the Border Patrol. 7/10/2003 . 26 ...------ I I I r1:c a t-J _s, P "- lllmlllllml<~o~ __ M_o_o_> ______________________________________________ ._. From: Sent: To: Subject: ... st 31, 2003 9:17 PM ••111•••[0-6 MOD) FW· ICDC Weblink ~- fyi. we ultimate:y go~ to the right guy on this. I thinK his response below answered if not satisfied most the questions from the other day. WR MAJ Webl1nk. 11111111 .. See my commenLs below. I am a bit wordy but I want to make sure my points are ~r9lood correctly, I hope that my words do not have an opposite eftect and ''muddy the waters.··- f'rom: Sent: To:····· Subject: Thanks for the info, you've been very helpful. on a couple points yet, however: 1 need to see if l can qct clarification 1. I think. some confusion may still exist over what "stood up" means wrt Battalions. A: 0 Stood up" means that a division recruits, trains, and equips a battalion's worth of people. Essentially, the divisions are starting with no~hing, gatherinq resources (men and equipment) and then making them into something, in this case small units. Q: I take it that it means that the decision point has been reached and we've decided to proceed? A: The original plan had a much more orderly implementation over the course of several months, CJT~-7 would recruit, train, and equip eiqht battalions. The time in between the initial eiqht and the follow-on battalions was to see if Lhe concept was a good idea and work out Lhe kinks. Over the past month, the leadership, (civilian and military) have made the decision to accelerate the implementation of the battalions. Moving the time forward via orders aud fraqos does not necessarily mean that we can physically do it. It does give commanders the latitude to do it faster if they can. 2. is it fair or proper to say that some battalions have been organized, say? A: As we get more people into the program the answer will be yes. At the stage of implementation we dre at right now the answer is no. Please understand that this past week was th~ fir~t w~ek the divisions rea:ly started to train ICDC. Training really takes about two to three weeks depending on the methods used by each division. You might be tempted to think. that they all do it the same way but this is not the case. Q: Or are being organi,ed? The excel spreadsheet/update continues to make reference to battalions. A: Yes, 1 would say battalions are being organized but this is more for administrative reasons than for employment. Q: J c~n ~e~ thNt tot~: trained and operating add up to less th~n-- but almost-- one battalion, however, I don't think its right to say Lhat only one battalion has been 1 organi~ed. Are these squads, even conceptually, being organized into battalions? A: You are correct. The !CDC on the ground are split up into small units. One coalition placoon may have a squad of its own rcnc. One of the intents of the ICDC is to help our soldiers communicate with the people in the communities that they operate. Here are some examples that I have used tor demonstration. Please note that these are some ways ! see the ICDC being employed. The division commander is ultimately the man who determines how his division will utilize his people. 1. A squad is going on patrol downtown in Mosul. The ~quad takes some of their ICDC with them to use as translators. The ICDC should have been hired from the local area and be able to help guide the squad, know or figure out who doesn't belong in a neighborhood, and start ~o give the Iraqis some confidence in the security environment. Like Bosnia, if the squad leader handles the situation right it can appear that the ICDC is taking the lead, mainly because of his language skills and give local people confidence. 2. Another situation is ICOC conducting convoy security with our troops. If ICDC are riding in convoys with coalition troops the Improvised ~xplosive Devices (IEDs) that the enemy is using against us will start to injure or kill Iraqis. This will change the attitude of the people. Instead of foreigners getting ~illed, they will have to face the reality of their own people being killed. If an ICOC is h1red from that area and he gets hurt the local people will really feel the impact. Who knows, they might get the courage to turn in the bad actors or foreign fighlers entering the country. Q: I need a way to link what's been briefed to An'lb. Bremer to what is actually going on now. Even if it no longer is an appropriate way to describe the situation, then what did we mean when w~ Sn1d B Battalions stood up? A: What was really meant was eight battalion "equivalents" recruited, trained and equipped. The divisions are striving toward this. They are simply using a building block method. For the ICDC, four squads form a platoon. Four platoons make up a company. Four companies and one HHC company form a battalion. Q: How do we know it we're hitting our targets, or how behind we are? A: Wow, this is a tough one that I have been struggling Lo figure out the ~hole time that I have had this project. J don't have an answer for you except that we will know as time goes on. rerhaps in as little as u month or so now th~t the division~ have started their training programs. I can speculate further but I do not have the expertise to give you a better answer. I can tell you this, the divisions are moving along as fast as they can with what chey have while maintaining all of the other commitments that they are obligated to fulfill as well as the new ones that they get tasked with daily. Originally, the ICDC were supposed to be an outfit with minimal training, seven days maximum, and then go out Lo work with our forces. Whal actually is happening is that divisions are realizing that you can't just give a guy a uniform and a gun and then expect him t:O know what to do. You have to train h1m. This is part of what makes uur Army gn~a L. The divisions know the endstate and they are making the necessary adjustments to make the plan successful. Q: If you can take a stab, or know so~eone who can, I'd appreciate it. A: I am the action officer for the !CDC so I am the one to answer your questions .. 1111111111111 WR -----Oriqinal Message----- ~rorn: • G3 fUOPS Sent~. Saturda A.u ust 30, 2~ To: MAJ;~ SubJect: RE: We ink Sorry about that, try this. I gave you the link to the internal LAN by mistake .. 2 http:/ - -- ' sections/g3/NIA_Briefingsllllllllll - nothing attached -----Original Messagc----- From: r.~ fUOPS Saturday, August 30, 2003 5:46 PM MAJ; COL; COL CJTF7-C3COL;- Mr.~. I have attached the two documents that I lhink wlll be most beneficial for you. The !lpread!lheeL l!l tin: meLho<.i I use Lu track. Lhe stat.us of t:.he ICDC .. MAJ - \\c5maincpweb\NIABRIEFINGSWEB MAJ CJTF-7 fUOPS Officer "Support 'til your nose bleeds" UNCLASSIFIED COALITION PROVISIONAL AUTHORITY BAGHDAD ACTION MEMO August 28, 2003 FOR: THE ADMJNISTRA TOR FROM: Office of Genera] Counsel SUBJECT: Order Establishing the Iraqi Civil Defense Corps The enclosed Order establishes the Iraqi Civil Defense Corps (ICDC) as a force in support of Coalition operations to assist in providing security and stability to the people oflraq. As a result of coordination through the interagency process, the Order is silent on two key policy issues: • Garrisoning and Employment. The Order does not address the garrisoning or regional employment of the force. Language limiting the utility of the force was removed to preserve flexibility. CJTF-7 envisions the force as being employed locally and adding value through their local relationships. OSD Policy has concerns with this approach, fearing that this force may not develop to provide a needed larger force capability and also may lead to the creation of regional militias. • Heavy Weapons. The Order authorizes the ICDC to possess Heavy Weapons in accordance with Order 3, Weapons Control. Language limiting the possession of Heavy Weapons was removed at the request of OSD Policy and JCS to preserve flexibility. Under Order 3, the ICDC are pennitted to possess Heavy Weapons under Coalition Forces supervision. The limitation language was originally included because the ICDC will undergo very limited training and there is concern about their ability to exercise judgment when using Heavy Weapons. RECOMMENUATlON: That the Administrator sign the proposed Order COORDINATION: Director, Security Affairs; CJTF-7 UNCLASSIFIED Iraqi Civil Defense Corns Status: Iraqi Civil Defense Corps (ICDC) has been established to provide tactical support to Coalition ground forces, whilst putting an Iraqi face on daily internal security operations. Currently deploying at individual, team. squad level~ tasks include fixed site security, convoy I route protection, crowd and riot control, HUMINT and linguistic support as well as humanitarian assistance and disaster relief. Initial planned strength is 8 battalions of 846 personnel each, increasing to 18 battalions by Jan 04. The current plan envisions each Governate being allocated one ICDC battalion. Update: Recruiting for the ICDC continues. To date 648 ICDC personnel have been trained and are operating with coalition troops. A further 3518 are undergoing training. Currently, ICDC personnel are only being used for joint missions with coalition troops. Training is conducted by coalition units within their respective regions. The content of the training is detennined by the unit's requirements; however, certain minimum training objectives have been laid down by CJTF-7. These minimum training requirements cover weapon handling, first aid, the law of land warfare and rules on the use of force. ICDC personnel are currently paid at the same rate as members of the New Iraqi Anny. Once the new rates have been set by the CPA, the ICDC wil1 continue to be paid at the same rate as the Anny. Original funding of $60.95M has been increased to $75.584M and included in the FY 04 Supplemental. Additional funding purchases vehicles, communications equipment, personal protective equipment and basic infrastructure. These purchases greatly improve the responsiveness and flexibility of ICDC units and also enable them to fulfill a wider range of mission requirements. Next Steps: Continue to recruit and train ICDC personnel in accordance with stated aim of 18 battalions by Jan 04. For the near term, ICDC salaries will continue to use the same scales as the Anny. Elements within CPA and CJTF-7 are establishing guidelines on salaries for ICDC and Anny that correlate to Police and other agencies of the MOI and FPS that adequately reflects and compensates for the element of risk inherent in the job, without contributing to wage inflation. The intent is to put these salary scales in place by 1 October. 01 MAY03 27 MAY03 06JUN 03 07 JUL03 05AUG03 10 AUG 03 15AUG03 06 SEP 03 18 SEP 03 23 SEP - 09 OCT 03 02Nov-UTC 08 Nov - 25 NOV 03 ICDC Timeline First Peshmerga soldiers arrive to AO Glory to assist with security of ASP FIFF/ NISF/ KDP combine to form the Joint Iraqi Security Company A Co. JISC begins basic training A Co. JISC graduate basic training and begin ASP security mission B Co. and C Co JISC graduate basic training CJTF-7/Dlvlslon establish Iraqi Civil Defense Corps A Co. and B Co. merge and C Co. and D Co. merge B Co. ICDC graduate basic training D Co. Graduation (1~ Bn Training Complete) 3n1 Bn ICDC (lrbll) MTT /CDC - PLDC begins 4111 Bn /CDC (As Su/aymanlyah) MTT ICDC Endstate & Troop to Task lrbl -lnMoaul -· 2 Camp Allied Training Center ------ Permanent Cadre Classrooms KB&RDFAC Billeting Facilities Medical suppo: rt Graduated over 1000 ICDC soldiers From a looted camp to quality facillty TRAINING •Modeled after US Army training •ROE, values, and standards •Focus on security ops •Weapons training •Physical Fitness 3 i. I Cadre OIC: CPTD NCOIC: MSG ICDC Cadre (8): MAJ Akram CPT Ahmed 1LTSophy 1LT Faris 1SG Zyad SFC Kazi SSG Radhwan SSG Sabah A/1 flCDC LNO MSG1 - SFC PFC US: 12 ICDC:S Total: 20 ~!' ~··_........ ~ ',.. --~'--- . - . ~(; I i . ·--,,i '!';j. "!ie ~ ._~. -- ~ -" "-- 1st Battalion {Ninawa) Missions • Security ol Mosul ASP/AO Glory • Security of Pipeline • Security of DMAIN/DREAR -. • Security of Jaguar ASP • Patrols In Mosul 4 ICDC MTT " • 3n:1 Battalion MTT {lrbil) ., < ' , • - 854 Soldiers·· •· ~~ ~·. ; .-. • · -.. ' . · • -P . #-; 404th ~A B~. 4't ·the c'Opc!ft1o~.;..for MT-r at_Kani~rJkii f t,· as&' begtri ~3 S&ent 03 •· ~ ~ "'\ ;a... ) ' r: ~ ...,....... . • 'F ·"' r-.:.e. . I ng .~!BPI~ 9 Oct dSi,ty,, ·'1... _ ~ ~ '14'1& ·'.~',. ' · ~ ~ . 11·· ' ~ _,.. ·~.r· • 4th Battalion MTr (AJ ~waymamyaY'I) , ·. ..i •. · .. ).. - 854 Soldier.s "" ~ __.: ~...&. ""1 ~r r - 404th CA/PUK providing As ~h ~ninQ'facility .... t <f - First class begins 08 Nov 03 &~ ~~ - Graduation 25 Nov 03 in As SulaymaniYfth. ~ i , ,. ~ • l !.. .. • Endstate: 2:44 ADA trained and graduated 3 ICDCCtions r· 1 1 with an endstrength of nearly 3,000 Arab, PUK, and °K~1 personnel ready to assume security operations In support ~ coalition missions ~ -· Camp Kan/-Karshal 3nt Battalion ICDC Begins 23 Sep 03 Complete 09 Oct 03 Graduation 05 Nov 03 Week 1 - 479 Soldiers \ 'Week 2 - 375 Soldiers Total 854 Soldiers 5 ICDC - PLDC • Objective. Provide ICDC NCOs with a basic leadership foundation .. • 7 Day Instruction includes: ·~ Laa~u... ~-If ""'1iJI~~ I . .....:comrntlnlcatton skills ~. *"1\en~nce ~ P~iQp,al S1<ins -:- Training · .--'Military Studies • Cedre is US and Iraqi • First Course to begin 02 Nov 03 at Allied Camp 6 ICDC Issues ./Uniforms - Acquisition of new BOU, winter clothing. - Require 7000 uniforms for 151 - 4th Battalions • Equipment - Units still lack basic equipment for operations, ie., • military vehicles, commo, computers, etc • ./ Pay - Remains an issue, but no longer a show stopper. - Mitigated effects of initial pay cut • Promoted 54 soldiers in A Co (JAW the ICDC MTOE and approval from G3) IOT get soldiers better pay. - Big boost In morale - Trust reinforced • Payment for weapons • Former Iraqi Military Pay IS ~ .. \ Comments ? 7 As of 301600d JUL 03 UNIT WEAPONS/EQUIPMENT REQUIREMENTS EQUIPMENT TOTAL RB:QUIRB:D CORREN'l' llIRIMUX REMARKS RBOUIRZD HLT v 30 JUL 03 ~VAILAB~E RPK LIGHT 30 66 0 35 issued to ~ MACHINEGUNS KMTB / AK-47 RIFLES 1000 0 1000-93-30- 671 issuec.'16i.11 100-671=106 retrieve when 1000 from Jordan arrive. 9MM PISTOLS 80 2+1+1+1=5 80-26=54 26 delivered to KMTB '/' 9MM PISTOL 4000 4000 2000 RDS OF 9x1Bmm= (2000) AMMUNITION 9MMX18MM; 9xl9mm-514,000 2000RDS OF Available 9MMX19MM AK-47 400,000 400,000 400,000 Almost ?million AMMUNITION rds of 7.62x39mrn. I 7.62 X 39MM Available AK-47 BAYONETS REMOVED AS A REQUIREMENT (18 JUL 03) INDIVIDUAL EQUIPMENT As of 301600d JUL 03 REQUIREMENTS EOO'IPMl'nT TOTAL REQUIRED CtJRRENT II DJ I MUM Anl'LABLE REQUIRED NLT 30 JUL 03 lUl!MABKS HELMET WITH 1000 7334 800 ACCESSORIES RUCKSACK (PACK) 1000 7837 800 BELT (PISTOL) 1000 7837 800 CANTEENS (2} 2000 35274 0 CANTEEN CUP 2000 0 0 CANTEEN CUP 2000 7902 2000 POUCH (2EA) AK-47 MAGAZINES 4000 8994 4000 9MM MAGAZINES 160 0 200 RPK MG, 40 /75FD 60 0 100 MAGAZINES (2EA) 9MM HOLSTERS 100 5818 50 2200 delivered 2200 delivered Zero 9mm mags Zero RPK mags No longer on report? SUSPENDERS 7837 HARNESS 1000 9620 0 (AK-47 VESTS) 1000 delivered CJTF-7 BPT EQUIPMENT As of 301600d JUL 03 AVAILABLE EQUIPMENT TOTAL CURRENT MINI MOM REQUIRED AVAJ:LABLE REQUIRED NLT 30 JUL 03 REMARKS DUFFLE BAGS 9264 IZ UNIFORM 4329 BELTS IZ UNIFORM 0 SHIRTS IZ UNIFORM 31 TROUSERS LBE 671 LT WT UNIFORM 100 Taking off report Taking off report WOOL UNIFORM 100 UTILITY 100 UNIFORM Taking off report Taking off report Taking off report CPA FUNDING REQUEST PRBNo: (PRB Staff t. o AssiJ?n) Project Name: AKs Date of Rec1uest: 7/2712020 Date Required:. 8/15/2003 Name of Requester: COL r I Signature: CPA0f6ce/Unit: MNSD POC/Persoo Completing Form: COL? Amount of Request: S6. ll5M DSN/Cell Phone:~ - l Project Location: Baghdad (Region) Email Address~ l. Project Category (check all that apply): 0 Health § Salaries 0 Reconstruction Humanitarian Food Distribution Water/Sewer Electricity Rule of Law/Govern. Div. Commanders Fund 0 Transportation Pensions 0 0 Economic Programs BudgetlOps. Support 0 0 Education 0 Other Pul>I ic Services 0 0 Ministry 0 Social Programs 0 0 Po1ice/ Security [81 Cultural Programs 0 0 Brig. Commanders 0 Regional Dir. 0 Fund Fund Construction Initiative 0 2. Proposed Fondi.ng Source: 3. Funding Data: (P. RB Sta: ff Only) Vested Assets § Baok Account Details: or Seized Assets Name/Title of Iraqi Receiving Disbursement: Appropriated Funds CPA Rcp/O nit Responsible for Oversight: Iraqi Development Fund D Engineering Oversight Assigned to: Name of Certifying Official: 4. Clearances: Please lndic-ate you have obtained appropriate clearances, as applicable. (Note: lf t.hat coordination cannot be done at tb.e regional level, it wiU be done by PRC.) Regional Coordinator: Yes 0 No 0 Name: · Ministry Senior Advisor: Yes 0 No D Name· : Office Director/Unit Commander: Yes 0 No D Name: Reconstruction!USAID: Yes D No 0 Name: lntemational Coordination Council: Yes 0 No 0 Name: Others: Pro2t"am Staff Use Only Form Complete: Yes D No D Date Request Received: rnm/dd/yyyy Disposition: Date Request Submitted to Program Review Committee: mm/dd/yyyy Disposition: Date Request Submitted to Progmm Review Board: mm/dd/yyyy Dis osition: Date Request Returned to Requester/Submitted to Comptroller. mm/dd/yyyy Disposition (including expenditure authorized): Form PRB-01 ver. 6/19/03 L L ---------- - . Description of Program or Goods To Be Purchased - Please See Above Instructions Ministries and Military units have identified an immediate need for just over 35,000 AK weapons. Contracting office will let open bid for 3 5 ,000 weapons at $17 5 ($6. l 25M) for delivery NL T 15 August to 3 COSCOM at Taji Airbase. The weapons will be distributed from there to units. Form PRB--01ver.6/19/03 ---------~~~~~ Request the following items from your list: Ammunition: 0 7.62 x 39mm ball- 13,160,300 o 7.62 x 39mm tracer- 1,052,800 o 9mm x 19mm Hydra Shock - 10,000 o 9mm x 19mm Ball - 40,000 o Mortar Bomb, 120mm HE - 5,328 o Mortar Bomb, l 20mm Smoke - J96 o Mortar Bomb, 120mm WP - 1,. 000 o Monar Bomb, 60mm HE - 4,824 o Mortar Bomb, 60mm Ulu'm, - 660 o Mortar Bomb, 60mm WP - 7 ,973 Weapons and accessories: o Machine G~ RPK., 7 .62x39mm 1,425 o Machine Gun Took Kit - 3 o Magazine, AK.-47 30 rd - 26.100 o Magazine, AK.SU - 74 30 rd - 6,440 o Magazine, RPK 40 rd - l • .SOO o Magazine, RPK 75 rd - 67 o Mortar, l20mm-31 o Mortar. 120 barrel w/ access - 6 o Mortar, 60 mm 4-barrel assy w / accessory - 9 o Mortar, 60mm Commando - 2 o Mortar tube, 60nun Commando - 150 o Pistol, PPK - 2 o Rifle, AK-47 - 13.272 o Rifle, AK-74 - 1,926 o Rifle, AKS-74U - 936 Thanks! CPA FUNDING REQUEST PRBNo: (PRB Staff to Assign) Project Name: NIA Weapons Date of Request: 7 /24/2003 Date Required :· 7/31/2003 Name of Requester: COLr I Signature: CJ>A OfficefUni. t: NSD POC!Person Complettn2 Form: COU Amount of Request: 10.72 DSN/Cell Ph()ne:r .. I Project Location: Klr Kush (Region) EmaU Address:1 l. Project Category (check all that apply): Health § Salades 0 Recnns lruc lion Humanitarian Food Distribution Water/Sewer Electricity Rule of Law/Govern. Div. Commanders Fund Transportation Pensions D Economic Programs Budget/Ops. Support 0 Education 0 Other 'Public Services 0 Ministty ~ Social Programs D Police/ Security Cultural Programs 0 Brig. Commanders Regional Dir. 0 Fund Fund Construction Initiative 0 l I 2. Proposed Funding Source: 3. Funding Data: (PRB Starr Only) Vested Assets D Bank Account Details: or Seized Assets 0 Name/Title of Iraqi Receiving Disbursement: Appropriated Funds 0 CPA Rep/Unit Responsible for Oversight: Iraqi Development Fund 0 Engineering Oversight Assigned to: Name of Certifying Official.: 4. Clearances: Please indicate you have obtained appropriate clcara11ces. as applicable. (Note: rr that coordination cannot be do11e at the regjonal lent, it · will be done by PRC.) Regional Coordinator: Yes 0 No D Name: Ministry Senio. r Advisor: Yes 0 No 0 Name: Office Oirector/Unit Command.er: Yes 0 No 0 Name: Recon. struc.tion/USAID: Yes 0 No 0 Name: International Coordination Council: Yes 0 No 0 Name: Others: Program Staff Use Only Form Complete: Yes D No 0 Date Request Received: mm/dd/yyyy Disposition: Date Request Submitted to Program Review Committee: mmlddlyyyy Disposition: Date Request Submitted to Program Review Board: mm/ddlyyyy Dis osition: Date Request Ret1.1med to Requestcr/Submhted to Comptroller: mmldd/yyyy Disposition (including · expenditure authorized): Forni PRB-01 ver. 6119103 Descriotton of Program or Goods To Be Purchased - Please See Above Instructions 39,000 new AK weapons are needed to equip the soliders of the New lraq1 Anny. (1,000 are needed by 1 August; 4, 000 by I Oct· and the remainder every training program over lhe next 2 years to a total of 39,000) Jordan has offered to sell up to 65,000 new AKs for $275 ea. At that rate, the NIA requirement costs $10.72SM. Recommend this money be advanced against the NSD budget for the New Iraqi Anny. Form PRB--0 l ver. 6/19/03 I July. 26, 2003 Saturday . - PR8 Seml"ar 0930.1630 t_• SEC0!1 ~ lofo ,... ID Ex,..."-" bv 1 CIVI - 7 00 I V CJTF-71,,...,,._ I 9 00 t..• 5e'1klr AdvlSIO<S MeeUno I "'1>ib Ofll<f!l I J~ly 27, 2003 ' ·' Sunday 6 !.!! 700 V OTF · 1U"""'~ I \..~ Senio'< A<Mso<$ ........._,<Ami> Ol!lc:e' -- 9.2!- 10$ 9~ Ga. t'dntf: 011 Security lloilrd f 1100 121!' - ""' 1.Q.\! 2_!12 ] .!l2 10.!!!> 11..QJ! 12· 11!! 0 Wffk/y a Fvslon loleWilg (window Ind n .... 1 U/Te - IU'I$ 12·2) (VICtllry 14111!1) 1- C!! -w · 2- 3 00 U l'n)gritm ~ Goerd (Mlnt<trie CR) 4 !0 500 t 5.!ll! 500 t..• Staffs~ HeeUnn <C<JS <>l!lce' I 6~ -- 7 00 "J"° Dinner tho Amb Saw<ers (R!NP by COB ID -....r - brCJ (Al Anjon R~Mt - Time T80) I• 8..Qq 8 00 9 -22 9~ ~ ~ - ~ ~ Slocombe, Walt 8. (SES) 3 7/24/2003 6:39 AM Slocombe, Walt B. (SES) 4 7/24/2003 6:39 AM From: v J{l Sent: To: ~ "'Nednesdav.July2 _ 3_ .2 ~ 0 -----:--:--- :-::~.,...~~~~~-=--:-~--~-:--.:r'=;.;.;;;.;;.;;.;.;.;.=. ~ ~ · ----. L _ .- locombe Walt B. (SES}; US Embassy Jordan DCM US Embassy Jordan e ' ---.,-- ---------- Subject: Re: RE: RE: RE: Support from Jordanian Military 2.£ ( 0 MM r-..JJ IN A--4/ ~/wifr-i./U. ~> TO /V\c.~~··/ I"\ _ ?f2. '"'""' n'l A•1'1*... l n - t>rr -, All v~ ....:-. ...,-~ L.£1.1££.... ro . .,J- , ft}\.; l c. "1 ~ c...Mi>~~\ So vv € c,,,.,.., /-...A ,,_' We just got a call from the JAF Chairman. He indicated the following weapons were i--'~ available for delivery: 65,000 AK47 rifles with complete kits- $275 ea. Avail. for transfer by l August. 200 M60 MG with kits- 2,750 ea. 9,960 Beretta folding stock rifles {5.56I!Ull)- $350 ea. l,000 Ml6Al rifles- FREE Just to reiterate the below message. All of this should be viewed as negotiable if elevated to a higher level. Regards, A liC:: 118. 121 M [ M'D -:: ~ •S'S" M Original Message ----- From:L I Date: .__W_e_dn_e_s_d~a-y-,-J-u~l~y--2.,.3-. -2~0-0~3-1_:_2_,7 pm Subject: Re: RE: RE: RE: Support from Jordanian Military g-c e.£ rrA- ": f .3 . s-"""' f Z'Z 7 5"'7 ti .:;-o J I > Gentlemen, > > I'd like to reflect back on a couple of the discussions from this > side on this subject: > > First off: . il there is no money in the till at CPA for these > weapons and equipment, we need t6 escalate this to a political > l evel and request they be "donat~d·. The Jordanians want to get > i.nvolved here ana holding these we· apons in their current state is > of negative value. U we pnli'A, ln!'il c01.1) g get th'i>PR gg, Q\ol.1"" t'ilnns > Of course, nothing is ever free so assurances from senior DoS and > ooo leaders that it will strengthen the relat ionship, or of other > compensation {TBD) would need to be given. This is outside the > influence of the DoD team here and needs to be addressed by more > senior Dos, OSD, CPA, an<l CENTCOM staff in thl:! c oming dayl::l. > >Secondly: t he AK-47's and other light weapons are only a small > portion of the potential assistance that the JA"F can provide. We > arf.! woA"Jd .. ng wi t h the JAF on a more substantial invencory o · f their > stocks in relation to vehicles and other equipment that they rnay > be willing to transfer in the medium (1- 3 month,s) to lopg {3 - 18 > mont.hs) term. In addition, the t . raining and personnel assistance > will most likely become a part of the equation. Our view is that >there needs ta hp a POC for managing the logistics and details of > this rapidly expanding program that is outside of t D > of t as to be someone from CPA, > dl' we will c ontinue to ru.n in circles to solve problems. We're > f i lling the gap for now, but this resourcing issue needs addressed > to get this all done properly. > IC~ c0 ,,.,,.,,.., tr ,voA-no...,: I. T'A ~ E E" _.. At..'- 2. ~ ~1..1C j,AJ/ ~. C..."'T Fe , r-H f N\JoLV~. > The JAF is prepared to release these weapons o/a 29 July and we > have arranged line-haul capacity £.or l August so its really a > matter of closing the terms of the deal. We'll support as best we c ~~ °'"" "\.. ~ 1 1 • 'Do iu. P• ~ .f-d~-J ~ '" oct- Cg..,..., ~ ._ .._ __ 7 r- - . -------------~ _ 1 61c~ ~ • ~i'~ 1 ' .., t5S 10... ''t__ J ~<~·~ ? ~-----~-------------------~ cJ.cT'4Co ~ "? -----------------------------------------------~---~--~---- > can to facilitate . > > Thanks, > : .••• > Kl\J, USAA > > NOTE: The D~TT/HAP Chiet has info'd oso and CENTCOM on curren~ > status of ~hese discussions and asked for their assistance. > Ori > F"rom: LTC >Date: Tuesday. July 22, 2003 1:44 pm > Subject: RE: RE: RE : Support from Jordanian Military : >COL ····· > > See the attached for an update on weapons . More soon. Let rne > > know if you > > hove questions. > > > > VR, >> - > > > > LTC > > oeput > > Cocran: > > Mobil > > SIPR: > > > > -----Orisinal Hsrales----- > >From: • • • ••• •• (0-6 Ministry of > > • > > Sent: Saturday, July 12, 2003 10:44 PM > > To: > >Cc: LTC > Ministry o >>Defense; Slocombe, Walt B. (SES); > > MAP-Jordan} De tense) > > Subject: RE: RE: RE: Support from Jordanian Military ---- : -and - > > > > Very important that nothing goes back to DAO Al:\'\rnan until Hr > > Slocombe has cleared it with A.MB Bremer. > > > > - - please see me or call me if you need > > to meet > > or clarify guidance. > > > > Thanks! > > > > - > > > > -- - - Original Messa e----- > > From: Lt Col ••••••••••••••••• > > Sent > > To : •1 I >>> ~ >> Cc: 11: 1s 1a 1t 1u 1r 1d 1a 1y 11. 1J 1u 111_., 1 ~ , ~ 2 ! 0~0~3 6:23 PM (0-6 Ministry of Defense) ; LTC - ~ ............ lllllllllll!!!!!!lllCIV M inistry of Defense; > Slocombe. > > Walt B - LTC;·········· > > Subject~ RE: RE: RE : Support from Jordan~an Milit~ry > > (SES); ····· > > Sounds like a plan, thanks > > 2 > > DATT > > > > > > of Defense); LTC~ Ministry of Defense; > > - LTC; > > Re: RE: RE: Support from Jordanian Military > > > > > > Sir, > > > > As discussed today. we met both yesterday and today with the > Ministry> ot > > Defense and Interior teams. We have a good laundry list of > > re~irementsfrom both that we will pull together and review with > > COi.m on > > Saturday. > > > > I' l l put something out from there for you t o float with the > > J ordanians. > > If they are in agreement. we can begi n to finallze details of > > logistics.costs, etc. > > > > Thanks, > > > > > > MAJ, USAR > > > > - - --- Origina~Messa e > > From: Lt Col 11111111111111111111111!! > > Date: Tuesday, Ju y 8, 2003 6:48 pm > > Subject: RE: RE: support from Jordanian Military > > > > > llW-ha ir - I hoped to get there but so much going on or I) were not able to get away this week. > > > here we was- > > > > > able to > > > discuss way ahead in a face-to face with you today? I am standing > > > by to help coordinate JO support for the effort. of Defense> > > > > > > > Cc: CIV > > Ministry o >>>Defense; Slocombe, Walt B. !SES}; LTC > > >Subject: RE: RE: Support from Jordanian Military > > > >>--- >>.-! > > > > > > Su.r:;.;y Wt! iniss~d (.;Ornm.s today - let's talk tomorrow. > > > > > > Very much agree with your desire to discuss way ahead. > > > > > > Thanlte! > > > 3 > > > COL > > > > > > -----Origina > > > From: Lt Col > > > Sent: Sunday, > > > > > > > > > Cc: IV > > Ministry of >>>Defense; Slocombe, Walt B. (SES);lilllllllllllll LTC > > > Subject: RE: RE: Support from Jor~ry > > > > > > Col - t:hanks for the invite. We hope to help bridge the > > > Jordanian offer of help made in Washington this May with firm > > > Co1JU11itments. I will > > > discuss this issue and visit proposal it with the Ambassador > > > tomorrow to > > > see > > >if he'll let me (or Lt Collllllllll travel. Looking for a detailed > > > listof > > > requirements from your end (training/equipment/etc) that JO just > > > roay be > > > able > > > to help fill. > > > > > > > > > Lt Col, USAF > > > c ing e ense Attache > > > Air Attache & Chief, AF Assistance Pgm > > > USDAO/MAP Amman > > >mail: US Embassy Amman Jordan USDAO > > > > > > phone: > > > > > > > > > > > > > > > of Defense) > > > > > AM > > > > Slocombe, Walt 8. (SES) Jordanian Military > > > > > > > > > > > - > > > Great! > > > > > > > > > My cellphone is (US nwnber) > > > What's yours? > > > > > > Would definitely like to work with you and-on > > Wednesday - >>>have puc placeholder on calendar from 1530-1630 ... but can > adjust if > > > morning makes more sense. > > > Thanks, 11111111- looking forward to this ... > > > > > > > > > > > > > > > - > > > > > > -----Original Message----- 4 ··---------------- -- ..... > > > > > > > en e > > > > > >----- > > M i nistry of Defense; Re: RE: Support from Wa t B. ($ES) Military > > > > > > Sir, > > > > > > I'll give you a call tomorrow to discuss. I'm curiou& as to > > what the > > > iesuee on this end were/are that are holding this up. I'm not > > > aware of any requests for support that have come through the > > > Embassy here . > > > > > > Let us know what you need and we can help. > > > > > > LTC is considering making a trip to CPA this week > > > {Wednesday) if > > > there is a need to discuss this and other opportunities for > > Jordanian> aupport of your efforts. I think it makes a lot of > > sense as there > > > is a > > > ton we can provide through the network of support the MAP/DAO team > > > havedeveloped here. Please let us know if you would like to meet > > > LTCF ] on Wednesday so we can arrange. > > > > > > I will be at CPA on Wedtlesday as I am coming to work on some other > > > issues so I will stop by then. > > > > > > Thanks. > > > •==;=:::;:t1 > > > > > > a:::==:a:;.i > > > > > > > > > ----- > > > Froll\: (0-6 Ministry of .Defense)• > > > .. e ______ ...... _-"----=--=-__;.. ..... , > > > Date: Saturday, July 5, 2003 5:~5 pm > > > Subject: RE: Support from Jordanian Military > > > > > > > > > > > > > > > I'm Walt'5 MA and will work details from thi9 > > end . • . workino to > > > > get more info soon. > > > > > > > > Thanks! > > > > r > > > > > > > > > > > > -----Original M.essage- - ---~-~----~-> > > > From: Slocombe, Wal~ B. (SES) > > > > Sent : Sat urda Jul 05 2003 6:16 PM > > > > To : > > > > Cc : LTC Lt Col ..._~~~~ > r I> > > -~--r::::-:-:-::M.:":'in.....,i;""stry of Defense; 4'. & -: -=- --- ==-- - _ (0-6 > Ministry of > > > > Defense) Subject : RE: Support from Jordanian Military > > > > > > > > Thanks for the reMinded. I am trying to organize a trip to > > > Amman to > > > > discuss these issues, but there are scheduling problems (at that > > > endl .> Walt > > > > > > > > - ---- Original Message----- ~= - - > > > > From: - - - - > > > > Sent: Friday, July 04, 2003 5:07 PM > > > > To: Slocombe, Walt B. (SES) 11111111111111111111111111111111 > > > > Cc: LTC•••!!!!!!!!!!!!••• Lt Col > > > > JamesCIV Ministry of Defense > > > > Subject: Support from ~ordanian Military > > > > > > > > Walt, > > > > > > > > We have met on a couple of occasions during my visits to OCPA. > > > >Usually.the discussion was about sourcing the material for the > > > > uniforms. > > > > > > > > During my last vi$it, r ~poke briefly with HG Eaton about the > > > > potentialfor having trainers £rom Jordan involved with the NIC. > > > > He indicated an interest in a contribution, but requested that > > > > the Jordanians > > > propose> something rather than we officially requesting a > > > contribution.> > > > > we have worked on this a bit from our end and it looks as though > > > this> would be well received by the Jordanians. In fact, it > > > appears there > > > > ¥/ere conuni LrntmLY made by senior Jordanian mili r..a.ry o!ficiall:J at > > > > the Dep. Secy Defense level offering to support your efforts. > > > > > > > > Unfortunately, the critical follow up was not accomplished > and the > > > > Jordanians are awaiting some sort of list of what the needs of > > > MoD are > > > > for trainers. > > > > > > > > I am cc'ing LTC (acting Defense Attache) here at US > > > Embassy> /ullJnan so that he can carry these discussions forward with > > > you or M'i......... > > > > Eaton. ~would like to come down to OCPA this week if > > > possible to > > > > discuss this. > > > :;,. > > > > Could you let us know if there are still needs from OCPA MoD and >>>when> may be a good time for LTCllllllto visit? > > > > > > > > > > > > > > > > Thanks > > > > > > > > > > > > > > > > > ~- ~ 6 ·"' - - (A,Sj [ ] (0-6 MoNSD) From: To: Cc: Sent: 1:50 PM ~----~ lC0-6 MoNSD); Kennedy, Patrick AMS; [ .._.._ _____ ___. Subject: {)v { L, L (Z C l,l O&v r uV' ro0/r11. interview by the WSJ and a ef1 You may want to look at this e-mail which highlights an r"' lin the north. I'm not sure what weapons cache they're referring to in Bag or who he spoke to a CPA, but I can give you the following update orr-= !bile>! issues. We received a note this morning from that our budget through December has been approved, add:i;-essing police uniforms and equipment, weapons and ammunition, vehicles and e. quipment, public order equipment, forensic equipment for the approximately 30,000 police officers that are on board already and some training facility needs. As for radios and communications, there is an assessment and proposal that will work on a nationwide system that will be interoperable for all MOI agencies. This is for the long term, but for the short, perhaps Col.r" J ean do what Baghdad and many other cities have done and that is to acquire small portable point to points to address present necessities. I'll keep you updated. MIKE BRAUN: According to the police advisory team, recalls a Col.r spoke with regards to his quotes.. Can you please see who he ~----~ -----Q:-ig-in .... a- · l...,_,.~ ... ~-s~ --- -- From: r'"~~- ---"--~~-~ J Sent: Monday, JulY=1: , 2003 2:59 AM To: I ~ ; .Sraun Michael A. (SES-5) Subject: Pw: WSJ query that requires response on Monday ..._ __ <&_lC'_..1Michael, We need to respond to this by tonight. Grateful for guidance. Spokesman Coalition Provisionary Authority Iraq [ Forwarded by L '--'ll•••••ll CIC on 21/07/2003 11:55 ----- [ To 21/07/2003 10:33 l cc Subject WSJ query that requires response on Monday In a visit to Mosul I was told to top commanders of the 2nd brigade of the lOlst Airborne of the numerous problems the h obtaining weapons and radios for the Iraqi police and fixed-site secu 1 y orce~ 1ng ere. ome po icemen are s a i just 10 Motorola radios, Col.~told me. Efforts to obtain more radios through the coalition administration 1n Baghdad have fallen on deaf ears, he said. Also, th second brigade sa s it has tried fruitlessly to obtain weapons from caches in Baghdad. When a request was made to t e coalition a inis ra ion, e answe ~•you guys solve that problem up north," Col. llllllllllsaid. Under the current system troops give weapons seized in raids to the cops, but those weapons oftentimes are old or don't function properly. According to the aecond brigade, bureaucracy continues to stifle efforts to bring law and order. Pots of money are strictly designated. For example, the lOlst has purchased police uniforms and boots, refurbished a police academy, re-built a prison and are rebuilding police stations -- all using mostly seized Iraqi monies designated for community development. Funds were even authorized to make police batons. But guns, radioa and police vehicles don't fall under •projects to help the people,n Col.llliiiiiililliisaid. Perhaps you can respond to these quite serious claims by the military in Mosul. Are more efforts being made to obtain weapons and radios for the police? What is the timetable to do so? I will need a response today (Monday, 7121) by 9 p.m. Baghdad time, as this is for a story scheduled to run in Tuesday's Wall Street. Journal. Thanks and best, Alexei Alexei Barrionuevo Staff Reporter The Wall Street Journal Alexei.barrionuevo@wsj.com PLEASE NOTE: THE ABOVE MESS~GE w~s RECEIVED FROM THE INTERNET. On entering the GSI, this email was scanned for viruses by the Government Secure Intranet (GSI) virus scanning service supplied exclusively by Cable & Wireless in partnership with MessageLabs. GSI users see http://www.gsi.gov.uk/mainfnotices/information/gsi-003-2002.pdf for further details. In case of problems, please call your organisational IT helpdesk. 2 -"--- - -- co~ A meeting was he!d today i;lj.J.;a.C.1..1..11!!!il.1..l,...l,,"'-U. Organization) to hammer out the terms of safe/ lransfer. There are several options that came up during the meeting, we need CPA direction ASAP ... <3HO would \ike us to provide them with a ~uest. ~:K47s at $275 each= $17,875,000 S ippiog (estimate) 5300,000 PTION : 6 . AK47s at $275 each:::: $17,875,000 30,000 K AK47s (0ddilionat), IF USG agrees to replace with M16A1/2s (in the future}; JAF uses this 30,000 as "reserve" weapons but would prefer to have M16s Shipping Ttiere is a third o lion working in which the USG can urchase 50 o and get the weapons ree_. _ a nee s addition;:it discussion at higher levels. t spoke with the Vice Chairman tfiis evening and he said whatever the option we choose, he will make it work ... he wants a ··win-win." The discussion will continue at 0830 hours tomorrow with MG Kai id Jamoka, ACOS Planning and Defense Resources. Please provide guidance and we'll continue to work it. VR, - From: Sent: To: Cc; Subject: RESEND Sir Again sent SIPR I'd add that you might want to send an assessment team to see the vehicles. Sir Our former JTF-West C-4 Majllllllllllllllland I ran all the JTF military convoys out of Jordan. Major is ~ing up the JTF base redeployment. I had him go today look at the AK-47 car o and recon the loading area to calculate linehaul requireme ars we could probably pie up on e irs day they are available, which may be Tuesday the 29th, load out and depart for the border on t with escort needed from Trebil to ing of the 1st. We can work the linehaul details from here, as we do ~his from here on e regular basis. vs CJTF-1 having to reinvent the wheel. However, we may need some assistance in securing a more robust security escort than usual, especially east of the hwy 1/12 split. On another note, I also went to the vehicle storage/rehab base and looked at vehicles. Although they don't have any available for use now in storage, but they have a rgha1> program which would allow them to take vehicles out of current seJ;:V"ice and replace them witfl: rehabbed units. I believe the quantities of US made equipment available in within a couple weeks are: L 1 Apporx..,5,5 duece-and-a-halfs and SS five ton units. We probably could get these within 2- 3 weeks (time to clean, repaint and service). - There were also 2~4~0~~e~e~~M~l~S~l~A~C~o~~~~'.::-~~~"":":~~~~~~~~~f~u~l~l~r~e~h~a~b~~~~~:...,! ~erviceable. They indicated that they would be willing to do a full re requested but it would be several months for the first unit and "'! ... r-,,.t~n-ott..,.n,..k->~$...,,(';;';=;;:r-,_.,, dilapidated condition. Available immediately are 19 Jeep liberties less than a year old. They were too small for the in tended us here. ' Also a vehicle from our Spanish allies, the Spartan APC ( 6 man tracked APC). There are 80 units available now and they are supposedly nearly new. They are mogas powered and were intended to be reengined with diesel but they have not been able to afford it. They have us Tank transporters, M-60 tanks, reeove:cy vehicles and other misc v~hicles available. They have no cranes or wreckers. They would really need a breakdown of your requirements as they have not been very irnaginacive abou~ what they could provide, V/R - Will sort that out in the AM - just covering emails after long trip. Wilt keep you informed. ---·-Ori I From: Se~, 2003 4:50 PM SUbject: Weapons Co- To-----(0-6 MoNSD) Col-here with the JS in Qatar. Question: If the country that is offering weapons for sale come through, are you set to "buy" them? I have seen some emails that indicate there are some people that believe they are being donated, and we know that is not the case. Just want to make sure that we are all oo the same sheet of music to execute as SOQTI as the agreements are struck. TO: L. Paul Bremer FROM: Walt Slocombe RE: Decision on Priorities for the Issuance of Weapons DATE: 23 July 2003 Attached for your approval is a policy paper regarding the priorities for the issuance of weapons to entities of the CPA and units of CJTF 7. The first step in providing a safe and secure environment in which the government and economy of a new Iraq can develop involves emplacing a properly equipped security structure, including police, Facility Protection Guards, the Iraq Civil Defense Corps, and other organizations. To date, none of these organizations has sufficient weapons to arm its personnel. As weapons become available, a policy decision is required to ensure that they are issued to those organizations that need them the most. This policy was crafted by a "Weapons and Facility Protective Service Prioritization Board• chartered by AMB Kennedy on 15 July. The Board is co-chaired by the Senior Advisors for the Ministry of Interior and for National Security and Defense. Its members include the CPA Operations Office, the CPA Requirements Coordination Office, and CJTF 7. It was vetted and endorsed by representatives of ministries, Baghdad Central, and CJTF 7 at a detailed briefing on Saturday, 19 July. We request that you communicate the urgency both of ensuring di~ciplined adherence to these priorities as well as expeditious yet thorough accountability of weapons as they become available The paper has been cleared by the individuals below. They did, however, raise the following concerns: • Please sign the attached paper if you approve of the policy as it is presented. ~~~ Approve ~~- Disapprove ~~- Approve with Modification Cleared: Sent to: -- --- ---- -- -- - COALITION PROVISIOIU.L AOTBORITY Policy Paper Apportionment of weapons for Security aJld Military Purpoae• 23 July 2003 The overriding challenge to establishing a functioning Iraqi government and economy, is the establishment of a commonly recognized and respected security infrastructure. The first step in achieving this infrastructure is an adequate and appropriate apportionment of the weapons necessary for security forces of all kinds. The police, ministries, military units, governates, the Iraqi Civil Defense Corps, and the New Iraq Army have all identified a critical need for weapons. In total, this requirement exceeds 65,000 weapons. Efforts are underway to obtain weapons from a variety of sources to meet this requirement. The inunediate challenge, then, is to logically apportion these weapons. The Coalition Provisional Authority (CPA) has decided that weapons for security forces will be apportioned in accordance with the fallowing procedures. l. 2. 3. 4. CPA entities. including Ministries, Governates, and Muni c.ip.;;i.11 t.ie~, hav~ suhmi tted weapons requirements (rifles and pistols) to the Requirements Coordination Office {RCO) as of 20 July. The RCO will consolidate these requests by geographic area (coinciding with CJTF 7 MSC Areas of Responsibility (AOR)} and submit them NLT 1 August to CJTF 7 C3. CJTF 7 C3 will integrate these requirements with those submitted by its MSCs. The result will be a matrix of weapons requirements by type, by unit, for the command. Weapons and ancillaries are being acquired from a variety of sources. As they become available, they will be consolidated and inventoried by CJTF 7 C4. As soon as accouncability is assured, weapons will be issued in accordance with the following priority. (Unless otherwise noted, unit of issue is one weapon with one magazine): a. weapons present in depot stocks at the date of this policy will be issued immediately to lA.D for issuance to the Baghdad Police. b. The first 1000 available new AK-type rifles, with 4 magazines each, will be issued to the Coalition Military Advisory Training Team (CMATT) for use by the initial battalion of the New Iraqi Army. 6 rW £"~r ~A'-IOM ,'~u"'""'' b; SJf,:~11f" , A.}M, N~r\ J ~ c. In lots of 1000, ,weapons]will ~issued to the following units in order: JJrf:f, 4lB, 3?~.'\.iKP...~1¥, :t'tJK D!v, .J..aJ. .AASLT 3Ac.a... The order of issue will be repeated until each unit has received its full requirement or 5000 weapons, whichever comes first. (Units are responsible 2 for issuing, with proper accountability, weapons to Governing Council Protective Service Details, police, government FPS guards, Border Guards, and ICDC units, in that order, within their geographic areas of responsibility.) d. Once this scale of weapons is issued, CJTF 7 C3 will review additional requirements and apportion additional weapons to MSCs as required. e. Weapons remaining at the end of this process will be issued to the CHATT for use by subsequent units of the New Iraqi Army. 3 UNCLASSIFIEOi'fFOR OFFICIAL USE. m1L¥ REPORTING UNIT - AK-47 MAGAZINES 7.62AMMO 9MM MAGAZINES IMMAMMO ·. 1AD 410 310 8758 17516 525480 3000 6000 90000 3ACR 2314 9{174 294420 3 406 10372 155580 _ 101AA 1300 2600 78000 7,607 15214 456420 16,982 33964 509460 2500 5000 75000 3000 6000 90000 I MEF 9000 18000 540000 3000 6000 90000 UK Div 6000 12000 360000 3000 6000 90000 !Total 287211 626881 18038401 293881 62336) 9350401 urqetA~~lfi'IEOl'l'FOR OFFIC~L USE ONtY WEAPONS REQUIREMENTS Note 1: For all but NIA and /GDF. need one magazine per weapon; for NIA and /GDF need_ magazines per weapon. Note 2: For all but NIA and /GDF, need 25 rounds of ammunition per AK, 10 rounds per 9MM; for others need_ rounds per weapon. -- ------- -- -- From; Sent: To: Cc: Subject: AITTISl!r .JPG ( lS2 KB) AlmSOOOlJPG (715 KB) Arm$0002.JPG (738 KB) An'rlSOOOl.JPG (712 KB) Anns001>4 .JPG ( 788 KB) Ann.ooo6Jl'G ( 202 KB) Sir, Attached is the list that was passed to the DAO at the Embassy in Amman recently. Open with Windows Imaging or to read them clearly. Closer examination shows like they actually have 98,663 new AK-47s (see last page), and SBOO Mls. Apparently they also have a number of used AKs as well that aren't listed here, but based on the number of new AKs available and needed, that doesn't seem relevant now, so we aren't inquiring further on used AKs. As for pistols, it appears there may not be quanities of any one type that meet your needs except the Mark 5 Lighting Pistol, which we have no idea what type or caliber it is. You may also want to have someone check with the CMOC in Najaf. I recall when we visited them 2 weeks ago they had taken in a large quanity of Iraqi 9mm pistols that looked new. Le~ me know if you need any additional info on anything on the list and we will inquire. We can put eyes-on any of these items, such as the Mark 5 pistols if needed as well. V/R ---r-Qriginal Message----- From: (0-6 Ministry of Defense) Sent: 15, 2003 9:50 AM - To: E-mail) Cc: (E-mail); .-----, CE-mail); ••••••• (E-mail) Subject: RE: weapons From Jordan Gentlemen, Excellent news - well done! We are adjusting letter now and will await Derek's next transmission before finalizing for review by Mssrs. Slocombe and Kerik. Thanks!!! COL. To: Cc; mail); Subject: - LTC (E- Currently it doesn't appear that the Jordanians have yet had enough of the Ml6Als replaced . 1 and taken out of service to meet CPA needs, except maybe for use by the Border police. However, Jordan has 40,000 brand new unused 1U<.-47s, Czech made, still in the box, with wood stock, magazines and cleaning kits etc. Major at MAP has seen these at the zarka armory and the Jordanians have said they are available ASAP. He said we can go look at these to get more info if needed The total AKs available including used but serviceable is up to lOOK rifles. Those additional eOK Mes may not all be the same model and are used. ~lso that initial offer of 2000 Ml6Als was made was apparently also made by Prince Faisal in Washington to OSD as well as to CENTCOM. While not optimal, the AKs would meet COLlllllllllbasic requirements for time and quantity. They would probably want to donate them vs sell as they would then get a greater return via their own FMS needs from the US. Larger quantities of M16Als would be down the road as they replace them with A2s. I am scanning a recent list of other weapons besides the AKs they have offered {see its cover letter) including 3000 Ml4 rifles, 300 Ml training rifles, assorted pistols and light machine guns that are in their current inventory. A shopping list of current inventory so to speak. I'll get that to you within the hour. US Embassy Amman/MAP HACC-West SIPRNET Mobile Iridium 2 / ·, GHQ or Jordan's Armed Forces Directorate of Planning and Organization No.: TMS/20/JAF Excess Equ./2'f J Date: 13 April2003 .\ Colone Chief , MAP and Defense Attache Embassy o:f the United States of America Amman • Jordan \ --~~~~~~~~ l . I would like to extend my complements and thanks to you for your constant efforts to further strengthen the cooperation between our Armed Forces and to enclose herewith a list of JAF's excess weapons from different origins (small arms, machine guns, cannons, and artilleries). ( 2. Since the storage of these weapons has become costly in terms of money and effort, JAF intend to sell or trade these weapons provided that an end-user certificate be provided by the buyer. Therefore, we see'k your assistance with the US concerned authorities to obtain their approval to transfer the US- origi n weapons to a third party and help to find customers for both U.S. and other origins. 3. While highly appreciating your constant cooperation, I assure you of my highest regards and best wishes. Brigadier O,;~ Director of Planning and Organiz.ation Moh'd Taisir Massad,eb .. : SWNft Arms , Mld\IMgUI\• • C.nof\• , 8nd Artllerln out of HfVfce available ft •IDcb .-t RMC ...... Stores 1 2237 PISTOL ,,., • 2 2 NIA u.s.s.R 2 2257 LAMA 7.11115 PISTOL - & 5 NIA NIA _3 ZZ~A .LAMA PtSTOL "7 ....... ,..,----------+----"12=----+--"'12.., _ --Nl""""'A'---+--·NI~~- --+--- ---1 4 2250 TOLITOU PISTOL 1MORRESE1 • 7 7 NIA ,. 5 22lll8 S>MMSTARPIST()t. 32 5 :U ""' NfA 0 227'5 WIPPL Y Pl.STOl 14 • 3 3 NIA NIA 7 =- STAR PISTOL .. "6HORTNOSF' • 9 I NIA HIA 8 22988 $TAR NTOl d '"SHOtU HOSE" • II 11 NIA NIA 10 2215 8 38 PRABLLO PISTOL - '7 17 NfA NIA t1 2'2Sl8 MARK 2 WIPLL Y PISTOL - 2 2 WA NIA 17 2318 9MM STYER PISTOL • 1 1 NIA SPAIN 18 231M 91YMPISTOI. 1 1 WA EGYPT 19 2321 MORRESE PISTOl. • 1 t NIA ITAl V :Ill 2324 PARTA PISTOL 1 1 NIA ITAlY 21 23o6 SPAtiii'PisroL 1 • 1 NIA SPAJN 22 23Cl5 WIPLL Y 38 PISTOL I • 1 NIA NIA 23 221111 WIPU '( 38 PISTOl 1 • 1 NfA NIA 24 22*. -: ... RMllJ\t PfSTOL 1 • I NIA QERMANY.=....-+------1 2IS 2230 1PISTOl. 39 - t I NIA NIA - 211 ZS2IS STAR PISTOl I • I NIA SPAIN rl 233M FAST TYPE PIST~ 1 • I NIA NIA 29 2230 911.W L.AtM PISTOL • 10 10 NIA NIA 29 n32 11 MM WIL TEil PISTOL • 7 7 NIA N.IA 30 2234 7MM PROWNING PISTOL • 4 4 NIA NIA 31 23'40 ,7 MM JiAAti: PisroL 2 10 12 NIA tTALY 32 »42 lSMITH PISTOL 3 2 5 NIA U.S.A 33 23-47 MARKIS LIGHTING PISTOL 121i 102 1321 _1,..-.950=--+---"Nl~'A;.:__+-------1 34 2~50 MARK 3 LIGHTING PISTOL. I) 4 SI N1A NIA 36 2354 LAMA PISTOL Ill & 18 22 NIA NIA $8 23611 11.lSPISTOL 12 1 13 NIA ITALY 37 23Sel JltSTOl ft . t 1 NIA NIA 38 2'57A II MM PARTA PISTOL • 2 2 NIA ITALY 30 t .2362 : PISTOt. "8 - 2 2 "'" NIA «1 35284 'slMM--=SM1T=--""t1-P""1"'"sr..,.o""L-----4--....;;.._ --+---::s---+-~s-""1--...:""~"-+--u.;..;;;s""A..--+-----1 413 39119 __ 22 ~ TOUTOU PISTOl..lMORRESE • 1 1 NIA NIA 44 3700 M 4 WIPPI. Y 3& PISTOL • 1 1 N.IA NfA 46 37a2A 7.85 PARTA PISTOL • 1 1 NIA ITAi. Y 40 3703A PI STOL WT - e e NIA NIA 47 37(MA 7.M PRISA PISTOL 12 13 25 NIA NIA '48 ~ MILL PISTOL • 1 1 NIA NIA ~ 3706 STYER #9 PISTOL • 3 3 NIA AUSTRIA 50 37<MI Ol.O STANIAN PISTOL • 7 7 NIA NIA lo-l!5~14-~3~7t=o:--+7~MM~~PRA8~~L~atN:..:.,..:.~P~.S~T~O~L--~~~-.'---l----:.l--+--,;;---t--·Nl:~A~+-~~Nl.~~':f---+------t 52 37UIA 9 MM DIFFERENT TVPE PISTOLS • 2 2 NIA NIA !5:l 3821> 12 MM A PISTOl • I I NIA NIA 64 38:» 38 P SIMM PISTOl - 2 2 NIA NIA 55 311J:2 7.65 *PE PISTOL - I 1 NIA SPAIN !Sa 3933 SPAIN PlSTOL • 1 I MIA SPAIN S7 39:'4 !t MM SI PA PISTOL • 1 1 NIA NIA 59 ae35 WATER l'ISTOL • 1 1 Nf.A NIA !i8 2711 E~GLISHIPISTOL I I NIA ENGLAND OD 2715 1 MM MAP! PISTOL • 2 2 NIA FRANCE fl1 2716A 7MMARMESE PISTOL - 12 12 NIA FRANCE 112 2726 7 MM PISTOL • :ZS 25 NIA NIA 83 2726A 0 MM PISTOL • 5 5 NIA NIA 1M ~ 9 MM PISTOL • 2 2 NIA HUNGRIA ti 27&4 7.116 PISTOl • 2 2 M.IA N.IA 97 2787 U5 PtSTOl • 3 3 NIA 8ELOIUM SmaM ~- • Machln9gl.l"5. C.MOM • and ArUl'lertiea out of .-viee avallabfe n a.tocks at RMC Mein Stor.s 70 2ll30A LIGHTINING PISTOL • t 1 NIA CHINA 11 m1·--r9MMFB PISTOL 1 • 1 HJA NIA 72 2723 7.85 PISTOl . ...._.__ _____ -+---1 -----.---+--,-1---Ni~'A'--+--,G'"'E,,,;Rw.~-HY--+-------f 73 :2856 STARLINGE PISTOl 1 • 1 NfA NIA 74 283ol MAs>s=~=s:~OL==-'.;.;..;-=--------1f----t;----i1-----B..----+........,7:-+---;Nl~A,,._.-+--F~RA~ . ~N~C~E,--+-------4 71 ~ 9 W4 PAATA PISTOL 1 2 3 NIA llAl Y IO 31157A 9M'4 PISTOL - t t NtA U 8.A 8t _..... &MM NAPt.ION"'"'-"P""IS~T'-'Ol=---- ---+--.;;..• --+--~S;___ • ._,....;;1_+-_N:.,:1~A:-......._~F~flA:;;;NCt<~;........+-------I 92 31169 MAPE PISTOL • 3 3 H:A FRANCE 8J 3800 TARia"=p1='=s-=ro=:-L--------+- ----4---:2~--+--:2'--~:-~M-'::.;'A' ........... --'...:,IR=A~Q'== -l-------1 l-i94~t--~386~1:;-..+C~H~l~LD~R~E~H:.;::Pl~S~T~O~L-------1---.;__-.,_ _ _:..t __ +--.::.1--;;.-..~Nl~A--+-·-~,T~A~LY,__-+------r 115 38S1 8M'M'w~1t'=r""E""'R""P""ro:;.:s:;,,OL:-:-----+--....;.-------,---1--,-1-t--"""Nl,.,...,,A..__...,G""1e;.,;R"'MA.,.,..,.N""Y,......... _____ --r 89 38e3 8MM PARTA PISTOL • t I NIA ITALV 87 3984 !IMMRECKPISTOl :.7' =-- ~----+---.---4...--~2;.-..--+---:!2;,.-..+--;.N<::.;A;,:---+--..:..:,:Nl~A:..:....--1------~ 81 _...., 7.G5 RECK PISlO\. • I 1 NIA NIA 89 388S 7 65 °'STER PISTOL • 4 .. HI" NIA SIO 3866 SIMM PARTA Pl$T0t. • 11 11 NIA ITALY ... ,_ ·-·-""""~ 92 *8 7.85 STAR PISTOL • 2 2 I N1A SPAIN 93 30e& 7.0SPARTAPISTOl • 4 4 N.IA ITALY IM 38el9A 7.65PARTAPISTOL • 1 1 NIA ITALY 95 3870 1 VT 7 PARTA PISTOL • 1 1 NIA ITALY lie 31171 «lOOASTE~R~P~IST~Ol:-:-------T...,-...,-_~-. ~-- 1'--~-t-~1--i----.NJ~A,---+--.....-Nl~A----.1----~----1 97 '872 ~AA ME SE PISTOL. • 1 1 NIA NIA 99 3873 ·- «lMM PISTOL • 2 2 NIA SPAIN -- 1-"GD~+-~38~7~ .. STAR.~P~rs~T~O~L~~-~-------1---. ---f.-- ~~1"----+--.:;:1'--+-·-:.:N~IA,__-+----~s~PA~t~N~-t--------1 100 3875 PRABBELLO PISTOL • 7 7 N1A NIA i--:-,O=-=l'-+-~38:;,.7.=.6 SMALL PISTOL • S 3 t4.'A ITAL V 102 3877 8MMPRA8El~LO~P~IS~T~O-L------~---.--_..,1----2"'--...,--+--'2~ . --t-~Nl~A'-'-_.._,..G~E~RMA-=-'~N~--+--------4 103 31182 2'2MM PISTOL • 1 1 NIA U.S.A UM - llMM PISTOl • 2 2 NIA GERMANY 105 *7 9MM PART-' PISTO'- • 1 1 NIA ITALY 100 38lllJ SMM STAR PtSTor-- . 4 4 NlA NIA tOI &1 DIFFERENT PISTOLS • 2 2 NIA NIA 108 3811811 8.!iMMEASTER~N-PJS~T~OL..-~~--+--~-.----<~---2"-----+--'2,._-+-~Nt~A~-+~-'-Nl=A~-+--------i 110 3lil07 ~~T~R~P~IS~T-OL=----------+--------t-~.......,;•;-----t--::'--t---::-:N/~A,__-+--~SIP~A~l~N---t---- -----t !1t 3lllJ8 ........ PISTOt. • 8 9 NIA SPAIN 112 3SI09 9MM PARTA PISTOL • 1 1 NIA NIA ttJ ~o SPEc1~ At."""'""'M'-"1t"'"L""'P""'rs""r""'o .... L-------.-------,-----=-,-1---N1~A.'---+--e""GY~a=r---+----- 11• 3811 22MM ASTRA .PISTOL • t 1 NIA NIA ... .....,_. ..... 1.-.,1_ _ 5;..+.-"512 'TMMBA PISTOL • 1 1 NIA NIA 118 3913A 38 MILLPiST;,;.0.;;:;L.:._ _______ ~-----~~--2.:..----+_,2,__.+---;.N;;.;/A'f--f---;.;HJ~'Ai---f--------1 117 391$ GMM PISTOLCLONG NOSEi • 1 I NIA SP"1N 1111 3917 9MMPARTAPISTOL • f 1 NIA ITALY 119 l9t8 eMIVI MILL PISTOL · 1 1 NIA NIA l f ~ \22 3$21 OIFFERENT tMUZ£Jt PISTOL • 2 2 NIA NIA 123 39'12 38MM LAMA r1STOL • 5 G NIA NIA 124 3828 7..65PtSTOL • 2 2 NIA NIA 125 mt 74M00£L PISTOL 8 • a NIA NIA 1211 • NIA TYPE PISTOL • 1 1 NIA NIA 127 • PISTOUl6 • 119D 1'951 NIA NIA 129 2382A 1tM STAR l'IS'!'Ol • 2 2 NIA fo&IA 129 'ntn 7.&SFAZORE PISTOL &4 70 134 NIA N.'A tJO 2373 22MM PARTA PJSTOl 14 4 18 NIA ITALV 131 2314 22 MM PARTA PISTOL • 3 3 NIA ITALY 132 2375 LAMA PISTOL 1 t 2 NIA SPAIN 133 2370 za4M STAR PISTOL • 1 I NIA SPAIN 134 73llG SMITH 311 PISTOL 2 t 3 NIA U.S A t3S 2703 9MN PAR1'A PISTOL • 10 10 NIA ITALY t35 2371 22MM STAR PISTOL I • 1 NIA SPAIN 137 23IS4 MAP PISTOL a - a NIA FRANCE. 138 ~ AMERICANPISTOl T • 1 NIA U&A 138 31:)8 M.1 PISTOi. 3 • S NIA IELGIUM I I ~ - - - ------- ___.... ........ .-.................................... __ .............................................................................................. ..,; .................... _ &Mall Alm• • MachifteOUhs • 1 caftl'IOI\• • Mtd Artll~id out ol HrYlce availab» ae stocks at RMC Main Store• 141 3841 9MM p. iSTOL 1 - 1 NIA ITAl..Y 142 3El60 GERMAN PISTOL J • 3 NIA GERtdANY 143 3833 "WILLIAM P ""lS::-:T:-:O:=olc--------r-~3--+----.-----=-_,-+---:eNl;,,A,---T- --,ti-,.,IJ'°'N..,- _CU~~="="IA.,--t--------t 144 3861 MAP PISTOL 4 • 4 NIA FRANCE 145 3862 0.:26 PISTOL 1 - 1 NIA U.S.A 1411 3854 8MM PISTOL 1 - 1 NIA GERMANY 147 3042 9MM PARTA PISTOL 1 - 1 NIA ITALY 1"8 3843 7.65 PISTOL I - 1 NIA IT~ Y ~14.9~-~3844,..,_ 7.65 PARTA PISTOL 1 - 1 "4/A ITA\.Y !50 3854 8.35 W.11 PISTOL 38 - 38 NIA NIA 1$1 3846 6.~MMPISTOI. 44 - 44 NJA GERPMNY 152 3847 6.35 MM PISTOL 1 - 1 NIA GERMANY 153 3848 6.35 M'JI PISTOL 3 - :! NIA ITM. Y 154 3849 ITAUAN PISTOL 4 - 4 NIA ITAl Y 157 3714A 22MM PARTA PISTOL - 1 1 N.'A ITALY 158 3715A OLD Mill PISTOL - 4 4 NIA NIA l-'-159~+-' __,3"-"7""16=- JO MM PISTOL - 160 3716A·-+s=-'_32=-'M~M'°"P~IS~T:;.:Ol:=-,... -------+--- _--+---:.:t3;.--+~13:;-+---'N.(.=:.,:A"---- ...: N/.o:,A:,:..--+-----t 1~ 1S--+--,-Nl=A~--..---'-N.l = 'A""--+-------l 161 3717A SMITH PISTOl - 3 3 NIA USA le-2 3722 RANIWE PISTOL - 1 1 NIA ITALY 163 3722A DIFFERENT PISTOLS - A 4 NIA NIA 164 3724 7.65 PISTOL - ;J :1 NIA ITALY 105 3727 JAMPO PtSTOL 32 11 41 NIA IT.ALY 166 • 3729 MILi.. MORRESE PISTOL • I 1 NIA NIA \~ 3TaA MOFl.RESE '12. PISTOL - I I f\llA NIA 168 3730 ANORACOFf PISTOL • I 1 NIA USSR 189 3730A NIA PISTOLS 11 22 33 NIA NIA 170 3733 HUNTING PISTOL• 12 ~ 1 1 NIA NIA 111 3734 PARTA PARSOlAM PISTOL - 1 1 NIA ITALY 1 n 3135 38 MM PISTOL • I 1 NiA NIA 173 3737 J8 MM PISTOL • 1 1 NIA NIA 174 3758 SMITH PISTOL C SHORT NOSE l - 3 3 NIA IJSA 175 3765 ~MM SMITH PIS..T""OL"""-'------+- ~~ · ----+----''-----1--..;.. 1 -1-..;.;N/-.A'--+-- - u,..s~A---1- -----1 176 3772 581 MAGNOME PlSTOL 2 2 NIA USA 177 3797 PISTOL# 7 - 3 3 N.IA NIA 178 • 3830 7 MM PISTOL 1 4 5 NIA eELGIUM 179 3832 9 MM PISTOL 8 IQ 18 WA USSR 1$'.l ~ ?.65 PISTOL 2 - 2 N1A ITALV 181 'J7'32 SMITH J8 PISTOL 1 • 1 NIA USA 1S2 ~ 6.~P,f,RTAJAMPOP ISTOL 32 - ~ N.IA ITALY t ~ · 189 3761 CARTRIDGE I 12 101 • 101 NIA NIA I 190 379 191 192 194 195 1!l7 198 2812 199 2812A 2718 HUNTIOO RIFLE I 12 10 e6 76 HUNTING RIFLE S S HUNTING RIFLE I 8 • 13 13 HUNTING RIFLE: I 16 1 6 7 OLD HUNTING RIFLE - 1 1 9 MM HUNTING RJFLE '4 2 6 0.1( HUNTING RIFLE - 1 1 9 MM HUNTING RIFLE 1 • 1 MAW HUNTING RIFLE - 3 3 MAW HUNTING RIFLE - 1 I TOOTOU MORRESE RIFLE 1 1 2 HUNTING GUN• 12 52 52 • AUTOMATIC HUNTING .RIFLE 21 - 21 I NIA NIA HJA NIA NIA NIA NIA NIA NIA NIA NIA NIA NIA NIA. NIA NIA NIA USA "'" Ni A ·$ ... ; :203 2().- 205 206 '207 208 209 210 211 212 213 214 215 218 217 219 219 220 w 222 223 _zz4 Z2S 226 Z!T 228 229 230 231 232 233 23'4 235. 236 237 238 239 240 241 242 2-43 244 245 246 2.ol7 2411 249 251 252 253 254 255 25& 257 258 259 260 ~I 282 263 264 285 2«l 268 269 270 27t 272 ~ ~ Small Arms , M.ctllnegun• , ~nnons • 8fld ArllllMles out or Ht''YQ aYallable as ~tocks al RMC Main Stores ···.·: IS'Nlf lliwE" ·'·::':. QTY O.le In ~ ;::· .;:;-;-: ,;• ~ u '··-· _..-ice 260 ENGLISH RIFLE - 21 21 NIA ENGi.ANO 28(lA ENGLISH 7RAINING RIFLE . 2 2 19'8 ENGL.ANO 2'61 M 1 TRAINING RIFLE 301 452 753 UM9 USA 261A M 16 RJFI.$. F 1 ' NIA USA 301 G3RIFLE - 5 5 NIA GERMANY 301A G3RIFlE 52 28 80 1969 PAKISTAN 3018 G3 RIFLE I , -- NIA . SPAIN 4028 AIR RIFLE 5 4 9 NIA 4'02 AIR RIFLE '" 14 NIA NIA NIA $)4 TRAINING RIFLE 3 1 4 NIA 14/A 410 EN9USH RIFLE - 60 60 NIA ENGLAND 4106 MARK I Et.JGLISH RIJ'LE - , 1 NiA""' ENGlANO 4HI EGYPTION RIFLE - , I NIA EGYPT ::-,MQ8;RESE E RIFLE , I 2 NIA ENGlANO MOAFIESE E • RIFLE - 1 I NIA ENGLAND 445 MOR~~E RIFLE , s 6 NIA USA 448 22MM RIFLE , 1 2 Nlill. USA 450 MORRE E22Ril'LE 11 3.t 45 NIA ENGLAND 4S1 TOUTOU Rif.i.e (MORRESE RIFl.EI 1 1 NIA NIA 454 MORFIESE RIFLE 1 I NIA USA 45$ MORRESE MORSEGE RIFLE 1 1 NIA USA 62-4 OIFFERENT TYPE Of RIFLES 29 29 NIA NIA 2709 MASS RIFLE , 1 NIA FRANCE :28'l3 NATOWRIFLE 28 IQ 45 NIA BELGIUM 2824A AASHIAN RIFLE . I 1 Niii USSR 27fJ7 SIMINOF£ RIFLE 77 - 27 NIA USSR 391!! M80RIF~E 1 1 NIA TIJRKEY - NIA RIFLE. - 1 1 NJA NIA 2655 CHEECIAN RIFLE 12 11 23 NIA GERMANY 2e56.'. CHEE.CIAN RIFLE l 3 NIA GERMANY 2656 GERMAN RlfLE 14 13 27 NIA NIA 2'8564 GERMAN RJFl.E . • 4 NIA NIA 2679 SAMTOFE RllFE - 2 2 NIA USSR 21183 17ALIAN RllFE - 2 2 NIA ITALV 3925 CANADIAN RILFE . 1 , WA CANAD ... HI08E•IO M1 RILFE 5801 ~ 9 8 .s] 1980 USA 1006£+10 M14RIFLE 2991 27 30t8 1970 USA .. -- ~· ~·~ .:·~· . <TOTAL r.lill''. ~ 41U '14"'"" . .... _f.iiA. 142A LAUNCHER MACHINE GUN . 5 5 N.-A -- 148 STEN M2 MACHINE GI.IN 1 - I NIA ENGLAND 149 MARK3 MACHINE GUN-. 22 22 f9Gs ENGLAND 14QA sreN""rJAcHINE GUN . 1 , NIA ENGLAND 150 STEN MARKS MACHINE OUN . 24 24 1949 ENGLAND 158 STEN MACHINE GUN - 1 1 NIA ENGt.AND 167 SHMAIZAR MACHINE OUN r- \ 1 1 NIA CHINA 570 STEN MACHINE GUN I 813 I 760 1373 1970 CHEE CK 1316 VIKERs MACHINE quN \. . / I 1 NIA NJA 1901 MACHINE GUN -:- 1 1 NIA BELGIUM 3)Q5 TRAINING MACHINE GUN 1 1 NIA NIA 2009 MARK ,-·MACHINE GuN . 1 1 N•A ENGLAND 2101 CARL.OWGOSTAF MACHINE GUN 48 272 318 1970 NIA 21018 CARLOy.t MACHINE GUN . , I NIA NIA 2832A OOSHCA MACHINE OUN . 1 1 NIA USSR 3500 SOO E PAACHINE GUN . '2 2 NIA ENGlANO 3500A 500 E MACHINE GUN . 1 1 Ii/A ENCL.ANO 3Sll08 500 E MACHINE GUN . I 1 NIA ENGL.ANO 3511 SMALl ~Oo!INE GUN . 3 3 NIA CHINA 3579 AFEOOW IMCHINE GUN . I 1 NIA BELGIUM 3858 $MM STARLINO MACHINE GUN I 1 2 NIA NIA 37G4 SHMIZAR MACHINE GUN . 2 2 NIA CHINA 3510 SHMIZAR MACHINE. GUN 6 . 8 NIA CHINA 3936 SIG MA.CHINE GUN . I I WA USSR 2IM8A CHINESE MACHlNE GUN - 21 21 NIA 2647 HOWJCUSE MACHINE GUN . ' 1 NIA NIA CHINA 2ee88 KiASHENCOFE MACHINE GUN 71 105 132 NIA USSR 2692A. BKM MACHINE GUN . 20 20 NIA US.SR 2692 81<M MA.CHINE GUN . 9 9 NIA USSR 21112 EASTERN MACHINE G\JN . 5 5 NIA CHEE CK 27116 STEN MACHINE GUN STEN 4 o4 NIA FRANCE 251QA 03 MACHINE GUN 2 2 4 NIA GERMANY 2822 ~MACHINE Out.I :l t 3 NII. NIA .~·"°' .,,..-... Nuteti ~_'.'---·- .. :~~~·:• ·- f t i .. I - - - ·- ------ Sman A.r"'s • M«.tltn~uns . C•nnol\S , and Attllltri.. oul of Mtvk:4r av4Uable as stoclt• at . RM(; Mah' St. ores • ' 'I74 3.892 KLASH£NCOF£ ~CHI. ~£ GUN 11 , 11 NIA USSR 1 I 23 ·- <12'1 I . . ,' .;;.:.. ----- 28:2 251 AN.~R,9~4 . EJECTOR 36 ----~--~ =~2=---+---=----+-"-' 10'2'""'"'"6 .___1;.:; 9 -..70.;.._r- _U"'" SI! ~--+-----~ 4 253 ;res ANERG.O. EJECTOR 19191 1696 : 1970 .USA 28-4 I 006E ~ 1 0 ROCKET 1.AUNCHE'Ft 409 605 1075 USA 19'& 2eS 400 MOB!,ER '4 S N/Jio N.IA * 268 , ~OCK£ "' T °"' LA_U_1'4_C_m: _·- -~ -C -A _N _N _ O_ N~ --+--........:.--+--...;.,,,.- -+-- 42"~-+ --NIA NIA •2 ~ :21S8A I ROCKE :r LAUNCHER CAt>iNON· 1 NIA NIA 1 180 ~2tle:= . ,-, . r--: f:-:- 0009=""2-i":OIFFERENT SMOKE CA.NNON • 4 4 t NIA NIA 5 25 3. 517 Sl\.10KE CANNON lEF'T 22 27 _L_Nf.::,:A;o--+ --+f'l;;_, I A,,.__-t-- ---~ll ........ m --- 35 ~ ,8 -_..... SM ......... O ~Kc~E~c A.trN °ON .,..,... "'R ..;;1 0 "" ; 1-f "" T ,__ ----1--= z "" 2 --+- --""----""'3 ....... , T--N!.., G NIA TOTAL 44 82 I 18 ' 29! eso ·3 ~ MORT E>! CANNON 20 20 ' NII\ Ni4 292 IOOo 2" CANNON 48 541 • N!A NIA. 6 2 2 10 , 297 Yn7 HOWEN «>MME CANNON 1 1 NIA ENOUINO 298 3.7 ~ CA.NN'O. N 3 NIA NIA 3 299 14.SMMM/ICHINE. GUN CARRIAGE 40 ~ NI-. KOREA - . - • 1• I '305 • 1A 5 WA M>.C!-ilNE. GUN 5 5 l NIA KORE.A .. 271 USA I I . · .· . , · . .. I ' I ~ I l ' ./ .. ·. Unysed sm1ll l'JI!& ayalfible M stocks at RMC Main Store.• P/N Oe•crlptlon Qty status Date rri Source Of S.N Service Suoplv NOTES CLASHtNKOfE MACHINE I :!688 GUN,fOLDABLE BUT 9177 Brand New 1987 GERMANY CLASHlNKOFE MACHINE 2 2686A GUN,FOLOABLE BUT 1895 Brand New N/A CHINA CLASHINKOFE MACHINE 3 2686 GUN.FIXED BUT 49869 Br1tnd N~w 1988 HUNGARIA CLASHINKOFE MACHINE 4 2666 BG GUN.FIXED BUT - ~ - Br•nd New 1987 GERMANY - I ' ~ ilrOJAl:. - ~~ - - - .. . ' .. ,w.., .. Page 1 of2 Slocombe, 'Walt B. (SES) From: r l(0-6 Ministry of Defense) Sent: Tuesday, July 15, 2003 5:39 AM To: r IL TC, DSCA/ME""r.--------------,1(COL, v Corps) Cc: Slocombe, Walt B. (SES) Subject: RE: Weapons r Roger - got some internal decisions to make. Will be in touch. Many thanks for working this for us!!! D ;;;;~rpirJS!I M§saJ~~~~-DSCA/ME Sent: Tuesday, July 15, 2003 1:04 AM To:r -i (0·6 Ministry of Defense);( Subject: Weapons -----~ Importance: High I (COL, v Corps) Sir, Thanks for the update, any future information is always appreciated. The situation as I understand it is as follows: 1. CPA requested from CJTF-7 for specific numbers of specific types of weapons and ammunition to be delivered by 30 July. 2. CJTF-7 has 657 serviceable AK on-hand. Decision has not been made to prioritize these weapons for NIA use. 3. CJTF-7 Is looking at availability of AKs within the region. 4. DOS has informally approached Poland, Hungary, and the Czech Republic. DOS to send form<JI request oTMvailability: of we~ons is known wit!!..!!:J...e region. Additional questions that need to be addressed. 1. Has the Program Review Board given approval for the purchase of weapons and ammunition? 2. If so, still require nomenclature, model numbers and quantities for required weapons. 3. Has .... C _ _.....I been approached about their ability to purchase initial weapons? 4. POCs in CJTF 7 C4 arid CFLCC-PARC, specifically a cot.r._ __ ~lwould be appreciated. Bottom llne Sir, I need an answer on if you want to pursue purchasing weapons or receiving donated 7/15/2003 -------------- Page 2 of2 • weapons? If you want to pursue the donated weapons I need to tell DOS that found weapons are available but are not being prioritized for the NIA. still require nomenclature, model numbers and Quantities for weapons. - We presented attached brief to Amb Bremer and L TG Sanchez on Fri AM. As you will see, brief captures info you have passed, highlights decision to focus on AK- type rifles, and emphasizes that we need to press ahead to acquire weapons. Accordingly, could you please continue your efforts to press hard for weapons? We have agreed that POC for inbound weapons will be CJTF 7 C4 and comms will flow through CENTCOM to keep chain of command clear and informed. coLr pass you to others as appropriate. I whom I Know you know very well, is gooo initial POC at CJTF 7. He will Pis continue to keep me informed. Thanksf~--~ 7/15/2003 CL> s..... ·- ::J 0- (.) en <( c: Cf) 0 0 0 +-' a. ~ - -0 co :J -:> CL> CL> CL> s ~ z CL> .c I- ~ Current Situation • Consolidated requests for weapons (some double-counting) - Police, Ministries and Baghdad Central (as of 10 July)= 17,025 AK & 9420 pistols for police and FPS guards - CJTF 7 (as of 4 July) needs= 28,721 AK & 29,388 pistols (1AD = 8,758 & 3,000) for police and FPS guards - NIA needs min 1000 AKs by 2 Aug, 3000 more by Oct - ICDF needs - TBD • AK-4 7 availability - CJTF 7 on-hand in Taji & AO Glory (as of 10 July) 657 serviceable AKs ... very few pistols - No "white-world" AKs avail in CONUS or Bosnia (JCS J4 & Army G4) - MEK weapons - awaiting policy decision - Peshmerga weapons? • Other Options - War Stocks= 40,000 M16A1 and 2800 M1911A1 (some ammunition concerns) - Jordan just transitioned to M16A2 and has M16A1 available - DATT is checking - DOS informally approaching Poland, Hungary and Czech Republic today Considerations I Recommendations • Considerations: - Optics of bringing large numbers of weapons into Iraq - AK vs M16 ... local experience, ammo availability, cost, and non-"Americanization" all favor AK - Poor state of repair of "used" weapons • Recommendations: - CJTF 7 lead w/ CPA support - Go with new AK-4 7 w/ 1 mags and 25 rds as base of issue (more for NIA) - Full court press to get weapons ASAP from multiple sources: • MEK decision • Coalition partner donations/sales • Allow purchase of weapons from individuals/commercial firms - Priorities: • NIA gets 1 000 off the top • Police • Protection of Oil, Electricity, Water infrastructure Q) ..._ ·- :::J 0- (.) en <( c ('() 0 0 0 ......, 0.. ~ - -0 ro => --:> Q) Q) ~s ~ Q) ..c: I- ~ Current Situation • Consolidated requests for weapons (some double-counting) - Police, Ministries and Baghdad Central (as of 10 July)= 17,025 AK & 9420 pistols for police and FPS guards - CJTF 7 (as of 4 July) needs = 28,721 AK & 29,388 pistols (1AD = 8,758 & 3,000) for police and FPS guards - NIA needs min 1000 AKs by 2 Aug, 3000 more by Oct - ICDF needs - TBD • AK-4 7 availability - CJTF 7 on-hand in Taji & AO Glory (as of 10 July) 657 serviceable AKs ... very few pistols - No "white-world,, AKs avail in CONUS or Bosnia (JCS J4 & Army G4) - MEK weapons - awaiting policy decision - Peshmerga weapons? • Other Options - War Stocks= 40,000 M16A1and2800 M1911A1 (some ammunition concerns) - Jordan just transitioned to M16A2 and has M16A1 available - DATI is checking - DOS informally approaching Poland, Hungary and Czech Republic today Considerations I Recommendations • Considerations: - Optics of bringing large numbers of weapons into Iraq - AK vs M16 ... local experience, ammo availability, cost, and non-"Americanization" all favor AK - Poor state of repair of "used" weapons • Recommendations: - CJTF 7 lead w/ CPA support - Go with new AK-4 7 w/ 1 mags and 25 rds as base of issue (more for NIA) - Full court press to get weapons ASAP from multiple sources: • MEK decision • Coalition partner donations/sales • Allow purchase of weapons from individuals/commercial firms - Priorities: • NIA gets 1 000 off the top • Police • Protection of Oil, Electricity, Water infrastructure Page 1 of 2 Slocombe, Walt B. (SES) --- ----- ---- From: 0-6 Ministry of Defense) Sent: To: Thursday, July 17. 2003 5:58 AM - L TC, OSCA/ME; Walters. Tome , , Lt. Gen/Dir. DSCA; Mlllies. Richard, , OSCA/FO Cc: -· DSCA/MEANFO DSCNME£lE·mail)'i1· •••• Col, DSAA/FO CIV, OSO-POLl~Y DSCA/ER: Slocombe, Walt B. (SES); Eaton, Paul; Riley. Jonathan P. (Brig (COL, V Corps) Subject: RE: IRAQ WEAPONS UPOA TE - Great summary! Info you provide below is invaluable for long term efforts for NIA. Near term solution. we believe, appears to be the Jordanian option you mention. We are on the cusp of getting permission to begin to work the details thru DATT in Embassy Amman; numbers are plentiful and we should be able to move via ground trans. As far as practical action in support of our weapons needs, please hold. We have the ball to run the Jordanian option to resolution. Will keep you closely informed - but if you have any questions or concerns - please call or write anytime. Thanks again-You are an absolutely terrific teammate! coi.m ;;;,~~~-DSCA/ME Sent: Thursday, July 17, 2003 12:17 AM To: Walters, Tome , , Lt. Gen/Dir. OSCA; Mfllles, Richard, , ~ Cc~EANFO; 05<;,NME;~E-mail) DSAA/FO;---, , DSCA/FO POLICY I DSCA/ER Subject: IRAQ WEAPONS UPDATE (0-6 Ministry of Defense) ~ion has not been made reference the 657 serviceable AK47s on hand. In COL -update today they are currently working a Jordanian option. 2. Based on DOS feedback it looks as if Poland is the best country to approach. Not clear yet how much they would be willing to donate, as opposed to selling. In any event, the Poles are aware of the issue and are prepared to be responsive, so the groundwork is laid for a formal approach. Once CENTCOM verifies there are insufficient quantities of weapons and ammunition available in theater, DOS will send a formal request. It could be very difficult - perhaps impossible - for Poland to supply weapons by August 1. Whether Polish equipment is sold or donated, the transaction would need MoD and Council of Ministers approval (though NO/NO par1iamentary vote) before going through Poland's export-control system. A Polish contribution is unlikely before 7/17/2003 Page 2 of2 mid-September at the earliest. 3. I have talked with Mr C F I Director, Southern Region Contracting Center, Army Contracting Agency and have verified there is no reimbursable procurement line in the contract. The NIAT SOW clear1y identifies all training aids, equipment. ammunition etc., as Government furnished. This is a Cost Plus Fixed Fee (CPFF) services contract. I have attached copy of the final SOW, the Letter RFP and a copy of the Letter Contract. I have also talked with General DynarnicsMOrdnance and Tactical Systems (GDOTS). GDOTS currently has contracts working similar issues in Afghanistan and Georgia. This may be the long-term solution for a quality weapon and ammunition source as well as for maintenance and spare parts. If sufficient quantities in acceptable condition cannot be found in country, or be donated, this is an option. 4. For future reference, IFF funds are available for use to purchase weapons and related items, requested by CPA, for the New Iraqi Army troops. Both OSD/GC for Fiscal and International Affairs agree that the lFF funds are available for this purpose. A key criteria for transfer is that SECDEF notify the Congressional defense committees, NL T 5 days in advance of transfer, the amount and reason for the transfer. The· normal rule applies regarding Congress having to be in session when notification periods start. ~~-=~=-===~ LTC,USA ountry Program Director (Algeria, Iraq, Lebanon, Morocco, Tunisia) Defense Security Cooperation Agency Middle East, Asia and Norlh Africa (MEAN) 1111 Jefferson Davis Hwy, Suite 303 (East Tower) Arlington, VA 22202 Phon ".&:-~~~~~~~--i FAX NIPR. SJPR ~ . --~~~~~~~_,,,----. 7/17/2003 ,_ Page 1 of2 Slocombe, Walt B. (SES) ----------------- From: , .. - Sent: (0-6 Ministry of Defense) - --- Wednesday, July 16, 2003 11 :31 PM To: CIV. OSD-POLICY Cc: ·------ Col, DSAA/FO , , DSCAIPOUCY , DSCA/PPPFO; Slocombe. Walt B. (SES); Eaton, Paul Subject: RE: Training programs for promising Iraqi officers Sir, DSCA/POUCY; Many thanks! You and your team are terrific es alwaysll! ~nd- Obviously completely new govt, new military, new situation here and we want to get things started - and as there is no base so we start afresh. Given that, we think we are talking more than just IMET, rather the whole gamut. .. including where to start ... in-country language programs, Mobile Education teams on a variety of subjects, etc .... need for 505 fonns completed by the country and filed with State, etc ..... all of those things .... Where do we start? Thanks! - DSCA manages the lMET program and ·1s probably your best starting point. lfwe can't get something done, we probably know who can. are our two experts. Call my exec, Col Tome Walters -----orilat Mw.--- From: av, OSD-POLlCY Sent: WednesdaB JulL 16, 2003 7:2~ To: I I (0-6 Ministry of Defense)' Cc: Walters, Tome , , Lt. Gen/Dir. DSCA Subject: RE: Training programs for promising Iraqi officers for advice/answers anytime and we'll help. 7/17/2003 Page 2of2 r-lthis is more of a DSCA-STATE issue, but I will crank it up. 1 will pass this to L TG Tome Varrers Dir of DSCA to get his best thoughts on how to crank it up. My guy for this wm beliiilil __ __, all the best Break Break ... Tome, engaged with recreating the Iraqi Army. He needs advice on imet. etc.C I is no. 2 to Walt Slocombe and is --- -Ori~! Message----- from: C ·· ~ (0-6 Ministry of Defense) Sent: Tuesda.y, JulX 15, 2003 10:39 PM .__ ___________ .....i To: L J CIV, OSD .., -PO ,.....;;... U """ CY .;;....;.... ___ ___,, Cc: Slocombe, Walt B. (SES) JP"---........ --~---.--.. .,- Subject: Training programs or promising raqt o 1cers [ Could you and your team lay out for us the steps we need to take to get promising Iraqi officers (and civilians) into US training programs? we are talking more than just IMET, rather the whole gamut.. .including where to start .. .in-country language programs, Mobile Education teams on a variety of subjects, etc .... need for 505 forms completed by the· c. ountry and filed with State, etc ..... all of those things .... Can you establish a point of contact on your team with whom we could work these issues? Thanks! VR,~[~ 7/17/2003 Iraq Page 1 of2 Slocombe, Walt B. (SES) From: (0-6 Ministry of Defense) Sent: Friday, July 18, 2003 6: 19 AM To: Cc: L TC, DSC.AIME· (0-6) Subject: RE: Iraq - Thanks very much for the note and for the offer. The service you offer is very attractive and may, in the long tenn, be the course we need to pursue for reanning the New Iraqi Army. In the short tenn, however, we have identified a local source for a substantial number of new AKs and are moving to acquire them now. I will remain in touch, initially vi~as the situation develops and as other needs become apparent. Thanks very much! co ----Original Message--- From: - ..... - -- -- - - - -- - - - -- - Sent: Friday, July 18, 2003 2:32 AM To: cc: - Col.- By way of introduction, my name is - and I am the Sr. Manager, International Business Development for General Dynamics Ordnance and Tactical Systems (GD-OTS). I received your contact detail.s from Lt. Col. lliiiiilat DSCA. He suggested I contact you regarding some of the armament and ammunition requirements coming out of your office in Iraq. We undC?Stand that there is an immediate requirement for 40,000 A K-47's and associated ammunition, as well as various small arms and ammunition. Although we do not make either of these products, we have been conducting a very successful anununition "one-stop shop" together with the US Govemmenl for the Government of Kuwait under an FMS Case. This has involved the provision of more than 80 line items of ammunition, including ilems of US, Russian, WesVEast European and other origin. We procwe, consolidate and ship these supplies in counb-y for the Govemment of Kuwait from 15 countries and 23 suppliers using a proprietary process known as GAPS or "Global Arrununition Procurement System" which Generol Taylor at USASAC is fully briefed on and supports. The GAPS system was recently enhanced and under the namr ofCS3 (for Coalition Supply and Support Services) has enabled us to offer major support across a number of discipline!! to include weapons, vehicles, logistics and, of course, munitions, with a full range of support services to USA SAC on the highly successful Georgia Train & Equip program. Currently, CS3 is being investigated by CENTCOM as an ideal vehicle for the Afghan National Anny's Train & Equip program, UAE, Jordan, Colombia, and several other international customers. 7/18/2003 Iraq Page 2 of2 To emphasize the benefits of having a company lilce GD-OTS wtder an ID/IQ contrac1 ...... we made some preliminary inquiries with our contacts in Ea.stem Europe and feel that we could provide the AK47's and ammo NLT Sept 20Cn and maybe sooner. I hope the above proves to~ you and the rest of your team. Ifso,- ••••••l(his email is attached and his mobile number i~) is in Kuwait and hopes to meet with you and your team in Iraq. He has been fitted wilh a bullet ;,:oof vest and has olher gear to help him in his journey. If you would like a meeting sometime nex.1 week. al eeds from you is an invitation and support for traru;portation in country (either military or ccmmercial, if available). Please do not hesitate to contact me if I can provide any further information on lhe above and I look forward to hearing from you on the subject in due coUISe. iiiiiii. Sr. Manager, International Business Development General Dynamics • Ordnance & Tactical Systems Phone: Fax: 7/18/2003 Q.) L- ·- ::l c- (.) U) <( c: ct) 0 0 0 ....._, c. ~ - -0 co ::J --:> Q.) Q.) ~$ ~ Q.) ..c: I- ~ Current Situation • Consolidated requests for weapons (some double-counting) - Police, Ministries and Baghdad Central (as of 10 July) = 17 ,025 AK & 9420 pistols for police and FPS guards - CJTF 7 (as of 4 July) needs= 28,721 AK & 29,388 pistols (1AD = 8,758 & 3,000) for police and FPS guards - NIA needs min 1000 AKs by 2 Aug, 3000 more by Oct - ICDF needs - TBD • AK-47 availability - CJTF 7 on-hand in Taji & AO Glory (as of 10 July) 657 serviceable AKs ... very few pistols - No "white-world" AKs avail in CONUS or Bosnia (JCS J4 & Army G4) - MEK weapons - awaiting policy decision - Peshmerga weapons? • Other Options - War Stocks= 40,000 M16A1 and 2800 M1911A1 (some ammunition concerns) - Jordan just transitioned to M 16A2 and has M 16A 1 available - DA TT is checking - DOS informally approaching Poland, Hungary and Czech Republic today . . Considerations I Recommendations • Considerations: - Optics of bringing large numbers of weapons into Iraq - AK vs M16 ... local experience, ammo availability, cost, and non-"Americanization" all favor AK - Poor state of repair of "used" weapons • Recommendations: - CJTF 7 lead w/ CPA support - Go with new AK-47w/1 mags and 25 rds as base of issue (more for NIA) - Full court press to get weapons ASAP from multiple sources: • MEK decision • Coalition partner donations/sales • Allow purchase of weapons from individuals/commercial firms - Priorities: • NIA gets 1000 off the top • Police • Protection of Oil, Electricity, Water infrastructure - ------ --- - Slocombe, Walter, CIV, OSD-POLICV From: Sent: To: SubJect: Tuesday, April 22, 2003 3:26 PM 'Slocombe, Walter, CIV, OSD-POLICY' RE: What's the reality? Walt, I move Thursday by air. We simply have to get to Baghdad and begin the process of introducWl!i.ourselves before more time goes by, as people are already skeptical .... has alot of charm, but we need to start to deliver and put fears at rest. It will take awhile before we have a place to work/stay comfortably. Our •compound• still lacks power and water. Biggest problem will be transport and comma. REsourc:ii..are a problem. We are constantly told we are running out of money. 11111 think has to ask permission for many things wh. drives him crazy. ODS reps emphasize getting someone else to pay, and claiming victory while we move on to the next. There is little appreciation for the enormity of what we have undertaken and how ill-prepared we are on the governance side (hU111anitarian and reconstruction are known qualtities). The struggle between the social en ineers and the tists continues. In short, the chaos continues, although I remain convinced there is an important job to do here, and even more convinced that we MUST finish what we started. Most of the people are talented and dedicated, They just lack coherent leadership and clarity of vision. Do not mean to sound too discouraging. I think we are probably at the lowest point psychologically. r must admit I have never experienced such an uneasy day before opening night -- and virtually everyone here agrees. But we will somehow get through it. My advice is that you send someone perceptive whom you trust to check it out soonest. The best would be you, but you would frankly be too high profile just now. Defense is a long term proposition I think, but a bit less urgent in that it is not a "basic service" at the moment. Hope this helps. Best, 111111111111 -----Original Message----- From: Slocombe, Walter, CIV, OSD-POLICY ~~~t: 4/2112003 2:3S PM Subject: What's the reality? 11111111111-- I gather from~l ________ ~Jthat you have in fact moved forward. - - I would be grateful for any information you can pass on as to the actual state of affairs out there and your advice to me about whether I should press to get out faster than now scheduled (something like 19 May) and what 1 to try to get settled in advance. Col my MA, will probably be going out to Qatar for a quick ontheground look this weekend, but I would be very interested in your perspective, in particular on the degree to which there is a real chain of conunand and someone with authority over resources. (You can reply to my personal e-mail if you prefer.) Walt 2 Slocombe, Walter, CIV, OSD-POLICY From: Sent: To: Cc: Subject: r;: et. al. -- I will be pulling up stakes soon to move north but~ jshould be with you now in Qatar. I would like to pass on my thoughts about the NIC concept before I lose my connectivity with the group. The concept i9 a sound. one in so far as it addresses the territorial security of Iraq in the short term until the Q. AI can be built. The implemenr:ac:.ion of the concept will be harder. I suspect that 12 months will be needed at a minimum to create a force of sufficient size to have even the least credibility with the Iraqi people. The force is noL so much as to deter foreign aggression as it is to assure the Iraqi people that there is a centra l power that is resuming control of Iraq. Any foreign thr eats will likely be dealt with by the coalition. I continue to believe the force should not lead any law enforcement effor t while the coalition remains in control of Iraq as required under the Geneva Four requirements. ~or should it be re~ponsjble fo~ border ~ro~~ing npera~ions or tariff collections as that will eventually lead to corruption within the force. On the issue of recovering equipment, we (ORHA) have the potential to contract that task out if it would support the implementation of the concept. The actual training of the force is something the group needs to decide on this weekend (contract?, task CFSOC?). Also need to figure out the internationalization angle too . Recruiting the force can be accomplished through a couple of venues. We can use the DDR center process which is now being implemented and should start accepting its first batch of EPWs in the next two weeks; and we can also conduct a major IO effort to convi nce self- demobilized forces that they need to return to a DDR center or report direct l y to one of th e bactlefield _ recovery teams for work and eventual DDR processing . Something that CENTCOM should take on board is that the EPW compound should halt the release of EPWs until they can be screened by the DDR center. We should also get the NDU folks started on drafti ng a strawman of a NSS and NMS for consideration by the reformed Iraqi MOD. We are finding that many of the indig enous bureaucrats are not comfortable (that's politely putting it) with making any kind of decision unless they are d i rected to do so. If we expect them to take the initiative to articulate to their newly freed countrymen the strategies by which their armed forces will operate, we will l.ie walLiug for a long Lime. I suggest that we go ahead and prepare something in concert with CENTCOM and NDU so that they can see an example. As alway's, comments are valued! If you don't hear from me for a while, it's because my comrns aren't I have been giv~n ~ Thuraya phone for use in Iraq -- number is 1 - - --- ---·----- ~ Walter Slocombe From: Sent: To: Cc: Subject; Sir -- MG Carl Strock <.1sked that I contact you about providing you a_ny information you may need regarding the reformation of the Iraqi military. I am currently serving as the chief of policy and speci al initlacives in ORHA, on loan from r-" j reserach directorat:.e at nrss. By way of background, I served 4. yeat:s in OSD(Policy) with~ when he was the DASO for Peacekeeping and Humanicari. an Assistance, working both peacekeeping and HA issues. and I worked the RA issues together. As you know, much of the Iraqi military has self-demobili2ed, in all likelihood as a means of avoiding direct combat with US forces. While we have destroyed much of their armor and artillery systems, I doubt that there has been the slaughter that some media venues have ouggeated. I was here for the last war and thought I would have seen many dead Iraqis but I did not. Empirical evidence suggested that many survived because their units retreated back across the Euphrates, knowing that there was little support for the 91 coalition to pursue them and that they had the strategic depth in which to retreat. However, this time the indiv·idual soldiers fled because they kne..., we would not atop until we had taken over the entire country. Some have cuggeeted that if theee Iraqis have aelf - demobilized, we should. let them go and not try to pull them back into some organ.i.zed body. I would offer that the need to gather them back tog· ether for some form of accountability and vet: ting is critical to the future internal security of the new Iraq. We do not. know what soldiers have demobilized or what their motivations were in doing so, ot.her than the obvious one o, f self- preservation, Some may have fled to their hometowns in an effort to assume a quiet. non-political life; others may have fled in order to avoid captivity and to prepare for ~urther mischief. If we can begin to gather soldiers back into some organized process to demobili ze them, we can demonstrate to botb tbem and the Iraqi people that the US is committed to reforming the mi.litary, ensuring t hat thousands of unemployed are not dumped at one time on to a non- existent economy, and give us more time and informat.i on wich which to vet people of interest. My concern is that we not unintentionally create the conditions that would result: in a power vacuum such as Afghanistan or Somaiia. On another note, the Britisb have agreed in principal to provide ORHA an expert on internal security matters t:o help review what has been done by the ORHA staff so far and harmonize their various efforts. I wanted to inform YC?U of this because the Minist. ry of Defense will be affected by this expert's work/recommendations as we seek to ensure that the .repressive internal security organizations of Saddam's era are not rebuilt:. Finally, on the issue of rebuilding the Iraqi military into a new . force that provides for the protection of Iraq's terrority, respects civilian rule and doesn't , pose a threat to its neighbors, I would like to recommend that a professor from t.he Naval War College contact you. Dr. is a. recoginzed expert on the !t:aqi military and has dooe considerable. work on 1es future organization. I think. his work is ve-ry good and recommend that you discuss his· thoughts with yo.u. If you wo:uld like I can have him contac1: you. Sir, please let me know if there is a. n.ything else tbat you may need. Once you learn your cravel da~ea, pleaae lee me know so we can prepare your quartere, etc. VR, r Colonel, U.S . Army 1 ~,~/ --- - .s4.;ttr ~ ~ J~ - k G:. ~ ----r.r ~ °JA' ·/ Si - ~ plfS~ J"- i ~ - I (b)(S)I ,._ .,.,_, T~ "t;:- e-u.dttt-ocfl_ f Lu..t.,,.J de_ . vet-r~ --- --- ---- --- ---- - - -- . . tt ·- ~ ..:.. t I ~ Cl s -0 - ,~6:1"., -~.u.:. ~ 11:-r - a.. "f«>j). - ]) r 1 - ll e,,,'-t.~ - ~To ~ ft.'ty ~ :• ' OFFICE OF THE UNDER SECRETARY OF DEFENSE FOR POLICY - -- - - - - --- - -~~-- ,..... ~ !==: ;(/l)C..( - 1 V a ~ - 1 - - ' ! I I _ 'I --~ ---~ -~----- Ni\. TIOl'V.L Df:FENSE UNIVERSITY INDUSTRIAL COLLEGE Of THE ARMED FORCES WASl-11:-<<1TON. D.C. 20319-6000 FROM: DATE: TO: ~ ,.._. ~ ~ SA:te w...v1--71 : ~ $a>.;;..j) ~ W/ "HdH-f ·~ .. .... I' I j , ; j ' t· I ··- .7 ~- ~ -----""> /OVl.?_ / r#-11/ ,~s - S-'2>~~ . 3 ~- ~-~ ~ ~ - ~ .. loc-.J . .:t(J c.; ;,t~ G.f>-.,,~~ : .. UJ~. -s~ ~ -~ - ~~~ - - ~ - ~ it..-o- .I - - 7 · - - - - ~·- . -~ - '146.7 . ·- - ~ -~- . - . • (b)(6 (b 6 • • - <\>(-.. ~ f--:J~,-- -< ~ ti..c.. t: ~ ~:p It. -J-.. - 6tJ ~ -- - ~- --~ ' - -·~~----,:.... __ ,_ ___ '~- . .:.::___v:_ -~-:-:.. __ --~ -l~ -" - --·----------- --- I I ·I ·+ , .. 4~~- +r s p; !''. cpa: ~ ~ ...... - - -~- - ~~~ - - ~~ - . 'l>f4111rt1# - ~L ~I)~--~ t:< O'J'lllS ~~ .,.. .: · +_ ~4 i "-:r:<AA ~ L' oj/.;n&-1--o,,,.. 1,. ~ u;_, - 1 0 fh."ca< +-fJGc~ MO\~ J) ~ t-.ir.t. 'fc.cr . I r 1·• ... 1 _1 \V~· \ .... ..,) (41- I (till f \ "i\ I L .... -<. , .......... ,~ .JI u-.. - g__ ~ r~ t ~- L-a..J ...Jo-"D~ 'Pa...d\~ ...... a. .• j-13 f -( ~ h_~ I ~ --(> lA.n....A ~ .. .....t. c w -{ ~ he. "' (:. (' t;.~ , c£,,-~ ~~ - p 'J b ~ ~ ,,,_ $c.u..+ _ ft>-.; ~ *flt/A.. ""U &.. ~( ~vet. t--. ~~ ~-~~ cb;-r:J-~ -...IL le OU if~ u.A_ 'f-9 ~ ju ~ ~ A.twJ f'{l\911 I fiCo(,, ".\ ; "'"1 ?o Lt.J .~ " ~ <. ~--£6]) '"t "J+. c:~ ~ s~ ~ h..oJ> t. u ~ k...;.... h( - """"\ u.51 u.\ ~ Pf(;. 'b -4- . ~ I 0 f ./,1. 5 £> - • ~· ~ \ O""'"" " -~·1 <t-~ - tkJ -~ .~ ! . t. Page I of 3 Subj: Thought• on atafflng 4/51 2003 11 :01 ·30 AM Eastern Da Ii ht Time Date: From; To: CC: Sent from Walt. Good to talk w;th you yesterday. Thanks for your vote of confidence. This is going to be great! On the issue of the personnel "package'" for the MoD, I think there are probably three sets of folks: 1 ) Core team of Slocombe plus 5 substanti\1e people 2) US admln/\og/comms/security etc support pacitage 3) lraQI exlles with substantive military backgrounds On #2. I understand that Centcom has been tasked to provide a full support pack~ge to each of the ministries. The sensitive nature and scale of the MoO will require a more "robust" package. I think we are looking at a the following· Slocombe: 2 secretaries, 1 translator Core staff (5 ): 1 secretary and 1 translator each (As a small team, we w1ll llkety to need the ability to operate during the .;fay individually, l.hus the team of translators) Comms: 5. Of' however many necessary for 2417 ops Admln: 05 . and 3 E-5/6 personnef (05 oversees complete support package and handles admtn llaison with CENTCOM, including security. mil air. access throughout the, country, etc.) Motorpool: In addition to travel bacic: and forth from the residence compoun<S to the MoD. we wllt need secure transport to various sites In Baghdad and around the country. To begin with we may need only one transport npa.ckag , e" with the. ability to draw on CENTCOM assets for additional "packages" if we need to have two teams in different locations. Security. Need a package that wraps around all of the above, including 24/7 protection for our offices at the MoD. Other: There is always an "other", but the above tist is a good starting point. On #3, I understand that Policy has put together a team of about 100 Iraqi exiles, trained as doctors, lawyers. civil servants, now living in the United States. A couple of these have formal military training-one was a general who attended Sandhurst They are potential candidates for seruor ministers and wlll also be useful to the '"sorting" process and are obviously fluent m Arabte. Whether these folks become the "Interim Ministers" or remain "technical support", is being debated between the WH, DOD and State. On #.1. the Core Team: I think we nee<! to keep the c.ore staff small. As fewer, we win be-more nimble, less obvious in the Ministry. and more easily achieve the. unity of effort whereby we can do a "no look" pass from person to person. fully confident that the issue is being handled well. The members of the team shot.ltd be relatlvety nexlble and Interchangeable to handle the flood of Issues that we will need to deal with each day. The type of people we ne'eQ are those who have worked at the top of a large orgaoiz:atfon, ltke OoO. and know how to get things done quickly In difficult bureaucratic environments. We will need strong knowledge of the team back in Washington (boo. State and NSC) and thelr trust. The core team should understand Sunday, April 06, 2003 America Online: Usdpwbs --- ---------- Page 2 of3 defense organ1%atlons and have e)(perience in defense strategy and planning at the Ministerial level A& in 1990 In Eastern Europe, we will be dealing with a country \hat has no tradition of civilian control of the military, never had a nanonal security strategy as we would know It. never had a defense strategy, never had a defense planning document. At least one of these folks should be able to fight the money wars in the US system to make sure we have the funding we need. As you noted. the team will need to be PA sawy, antJ someone will need, at least uoofficialJy, to watch this ISSUe The core group will aJso need to know when and how to bring In 1ssue•specific, occasional expertJse for partic:ular Issues (munitions disposal, legal, medical pohcy, etc} through one of the several contract vehicles DoD has In place. Is an excellent choice. He'd bring to the ng of the Iraqi military and knowledge of Iraq Beyond we need people responsible for: 1) ministry organlzallonal reform and management; 2) a strategy, foroo planning, policy guy; and 3) a resources/budget/acquisition person. My thought is to volunteer for the organizational reform and management portfolios ct Vil (In addition to handling PA Issues and llarson with other mrnistnes and the administrator as collateral duties). For strategy/ ~/force planning. I'd strongly recommenci I have known inoe I hired him 10 years ago. entered OSO as a PMI and has had an outstanding civil service In Policy (you detailed him to USS to wnle his Adelphi Paper on coalition warfare-copy available on request). Is also a US Navy reserve officer. I'd p-ut him at the very top of my hst Very lnnovatrve and probabty the best ·10e~s· guy J n OSO - he was tho lead pen on the 2001 QDR and formulated the post-2 MTW force plannlng construct We going to need someone to work with the Iraqis to help formulate a new Iraqi defense strategy, force structure and basing requirements, and qulci<ly draft up key defense policies and guiding principles for reform. the guy. At present, he's Wolfowil.z's special assistant (and has been n imately Involved fn postwar planning efforts). If Wolt'owitz could be persuaded to let him join us for some period of time, he'd be Indispensable. This will certainly require a by-name request from you to Wolfowltz but is definitely worth It. ::.:.::.:.;:.::.:..:..c..::::.:. rs .=: o::..:n ..:.!., agarn I'd recommend a career person, \his time from PA&E. ls the director for theater asse$sments and projections and began his OSD career as a PMI He oas also been the PA&E lead for a number of Defense Resources Management Studies we've done 1n Eastern Europe and Central Asia so tie's famlllarwtth the nature of the challenge of standing up a new resource allocation s stem that can produce some degree or transparency and civilian control. ___ _, terrific - he's versatile and would mesh nicely on a team Again, as with .. the issue will be persuading the system to \urn him loose I would also recommend that you request one or two 05/06 Foreign Area Officers (FAQs) for the core team. In addition to regional and language expertise. it will be useful to showcase US cfvH-milltary relations I don't have Immediate names. but if this sounds right, I'll hunt a few candidates down. I look forward to your thoughts and to working With you. Sunday, April 06, 2003 America Online: Usdpwbs Page J of3 .. y. ·s a PRIVATE communication. recipient, please o others. Please notify the s message, and e it from your system. If you e intended o not disclose it to r by replying to this Than y For more information on The Cohen Group please visit our web5ite at: http://www.cohengroup.net/ Sunday, April 06, 2003 America Online: Usdpwbs Pagel of 1 Walter Slocombe. Froul: Stat:Fri 4/2.512003 4.02 AM To: Cc: Auach· mcnts: ~et al.·· I wilt be pulling up slakes s.oon to move north buL] -~should be with you now in Qa1ar. I would like to pass on my thoughts about the NIC concept before I lose my connec.:tivity with the group. Ilic toocept is a sound one m $0 far as 11 addresses the terricorinl security of Iraq in the shon tem1 uncll the QAI can be bu1h. The implementation of the concept wilJ be harder. I SlL~pcct that 12 months will be needed at a mioimwn 1 0 create a force of sufficient size to have even the least credibility wilb the Iraqi pe<1ple. The fQrce is not so much as to deter fmeign ag&ression as it is to assure the Iraqi people that thece is a central power that 1 s resuming conrrol of Iraq. Any foreign thr\:ats will hkely be dealr wilh by the coalition. I cont 1oue to believe the fo~ should not lead any law enforcement effort ~bile the coalition n:maios in control of Iraq as required under the Geneva Four requirements. Nor should tt be re ponsible for border crossmg operations or tatlfr'collectmns as 1hat will evemually lead 10 corruption within the force. On lhe issue of rccQvering e4uipment, we (ORHA) have I.be potential 10 contract that task Ou\ if lt wo11ld support the implementation of the concept. The accual !raining of I.he force is something !he i;roup needs to decide on this weekend (contrnct?, task CFSOC?). Al~o need to figure out the lntemationalir.a.rion angle 1 00 Recruiting the force can be accompli.shed through \l couple of venues. We can use the DOR ccrucr process wl11ch is now being implemented and should stan accepring its fin;t batch of P.PWs in the next two weeks; and we ca.n also conduct a major 10 cffon to convince self-demobilized forces that they need 10 return 10 a DOR center or rtl'\Ort directly to one of the battlefield recovery teams for work and e~c11tual DOR processing. Somcthmg that CENTCOM :.hould take on board is lh31 the EPW compound should hall the release of EJ>Ws until they can be screened by tJ:ie DDR center. We should also get the NDU folks started on drafting a su- .iwmiin of a NSS and NMS for consideration by the ~formed Iraqi MOD. We are nniling that many of the indigenous bureaucnit.~ are nor comfonable (that 's politely putting it) wnh malu.11g any kind of dcc1S1on unless they are din:ctcd 10 do so. If we expect them to lake the mi1iative to articula te to their newly freed counlrymen the strategics by which rheir armed forces will npcrarc, we will ~ wiutmg for a long time. I suggest that we go ahead and prepare something m concert with C ENTCOM and NOU so tt11n they can see .lrl example As always, comments are valued! If you don't hear from me for a while, it's because my comms aren't up. I have been given a Thuraya phone for use in Iraq u number i.f" I hnp://email.capdalc.com/exchange-nbox/NIC%20Conceptual%20Planning.E... 4'2612003 Onyszkiewicz Notes http:l/email.capdale.comiexc~box/Onyszkiewicz%20Notes.EML?Cmd::opei •, t. i•'ll'i. ~1~1!~~ .. I~ lJll ~ ~· .. ~· I . ..... "".'.J'....t..."'-£.it~_Jll...0J ~.,,, Walt: Last night I was at a dinner at the German Ambassador's residence and was fortuitously seated next to an ~Id friend of yours--Janusz 1 Onyszkiewicz, the former defense minister of Poland. Dr. Onyszkiewicz sends his best. However, the real reason for this email is that I took the opportunity to pick his brain about how you go about transforming a military built by a totalitarian system into one suitable for a democratic system. What follows is a summary of what I took away from our conversation. Obviously, there are considerable differences between Poland and Iraq, and under no circumstances would I suggest that we simply copy the Polish experience. Nevertheless, I think Onyszkiewicz's insights are a useful and helpful input into the process and can help sort out our own thinking. On vetting officers, Onyszkiewicz's method was to rely first on foreign , intelligence services--in the case, the U.S., UK and Germany. He relied on them to pick out the worst of the party hacks from the officer corps. 1 (In the case of Iraq, he and I both felt that soliciting information from the Turks, Jordanians, and Egyptians--all of whom had military-to-military contacts with the Iraqis--might be helpfuJ in the same way. We could simply ask who seemed like good, professional officers, who were party hacks, snitches, or idiots.) Second, he did have people go through personnel records. He had them look for who was competent or not, and who was considered an enthusiastic party supporter. He pointed out that everyone had to be listed as a loyal party supporter, otherwise you could not advance, but he said that if you learned to read between the lines, you could find out who were the most committed to the party and the most involved in party activities--all of these people he cashiered. (He specifically did not use the intelligence files on the officers because he felt they were probably too politicized and "full of junk" to provide and accurate assessment. He also felt that the personnel files were likely to provide the same kinds of information that he wanted--if you knew how to read them--but without the same political junk.} He mainly cashiered people by retiring them (he noted that Poland had a low minimum retirement age which proved very useful lo him in this.) Overall, he suggested that he really did not purge that many officers--perhaps only 10-20 percent of the total. He said he basically erred on the side of leaving people in. He wanted to get rid of the worst of the lot, but felt that beyond them, it would be too difficult to try get down much further. He also felt that by forcing out that many, the rest would get the message and fly right. The two most important positions in the MoD are the director of personnel and the director of counterintelligence. Having people you 1 of2 4129nJXl3 1:23 p:p,.. Onyszkiewicz Notes http://email.capdale.comlexchange•••9Jmbox!Onyszkiewicz%20Notes.EML~1 can trust in these two jobs are what count the most. The chief of 1 staff, chief of operations. and all of the other positions are secondary. What matters in this new organization is people--whether it does its job (i.e .• defend the country) properly is a distant second. For the moment, the key is transform the institution and that means getting out the dead wood, bringing in new personnel, and keeping the officers who are most trustworthy. Moreover, as he pointed out, if you need someone to run a division, you just have to have a military officer--there just aren't civilian careers that provide a close alternative from which you can draw personnel, so he had to come many of the personnel just to keep the organization functioning. Onyszkiewicz felt that establishing what civilian control over the military meant was critical right at the start. He said that he purposely laid down a marker early on with the Ministry: the professional officers tried to explain to him that his role, as a politician (as under the old communist system) was to set broad policy guidelines and leave all military technical matters to the officer ' corps. He told them that ~if I want to decide what the organization of a battalion should be, then I will decide what the organization of a ' battalion should be." He said that he tmned away all of the exiled former Polish military officers because he did not believe the rest of the officer corps would accept them. However, he did seek out Polish military officers still in Poland who had been arrested for subversive activities and he reinstated and promoted them, in part to help push forward the reform agenda. Finally, he noted that an important factor that made the transition somewhat easy in Poland was that the Polish military appeared to have been expecting the transformation for some time--lower level officials apparently saw the handwriting on the wall beforehand and this seemed to have prepared them psychologically for the blows when they came. I think you~ in touch with him as well. His number in Warsaw i~d his email is In addition, might it be worth bringing together a small number of other officials from Eastern Europe and other countries (South Africa? Chile?) that have undergone similar transitions to get their thoughts on how to go about this? 1 On another note, I am hearing some pretty disheartening things about how the reconstruction effort is being handled (or not handled, in some cases). I will send a separate email on these points, also suggesting some questions that you might raise with your interlocutors, as you requested. Best Senior Fellow and Director of Research , The Saban Center for Middle East Policy The Brookings Institution 1775 Massachusetts Avenue. NW Washington. DC 20016 2of2 4129/2003 1 :23 PIV Caplin&Drysdale A R N Caplin & Drysdale. Chartered One Thomas Circle, NW Swte 1100 Washington, DC 20005 1202) 862-5000 ~----- I INOOSTRlAL COLLEGE OF THE ARMED FORCES FROM: DATE: TO: r ol.. C--.(,o 5 - 1-LJ,,, b- [ ,, ~ ..; (_""' <; '~. ,,h -- ..,, wl; ,,._,...... ~ I~ ,,_fc;""' ,,,;;i. "'l ~~· - "-<MJ "-"". i'u,.... /t'JW , c t-i. ~ .J'iQ ~ "" kt.D-- ( c_--£) - uJh.A &.... ..,, fr...(Q :rC~ ,q..p ' "''- t-- V'<- k.,j ...... ( - C4i: ~ ' \..AM.-~ ~i\i ? - ~ """' c ·. ·~ &,., G:< /ff-~k ? -- ""r "' .Jl " " t -i ~ i:;,,, , ? c {.. , r .f.o.o \ ~ '"'.......,,fl"'" Ly-.> ur-- J-~ vA-X ( .Q,, ~ ~ ' ( d. ~<AO - ( 0 <!. Ubl I t__.c....;-, • - jl" .,, <S L, a- .(I.., """ , ) t.... -t_ lr~ ' J ~ /.:. " + _e..,,,. c:,.,._. ( 2 b ) - (>--.~ "'iJ ~~ "" q<;~ ? [ 3'•) MATIOl'l/\l. t>EF£i'!Sl: UN~rv ~ JNDUSTRlAL COLLEGE OF THE ARMED FORCES 0 WA!>t<f'4()TC'n, DC. 2031~ FROM; DATE: :·o, -'f ~ / ( ~ J -L' \ ( !1 y.) -C~ - ~ C-'J ~ /i,,......,,1 ~ 6 ~ J/ lb.,-_; ~4 .!.. cn~J C0 ~ C-96) c/~ - c '--d <4cl' ~ /.hon &J Sqsuf "'&) J (q1) NATIONAL DEF'EM&: Ol'<IY9SITY INDUSTRiAL COLLEGE OF THE ARMED FORCES WASHINGTON, D.C 20~19-6000 FROM: DATE: TO: ~ n, ''°P'64 ~ · ....._ tft-- y()J__-..{ A. - ... ,-- ,---------------------- ,..... - - I - . ·----· __ ___.__, ____ _ -····---··-------------- -- -----·--------- -·.· -----+'-'----· -··-----'-- ---- .------·-~------- - - M-'"-··- - --- --------·.., ... -- I { -- -- -- ·- - -·· i- - -·- -·-- .. --~:-~ ~ ~ 'y'o -~---- ----~~-. _ -· --T~: ~/,r111$. '"_·_ t·:~~--~ :~~_q_{c_~ ~ ~s~ - _ ~--·----~-- ~ 7-~- ' €. c.) '' ~- t··--- n-~ · ~-"i:- -·-·----;;: - - -----~- -·· -y"AeJt -- I • (~ ~ L.. ••• --- -1' . ---=-- ·-- .. _ ::--. .t':~ _ ___f ~&. ~ f CCC I c: .. 1~~fo- ~ ;__-- · · - _ ~ - - - --·- --- .. ___ -=-IC.I _'(~ _ . ___ _ ~ -·==- - - _ ':"-t ~-~ 1 .-r' .C __ z ...... 0.__ ____ -· ·--- _ _ _ _ -'h,.l ~ --- --- -- -------·----- ------ - - --- --- li - ; -T _ -:_ g,, _?h~ -~~ ~~"'"'!'!.$ :!__ _____ -----·-- -r.---- ---·-= -\- ~-- §1 1'-§~ _ --- -- -·- - I- - -·- ---·-·. -· - - - -- -· - ·-------------- . .. ..: ~ . ~· -}~_c..J __ (,_ - 'O lC 0:..\1 - ~ fMo ... L7: _ U ~ - - ---~ ~- ~ ~c~~~- ' 1: I '------ i - t~~- - --~ftc ~ .~ ~ . ~ _I !t . ·~ ;.~ ...... ~ d.L~~ ' ~(zi) I r·---- -·-- r· .. - ~ ~-~ l. . ·------ - - -_.-::-~- .. ~ -__.:.-.·---·-·- - ----- ~ -- _:::::_- :& l • ""' s.s oμ_ ?'f(i;--=r _~G_ _ _ r~~ ;g~ 1 'j)J/il ,. ~ ___ : Lw..::. j;,- ~ R !! ""'---7 Q ~--- - .._._ (J 5 ! t " ... :b . . ------·--·---- 1----~-·-· .... .. -o;;;:;::-.. -- 1--···-·--- - ' :------- ·- - - ~=--:::~?IS - --- ---- - ___ .. ________ , ______ .. - ~---·-- - - ' I ·- . _ .. _ .. ___ r.;;.·;, .. : - s~ - • -·- _ I TU/ --- μ . ~/'<..rf&__ • ,,, - I - --·-·-- --~-- L. --~ -- -- ;: 6:v.~-~ -.~~"1 ~.., (l;) !' . ------------- --------- -··--·-- ;:) . . f'. __ w_, ~~-~ ~ «rJ-.P"J~ (g; _ _ .. ;---- - --·-·11r ;,;.- -- - ---- -- -- ~- .. ---- - ! ;J.f '.J ~ Dtf . 44"~ ~ ~ ... (<{'/ - ~· ·---------~----- l~ ~-~5&-iplLt). -- - -- ~·- .:_-··::-~~ .. ... r-h"!f ---- ---- ~- -.;_ - ~--- :J; ---~ -~ r- I ~ ~- __ !) ____ - l J r .. ~ ~ _,.....~ -4 ~ ~. -! ~ -~ - ~ - - - -~ --· ~ - v:- ~, 0 ~ - ~-- - __ ... _ .. __ ----r--·------- ·-- -----------·------- .. , - . ' i -- ... ---- -+ ~-;:.,.. -~ -~ - ~;~ ---- . ------- ·0 -- -- ---- - . - ... _:_i~-~---- · - - - l __ -- --· _l_ - ~-~~_((flf _____ . \ ·--··------·------- lbK I A - ./:. ---- -- 1' _ -· __ .. _ 511 ~'14!.-~ ~ o'( c~ __ {_~]_ _ _ --- -·- - - . ----z--·-- -----·--------- -- --------- .. - -- .. 1 .""e.2Ld_ __ ~ ..=:. .s~~ ~!.~~-- ~-- I urJr _ _ --- ·-- .· - ~ ~'~ - (<bj_ _ __ . . ::-k~~t::f :;;~~¥ ;-___ - -- . ---- ·- - _,.. __ . - ~--· -· - -- ---- - -- ------ --- ---- -·-~ -~-- -- -· ~ . - --- ~ '-- I • -----·-- - +--- --~--- . :._ ""'\A../-. ~t:-<- . (JI-,..'\ ------- -:r ·F·"-·'W--. T-V-) ------· - ---- - - -·-- --- -r-.. ~ - ·'? -------. - -- ----- --· --- ---- __ ¥ ___ -·- -- ---- -=!~ ' • ~::.::'..~fi::- ~_ ~fj/ - - ~ · _!_/&/ o!~!!:! _ (/1 M ' I I t-- '--·--- I I -------·-- ~-------+·----- 1 I [__ -------------- ' l r--- ·- .• , -----'---· I ------------------ ..------ ____ .. ' !--- ....__ • .w ....-----.i..--~ ----~---------·----- _.., __________ ......._ ____ r• ···--·--· I -- ··--·-- ;-------... __ _..,__ __ . -- - --- . ---------- ·""!""'-· -----·- ---.--- ~-----_, ____ .........___,_~-------~ '---·-· -- . ,.......;....... __ -.---,. l - -------'""'T"' --- ------- ------- ------ ---- -------- ~··~- --··-- ----r.---· ·- ·---------------------- ' . - ' . - - - ---- --- --- ~ c..o+-~If •M J -~ -~A- - ~ ~---\ .... ~~ - Pc:>I\ ft~ - k.ow C.<~,...;~ ~- t: "J.~J. ' -~ ~ r~r . -~~ ~. - - ~ ~ l..:;; ""1ot'"-dtvQ~~"""') ~161&•• t.. -.c..a ~ °i ~ - - - ------- --.---- .. 'J 0 (b){8) I ("" .,. I I A ;w,,..-"' ! -~'--.JC~~ -t...J.-~ ~ ~ ~ ~1 ~~ ~ !~ dszu~ ... °"" ~ e Ole.Li &../ ~~ l>y -~ ~ t=. db-... ~ ~ Se-1-7 -. a ,, c~"- Y c• w..A.u. d.e., ~ C'-f rd ~ e'nJW'- ,_ ~ t4 .4J ~.~, ~ ~ ..... ~ ... M~~· ~ 1 ~, - d.t J./tJLtrh.~ ~ ~ .._ 'fr ,h:,. ' k,.t ~ s.-. ...... -~ ~ ~ ~ Y7/f - -~~~t.~ - ~ ~ GL_._ ro ~,f(Jr <-,- d ~ i" J(L z Q d'?:'. ~f~iL 4 - ~ ..,,,.~,.e, -11«c«) ~ t.t. A.Jk,,_4_ ~ ~-"5P --ua.J ~ ~I' ~ ~(-e.,\Q~/ ,) - 'JiT -.It./ 1 ~ ~ ~5,, $/tA~ ~ ~ _._ 4( -~ - .a...r r1~l111 ~~, ~11lo; rl-~ =-....,.,.,,,4 Ozt>~~ ~ Avz,,'cf ~ ta ~ ct...1 ~ 4 ~ ~ • -;) 5 /y;;&l<J ~ • _μ- 4,tJ w-r/ /.- ~ r~. ,,~ .,~ t r. ~Q. Vt~ ee,bf ~ • ..,,..... ~ ~-1" ~-t~ - UNITED STATES INSTITUTE OF PEACE 1200- l 7th Street NW, Suite 200 Washington, OC 20036-3011 (202) 457-1700 (202) 429-6063 Contact: Neil Kritz, Director, Rule of Law (nkritz@usip.org 202-429-3888) Paul Stares, Director, Research and Studies (pstares@usip.org 202-428-3891) Conclusions of USIP Roundtable on Lessons Learned From Prior Vetting Processes· Qanuary 24, 2003) I. Why is vetting critical to the success of a democratic transition? Vetting is necessary in order to: 1) Sanction those who have committed abuses and remove them from positions in which they could continue to do so. 2) Instill public confidence in the reformed and cleansed institutions of government. The vetting process can serve as a means of inculcating new social norms, promoting government legitimacy, and building a new sense of civic responsibility and national identity. This emphasis is increasingly preferred under international standards to the Point (l)'s focus on patently punitive vetting. 3) Render the handling of past abuse more manageable. Even if prosecutions occur for abuses of the ousted regime, there will be very few trials relative to the number of potential cases. 4) Contribute to public order. A hesitant, arbitrary or incomplete vetting process can likewise result in personal vengeance, festering grievances, and lack of public trust in government. II. Who does the vetting? * With the encouragement of senior NSC staff, the United States Institute of Peace organized a roundtable discussion on Janurary 9th, 2003 involving former U.S. government officials and non-governmental experts on the experiences of several countries with efforts to screen and purge the security forces and civilian administration during a transition from a repressive system to democracy. Prior cases that were discussed included post-WW II Germany and France, the purge of the military in El Salvador, de-Stasification of various sectors following German re-unification, and police vetting programs in the Balkans, Haiti and elsewhere. - -- -- ---------------------- -- - Vetting may be conducted by (1) one centralized government agency or specially established commission; (2) separately by each ministry and agency; (3) by foreign occupation authorities; or (4) by an international interim authority; or (5) by a combination of the above. In the last two cases, it will be essential that carefully selected and publicly credible locals participate in or advise the process. If local authority is to have responsibility for the vetting process, international pressure can be important to ensure implementation, enforcement and fairness of vetting decisions. Authority: In most cases, vetting is based on the enacbnent of a law, the imposition of a decree by governing authority, or the provision for vetting in a peace accord. Vetting will often be subject to charges of arbitrariness and "victor's justice," making it important to clarify the standards and procedures to be applied. A greater expectation applies in this regard in the vetting of the civilian sector than security forces. Whenever possible, make use of local laws and legal principles. This legitimates the process in the eyes of both accused and surrounding public. III. Who gets vetted and when? Vetting requires balancing the need to purge with the necessity of "keeping the trains running." The need to have sufficient personnel in place to run essential government functions, especially security functions, may constrain the thoroughness of an initial purge. Before beginning any purge, determine (a) the availability of qualified replacements; (b) the time it will take to recruit/train new personnel; and (c) the level of disruption that will ensue in any institution during a gap between dismissed and new personnel. It is essential to determine-and prioritize-which positions in which sectors should be vetted lest they pose a threat to immediate post-conflict security and undermine public confidence in the transition. ( In various cases, this has included the military, security, intelligence forces, judiciary, teachers, financial officials, media, and health professionals.) In the initial phase, vetting must focus on removal of unsuitable personnel from police and security forces. This serves to enforce immediate public order for the interim administration, break up cabals of corrupt or criminal officers, and dissuade victims from taking private vengeance. Vetting of prosecutorial and judicial personnel must keep pace with the vetting of security and police forces in order to ensure a functioning justice system. Leaving corrupt judges in place can undermine efforts to reform police forces and can facilitate a return to police abuse. Vetting must take place in all areas of government, and often in the private sector as well as the public sector, in order for the public to feel justice has been served. Private 2 sector vetting may follow its own procedures, but should be monitored so as not to violate the democratic principles that will govern under the new regime. As seen in several prior cases, accusations and purges can easily get out of control. Vetting should be thorough, particularly in the security forces, police and judiciary, but should be constrained . IV. What Criteria are applied? In previous vetting programs in various countries, the following categories of implicated personnel have been excluded from key positions on the basis of vetting: • Senior officers (e.g. from colonels up), except as truly needed • War criminals and human rights abusers • Secret police informants • Senior party officials • Drug traffickers/members of criminal syndicates • Those deemed unqualified based on professional history and competence V. What sources of information provide the basis for vetting? Ideally, vetting should be based on a comprehensive review of as many sources of information as possible given the possibility of incomplete, missing, and falsified records. It is necessary, therefore, to be able to fuse/filter disparate sources of information and to account for distorted/politically-based allegations. It is imperative to immediately locate, secure and restrict access to all relevant personnel records, intelligence files, court and prison records, and other relevant databases as quickly as possible. These will provide the main basis for vetting. Unsecured, these records will be destroyed, falsified, or used for blackmail. In addition to records of the new deposed government, vetting can draw on data from publicly available news sources, international human rights groups, and foreign intelligence sources. Compile as many records and sources of information as possible before the transition. Elements of vetting review: (1) Records and data sources as noted above. (2) Publication of candidate lists (ideally in local papers and in refugee centers abroad), with a request for the public to submit any relevant information regarding candidates. (3) Applicants should be required to self-report their history and activities, with any falsehood being an immediate disqualifier. Self-reported histories can be cross- 3 checked against available records and witness testimony. Misrepresentations, even impersonations, are conunon. (4) Vetting review must not only clear an individual of culpability for abuses of the old regime, but also determine his/her objective qualifications and ability to adapt to the norms and practices of a new, accountable and civilian-led democratic government. VI. What are the key procedural considerations? Fewer cases versus faster processing: Vetting can target and purge specific individuals based on past abuses. This is by definition retrospective and retributive, and consequently a higher due process standard is required. Alternatively, all current holders of the designated positions are required to re-apply. In this case, vetting is prospective and, like routine civil service screening, a lower due process burden can be applied to the program. In the second scenario, continuation of the applicants in their jobs is contingent on eventual approval in the vetting process - making it possible to more quickly remove targeted individuals while review of other cases proceeds more slowly. Due process: Three due process questions routinely arise: (1) Is there a right of the vettee to confront the evidence against him/her? (2) Is representation by counsel permitted? (3) Can vetting decisions be appealed? Provision for a limited appeals process is helpful, particularly for civilian positions, in that a successful appeal by an accused abuser vindicates the legitimacy of the vetting process. Standardization: Vetting rules may (1) be rigid and uniform, to expedite the process and avoid the appearance or reality of arbitrariness, or (2) allow for subjective evaluation, taking into account such factors as severity of misdeeds, mitigating factors, coercion or other reasons for taking the action in question, later remorse/ change in conduct, or distance in time from the abuse. Duration: Dismissal from the security forces may be permanent, given concern over renewed abuses. Civilian vetting, on the other hand, is usually of temporary duration (typically 5-10 years) to allow breathing space for government and society to re-create itself, after which they move to a level playing field. VII. What happens to the purged? Types of sanctions which may result from vetting: Those sanctions which have been employed in various countries include employment dismissal; exclusion from appointed office; exclusion from elected office; exclusion from designated private sector 4 positions or professions; denial of benefits (including government pension); exclusion from suffrage. Prevent the purged from becoming spoilers: Those vetted out cannot simply be sent home, but must be placed in some sort of organized, remunerated activity. This temporarily ensures their livelihood so they do not turn to criminal activity, facilitates observation of their interactions with former colleagues, and prevents them from organizing a troublemaking underground force. VIII. What happens to those who survive the vetting process? Probation: Those retained - particularly in the police and security forces - should be retained on a probationary basis. The probationary period should be long enough to (1) allow refugees to return and provide additional relevant information, and (2) permit monitoring of performance to ensure suitability. This may last up to two years. It may be useful to put outside personnel in place to closely supervise the work of these remaining employees during this period. 5 Iraq Corps • Iraqi Military Reconstruction wysiwyg://1/tile:/Cjn)ocuments and Setti ..• qis - Iraqi Military Reconstruction2.htii ~ ... Glo. bal ,.•~ Security .org Search Home >> Miiitary >> World >>Iraq >> Iraq Corps - Iraqi Military Reconstruction On 23 May 2003 the US civilian administrator for Iraq, L. Paul Bremer, abolished several ministries and institutions of Saddam Hussein's regime, and disbanded the Iraqi army, declaring them illegal. The ministries of defense and information were among institutions being dissolved as well as the military and security courts, the Iraqi Olympic Committee, and the Republican Guard units. Bremer's office said that plans are afoot to create a new Iraq Corps as the first step toward forming "a national self-defense capability for a free Iraq." The statement said the corps will be •professional, nonpolitical, military effective and representative of all Iraqis." The move Is aimed to get rid of Ba'athist influences in the military and security institutions. It follows last week's decision to abolish Hussein's Ba'ath party and order the dismissal of party officials from the civil service. It is estimated that about 400,000 people, mostly military personnel, will lose their jobs. Originally, the hope was in fact that large elements of the army would stay intact, and that the municipal police [the political security police] would very quickly return to their beats in Baghdad and other areas. The team under the former civil administrator [Jay] Garner was really taken somewhat by surprise in that the apparatus of the Iraqi government went home. The army dissolved. Ten years of sanctions and continual air patrols, the destruction of nearly all air defense capabilities, and two wars, left the Iraqi military expectantly decimated. If the United States Ins not going to maintain a persistent armed presence in Iraq, then Iraq must prepare to defend itself in the absence of or in concert with us forces. The rebuilding of the Iraqi military will, in all likelihood, be closely supervised and controlled by the United States as part of an overall rebuilding process. The rebuilding of the Iraqi military seems paradoxical considering the amount of time and effort spent dismantling the Hussein regime. However, a stable and well-trained Indigenous military force will be key in maintaining internal stability and filling the power-void left by the removal of the Hussein regime. It is Important for the United States to monitor and supervise Iraq's military reconstruction as the US has an interest in reequipping Iraq with US military equipment. The use of US systems would require significant training and allow the US to have continued military influence in the country long after significant US units had departed. likewise, if left to its own accord Iraq would likely tum to other available systems on the open arms sales markets, most likely Russian, or Russian derivative arms that the Iraqi military already has experience using. Concerns over Iraq eventually turning these weapons against its neighbors should be limited when one considers that, as in Saudi Arabia, significant dependence on US technical advisors would exist to maintain the most sophisticated weapons systems. In addition the dependence on US technical expertise and training will ensure the US will have a continued military presence within the country. Naturally, it will be difficult to guarantee that a defense force constructed in any country would maintain a permanent defensive poster. It would be Important to formulate a control regime that would monitor Iraqi defense forces as well as integrate US technical personnel to attempt to Insure that Iraq would continue to maintain a force structure with limited offensive capabilities. This assessment assumes that Iraq will be able to resume normal oil production by the beginning of 2004 and military spending will be structured in a way to allow for maximum resources going toward infrastructure reconstruction. Assuming 22 billion dollars in oil revenues with s per cent available for defense allocation, Iraq would be able to allocate approximately 1.1 billion per year on defense. Procurement structuring would likely take place over five to ten years with an increasing in defense allocation to coincide with completion of infrastructure projects. I of6 S/28f2003 12:21 PN Iraq Corps - lraqi Military Reconstruction wysiwyg://l/filc:ICl/I)(icuments and Setti ... rps - Iraqi Military Reconsuuction2.hm A caveat of military reconstruction will be that none of the systems provided will surpass Israeli systems and the force structure will primarily defensive in nature and therefore not an immediate threat to any of its neighbors. Security Forces 200,000 Why this number? These are enough troops to perform internal defense but not enough to launch offensive attacks against neighbors. Tanks M1A2 500 M60A3 750 Why this number? Saudi Arabia and Jordan both utilize M-60 systems and Saudi Arabia has M1A2 tank systems but nearly half are in storage because of a shortage of trained tank crews. APC M2 500 LAV 500 M113 1500 Why this number? Smaller force structure--lraqi defense force will likely be a much smaller force than the Iraqi army prior to the first gulf war. To be effective, these troops need to be able to be highly mobile. MOR Bl mm M29 81-mm 400 107mm M30 107-mm 100 120mm M121 120-mm 100 Why this number? This number corresponds with proposed force structure and based on similar sales to other countries Towed Artillery 105mm M101/Ml02 100 155mm M198 50 M114 50 Why this number? This number is in line with artillery systems found in Saudi Arabia and Jordan. Self-Propelled Artltlery 105mm M52 150 155mm M109A6 110 203mm MllO 100 Why this number? This number is in line with artillery systems found in Saudi Arabia and Jordan. MRLS M270 MLRS 50 RCL M-67 90mm 100 M40 200 Utlllty vehicles AMEV 100 2of6 512812003 12:21 PM Iraq Corps - Iraqi Military Reconstruction wysiwyg:/11/file:ICl!Documents and Setti...rps - Iraqi Military Reconstruction2.htr M548 500 Why this number? It is like that Iraq would need this number of support vehicles to operate and supply its defense force. Anti tank weapons M136 AT4 500 M47 Dragon 750 Why this number? Iraq will need systems to protect against armor assault from its neighbors. The optimal number of systems was derived from the number of AT systems possessed by Saudi Arabia and the relative size of armored forces possessed by Syria and Iran. Attack Helicopters AH-64 50 Why this number? Attack helicopters have a relatively short range and can not hold territory. As a result they are perfect for a combined role but in and of themselves do not possess an inherent offensive threat. Sophisticated attack helos would be dependent upon US technical expertise for optimal usage and maintenance. General-purpose Helicopters S-70 15 UH-60 25 SA-365n 5 Bell 406c 15 Why this number? These numbers are in line with other militaries' in the region of similar size and structure. Air Force 25, 000 Fixed wing F-15 40 F-16 160 Why this number? F-15's are flown by the Saudi air force. They are modern fighting aircraft but are not the most advanced US aircraft being flown in the area. The F-15 is a capable of conducting both air and ground missions however, the variant likely to be sold or leased to Iraq would be the F-lSC which is an air superiority craft not a ground attack craft. The F-16 Fighting Falcon is a compact, multirole fighter aircraft. It is highly maneuverable and has proven itself In air-to-air combat and air-to-surface attack. It provides a relatively low-cost, high-performance weapon system. In an air combat role, the F-16's maneuverability and combat radius (distance it can fly to enter air combat, stay, fight and return) exceed that of all potential threat fighter aircraft. It can locate targets In all weather conditions and detect low flying aircraft in radar ground clutter. In an air-to-surface role, the F-16 can fly more than 500 miles (860 kilometers), deliver its weapons with superior accuracy, defend itself against enemy aircraft, and return to its starting point. An all-weather capability allows it to accurately deliver ordnance during non-visual bombing conditions. Naval Forces FF-1040 Garcia 3 PC- 1 Cyclone 30 Anti mine 5 Service Craft 2 Why this number? Iraq will have no need for offensive naval systems but well need craft capable of patrolling costal areas and guarding oil assets. 3 of6 512812003 12:21 P?v Iraq Corps - Iraqi Military ReconslIUCLion wysiwyg:lll/file:ICIJDocuments and Setti...rps - Iraqi Military Reconsll'UCtion2.htr Air Defense 20mm M163 PIVADS 100 3Dmm AMX-30 SO SAM MIM-104 Patriot 5 MIM-23 Hawk 10 M6 Linebacker 100 FIM-92A Stinger and Redeye missiles 500 MIM-72 Chaparral FAADS 10 Why this number? Air defense will be a priority. Likely systems would include multi-use missile and air defense systems to protect against scud and mlg systems prevalent In the area. Iraqi Military Reconstruction Army 200,000 Armor M1-A2 M-60 M2 LAV M113 500 750 500 500 1500 APC MOR BJ.mm M-29 J.07mm M-30 J.20mm M-121 J.OSmm M-101/102 155mm M-198 M-114 105mm M-52 J.55mm M-109a1b/a2 203mm M-110A2 MRL Astros II RCL M-67 90mm M-40A1 106mm 400 100 100 Towed Artillery 100 50 so Self-Propelled Artillery 150 110 100 so 100 200 4of6 5/28/2003 12:21 p~ Iraq COipS - Iraqi Militacy Reconstruction wysiwyg://l/file:/CVI>ocwnents and Setti ..• rps - Iraqi Militacy Reconstruction2.hm Utility vehicles AMEV M548A3 100 500 Anti-Tank Weapons 500 TOW M-47 750 Attack Helicopter AH-64 50 1,000 General Purpose Helicopter S-70 A 15 UH-60a (Medlvac) 25 (5) SA-365n Bell 406c 10 25 Air Force 25,000 Fixed wing F-15c F-16c Frigate Patrol Anti mine 40 160 Naval Forces 3 30 5 Air Defense 20mm M-163 30mm AMX 30 PAC I Hawk M6 Stinger and redeye missiles M48 Chaparral 100 50 5 10 100 500 10 SAM Help Support Our Work :: Home :: Sltemap 111 WMD :: Mllltary :: Security :: Intelligence :: Space file:///Cl/Documents and Settings/gardnerg/Local 5ettings{Temporary Internet Flles/OL.K9E/Iraq Corps - Iraqi Military Reconstruction2.htm Maintained by John Pike Last Modified: May 27, 2003 - 12:01 Copyright© 2000-2003 GlobalSecurtty.org Ail Rights Reserved S of 6 5128/2003 12:21 PM inlq Corps - Iraqi M1htlll'}' Reconstruction wy$iwyg://l/fi\cJCVDocumcnls and Seui ... rps - lr.K(i M1htary Rccon~uuclionl.h1r 6 of 6 Sf.1.8fl003 12:21 Pf.' Education and Its Important Role in the National Defense of Iraq by Brigadier General (Staff) Najeb M. Al-Salhi [ I In a country such as Iraq, which has been susceptible to radical political, economic and social changes, and after its participation in several external wars with its neighbors and internal wars in the north, the south and even the country's central region, there has been a resultant intervention and haziness of the doctrine and philosophy of national defense. That doctrine requires a number of educational and training programs in accordance with a new strategy of defense that reflects the policy of a new government These probrrams w ill jncludc the following benefits: • Education of the people, especially the new generation, in the doctrine oflraqi patriot-ism and what Iraq means as a geographic region, a people, a political system, what are Iraq's intei:national boundaries, lraq's human resnurces, Iraq's rich popular culture (without chauvinism or fanaticism), and what.are the rights and duties of the Iraqi citizen • National symbols, such as the Iraqi flag and the Iraqi national anthem, and their imponance • Peaceful coexistence among the populations inside the Iraqi nation • The principles of human rights under the auspices of a democratic and pluralistic government • Tlte meaning of Iraq's national defense, including moral and political defense by means of confirmation of love of Iraq and commibnent to protection of its interests, its land, its resources and culture, and confirmation of its national unity and the cohesion oflraq's people In regard to military and civil defense, education and training can enable the following: • A culture of change and transition from war to peace, including the conditions and requirements of such change • Civil defense programs • A culture of protective securiry and inte11igence • Educational and :protective programs about wars of mass casualties, such as chemical, biological and nuclear wars, and training on the use of suitable specialiwd procedures • Programs for basic military training of volunteers for limited time-periods and their introduction with recreational and educational programs • Activation of scouting programs (Boy Scouts), young peoples' programs, and youth camps • The priority importance of sports programs for physical fitness and readiness, such as programs for parachute jumping, climbing, rifle marksmanship, field navigation and map reading, individual combat, survival camping, etc. • General awareness of the Iraqi people about wars in the world, their causes, their causes and methods, their results, how to avoid such wars, and the human and material lessons learned from such wars W.alter S. locombe From: Sent: ~-~-~....._, CIV,JCSJ5f: ) Tuesday, April 01, 2003 16:53 ------------ To: Walter Slocombe Subject: FW: Iraqi MOD MOD Guidance.doc TheFutureoftheiraqll.l·Salhi CV.doc (32 (40 KB) iMllitary.do... KB) Mr. Slocombe-- co1 .... r_~ asked that I forward these to you. Best, r -- - --Original Messa~e - - -- - From: L: _COL, JCS JS Sent:: Tuesday, Apri 01, 2003 4:36 PM 'l'O: r-" I, CIV I JCS JS Subject: PW: Iraqi MOD - - - - -Original l"lessag· e- - - - - From: r: :" Sent: Sund a¥, March - 30 , 2003 10: 57 PM To: .. ~ r- ~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~ ) Subject: lraqi MOD [ Please confirm you recieved this. This is in prep for the meeting with Walter Slocombe today. There are a couple of things here. 1.) Start of paper I drafted on ORHA objectives and Immediate actions. This is a working paper, so comments and corrections are much appreciated. 2.) There is also a paper from Najeb Sahli, an Iraqi Brigadier who defected in 1995. l met with Najeb last week and friends of his sent me this paper that he worked on with SAIC. It says all the right things, but the word is he is not a trusted agent. We are suspect as to his real motives. 3.) Also attached is a CV on Najeb. You might run the trap line on his credentials down there. We are doing it over here. Help STOP SPAM with the new MSN 8 and get 2 months FREE* 1 http://join.msn.com/?page=features/junkmail 2 ----·---------------- Free Officers & Civilia1i Moveme111 November 1st 2001 The Future of the Iraqi Military and Its Role in Civil Society When we think about a new regime in Iraq and contemplate the horizons of a bright future, our nigh hopes oblige us to make an effort to formulate a way in which to sketch the features and the essential nature of the Iraqi military establishment, in a way that makes it a vital force which can share, along with the other social and national institutions, in the building of a new and democratic Iraq. At the same time, the military must be able to defend effectively Iraq's national borders and to maintain Iraqi sovereignty and the unity of Iraq's lands. Iraqi National Security Any group of nations, regardless of the differing nature of their regimes, wilJ all work to guarantee their national security. which is simply an expre-ssion in which arc enshrined the following fundamental values which nations strive to perpetuate and to protect: 1) the ability to survive and continue as a nati. onal entity and to guarantee political independence and the unity of the national territory. 2) 3) the ability to attain a certain level of economic well-being. the ability to perpetuate and maintain the national characteristics of the country. In other words, national security means preservation of the manner of living in society, religion, culture, intelleotual ]jfe. science, and the arts, among others. The effort that the state exerts in order to preserve these fundamental values is called "the national security policy of the state". Every effort or step (and even refraining from taking action) that an individual or a group undertakes to attain or perpetuate these fundamental values is described as serving "the national interest". In addition, the preparation by the state of steps that it will take to guarantee the above-mentioned goals is caUed "the higher strategy of the state". Further, the various lines of general action designed to attain the higher strategy are referred to by the term "strategy" and fhjs term can be used to describe many things, such as; political strategy, or economic strategy, or military strategy, or environmental strategy, among others. ln each case, the term strategy applies to all the lines of approach deploye-d in support of a given policy in any particular field, as well as the apparatus used to attain that policy, including all the variations and permutations of approach. On the other hand, something that is too often the c, ase, the pursuit of this grand strategy should not lead to a situation in which a part of the overall strategy ("a branch strategy") ends up hanning the grand ( overaJJ) strategy or is in contra.diction with the othe.r strategies. In other words, it is imperative that in the future the political strategy for Iraq not conflict with the country' s military ~trategy. 2 At present, discussions about the future policy of Iraq (post-Saddam Hussein) are focused on the creation of a democrati. c regime, the development of a civil society and the adoption of a policy of openness ('" infitah") to the world (and in particular the neighboring countries and the great powers, especially the USA), the settlement of disputes through peaceful diplomatic means, and the adoption of effective economic and social development schemes which would compensate the Iraqis for past backwardness. 11 is therefore natural that this state of affairs shouJd be reflected in the military establishment in a clear and tangible way. The mi1itary should be made into an attractive establishment, we.II diversified and capable, which is self-controlled and compatib'le with the new democratic life and with the peaceful tendencies of the new state policy. The lraqi military will need to make a commitment to adopt modem ideas and theories concerning national security. No longer will security be attained only by the strength of the army or by its size or by the advanced technology of its weapons systems, or by the militarization of the people a.nd placing them in a perpetual mass mobiJ: ization. At present, the concept of security has come to mean comprehensive development and the creation of an educated and aware citizenry which is civilized and liberated and bas the power to make its will felt. Democracy is a strength. Economic and social development are strengths. All of these strengths serve to ensure the national security, which is tied to the freedom of the individual with an indissoluble bond, ooe complementing the other. It is not possible to violate the freedom and the rights of the individual on the. pretext of protecting the security of the political regime or of the state from the threats and dangers which surround it, although many dictatorial regimes have used this argument as a justification. In other words, it is not possible to talk about national security in the context of a de:Prived citizenry which does not enjoy a ce. rtain degree of democracy or is living under a repressive regime based upon the denial of intellectual and political pJuralism, where constitutional institutions, legislative and executive au. thorities, and the judiciary have been converted into empty fonris. When the right of the citizens to share in pohtical decision-making is undermined, when individual initiative is para.lyzed, when justjce is demolished, when human existence is distorted, when there is aggression against political. religious, and cultural freedoms, then there is no guarantee for the security or the stability or any political regime which rules under a police tyra1my. There is no way to achieve national security other than through a democratic political system that respects the basic freedoms of the individual. In this regard, the well-known American political expert Henry Kissinger commented that there cannot be a contradiction between the demands of national security and the demands of individual freedoms, because both depend upon the other. The Milit~ry Establishment ... and Development The Iraq of the future is in need of comprehensive development in all aspects (the economy, services, sciences, human resources, and others). In addition, at present military expenditures constitute a terrible waste of the nation' s resources, sapping the 3 natio. nal strength and taxing currently ineffective human resources, while weapons, war materials, and equipment are imported at astronomical prices. Iraqi milita.ry expeudjture reached (as was reported in an article by NidhaJ al- Laythi in "al-Hayat" on July 7, 1995) in the years 1981, 1982, and 1983 the level of 24.6, 25.1, and 25.3 billion dollars respectively. At the same time, the revenues from oiJ during the same three ye-ars were only 10.4, l O. l, and 7 .8 billion dollars. This means that the ratio of military expenditure to oil revenue du. ring these three years was 236. l %, 248.5%, and 324%. In additio· n, these figures are certain to be too low, because they do not take into account secret deals. Further, the level of military expenditures increased markedly during the following years frorn what it was in '1983. For one thing, the prices of weapons and war equipment have become much more expensive today for many reasons. We should not forget that the estimates of the losses which were inflicted upon the Iraqi economy exceed 600 billion dollars, in other words more than 60 times the real value of the gross domestic product in the year 1993. This figure includes the value of what was destroyed during the Gulf War, compensation paid during the two wars (Gulf and Iran), foreign loans, and the expenditures of the arms inspections committees. We point to the estimates of economic analysts who say that the future of [raq will be black during the coming years unless the way of doing business is changed and comprehensively reviewed from the bottom up. Necessity and logic dictate the setting of priorities that guarantee the appropriate level of the necessities oflife, of education, and of development of human resources. This in itself will make e.xtensive military expenditure unlikely , or at least military expenditure wiH take second priority, because development and construction will become the first goal of the state. The Size of the MiJit, ary Establishment The size and capability of the Iraqi military establishment will be determined by many factors that are too numerous to mention in this summary study. There are three principal factors, however, which must be pointed o·ut briefly: First: We hope that the possible threats to the country, when we are seeking a peaceful democratic regime which wiU strive to handle its problems with neighboring countries by peaceful means and by good will, far from recourse to weapons and the desire for wars, will be reduced to the minimum through a peaceful and open political strategy. Second: Iraq's economic and human resources impose upon the country certain limitations that cannot be avoided. Third: The resolutions of the UN and of the UN Security Council oblige fraq to abide by certain limils for the armed forces. In addition, the efforts by UNSCOM are a continuation of this mandate to remove \VMD and other prohibited weapons, including long- range surface-to-surface missiles. The UN resolutions, however, permit Iraq to maintain military capabWties and · defensive missiles which will allow it to react to any aggression, within the re. stTicti.ons on the size of the armed forces. the limitations on Iraq's military industries, and Iraq's ability to benefit from dual-use technologies. The 4 issue oJlifting the economic and political sanctions on Iraq in the future is tied to the extent to which a future regime is committed to execute the resolutions of the international community. It has become necessary, however, to reexamine all of those resolutions, because they we.re imposed on a11 aggressive regime after its attack on and occupation of a ueighboring country (Kuwait) and thus were the products of that attack, occupation, and aggression. Thus. the removal of those resolutions bas become a legitimate Iraqi goal. in the event that the aggressive regime is removed. In addition, the increase in armaments in the region, particularly in Iran and Turkey, makes it necessary for Iraq to have sufficient defensive capabilities to defend its te.rritories and its vital interests and not to be weak. Weakness will only encourage those countries to violate Iraq's vital interests and even to attack Jraqi territory. Ao Army for Defense or a For'Ce for Attack There is no clearly-defined boundary between an anny committed only to defense of the country or destined for attacks outside the country. This issue depends on many factors, the most important ofwbich are intentions and legitimate or illegitimate ambitions. The distinction can also be discerned from training programs, from planning, and from political strategies. In the end, the military establisbment remains the tool of the poticymakers for the attainment of their goals and plans. We can never imagine a defensive army under a regime committed to an aggressive political ideology, just as we cannot imagine the opposite. Indeed, there must be harmony between the overall strategy and its components (policy is the womb in which war grows; it is tbe politicaJ goal which becomes the strategic objective; war is the means to attain this political goal, but one should not view the means separately from the strategic objective.) For these reasons, what we aspire to in the future is a defensive national anny with a size and armament that conform with a policy of national defense and are consistent w. ith the pressing demands of comprehensive development which our country requires and which does not involve of necessity any aggressive intentions. ln fact, the size and quality of the Iraqi armaments at present, despite the losses that Iraq has suffered, are considered appropriate to serve as the basis for that defensive force. We will be able to compensate for d~ficiendes in some highly expensive areas of annament through more effective investment in Iraqi capabi.lilies and expertise, in scientific planning, in sound use of economic resources, with concern for the individual and the development of his personal capabilities, through re1ationships based on humanity, justice, equality, and a recommit:roent to the Iraqi social fabric, which bas been exposed to splits and breakdowns as a result of Saddam's dictatorial regime. Volu· oteers in the Armed Forces The anny of the future must depend upon a significant number of volunteers (officers, noncommissioned officers, soldiers), for they are the important nucleus and support for the military. These volunteers should be qualified educatjon<tIJy. professionally, and in terms of health to form that nucleus. The extreme importance of this element should be stressed to the military leaderships at all levels of the chain of 5 command, because the most important elements in the command of the soldiers are the noncommissioned otUcers. ln this regard, it will be necessary to treat an ingrained problem in the Iraqi military establishment, because the soldiers and the noncommissioned officers come from certain governorales and locations, while the officers. come from other governorates. l am referring here to discrimination between Iraqis, even though tb. ey serve the same country. This discrimination is based on unreasonable assumptions and springs ftom political, confessional, and racial per.:;ecution. For that reason, in the future, membership in the lraqi military and security establishments should be based on national nonns, far from any distinction based on any race, religion, belief, or region. This discrimination is no longer valid in the selection of officers, noncommissioned officers, or soldiers. Nor is it acceptable that key leadership positions be filled on the basis of discrimination concerning ideology, race, origin, or politics, as is the case at present. Indeed, it is necessary for the lraqi mWtary college, the Iraqi staff college, and the rest of the other Lraqi military schools to include young men and officers of aH the differe.nt types in fraq, in a way that truly represents the demographic realities of the countTy. This point will become a virtual litmus test of the intentions of the new Ira. qi political regime and will become a reflection of its true orientation, not only on the level of tbe military establishment, but also on other political levels. The extent of the regime's seriousness in implementing these reforms will show whether it can move in a positive direction and whether it has a just and evenhanded attitude toward Iraq's citizens. The opposite is true as well. Repeated experiences have caus(;;d Iraqis not to believe in promises and not to be satisfied with what is written in the constitution or in the laws or in politica] pronouncements. Instead, Iraqis look at what is happening concerning the practical implemc. ntation of what was published or announced. What applies to these military training institutions should also be evide.nt throughout the lead,ership structure of the Iraqi armed forces, for there are many in&,11'ained problems in tWs area which cannot be solved other thao by an evenhanded and egalitarian approach which puts all Iraqis on the same starting line. The regime of Saddam cotnmitted serious crimes against the people and favored one soldier over another and one o fficer over another, including even the positions filled by staff officers who were graduates of the staff college. There is discrimination ... it operates in regard to the movement of troops, although it is not permitted in regard to work in the field of military intelligence. This discrimination becomes imbedded in the training process and prevents the exerdse ofleadership. All of this rises from irresponsible assumptions and i.s attribuled to an anxiety about security. There should not be mything preventing an officer from graduating without restrictions into the armed services other than his competence and his absolute loyalty to the country (Iraq). In other words, his beliefs., his race, or his region should not stand in the way of the fulfillment of the legitimate aspirations of any person in Iraq, most particularly in the armed forces. The Elimination or Artificial Formations --··- - ------ 6 It has become necessary to review the military forn1ations created to protect the regime, such as the R~public1m Guards, the Special Republica11 Guards, and various otlier security orga11izations. These unJts should be disbanded and their cadres should be dispersed, because they were fotmed in the service of the dictatorial regime and according to discriminatory principles that should not be allowed to continue wider a new regime that is committed to democratic equality a:nd to human rights. All of the equipment and anns of these units should be returned to the united, national Iraqi military. In addition, the persons in these units should be handled with caution. Do not attribute the crimes of Saddam in an overly emotional way to those belonging t'o all these institutions. These units iac.lude honest office.rs and nationalist elements who have committed no crime against the people. This makes it necessary to be precise and to be completely objective. Accusations should only be directed against active and effective clements who persisted in the.ir support for Saddam. These should be singled out, but only as few as possible. The Building of Nationalist Armed . Forces The lraqi armed forces and the army should be rebuilt according to the tenets and programs of democratic life and the new political atmosphere, and should reflect as well the general situation in the country. There is considerable educational literature that has been published concerning how to remove the military mentality and hostile mind-set and how to develop the latent humanitarian impulse that is also present in each individual. There also must be remedies for the negative effects caused by the dictatorial systems and methods and the paralysis resulting from overly bureaucratized activity, which defined the nat'ure of the forms of social interaction within the armed forces. Compulsory Military Service There must be a review of the laws pertaining to compulsory national service and to reserve duty in a way that is appropriate for the special sit\1ation in Iraq. The country is in nee. d of comprehensive development, in a way that will mandate a reduction in the length of service to the shortest term possible, with no possibility of extending that term, no matter what the reasons. It is important to treat the problems and the frustrations that have afflicted the youth of Iraq as a result of erroneous policies. There needs to be a new emphasis on scholastic achievement for lraqi youths, on teaching them various skills, on raising scientific qualifications. This need.s to be done in tandem with a new system in the military for recruiting, for selection, and for training. This new approach must also be part of a system tluit is fafr to all Iraqis and guarantees the most productive investment of effort and energy, making compulsory military service a humane and patriotic interval that takes place on an accelerated basis, is a known quantity, and is a positive experience for all. Respect for Constitutional Institutions ·-- ------- 7 An effort, based on a rapidly-i.ntroduced educational program, is needed which can inculcate in the armed forces a respect for d. emocratic, constitutional institutions that represent the wilJ of the people and a commitment to support the decisions of the people. The necessary measures should be taken to prevent a repetition of the old phenomenon of military coups. In addition, instruction on human rights should be one of the primary topics in military educational institutions and in ntilitary units, so that the am1ed forces are in conformity with the prevailing humanitarian concems of the country. Humanitarian concerns must be impressed upon all thQse belonging to the anned forces, from officers to soldiers. It is really embarrassing that . officers and soldiers receive instruction in security and military intelligence without knowing anything about human rights. Defining the Mission of the Army The mission of the army is defined as the defense of the country, protection of national sovereignty, and protection of the constitution and the laws. The use of the army in the case of internal problems and disputes is exduded. The natural location for the anny is inside the military barracks. The specific duties of the army are to he defense of the horuers and protection of national unity. 1n addition, the army is to preserve the democratic regime and to protect the regime from the dangers of factionalism and from plots. PolUicallncUnations and Party Tendencies The armed forces are to be above political inclinations, party tendencies. and ideological cun-ents, in order to protect their unity, their national identity, and the desi;red level of professionalism. The military must be removed from the causes of division and factionalism. It must be assured that there is no opportunity provided, that the atmosphere is not allowed to develop, for the formation or the proliferation of blocs within the military, which might be exploited under certain conditions in ways that to not serve the national democratic effort and the true interests of the country. Indeed, the entry of the military into potitjcs created a dangerous precedent in the political life oflraq. lbe result of this intervention was a convulsion in the political stability of the country that exposed the unity of the armed forces to divisions, as well as the removal from the military of effective leaders and commanders. This led to th.e exploitation of the military and to its inevitable unpopularity, because it was involved in endlt:ss adventures, entered numerous wars, and was exploited as an instrument of suppression againsl the people and liquidation of political opponents. This was in violation of the rights of the citizenry and of the fundamental responsibilitjes of the military. For this reason, thjs is no justification for the politicization of the anned forces, which does not in any case accord with the fundamentals of democracy and the objectives for which the military was created. 8 The Defense Budget The drawing up of a military budget must be in conformity with a well-considered prog,ram that takes into consideration the most pressing requirements for the defensive requirements of the military and the development of its technical and bwnan capabilities. This must be done in a way that conforms to the requirements of comprehensive national development. The size of the military budget should be announced yearly, along with the other ministerial budgets. Military Manufacturing Enter _ prises There should be an effort to make enterprises involved in manufacturing military equipment operate according to their productive capabilities. The programs of the enterprises should be defined according to Iraq's defensive needs. All excess production capacity should be turned into civilian productive enterprises. These military enterprises should participate in meeting the requirements of the army and the armed forces in terms of maintenance and industrial production of traditional defensive items. These enterprises should be developed in a way that (l.SSurcs self-sufficiency within the military and contributes to the comprehensive dcve lopment of the country. Su pervisfon o( Military A ff airs It has become necessary to have complete supervision over the affairs of the military, to keep a:n eye on military locations, activities, and ranks. It is essential to make sure of the return of the Iraqi military to normal civilian life. In accordance with that goal, military personnel must be made ready to be effective elements who can participate in the uew democratic life oflraq and can contribute to its prosperity. On another important level, there should be a study concerning compensation for military men who were exposed to dire penalties because of their stands on national principles and policy. TI1is study should examine how to guarantee their professional rights, thei.r retirement rights, and their military accomplishments, specifically salary and military ranks, but also including other rights. Modern Expertise There shouJd be reliance upon modem foundations in military education and training, wl1ich will cost less in time and money. Modem technical know-bow among the military should be utilized and the military should become open to the world. Iraq should send military technical and cultural delegations to the advanced countries to develop and exchange expertise with the militaries of the modern world. The level of military and political culture of the Iraqi anned forces needs to be raised in a way that strengthens the humanitarian outlook and the desire for peaceful solutions to problems that arise. 9 The System of Mobilization and CaUing to Arms A new Iraq military of the appropriate size and annament requi-res a modem system for general mobilization and calling up the people to arms, as well as wcll- deve1oped plans to call up the reserves. Such a system will save considerable expenses within the armed forces and will prevent damage to the national economy. Such a system will ensure that there is no popular anxiety or fear over the sma11 size of the military during normal times. In addition, the speed and precision of a modern system of mobilization, something every nation is anxious to have, are considered elements of a successful response to possible crisis, particularly under future· conditions in lraq, when economic development will take first priority within the operation of rebuilding and modernizing Iraq. Intellectual and Morale Considerations We will need in the futur:e to exert considerable and sincere effort to restore an adherence to the national social framework within the Iraqi armed forces. The spirit of citizenship and brotherhood must be strengthened among those be1ongiag to the armed forces. An Iraqi national identity needs to be created. In addition, it is essential to deal with any feeli11gs of unreasonable discrimination among members of the military establishment. It is important that the loy~lty of everyone in (he military establishment be to Iraq, the military, and the constitution. The handbng of any attempts within the military to form blocs, interest groups, or regional, confessional, or racial factions must be firm and decisive. The example provided by the national leadership ·in tem1s of applying the law with justice to all will be sufficient to lay a strong foundation for this new and lofty military edifice. It is incumbent upon us to foster civilized behavior in military interaction with the people. Sound citizenshjp depends upon that. Unhealthy attitudes of some military men toward civilians must be eliminated, and the opposite is true as well. A new page must be opened in which relations among Iraqis are governed by respect. decorum, poise, and self-control in relation to others. The End Nov. 1st 2001 General Najeb aJ-Salhi Secretary General Free Officers & Civilian Movement r 1 To From: Subject: Amb. Bremer Wa1t Slocombe Accelerating NIA Deployments This is a preliminary report on the outcome of MG Eaton's training discussions on Sunday with the Jordanians.1 Because I know of the interest in Washington and Tampa in speeding up NIA deployment, I want to give you a preview of a concept MG Eaton has developed, and that I support, for doing that in a way that will not only exploit the training facilities of Jordan, but also will make more optimal use of the human resources of Iraq and the experience of the US and British armies in developing junior leadership than our present course. The initia1 round of training has shown th at we have access to a very large pool of rank and file enlisted men who are reasonably proficient in basic soldier skills. To some degree therefore the current program of basic skills instruction is re-teaching what many of the trainees, both enlisted and officers, already know fairly well. What is lacking is junior officers and NCOs with the leadership skills necessary to transform groups of individually trained soldiers into effective military units. The basic ronccpt of our proposal - which the CMATT team is developing into a detailed proposal that will be ready in a few days - is to shift our emphasis to focus very heavily on training junior officers .and NCOs in the fundamentalJy new leadership skills needed in a proficient army.2 This training would be done, for the officers in Jordan using a combination of US and Jordanian military trainers, and for the NCOs, at the Kirkush base by a combination of US active duty military and contractors. The Jordanians say they could be ready to receive large numbers of officer candidates at the beginning of January 2004, and we believe the NCO "academy" at Kirkush (which would not require new facilities) could be staffed and ready by then as well. At that point, we would stop providing large scale basic training to recruits and instead for several months concentrate entirely on training leaders. The resulting cadre of newly trained officers and NCOs would then mold the intake of former Iraqi (and PershMergaf privates - who already have the basic individual skills of a soldier- into fighting units. This approach would allow us by the middle of next year to have a force much closer to the 27 battalion target (probably organized in brigades, rather than divisions) now scheduled for mid 2005. L TG Sanchez' talks on the other issues went very well, and will be reported in a separate, classified channel. 2 It would also be sensible to use Jordanian training facilities next year to bring back into the force junior level specialislS - from lank drivers to truck mechanics to payroll clerks - who will be needed in lhe target force and whose specialized training would otherwise alrophy. There is also 11 case for doing the same with pilots and other air force persoMel, but that obviously depends on a basic policy decision whether to move toward any sort of air capability. J The new army cannot rely forever on prior service privates, so eventually, perhaps as soon as the second half of 2004, we wou1d also need to open a basic !raining facility- staffed almost entirely by Iraqis. This concept, we believe, is a way to get NIA units into service faster (and probably better) than our current course. It would, however, require that we also accelerate into 2004 funding that would otherwise stretch into 2005, for the equipment and garrisons the units would need, as well as for the structure to administer, maintain, and otherwise manage and support the force. We would also have to substantially expand recruitment and make it more sophisticated, because we would during the course of the next t 2 months be recruiting potential officers and NCOs, ex-servicemen with special skill sets, and much larger numbers of ex-privates. IRAQI CIVIL DEFENSE CORPS PUBLIC AFFAIRS GUIDANCE Current as of: 01 08450 Aug 03 PURPOSE: The purpose of this guidance is to provide media handling instructions for the implementation and mission of the Iraqi Civil Defense Corps (ICDC). BACKGROUND: The concept of an ICDC was approved on July 11, 2003 and subsequently referred to at press briefings by senior commanders (such as Lt. Gen. Abizaid and Maj. Gen. Sanchez). It is therefore firmly in the public domain. No details have yet been made available. CJTF7 FRAGO 488 dated 23 Jul 03 directs all Major Subordinate Commands (MSCs) to begin recruiting immediately. Hiring is authorized and visible activity may have occwred already. IO is directed to encourage Iraqi support and PAO is directed to ensure ICDC is widely recognized and understood. POSTURE: The PA posture is Active. STATEMENT: The Combined Joint Task Force-7 is establishing an ICDC with nine batta […اقتُطع العرض هنا — النص الكامل في ملف التنزيل]