08-F-0847 Doc 22

DO •1 1 106 1 2 111 4 3 6 1 €11.LEOEIC04149•MVINI'llrr Draft CG's Initial Guidance for The Next 45 Days(v1.1) FULL TEXT (Summary in Point Form Follows) I need to re-evaluate our current position and the options that are open to me. I am concerned that the Security line of operation is being isolated—we are doing 'more of the same' in our security ops and yet we face specific challenges in security in the immediate future. I feel that I am not getting the best from those areas where CF can impact on Governance, the Economy and Essential Services. I want to regain the initiative. I want to pre-empt the enemy. I want to look at my situation in terms of what I can do along the four Campaign Plan lines of operation to regain the initiative. Do not limit yourself to Security because that is our comfort zone. Perhaps we can act pre-emptively in Governance, the Economy and Essential Services as much or more than we can in Security. — My focus is on the period up to Sovereignty. But whatever we do must fit in to the long term need to ultimately conduct successful elections. But I repeat, my focus is on the ( period up to Sovereignty. We are examining the medium term (the elections) in a \ separate planning exercise. I do not want principles or generalities. I want practical solutions that can be applied in the short term that impact on the next 45 days. Options must be convertible into practical tasks. Initiatives themselves must be individually Red Teamed, and the overall strategy, once I choose a range of options, must also be Red Teamed. Security I want to maintain our current high rate of effort in Security, but I want a range of options that allows me to regain the security initiative. I am prepared to examine radical options as long as they are practical. o/p(i'i\At DO NOT DIOTIIIDUTE 11111111111111111 CL 3L11 ED/F U -15f)-N 10,191•911 4 1413riati— An increased emphasis on the partnership with emerging ISF is mandatory. What form that increased emphasis takes must be considered. Options involving a significant redeployment of CF forces to the ISF training function are to be considered. Also, we must take a position on the integration of Militia into the ICDC. Is the Fallujah. Brigade a viable Option and if so, how do we implement it on a wider scale and with what conditions? But they must be Red Teamed, be feasible within acceptable risk, fit into an overall plan and be capable of producing results within the time frame being considered. Other suggestions such as creating an effective chain of command for the ISF, utilizing IZ LNO, directing more joint patrols, stepping back from certain areas and only providing a QRF, could form part of a menu that I will choose from. Other options might be to redeploy significant forces to the borders, rationalize our use of LOC, or rationalize our base structure must be considered. Consider everything. Economy I want to examine the effect of being able to use funds more freely to take young men the street, to encourage a sense of local ownership of infrastructure, and to Fmpower local . leadership. Assume that I can obtain funds if required. Tell me what the log jam is, so that I can break it. I want to free current funds from bureaucratic restrictions on their use and transfer discretion to MSCs. I do not want an option to be: "Provide funds to MSC's". I want it to be in the nature of; "Release $500,000 to each MSC - this can be effected within one week from X Fund and is legal". Governance There is a vacuum of political guidance. I will continue to attempt to influence the _o_l_iticOIN_sidesin_thisisaie. However, this may not be forthcoming - assume that such guidance will be late, and identify what assumptions we have to make. We may have to take over certain parts of the Governance support function if it is important to us and the CPA cannot continue to do so. Make recommendations on this. Consider how we can be best poised to support whatever the Brahimi Plan becomes. Essential Services The MSC are currently making a significant contribution to the maintenance of essential services, What are my options for reinforcing that effort in the immediate future? Projects that assist the infrastructure, are related to essential services, provide employment and enhance local leadership are to be a priority. I want specific projects - 7 ..••••• 4144-14(44411.86 1 1 1ttrer1' CLOCE HOLD/r0U0 that deliver now. MSC may know these at the local level, but we need to superimpose on their activities with a National perspective. I know that I must protect infrastructure, especially given recent seemingly coordinated 1 attacks and the promise of more to come. Balance this in priority with what we are doing now, and examine the risk. Answer the question — 'Is the protection of infrastructure more important over the next 45 days than anything we are currently doing?' Identify specific infrastructure and the forces that they may need. Identify what we need to stop doing, and what the risk is. General Guidance I want the individual options to be tied into COAs within the Lines of Operations (EG a Security COA) and then tied in to an overall synchronized plan. I do not expect a long and detailed plan, but I want practical outcomes that can be implemented immediately. Consider whether I should focus the effects of this plan on one area, such as Baghdad, or on several areas, or across the country. I am prepared to accept some risk in the use of funds. Planning must be tied together by IO (this must be a major aspect of what we do, it must be central), there must a plan to synchronize the effects, and the action of the enemy must be considered at each step. I do not want the planning cycle to be too long. I want to be giving orders to execute in 7 days. Look at how we can use the MSC Commanders when they are in Baghdad on 15 May. If you discover anything that needs doing within this planning timeframe (7 days), pass the recommendation to C3 Ops for review as immediate action. Conduct a rapid but formal planning process. Consider this to be Commander's Initial Guidance. I wish to give you Commander's Guidance once you have conducted a Mission Analysis, and then I want to choose individual options within the four lines of operations. Having done that, I then want to choose the overall plan that orchestrates all (l, the effects that delivers me the initiative and pre-empts the enemy in the next 45 days. 1,3,t19,191, 1 14t11311 6 PE' CLOGE I JJL 1: 1 1 DISTRIBUTE CLOOE IIOLD/FOU0 SUMMARY OF THE ABOVE (in point form) Re-evaluate our current position and options open. Security line of operation is being isolated we are doing 'more of the same' in our security ops yet we face specific challenges in security in the immediate future. Not getting the best from those areas where MNF-I can impact on Governance, the Economy and Essential Services. Regain the initiative. Pre-empt the enemy. Along the four lines. Act pre-emptively in Governance, the Economy and Essential Services, as much or more than in Security. Focus on period up to Sovereignty. Fit in to the long term need to ultimately conduct successful elections. Not want principles or generalities. Want practical solutions-that can be applied in the short term that impact on the next 45 days. Options must be convertible into practical tasks. Red Teamed initiatives and the overall strategy. Security Maintain our current high rate of effort in Security, but I want a range of options that allows me to regain the security initiative. Examine radical options as long as they are practical. Increased emphasis on the partnership with emerging IZ forces is mandatory. Form of increased emphasis must be considered. Options involving a significant redeployment of forces to the ISF training function are to be considered. Must be Red Teamed, be feasible within acceptable risk, fit into an overall plan and be capable of producing results within the time frame being considered. Form a menu that I will choose from creating an effective chain of command for the ISF, utilizing IZ LNO, directing more joint patrols, stepping back from certain areas and only providing a QRF 410O"NeerliMITICTISTIE—' -CTI,Q&E-144i0L-D 0111,— Other options: to redeploy significant forces to the borders, rationalize our use of LOG, rationalize our base structure etc Economy Examine being able to use funds more freely to take young men off the street, to encourage a sense of local ownership of infrastructure to empower local leadership. Assume that I can obtain funds if required. What the log jam is, I can break it. Transfer funds discretion to MSCs. I do not want an option to be: "Provide funds to MS C's". I want it to be in the nature of; "Release $500,000 to each MSC — this can be effected within one week from X fund and is legal". Governance Vacuum of political guidance. attempt to influence the political/UN side on this issue. assume that such guidance will be late, and identify what assumptions We may have to take over certain parts of the Governance support function if it is important to us and the CPA cannot continue to do so. Make recommendations. Essential Services The MSC are currently making a significant contribution to the maintenance of essential services. What are my options for reinforcing that effort in the immediate future. Projects that assist the infrastructure, are related to essential services, provide employment and enhance local leadership are to be a priority. I want specific projects that deliver now. MSC may know these at the local level, but we need to superimpose on their activities with a National perspective. I know that I must protect infrastructure, especially given recent seemingly coordinated attacks and the promise of more to come. Balance this in priority with what we are doing now, and examine the risk. Answer the question — Is the protection of infrastructure more important over the next 45 days than anything we are currently doing? Identify specific infrastructure and the forces that they may need. Identify what we need to stop doing, and what the risk is. 400460841i1VIISTItlISTIFr' • Rellfr01")!PrilICIMITE General Guidance Individual options to be tied into COAs within the Lines of Operations (EG a Security COA) and then tied in to an overall synchronized plan. Not expect a long arid detailed plan I want practical outcomes that can be implemented immediately. Focus the effects of this plan on one area, such as Baghdad, or on several areas, or across the country. Prepared to accept some risk in the use of funds. Planning must be tied together by JO There must a plan to synchronize the effects Action of the enemy must be considered at each step. Planning cycle not too long. I want to be giving orders to execute in 7 days. Look at how we can use the MSC Commanders when they are in Baghdad on 15 May. Conduct a rapid but formal planning process. Consider this to be Commander's Initial Guidance. I wish to give you Commander's Guidance once you have conducted a Mission Analysis, and then I want to choose individual options within the four lines of operations. Having done that, I want to then choose the overall plan that orchestrates all the effects, that delivers the initiative and pre-empts the enemy in the next 45 days. DO NOT DI3TfflDUTJ INTERAGENCY DOCUMENT DEPARTMENT OF STATE EXECUTIVE SECRETARIAT S/ES 200410833 ACTION: NEA a$35 Pin 13 fi:7 1 8 12 5 /13 /0 4 INFO COPIES TO: DATE A 060 AC OES D S/ES-EX S/ES-IA A/ES-IRM v S/ES-0 XX S-CR S/ES-S CA OIG DRL 1 " - PM DS L.,..„„PRM 1 7 E8 RM ECA S/CPR S/CT IIP S/OCR INL S/OF 1 -"" 1NR S/WCI AF PA EAP S/P EUR NEA SA WHA 10 USUN/W 4 • pecropt.atA ",IRM VC " L M/DGHR M/FSI M/P USAID M/WHL NP COPY ADVANCED TO: National Security Presidential Directive/NSPD. -36: ACTION REQUESTED: United States Government Operatic:ins in Iraq MEMORANDUM FOR: REMARKS: XX APPROPRIATE HANDLING FOR YOUR INFORMATION OTHER VOA EDITORIAL: CALL/FAX OR E-MAIL COMMENTS/CLEARANCE TO: DUE DATE IN S/ES: StIrSITIVTIltiruflet*381K -9-- AUTHORIZED BY S/ES, ROOM 7241 EXT. 7- 6590 FAX. 7-2283 _(b)(6) YOUR RESPONSE SHOULD BE ACCOMPANIED BY A COPY OF THIS TASKER. 04IF AI SSififf No. #0430091 co py STATE NATIONAL SECURITY COUNCIL INFORMATION Notice The attached It is to be read and di t contains classified National Security Council Informatio only by persons authorized by law. Your signature acknowledges you show or discuss information contained In th authorized by law to have access to trt. ch a person promise you will only with persons who are men Persons handling this d the security law by the acknowledge he or she kn • thereto and will cooperate fully with any lawful nderstands ion tates Government Into any unauthorized disclosure of class atlon contained herein. Access List DATE NAME DATE NAME ORIG ACTION TO: NEA COPIES TO: - 200410833 .- 2973 NATIONAL SECURITY COUNCIL WASHINGTON. D.C. 20504 SES SESIA SESSO SESS EB INL May 11, 2004 INR MEMORANDUM FOR RECIPIENTS OF NSPD-36 PM gm - SUBJECT: Distribution of NSPD-36 USUN/W- (AMB. NEGROPONTE ONLY) IPS Attached is . your agency's copy of National Security Presidential dar Directive-36. Although the text of NSPD-36 is unclassified, we ask that the distribution of this document be strictly Controlled in order to protect the format (which will be Used for subsequent National Security Presidential Directives). Your cooperation is appreciated. Gr gory L. fchulte cutive secretary ORIGINAL ANO I -COPY TO: S/ES-IA ADVANCE COPY MAT •11 2004 , S/ES-2 S/ES RMU SUPV. PENDING 13 TCO a • ;"2 l'f • ni.lw 2973 THE WHITE HOUSE WASHINGTON May 10, 2004 NATIONAL SECURITY PRESIDENTIAL DIRECTIVE/NSPD-36 ,MEMORANDUM FOR THE VICE PRESIDENT THE SECRETARY OF STATE THE SECRETARY OF THE TREASURY THE SECRETARY OF DEFENSE THE ATTORNEY GENERAL THE SECRETARY OF INTERIOR THE SECRETARY OF AGRICULTURE THE SECRETARY OF COMMERCE THE SECRETARY OF LABOR THE SECRETARY OF HEALTH & HUMAN SERVICES THE SECRETARY OF HOUSING AND URBAN DEVELOPMENT • THE SECRETARY OF TRANSPORTATION THE SECRETARY OF ENERGY THE SECRETARY OF EDUCATION • THE SECRETARY OF VETERAN AFFAIRS THE SECRETARY OF HOMELAND SECURITY CHIEF OF STAFF TO THE PRESIDENT DIRECTOR, OFFICE OF MANAGEMENT AND BUDGET • ASSISTANT TO THE PRESIDENT FOR NATIONAL SECURITY AFFAIRS ASSISTANT TO THE PRESIDENT FOR ECONOMIC POLICY DIRECTOR OF CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE CHAIRMAN, JOINT CHIEFS OF STAFF SUBJECT: United States Government Operations in Iraq We have seen a period of significant advancement in Iraq, as the yoke of Saddam Hussein's tyranny has been thrown off and democracy and economic reform have begun to take root. With the termination of the Coalition Provisional Authority (CPA) not later than June 30, 2004 and the re-establishment of diplomatic relations between the United States and a sovereign Iraqi government, our efforts in Iraq will take on new and formidAhle challenges that must be met successfully. 2 During these critical times, we must organize to advance these gains and establish and sustain a strong bilateral relationship. When the CPA is terminated, the United States will be represented in Iraq by a Chief of Mission, who on my behalf and under the guidance of the Secretary of State, shall be responsible for the direction, coordination and supervision of all United States Government employees, policies, and activities in country, except those under the command of an area military commander, and employees seconded to an International Organization. Commander, USCENTCOM, under the authority, direction, and control of the Secretary of Defense, shall continue to be responsible for U.S. efforts with respect to security and military operations in Iraq. In all activities, the Chief of Mission and Commander, USCENTCOM shall ensure the closest cooperation and mutual support. The Secretary of State shall be responsible for the continuous supervision and general direction of all assistance for-Iraq. Commander, USCENTCOM, with the policy guidance of the Chief of Mission, shall direct all United States Government efforts and coordinate international efforts in support of organizing, equipping, and training all Iraqi security forces. At the appropriate time, the Secretary of State and the Secretary of Defense shall jointly decide when these functions shall transfer to a security assistance organization and other appropriate organizations under the authority of the Secretary of State and the Chief of Mission that will be staffed in accordance with NSDD-38 of June 2, 1982. The U.S. Mission in Baghdad and an office in the Department of State will assume from the CPA those authorities and responsibilities that continue after CPA termination. I establish, in accordance with Title 5, United States Code, section 3161, a temporary organization within the Department of State and, if the Secretary of State so designates, within the U.S. Mission in Baghdad, called the Iraq Reconstruction Management Office (IRMO) to facilitate the transition in Iraq.. The IRMO will be headed by a Director selected by, the Secretary of State, and its staff may include, as determined by the Secretary: (1) personnel with relevant expertise detailed on• a non-reimbursable basis from other United States Government agencies; (2) senior and other technical advisors; (3) personnel from other Coalition partner governments; and (4) such other personnel as the Secretary may direct to support that effort. 3 The Secretary shall regularly evaluate the staffing requirements of this organization. I also establish, in accordance with Title 5, United States Code, section 3161, a temporary organization within the Department of Defense to be called the Project and Contracting Office (PCO) to provide acquisition and project management. support with respect to activities in Iraq, as requested by the Secretary of State and heads of other Departments and agencies. The Secretary of Defense in consultation with the Secretary of State shall select a Director for PCO. PCO personnel in Iraq shall be permanently or temporarily assigned under Chief of Mission authority. PCO shall provide acquisition and project management support to the Chief of Mission. PCO's services may include engineering, auditing, and other contract-related services. The effort to build a strong bilateral relationship with the Government of Iraq and support Iraq as it makes the transition to democracy must have the full commitment of all agencies. To accomplish our mission, I direct the heads of U.S. departments and agencies to provide, on a non-reimbursable basis, , assistance, services and other support, to include security, medical, logistical and administrative support and details of personnel, with respect to U.S. activities in Iraq. To the maximum extent possible, the Secretary of State shall identify for the heads of relevant departments and agencies the expected requirements for non-reimbursable support for their use in preparing future budget requests. The Director of the Office of Management and Budget shall ensure that future budget submissions request the funding and authorities I determine necessary to support the U.S. Mission in Iraq. This NSPD shall be effective immediately, shall constitute an Executive order solely for purposes of 5 U.S.C. 3161, and shall not be subject to Executive order 11030 of June 19, 1962, as amended. The CPA shall terminate not later than June 30, 2004. Upon the termination of the CPA, this NSPD supersedes NSPD-24, dated January 20, 2003. Polad 10:11 lErt! (b)(6) Women's Issues Polad Baghdad Deputy Director Public Affairs Officer Coordinator 1=111M Al Hilliah Karbala Ba hdad Bagffdad Al (Dadisvh Karbala Maysan Baghdad Ba hdad Ba hdad Baghdad Arbil 1=21E 1:1= Diyala Ninawah Public Affairs Officer Re lona! Coordinator Polad OMS Coordinator Coordinator Coordinator Polad Coordinator Governance Advisor De ,u Director Public Affairs Officer Coordinator Public Affairs Officer Coordinator Polad Polad Public Affairs Officer Polad 1:1711 Polad Coordinator Depu GC 101E=M Coordinator Polad MIZIE= IZIEMEMMEMMEE Coordinator Al Muthanna Polad Dahuk De .0 GC 1-Jul-04 1-Jul-04 1-Jul-04 1-Jul-04 -Jul-04 -Jul-04 1-JutO4 1-JUI-04 1-Jul-04 1-Jul-04 1-Jul-04 1-Juli-04 1-Jul-04 1-Jul-04 4-Jul-04 5-Jul-04 12-Jul-04 14-Jul-04 15-JUI-04 Page 1 of 2 Al Anbar Coordinator Al Gedisiyah Deputy GC Baghdad Deputy CIV ED Coord Baghdad TNA Admin Officer Baghdad Deputy GC Baghdad GC Liaison Najaf Public Affairs Officer PJ Anbar Deputy GC Ninawah Deputy GC Baghdad Polad Baghdad Transition Policy Officer Sulaymaniyah SLKnaffiph Karbala Deputy GC Public Affairs Officer Baghdad Prop. Mgr. PoliticaliMintstries Baghdad OMS Maysan Ninawah Public Affairs Officer Coordinator Tamim Polad Baghdad Women/Elections Baghdad Arbil Fund Manager Coordinator Babil Public Affairs Officer Salah ad Din Coordinator Najaf Dhi Oar Deputy GC Polad (b)(6) 15-Jul-O4 1S-Jul 18-Jul-04 22-Jul-04 274u144 27-Jul-04 314u4-04 1 1 Page 2 of 2 US Mission Iraq, Country Team MNF-I Commander Ambassador Area Spt Group MNF-I ' DCG DCMA 80 389 20 . t n y_ljulgigs j 1 l agly j Liq_j a t not u d r Co d___ Deputy Chief of Mission Executive Secretariat Corn Pub Integn y Ministry 35 Advisors 155 Legend: Other DoS D, DoD Uhl 171 * Management: includes CLO, FMO, GSO, HR, IMO, MED. OBO ** Provincial Teams: Baghdad Central-included in DoS Unit total (18); Hilla (8); Kirkuk (8); Basra (8) Mosul (8). *** DoS/DoD Team: Legal Office: 2 DoS; 3 MNF-I; Strut Comm: 28 DoS; 3 MNF-I 940 Number of US positions under CoM CPA - U.S. Mission-Baghdad Transition Redeployment Plan Ambassador John C. Holzman ITPT Team Leader April 25, 2004 U.S. Mission- Baghdad MISSION • Define a transition redeployment plan that will contribute to CPA becoming U.S. Mission-Baghdad — Includes: DoS, DoD, and other Executive Branch personnel, Military, Contractors and FSNs — Transitions personnel "out" as well as "in" CPA — U.S. Mission-Baghdad Transition Redeployment Plan As of April 26, 2004 U.S. Mission- Baghdad Transition Redeployment Plan Objectives • Write Redeployment Plan in concert with CPA's Strategic Goals • Security • Governance • Essential Services • Strategic Communications • Economy • Focused on... • Power Ministries • Heightened Security • Essential / Non-essential Personnel • Taking care of people • Transport, checking out, transition to personal life • More needed -- Awards, other forms of recognition, CPA farewell celebration for all employees CPA — U.S. Mission-Baghdad Transition Redeployment Plan 2 As o f April 26, 2004 Individuals 1600 1400 1200- 1000 - SOO - 600 400 200 CPA to US Mission-Baghdad Transition Start MidMay EndMay MidJun EndJun MidJul EndJul US Mission Month 1111.1,S Mission Deployment INCPA Redeployment Transition El Other US Agencies MIRMO/HSG 3 250 200 150 100 - 50 Power Ministries Redeployment Transition Power Ministries Interior Defense Finance Justice & Prisons Planning Start MidMay EndMay MidJun Interval EndJun MidJul EndJul ,-4—Sum Power Ministries —M—Power Ministries End State71 All Other Ministries Redeployment Transition Start EndJun MidJun MidMay EndJul MidJul interval r .:4—Sum All Other Ministries —M—All Other Ministries End State ] 400 350 300 250 200 150 100 50 - Key CPA Organizations Redeployment Transition Key CPA Organizations StratComm Provincial Outreach Governance Team Baghdad Central HQ Support Group I Chief Policy Officer Chief Operating Officer Executive Secretariat Start MidMay EndMay MidJun Interval EndJun MidJul EndJul • _•---Sum Key CPA Orgs —0—Key CPA Orgs End State U.S. Mission- Baghdad NEXT STEPS • Early May through June Redeployment • Ties personnel movement to mission goals • Selected personnel present to the end • Maintain CPA mission capabilities while redeploying personnel • Execute OPLAN • ITPT manages and COO executes • Maintain positive control of process • Movement leads identified in each organization • Track personnel out and in flow CPA— U.S. Mission-Baghdad Transition Redeployment Plan 3 As of April 26, 2004 U.S. Mission- Baghdad ISSUES • Based on a snapshot in time, not perfect resolution — Work in progress... continue refinement of personnel data and movement requirements • IRMO & PM0 -- No decisions from Washington • Governances and Provinces -- No decisions from Washington • CJTF7 Reorganization -- In process • Complete elements of the US Mission: NSDD 38 -- In process • Security -- increasing threat could speed or slow transition redeployment plan CPA — U.S. Mission-Baghdad Transition Redeployment Plan 4 As of April 26, 2004 U.S. Mission- Baghdad QUESTIONS? CPA — U.S. Mission-Baghdad Transition Redeployment Plan As of April 20,2004 U.S. Mission- Baghdad TRANSITION TEAM'S JOB • April 10: Assumed responsibility for defining the transition plan — Surveyed all CPA elements and tenants — Established a personnel data base that captures: • Current listing of personnel by organization • Transition dates — Defined transition plans for each current CPA element — Developed a written redeployment plan (operations plan) that defines all requirements for movement and out-processing • Personnel; Logistics; Finance; Medical; Strategic Communications CPA — U.S. Mission-Baghdad Transition Redeployment Plan 6 As of April 26, 2004 U.S. Mission- Baghdad Personnel Movement Database Development 1.Data Collection HRM Database CPA On-Board Office Billeting Badging Count Surveys Database Database 2.Data Consolidation 42. Data Validation 11 ( Chief of Staff .1 ( Chief Operating Officer CPA - U.S. Mission-Baghdad Transition Redeployment Plan As of April 26, 2004 itxmczovria,, wp.-TI2M1 FOIE Chief Information Officer Iraq 29 April 2004 Ministry Of Communication Stepl Conduct an inventory of IT requirements for the Ministries The office of the CIO is to Consolidate IT requirements and standardize IT procurements at the PM0 7.1410 EDI It! 1 I tep2 Categorize requirements: - Applications - Infrastructure & Architecture - Organization & Operations - Training Steca Prioritize & Standardize Procurement: - Short term - Long term - Open standard I Microsoft_offic.e_suite LAN Ministry CIO Email Accounting/GL WAN Internet HR/Payroll VSAT Ministry Applications Infrastructure & Architecture { Accounting/GL Internet Email HR/Payroll LAN WAN VSAT Short term Long term Organization & Operations { Minisiry Clo VSAT Email HR/Payroll Data Center. LAN Reg. Analysts TrairA6 PM0 Procurement Standards Internet Accounting/EL ‘/VAN 29 April 2004 Ministry CIO Req. Analysts Training Ministry Ministry Of Communication Ministry 2 Office of the CIO plan milestones 'rketatillKtWilkatria-4 031 1 1 ,1C Z111 1. Issue CIO standards for PM0 procurement 2. Work with Ministries to: 3. 4. 5. a. Inventory IT requirements b. Plan Ministry connection to the network Assess Ministry and Ministry-CIO training requirements Develop internet portal for the Iraqi Government Work with PMO to provide oversight over procurement standards a. Setup shadow CIO office at PM0 b. Establish 2 national data centers 3 29 April 2004 Ministry Of Communication Government Connectivity - WBB — Baghdad riNfiggaaltaatile fitZ Ifita II • Point-to-point wireless solution for key jocations and infrastructure • Complements/r- laces VSAT interim solution Commercial •mi H raltir Area of Baghdad „ "7114PiAll 4.gm1t HAF,;-; BAGHDAD Pediatric Hospital Min of Trade Centaii ilrfi Simian \ de jai PiEst reOtral Bank of iaghulad Baghdad Int. Airport ralian - Eit .ibasy Mterriationnfr Airport , Baghdad Univ. AD OPINP,M 4 29 April 2004 Ministry 01 Communication Government and Other Connectivity — Baghdad pijkfleipipl! Ke.5,:u1.:$15p,15.1415,. 1..qvl,%%14 2 .1 4 ;;;,A.A...;" d ;11 - ii!..416z..ktearAYsl'iito.44515,7 01 3i.R;AM1P,1:1P. ? Ell • WiMax Overlay (poirit-to-muyipoint) for greater service area coverage Example Rollout • 9 Microwave Nodes 5 WiMax OFDM Cells 40,000+ user initial capability • End user speeds >1.5mbps • First links (i.e. ministries) operational within 90 days of funding Ubiquitous service capability for metro-Baghdad 5 29 April 2004 Ministry Of Communication Service Providers MoC/C10/Ministry Relationships WitilfEENEfUN M El it II Global Internet: Ministries • • Spacelink Global Internet: Satellite SCIS/VEGA Hthemet Switch Radius Servers: DNS, Server IP Address Broadband: wireless, fiber OR Broadband: wireless, fiber Ministry 2 Router tio, '"" Mail WEB i4hernet Switch Rad,k1S Servers: DNS, Server IP Address Workstations 6 29 April 2004 Ministry Of Communication CIO Function Iraqi CIO: — Cross functional (IT across ministries) — Sets standards; provides guidelines — Develops future vision for Iraqi gov't IT PMO CIO "Shadow Function" — Executes vision — Builds to Iraqi CIO Approved Standards — Economies of Scale (combine like reqmts) — Works across all sectors — Coordinates projects with Iraqi CIO — For Trans/comm sector: "more of the same" 29 April 2004 Ministry Of Communication 7 ey? L in" t I 10.,d-r9A-<-4 NATIONAL SECURITY PRESIDENTIAL DIRECTIVE/NSPD — XX MEMORANDUM FOR THE VICE PRESIDENT THE SECRETARY OF STATE THE SECRETARY OF THE TREASURY THE SECRETARY OF DEFENSE THE ATTORNEY GENERAL THE SECRETARY OF INTERIOR THE SECRETARY OF AGRICULTURE THE SECRETARY OF COMMERCE THE SECRETRY OF LABOR THE SECRETARY OF HEALTH & HUMAN SERVICES THE SECRETARY OF HOUSING AND URBAN DEVELOPMENT THE SECRETARY OF TRANSPORTATION THE SECRETARY OF ENERGY THE SECRETARY OF EDUCATION THE SECRETARY OF VETERAN AFFAIRS CHIEF OF STAFF TO THE PRESIDENT DIRECTOR OF THE OFFICE OF MANAGEMENT AND BUDGET DIRECTOR OF HOMELAND SECURITY DIRECTOR OF CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE CHAIRMAN OF THE JOINT CHIEFS OF STAFF ASSISTANT TO THE PRESIDENT FOR ECONOMIC POLICY ASSISTANT TO THE PRESIDENT FOR NATIONAL SECURITY AFFAIRS SUBJECT: United States Government Operations in Iraq We have seen a period of significant advancement in Iraq, as the yoke of Saddam Hussein's tyranny has been thrown off and democracy and economic reform have begun to take root. With the dissolution of the Coalition Provisional Authority (CPA) not later than June 30, 2004 and the re- establishment of diplomatic relations between the United States and a sovereign Iraqi government, our efforts in Iraq will take on new and formidable challenges that must be met successfully. DLITIVL DUT U1JCLACCIFILD During these critical times, we must organize to advance these gains and establish and sustain a strong bilateral relationship. When the CPA dissolves, the United States will be represented in Iraq by a Chief of Mission who on my behalf and under the guidance of the Secretary of State, shall be responsible for the direction, coordination and supervision of all U.S. government employees, policies and activities in country, except those under the command of an area military commander, or employees seconded to an International Organization. Under the authority, direction, and control of the Secretary of Defense Commander, USCENTCOM shall continue to be responsible for U.S. efforts with respect to security and military operations in Iraq. In all activities, the Chief of Mission and Commander, USCENTCOM shall ensure the closest cooperation and mutual support. The Secretary of State shall be responsible for the continuous supervision and general direction of all assistance for Iraq. Commander, USCENTCOM, with the policy guidance of the Chief of Mission, shall direct all USG efforts and coordinate international efforts in support of organizing, equipping, and training all Iraqi security forces. At the appropriate time, the Secretary of State an srt- I- Te'Secretary of Defense shall jointly decide when these functions shall transfer to a security assistance organization and other appropriate organizations under the authority of the Secretary of State and the Chief of Mission that will be staffed in accordance with NSDD 38 of June 2, 1982. The U.S. Mission in Baghdad and an office in the Department of State will assume those CPA authorities and responsibilities that continue. I establish, in accordance with Title 5, United States Code, section 3161, a temporary organization within the Department of State and, if the Secretary of State so designates, within the U.S. Mission in Baghdad, called the Iraq Reconstruction Management Office (IRMO) to facilitate the transition in Iraq. The IRMO will be headed by a Director selected by the Secretary of State, and its staff may include, as determined by the Secretary: (1) personnel with relevant expertise detailed on a non-reimbursable basis from other USG agencies; (2) senior and other technical advisors; (3) personnel from other Coalition partner governments; and (4) such other personnel as the Secretary may direct to support that effort. The Secretary shall regularly evaluate the staffing requirements of this organization. 1 I A33IFIE -3 - I also establish, in accordance with Title 5, United States Code, section 3161, a temporary organization within the Department of Defense to be called the Project and Contracting Office (PCO) to provide acquisition and project management support with respect to activities in Iraq, as requested by the Secretary of State and heads of other Departments and agencies. The Secretary of Defense in consultation with the Secretary of State shall select a Director for PCO. PCO personnel in Iraq shall be permanently or temporarily assigned under Chief of Mission authority. PCO shall provide acquisition and project management support to the Chief of Mission. PCO's services may include engineering, auditing and other contract-related services. The effort to build a strong bilateral relationship with the Government of Iraq and support Iraq as it makes the transition to democracy must have the full commitment of all agencies. To accomplish our mission, I direct the heads of US departments and agencies to provide, on a non-reimbursable basis, assistance, services and other support, to include security, medical, logistical and administrative support and details of personnel, with respect to U.S. activities in Iraq. To the maximum extent possible, the Secretary of State shall identify for the heads of relevant departments and agencies the expected requirements for non-reimbursable support for their use in preparing future budget requests. The Director of the Office of Management and Budget shall ensure that future budget submissions request the necessary funding and authorities to support the U.S. Mission in Iraq. This NSPD shall be effective immediately. The CPA shall dissolve not later than June 30, 2004. Upon the dissolution of the CPA, this NSPD supersedes NSPD-24, dated January 20, 2003. 2603 reiL( ‘Y-rbe\ UNCLAS SECSTATE 91109 Laser 1: ACTION: EXEC INFO: IPC COS DISSEMINATION: EXEC /1 CHARGE: PROG APR 2 4 2004 VZCZCBG0821 PP RUEHGB DE RUEHC #1109 1142109 ZNR UUUUU ZZH P 232108Z APR 04 FM SECSTATE WASHDC TO CPA BAGHDAD PRIORITY 0774 BT 2s UNCLAS STATE 091109 FROM OBO DIRECTOR TO AMBASSADOR HOLZMAN E.O. 12958: N/A TAGS: ABLD, AMGT, ASEC SUBJECT: SPACE PLANNING FOR INTERIM EMBASSY FACILITIES 1. The OBO Space Planning Team will arrive in Kuwait on April 29th and proceed to Baghdad as soon as practical. The team members are: 0130/PD/PDD DBO/PD/PEA OBO/PE/ADB 2. In conjunction with the space planning effort, team members will also be meeting with staff to refine a statement of work for the next phase on the interim facilities project. That work is intimately related to the space planning and will include access controls, hardlines, and technical security measures. 3. Please have as much of the following information as possible ready for team arrival. A. Current space assignment information. B. Listings of organizations and functions that are planned to move to other locations. C. Listings of organizations and functions that will move into the annex. 4. For initial planning purposes the team will be using the following assumptions: UNCLAS SECSTATE 91109 UNCLAS SECSTATE 91109 A. Staff that is not planned to remain in the Annex, see staffing plan, will vacate it in time to allow new embassy staff to occupy it by July 1, 2004. B. The cafeteria will remain in the Annex in its present location. C. No one will reside in the Annex. D. Space will be provided in the Annex, for IRMO coalition advisors, up to 45. (These are in addition to the 155 US ministry advisors included in IRMO.) E. Staff that will remain in the Annex, e.g., MNFI personnel, will stay in their present locations unless there is a compelling reason to relocate them. F. Desk space will be provided in the Annex for up to 50 United Nations staff. G. All US government personnel under the authority of the Chief of Mission will be relocated from the Convention Center to either the interim Chancery or Annex. H. The interim Chancery is being designed to accommodate 42 desk positions, which will include Consular Affairs. I. The interim chancery will be an unclassified building. J. The total planned desk population of the interim Chancery and Annex (palace) is 1,510 including 406 Locally Engaged Staff (LES). Of this total 191 desk positions will be located in the Embassy,s Controlled Access Area (CAA) in the Annex. The remaining 1,319 desk positions will be located outside the Embassy CAA in either the Annex or Chancery. K. Staff that is not under the authority of the Chief of Mission but located in the Annex will be subject to its own standards for classified operations and the space it occupies will not be considered Embassy CAA. L. No new furniture will be purchased for the Annex. Existing furnishings will be used. Furniture for the Chancery is being acquired as part of the ongoing construction contract, i.e. 42 workstations, and other furniture shown in the contract documents. 5. We are looking forward to working with you in establishing Post Baghdad. UNCLAS SECSTATE 91109 UNCLAS SECSTATE 91109 6. Minimize considered. POWELL BT #1109 NNNN UNCLAS SECSTATE 91109 Proposed Mission Baghdad Staffing 4/23/2004 NOTE: Data reflect known and projected positions to date and are subject to change. US LES AGENCY desk non-desk desk non-desk NSDD 38 received? State (See NOTE 1) 141 0 155 TBD n/a Other State units (See NOTE 2) Other State unit: Baghdad Central 25 TBD TBD TBD n/a Other State unit: Corn for Public Integrity (Just) 27 TBD TBD TBD n/a Other State unit: Stratcom (civ & mil) 100 0 35 TBD n/a Other State unit: Oil for Food 3 0 0 0 n/a Other State unit: Ministry Advisors (FINAL) 155 0 0 0 n/a Other State unit: IRMO Management 35 0 65 0 n/a Other State unit: Legal Office 1 0 3 0 n/a Other State unit: ORA 120 TBD TBD TBD n/a Agriculture/FAS Commerce/FCS 2 0 3 1 yes 3 0 7 1 yes Defense/ACOE. Defense/OW .. DefehSEIDIA ' Defense/OSC 39 TBD TBD TBD NO 20 0 0 0 yes 43 0 2 6 yes 6 0 2 1 yes Defense/Army/APCO (See NOTE 3) 110 TBD TBD TBD NO DHS (estimated 12 total) 12 DHS/BPT DHS/CBP DHS/ICE DHS/TSA TBD TBD TBD TBD NO TBD TBD TBD TBD NO TBD TBD TBD TBD NO TBD TBD TBD TBD NO EPA HHS 1 0 1 0 yes 4 0 0 0 yes Justice/ATF Justice/CRIM/OPDAT Justice/FBI Justice/ICITAP Justice/US Marshals 4 0 0 0 yes 9 3 4 0 yes 7 0 0 0 yes 4 0 6 0 yes Justice/RCAO (See NOTE 4) 50 TBD TBD TBD NO 4 3 0 0 yes Labor Transportation Treasury USAID USAID/RIG 1 0 0 0 NO 3 0 1 0 NO 3 0 1 0 NO 22 0 126 122 yes 8 0 2 0 yes TOTAL 962 6 413 131 Total US: 968 Total LES: 644 Grand Total: 1512 Proposed Mission Baghdad Staffing 4/23/2004 Not under COM authority but in Embassy Defense MNF-I in Embassy 389 n/a MNF-I Area Support Group 80 a/a MNF-I Legal Office 3 n/a DCMA 20 n/a Special Tribunal (Contract) 50-70 n/a The following agencies have informed State that they will have no permanent Iraq presence Energy Interior Justice/DEA (See NOTE 5) NASA Peace Corps Secret Service Social Security Treasury/IRS Notes NOTE 1: State phasing FSN: FY04 83 to FY06 155; desk/non-desk not yet identified NOTE 2: Other State units - all numbers are estimates, except for Ministry Advisors; will phase in and out depending on need, normally 3161 or TDYers. This category includes all functions previously performed by CPA. NOTE 3: APCO includes 110 DH, 35 contr, 10 Coal NOTE 4: RCAO = Regime Crimes Advisors Office NOTE 5: DEA anticipates using TDY teams. UNCLAS SECSTATE 89241 Laserl: ACTION: EXEC INFO: COS IPC DISSEMINATION: EXEC /1 CHARGE: PROG VZCZCBG0554 00 RUEHGB DE RUEHC #9241/01 1130255 ZNR UUUUU ZZH 0 220252Z APR 04 FM SECSTATE WASHDC TO ALL DIPLOMATIC AND CONSULAR POSTS IMMEDIATE SPECIAL EMBASSY PROGRAM IMMEDIATE RUEHDBU/AMEMBASSY DUSHANBE IMMEDIATE 2845 RUEHGB/CPA BAGHDAD IMMEDIATE 0718 BT UNCLAS SECTION 01 OF 04 STATE 089241 OENDITIVL E.O. 12958: N/A TAGS: AMGT, IZ SUBJECT: ESTABLISHING US MISSION BAGHDAD (U) WW1' WHC'ACCIPIED PLEASE PROTECT APR 0,4i1 'k04(4/ grek ) riegrign gAu° (0a42,00L- oilguaht ACCORDINGLY OP- SUMMARY 1. (U) This is an action request. This telegram has been cleared by SEP. 2. -- 0.14} The State Department is working closely with the Department of Defense and other USG agencies to establish a US Mission in Baghdad on July 1. Our future Mission Baghdad will resemble that of other large US Embassies in countries where we have a broad range of bilateral and multilateral interests and major military and economic assistance programs. Nonetheless, given the complexity of US interests in Iraq and the scale of US resources devoted to them, US Mission Baghdad will have some unique features. 3. '''1915.1. Mission Baghdad will represent the US Government to the Government of Iraq and assist Iraqis in making their country secure, free and prosperous. We plan to open a US Office in Baghdad in May as a key step toward creating a US Mission to take final charge of US interests UNCLAS SECSTATE 89241 UNCLAS SECSTATE 89241 from July 1. Meanwhile, throughout the coming months, the Coalition Provisional Authority (CPA) will complete its work and transition responsibilities. After July 1, we will coordinate with Coalition partners in capitals and through their respective Embassies in Baghdad. 4. t,,, This cable sets out a snapshot of plans to stand up US Embassy Baghdad. Action request: Posts in the countries that support the Coalition and/or are troop contributing nations (see list in paragraph 17) should brief host governments on our plans, invite their views, and report on their plans for representation in Iraq. Other posts may, at their discretion, do the same. Briefings should emphasize that our plans and preparations are constantly developing, and are subject to adjustment. Department requests reports on the results of the demarches. End Summary. US MISSION BAGHDAD 5.f159.5T,mThe State Department is working closely with the Department of Defense and other USG agencies to establish US Embassy Baghdad. The Coalition Provisional Authority's role in governing Iraq will terminate and the interim Government of Iraq will assume full governing authority on June 30. The new US Mission will represent all US civilian policy and program interests in Iraq from July 1. 6..+043TO• To manage the transition from CPA to US Mission, State and DoD have created an Interagency Transition Planning Team (ITPT) led by Ambassador Francis J. Ricciardone and Lieutenant General (US Army, Retired) Claude ("Mick") Kicklighter. Ambassador John Holzman directs the ITPT Baghdad unit. In May, the Baghdad transition team will become US Office Baghdad and key personnel will be in place. The US Office will be formally designated a US Embassy at an appropriate time immediately following CPA's closure. After nomination by the President and confirmation by the Senate, a US Ambassador will assume his or her duties in Iraq. On April 19, The President announced his intention to nominate John Negroponte, The United States' current Permanent Representative to the UN, to become the U.S. Ambassador in Iraq. 7. (31ilieT) As we stand up the US Office, CPA will continue its work. During this period, other organizations such as the Iraqi Governing Council and Iraqi Ministries, the US Office, the US military command, and other Coalition UNCLAS SECSTATE 89241 UNCLAS SECSTATE 89241 partner Embassies, may assume some current CPA functions. 8.r1m*. The US Mission will be our largest but its functions and organization will largely mirror those of other US Missions around the world where we have the broadest range of interests and major military and economic assistance programs. The Mission will have all of the traditional Department of State sections, including political, economic, public affairs, consular, management and regional security. In addition, many other USG agencies will have sections in the Mission, operating under Chief of Mission authority. US agencies are now making NSDD-38 requests to the Secretary of State to meet their operational requirements in Baghdad. 9. (11.B.Tm4. An atypical feature of US Mission Baghdad is likely to be one or more "temporary organizations," dedicated to managing the unprecedently large programs in support of Iraq's political and economic reconstruction. (NB. The President has the discretion to set up "temporary organizations" with special authorities. CPA is a "temporary organization.") The COM would use these organizations to manage technical assistance to the Iraqi government and to manage the implementation of the Iraq Relief and Reconstruction Fund (IRRF). The USG has not yet taken final decisions regarding the creation of such specialized temporary organization(s). 10. +1*@ , 4.* In addition to the Mission, a large US and Coalition military presence will remain in Iraq post-June 30. The current Combined Joint Task Force-7 will transition to the Multinational Force - Iraq (MNF-I). A senior general officer will lead the MNF-I. As is the case elsewhere, the US Ambassador and the US force commander will work closely as a single team. The US commander will continue to report formally through his chain of command. 11.4011;MY1 US Mission Baghdad will temporarily use several properties. An interim Chancery will open in the "green zone" where the Ambassador will have an office and we will have public affairs and consular operations. The majority of Mission Baghdad personnel will continue to work in the former Republican palace as a temporary Embassy annex while a new Mission compound is constructed. Some US agencies may utilize temporary space in other annexes. U.S. Mission employees will occupy temporary housing structures, including some now used by CPA. 12.{4W-)-Washington agencies are still in the process of coordinating decisions on the transition. Here are our UNCLAS SECSTATE 89241 UNCLAS SECSTATE 89241 current views on three important issues, which may be of interest to Coalition supporting countries. Posts should emphasize that our planning in these areas may change as decisions are made in the coming weeks. A. Advisors: With the dissolution of CPA, the new Government of Iraq will assume responsibility for their Ministries. Hence, the positions of the current CPA Senior Advisors and their offices will change or, in some cases, come to an end. Nevertheless, the GOI will continue to need substantial foreign assistance. We will continue to offer the new GOT all appropriate advice and support for their key ministries. We will use, as appropriate, individuals now serving in the CPA who wish to stay. The US advisors will be under Chief of Mission authority within one of the temporary organizations mentioned in paragraph 9, above, and will receive policy direction via normal country team channels. The US advisors to Iraqi government agencies would work closely with appropriate Embassy sections. Other governments may also offer technical assistance to the interim Iraqi Government and we would coordinate our assistance programs with theirs, through whatever formal and informal mechanisms that we collectively find effective. B.Provincial Teams: To provide assistance in the governorates, we believe it may be necessary for US personnel to be located in up to 17 locations outside Baghdad. Building on the US and Coalition experience in CPA and Afghanistan, we are now studying options for the composition of these offices/teams and their locations. We see close coordination with other interested Coalition supporting partners on these offices and their locations. However, at this time we cannot commit to providing logistical support, even on a reimbursable basis, to non- USG personnel in Baghdad or beyond. C.Public Affairs: The Embassy's new Public Affairs Section, working in close integration with the MNF-I's public affairs officers, will carry forward the work of CPA's "StratComm", that is, it will be responsible for communicating U.S. policy to the Iraqi people and world audiences through mass media and various culture and information outreach programs. 13. (9F9190M• Finally, the new US Embassy will be an American operation. Although CPA is multinational, Embassies are by definition national missions. Their direct hire personnel are Americans and primarly host national FSNs. There is limited precedent for third-country employment in US Missions as foreign service national personnel, i.e. locally engaged staff. We understand that Coalition UNCLAS SECSTATE 89241 UNCLAS SECSTATE 89241 partners with staff in CPA are very interested in our planning. We expect that a number of Coalition partners' current CPA staff will become members of their own national missions on July 1. We would be interested to hear of other states' planning in this regard. 14. .JEU) Both before and after June 30, we will, of course, continue to coordinate very closely with our Coalition supporting partners on the full range of mutual interests. Coalition coordination will continue without interruption in capitals and in Iraq, both within the MNF- I and among our respective national missions. NBA - IRAQ TRANSITION 15.rTrrr To coordinate the transition in Iraq, the Bureau of Near Eastern Affairs has established an Iraq Transition team (NEA/IT) headed by Ambassador Ricciardone. As noted above, NEA/IT works in tandem with the ITPT unit at the Department of Defense led by General Kicklighter. The DOD and State teams share staff and work jointly on all transition projects. Amb. John Holzman anchors the ITPT in Baghdad. 16.(OUT) 0ther officers of NEA/IT include: rbOTIlir Deputy Coordinator for the Transition in Iraa (111(6) Deputy Coordinator for Management (111(6) Director of the Iraq Transition Management start. The Transition Management Staff operates an information, management and organization program on the transition. The staff tracks and reports progress on the transition. The TMS operates an Intranet website accessible to US Missions that provides additional information on the tranqition a-vailahle on OpenNet at 1070(6) Most content on the site is password protected, and users reauiring detailed access should/ (b(6 MAT) also supports the transition management tracking and reporting effort ACTION REQUEST 17.19W64 Posts in the countries listed in the next paragraph should brief host governments on our plans UNCLAS SECSTATE 89241 UNCLAS SECSTATE 89241 outlined above and solicit their views and plans for their own representation in Iraq. Other posts may, at their discretion, do the same. Please report results. All cables should be slugged for NEA and PMAT. 18.(U) For USUN and Amman: Please brief appropriate UN personnel. Amman, note that Ricciardone has briefed Acting UN SRSG for Iraq Ross Mountain. You may follow up with him at your decision. 19. '7 .1 37,1!0)•• The list below of 61 countries includes all Coalition supporting partners and troop contributing nations. Afghanistan Albania Angola Australia Azerbaijan Bahrain Bulgaria Colombia Costa Rica Czech Republic Denmark Dominican Republic Egypt El Salvador Eritrea Estonia Ethiopia Georgia Greece Honduras Hungary Iceland Italy Japan Jordan Kazakhstan Korea Kuwait Latvia Lithuania Macedonia Marshall Islands Micronesia Moldova Mongolia Netherlands New Zealand UNCLAS SECSTATE 89241 UNCLAS SECSTATE 89241 Nicaragua Norway Oman Palau Panama Philippines Poland Portugal Qatar Romania Rwanda Saudi Arabia Singapore Slovakia Solomon Islands Spain Thailand Tonga Turkey UAE Uganda UK Ukraine Uzbekistan 19. (U) Minimize considered. P0 WELL BT #9241 NNNN UNCLAS SECSTATE 89241 State NSPD with DoD Compromise language and Do:I Edits - Post the Iraq DC of 040420 NATIONAL SECURITY PRESIDENTIAL DIRECTIVE/NSPD - XX MEMORANDUM FOR THE VICE PRESIDENT THE SECRETARY OF STATE THE SECRETARY OF THE TREASURY THE SECRETARY OF DEFENSE THE ATTORNEY GENERAL THE SECRETARY OF COMMERCE THE SECRETARY OF AGRICULTURE THE SECRETARY OF ENERGY THE SECRETARY OF EDUCATION DIRECTOR OF THE OFFICE OF MANAGEMENT AND BUDGET CHIEF OF STAFF TO THE PRESIDENT DIRECTOR OF CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE CHAIRMAN OF THE JOINT CHIEFS OF STAFF ASSISTANT TO THE PRESIDENT FOR ECONOMIC POLICY ASSISTANT TO THE PRESIDENT FOR NATIONAL SECURITY AFFAIRS SUBJECT: United States Government Operations in Iraq We have seen a period of remarkable advancement in Iraq, as the yoke of Saddam Hussein's tyranny has been thrown off and democracy and economic reform have begun to take root. With the dissolution of the Coalition Provisional Authority (CPA) on June 30, 2004 and the re- establishment of diplomatic relations between the United States and a sovereign Iraqi government, our efforts in Iraq will take on new and formidable challenges that must be met successfully. During these critical times, we must organize to advance these gains and establish and sustain a strong bilateral relationship. When the CPA dissolves, the United States will be represented in Iraq by a Chief of Mission who, on my behalf and under the guidance of the Secretary of State, shall be responsible for the direction, coordination and supervision of all U.S. 2 government employees in country, except those under the command of an area military commander or secunded to an International Organization. The Secretary of State, under my direction, will be responsible for the overall coordination and supervision of all United States Government activities and operations in Iraq, including the provision of assistance to that country, except that, pending full transition of security responsibility to the Government of Iraq. the Secretary of Defense shall continue to be responsible for security, for military operations, and for provision of military assistance to Iraq. The U.S. Mission in Baghdad and an enlarged Office of Iraqi Affairs in the Department of State will continue CPA's authorities and responsibilities. The Secretary of State shall establish, in accordance with Title 5, United States Code, section 3161, a temporary organization called the Iraq Reconstruction Management Office (IRMO) to facilitate the transition in Iraq. The IRMO will be headed by a Director selected by the Secretary of State, and its staff may include, as determined by the Secretary: (1) personnel with relevant expertise detailed on a non-reimbursable basis from other USG agencies; (2) senior and other technical advisors; (3) personnel from other Coalition partner tlovernments: and (4) such other personnel as the Secretary may direct to support that effort. The Secretary shall regularly evaluate the staffing requirements of this organization. The Secretary of Defense shall establish, from forces assigned to ... USCENTCOM, an Office of Security Transition (OST). The OST shall, in coordination with the Chief of Mission. and under the Commander. USCENTCOM, direct USG efforts, and coordinate international efforts. in support oforgtmizing. equipping, and training all Iraqi military. police, facilities protection, border enforcemenLand other security forces. ,Based upon progress made by the Iraqis in the formation of an Iraqj government under a permanent constitution, and according to a timeline to be determined by the Secretary of Defense and the Secretary of State, the OST shall transfer functions to a security assistance Organization and to other appropriate organizations within the U.S. diplomatic mission that will be staffed in accordance with NSDD 38 ofiune 2. 1982. Department of Justice and other federal law enforcement experts who provide training to police and other security forces in support of the OST under the agreed program shall be assigned to and under the authority of the Chief of Mission.' '(Comment DoD ADD Comment Dal CHANGT. , except that. pending development of security forces needed by the Government of Iraq capable of carrymg out its securny responsthdines, the Secretary of Defense shall continue to be responsible comrnent: DoD ADD f Deleted: ] Comment: Don ADD Deleted: Pursuant to paragraph approved liv r, 0U I UIL , Lfl3iI IL. -3 - In addition, there shall be established, in accordance with Title 5, United States Code, section 3161, a temporary organization in the Department of the Army to be called the Army Project and Contracting Office (APCO) to provide acquisition and project management support with respect to activities in Iraq, as requested by the Secretary of State and heads of other Departments and agencies. The Secretary of State and Secretary of Defense shall select a Director for APCO. Under the direction of the Secretary of State and the COM, the APCO shall provide acquisition and project management support. These services may include engineering, auditing and other contract-related services. The effort to build a strong bilateral relationship with the Government of Iraq and support Iraq as it makes the transition to democracy must have the full commitment of all agencies. In this regard, I hereby direct the heads of U.S. Government departments and agencies to provide on a non- reimbursable basis such assistance, services and any other support as the Secretary of State may request with respect to U.S. activities in Iraq, including security, medical, logistical and administrative support and details of personnel but. with respect to the provision of DoD support. the Secretary of State and the Secretar\ of Defense shalipake decisions jointly. This NSPD shall be effective immediately. The CPA shall dissolve on June 30, 2004. Upon the dissolution of the CPA, this NSPD supersedes NSPD- 24, dated January 20, 2003. • LComment: Doll ADD I Deleted: coordinate decisions NSPD-XX "USG OPERATIONS IN IRAQ" Original State NSPD DoD Compromise Language DOJ Language State comments on edits The Secretary of State, under my direction, will be responsible for the overall coordination and supervision of all United States Government activities and operations in Iraq, including the provision of assistance to that country. The Secretary of State ... CHANGE: ... except that, These changes are including the provision of pending development of unacceptable. assistance to that country, security forces needed by the The Secretary of State not the (ADD) except that, pending Government of Iraq capable Secretary of Defense is full transition of security of carrying out its security responsible for the provision of responsibility to the responsibilities, the Secretary all foreign assistance, Government of Iraq, the of Defense shall continue to including military assistance Secretary of Defense shall be responsible for security, and police training. continue to be responsible for for military operations, and Under longstanding security, for military for provision of military procedures, DOD implements operations, and for provision assistance to Iraq. programs when and if of military assistance to Iraq. The Nov 15 agreement clearly requested by the Secretary of states that full sovereignty State. transfers on 30 June. With the DOD's proposed assumption transfer of full sovereignty of State Department passes full governmental responsibilities would have responsibilities, including the profound adverse implications responsibility of security. for Iraqi governance and Responsibility, however, is democracy. clearly different from capacity U.S.G. military assistance to carry out that responsibility, has always, as a matter of but the document as written longstanding policy and law, might be interpreted by some been controlled by U.S.G. as a partial derogation from the civilian authorities, allowing President's assurance that full the U.S.G. to ensure that the sovereignty will transfer, civilian leadership of the recipient country accepts and supports the assistance. By encouraging direct military-to-military contacts, we undermine Iraqi civilian control of its military. NSC DEFPOL post the Iraq DC of 040420 Original State NSPD DoD Compromise Language DOJ Language State comments on edits The exception for "military operations" is not necessary, was not needed for previous military operations, including in Afghanistan, Yugoslavia, and Haiti, and implies that DOD will retain sovereign functions in Iraq after the transition. The paragraph 2 exception is also unclear and links functions that are not necessarily on the same schedule. Coalition partners must be responsible for hiring, paying and housing their own advisors These changes are unacceptable: See above ADD: May include staff... (3) personnel from other Coalition partner governments ADD: The Secretary of Defense shall establish, from forces assigned to USCENTCOM, an Office of Security Transition (OST). The OST shall, in coordination with the Chief of Mission, and under the Commander, USCENTCOM, direct USG efforts, and coordinate international efforts, in support of organizing, equipping, and training all Iraqi military, police, facilities protection, border enforcement, ADD if DoD paragraph is approved: DOJ and other federal law enforcement experts who provide training to police and other security forces in support of the OST under the agreed program shall be assigned to and under the authority of the Chief of Mission. 2 NSC DEFPOL post the Iraq DC of 040420 Original State NSPD DoD Compromise Language DOJ Language State comments on edits and other security forces. Pursuant to progress made by the Iraqis in the formation of an Iraqi government under a permanent constitution, and according to a timeline to be determined by the Secretary of Defense and the Secretary of State, the OST shall transfer functions to a security assistance organization and to other appropriate organizations within the U.S. diplomatic mission that will be staffed in accordance with NSDD 38 of June 2, 1982 The effort to build a strong The effort to build a strong bilateral relationship ... direct bilateral relationship ... direct heads of USG departments heads of USG departments and and agencies to provide on a agencies to provide on a non- non-reimbursable basis such reimbursable basis such assistance, services, and any assistance, services and any other support as the Secretary other support as the Secretary of of State may request with State may request with respect to respect to U.S. activities in U.S. activities in Iraq, including Iraq, including security, security, medical, logistical medical, logistical and (ADD) but, with respect to the administrative support and provision of DoD support, the This change is also unacceptable. The State Department must have the resources it needs to ensure a successful transition in Iraq. As used by DOD, "coordinate" means "agree". By forcing State to obtain DOD agreement, we ensure gridlock, bureaucratic delays, and inaction. details of personnel. Secretary of State and the Secretary of Defense shall make decisions jointly. NSC DEFPOL post the Iraq DC of 040420 24-29 Apr 04 30-Apr 1-6 May 04 7-May 8-13 May 04 14-May 15-20 May 04 21-May 22-27 May 09 28-May 29 May -3 Jun 04 4-Jun 5-10 Jun 09 11-Jun 12-17 Jun 04 18-Jun 19-24 Jun 09 25-Jun 26-30 Jun 04 CPA Star Msns Draw-down Pax Comm Contract DC10 Passengers/aircraft (Passengers/week) 300 300 300 300 300 300 300 300 300 200 5XC130 250 250 250 250 250 250 250 250 250 1200 per month 2250 pax total 275 275 275 275 275 275 275 275 275 14 -Day Req MM Lead Time to ETD 16-Apr 23-Apr 30-Apr 7-May 14-May 21-May 28-May 4-Jun 11-Jun 45-Day Req Min Lead for 10% Discount Passed Passed Passed Passed 20-Apr 27-Apr 4-May 11-May 18-May Sayings on Discount to BWI Sayings on Discount to ATL 540K 540K 040K $406 $40K $200K 543K 543K $436 $43K 5436 $215K — I TASK: - r r a n s p o r t 1 5 0 0 + personnel to a main CONUS airline hub H 7 7 BENEFIT: _L , RECOMMENDATIONS: Tarn in SAAM requests now Sayings to $200,000 ± -Use BWI for all 11 ights _avings to $15,000 —I - -Use Patriot Express as much as possible (Kuwait & Qatar DEP pro) Reduce need for more contract commercial airlift -Bunch departures on day prior to commercial connenction (opts 5XC130) Reduce ground time at Kuwait —I 1 T 1 - I 1 _ , _I I 1 , ISSUES: Zone - BIAP road I _peen 1 Daily fit limitation (5XC130) I I I 2-week minimum lead time for contract rnsns I -1 1 Customer Relations Management Business Unit Master List 4/ 5/2004 Contact Business Units Location End State Comment AAFES MNF&I Indef. 7 NE 5/5 17 38022 s MINISTRY 231 , C.11S PSD 38013 11 ,-) rjur.rerT0i'rr, Sup:,,ort P44108' MNF&I 16 NE Fo.A*041116104Mititetittl 5/5 5 H, t b )r-f ce of Baghdad (BOOB) UK 6/30 38018 (OPOC?1'. PP-M203 MNF&1 MOU 21-4an-04 . C1iaplatrl's Office ,PP-M IRMO (7) 381540 CJTF7 - 09* pp m MNF&I 38022 CJTf7-JOC PH c,2 MNF&I 46 88011 cfalAtr (Coalition Assistance Training TearM PP -N bal m MNF&I 409 CPA FT MNF&I / Ministry Coalition Press Infairation Centel MNF&I 'Tif;i5 UT*" NE DCAA review Vinnell MNF&I CMATT NE 6/15-6/30 12 14-Mar-04 ;Communications Support Office (C6) 1 PP-M231 I-1SG 145 Raytheon HSG 23 MCI HSG 23 29-Feb-04 Comptroller LPP-M107 HSG 18 21-Mar-04 [Contracting Activity I PP-SW PMO 27 :5-Feb-04 ,countefintelligence/OSI (CI) PP-M - 237 MNF&I 48 5-Feb-04 CPA Protective Services (USACIDC) PP-M204A PSD Redd/Jones 6/30 32 24-Jan-04 Defense Contract Audit Agency PP-M208 EMBASSY/USMB 21 15-Feb-04 Defense Contract Management Agency PP-N113 HSG 10 21-Mar-04 Defense Criminal investigative Service (DCIS) PP-N100E EMBASSY/USMB NSDD-38 5 38003 Defense Energy Support Center PP-S225 APCO (?) Mike Kelly Defense Support Agency OGA? Demining EMBASSY/USMB RONCO 27-Feb-04 Department for Intl Development - Palace Element PP-N1050 UK 6/30 17-Jan-04 DePe.C1110t,,Pf c. NE 5/15 NE 6/15-6/30 28-Jan-04 Deputy Chief of Staff PP-M110 HSG NE 6/15-6/30 20-Jan-04 Directorate of Civil Affairs PP-M117 NE 6/5 NE 6/15-6/30 23-Jan-04 Directorate of Strategic Cornmurlcations Green Room IRMO 137 18-Feb-04 Distinguished Visitors Bureau PP-Gm Pm NE 6/30 11-Feb-04 Executive Secretariat PP-M122 EMBASSY/USMB , 16 14-Mar-14 Facility Management Office PP-8104 HSG 9 38031 Finance Office .:-„C/1261h FinanceBn (204 PP-B13G, MNF&I Front Office Translation Team EMBASSY/USMB 8-Feb-04 Governance Office PP-N105 EMBASSY/USMB 222 11-Mar-04 GSO PP-N100C EMBASSY/USMB HSG Logistics (C4) 7 1-Mar-04 'Human Resources Management - CPA PP-M210 IRMO 28-Jan-04 Information Management Unit LPP-M101A IRMO 16-Mar-04 Inspector General (IG) PP-M106 9/4 ItalianDelegation 6130 -[ ; 10 2•8 44a11-0$ Ill'e sqlp.urtAi,3 . Nticirad Convention, Ce, ter) Forum MNF&I 2-Feb-04 Iraqi Media Network Forum NE 6/30 50 NE 6/30 I Iraqi Reconstruction Development Council NE 6/5-6/30 174 SA1C NE 6/5-6/30 39 38041 Joint Lessons Learned Team (..ILLT) PP-M201 MNF&I ,VICTORY 8 Joint Scowls,' Di-eonfate (FWD) , PH N104A MNF&I 6/30 4-Feb-04 medical Sr S rr T 57/CPA Pt- ' MNF&I Indef. , 1r 0-r - r .,r- non 0-r PP-S101 1HSG _,JikitaiNWE4;1 NE 5/15 22-Jan-04 I National Security Defense Office of Management and Budget Office of National Security AffaJrs 75 3-Feb-04 Office of Private Sector Development 1-Feb-04 Ottice of Provincial Outreach Office of Security Coordination NE 6/15-6/30 9 PP-N218A [MINISTRY NE 5)15-5/30 I 14 NE 6/15-6/30 28 EMBASSY/USMB EMBASSY/USMB OR MNF&I 1 - 13 Customer Relations Management Eusiness Unit Master List Contact Business Units Location 'End State 31-Jan-04 Office of the Administrator PP-Front Off NE 28-Jan-04 Blackwater PP-N211 NE Office of Sepecial Investigations 0-Mar-04 1Office of the General Counsel (OGC) 3-Mar-04 'Oil for Food Coordination Center 22-Jan-04 1Personnel (C1) I RS° 31-Jan-04 Regional Security Coordination Office 29-Jan-04 Global Risk Strategies, Ltd (Adynin Only) Force Protection Fte^Tdi "re-tor-ism Suphc Es S'rv- .res - PP-M115 PMC)/1-1SG 1 Forum-B108 TEMBASSY/USMB 1 PP-M1 14 HSG (MIL) IEM BASSYILISM B PP-NlOOF I EMBASSY/USMB PP-N208 EMBASSY/USMB HSG EMBASSY/USMB MNF&I 1 11 -k 1 911Itnt Aff . .) .*:71 26-Feo-u4 Requirements Coordination Littice PP-N118 HSG S&K Technologies HSG MPRI HSG NAID NE 8-Feb-04 5-Mar-04 30-Jan-04 1Sr Advisor to Ministry of Agriculture PP-6217 i MINISTRY I Sr Advisor to Ministry of Communications PP-S214 MINISTRY [ Sr Advisor to Ministry of Culture , PP-5106 _MINISTRY Sr Advisor to the Ministry of Defense I MINISTRY PSD (?) PSD 7-Mar-04 1Sr Advisor to Ministry of Displacement and Migration PP-8108 1MINISTRY 31-Jan-04 I Sr Advisor to Ministry of Education PP-S206 1MINISTRY 22-Jan-04 ISr Advisor to Ministry of Electricity IPP-5117 MINISTRY 22-Jan-04 Sr Advisor to Ministry of Environment ,PP-S109 MINISTRY 3-Mar-04 I l Sr Advisor to Ministry of Finance/OMB — PP-S210 rMINISTRY MZM NE Central Bank ttlinistry MINISTRY Tregsury - IRS EMBASSY/USMB NSCID-38 OCC NE 27-jan-04 Sr Advisor to Ministry of Foreign Affairs PP 5100 'MINISTRY 22-Jan-04 Sr Advisor to Ministry of Health PP-S223 MINISTRY PSC) (0) PSD 23-Jan-04 Sr Advisor to Ministry of I-iigher Ed & Scientific Rsrch , ,PP-S220 MINISTRY 2-Feb-04 [ Sr Advisor to Ministry of Housing and Construction PP-S115 MINISTRY 1-Feb-04 Sr Advisor to Ministry of Human Rights 'PP-N106 L MINISTRY 29-Jan-04 ISr Advisor to Ministry of Industry & Minerals PP-S107 [ MINISTRY 2-Feb-04 PP-S213 MINISTRY 1Sr Advisor to Ministry of Interior Rand Corp CRG Meteoric Tactical Solutions PSD PSD 15-Mar-04 f Sr Advisor to Ministry of Justice PP-S102 MINISTRY I CPI- Public Integrity EMBASSY/USMB NSIDD-38 Special Tribunal (EMBASSY/USMB NSDD-38 FBI EMBASSY/USMB NSDD-39 9-Mar-04 22-Jan-04 23-Jan-04 Sr Advisor to Ministry of Labor & Social Affairs PP-S202 MINISTRY Sr Advisor to Ministry of Municipalities & Public Works 1_PP-S221 MINISTRY Sr Advisor to Ministry of Oil PP-S110 MINISTRY F Erinys PSD (Sr Advisor to Ministry of Planning & Development MINISTRY TCouncil for International Cooperation 20-Jan-04 21-Jan-04 3-Feb-04 20-Jan-04 14-Feb-04 ,'Sr Advisor to Ministry of Science and Technology ISr Advisor to Ministry of Trade/Standards Sr Advisor to Ministry of Transportation Sr Advisor to Ministry of Water Resources Sr Advisor to Ministry of Youth & Sport PP-S218 I MINISTRY PP-M213 MINISTRY PP-M216 MINISTRY PP-S222 MINISTRY PP-.S219 'MINISTRY NE 4/ 5/2004 Comment 6/15-6/30 16 6/15-6/30 36 28 '7 3 5/5 6/30 16 14 149 "0- MINISTRY UK Administration ( PP-M211 NE 3-Feb-04 27-Jan-04 4-Feb-04 14-Feb-04 UK Special Representative's Office PP-Front Off NE ,UN Assessment Team ,PP-1N105A iINDEF Worldwide Language Resources (Translation Off) PP-M121 NE USAID 'PP-M122 USAID 28-Jan-04 PP-M122 USAID Bearing Point General Electric USAID Olive USAID GRD 123 GRD 29 OIL 5 1_ 6/30, 44 6/30 17 90 2- 13 Customer Relations Management 0,usiness Unit Master List Contact Business Units I Location End State Comment Washington Inc USAID OTI USAID Kroll USAID RTI USAID 5-Feb-04 U.S. Consular Office, Baghdad 4Forum EMBASSYIUSMB _4/ 5/2004 NE 7/15 I I Other OGA I 1 United .States Postal Service _I 1-Mar-04 I Program Management Office (PMO) IPP-KBR Wing l + 1 DA Contracting 1 I I USACE I PP-KBR Wing I Seabees 1PP-KBR Wing AECOM PP-KBR Wing CH2M Hill/Parsons PP-KBR Wing Berger/URS PP-KBR Wing Iraq Power Alliance PP-KBR Wing Foster Wheeler PP-KBR Wing CACI PP-KBR Wing Force Protection PP-KBR Wing Armored PP-KBR Wing Stanley Baker PP-KBR Wing Stanley/Baker/Hill (Army CMS) PP-KBR Wing Fluor/AMEC PP-KBR Wing Washington International PP-KBR Wing Perini Corp. PP-KBR Wing Washington International & Black & Veatch PP-KBR Wing Lucent Technologies PP-KBR Wing Contrack/AICl/OCl/Archirodon JV PP-KBR Wing Parsons Delaware PP-KBR Wing Parson Iraq JV PP-KBR Wing Arrmor Group KBR PP-KBR Wing Outside Palace Contact Business Units Regionals I Northern Region - Mosul Arbil Dahuk Baqubah Mosul Tikrit Sulaymaniyah Kirkuk South Central - Al Hillah Ramadi Hillah Karbala Najaf Diwaniyah Kut 96 OTHER MNF&I 171 4 Location I EMBASSY/USMB 40 South - Basrah Basrah Nasariyah Amarah Samawah 3 - 13 CUStomer Relations Management lifusiness Unit l Master List Contact 1 Business Units Location ( End State 'Non-CPA Customers orn BM, 22tilit 9IDE 304th 350nii 937th ENGri GI' IC) Force riytni57 -i .Forc'E. P,i,r, , , c1.i7n 2ND. MNF&I MN F&I MNF&I MNF&I MNF&I MNF&I Location Abbreviations Presidential Palace 'Iraqi Convention Center Forum —r I Color Codes Contractor after 6/30 Non Essential redeploy May Ministry 2818 640 Redeploy June 3458 Redeploy H-- June/July MNF&I Follow on [Right Sized 4- 13 Baghdad Central, Strategic Communications, Ministries Contact Business Units Location End State Comment -' 0";.-. r- -‘.1 ( 38022 Baghdad Central PP-N110 MINISTRY Existing ,224 Existing 23-Jan-04 Directorate of Strategic Communications Green Room IRMO 137 V G1 "/ 11-Mar-04 Religious Affairs PP-S104 NE Existing 8-Feb-04 Sr Advisor to Ministry of Agriculture PP-S217 MINISTRY Existing 5-Mar-04 Sr Advisor to Ministry of Communications PP-S214 MINISTRY Existing 30-Jan-04 Sr Advisor to Ministry of Culture PP-S106 MINISTRY Existing Sr Advisor to the Ministry of Defense MINISTRY Existing 7-Mar-04 Sr Advisor to Ministry of Displacement and Migration PP-S108 MINISTRY Existing 31-Jan-04 Sr Advisor to Ministry of Education PP-S206 MINISTRY Existing 22-Jan-04 Sr Advisor to Ministry of Electricity PP-S117 MINISTRY Existing 22-Jan-04 Sr Advisor to Ministry of Environment PP-S109 MINISTRY Existing 3-Mar-04 Sr Advisor to Ministry of Finance/OMB PP-S210 MINISTRY Existing Central Bank Ministry MINISTRY Existing OCC Existing 27-Jan-04 Sr Advisor to Ministry of Foreign Affairs PP-S105 MINISTRY Existing 22-Jan-04 Sr Advisor to Ministry of Health PP-S223 MINISTRY Existing 23-Jan-04 Sr Advisor to Ministry of Higher Ed & Scientific Rsrch PP-S220 MINISTRY Existing 2-Feb-04 Sr Advisor to Ministry of Housing and Construction PP-S115 MINISTRY Existing 1-Feb-04 Sr Advisor to Ministry of Human Rights PP-N106 MINISTRY Existing 29-Jan-04 Sr Advisor to Ministry of Industry & Minerals PP-S107 MINISTRY Existing 2-Feb-04 Sr Advisor to Ministry of Interior PP-S213 MINISTRY Existing 15-Mar-04 Sr Advisor to Ministry of Justice PP-S102 MINISTRY Existing 9-Mar-04 Sr Advisor to Ministry of Labor & Social Affairs PP-S202 MINISTRY Existing 22-Jan-04 Sr Advisor to Ministry of Municipalities & Public Works PP-S221 MINISTRY Existing 23-Jan-04 Sr Advisor to Ministry of Oil PP-S110 MINISTRY Existing 3-Feb-04 Task Force Shield/M00 Security Office PP-S226 MINISTRY Existing Sr Advisor to Ministry of Planning & Development MINISTRY Existing Council for International Cooperation Existing 20-Jan-04 Sr Advisor to Ministry of Science and Technology PP-S218 MINISTRY Existing 21-Jan-04 Sr Advisor to Ministry of Trade/Standards PP-M213 MINISTRY Existing 3-Feb-04 Sr Advisor to Ministry of Transportation PP-M216 MINISTRY Existing 20-Jan-04 Sr Advisor to Ministry of Water Resources PP-S222 MINISTRY Existing 14-Feb-04 Sr Advisor to Ministry of Youth & Sport PP-S219 MINISTRY Existing subtotal 705 Total 1073 2- 0 _ CJTF-7 Contact Business Units Location End State Comment AAFES MNF&I Indef. 7 AFCIS MNF&I PSD 38013 38018 38040 1AD Governate Support Team CENTCOM (OPCC?) CJTF7 - C9* PP-N108 MNF&I 16 PP-M203 MNF&I MOU 2 PP-N Balfrau MNF&I 38022 CJTF7 - JOC PP-M222 MNF&I 46 38011 CMATT (Coalition Assistance Training Team) PP-N Ballroor MNF&I 8/15 409 CPATT MNF&I / Ministry Coalition Press Information Center MNF&I 5 5-Feb-04 Counterintelligence/OSI (CI) PP-M237 MNF&I 48 38008 Defense Energy Support Center PP-S225 MNF&I Mike Kelly 38031 Finance Office - C/126th Finance On (208) PP-0130 MNF&I 29-Jan-04 Iraqi Forum (Baghdad Convention Center) Forum MNF&I 1 38041 Joint Lessons Learned Team (JLLT) PP-M201 MNF&I VICTORY 8 38047 Joint Security Directorate (FWD) PP-N104A MNF&I 6/30 4-Feb-04 Medical Section CJTF7/CPA PP-S115 MNF&I Indef. 9 Escort Services MNF&I United States Postal Service MNF&I ( Non-CPA Customers 234th Signal RN, 22nd Signal ODE MNF&I 1 304th Civil Affair Brigade MNF&I (c14'; -• 350nd Civil Affairs Command MNF&I 1 937th ENGR GP (C) MNF&I Force Protection (571 MP Co) MNF&I Force Protection, (2ND 82TH) MNF&I P.244-)r v', Total 553 04 -4 4 0 is' /1 2 irk"3.1 ,4?, PMO/APCO Contact Business Units Location End State Comment 1-Mar-04 Program Management Office (PMO) PP-KBR Wing 171 DA Contracting USAGE PP-KBR Wing Seabees PP-KBR Wing AECOM PP-KBR Wing Full Support CH2M Hill/Parsons PP-KBR Wing Full Support Berger/URS PP-KBR Wing Full Support Iraq Power Alliance PP-KBR Wing Full Support Foster Wheeler PP-KBR Wing Full Support CACI PP-KBR Wing Full Support Armor Group PP-KBR Wing PSD Stanley Baker PP-KBR Wing Full Support Stanley/Baker/Hill (Army CMS) PP-KBR Wing GRD Fluor/AMEC PP-KBR Wing Washington International PP-KBR Wing Perini Corp. PP-KBR Wing Washington International & Black & Veatch PP-KBR Wing Lucent Technologies PP-KBR Wing Contrack/AICl/OCl/Archirodon JV PP-KBR Wing Parsons Delaware PP-KBR Wing Parson Iraq JV PP-KBR Wing Go?" Total 171 ,ovTAk° 7!cl t pA C/ 4 err- jyl:n Provinces Contact Business Units Location End State Comment Outside Palace Office Location EMBASSY/USMB Contact Business Units Regional Northern Region - Mosul Arbil Dahuk pagubah VMosul Tikrit Sulaymaniyah / Kirkuk South Central - Al Hillah Ramadi V/ Hillah Karbala Najaf Diwaniyah Kut Soup - Basrah asrah Nasariyah Amarah Samawah 40 Total 40 USAID Contact Business Units Location End State 14-Feb-04 USAID PP-M122 USAID 28-Jan-04 Bearing Point PP-M122 USAID General Electric USAID Olive USAID Washington Inc USAID Oil USAID Kroll USAID RTI USAID Comment 90 Total 90 EMBASSY I USMB Contact Business Units Location End State Comment 11-Feb-04 Executive Secretariat PP-M122 EMBASSY/USMB 16 11-Mar-04 GSO PP-N100C EMBASSY/USMB 1-Feb-04 Office of Provincial Outreach PP-M102 EMBASSY/USMB Office of Security Coordination EMBASSY/USMB OR MNF&I 3-Mar-04 Oil for Food Coordination Center Forum-13108 EMBASSY/USMB 3 RSO EMBASSY/USMB 31-Jan-04 Regional Security Coordination Office PP-NlOOF EMBASSY/USMB 16 Fleet Anti-Terrorism Support Team EMBASSY/USMB 5-Feb-04 U.S. Consular Office, Baghdad Forum EMBASSY/USMB 1 Treasury - IRS EMBASSY/USMB NSDD-38 CPI- Public Integrity EMBASSY/USMB IRMO Special Tribunal EMBASSY/USMB IRMO FBI EMBASSY/USMB NSDD-38 8-Feb-04 Governance Office PP-N105 EMBASSY/USMB 222 Iraq Property Claims Commission Total 258 vrAo M s 07b7o HSG Contact Business Units Location End State Comment 14-Mar-04 Communications Support Office (C6) PP-M231 HSG 145 29-Feb-04 Comptroller PP-M107 HSG 18 15-Feb-04 Defense Contract Management Agency PP-N113 HSG 10 28-Jan-04 Deputy Chief of Staff PP-M110 HSG 9 14-Mar-04 Facility Management Office PP-8104 HSG 9 Logistics (C4) HSG 7 28-Feb-04 Ministry Requirements Coordination Office PP-S101 HSG 10-Mar-04 Office of the General Counsel (OGC) PP-M115 PM0/1-ISG 28 22-Jan-04 Personnel (Cl) PP-M114 HSG (MIL) Force Protection HSG 14 26-Feb-04 Requirements Coordination Office PP-N118 HSG 149 Total 389 CPA Other `4 Contact Business Units Location End State Comment ^24-Jan-04 Defense Contract Audit Agency PP-M208 21 21-Mar-04 Defense Criminal Investigative Service (DCIS) PP-N100E 5 Demining 3 Topograhic Mapping Team PP-M202 NE 5/5 17 25-Jan-04 Forward Engineering Support Team (FEST) PP-N206 NE 5/5 5 British Office of Baghdad (B0oB) UK 6/30 21-Jan-04 Chaplain's Office PP-M IRMO (?) 8 Chief Operating Officer NE 6(15-6/30 12 Defense Support Agency OGA? 1 17-Jan-04 Department of Economic Policy PP-S207 NE 5/15 27-Jan-04 Deputy Adminstrator & Chief Policy Officer PP-M103 NE 6/15-6/30 27-Jan-04 Director of Administration & Chief of Staff PP-M104 NE 6/15-6/30 20-Jan-04 Directorate of Civil Affairs PP-M117 NE 6/5 3 15-Feb-04 Directorate of Operations and Infrastructure PP-M234 NE 6/15-6/30 18-Feb-04 Distinguished Visitors Bureau PP-Gm Rm NE 6/30 1-Mar-04 Human Resources Management - CPA PP-M210 IRMO 28-Jan-04 Information Management Unit PP-M101A IRMO 16-Mar-04 Inspector General (IG) PP-M106 9/4 4 Italian Delegation 6/30 10 2-Feb-04 Iraqi Media Network Forum NE 6/30 50 ,J „,P Iraqi Reconstruction Development Council NE 6/5-6130 174 NSC Representative's Office PP-M235 NE 5/15 u\L" National Security Defense 75 e 1 Office of Management and Budget NE 6/15-6/30 9 22-Jan-04 Office of National Security Affairs PP-N218A 16-Mar-04 Office of Policy Planning and Analysis PP-M239 NE 5/15-5/30 14 3-Feb-04 Office of Private Sector Development PP-S107 NE 6115-6/30 28 31-Jan-04 Office of the Administrator PP-Front Off NE 6/15-6/30 16 Office of Sepecial Investigations 36 Task Force PIE NE GRD 123 Task Force RIO PP-S225 NE GRD 29 3-Feb-04 UK Administration Office PP-M211 NE 6/30 44 3-Feb-04 UK Special Representative's Office PP-Front Off NE 6/30 27-Jan-04 UN Assessment Team PP-1N105A INDEF 27-Feb-04 Department for Intl Development - Palace Element PP-N105D UK 6/30 US MISSION PP-N1 15A NE 7/15 Front Office Translation Team NE Other 96 OGA OTHER Total 783 Contractors Contact Trans CMATT CSO CSO CSO Demining Iraq Media Network IRDC PSD Security Reg Ops Reg Ops Reg Ops MOD/Stratcom PSD Trans MOH PSD MOI UK PSD UK PSD PSD/Security Oil Trans Min/USAID USAID USAID USAID USAID USAID PSD USAID Business Units Titan Linguist Vinnell Raytheon MCI OrascomPragna RONDO Harris Corporation SAIC Blackwater Global Risk Strategies, Ltd (Admin Only) S&K Technologies MPRI NAID \ 4 0' MVM 54/4 4iSt MZM PSD (?) Rand Corp CRC Meteoric Tactical Solutions Erinys Worldwide Language Resources (Translation Off) Bearing Point General Electric Olive Washington Inc OTI Kroll RhI End State NE MNF&I HSG HSG Comment DCAA review CMATT NE NE NE EMBASSY/USMB HSG HSG NE -Eap, NE PSD • 6/30 6/5-6/30 6/15-6/30 6/30 PSD PSD PSD NE USAID USAID USAID USAID USAID USAID USAID KBR Prepared by (b)(6) ITPT Draft Transition Plan April 10, 2004 Write Transition Plan in concert with AMB Bremer's Strategic Goals • Security • Governance • Essential Services • Strategic Communications • Economy Modified by current filters • Power Ministries • Heightened Security • Transition by 6/30 • Maintain essential Palace support i.e., non DoS IT, communications. medical Determine US Mission, IRMO and Green Zone Management end state on 7/1 (until final end state is determined, plan with draft organizational documents). The intention is to transition into the follow on organization by upsizing, maintaining, downsizing or eliminating functions that are not required or are to be provided by the US Mission, IRMO, and assigned military units. Review or develop transition plans for Ministries, Governance Teams, STRATCOM, Baghdad Central (complete). and 17 Governorate Sites (CPA North, Central South and South), PMO/APCO, and CPA Rear (in coordination with Washington), to meet goals prior to 6/30 and start transition on 5/15. Identify and review all current business units that are not classified above into key support and non essential support, require lead person to develop transition plans. Review current and 7/1 use of contractor personnel. Determine transition / manning capacity of HR, travel and logistics system (work with and provide requirements to HR, C-4 and DCMA). Determine transition rate versus transition capacity: • Achieve 7/1 US Embassy, IRMO and Green Zone organization and manning by 6/30 Develop Draft Plan for approval including final end state of CPA (US Mission, IRMO, Green Zone support, etc.). Upon approval of Draft Plan populate and implement Transition Plan. Timeline and discussion: • Submit Draft Transition Plan to AMB Bremer, AMB Jones, AMB Ricciardone and LTG Kicklighter on 4/15 • Gain approval by 4/20 • Submit populated non essential business unit transition plan on 4/25 (start with non essential business units and personnel, continue with Ministries, Governance Teams, 17 sites and STRATCOM and key operational support business units) • Submit populated final transition plan on 5/1 • Publish plan and notify initial group of personnel on 5/1 • Allow one week for reallocation of qualified personnel to follow on organization • Commence transition to follow on organization on 5/07 • Start personnel fly away on 5/15 • Concurrently reduce other support organizations, including KBR • Assign remobilization of OPCON military forces to CJTF-7 or MNF&I • Overlay US Mission Baghdad • Coordinate the internal Palace movement of personnel into temporary / final work space • Coordinate with continued mobilization of new incoming or follow on personnel UNCLAS SECSTATE 75518 Laserl: ACTION: EXEC INFO: COS IPC DISSEMINATION: EXEC /1 CHARGE: PROG z" -rifi/k1(' APR 0 6 2004 R e . VZCZCBG0649 RR RUEHGB Err H eoiorS DE RUEHC #5518/01 0962212 e ZNR UUUUU ZZH R 052211Z APR 04 PM SECSTATE WASHDC TO CPA BAGHDAD 0302 BT \-\ 7.rn 4y , C- UNCLAS SECTION 01 OF 03 STATE 075518 FROM OBO DIRECTOR (b)(111 TO AMBASSADOR BREMER E.O. 12958: N/A TAGS: ABLD, AMGT SUBJECT: INTERIM EMBASSY FACILITIES 1.I am pleased to inform you that our contract to renovate and improve the DOS interim embassy facilities in Baghdad was awarded within budget and on schedule on April 1, 2004. The successful award of this contract is a significant milestone in the execution of the plan that was briefed to the senior CPA staff during my visit to Baghdad on February 29, 2004. 2.The work is divided into three phases and will be performed at the three interim facilities: the interim embassy compound consisting of the C/1-35 compound, the adjacent site that is being developed as housing by the United States Agency for International Development (USAID), and the adjoining pool complex; the interim embassy annex consisting of the palace compound, expanded to include the offices and housing of the other government agency; and the interim Chief of Mission Residence (CMR) consisting of the residence occupied by you. 3. Phas 1 work will focus on the interim chancery and will be completed e conc usion o enase- '1, , unclassi ie office, meeting and limited residential space will be available on the second floor of the chancery for use by the DOS transition staff. Specifically, the scope of work includes the following: a. Site development to support facilities/improvements being installed under Phase 1; UNCLAS SECSTATE 75518 UNCLAS SECSTATE 75518 b. Installation of a chain link fence and gates between the interim chancery building and USAID housing; C. Installation of concertina wire on and in front of the perimeter security ballistic barrier along the riverfront road and on top of the perimeter wall south of the interim chancery building. d.Construction of the perimeter wall around the pool complex and installation of vehicle barriers at the entrances to the pool complex; e.Installation of a vehicle/pedestrian main Compound Access Control (CAC) and the vehicle/pedestrian portion of the service CAC; f.Installation of shatter-resistant window film (Mylar) on all windows; g.Installation of approved security grilles on all windows located within 5.0 meters above grade or accessible platform except on windows already equipped with grilles; h.Installation of compound security lighting; i.Installation of the infrastructure to support the compound security system; j.Repairs to the water supply system; k.Connection to the USAID telephone and computer network; 1. Installation of a sewage collection and pumping system to a contractor-provided holding tank located on the USAID compound; and m. Installation of a remote fuel fill pipe, piping and temporary tank(s). 4. has 2 w k will include three of the interim facilities. The work will be completed y June 7-213-04, in order to permit the interim embassy to 1, 2004. The Phase 2 work, by facility, includes the following: a. Interim Chancery Compound 1.)Site development to support facilities/improvements being installed under Phase 2; 2.)Installation of a water fill pipe, pumps and temporary tank(s); UNCLAS SECSTATE 75518 UNCLAS SECSTATE 75518 3.)Installation of a consular pedestrian CAC; 4.)Completion of the service CAC; 5.)Connection to USAID generators for power/limited electrical distribution; 6.)Installation of a remote water filling station along with necessary storage tanks and pump(s); 7.)Building modifications and upgrades consisting of electrical/mechanical improvements, interior guard posts, lighting, installation of hardline walls, partitions, FEBR doors, etc.; 8.)Installation of a Government-furnished Great Seal and flag pole; 9.)Building HVAC repairs and improvements; and 10.)Building furnishings. b. Interim Annex Compound 1.)Site development to support facilities/improvements being installed under Phase 2; 2.)Construction of perimeter security walls around the interim annex; 3.)Installation of perimeter security lighting; 4.)Installation of the infrastructure for compound security system; and 5.)Installation of all CAC's at the interim annex. c. Interim Residence Site 1.)Site development to support facilities/improvements being installed under Phase 2; 2.)Installation of perimeter security walls; 3.)Installation of a vehicle/pedestrian CAC at the main entrance; 4.)Installation of an emergency exit with a remotely-operated vehicle barrier and gate; 5.)Installation of FEBR doors; UNCLAS SECSTATE 75518 UNCLAS SECSTATE 75518 6.) Installation of approved security grilles on all windows located within 5.0 meters above grade or accessible platform, except on windows that presently have grilles; 7.) Installation of perimeter security lighting; and 8.) Installation of the infrastructure for the compound security system. 5,_Phase 3,inc1udes the residual work at the interim chancery and annex and id'll f.3.1____2_e_comp_l_eles .5200L4. It includes the following: a. Interim Chancery Compound 1.) Completion of any site development including landscaping, seeding, walkways and parking necessary for a fully functional compound; 2.) Completion of the fuel distribution system; 3.) Installation of protection around the compound generators; 4.) Completion of building modifications including installation of fire escapes, hard-wired fire alarms, smoke detectors, fire doors, fire-rate doors, infrastructure for Telephone PBX and wire management; and 5.) Installation of the perimeter wall enclosing the pool complex adjacent to the interim chancery. b. Interim Annex Compound 1.) Installation of security grilles on all windows located within 5.0 meters above grade or accessible platform, except on windows that presently have grilles; 2.) Installation of shatter-resistant window film on trailer windows; and 3.) Installation of vehicle barriers within the compound. 6. In addition to the work described above, the contract scope of work includes providing,75 residential trailers. The first 20 will be installed and ready for occupancy sy May _15 2004 The remaining 55 will be compEeted by June 15, 200/4 The trai ers wi majority will be located in proximity to t e The lside Suites and the balance will be interspersed among the UNCLAS SECSTATE 75518 UNCLAS SECSTATE 75518 existing trailers as directed by OBO's Project Director after consultation with CPA. These housing units are being acquired to augment the existing housing units, which are expected to be transferred from CPA to DOS to house the U.S. staff. The goal is to have sufficient housing to accommodate the U.S. personnel under the authority of the Chief of Mission at no more than two staff members per trailer with each staff member having a separate sleeping area with a shared bathroom. 7.The OBO Project Director and Contracting Officer's Representative (COR) for the contract is Mr. nw6) Amk who arrived in Baghdad on Friday April 2. The contfaTt documents have been forwarded to him, which he will share with your staff, as appropriate, in order to assure coordination of the contractor's work with ongoing CPA operations. 8.The next phase of work to provide the interim embassy facilities will be the interior improvements to the annex. As briefed during my visit, the goal is to provide secure, safe and functional facilities within the available funding. As a result, the interior improvements to the annex will be limited and will not meet all New Embassy Compound (NEC) standards. I want to emphasize, however, that these improvements will ensure that the facility will function and be safe and secure for operation. Diplomatic Security has been a full participating member of every planning effort for all of these facilities. Hand in hand with finalizing the scope of work for these improvements will be limited space planning for the annex building. This planning will be accomplished by a joint DOS/DOD space planning team. The scope and schedule for this effort will be addressed by Septel 9.We look forward to executing this "fast-tracked" construction and make ready effort with CPA's support as we move forward in providing the facilities that will be required for the interim embassy in Baghdad. POWELL BT 45518 NNNN UNCLAS SECSTATE 75518 COALITION PROVISIONAL A UTHORITY BAGHDAD INFORMATION MEMO DATE April 5, 2004 FOR: THE ADMINISTRATOR, THE DEPUTY ADMINISTRATOR FROM: Andrew Rathmell (OPPA) SUBJECT: CPA Priorities towards Transition Summary: Although a great deal remains to be achieved before transition, it will be valuable to keep CPA focused on a small number of vital tasks so as to marshal our resources. To assist in this prioritization, we have undertaken an analysis of the Strategic Plan goals. This process provides a systematic set of recommendations for where the CPA leadership should focus its efforts in the remaining period before TOA. Our methodology for selecting these priorities is summarised in Tab A. Our analysis led us to select 15 vital objectives for CPA. We refined these into four top vital objectives. Within the four Objectives we have defined as vital for success of transition, our recommendations focus on those tasks that are Amber or Red in the plan and about which something can realistically be done. The main resources that CPA is able to (re)deploy in the remaining weeks are: i) time and attention of the senior leadership; ii) CPA personnel; iii) funds; iv) CJTF-7 assets. Any redeployment of personnel or assets will of course have to ensure that significant gaps are not thereby created in other programs that may cause unexpected risks. Top 4 Priorities for Transition 1) Continued emphasis by the Coalition Forces and Iraqi Security Forces on public safety and counter insurgency. (Objective:- Achieve a Secure and Stable Environment) 2) Resources and training for Iraqi Security Forces that allow them to effectively provide public safety. (Objective:- Public Safety: Develop Institutions that are Effective in Protecting Society and Constitutional Order) 3) Support for development of the caretaker government and the Transition Administrative Law, including civil education programs. (Objectives:- Develop Civic Participation in Governance & Support Governance with a robust communications campaign) 4) Increase Iraqi satisfaction with Electricity. (Objective:- Provide Electricity Services that Meet National Needs) 1. Continued emphasis by Coalition Forces and Iraqi Security Forces on public safety and counter insurgency. The overwhelming consensus of the participants to this study and the Iraqi polling data is that security is the top priority. In addition to ongoing military operations, probably the most important areas on which to focus are: • Militia Transition & Reintegration; particular steps are: o Conclusion of political agreements underpinning proposed militia order; employment and reintegration for demobilized militia (and military) personnel; neutralization of non-compliant militias • Border security; particular steps are: o Expedite equipment deliveries; POE refurbishment; recruitment and training of expanded number of border personnel. 2. Resources and training for Iraqi Security Forces that allow them to effectively provide public safety. The police must be resourced properly and trained; the quality of the forces is probably more important than simple numbers. The development of specialist capabilities (e.g. criminal intelligence and organized crime investigative units) is critical if the police are to make real inroads against criminal and terrorist networks. The most important areas related to the Task Create an Effective and Accountable Police System are: • Fully staff and resource OSC/CPATT to enable it to achieve its mission; • Establish governance framework for internal security, notably, define and implement a national command and control framework for the IPS; • Acquire and distribute remaining equipment for IPS; • Develop and transition to Iraqi control Special Police Units — notably intelligence, counter-terrorism and public order • Fully implement police information campaign (Strategic Communications). 3. Support governmental reform and the Transitional Administrative Law, including the provision of resources to civil education programs. An important CPA focus is, rightly, upon working with the UN to establish a stable caretaker government. However, the governance information campaign and civic education program are absolutely critical to a smooth TOA. Decisions on the form of the caretaker executive must be made and explained to the people of Iraq before the transfer. The local governance order is an important asset in this campaign as it will provide demonstrable benefits at the local levels of government. The key tasks here are: • Develop civic education programs promoting electoral participation and democratic ideals; • Develop local civil society capacity to conduct advocacy and participate in political life; • Support Governance with a robust communications campaign (Strategic Communications). Given the strength and inherent advantages of anti-CPA information campaigns, ranging from the Sistani anti-TAL effort to the attitudes of some Arab media networks, the provision of resources for the engagement and education of civil society should be reviewed for adequacy. There may be additional steps that CPA can take to bolster these critical information campaigns. UNCLASSIFIED 2 4. Increase Iraqi satisfaction with Electricity. CPA/CJTF-7 planners and Iraqi poll data alike make electricity one of the vital priorities for the next 3 months. Whilst the Ministry of Electricity is focused on the symbolic target of increasing capacity to 6,000MW, the most important measure is Iraqi satisfaction through a program of managed expectations. Success in this program will involve improved performance in the critical tasks supporting this objective (all are currently rated as Amber): • Minimize sabotage and improve security • Improve generating capacity to 6,000 Megawatts by 1 July 04 o Requirements are well understood and planned but implementation challenges remain • Fully implement policy on allocation of electrical power • Publish draft document of long-term strategy for Iraqi electricity sector o A particularly important part of this task will be to implement electricity price reform in a way that generates public support whilst beginning to remove price distortions • Electricity Information Campaign (Strategic Communications) o Full implementation of this campaign, which must involve regular feedback reviews, will be central to building Iraqi satisfaction. COORDINATION: COO — ok CJTF-7 - ok ATTACHMENT: TAB A: PRIORITY SETTING METHODOLOGY UNCLASSIFIED 3 TAB A: PRIORITY SETTING METHODOLOGY To establish the above priorities, we used the following methodology: Each Strategic Objective and its subordinate Key Tasks were evaluated by the OPPA Lead Planner. They were annotated as Vital, Critical, Important or Needed based on the following definitions: • Vital for those elements that will impact the success of the transition. The implication is that if a Vital element failed, then the transition itself would fail. • Critical was used to identify those elements whose failure would imply serious damage to the transition or would place other tasks and objectives at unacceptable risk. • Important and Needed are self explanatory. The priorities derived from this assessment were modified by the following steps: i) ii) iii) iv) v) Analysis of Iraqi poll data to determine the expressed priorities of Iraqi citizens (in broad terms, Iraqis rank CPA's pillars as follows: 1 — Security, 2 — Infrastructure, 3 — Elections/Governance and Employment and 4 — Economy) Prioritisation of ministry criticality according to CJTF-7 Essential Conditions and infrastructure dependency matrix. Analysis of COO's top ten priorities in the infrastructure ministries Brainstorming by OPPA, COO, AID and CJTF-7 to revise the priorities Input from expert sources outside CPA, including the Dobbins RAND report This process allowed us to select 15 vital objective priorities from the Strategic Plan (table 1). Table 1: Vital Objective Priorities Sect OBJ Name Pri. Iraqi Ministry Tier 1 1 CJTF 7 SEC 1 Achieve a Secure and Stable Environment 2 1 Interior SEC 2 Public Safety: Develop Institutions that are Effective in Protecting Society and Constitutional Order 3 1 Strategic STR 2 Support Security with a robust communications Communications campaign 4 1 Justice SEC 3 Build Justice 5 2 Electricity ESS 1 Provide Electricity Services that Meet National Needs 6 3 Governance GOV 1 Support Role of Governing Council (GC) 7 3 Governance GOV 2 Develop Civic Participation in Governance 8 3 Governance GOV 3 Develop Framework and Capacity for Elections 9 3 Governance GOV 4 Support Development of Sustainable Political Parties/Associations 10 3 Strategic STR 3 Support Governance with a robust communications Communications campaign 11 3 Health ESS 5 Improve Quality and Access to Health Care 12 4 Oil ESS 12 Reconstitute Oil Infrastructure 13 4 Trade ECO 4 Private Sector Initiatives 14 4 Trade ECO 9 Lay Foundations for an Open Economy 15 4 Finance ECO 1 Build Financial Market Structures UNCLASSIFIED 4 CPA/U.S. Mission Staffing 2004-2005 poC: TSgt Westbm3 5 Years? Now CPA Mission CPA/U.S. Mission Staffing 2,004-2005 POC: "Mgt WeRbe,0 Today 0 0. DOD arid OthE OTHER Steady State USG OSC Created IRMA A0100 Aga 12004 LA- eeted Creaked May 1,2004 May 15,04 une 1,2004 oft Opening" o1 rnba411Y Now CPA July 12004 5 Years? U.S. Mission fe COALITION PROVISIONAL AUTHORITY EXECUTIVE SECRETARIAT FROM: DATE: 3-Apr-04 FOR: THE ADMINISTRATOR ORIGINATOR: Executive Secretariat RE: Request for Information on Advisors to Iraqi Ministries after June 30 ' Attached is State's response to our cable (Baghdad 0169/CPA 0833, sent 1 April) on post-transition Advisor requirements. We had simultaneously sent an e-mail to State Ops and several others with accompanying documents, including excel spreadsheets on staffing. We had asked State Ops to transmit these documents to various offices in State. DOD, and the NSC. Some of the questions in State 74163 touch upon information that was in the e-mail. It appears that there were communication problems in Washington addressees receiving the original e-mail. .We have resent it; Ops has confirmed receipt and will transmit the documents. ATTACHMENTS: State 74163 Baghdad 169/CPA 833 E-mail documents: Ministry summary Current staffing Ministry summary notes Ministry staffing UNCLAS BAGHDAD 00169 Laserl: ACTION: EXEC INFO: IPC COS DISSEMINATION: EXEC /1 CHARGE: PROG APPROVED: LPBREMER DRAFTED: CIVIL AFFAIRS/GDENHA CLEARED: EEL 1 VZCZCBGI089 00 RUEHC RUEKJCS RHEHNSC DE RUEHGB 40169 0920754 ZNR UUUUU ZZH 0 010754Z APR 04 FM CPA BAGHDAD TO RUEHC/SECSTATE WASHDC IMMEDIATE 0360 RUEKJCS/SECDEF WASHDC IMMEDIATE 0350 RHEHNSC/WHITE HOUSE NSC WASHDC IMMEDIATE 0343 BT UNCLAS BAGHDAD 000169 FOR SECRETARY POWELL FROM AMBASSADOR BREMER E.0.12958: N/A TAGS: PREL, PGOV, AMGT, APER, AFIN, IZ SUBJECT: CPA 833: ADVISORS IN IRAQI MINISTRIES AFTER JUNE 30 REF: BAGHDAD 136 1. As promised, we have completed a thorough review of the current staffing of CPA ministry advisors and arrived at recommendations about the post-June 30 advisor staffing needed by U.S. Mission Baghdad. 2.Overall, we have identified a mission critical need for 19 senior consultants (policy advisors) and 180 technical advisors -- 199 in total -- to be based in the ministries and associated regulatory organizations after June 30. These numbers are projected to fall rapidly over time, to 171 after 6 months, 53 after 12 months and 1 after 24 months. (According to our records today, we have 637 advisors, of which 515 are U.S. civilians. Current CPA numbers are not exactly comparable to future projected needs, as some current activities will be funded out of the supplemental.) 3.Of the 199 positions, we would propose filling 155 with U.S. personnel (including 68 "3161s"), 43 to be filled by AO 01 7004 UNCLAS BAGHDAD 00169 UNCLAS BAGHDAD 00169 coalition partners, with the disposition of a remaining position to be determined later. We have assumed that, where the choice is for a post to be filled by a Coalition government or by the USG, we should seek a foreign fill. We have assumed that, where possible, USG-filled positions will be filled by detailees, and only if necessary by contractors or 3161s. 4. I recommend that we agree to work from the above proposed numbers of advisors. Over the remaining 90 days, we will continue to scrub to cut numbers and press coalition partners to do more to fill appropriate slots. UK DfID has already responded positively, and is likely to provide a dozen advisors over and above those shown in the full report on this work. Other support needs 5. The above number of advisors does not include: -- Other U.S. positions currently fully funded from the supplemental to at least April 2005. For example, in addition to 600 or so civilian police trainers, there are approximately 107 staff working on development of the Iraqi prison service, and approximately 60 who will be working to reconstruct justice agencies including the Iraqi Special Tribunal and the Commission on Public Integrity; -- Advisors whom relevant ministers plan to recruit bilaterally from other international agencies, e.g., World Health Organization, and/or which ministers will not seek from any successor organization to CPA. Pending a requested briefing with CPA, the UN has not yet determined advisors it may be able to offer; -- Any advisors provided by planned aid programs that will be separately funded and resourced. In particular, DfID expects to deploy up to a dozen consultants to undertake cross-cutting Public Administration Reform. -- Support to Iraqi government institutions that do not yet exist. In particular, it will be necessary to provide advisors to any offices formed to support the Prime Minister and Presidency (e.g., a cabinet office) and the National Legislature. DfID and USAID are considering how they may provide such advice and assistance but programs have not yet been scoped. 6. We are sending by e-mail to the Department a copy of our full report on proposed staffing needs. This report UNCLAS BAGHDAD 00169 UNCLAS BAGHDAD 00169 includes more detail on: -- The support needed by Ministries and source agencies providing support; -- Summary data comparing proposed support with current support under CPA, -- A section for each Ministry providing: a) justification for support by the Ministry; and b) a detailed breakdown of the proposed advisor posts by job description and source. 7. We will also provide Iraq Reconstruction and Management Organization (IRMO) and regional staffing recommendations by separate messages. BREMER ST #0169 NNNN UNCLAS BAGHDAD 00169 Page 1 of 1 (b)(6) From: (b)(6) Sent: To: Thursday, April 01, 2004 6122 PM Rathmell, Andrew (SES1); Oster, Jeffrey W. (0-9); Tappan, Robert A. (SES-4); Jones, Richard (AMB); Haveman, James (SES-7) Subject: FW: PROGRAM FOR MINISTRY TRANSITIONS Please see a1täte Regards has asked me to add Ambassador Bremer's comments to in italics. PA/Director of Civil Affairs CPA Baghdad DSN: (b)(6) Civ: (b)(6) Original Message From: (h)(61 Sent: Thursday, April 01, 2004 5:47 PM To (111(61 Subject: FW: PROGRAM FOR MINISTRY TRANSITIONS rb)(6) Director Civil Affairs Coalition Provisional Authority Baghdad Room M117 cell: (+) (111(61 DSN: 11..\/1":\ civ (b)(6) vityllial iessaye From: (1.,) Sent: Wednesday, March 31, 004 12:21 PM To: Executive Secretary Cc: 11,111 (b)(6) Rathmell, Andrew Oster, Jeffrey W. (0-9); (SES1); Tappan, Robert A. (SES-4); Haveman, James (SES-7) Subject: PROGRAM FOR MINISTRY TRANSITIONS Action memo attached. Director Civil Affairs Coalition Provisional Authority Baghdad Room M117 cell: + DS civ 4/1/2004 Strategic Plans exist CPA Groundwork Goal Skills Control Oriented Needs Systems Structure Analysis Planned -7,- Iraqi Engagement and Progress Ownership of Strategy Key Posts filled in Structure Skills Control Training Systems Instituted Working Ministry' INTERIOR 0/L ELECTRICITY JUSTICE DEFENCE TRADE FINANCE TRANSPORTATION AGRICULTURE COMMUNICATIONS CENTRAL BANK MUNIC. & PUBLIC WORKS WATER RESOURCES LABOR AND SOCIAL AFFAIRS HEALTH HOUSING & CONSTRUCTION EDUCATION HIGHER EDUCATION DISPLACEMENT & MIGRATION HUMAN RIGHTS CULTURE ENVIRONMENTAL FOREIGN AFFAIRS INDUSTRY & MINERALS PLANNING & DEV. COOP. SCIENCE AND TECHNOLOGY YOUTH AND SPORTS - 7•1714.; minows; • 'Order is based on a three-tiered system that reflects the importance of each ministry in ensuring the security and legitimacy of the new govemment after TOA. iindicates improvement since original assessment in mid-February April 1, 2004 COALITION PROVISIONAL AUTFIORITY BAGHDAD ACTION MEMO March 31, 2004 FOR: THE ADMINISTRATOR FROM: (b)(6) Director Civil Affairs SUBJECT: Transferring full authority to Ministries — next steps You asked for advice on the sequencing of the remaining Ministries, following the expected transfer of authority for four this week (Health, Education, Municipalities and Public Works, and Water Resources). From a Strategic Communications standpoint, the regular transition of these ministries is extremely helpful in communicating the larger picture of incremental, orderly and sustained devolvement of control over to the Iraqis. Inside Iraq, this transition process communicates that we are not abandoning them; for audiences outside Iraq, it communicates peaceful transfer of sovereignty with negligible disruption in continuity. I think we need to review for each Ministry: • Whether it satisfies the four tests we have publicly announced — strategy, structure skills, systems. Some of this is a matter of judgment, and therefore flexible, but it would be difficult to justify transitioning a ministry which could not point to a form of written strategy and demonstrate that its management structure reflected this. I would therefore expect these sections (both CPA and Iraqi) to be mostly green on the transition stoplight chart. A copy of the latest version is attached: we will do a further assessment of some Ministries. • Where the Ministry does not yet satisfy the tests, how soon it will, and what we might do to promote progress in the weakest areas. -\/ • What presentational risks we run in publicly announcing that we are giving a Minster and his team full authority. While you remain the ultimate authority until June 30, it would call our judgment in * question if you had later to intervene in such a Ministry, or in the worst case, to dismiss its Minister. Human Rights meets most of the tests, but its Minister still seems to need our attention. * That's not a concern. He either does well or not. Blair fires ministers. • What strategic or political issues we face in transitioning while Ministers are still reporting to the IGC. Even where a Ministry seems relatively competent, its importance to the national economy (as for Oil) or security (as for Interior) may still point to caution. Conclusion Based on the stoplight chart, I think we have six further Ministries which are close to being ready for transition - Displacement and Migration, Foreign Affairs, Higher Education, Human Rights, Justice and Oil. We would probably want to discount Human Rights, Oil and Interior, as explained above. If discussion with Senior Advisors confirms this, we could have four Ministry candidates in April. Next down the track seems to be Housing and Construction. Defense is well placed on strategy and structure, but its transition so early in its life would be a risk to security. If Youth and Sports were able to produce a strategy, it might also be a contender before June. So might Planning and Development Co-operation if it addressed skills issues. We might find three more candidates in May. In several other Ministries there is a basic disagreement over strategy between the CPA/Senior Advisor and the Ministry —Agriculture, Labor and Social Affairs, Industry and Minerals and Science and Technology. Unless there is resolved before the end of May, there is little to be gained from delaying transition where the Ministry is otherwise competent eg in the latter two cases. This raises the question of the real impact of transitioning Ministries in the four weeks before sovereignty. We are likely to struggle to find four credible candidates in June, unless you want to reconsider one of the Ministries discounted earlier. On current progress the remaining seven Ministries - Communications, Culture, Environment, Finance, Interior, Trade and Transportation — seem unlikely to be ready for transition ahead of sovereignty. [DC00 believes the MoI self assessment may be overoptimistic.] Many of them also have a long way to go to meet high profile targets in the Strategic Plan. Possible Timings If the Senior Advisors and their Ministers agree with something like the schedule above, it would be possible to transition one Ministry a week between now and the end of May. A rough sample schedule is attached. We might continue at this rate through June, if it was thought presentationally desirable. RECOMMENDATION: I recommend that I (andr(6 - 7 — lin my absence) consult the relevant Senior Advisors on these proposals. If they agree, we would ask them to discuss with their Ministers. Approve: 4/1 Disapprove: Approve with modification: * I would like to try to transition at least one per week to June 30. We should set one for the week lam away which(b)( can do. ATTACHMENTS: I. Ministry transition stoplight chart 2. Sample schedule of Ministries to transition UNCLASSIFIED 2 CO-ORDINATION: Andrew Rathmell - ok LTG (Ret) Oster - ok Stratcom, (b)(6) - ok COPY: Amb Jones Dep Dir Civil Affairs, UNCLASSIFIED 3 SAMPLE SCHEDULE OF MINISTRIES TO TRANSITION Date Ministry March 28 Health April 3 Education April 3 Municipalities and Public Works April 4 Water Resources April 11 Foreign Affairs April 18 Justice April 25 Higher Education May 2 Displacement & Migration May 9 Housing and Construction May 16 Planning and Development Co-operation May 23 Youth and Sports May 30 ? Industry and Minerals June 6 ? Science and Technology June 13 ? Agriculture June 20 ? Oil June 27 ? Human Rights 16 UNCLASSIFIED 4 COALITION PROVISIONAL AUTHORITY BAGHDAD INFO MEMO March 17, 2004 FOR: Ambassador Jones FROM: (b)(6) SUBJECT: Summary of Immediate PMO Field Requirements PMO seeks a balanced field organizational approach and presence with equal focus on the essential political process for reconstruction and effective implementation of the $18.4 supplemental in accordance with legislated dictates, overall Coalition expectations as well as Iraqi aspirations. This can only happen through rapid, but sensible planning; hope and memo duels are not feasible options for PMO. Accordingl , ten out teen major PMO coptra_. cts have been a ixiudijitle past week . alone. e remaimn to S3LflWI ow. Hun rea s of contractor personnel are pre ann \I leploy into Iraq now. Neither the Administration no ongress appreciate delays caused by inadequate planning and preparation. Here are the immediate needs for what you characterized in the transition planning meeting you chaired today as the "PMO force of nature." We appreciate your support in terms of allowing others to work with us i.e.," Others must plan around you." We humbly agree that this is a ( sensible way to proceed for now. Immediate decisions and detailed planning are needed for the following. • A March 13, 2004 from Ambassador Bearpark to Ambassador Bremer recommended that PMO become the "prime owner" and the essential inn-keeper for itself and "blister" organizations who wish to attach themselves for purposes of combined security, economies-of-scale and regular substantive interaction (see attachment). While details must be worked, this approach will: capture sunk taxpayer and other Coalition player costs while saving contract funds by avoiding duplicative facilities; lower overall security costs; allow quicker implementation of PMO and other activities by slimming deployment requirement lists; and, meet Administration needs for rapid implementation. This approach fully respects the need for PMO to interface and integrate contractors with construction management along with a myriad of highly complex logistical priorities. • With respect to field advisors, it makes sense_to polarize activities at the regipit!lisyel rather than at the govrnoratel cause of economies-of-scale for secnrity and administrative costs. A few governorates will, for various reasons, require a presence. It is important tculecide_now what kind,-homunany_and which Coalition artners will continue to provide field advisors generally and, more specifically, which ones can be — attached-from whichever USG entity or Coalition partner to PMO. There are many fine and c visors. e ow many of them well. In the South, for example, every one of the UK advisors plans to leave before June 30, if only for lack of DFID or CPA guidance to the contrary. If this happens, then PMO will lose a vast store of technical and political knowledge that oil, water, power, telecommunications and other specialists have developed at great effort. If PMO projects cannot benefit from this knowledge, then it must be created again at great costs in time and money. The value of this intellectual capital cannot be overstated. At a minimum, a policy decision is needed now to keep as many of the qualified and willing field technical advisors for as long as needed. This will vary from person-to-person, p e- o-p ace an oa ion partner- o- partner. • PMO is insolvent for operating money yet an avalanche of implementation responsibilities are coming over the horizon now. Arm and other Do staffing a draft MOA that would allow PM access supplemental money for o eration well as retain 3161 capability. State , reportedly has issues, ut PMO doesn't know what they are. CPA/GC said at today's meeting that the MOA is unnecessary and the Army can access up to ten peiceiit o rcent the e alrfl p emental for operating costs now if it wishes to do so. The policymakers and the (/ regariliffslice to resolve thfiW. In short, PMO needs: 1. Designation now as the "prime owner" and innkeeper for key field facilities as shown in Bearpark's memo with its attachments. 2. Agreement now that key technical field advisors from the Coalition should be attached to PMO. 3. Agreement now on how and specifically when PMO can receive operating funds. While you asked for an information piece, we could just as easily prepare a decision memorandum. At your direction, we are prepared to do so. In any event, PMO believes an excellent opportunity arises during the coming high level visit to, among many other things, resolve all the issues raised here. ATTACHMENTS: COORDINATION: Director of Infrastructure Action Memo PMO Project Maps and Report COO 2 (, 0 COALITION PROVISIONAL AUTHORITY BAGHDAD ACTION MEMO March 13, 2004 FOR: THE ADMINISTRATOR FROM: SUBJECT: Post CPA Field Presence Planning for post CPA activities continues. An important element is the post CPA field presence and structure All concerned are keen to move ahead quickly with this, but we are hampered by uncertainty over the overall CPA post transition structure, particularly the precise roles of the PM0 and IRMA ( if it is created). There is also an issue of cost — they are very expensive. Security alone is estimated at in excess of US$300 million per year. Your current guidance is that you want to see all the RT and (IT site offices (18) remain open, and with a continuing international flavor. The following model has been discussed widely within CPA and appears to be practicable. I should be grateful for your views. Regional presence: Regional offices will be located in Kirkuk, Hillah and Basrah. The regional offices will contain the following elements: • US Consulates and in Bhasra and possibly Kirkuk UK Consulates • PM0 and/or IRMA • USAID • Other bi-lateral development agencies We assume that the financing would come from State, with other non US tenants reimbursing a share. Governorate presence: It is suggested that the PlAcilIesDme_tlaepriine..!toumer," of the Governorate offices Jocated in Dahuk, Arbil, Sulaimaniya, Baqubah (Diyala), X Kut (Wassit), ALAmarah (Maysan), An \_Nasiriyah (Dhi Qar) ang (Muthanna). They are self sustainable with contract security. GT locations in Tikrit (Salah ad Din), Mosul (Ninawa), 1ama2 zli (Al Anbar), Karbala, , An Najaf and Diwaniyah (Al Qadisiyah) are within Coa ition military corn ounds. An agreement would have to ber " -- d with CJTF-7 and its successor organization or the uti ization of these locations or the sites be relocated "outside the wire" at significant cost. UNCLASSIFIED -2- The Governorate offices will be utilized to provide administrative, site security and life support for PM0 prime and subcontractors. PMO would administer the current GT locations. Others who could be allowed access on a reimbursable basis, room permitting could include: • State Department staff • USAID and their contractors • other bi-lateral development agency contractors They will be allowed access, room permitting. RECOMMENDATION (1): I recommend you approve the above mentioned concept. Approve: Disapprove: Approve with modification: COORDINATION: COO PM0 OPPA Comptroller Director, Civil Affairs ATTACHMENTS: PM0 Project Maps and Report UNCLASSIFIED Kirkut AiTundm Diwaniy At Project Report by Governorate Report Criteria: Approved Projects Unspecified Project Code Unspecified Sector Unspecified SubSector Unspecified Ministry Unspecified Governorate Governorate Summary: 1 Projects Anbar Governorate Summary: 198 Projects Babil Governorate Summary: 69 Projects Baghdad Governorate Summary: 229 Projects Basrah Governorate Summary: 203 Projects Dahuk Governorate Summary: 37 Projects Diyala Governorate Summary: 171 Projects Erbil Governorate Summary: 54 Projects Karbala Governorate Summary: 38 Projects Missan Governorate Summary: 161 Projects Muthanna Governorate Summary: 178 Projects Najaf Governorate Summary: 38 Projects Ninewa Governorate Summary: 216 Projects Qadissiya Governorate Summary: 50 Projects Salah al-Din Governorate Summary: 204 Projects Sulaymaniyah Governorate Summary: 40 Projects Tameem Governorate Summary: 145 Projects Thi-Qar Governorate Summary: 168 Projects Wassit Governorate Summary: 139 Projects Nationwide Governorate Summary: 25 Projects $507,659,520 $526,321,786 $3,054,545,236 $1,779,414,183 $344,113,113 $478,617,139 $398,139,122 $229,82Z573 $193,760,900 $267,004,604 $214,378,331 $1,039,175,931 $283,253,648 $517,239,496 $439,076,560 $285,831,792 $797,126,606 $178,551,721 $1,146,633,439 Report 2364 Projects $12,680,665,701 Thursday, March 11, 2004 Page I of 1 Regional Governorate Teams Logistics Status LOGISTICS STATUS IS 4 Buildings Traller/FiXed/Tent 4 Buildings Office/Residential IS IS 3 ElectrIcay Generator/Local IS Vehicles Truck/Car Armored/Soft Fue; Type! Capacity Region Governorate Baghdad Baghdad Center Baghdad Baghdad Noah Mosul Arbil rbil MF24331982 == =1:1 61M F 82 8008 = C 6730349 =6 1W.EMMLF320629 6 1080392954 IMEMEMIESIEMEEMINI mum Kirkuk M[4339271 MF24331082 MF2433198 MF2433198 /A N/A N/A 120F N/A N/A 1H 00114 9 9 99 MS/I, D-5K LE 82 8006 LE 82 BOO. I F 12 800612EMEM 206 11-1 Evam 62 6 2/0/79 M 500 MIZEDESIIMEMEMIEMINIEMZEI IM31132M 2 MIEMINDIMEZE 5/8 MO U-SOD IF 20629 6 LF320629 LF320629 6 L080392954 L08039295 L09039295 24/1/0 LIIIIIKM1111113LEUNGIENIETI Feed /0/5 M -2K Bomm. Noresmanimimm N/A BD 113.1111103.1.101 NM MEM MEM M643392717 17E4378241 ME43392717 /0 SOF 19 24 C/H Both 65 6 1018 -5K Central South Hillah M5469977 MA469977 MA469977 M0469977 47/2/1 16099/ 60/12 2058/0 62/60 48187 All Both ipht19: 90W 102/0/a1112Kt TRS(both) Anbar Ramadi LC309017 LCLC389017 1L5417997 1/0389017 I 141 Babil Ill//oh MA469976 M5469976 176471950 17A469976 Katbala Karbala M0078071 1111078011 17I3078071 MB078071 6/0 664980 0 250 3-Jan Najaf Najaf 110408428 M6408428 MA 408428 M0404428 14 3 26 300F 13/4 13/2 C G BTU Amp/ 1 4 1 MID Oadislyah Diwardyah MA 917414 MA 917414 MA 924389 M6917414 I 1 30/22 100/4/ 15/4 15/4 C-H 711 1 W W II 3 KBR Wasd Out NA 76 957 NA 765957 NA 765957 NA 765957 050 -Feb 0/54 0/75 0/57 0/62 C CJG )1 V 5-Apr KBR South BaSrah .. -. . -• ''' 120/4 M-9K, D Dhi Oar Maysan Muthanna Nasariyah Amarah Sarnawah As of 9117/2004 C D Regional Governorate Teams Logistics Status LOGISTICS STATUS Billet Location Gdd # Binlain% Office/ Billet Spaces Trailer/Fixed Mess Capacity Trailer/Fixed Capacity Trader Fixed A Latrine Capacity Trailer Fixed Heat Type/Capaci chides Truck/Car Arrnored/Soft 8 Region Baghdad Governorate Center Baghdad Baghdad Baghdad North Mosul Arbil Arbil MF24331982 MF24331982 MF2433198 5724331982 NIA N/A N/A 120F N/A N/A C/H Both 9 9 50/2/48 M-5K, 0-56 DaNM Talc 06 LF 18218006 LF 18218006 LF 1821800 IF 18218006 OHS 265 245 N/A 5 5 C/H 62 2/0/2 5-500 Diyala Bagubah MC 6738391 MG 67383417 MG6738341 MGD7383417 05/2/0 65 65F 20 9 All Both 95/8W 95/8N 15/0/15 M- 500 Ninawa Mosul LF32062916 LF32062916 LF3206291E LF32062916 74/1/0 66/1 IC 8 8 C/H Both Fixed Fixed 5/0/5 -2K Salah Ad Din L080392954 LD80392954 L08039295, L080392954 24/1/0 24/0 LC 10 10 A Sulaymaniyah Tamira Sulaymanlyah Kirkuk TOO TAD TAD TOT ME43392717 ME43392717 ME4378241 10E43392717 N448 80/0 5OF 19 24 C/H Both 65 65 8/0M M-55 Central South Anbar Babil Karbala Najaf Qadisiyah Wasit Hillah Ramadi Hillah Karbala Najaf Diwanlyah Oct 5A469977 5A469977 14A469977 M4469977 4212/1 5015i, 69/120 205f/0 62/60 48/87 At Both 381,119" 90W 02/0/NI 2KLTRS(boll ) LC389017 MA469976 55578071 MA408428 MA 917414 NA 765957 LCL C389017 MA469976 MB078071 MA 408428 MA 917414 NA 765957 L0417997 LC389017 14 0 26 0 13 2 0 26 4 None MA471950 MA469976 M6078071 59078071 6/0 ' MA 408428 MA404920 MA 924389 5A917414 NA 765957 0A765957 350 3 26 1 30/22 3-Feb 0/54 250 0001 13/4 100/4/ 15/4 0/75 0/57 13/2 BTU Amal 15/4 C H SD' 0/62 C/G 3-Jan 1 4 1 MID 1 1 3 KOR 5-Apr KBR South Basrah 1120/4 M-9K, D-166 1 Al Basrah 1Basrah 0LI74047701 13074357700 i0074347709 I1[ IL Cs/ Oar Nasariyah Maysan Amaral, Muthanna Samawah Policies for Post-Occupation Iraq RAND March 2004 Likely Situation Post-June 30 • Interim government likely to be weak, inexperienced, corrupt and perceived as beholden to Coalition Groups will maneuver for advantage in writing constitution, preparing for elections Violence likely to increase Sophistication of attacks still rising Mass casualty terrorism on upswing Political groups engage in violent conflict Economic growth will be strong But price controls will result in misallocation of resources, shortages, and lines, with destabilizing effects on security RAND/ National Security Research Division 2 3/23/2004 07:33 Sunni Disaffection Most Serious Challenge to Stability • We recommend: • Increasing economic assistance to Sunni regions and neighborhoods, targeted towards moderates Accelerating selective rehabilitation of former Baathists Providing UN mandate to develop truth and reconciliation process UN should be given broad responsibility to oversee elections and assist with writing Iraqi constitution RAND/ National Security Research Division 3 3/23/2004 07:33 Public Security Must Become Centerpiece of Military Strategy • Coalition's key task is to make Iraq safer for Iraqis • Most important metric in Iraq: Number of civilians killed; not insurgents killed, coalition casualties • Coalition also needs to focus on protecting Iraqi leaders, foreigners assisting with reconstruction • Counterinsurgency efforts remain important so as to get the "bad guys' out of circulation • Coalition forces will need to pursue delicate balance • In peaceful areas, need to withdraw "over the horizon" Iraqis see Iraqi forces providing security • In contentious areas, need "3 block" strategy: 1. Quick, lethal response to attacks 2. Humanitarian assistance after violence 3. Daily help with reconstruction RAND/ National Security Research Division 4 3/23/2004 07:33 Security Needs a More Multinational Look • U.K should take over for the Poles in South- Central Iraq; NATO should replace U.K. in Southeast • Iraqi Armed Forces (IAF) needs to be truly integrated into Coalition operations • UN or EU could contribute to training police • Police, nOt Iraqi Civil Defence Corps (ICDC or NIA, will be on frontlines with insurgents Garner local intelligence - Provide local security • Improving the quality of police through training by foreign advisors, not expanding numbers, should be the priority RAND/ National Security Research Division 5 3/23/2004 07:33 Iraq's Economy is Growing Strongly, Will Continue to do so in 2005 • Year-on-year comparisons will be highly favorable in 2004 • Oil output - 0.852 mbd (July 2003); 3.1 mbd (Dec. 2004) • Electricity - 3,193 MW peak capacity (June 2003); 6,000 MW (June 2004) • U.S. Supplemental appropriation will boost investment, spending on security • Investment in water, sewage, schools has high domestic component • Security expenditures will boost incomes • Permissive business environment: low trade barriers, relatively easy to set up a business, few taxes • Other post-conflict economies enjoyed strong growth in first two years: Bosnian, Kosovar economies doubled in size RAND! National Security Research Division 6 3/23/2004 07:33 Growth May Stop When Supplemental Ends 50 45 40 co 35 Ze 30 25 20 15 10 Sharp fall in external assistance will hit consumption, investment Growth in oil output will slow Iraqi tax revenues may inadequate, budget cuts may have to take place Iraq extremely vulnerable to fall in the price of oil • GDP El Oil Output la Oil Exports El Supplemental RAND/ National Security Research Division 7 3/23/2004 07:33 Failure to Institute Economic Policy Reforms Will Derail Growth Ridiculously low prices for energy resulting in shortages, smuggling; lines for gasoline exacerbate security problems Food rationing system highly dysfunctional: deprives Iraqi farmers, manufacturers of domestic market Budget totally dependent on oil exports; contingency planning needed in case exports fail to materialize Central Bank of Iraq still lacks monetary policy framework Civil servants in all ministries and the Central Bank o Iraq need training, better management Agricultural subsidies need to be better targeted RAND/ National Security Research Division 8 3123/2004 07:33 Supplemental Skewed Towards Electric Power, Water, Sewage $6,000 $5,000 .0 $4,000 $3,000 E $2,000 $1,000 $0 .Z‘ < RAND/ National Security Research Division 9 3/23/2004 07:33 Supplemental Poorly Allocated to Maximize Economic Growth • Failure to charge, collect for electricity usage exaggerates estimates of demand • Power plants better financed using loans, not grants • 3.2 cents/gallon gasoline prices encouraging overinvestment in refinery capacity • Road repair, rehabilitation gives most bang for the buck: $240 million allocation low • Grant money most useful when used to fund projects difficult to fund with loans • Training • Civil service reform • Computerization, streamlining of government operations RAND/ National Security Research Division 10 3/23/2004 07:33 Sovereignty Will Dramatically Alter Roles of Foreign Actors UN can play role of moderator, goad, and mediator after June 30, but role needs to be well-defined New structures for multilateral consultation vital Each embassy will be housed separately, focus on own issues Home governments likely to take greater role in decision-making Integrated policy planning mechanism needed Authority for assistance programs needs to be concentrated in one pair of hands One senior official at the Assistant or Under Secretary level needs to be assigned with exclusive responsibility for overseeing both policies and programs for Iraq RAND/ National Security Research Division 11 3/23/2004 07:33 Page 1 of 1 (b)(6) From: To: (b)(6) Sent: Monday, March 22, 2004 5:43 PM Cc: Bearpark, Andy Amb. (CIV); Larry (SES); Nash, David (SES); Holly, John (SES-3) ional Operations Officers: Please forward to your respective Regional and Governorate Coordinators and Regional Chiefs of Staff. Please request recipients insure that they provide this info to their teams. All: FYI/use as appropriate. Questions — AIL Thanks (b)(6) Deputy, Regional Operations Directorate of Operations and Infrastructure (C) DSN: 11,111 (b)(6) COM 3/25/2004 JOINT INFORMATION MEMORANDUM FOR GOVERNORATE TEAMS SUBJECT: POST CPA FIELD PRESENCE FROM: ANDY BEARPARK AND DAVID NASH On March 16 Ambassador Bremer signed an Action Memorandum which establishes the Program Management Office (PMO) as the "prime owner" and essential innkeeper for overseeing governorate facilities post June 30. The concept is simple. The PMO will manage the facilities, and in some cases be a significant user of them. But it will also provide a home for State Department officers and others. The decision applies to those entities who wish to attach themselves to these facilities for purposes of, inter alia, combined security, economies-of-scale and regular substantive interaction. While many details must be worked, this approach will: capture sunk US taxpayer and other Coalition player costs while saving contract and other funds by avoiding duplicative facilities; lower overall COM and other security costs; allow quicker implementation of PMO and other activities by greatly slimming deployment requirement lists; and, meet Administration and Coalition needs for effective implementation of involved activities. The latter also serves the requirements of the Iraqi Government. Ambassador Bremer's decision must be understood as one that supports both USG and Coalition interests at large. Direct-hire Department of State, USAID and other official USG must locate at these facilities for both living and working purposes. A similar requirement may be levied on some USG contractors. Other official Coalition personnel, bilateral development agencies and their contractors plus multilateral agencies, NGOs and certain others may participate in varying locations in differentiated formats on cost bases determined by official USG formulae. There are many issues that must be addressed before this decision is made whole. We will be arranging a series of site visits as soon as possible, but will of course seek to minimize the burden on you at all times. Likewise we will need to ask you to send us some data electronically. We will be in touch separately about that. in the Directorate of Operations and Infrastructure is Deputy (b)(6)The POC lead in the Program Management Office is Deputy They are organizing a team now to make the first of several field visits to governorate sites. These visits will be coordinated with the State Department Regional Security Office (RSO), CJTF7 and others. In advance, we thank all of you for your cooperation and the extreme patience that will be required to make it work. Page 1 of 1 (b)(6) 1-) From: (b)(61 Sent: Monday, March 29, 2004 10:45 AM To: Jones, Richard (AMB),(b)(6) (b)(6) Cc: Subject IIG's Power to Enter into International Agreements Attached please find a memorandum we have drafted regarding the IIG and its capacity to enter into international agreements. I think it will be helpful in assessing the needs in this area. If you have any comments, please let me know. We would like to put it in late tonight or first thing tomorrow morning. Thanks, (b)(6) 3/29/2004 COALITION PROVISIONAL AUTHORITY BAGHDAD INFO MEMO March 29, 2004 FOR: THE ADMINISTRATOR FROM: The Office of the General Counsel SUBJECT: Iraqi Interim Government's Power to Enter into International Agreements In discussions regarding the powers and structures of the Iraqi Interim Government (IIG), certain limitations, including to the IIG's ability to enter into treaties and international agreements, are being contemplated so that the government does not act beyond its perceived legitimacy. Nonetheless, upon the transfer of full governmental authority from the CPA to the JIG, the United States and other nations will likely need or want to conclude a number of agreements with the IIG. Some of the agreements are time-sensitive and should be concluded immediately upon, or very shortly after, the transition. Accordingly, the IIG must have some ability to conclude certain international agreements that endure, preferably beyond its replacement by an elected government, the Iraqi Transitional Government (ITG). If not, such agreements will have to wait until the formation of the ITG in early 2005. This memorandum briefly categorizes and summarizes these potential agreements. The United States will likely need to conclude the following agreements: • Diplomatic and Consular Relations. The United States will need to exchange diplomatic notes reestablishing diplomatic and consular relations with Iraq. Such an exchange of notes will constitute an international agreement, will likely occur on June 30th or July la, and could provide the appropriate privileges and immunities for U.S. personnel (or portions thereof). • EmbassPropertv. The Department of State has set an ambitious schedule to build the new embassy and will accordingly need to have clear title or a long-term lease in place before breaking ground, as scheduled, in . In exchange for the new property, such an agreement could release the claim owned by the United States with respect to U.S. diplomatic property expropriated in 1971. • Economic Assistance. Given the limitations in the existing 1951 Point Four General Agreement for Technical Cooperation, the United Sikes may need to negotiate a bilateral agreement that sets the framework for technical, infrastructure, and commodity assistance. In addition, the agreement could ensure the continued availability of a tax exemption for U.S. Government assistance. Such an exemption currently exists in section 4 of CPA Order No. 49 (Tax Strategy for 2004), but would likely be subject to change by the IIG. The United States may wish to conclude the following agreements: • Claims Settlement/Waiver. As was the case in Germany and Japan, the United States may wish to obtain a waiver of all claims of Iraq and its nationals against the United States and its nationals arising out of the war or the occupation or out of actions taken because of the existence of a state of war or the occupation. • Iraqi Government-owned property. The United States may need to ensure that the property assigned by the CPA to public and private agencies for the use and benefit of the Iraqi people will remain with those groups and not be confiscated by the IIG or the subsequent ITG. • Status of Forces Agreement. Current thinking in Washington appears to be that U.N. Security Council Resolution 1511 satisfactorily ensures that the multinational force has the protections (privileges, immunities and exemptions) it needs after the end of the occupation. A status of forces agreement would be one means of enhancing these protections. The Transitional Administrative Law implies that the ITG (vice the lI(3) should engage in negotiations to conclude binding international agreements regarding the activities of the multinational force operating in Iraq. Nonetheless, the United States may wish to obtain a status of forces agreement from the JIG. (Such an agreement could also authorize operations of the multinational force.) Coalition partners of the United States may wish to conclude the following agreements: • Diplomatic and Consular Relations. Our Coalition partners are likely to open diplomatic and consular relations with the JIG using an exchange of notes. • Status of Forces Agreement. Some Coalition members have indicated that, in the absence of a new U.N. Security Council Resolution, they will seek a status of forces agreement to afford the appropriate protections (privileges, immunities, and exemptions) for their forces and accompanying elements. • Embassy Property. Our Coalition partners may want to obtain a permanent location for their diplomatic operations through an agreement. • Claims Settlement/Waiver. Our Coalition partners are likely to want the same waiver as described above. The United States has a strong interest in Iraq concluding the following agreements: • International Financial Institutions (IFIs). In order to begin restructuring Iraq's sovereign debt load and participating in future WI programs, the IIG must be able to assume UNCLASSIFIED 2 obligations related to new lending and recognize existing debts, including longer-term (e.g., 30-year) obligations. • Non-proliferation. The United States favors Iraq's accession to the Chemical Weapons Convention and the International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA) Additional Protocol at the earliest time appropriate. Separately, the United States favors Iraq's reaffirmation of its obligations under the Nuclear Nonproliferation Treaty, the Iraq/lAEA Safeguards Agreement, the Biological Weapons Convention and the 1925 Geneva Protocol on the Use in War of Poisonous Gases or Bacteriological Methods of Warfare. Iraq could reaffirm its commitment to honor these obligations in a unilateral declaration or an international agreement with the United States. ATTACHMENTS: NONE COORDINATION: Deputy Administrator Amb. Jones — Governance 6) MFA, vA \ CJTF-7,(b)(6) CJTF-7, UNCLASSIFIED 3 (b)(6) From: Sent: To: Subject: Rath Met Andrew (SES1) Monday, March 29, 2004 7:32 AM Jones, Richard (AMB) coaon entity post-CPA slides.ppt (304 KB) Dick, Further to our conversations on the evolution of ABIRD, I wanted to ensure you were aware of the thinking coming from the DoD portion of the ITPT (Wolfowitz is, I believe the driver). You will see they have come up with the concept of a coalition coordination board - tightly linked to the US COM and clearly coalition - not international. I have pushed back on this in line with our discussions and would think that State will resist it. I understand that Riccardione and Kicklighter are briefing their interim ITPT findings to the White House today so it would be worth trying to obtain a copy of their briefing once it is finalized. US Mission Baghdad, Country Team Ambassador MNF-I Commander Executive Secretariat Deputy Chief of Mission MGT/Chief of Staff . . . • CLO .IMO • FM0 •MED • GS0 •080 • HR mbassy/MNF-I Joint Management Council Office of Security Cooperation Construction/ Contract Mgt. Office (1) Assistance Coordination Staff US AID Treasury Contractors/Technical Advisors report to appropriate Country Team elements PawIncl.' Teams or Consulate. Coordinate with and/or report to appropriate Country Team Offices, Executive Secretariat, and MNF-1 Footnote: 1. Construction and Contact Mgt Office components MD. Includes Army Corps of Engineers and Army Contracting Agency; includes civilians, ex-PMO as appropriate. Note: Most mission offices will coordinate directly with coalition counterparts. US Mission Action Core Teams Economic Recovery/Essential Services Core Team Law Enforcement/Security Core Team State Econ (CHAIR) DOT DOE 111111 POL (CHAIR) Consular DA0 DEA MII 1111111 DOJ II. Construction & Treasury US AID Contract Mgt Office PAO III °GA Lif. S . Ministry MNF-I REP Advisors POL-MIL RSO TSA Ministry Advisors MNF-I REP Governance/Human Rights/ Democracy Core Team POL (CHAIR) DAD ECON DOJ Public Communications Core Team PAO (CHAIR) MNF-I Public Affairs Provincial Team Reps Agency PAOs OGA IIIIII IMO PAO PRM Treasury Ministry US AID Advisors IMNF-I REP Note: Each team includes Ambassador's Executive Secretariat staff officer Ministry Advisors CJTF-7 LTG Ricardo Sanchez Multinational Divisions (MND) North 101st AASLT N-Central 4ID West 82ABN/3ACR Cen-So: POL Div SW GBR Div BGD: lot AD, 2/82ABN, 2LCR COALITION PROVISIONAL AUTHORITY MARCH 2004 Counselors Administrator fkli Amb L. Paul Bremer General Counsel (b)(61 WM= / Info M Mt Unit lMlJ) Policy Planning & Analysis Kl OGA /IL\ (b)(6) Council for International Cooperation (Cie) /L\ c (AUS) Governorate Coordinators Regional Coordinators j 1 (Baghdad) (b)(6,:ri (a1( 11 M iL eh ") 1)* (Basrah) is now Director, Office of Provincial Outreach Deputy Administrator &Chief Operating Officer VADM (ret) John Scott Redd Deputy Administrator & Chief Policy Officer Amb Richard Jones 'Director Director Pmeteaset4r _.P0 ,11 0 Pni‘c-' Director Director National Security Affairs Affairs Director Economic Po Icy Dirictor" Adman & Logistics (1400) chiefprstaff — Culture Amb Mario 0 io (ITA) • Direeto Acting- Industry & — Education Strategic Minerals Communication COL \ Health (1,l1 _I Director Co _ Higher I Foreign — Finance/ Planning n Affairs Dir Headquarters Support Group Regional — Coordinato Dr 11 Science & (PolinY) • Technology — Labor & Social Affairs _ Displacement Govemorate — Coordinators (Policy) (b)( — Trade 6) /1_ \ / \ — Jusdce Youth & Sports Migration (hV61 Agriculture 11_ \ \ II-s\ — Foreign Won Poll Banking Affairs Oil for Food (hV61 11,11K1 Coordination (b)(6) Environment (b)(61 DWecter NAB !....Director 1 r AD ,Directer — Communication 171_ (GMAT?) , — Constructi Housl Acting- MG Paul Eaton Regional Coordinators — - Electricity (b)(6) (Operations) — Public Works II-s\ Govemorate Coordinators — (Operations) _ Transport Amb Darrel Trent — Water Resources CPA-I-iRM altered / 10-Mar-04/ JP Coalition Coordinating Executive Board (CCEB) US Embassy UK Embassy Other Coalition Embassies Ministries" — — — — — Iraqi Reconstruction and Development Coordinating Group DCM DCM Their option or same as Us Executive Director Senior Section 1 MoD Advisor MoF !rag Reconstruction Technical Mol Management Office Advisor Embassy (lRMO) Orations Section 2 MoJ Etc. r Advisors APCO STRATCOM iztr4p4,4t.i0cr,1 Finance. MU 'hatr Contracts I OM ASA President NSC SECDEF United States Mission-Baghdad CENTCOM SEC Army Iraq Multi-National Force (IMNF) Iraq Reconstruction Economy Management Office (IRMO) Political Advisors Consular Theater SPT CMD Iraq Multi-National Command (IMNC) JIACG Operational Command Operational Control ADMIN SPT Strat Comm/Pub Dip AID & Other GO's Off of Prov Outreach President NSC SEC DEF United States Mission-Baghdad CENTCOM SEC Army Iraq Multi-National Force (IMNF) Iraq Reconstruction Management Office (IRMO) Economy Political Consular Theater SPT CMD Iraq Multi-National Command (IMNC) JIACG PGNI/Plan & RPT AID & Other GO's Off of Prov Outreach Operational Command Operational Control President NSC SECDEF United States Mission-Baghdad CENTCOM SEC Army ** Iraq Multi-National Force (IMNF) Theater SPT CMD Iraq Multi-National Command (IMNC) JIACG Operational Command Operational Control Iraq Reconstruction Management Office (IRMO) Adyiscirs . ADMIN SPT PGM/Plan &RPT Fin MGT Economy Political Consular Strat Comm/Pub Dip AID & Other GO's Off of Prov Outreach Theater SPT CMD President NSC SECDEF United States Mission-Baghdad oahtkoo: CENTCOM APCO SEC Army oo Iraq Multi-National Force (IMNF) CPATT Iraq Reconstruction Management Office (IRMO) Iraq Multi-National Command (IMNC) J1ACG AMIN SPT Operational Command Operational Control PGM/Plan & RPT, Fin MGT Economy Political Consular Strat Comm/Pub Dip AID & Other GO's Off of Prov Outreach Page 1 of 2 (b)(6) From: Sent: To: Cc: DA. Holzman, John C. (AMB) Monday, March 22, 2004 2:39 PM (b)(6) Jones, Richard (AMB) (b)(6) Sftubjert fiE: Lay-down of whostrisiwilogoet.. We should give this our best shot, even though th rom precise. Caveats will certainly be in order. To the extent that we can give Mick Kicklighter and and we will be. As the process proceeds, the numbers wi (b)(61 get ar something to work with the better off they er— ope. (b)(6) Original Message From: 011(61 Sent: Monday, March 22, 2004 7:41 AM To: Holzman, John C. (AMB); Jones, Richard (AMB) (b)(6) Subject: RE: Lay down of who stays/who goes... (b)(6) I was out Sunday, but would like to emphasize that a detailed lay down in two three hours on who stay and who goes would be a very broad brush indeed and so unreliable at this point (since, among other things the precise numbers of ministry advisors/implants is not fixed and the size of CJTF-7 remaining in the Palace are not fixed yet) nor, in my mind is the final size of the State contingent, since State has not acted on the size of our provincial staffing. I would also like to discuss and clarify how jobs like this are tasked to CPA employees. Thanks and regards, (b)(6) Chief of Staff Director of Administration and Logistics Coalition Provisional Authority Baghdad 011(6 DSN: Commerciall(b)(6) Original Message From: (1 1)(6) Sent: Sunday, March 21, 2004 5:11 PM Tcr (b)(6) cc : \ i\ Subject: Lay down of who stays/who goes... Importance: High General Kicklighter would like a detailed lay down of who stays, who goes. Who goes to Embassy who goes to military; who goes away. Have the "best team" to lay that down. He asks for two-three hours. 3/25/2004 Page 2 of 2 I strongly suggest we go as late as possible in their schedule. If they do NOT go north, then we can do that on Tuesday afternoon. I sense that getting a better perspective from the son-of-CPA would be helpful. I know that COO & Strategic Plans are guessing about 200+ experts stay to help with the son-of- CPA. Then we look at whatever is left with the HQ Spt Group. Please let me know soonest of (1) team and (2) time. (b)(6) 3/25/2004 COALITION PROVISIONAL AUTHORITY BAGHDAD INFO MEMO March 26, 2004 FOR: FROM: SUBJECT: THE ADMINISTRATOR (b)(6) Ministry Transition—Final Report of post-sovereignty support plans We present our findings on the support which Senior Advisors and Ministers consider is needed to the Baghdad ministries after June 30. This consists of: • Summary sheets on the support needed by Ministries and their transition status. These cover some key performance indicators and include a breakdown, and summary paragraphs of the concept for each Ministry, as you requested • Two detailed sheets on each Ministry in case you want more detail Findings Overall, our work identified a need for [15] policy advisors and [181] technical advisors— [196] in total - to be based in the Ministries after June 30. These numbers are projected to fall rapidly over time, to [117] after 6 months, [25] after 12 months and [8] after 24 months. Of the starting total, [116] posts are definitely proposed as US civilian hires, including [78] 3161s, and [27] posts are judged likely to be provided by Coalition partners, though this is probably the lower end of the range eg DfID has not yet decided how many of its current contractors to extend. The number of advisors presented,here excludes: • Other US posts already fully funded fronithe supplemental to at least April 2005: apart from civilian police trainers, there are some 107 developing the Iraqi prison service, and another 60 or so staff who will be working to stand up justice agencies including the IST and Commission on Public Integrity • US embassy staffing — if anything there may be a very small amount of double counting with the assumptions DoS has made for that • Staff funded through wider aid programs (e.g. USAID and DfiD) — typically project based support • Advisors which the relevant Ministers intend to recruit from other international agencies e.g. WHO, and which they will definitely not be seeking from any successor organization to CPA. Issues We think it will be important to draw attention to the relatively short durations proposed for many of the advisor roles — it reflects the need to achieve a smooth transition. While we have encouraged Senior Advisors to minimize the duration of the support they recommend, we think you may want tchiabe the assumption that MoT will need support for only 6 months after transition. (bY6 is not expected to return until 30 March, so we have been unable to pursue this with him.] If you want to recommend a smaller number of advisors, we suggest you might remove or reduce numbers in the less important Ministries and/or bear down on larger numbers in power Ministries. For example, it would not be difficult to save 15 posts from the relatively large numbers of advisors proposed for the ministries of Housing, Culture and Youth & Sports, as well as for the Central Bank. The need for senior policy advisers in some of the apparently more capable Ministries could also be challenged. While we don't have specific cuts to propose in the more significant Ministries, we would suggest reviewing the number of advisors proposed for Oil, Transportation and Communications. Our memo of March 19 promised further advice on the need for continuing support at Regional and Governorate level. COO aims to provide this to you. A key issue will be what happens to Baghdad Central after June 30 - it is a large office currently and the US Embassy in Baghdad is unlikely to assume many of its responsibilities. We understand that the future staffing of Stratcom is being addressed by the transition team and the NSC in Washington. Next steps We stand ready to discuss our finding with you, ADM Redd and Amb Jones. You may also wish to meet individual Senior Advisors for those Ministries where you intend to modify their staffing recommendations. Once we have your recommendation, Admin and Logistics need to work on support staff numbers, and discuss with relevant CPA staff their availability to remain after June 30. ATTACHMENTS: 1. Summary matrix on Ministry support needs 2. 3. 4. Summary paragraph of concept for each Ministry's support Overview of Ministry transition status Assessment pack on each Ministry COORDINATION: Deputy Administrator - Chief Operating Officer - COPY: PM0 USAILFM UNCLASSIFIED 2 Combs* as this tho cascogAte" Dri*kowsI provIdeitT DfID, Dir Inf (b)(6) Dir Admin, UNCLASSIFIED 3 Postured Peownnnol Criticality of Capability Ministry Services of Ministry INTERIOR , ,4 Atitude of Ministry Risk of Failure w/o support Sr Policy Advisors Technical Max Duration Advisors 3161 Contractor Detailee Forel n Military UNK Total (months) . 29 30 30 6 OIL 4 14 6 ELECTRICITY 2 8 10 24 ..-, 4 JUSTICE 2 5 12 ., DEFENCE Un ny,u I no n 20 5 16 21 24 TRADE X 1;1: 7 7 36 FINANCE F Medu 1 11 3 12 12 TRANSPORTATION Very ImpotruE Fart ris.rrr 0 10 6 AGRICULTURE Very Imorant For F t: 6 4 COMMUNICATIONS Very !moor:oat Fart 14 14 14 11 CENTRAL BANK L., S-z:,, . • tvlsJlurn 7 30 MUNIC. & PUBLIC WORKS t r,•,r,;••• • • MCd1,11 .lit. '41-, 3 12 WATER RESOURCES wary imp: ''. 9 12 LABOR AND SOCIAL AFFAIRS Very Impc .-. ..:.• . 4 4 12 Very Imo: i i HEALTH IEREMEr, HOUSING 7 1,7 - .:- ,:.,- ,. F ,- 8 18 ., EDUCATION :••:.Lir. - ...*- .- 2 12 HIGHER EDUCATION ' . .,,, 3o3. r 6 DISPLACEMENT & MIGRATION F t,.•!- 3 6 HUMAN RIGHTS :rh; ;2£' , ,ir.:*. .. A c, 2 6 CULTURE 5 24 ENVIRONMENT 3 18 FOREIGN AFFAIRS • ..fri,o- ' 4 12 INDUSTRY & MINERALS 2 12 PLANNING & DEV. COOP V; F 4 12 SCIENCE AND TECH 2 2 YOUTH AND SPORTS 12 70 74.L Italicized ministries have not yet submitted details Total US Personnel (not including unknowns) 116 Interior The personnel requirements for the Ministry of Interior after transition are related to the unique nature of the mission with which CPA/MOI has been tasked. The mentoring and advisory oversight of 200,000 active duty security personnel who must be recruited, trained and equipped—while under attack — present significant challenges to the staff responsible. Most of the support personnel for the ministry following transition will come from the CPATT organization. Justice The centerpiece of assistance to the justice sector after July 1 will be training to inculcate a culture of judicial independence and rule- of-law norms. A corollary assistance priority will be advising on security to protect the machinery of justice from the predations of terrorists and criminals. The post-transition plan for the Ministry of Justice proper therefore calls for a contingent of 13 training advisors and three U.S. Marshals as security advisors. Of these, 12 training advisors are already funded out of the supplemental, leaving one training supervisor requiring salary and life-support funding, and life support only for the three security advisors, whose salaries are being paid for by DoJ. The one training supervisor is critical to keep on board after the transition because he is currently arranging numerous training programs, both systematic and piece-meal, which will extend beyond July I. There is also an IPCC advisor currently lodged in the Senior Advisor's, whose advice will likely be needed beyond the transition. Since the post-transition Embassy structure remains unclear, it is uncertain whether a post-transition Senior Advisor (or equivalent) for justice will be necessary. The necessary support for management and training in the prison service and for standing up the Commission on Public Integrity is fully funded by the supplemental — potentially some 130 posts in all. Trade From a macroeconomic point of view, Iraq needs to raise prices and wages to the level found in neighboring countries. The challenge for the Ministry of Trade ("MOT") will be to help maintain political stability by maintaining the Public Distribution System—making it more efficient and less costly to the public treasury while leading an all-out effort to develop and create a diverse and wealth- creating private sector. The MOT can play a key role in stimulating the growth of the private sector in a number of areas. It will have the lead in managing Iraq's process of accession to the WTO. This process will require extensive legislative changes in Iraq in order to create an enabling legal environment conducive to economic growth, driven by entrepreneurship and innovation in the private sector. In tandem with the legal reform being promulgated by the MOT under the guise of the WTO accession, the Ministry will need to creates number of foreign offices in key international business centers (located in New York, Tokyo, London, and Dubai) which will proactively recruit foreign investors in a highly targeted manner. The Ministry will also be creating domestic "Business Centers" which will assist Iraqi businesses by providing classic management consulting advice on finding financing, and providing basic business skills training in such areas as how to respond to requests for proposals and tenders, understanding financial statements, and change management, as well as providing reading areas with directories and "how to" business publications. These business centers can team with local universities and colleges to create business incubators which will help Iraqi entrepreneurs by providing low cost space, free research assistance, and mentoring until the businesses can be graduated because they have become self sustaining. The business centers can also play a key role in the helping to stimulate civil society institutions such as trade associations and economic think tanks and in stimulating international linkages which have proven business dimensions such as the Sister Cities program. The Ministry may play a key role in dealing with the problem of the State Owned Enterprises by creating a trust to which these enterprises can be transferred. Putting them in a trust with a Board of Trustees to deal with day to day management issues will free the Minister to address policy, trade and investment promotion, and building the private sector. Once in a trust, it will be easier to request targeted technical assistance to restructure, reform and reorganize these SOEs to prepare them for consolidation, privatization, formation of joint ventures, etc. The ultimate aim should always be privatization including via employee stock ownership plans but the method needs to be appropriate to the situation in view of the social and community roles these enterprises have played in Iraqi society. Transportation Transportation has identified technical support requirements for both primary and secondary sectors of the Transportation ministry. For Maritime and Port capability, three technicians are required; one form Port of NY/NJ; two former military for security. For railroad support; three technicians are required; passenger rail, cargo rail and rail security. For aviation support; three technicians are required; all FAA personnel. In the secondary sector, one technician is required for surface movements within Iraq. All positions are estimated to be required until 12/31/04. Agriculture The Ministry of Agriculture requires ongoing support from three full time advisory staff and project based consultants post July 1. The Minister has indicated that he wishes to retain advisory assistance directly. Further, given the far reaching recommendations of the agricultural sector and ministry transition plan (under preparation by DAD, several advisory staff will be required by the Ministry for some time to come. Their functions will need to include: policy advice and development, the implementation of the transition plan across the agricultural sector and the ministry (note - there is going to be resistance to both the transition of the sector to a market based system and within the Ministry in its transition from 'central control' to the provision of 'support' for the agriculture sector), donor project co-ordination, and agricultural procurement and contract management. Water Resources Ministry of Water Resources requires additional technical assistance post the transition on 6/30/04. Technical support includes; USACE technical support to direct and train the ministry capable workforce in master planning for water infrastructure and river engineering, DOD support to interface with the MNF and the FPS guards placed across the country, and administrative support. This level of support is required to transition from a system 30 years behind the times to one which meets modem standards and the needs of the Iraq Water Resources System. Health The Ministry well placed for transition to sovereignty with a clear strategy and supporting management structure, a capable minister and senior advisor team. The Senior Advisor and the Minister agree that the Ministry will need specialized technical support after June 30. The Ministry, in cooperation with the World Bank, USA Health and Human Services, USAID and DfID and donor nations/NG0s, will arrange specific technical assistance agreements. The Ministry does not expect to need advisors from any successor organization to CPA. Higher Education The Ministry has become more confident and adept in all its financial and budgetary matters, the presidents are more comfortable working with the Ministry in setting policy and the Minister is comfortable in sharinr authori . Concerns about the Ministry's ability to handle scholarshi • and exchange matters have been allayed by the selection o as one of the deputy ministers. And the appointment o 7as the second deputy should be excellent for day to day administrative detail. The Senior Adviser does not therefore see a need for support after June 30, except in the ITNTC/computerization area. An existing DoS person in CPA would be available to deliver this: they also have finance and budgeting skills if needed. Displacement and Migration The advisors outlined are needed to help the MoDM develop its staff to adequately address forced migration policy issues. The MoDM has recruited much of its staff relatively recently, (since January 04) and most staff recruited while capable, are not experienced with humanitarian affairs. Therefore, a lead advisor is needed to continue to assist the minister and the ministry with overall policy issues, including working with Iraqi colleagues in Northern Iraq. A technical advisor will work with the director generals to develop the expertise in each department and the Internally Displaced Persons (IDP) Advisor will help the ministry develop expertise on the complex and potentially volatile IDP issues. It will be particularly important to assist the MoDM as the IPCC begins to implement its decisions, which will create a new set of forced migration issues, well beyond July 1. Human Rights Human Rights is a new Ministry, though it is staffing up well. Its Minister, while smart, has little background in the area. Whether he stays or goes, the top team will need expert policy advice and some continuing help with specialist training over the transition. The main new initiative — the creation of a network of human rights centers, will need technical support as it rolls out. Culture Support for the Ministry of Culture after July needs to focus on the associated national heritage organizations, building on the work done there sp far. The Executive Advisor for Museums, Antiquities, Heritage, and Libraries will continue to coordinate US-source financial and professional resources for the problem of restoring Iraq's cultural sites. This position has proven essential to carrying out the US work to date on these institutions and such projects will continue after July 1. The three Technical Advisor positions are continuations of three very successful IRDC positions in support of the Iraq Museum, the State Board of Antiquities and Heritage, and the National Library and Archives. All of these institutions have a difficult road ahead in returning to full operation, and they have requested that these experts continue to assist with this process. In the Ministry itself, a Financial Advisor is needed now and will continue to be required as the Ministry resumes its varied operations in Culture, Heritage, and Tourism under the financial systems of the new Iraq. Although the Ministry itself stands in need of further support, these are the priorities. Environment Ministry of Environment requires Senior Policy Advisor and Technical Advisor post the transition on 6/30/04, including support for strategic planning, coordination with donors and donor funding, procurement of scientific equipment, coordination of international support for priority environmental assessments and projects, development of sound environmental enabling legislation, development of environmental awareness programs, and building the capacity of staff to use new equipment, information technologies, and to facilitate the establishment of national and governorate development assistance centers. This is necessary to stand up an environmental regulatory agency for a country that has been neglected and ignored environmental risk. The Ministry has become more confident and adept in all its financial and budgetary matters, the presidents are more comfortable working with the Ministry in setting policy and the Minister is comfortable in sharing autlyt . Concerns about the Ministry's ability to handle scholarshiti exchange matters have been allayed by the selection ol(1-0(6 -71as one of the deputy ministers. And the appointment of as the second deputy should be excellent for day to day administrative detail. The Senior Adviser does not therefore see a need for support after June 30, except in the ITNTC/computerization area. An existing DoS person in CPA would be available to deliver this: they also have finance and budgeting skills if needed. Foreign Affairs The Ministry is improving. The Senior Adviser sees no need for policy input after 30 June but provision for short term contingency support, if necessary, will be available, together with a limited amount of technical support, which would be useful. This would be: -- Support for implementation of the Ministry Management Plan now under discussion. This support function would be carried out by one person with UK funding and would likely last no more than two months. It would involve sustained engagement with key ministry staff to ensure the smooth implementation of the plan, but will only be implemented if Minister Zebari agrees to the Management Plan and if there is still a need for support after June. -- IT support and training. This support would be carried out by two technical experts, probably from the State Department. One would concentrate on upgrading the Ministry's secure communications system, the other would provide IT training to Ministry staff. This support would continue for up to one year -- Technical support on consular controls. This support would be carried out by one person, probably by a consular officer already assigned to the U.S. embassy. It would be part-time support for the Ministry to assist it in increasing the sophistication of its consular control systems and would continue for about one year. Page 1 of 2 (b)(6) From: Redd, John S (VADM, Ret ) Sent: To: Wednesday, March 24, 2004 9:43 AM Redd, John S (VADM, Ret ), Rathmell, Andrew (SES1), (b)(6) Cc: Jones, Richard (iMB sabliewi s ieD1.0e All, heie's the latest which includes IMU as well. (b)(6) has the pen on org diagrams — please pass suggested changes to her. Scott Redd Vice Admiral, U.S. Navy (ret.) Deputy Administrator and Chief Operating Officer (C00) Coalition Provisional Authority (CPA) Baghdad, Iraq Original Message From: Redd, John S. (VADM, Ret,) Sent: Wednesday, March 24, 2004 ::25 AM To: Rathmell, Andrew (SES1) 1:461 Cc: Jones, Richard (AMB),(b)(6) Subject: RE: Draft' Andrew, It remains in the org chart as do other elements not explicitly noted in the document Attached is current version Scott Redd Vice Admiral, U.S. Navy (ret.) Deputy Administrator and Chief Operating Officer (C00) Coalition Provisional Authority (CPA) Baghdad, Iraq Original Message From: Rathmell, Andrew (SES1) Sent: Wednesday, March 24, 2004 7:25 AM To:(3)(6) Redd, John S. (VADM, Ret.); Oster, Jeffrey W. (0-9) Cc: Jones, Kicnara (Ami3); (b)(6) Subject: RE: Draft' I'd hope we can ensure the program planning function is instantiated in the IRMA/Embassy org chart even if not mentioned here. Andrew Rathmell Office of Policy Planning & Analysis Coalition Provisional Authority - Baghdad Room M239 DS19. 11. \ 7C\ civ: (+) (b)(6) cell: (+ 0 ri ina I Mpsca n From:(b)(61 Sent: Wednesday, March 24, 2004 2:55 AM 3/25/2004 Page 2 of 2 To: Redd, John S. (VADM, Ret.); Oster, Jeffrey W (Cr) Cc: Jones, Richard (AMB); Rathmell, Andrew (SES1);(b)(6) ASA-I&E Subject: RE: Draft' Importance: High Sir: Here's the final draft, incorporating the target dates and Andrew's recommendation re ardin the description of ABIRD as an international, rather than a Coalition advisory board. Best Original Message From: Redd, John S. (VADM, Ret.) Sent: Tuesday, March 23, 2004 7:08 PM To:(b)(6) (CIV) Subject: Draft (b)(6) (b)(6) would like to include a target date to establish IRMO/APCO, say 1 May, with a resultant requirement for an NSPD by, say, 24 April. Idea is to put a bureaucratic forcing function in this. You're my hero. Scott Redd Vice Admiral, U.S. Navy (ret.) Deputy Administrator and Chief Operating Officer (C00) Coalition Provisional Authority (CPA) Baghdad, Iraq 3/25/2004 IRMO'S US MISSION RESPONSIBILITIES Chief of Mission Executive Director IRMO Iraq Reconstruction Management Organization TOTAL FAX 10 EXEC. SEC.; SPECIAL ASSISTANTS/MANAGEMENT STAFF Admin Support TOTAL PAX 20 (FORWARD & REAR) PERSONNEL; LOGISTICS; FACILITIES; INFO TECH A small planning start would help review and manage the strategy, requirements Program planning, and programming for reprioritization of selected reconstruction programs in response lathe situation on the ground. A small reporting staff (current IMU) would Planning and lead reporting efforts. Reporting, Staff TOTAL PAX: 15 Financial Management A small management staff including a CFO, Comptroller, and 1G function would be required for oversight and control. TOTAL PAX: 10 CHIEF FINANCIAL OFFICER, 2; INSPECTOR GENERAL 8 Senior & A high level of advisory support, including in some cases day to day operational Technical functions, will be necessary for those ministries that are critical to US objectives, Advisors * TOTAL PAX: 204 ** (plus INTERIOR: 30 OIL, 13 ELEC: 10 JUSTICE: 6 DEFENSE: 20 TRADE: 7 FIN: 12 TRANS: 10 COMM: 14 AGRIC: 6 supporting CEN. BANK: 6 WATER: 4 LABOR: 4 HEALTH: 22 HOUSING :8 staff) EDUC: 2 HUM RTS, 2 MIGRATION:5 CULTURE: 5 ENVIR: 2 FOR AFFAIRS, 3 PLANNING: 4 SCI&TECH, 2 INDUSTRY: 2 YOUTH&SPORTS: 2 HIGH EDUC. 1 MUNIC.&PUB. WORKS: 3 *Senior and Technical Advisors double-hatted to ABIRD **Numbers are tentative, pending review by CPA Administrator 25 March 2004 VERSION 3 DRAFT WORKING PAPER 0'0 0 Other (3161) Administratively Attached Personnel - STRATCOM - REGIONS - SUPPORT TO IRAQI INDEPENDENT COMMISSIONS - OTHERS TBD Army Programming and Contracting Office (APCO) u, u COALITION PROVISIONAL AUTHORITY EXF jIVE SECRETARIAT DATE: I6-Mar-04 FOR: ORIGINATOR: TIE ADMINISTRATOR Infrastruc(ure& Operations Ambassador Jones continent Ash. Jones read the attached memo and noted the following: I agree +pith the overall concept, but I hare some comments: -- No consulates will he opened in the immediate post CPA period (NM opposes, Slate Dept. too) -- Costs of offices would be shared according to established Admit+ WASS) rules. State will have fewer people than PilIO/AID and others. So its share be small. Oar goal should be to continue using current facilities wherever we can. AvrAci IMENT: March 13 Mena) from "Post Cl'A Field Preset!" 1. 1 , \ \A _ b)(6 COALITION PROVISIONAL AUTl IORITY BAGHDAD ACTION MEMO March 13.2004 FOR: THE ADMINISTRATOR FROM: SUBJECT: Post CPA Field Presence Planning for post CPA activities continues. An important element is the post CPA field presence and structure. All concerned are keen to move ahead quickly with this, but we are hampered by uncertainty over the overall CPA post-transition structure, particularly the precise roles of the PNIO and IRNIA (if it is created). There is also an issue of cost — field offices are very expensive. Security alone is estimated in excess of USS300 million per year. Your current guidance is that you want to see all the RT and CT site offices (18) to remain open with a continuing. international flavor. The following model has been discussed widely within CPA and appears to be practicable. I should be grateful for your views. Regional presence: Regional offices will be located in Kirkuk. Hiltah and Basrah. These regional offices will contain the following elements: • U.S. Consulates, and UK Consulates in Basrah and possibly Kirkuk • PM0 and/or IRMA • USA I D • Other bilateral development agencies We assume that the financing would come from State, with other non-U.S. tenants reimbursing a share. Governorate presence: It is suggested that the PM0 become prime "owner" of the Governorate offices located in Dahuk, Arbil. Sulaimaniya, Baqubah (Diyala), Al Kut (Wassit), Al Amarah (Maysan), An Nasiriyah (Dhi Qar) and As Samawah (Muthanna). They are self-sustainable with contract security, CT locations in Tikrit (Salah ad Din), Mosul (Ninawa), Ramadi (Al Anbar), Karbala, An Najaf and Diwartiyah (Al Qadisiyah) are within Coalition military compounds. An agreement would have to be reached with CJTF-7 and its successor organization for the utilization of these locations or the sites be relocated "outside the wire" at significant cost. UNCLASSIFIED The Governorate Governorate offices will be utilized to provide administrative, site security and life support for P),I0 prime and subcontractors. PNIO would administer the current CT locations. Others who could be allowed access on a reimbursable basis, room permitting could include: • State Department staff • USAID and their contractors • other bilateral development agency contractors They will be allowed access, room permitting. RECOMMENDATION: That you approve the above mentioned concept. Approve: Disapprove: Approve with modification: /2 0 / . COORDINATION: COO FMO OPPA Comptroller Director, Civil Affairs ATTACHMENT: PM0 Project Maps and Report fAit7 'ecoitt UNCLASSIFIED SITE SECURITY PSD VEHICLES REMARKS Region Governorate Baghdad Baghdad Location Baghdad Baghdad Global Global Global Global North Mosul SBCT Wig SBCT Arbil Arbil TO (Posh) (7 1C (Pooh) Dahuk Dahuk BW (TED) BW Diyala Baqubah st ID MO lot ID Mil) Nina a Mosul SBCT ;Mil) Same Salah Ad Din Tik it st ID "Mil) Same Sulaymaniyah Sulayrnaniyah TC (TBD) IC Tam in Kirkuk TC (40) TC Central South Hillah OW (56) BW Anbar Rimad 1st MET TC Babil Hillah BW BW (12) Karbala Karbala Bulg (Mil) BW (36) Najaf Naja Span (Mil) Span (Mil) Qadisiyah Diwanyeh Dom (Mil) BW (12) Wasit Kut TO (50) TC I South Ras,' h Global (101) Global Al Basrah Basrah Global )IS 1) Global Dhi Oar Nasariyah WI (Mil) dal (Mil) Maysan Am rob UK (Mil) UK (Mil Muthanna Samawah BW (33) BW 13W - Black VVa or CRG - Controlled Rsks Group TO - Triple Canopy e. Hard Cars • Current OSI None 0 CRGIOSI C (18) BW (8) TC (12) TC (24) TC (25) TC (24) RG 2 3 2 OSI 1 2 TC (24) 2 Poles (Mil) BW (14) BW (8) BW (9) CRG NCIS RG R G R G RG Hard Cars • Future 2 Hard Cars actually in Arbil 1 4 Ilife Support Shared ‘6,/ Region Advance in Place - Iraqi Police to Penh No worksde selected - TC Schad to cover Downtown site Global Until 1 April 5 i e Support Shared w/ Region 3 3 3 Plus Salvadorans Site also covers Hillah GT 4 5 25 25 TC (74) takes over 1 April TC (74) takes over 1 April - Shared WI Region 6 4 2 7 5 3 TC takeover TOO (TCN Fielding) TC takeover TIM (1CN Fielding) NOTE: Total TC Hard Cam deploye Does not include inbound DoS assets PSD for GT Baghdad reviewing funding Prepared by JVVA As 0.3/2612004 Page 01,1501461 0:0(4) Message Page 1 of 1 Sent: Tuesday, March 23, 2004 6:11 PM To: Jones, Richard (AMB) Cc: (b)(61 Subject: Transition from CPA to Mission Dick -- Please tell Jerry that I briefed Condi and Steve thoroughly on your transition plan, and they a Armitage will inform us of State's current position on the subject later this week, havingdTited the results of Powell's visit to Baghdad. I will immediately let you and Jerry know the results of that. d. I think we are making progress. Look forward to seeing you both again in early April. Best. (b)(6) 3/25/2004 Required Personnel Minis Criticality of Capability Services of MiniS Risk of Atitude of Failure wlo MinIs sep.Advisors Sr. Policy Technical Advisors 3161 Contractor DetaIlee Foreign Military UNK Total INTERIOR 1 29 30 30 OIL 1 13 14 14 MM. ELECTRICITY Fee 2 8 10 JUSTICE Fee 5 5 Fab DEFENCE Un non Uvknowfl 1 20 16 21 TRADE F eW 1 6 7 FINANCE Fair 12 Fair TRANSPORTATION Fat Fat 0 0 10 Egg AGRICULTURE Fair Ft* 9 3 9 COMMUNICATIONS ,, Fair Medium 14 4 14 CENTRAL BANK Madam 1 6 7 7 MUNIC. & PUBLIC WORKS Medium 3 3 3 WATER RESOURCES 8 4 9 LABOR AND SOCIAL AFFAIRS MUM. Medium 3 4 4 HEALTH WA HOUSING F* 8 11111117911M EDUCATION FaY 2 2 HIGHER EDUCATION Mir= DISPLACEMENT & MIGRATION Fair 1 2 3 HUMAN RIGHTS Fed 2 CULTURE MraiiMedIan 5 5 5 ENVIRONMENT 3 3 FOREIGN AFFAIRS IIINIMII 4 4 INDUSTRY & MINERALS 2 PLANNING & DEV. COOP 3 4 =MIMI 1 SCIENCE AND TECH IffirMil 2 2 YOUTH AND SPORTS Lena ''4. 1 251 4 31 't Italicized ministries have not yet submitted details Total US Personnel (no including unknowns) 116 M. Duration (months) 6 6 24 12 24 36 12 6 4 11 30 12 12 12 18 12 6 6 6 24 18 12 12 12 2 12 Required Personnel Risk of Criticality of Capability Atitude of Failure w/o Sr. Policy Technical Ministry , Services of Ministry Ministry support Advisors Advisors 3161 Contractor Detallee Forel , n Military UNK Total Max Duration (months) INTERIOR .,..:2::- .,..(1! ..L.,;_i , 1:,: i... - .6,; 29 30 30 . OIL 13 14 14 ELECTRICITY 2 8 4 0 24 rar ,..7. C. ' ' " JUSTICE a, Fa r 5 2 5 12 DEFENCE 1 20 5 It 21 24 TRADE F ' . 6 7 36 FINANCE . r ru Moth um 1 II 3 12 12 TRANSPORTATION Very Invade i F ir 10 10 10 AGRICULTURE Very ennore, F r Fair 9 3 COMMUNICATIONS Veer frnool r F MEri nr. 14 14 4 11 CENTRAL BANK In, ri. ‘..! . 6 7 30 . MUNIC. & PUBLIC WORKS Mcdxv 3 3 3 12 . WATER RESOURCES W.) , Import, a 1 8 4 0 12 LABOR AND SOCIAL AFFAIRS 1 3 12 Very Import,. HEALTH V..rY IMPOrtiA . HOUSING 8 18 EDUCATION .i :- .11 2 2 2 12 HIGHER EDUCATION fq :•' ..VW- DISPLACEMENT & MIGRATION , ,z.rt, ,,, I 2 _.., HUMAN RIGHTS 7rd CULTURE ..`1 ,mtvie. , ... - 5 5 24 . r.•:,-fh,. .runl: ti , ENVIRONMENT 3 8 FOREIGN AFFAIRS F r 4 INDUSTRY & MINERALS 12 F PLANNING & DEV. COOP I 3 12 Fair SCIENCE AND TECH ,. 2 2 YOUTH AND SPORTS I - t 12 L Il El 53 • 1: 56 Italicized ministries have not ye submitted details Total US Personnel (not including unknowns) 116 Seams TRANSITION TASK FORCE Chaired by: h(6 (b)(6) ADMIN Political IRMA Econ StratCom Strategic Mission Issues BUDGET RSO (security) IPC (Comms) Each Group has members (as appropriate) from: - State (new Embassy) FACILITIES - CPA (new IRMA?) - CJTF-7 (new MNFI/MNCI) GS() (log) - PMO (new PMO) - Coalition HR (Pers) Critical Support Issues Regional Presence -Embassy/Consulate -IRMA (?) -PMO -USAID Functions Security -Mil Civil Affairs -Coalition Transforming CPA to U.S. Mission Iraq Baghdad, March 9 2004 Although CPA will disappear on June 30 with the transfer of full governmental authority to an interim Iraqi government, for that government to be viable following the occupation, many of CPA's functions will need to continue to be performed for months if not years after June 30. While some of these functions can and will be taken on by Embassy Baghdad, others require personnel skills and funding far beyond the capabilities of a normal embassy. These include a whole range of capacity building activities in support of Iraqi ministries and security forces as well as many of the activities now being carried out by CPA's Office of Strategic Communications, its CFO and IG. Transitional functions fall into at least five general categories: (1) advisory and operational support, (2) program planning, (3) project and contract management, (4) strategic communications and (5) oversight and control. In order to utilize available funding support, personnel carrying out these functions will need to be given a new home. We should do this in a way that preserves a clear line of authority for the Chief of Mission. minimizes disruption of their work and the need for additional contracting, interagency agreements or new legislation. We also believe it essential to preserve the unique cooperative culture that has evolved within CPA, both among coalition partners and between CPA's civilian and military sides. For these reasons, we believe that transitional functions should be performed by temporary organizations that will augment the Embassy's traditional capabilities. For civilian programs we are proposing the establishment of two new temporary government organizations, the Iraq Reconstruction and Management Agency (IRMA) under Department of State (DOS), which will be the successor to CPA and report to the Chief of Mission, and a reconstituted Program Management Office (PMO), which would be a DOD (U.S. Army) entity. We are also proposing the creation of an Office of Security Cooperation for military/security programs. IRMA/PMO: IRMA will establish overall policy for the reconstruction effort, including the strategic application of the IRRF. While the broad outlines of the effort have been established, there is a requirement to manage the strategy, planning and programming associated with the ongoing reprioritization of selected reconstruction programs in response to the situation on the ground. We envision this process to be directed by a Requirements Review Board (RRB) bringing together key members of IRMA and the Embassy staff. A small RRB staff would reside in IRMA. The RRB would be chaired by the Embassy DCM and would set the overall programmatic direction of the reconstruction effort. A small management staff including a CFO, Comptroller, and IG function would be required for oversight and control.(Organization chart A attached) Critical contract management and execution functions for IRMA would be undertaken by a newly established PMO. We would establish PMO independently as a temporary organization within Doll)/ Department of the Army, allowing it to sustain itself through the 10% contract management fee authorized under the Emergency Supplemental Appropriations Act for Defense and for the Reconstruction of Iraq and Afghanistan, 2004... The Executive Director of IRMA will provide overall project direction to PMO, as decided by the RRB. In addition, although diminished somewhat after the transfer of governance authority to the new Iraqi government, strategic communications will continue to be required beyond the normal public affairs capability of an embassy. We envision a small but capable STRATCOM staff, which would be resident in IRMA, interfacing as appropriate with the Chief of Mission's staff, the Embassy's Public Affairs Section, and U.S. Military PAO's. This latter lash-up will be particularly important if we are to maintain successfully the close working relationships that currently exist between CPA and CJTF-7 in this area. This issue is to be dealt with more fully in a subsequent message. Finally, IRMA also will provide a vehicle for continuing Senior and Technical advisory support for Iraqi government ministries. The required level of this support will depend upon the ability of the ministries to function on their own and the criticality of those ministries to US objectives. A high level of Senior and Technical advisory support, including in some cases involvement in day to day operational functions, will be necessary for those ministries that are critical to US objectives (e.g., the "Power Ministries," as well as essential services ministries such as Electricity). The Senior Advisors and Technical Advisors, which will likely number between 150 and 250 people, as well as their supporting staffs, will be operationally housed within another component of IRMA, which will be known as ABIRD (see below). IRMA will be funded by the operational funds allocated to CPA or its successor organization, including CPA's remaining operational budget and I% of the IRRF. IRMA will also be able to rely upon DOD and other agency support without reimbursement responsibility. IRMA will be a founding member of the Embassy's International Cooperative Administrative Support Services (ICASS) Council, which it would likely join as a service provider. Administratively, the temporary status of both IRMA and PMO would allow for the use of Title 5, U.S. Code, Sec. 3161 hiring and detailing authority. We anticipate IRMA would phase out over a period of 1-2 years as the operational and critical advisory requirements subside and are transferred to normal Embassy bilateral relationships. PMO would remain until the completion of IRRF projects. Both could be established by a National Security Presidential Determination (NSPD), if judged necessary. AB1RD: US Advisors will be administratively housed in and hired through IRMA. Conceptually, they will be grouped together along with other countries' advisors in the Advisory Board for Iraqi Reconstruction and Development (ABIRD). In our judgment, a structure like ABIRD is essential for the continuing work of American and other countries' advisors in Iraqi ministries to be politically acceptable to Iraqis. We propose that it be billed as an advisory board for the head of the interim Iraqi government that takes office on June 30 (the Prime Minister). The Prime Minister, or his representative, would be the Board's titular head. A senior American, who would report to the Ambassador (COM) and be a member of the Embassy Country Team, would serve as its Executive Director. The Executive Director could be supported by one or more deputies from major contributors to the Multi-national Force or to the Madrid donor process. Regardless of nationality, the most senior representative of the advisory team for each ministry would report to the Executive Director and serve as a member of the ABIRD, which would probably only meet as a group a few times a year. A structure of this type would: -- allow us to exercise COM policy guidance to the advisors without having them tied too closely in the popular mind with the American Embassy; -- give each ministerial advisory team a direct line to the Prime Minister's office, which would help prevent its recommendations from being ignored by an uncooperative minister and help establish the PM's control over his ministers; -- provide us greater flexibility to bring in American advisors from other agencies and the private sector without going through a formal NSDD 38 process. Most would be seconded to IRMA on non-reimbursable details from USG agencies or hired under Title 5, U.S. Code, section 3161. -- allow us to maintain the multilateral character of the policy advice being given to the Iraqi ministries. Office of Security Cooperation: After June 30, one of America's main objectives will be to continue building Iraqi security forces. We will need to focus on three key areas: (I) the Iraqi Police Service, (2) the Iraqi Armed Forces, and (3) effective civilian control and management of both, all under the policy guidance of the Chief of Mission. Success will demand cooperation among a number of indispensable actors: sovereign Iraqi government structures (Cabinet Committee for National Security, MOI, MOD, and, as relevant, MFA and MOJ); the U.S. Embassy; the Commander, Iraq Multi-national Force (IMNF), and other Coalition missions. A clear understanding of the respective roles and authorities among these three will be vital. Iraq MOI should take responsibility for developing, managing, supporting and employing the IPS, while Iraq MOD takes the responsibility to develop, manage, and support the IAF, which will be assigned to IMNF for employment. Meanwhile, under the guidance of the Chief of Mission, the Embassy will take responsibility for U.S. security policies in Iraq and for our bilateral security assistance. It will also provide policy and strategic direction, resource management, and oversee political aspects of military and police capacity-building assistance from the U.S. The Commander, IMNF will oversee the execution of the man, train, and equip portion of both the military and police capacity-building assistance program. An Office of Security Cooperation (OSC) should manage implementation and coordination of the man, train, and equip programs. All three of the main US actors would connect into and through this single entity. OSC would be responsible to Commander, IMNF for fulfilling his specified execution responsibilities for the military and police development function, under the policy direction of the COM. It will also receive policy guidance through Senior Advisors to the MOI and MOD, who would be supported by robust advisory teams. OSC would have a police division (Civilian Police Advisory Training Team, CPATT) and a military one (Coalition Military Assistance Training Team, CMATT). CPATT will be staffed as far as possible by civilian police experts. In order to facilitate policy direction from the Chief of. Mission, the deputy director of CPATT would also serve as a deputy senior advisor MOI. A deputy director of CMATT would be a deputy senior advisor MOD. Page 1 of 2 (b)(6) From: Rathmell, Andrew (SES1) Sent: To; Monday, March 22, 2004 5:36 PM Redd, John S. (VADM, Ret.) (b)(6) 9) Subject: RE: Oster, Jeffrey W. (0- Cc: (b)(6) Joint* Richatti4MB) RD/Donor Coo dfr4Mlon Meebanism (b)(6) Quite understood. Once of action on AStROICIC is back, it may be worth us sitting down and debating the options and course Andrew Rathmell Office of Policy Planning & Analysis Coalition Provisional Authority - Baghdad Room M239 DSN: 11,11A1 civ: (+ (b)(6) cell: (+ Original Message From: Redd, John S. (VADM, Ret.) Sent: Monday, March 22, 2004 12:28 PM To: Rathmell, Andrew (SES1); (1111A1 Cc: (11)(61 Jones, Richard (AMB) Subject: RE: ABIRD/Donor Coordination Mechanism Oster, Jeffrey W. (0-9) Andrew et al, You've been privy to a lot of sausage making in the last few days, much of which, of necessity, has been predominantly an internal USG issue since it deals with US funds. ABIRD, discussed in that context, 4v e comit-aoross,tootitrongly as atifira operation. The overall intent, as was noted, is that AIM tiIdbtticud1itiuñ pleCe"Wigh'couti, in principle, include significant donors. I would hope that any discussions of alternate models — including a CIC follow on or others --would not be based on a faulty premise. will be back tomorrow night and I recommend you discuss with him. JSR Scott Redd Vice Admiral, U.S. Navy (ret.) Deputy Administrator and Chief Operating Officer (C00) Coalition Provisional Authority (CPA) Baghdad, Iraq Original Message From: Rathmell, Andrew (SES1) Sent: Saturday, March 20, 2004 11:18 PM To: Redd, John S. (VADM, Ret.); (1-11(61 (b)(6) Oster, Jeffrey Subject: MIRO/Donor Coordination Mechanism 3/23/2004 Page 2 of 2 Adm Redd, Further to the discussions today on ABIRD/IRMA and donor/advisor coordination. You will know that, whilst supporting Amb Jones in developing the IRMA/ABIRD concept, we have also been exploring other models, such as that provided by the CIC which seeks to be more inclusive and internationalist. This model also addresses the UNNVB involvement that we discussed today. In order to assist in the debate with the ITPT, Neil Hawkins has drafted a new summary, after consultation with major donors, of how this model may work. We did not feel it appropriate to raise this issue in the initial meeting today with the ITPT but I would suggest that it would be important for us to spend some time tomorrow to examine the options for donor coordination 1 before we put a more detailed case back to the ITPT. We realize that we cannot resolve this ) issue before the return of Amb Jones, but it may be helpful to work through the arguments I and implications so that we can provide Amb Jones and Bremer with a view on the way forward that also meets the needs of the ITPT. Andrew Rathmell Office of Policy Planning & Analysis Coalition Provisional Authority - Baghdad Room M239 DSN•1(1-11(1 civ: (+)(b)(6) Oriainal Messaae From: 011(6) Sent: Saturday, March 20, 2004 9:17 PM To: Rathmell, Andrew (SES1) Cc: (h)(61 Subject: Donor Coordination Mechanism Bent, Rodney (SES-4) Andrew, As requested, here is a draft on donor coordination mechanisms. This broadly reflects discussions I have had with PM0, USAID, Giles and donors (DFID, Canada, Japan and Poland). Happy to discuss. (b)(6) (b)(6) Director Development Cooperation Coalition Provisional Authority Baandad +011(61 E-mail: (b)(6) ******** 3/23/2004 Page 1 of 1 (b)(6) From: Sent: To: Rathmell, Andrew (SES1) Saturday, March 20, 2004 11:18 PM Redd, John S. (VADM, Ret.) (b)(6) -1M 9) Cc: (b)(6) Oster, Jeffrey W. (0- Adm Redd, Further to the discussions today on ABIRD/IRMA and donor/advisor coordination. You will know that, whilst supporting Amb Jones in developing the IRMA/ABIRD concept, we have also been exploring other models, such as that provided by the CIC which seeks to be more inclusive and internationalist. This model also addresses the UNNVB involvement that we discussed today. In order to assist in the debate with the ITPT, Neil Hawkins has drafted a new summary, after consultation with major donors, of how this model may work. We did not feel it appropriate to raise this issue in the initial meeting today with the ITPT but I would suggest that it would be important for us to spend some time tomorrow to examine the options for donor coordination before we put a more detailed case back to the ITPT. We realize that we cannot resolve this issue before the return of Amb Jones, but it may be helpful to work through the arguments and implications so that we can provide Amb Jones and Bremer with a view on the way forward that also meets the needs of the ITPT. Andrew Rathmell Office of Policy Planning ez Analysis Coalition Provisional Authority - Baghdad Room M239 DSN: civ: ( cell: ( Original Message From: 011(6) Sent: Saturday, March 20, 2004 9:17 PM To: Rathmell, Andrew (HSI.) Ccl(b)(6) Subject: Donor Coordination Mechanism Bent, Rodney (SES-4) Andrew, As requested, here is a draft on donor coordination mechanisms. This broadly reflects discussions I have had with PM0, USAID, Giles and donors (DFID, Canada, Japan and Poland). Happy to discuss. (b)(6) * Director Development Cooperation Coalition Provisional Authority Bpahriarl +111-111A1 E-mail: (b)(6) 3/21/2004 Post-Transition Donor Coordination 20 March Do S (:ziOipvt rtlin is ters Chief of Mission Deput.). Chief o Donor Core Group U.S Embassy I11111 Of Bilatl'FILI and \AIN i , or, Proposed Donor Coordination Mechanisms Post Transition 20 March 2004 1. Aims of the proposed donor coordination mechanisms: i. Establishes donor coordination under Iraqi leadership Provides an "international" framework that encourages other donors to join the reconstruction effort Encourages coordination among the broader group of donors iv. v. Establishes a practical forum for regular discussions among large donors Makes use of existing mechanisms requiring minimum change vi. Recognizes reality 2. Assumptions i. Most donors will be reluctant to second staff to an organization that comes under US authority in a sovereign country Most major coalition donors are opening Embassies/offices in the Green Zone where they will base their staff and advisors As in other situations, countries with a smaller presence will share resources 3. CIC Assembly i. The CIC Assembly is the main forum for donor discussions (General Assembly). It is currently chaired by the Minister of Planning and Development Cooperation. Such a group generally reports to a Cabinet Sub-Committee or Council of Ministers ii. Secretariat services could eventually be provided by the United Nations. In the interim, these services could be provided by elements of the CIC secretariat that will be transferred to the MoPDC The CIC Assembly would meet on a quarterly/or six monthly basis. iv. v. All donors would be eligible to attend The Assembly can set up Sectoral Sub-Committees to provide a forum for active donors and the appropriate Ministries to discuss a particular sector or issue 4. Donor Core Group i. The Donor Core Group will provide a forum for regular donor discussions and practical coordination. It will comprise the major donors in Iraq (currently Canada, EU, Italy, Japan, Kuwait, South Korea, Spain, UAE, UK, USA) and the World Bank, UN and IMF ii. The World Bank would be invited to provide secretariat support. Until the World Bank has a presence on the ground, one of the donors could provide secretariat services, such as DF1D iii. The Core Group would meet on a fortnightly or monthly basis 5. Advisors i. Advisors would formally report to their missions/Embassies as in any regular bilateral donor partnership and would be placed in a Ministry Each country would be responsible for establishing and paying for PSD for their Advisors. This is already the case with coalition partners such as Australia, Canada and Japan Smaller countries that wish to provide support and advisors but who do not have a presence on the ground could enter into an agreement with KBR to provide trailer accommodation and meals within the confines of the Palace. TASK FORCE FOR TRANSTION CPO/C00 1 (b)(6) 1 Security Finance f I GS0 I I Facilities I I Personnel I f Communications IRMA I OPO In-, \ r \ 1 KBR i(b)(6) (b)(6) Strategic Comm tt- CT I O MAR . 14 2004 Coalition Provisional Authority (DMS) Subject: FW BAGHDAD - PROPERTY NEGOTIATION GUIDANCE OTTUZYUW RUEHCAA6062 0722030-UUUU--RHMFIUU. ZNR UUUUU ZZH 0 1220241 MAR 04 FM SECSTATE WASHDC TO HQ COALITION PROVISIONAL AUTH BAGHDAD BT TiNCLAS STATE 056062 FOR AMBASSADOR NEUMANN E.O. 12958: N/A TAGS: ABED, AMGT SUBJECT: BAGHDAD - PROPERTY NEGOTIATION GUIDANCE 1.OBO UNDERSTANDS THAT THERE ARE ADVANTAGES TO THE USG TO BEGIN PROPERTY NEGOTIATIONS NOW AS OPPOSED TO WAITING FOR AN IRAQI SOVEREIGN GOVERNMENT. PRINCIPAL AMONG THESE IS THE GOOD WORKING RELATIONSHIP BETWEEN CPA AND THE MINISTER OF FOREIGN AFFAIRS, WHO WILL BE OUR KEY NEGOTIATING PARTNER. OBO RECOGNIZES THAT PROPERTY NEGOTIATIONS MAY OR MAY NOT BE COMPLETED BY JULY 1. 2.WE AUTHORIZE THE FOLLOWING: A. TO BEGIN PROPERTY NEGOTIATIONS NOW, SEPARATING THE DIPLOMATIC AND PROPERTY NEGOTIATING TRACKS, IF NECESSARY. B.TO SEEK "FEE SIMPLE" (FREE HOLD) OWNERSHIP OF THE LAKE FRONT SITE AT NO COST TO THE USG. WE ACKNOWLEDGE THAT IT MAY RE NECESSARY TO ACCEPT A LESSER INTEREST IN THE LAND, BUT THE AMBASSADOR SHOULD ASK FOR THIS MAXIMUM AT THE OUTSET. C.TO SECURE AN APPROPRIATE AGREEMENT BEFORE THE END OF OCTOBER AND PRIOR TO OBO'S REQUEST FOR SUPPLEMENTAL FUNDS. PLEASE NOTE THAT ANY AGREEMENT REQUIRING PAYMENT MUST INCLUDE AN EXPLICIT "SUBJECT TO THE AVAILABILITY OF FUNDS" CLAUSE, AS ACQUISITION FUNDS HAVE NOT BEEN APPROPRIATED. D.FOR 11)(6) ITO CONTINUE TO WORK WITH AMBASSADOR NEUMANN ON THESE PROPERTY NEGOTIATIONS IN BAGHDAD. YOU WORK CLOSELY WITH MEIIIIIII AND iiiiiiiiiSURE BAGHDAD-RASED DEPARTMENT LAWYERS WORK:NG IN CPA/CG. 4. WE EXPRESS CUR GRATITUDE FOR YOUR EFFORTS AND OUR BEST WISHES FOR SWIFT AND SUCCESSFUL NEGOTIATIONS. POWELL B7 06062 NNNN CPA/U.S. Mission Staffing 2004-2005 POC: TSgt Westberg PM0 Created May 1.2004 Now CPA 5 Years U.S. Mission CPA/U.S. Mission Staffing 2004-2005 POC: TSgt Westberg Today a.. Steady OSC Created April 1, 2004 PMO Created May t.2004 IRMA Created May 15,04 Janet, 2004 "Soft Opening' of Embassy Now CPA July 1, 2004 1 5 Years U.S. Mission iii ill .".111 11111 ''' 2 1 111 111 11101111111111111 .. 1 11.011111 111 -.4.11.1111b..- IM 5 Years U.S. Mission I f PrAe H (- ,; COALITION PROVISIONAL AUTHORITY BAGHDAD ACTION MEMO March 13, 2004 FOR: THE ADMINISTRATOR FROM: (OPPA) Andrew Rathmell SUBJECT: Transition Planning with Washington Summary. This memo summarises my latest information on the Iraq Transition Planning Team (ITPT) as of last night Iraq time. It also seeks •uidance on how we should engage with ITPT Washington. My sources includ and BG Ed Rice (CPA-W). Bearing Point have been contracted to produce a transition planning process. This is encoded into a matrix that covers 12 functional areas. This has been loaded onto a laptop since it is too large to email; it will be carried here either by BG Ed Rice, who is arriving early in the week or brought by towards the end of the week. As you know, the ITPT is being formally stood up on Monday and is mandated to produce a report to the Secretaries by I April. The intention is to locate approximat y 15 of the ITPT staff in Baghdad, starting late next week. Transition Planning Issues DepSecDef Wolfowitz was briefed Friday on the process the transition team plans to implement. Five key planning issues arose, which he wants to focus on in preparation for the 1 April plan to the Secretaries: I. Post-CPA endstate. ITPT wants a decision memo for the Secretaries to give a clear ruling on the best option and details of how this option may work in practice. 2. Governorate representation. Wolfowitz and PMO remain keen on a large number of offices; the DoS preference at present is for 3 large regional offices and a small number of political representatives. 3. Personnel management - Washington wants a gradual drawdown of CPA personnel (noLa big bang on June 30) and wants clarity on ministry advisors. 4. Strat Comms - POTUS is concerned about the Stratcomm effort so there will be particular focus on planning for the future Strairnmm effort, 5.CPA operating budget — the ITPT has been mandated to resolve the current problems with the operating budget. UNCLASSIFIED -2- Request for Guidance on Engaging with the ITPT Washington would like us to share fully the work we are doing on transition planning (e.g. the ministry transition assessment) so that they can operate off the same information basis as us. My recommendation would be to be as open as we can with the ITPT; this may be the best way in which to ensure we influence and shape the transition planning process and results. RECOMMENDATION (1): Share our March 11 memo providing an interim assessment of ministry transition readiness with the ITPT. V,\ , Approve: `)\ t,51 - Disapprove: Approve with modification: RECOMMENDATION (2): You issue guidance to the CPA-Baghdad transition planning team on how to engage with the ITPT and how extensively to share internal_CPA-FLworkinprogress. Approve: Disapprove: Approve with modification: ATTACK ENTS: requirements March 11 memo Ministry Transition: Post-sovereignty support UNCLASSIFIED - COALITION PROVISIONAL AUTHORITY BAGHDAD INFO MEMO March 11,2004 FOR: THE ADMINISTRATOR FROM: SUBJECT: Ministry Transition: Post-sovereignty support requirements Summary. The CPA senior advisor teams have been requested to outline their Ministries' requirements for support after July 2004. The intention is to have firm plans in place by the end of March to ensure a seamless transition. This report provides a first cut of the advisor support requirements detailing numbers, source and expected duration. We will continue to refine these assessments and will provide a further update by Friday March 19. State of Transition Plans The state of transition plans varies widely amongst advisory teams. A few ministries (e.g. Health) have very detailed transition plans with clearly identified advisory personnel needs and identified sources of support. Others (e.g. the new Ministries of Human Rights and Environment) will not be able to outline their advisor support needs until the end of the month. Personnel Requirements We have defined ministry advisors as personnel performing similar functions to those as the current Senior Advisor Teams. They provide policy and technical advice to Iraqi ministries. They are therefore distinct from personnel implementing technical projects — i.e., the bulk of the contractors working on Supplemental construction projects. Our current best estimate is that Iraq will require approximately 236 Ministry advisors from July 2004. Note that this figure is derived from expressed SA requirements. We have not yet reviewed this figure against CPA's overall priorities and against available funding. These advisors will provide technical and (in some cases) policy advice to the Iraqi Ministers and Ministries. In most cases, current plans call for these advisors to stay for approximately a year. However, certain ministries are planning for much longer periods (e.g. out to 2007 for the Ministry of Industry & Minerals). In addition to the ministry advisors, there will be a requirement for 107 prison advisors to be attached to the Ministry of Justice to assist with management of Iraqi prisons and mentoring of Iraqi Correctional Service Personnel. Ministry of Interior and Ministry of Defense requirements for several hundred police and military trainers are taken care of in the structure of the Office of Security Cooperation. In addition to the identified ministry requirements, advisors will be required for two additional tasks: • Public Administration Reform. The current DfTD program on Public Administration Reform envisages a number of advisors (to be specified) to undertake generic capacity building tasks across the civil service. These advisors will offer generic training programs to all Iraqi ministries, as well as tailored support to three key ones, • Support to central executive and legislative branches. It is likely that the Iraqi Presidency, Council of Ministers and Transitional Assembly will require international technical assistance but these requirements cannot be scoped in detail until more detailed planning for these institutions is undertaken. In addition to these advisors are the following: • PM0 staff • IRMA management staff Sources of Personnel US advisory personnel are expected to be a mixture of government detailees from multiple USG agencies, temporary hires (3161) and contractors. We do not yet have a fine-grained breakdown of the sources of US personnel and US hires. Although the majority of personnel are likely to be US hires, a significant minority' will be detailed or hired by other governments. Further work is needed on this with national representatives. Staff in the regions In many cases, Senior Advisors (SAs) are focused on building the capacity of the Baghdad ministry, leaving the regional offices and ministry functions to be supported by RCs and GCs. In the South, in particular, there is a large advisory presence supporting many of the ministry DGs and regional offices. Few ministries have actually detailed their requirements for support in the provinces: The SA for the Ministry of Justice has identified a need of from five to 18 regional advisors; other SAs, like the SA for Education, assume GCs will still be available for coordination after Jul. 1st; and the SA for Science and Technology has identified the need for a Nonproliferation Office but has not identified the manning requirements, either national or regional. Next Steps We need to work with Senior Advisors and with Regional and Governorate Coordinators to refine the requirements identified here in terms of numbers, sources and nationalities. We will contrast the (often Baghdad-centric) views of the Senior Advisors with the views of GCs and RCs who have been working with ministry DGs and regional offices on the ground. • We need your advice on the priority areas, as not every request may be affordable • Where they have not already done so, we should ask SAs to agree their needs assessments with their Ministers • We will work with each SA to provide a detailed transition plan by March 26 Coordination: COO Jeff Oster PM0 USAID DfID UNCLASSIFIED 2 DirInf ATTACHMENTS: I: Summary matrix of support requirements 2: Ministry support assessment sheets UNCLASSIFIED 3 Ministry Advisors: Personnel Requirements after Sovereignity (version March 11, 2004) Ministry Total Advisors Others INTERIOR 30 787 OIL 12 ELECTRICITY 14 JUSTICE 10 107 DEFENCE 20 TBC TRADE 8 FINANCE 12 TRANSPORTATION 10 AGRICULTURE 6 COMMUNICATIONS 25 CENTRAL BANK 6 MUNIC. & PUBLIC WORKS 3 WATER RESOURCES 4 LABOR AND SOCIAL AFFAIRS 3 HEALTH 22 HOUSING 8 EDUCATION 2 HIGHER EDUCATION 2 DISPLACEMENT & MIGRATION 5 HUMAN RIGHTS 4 CULTURE 5 ENVIRONMENT 3 FOREIGN AFFAIRS 4 INDUSTRY & MINERALS 6 PLANNING & DEV. COOP. 7 SCIENCE AND TECH. 2 YOUTH AND SPORTS 3 Total 236 894 PM0 410 Regional Ops Note 1: Figures in italics are estimates not finally confirmed by the ministry CPATT prison advisors OSC -1 Ministry Overview assessment for 1 July INTERIOR • Criticality of services ESSENTIAL • Capability/attitude of minister and senior team GOOD • Risk of catastrophic failure w/o support HIGH OIL • Criticality of services ESSENTIAI. • Capability/attitude of minister and senior team GOOD • Risk of catastrophic failure w/o support 111011 E 1,ECTR ICI I Y . Criticality of scrvi ccs . ESSENTIAL . Capability/attitude of minister and senior team GOOD • Risk of catastrophic fail ure w/o support 111011 Support specific to Ministry Senior Policy advice Main areas where technical/operational support is required • YES • 117 miff embedded in cpArr and admit', 700 Civilian Police, 200 international police trainers • State department will fund embedded staff, Civpol and international trainers. • Likely duration through January 1, 2005 Support for generic capacity development projects • Once the CPATT resources come on line—all should be well TOTAL: 817 • NO • Oil trading expertise- most likely will boa Mo0 Einployec. . Potential sources - Ministry budget, foreign governments, NGOs etc • likely duration - up ton year Torm. : 12 • NO • Level of resource needed 14 MISCELLANEOUS TLC! IN ICA L AREAS • Potential sources - DOD, DONORS • SEPTEMBER 2005 TOTAL: 14 Mi try nis - COURTS - PRISONS Overview assessment for 1 July JUSTICE • Criticality of services lioth services EssENTIAL to underpin national security, Judiciary capable and training by 7/1 will strengthen this. Security and witness prorection crucial • Capability/altitude of minister and senior tenni Ministry likely to be less able to manage PAIR • Risk of catastrophic failure w/o support for Prisons 111Cill DEFENCE • Criticality of services ESSENTIAL • Capability/attitude of minister and senior teain I ttsIENOWN • Risk of catastrophic failure w/o support 111011 -I RADE • Criticality or services ESSENTIAL • Capability/ attitude of minister and senior team GOOD • Risk of catastrophic failure w/o support 11101-I Senior Policy advice • Coatis: Not clear, may depend on progress with future organization of court services • Prisons: Not clear Supporlyecifie to Ministry Main areas where technicalioperational support is required • Support: o Courts: Judicial Council will get support from 5 OPDAT (DM lawyers, a US Army LSO lawyer to be assigned in each Governorate, three to live U.S. Marshals will serve as advisors. a Prisons: 107 staff arriving soon, wills US funding. Will be based in prisons. • Funding : US agencies (Dot USAnny) • Duration: unknown • Y Es • 8-12 Embedded UK MoD, G-8 POLMIL US • Funding sources; ministry budged; DOS; foreign governments • In place until June 2005 • YES • Six new CPA MOT staff in pipeline to direct major projects • Additional sources: Ministry budget; USAID, foreign • Duration: 31 July 2005 Support for generic CO pacit y development projects Not yet clear Not yet clear TOTAL: Ill TOTA I..: 20 • Oise additional CPA MOT short term (3 week) staff irasiming for Trade Fair. • Corporate sponsors CYPF- 7(5250m) • I Staffer embedded in CPA MOT for budget and financial controls; USG, foreign governments; inultilateral development and finance institutions. TOTAL: 8 Ministry Overview assessment for I July FINANCE • Criticality of services ESSENTIAL • Capability/attitude of minister and senior team FAIR • Risk of catastrophic failure w/o support MEDIUM TRANSPORT • Criticality of services VERY IMPORTANT • Capability/attitude of minister and senior leans (5)01) • Risk of catastrophic failure w/o support MEDIUM A GRICIILTURE • Criticality of services VERY IMPORTANT • FAIR on basics, not fOrward thinking. Minister 'unlikely to accept long term technical support unless attached to development cash • Risk of catastrophic failure w/o support LOW Support specific to Ministry Senior Policy advice Main areas where technical/operational support is required • YES, Advise required at the policy level & exec levels • 12 person team, covers budget formulation/policy, execution, compensation, revenue, debt, audit, IT/training, and SOEs • Potential sources. • US/UK treasuries, DOS, DOD, DM, USA1D • Likely duration - minimum 2 years, unknown maximum • NC) • Tech support 3 per primary sector (Maritime, Railroad, Ports); I per secondary sector (surface transport, e.g. buses and trucks) • Potential sources Ministry budget, foreign governments, NGOs etc. Pursuing USA ID funding, World Bank funding, State Dept, funding, and ministy DEI budget. • likely duration 6 months • NO, though likely to he USDA counsellor in US Embassy • If Minister agreed, likely to be roles for 5 or 6 long technical advisers providing 4 month training programmes for 100 Iraqis with lung term potential — English language training, generic management skill, agriculture specialization • Funding: AL/SAID. World Bank • Duration: 4 months Support for generic capacity development projects • Financial Management Information System, Financial management training at all levels • Us supplemental, DPI, IMF, World Bank, DFID TOTAL: 12 • Resources needed for this — Ministry: CIVIL AVIATION TRAINING; MANAGEMENT AND TRAINING AT PORT OF UMM ()ASK; MINISTRY MANAGEMENT • Potential sources: DEL AND WORLD BANK TOTAL, 10 • Information Management throughout Ministry (DfID?) — training likely to he accepted TOTA I.: 6 Ministry Overview assessment for 1 July COMM • Criticality of services VERY IMPORTANT • Capability/attitude of minister and senior team FAIR • Risk of catastrophic failure w/o support MEDIUM 'apport specific to Ministry Senior Policy advice Main areas where technical/operational support is required Support for generic capacity development projects • NO • 6 person commercial development ,I 2 person tech support • Potential sources — State Department, Ministry and Independent Commission Budget • Finance, management, corporate structures capacity building teams for range of areas will be in place within weeks. • likely duration UNDETERMINED • Will follow on with supplemental funds TOTAL : 25 CI, NTRA I. BANK • Criticality of services- IMPORTANT • Capability/attitude a minister and senior team- GOOD • Risk of catastrophic failure w/o support-MED . YES • Monetary economist, bank supervisor, economic research, open market operations, private sector banking, bank restructuring • Potential sources — AMEMB; IMF; DONORS • PHASE-OUT TI RU MULTIPLE YEARS DEC 2007 MUNICIPALITIES • Criticality of services • NO • Tech and coordination assistants-3 AND PUELIC I M PORTANT • Potential sources -- DOD; DI1D WORKS • Capability/attitude of • DECEMBER 2005 minister and senior team EXCELLENT • Risk of Catastrophic failure w/o support MEDIUM WATER RESOURCES • Criticality of services VERY IMPORTANT • Capability/attitude of minister and senior team EXCELLENT • Risk of catastrophic failure ve/o support MEDIUM • NO • Tech support 4; I military;2 Tech; I admin also recommend USCOE Oversight • Potential sources -- Ministry budget, foreign governments, NGOs Dept. of State • Likely duration 12 months estimated TOTAL: 6 TOTAL: 3 TOTAL: 4 Ministry LABOR & SOCIAL AFFAIRS Overview assessment for I .1uly • Criticality of services VERY IMPORTANT • Capability/attitude of minister and senior learn POOR • Risk of catastrophic failure w/o support MEDIUM Support specific to Ministry I Support for generic capacity 1 deVei0pIll era projects Senior Po avice licy d Main areas where technical/operational support is required • NO • Budget and Financial Assistance 1 each, Audit function for social programs I ca., Program Management oversight I each . Ministry Budget; USA ID, DOD, NGOs • July 05 TOTAL: 3 HEALTH .. Criticality of Ministry services VERY 15A PORTANT • Capability/attitude of minister and senior team EXCELLENT • Risk of catastrophic service failure without • NO • 14 Ministerial Consultants, 5 operational level consultants • Potential sources: Ministry Budget, USAID capacity-building contract, World Bank, DFID, other donors. Health and Human Services, WHO • Duration: 6— 12 months • Human Resources, Management Practices, and Financial Management System Consultant support LOW tither donors • Potential sources: World Bank; USAID capacity- building contract; DEID: • Duration: 6-12 months TOTAL: 22 I IOUSING • Criticality of services • YES, !lousing • 5l-lousing Policy Tacit Asst, 3 Hwy and IMPORTANT Policy execution infrastructure support • Capability/attitude of • Potcntial sources — USAID;MoH&C minister and senior BUDGET; COE;OTHERS team GOOD • Likely duration PHASED REDUCTIONS; • Risk of catastrophic LAST PERSONNEL COMPLETE failure w/o support JUN 05 LOW TOTAL: 8 Oven-view assessment for I Ministry July COlIC A I ION HIGHER EDUCATION DISPLACE. & MICiRATION • Criticality of Ministry services IMPORTANT • Capability/attitude of minister and senior team - Credible now, getting better FAIR • Risk of catastrophic service failure without support VERY LOW if current Minister stays • Criticality of Ministry • Probably NO services IMPORTANT though could Capabilify/attitude of engage an minister and senior team FAIR on basic, expert to create not forward thinking, strategy, fulltinie mixed picture on initially. Current attitude Minister not • Risk of catastrophic keen service failure without support LOW • IMPORTANT • YES, will need I lowever the II)!' Minister and situation ill the North DO-level advice has the possibility to and assistance. create local unrest and Needed in instability, if not Baghdad and properly managed. likely inn lour • Mixed capability of regional offices. minister and senior Ministry is keen Santo but attitudes are to have positive. constituted • LOW support to its inission Support specific to Ministry Senior Policy advice Main areas where technical/operational support is required • NO. Ready to • No technical support required stand down Senior Adviser within weeks. I person for Development of academidadmin IT in universities, I Grant writing skills in Ministry Sources: DoS funded already, LISA ID for grant writer Duration: unknown Support for generic capacity development projects Procurement, Financial Management, Project Management Source: World Bank TOTAI.: 2 (although detailed assessment notes that support personnel not required) • Ilasic IT kit and skills needed in Ministry (USA ID for training?) I .ikely to he :tcceplablc to Ministry TOTAL: 2 • staff attached to the ministry, is needed [5- • 7 full time equivalents overall] • Potential sources UNHCR and 10M ,State Department's, Ministry budget and foreign governments . • Likely duration -- Senior Policy advice estimated lo be needed thmugh CY2004. Some level of technical support would be needed through FY (September) 05, us • coordination structures are established.. Administration and Finance resources needed for this Ministry — qualified staff and training. Potential sources — UNFICIL, 10M, USG, other governments. Ministry buy in — Ministry bought in. TOTA I.: 5 Support specific to Ministry Ministry Overview assessment fort July Support for generic capacity development projects Senior Policy advice Main areas where technical/operational support is required I It IMAIN 510111'S • Criticality of Ministry • Depends on • Not yet clots, will also depend on progress • Not yet clear, hut unlikely services IMPORTANT Ministry made. [Potential areas include continuing to be substantial in view • Capability/attitude of progress in technical support and training on human of size of Ministry. minister and senior coming months, rights istrict, raising awareness across team Minister government and mass graves]. TOTAL : 4 improving front standing start, new team Will update at end of March. open to support FAIR • Risk of service failure without support LOW CULTURE • I M PORTANT • NO, but senior • At least 4 subject experts needed • Strategic and operational • • Minister not strategic, policy advice • I.'turtling sources [NGOs?j. Ministry not effective, may be seen ad • Duration: Several years may be receptive to interference. technical support POOR. MEDIUM planning, Financial Management, Project Management, IT skills • Current base is low, could be heavy users of DfID and USAID programmes, Ministry DGs know they need support TOTAL: 5 ENVIRONMENT • Criticality of services IMPORTANT • Capability/attitude of minister rutd senior team- Doubtful capability, receptive to external suppor POOR • Risk of catastrophic failure w/o support - LOW • NO • I for Equipment procurement and project work, I for Communication and consultation • Potential sources — USEPA: Donors • December 2005 TOTAL: 2 Ministry Overview assessment for I July FOREIGN AFFAIRS • • Criticality of services IMPORTANT FAIR on basic diplomatic functions. and well disposed • Risk of catastrophic failure w/o support LOW Support specific to Ministry Senior Policy advice Main areas where technical/operational support is required • NO • Secure It systems and Consular control systems both need 1-2 people for up to a year, • Source: DoS? • Duration: up to a year Support for generic capacity development projects TOTAL: 4 INDUSTRY AND • Criticality or services • NO • COALITION COORD;TECH ADV MINERALS IMPORTANT TRAINING;TA for IND DEV;FORENSIC • Capability/attitude or ACCT; LEGAL Turni.: 6 minister and senior • Potential sources - Ministry budget, foreign team POOR governments, NU0s, World Bank, Donor's • Risk of catastrophic Development Fund, etc failure solo support • Up to three years; mostly; 12-18 months LOW PLANNING AND • Criticality of services • YES, Senior • 6 policy advisors lin: DEV. COOP. IMPORTANT level advisor - donor coordination; • IT databank management • C:apability/attitude of - project identification; minister and senior - budget integration; • Project management and monitoring team: Minister - monitoring and follow-up; . moderate, senior team - Central Statistics Office WEAK, but receptive to At least 30-40 Ministry staff will need training. support • Risk of catastrophic • Donors may be willing to fund advisors • 12-18 months TOTAL: 7 failure w/o support LOW Ministry Overview assessment for I . July .SCIENCE AND TECH YOUTI I AND SPORTS • Criticality of services IMPORTANT • Capability/attitude of minister and senior team POOR • Risk of catastrophic failure w/o support LOW • Criticality of Ministry services IMPORTANT • Capability/attitude of minister and senior team POOR but receptive to external help • Risk of catastrophic service failure without support MEDIUM [implication of d0% of p opulation under 251 . Senior Policy Advice • NO S apport specific to Ministry Main areas where technical/operational support is required •• • 2 technical advisors (liaisons with Nonproliferation Agency) • Potential sources - Host agencies (Dept. of Defense and Navy) will pay salaries • Likely duration -2 months (July/Aug 2004) • Desirable • I person fulltime for one year, based in Ministry, strongly desired by Minister • 2 people to help Ministry to develop youth and sport programmes respectively. • Funding front ?.[IS Embassy • Duration: one year Support for generic capacity development projects TOTAL 2 • Financial Management, Project Management - at least 50 Ministry stair will need this • Funding front T Dill) programme TOTAL: 3 Page 1 of 2 (b)(6) (0-5) Sent: Sunday, March 14, 2004 8:39 PM To: (b)(6) Cc: Subject: FVV: IMPORTANT! - FW: The next trip Tracking: Recipient Delivery (b)(6) Failed: 3/14/2004 8:39 PM Failed: 3/14/2004 8:39 PM Failed: 3/14/2004 8:39 PM Failed: 3/14/2004 8:39 PM (b)(6) Their desires are as follows: March 19 - Arrive March 19 - 20 work Transition issues with CPA, CJTF7, and DOD/DOS Transition Team March 21 - fly to Kirkuk and Sulaymaniyah (RON) March 22 - travel to Irbil and Mosul (RON) March 23 - return to Baghdad and outbrief March 24- depart Baghdad Desire is to look at potential consulate sites. that is a tertiary objective. At any of these locations, does e have anything else/additional in mind that I should be coordinating? 1 1(61 want to meet the senior USG / coalition civs and military in each location, want their views on precise USL3 coalition presence, civ+mil, thru transition. (#s / skill sets of people, their missions, support needed, security, etc). second: any appropriate contacts w/ locals (preferably contacts that would help advance their missions, not impose burden; e.g. stroke any locals who crave contact w/ washington VIPs). potential consulate sites (esp kirkuk) a nice-to-do, but not essential. DS has come on line stating that they are unable to support the visit due to higher priorities. I have asked CID — they have stated that, "We are still awaiting info ref upcoming VIP's that may or may not be arriving about the same time frame. I have requested direct info from CONUS in an attempt to better serve the CPA. I am sorry, I can not give you a more definitive answer at this time. At this time, I can not commit any resources". Hope this helps in the decision making. A definitive answer as to whether or not we can sponsor this trip would be helpful as they are pressing for details. We are politely stalling I do not want the regions to do a lot of work for nothing. Alternatively, we need to plan and coordinate a different schedule for them if the security assets can not be made available. Thanks in advance for your help on this. 3/14/2004 March August April May June July DOE Max or mini-max DTRA P : Rad Source time line RaythOon contract IRSRA CJTF7 Multinationol security force (no Tuwaitha security) MoST security for Tuwaiiha MoST US CPA Technical Advisors on Rad-sources/nonpro issues CPA Office of Nonproliferatio Coordinatio0 US EmbaSsy Nonpro FS0 Page 1 of 1 (b)(6) (FS-4) From: L. Paul Bremer Sent: Sunday, March 14, 2004 5:49 PM To: (b)(6) (CIV), Jones, Richard (AMB) Subject: RE: Update on CPA Budget-Shortfall Eliminated (b)(6 Well done indeed. LPB Orlalnal Messaae FroM:6)(6) (CIV) Sent: Sunday, March 14, 2004 4:23 PM To: Bremer, L Paul CPA; Jones, Richard (AMB) Subject: Update on CPA Budget-Shortfall Eliminated I'm pleased to report that we went back to the regional security contracts for updates and learned that the British military will be providing the security for the sites in the South, saving close to $30mm, correspondingly reducing our overall security cost and eliminating any shortfall, which is reflected in the attached revised memo to (111(6 (hV61 and summary Page which we will send out shortly. We also spoke withl(b)(6) who suggested we use the same percentage that.316.1 , s- inel which is approx. 25%, i.1ai our at July numbers. We felt that was cutting it too close, so we added an ii- daikillaTte-- ' to our estimate, giving us 10 s etween senior advisors and others at IRMA, all of which is well within the current budget. Based on what we're seeing in several areas I also think we will find significant other savings which you will be able to use better elsewhere. As you move forward with the transition, we would welcome any opportunity to participate. If you have a chance, I'd greatly appreciate your thanking (1741 5 ) week, for his efforts. He was a true wealth of information and he and c\ shortfall. Thank you the CPA Comptroller who is leaving this (b)(6) work tirelessly to get rid of this (b)(6) Chief Financial Officer Coalition Provisional Authority Republican Palace, Room M107 Baghdad, Iraq APO AE 09316 E-mai Corn. Cell: 3/14/2004 Date: 2004-03-14 To: (b)(6) Assistant Secretary/CFO, Department of State From (b)(6) CFO, Coalition Provisional Authority Re: Updated CPA 2004 Operating Budget and Shortfall Resolution Strategy Attached please find for your review our updated CPA 2004 Operating Budget and shortfall resolution strategy. Hopefully, y_ou will find this financial information helpful in r i i and transition discussions. Lead byL)(6) M Col, USAF, CPA Comptroller, and CPA Deputy Comptroller and Budget Officer, we have conducted extensive due diligence of each of the budget items. These items have also been reviewed with the key members of the CPA Washington financial team, and we are prepared to discuss in depth our methodology, findings and recommendations. As you will see from the attached, we have revised the estimated shortfall from $421 million (Dec. 2003 est.) down to $68 million. In addition to having three months of actuals and much firmer cost estimates, the material changes to the Budget have been a decline in estimated LOGCAP costs, a continued significant increase in security costs, (from the original $80mm budget to $235mm), and the expected reimbursement by PM0 when funding from the Supplemental becomes available. We've sought to close this shortfall primarily with three actions: 1. transferring the Iraqi Media Network's $96 million expense from the CPA operating budget to a DFUIRRF capital project funding; 2. properly charging the 2003 IFF budget $68 million for obligations incurred prior to the enactment of the Supplemental on 11/6/03; and 3. constraining personnel, communications and other costs to the minimum (transferring $71 million to security). The net effect of these actions would be to eliminate the previously estimated shortfall. With respect to personnel expenses, we have projected the number of 3161's peaking in April/May at 350 (currently 256) and declining to 250 in June and then to 100 from July through Sept. remaining well within budget (the est. cost of fifty additional 3161s is $938,000 per month). Of particular note, we have not factored into the FY 2004 budget any cost allocation either pre or post transition, using our current FY 2003 Operating Budget as a baseline case. We expect that a cost allocation approach will be put into place on July 1, 2004, either utilizing State's 1CASS full allocation or some variation of per capita LOGCAP and communication expense allocation. The net effect to CPA's Operating Budget of a full cost allocation will be significant, reducing CPA/successor organization's operating expenses by an estimated 60-75% in the Q4 of FY 2004 (the current Q4 budget is $265mm) and beyond. The advantage of using a July 1 date is that it provides all participating organizations sufficient notice that going forward they will need to budget for life support services, imposing a financial discipline that will undoubtedly impact headcount. We have just started an in depth scrub of all expense items, and we expect that we will identify additional savings. We welcome your comments, particularly suggestions where you think savings might be realized, which could be better allocated to the overall CPA mission. 3/13/2004 CPA FY 2004 Operating Fund Budget and Shortfall Resolution Strategy 1, 2 (S proposed budget adjustments Cumsnt scrub March APProved Budget 2004 LOGCAP 400 480 80 Resolution Strategy Properly charge '03 IFF with all obligations prior to 11/6; covers - $68M of LOGCAP. OMB working to establish prior expenses. Security 80 235 155 Scrub requirements; post July 1. State Department requirements unknown, but may be lower, reducing/eliminating shortfall COMMS/It 100 88 -12 transfer unused budget to LOGCAP Personnel 126 96 -30 transfer unneeded budget to Security Iraqi Media Network 96 0 -96 transfer unneeded budget to Security PNIO 0 0 0 PMO reimburses advances from supplemental funding Other 56 27 -29 transfer unneeded budget to Security Grand Totals 858 926 68 Shortfall 0 68 0 I Base case assumes staff reduction post 1 July transition, but no cost re-allocation for FY. Significantly, after I July, a full !CASS re- allocation could shift 2/3 to 3/4 of CPA's operating expenses to participating organizations. Allocating LOGCAP/Communications expenses only would reduce the operating expenses an estimated one-third. 2 Carry forward from FY 2003 IFF into FY 2004 totals $106M, and is reflected in the figures above. 3 December 2003 revised requirement totaled $1,279 million, wth a projected shortfall of $421 million. page 1 006 Chief Management Officer ADMIN RSO IPC —1 FACILITIES GSO HR BUDGET TRANSITION TASK FORCE Chaired by: (b)(6) (b)(6) Econ Political IRMA StratCom COALITION PROVISIONAL AUTHORITY BAGHDAD ACTION MEMO March 13, 2004 FOR: THE ADMINISTRATOR FROM: (OPPA) SUBJECT: Transition Planning with Washington Summary: This memo summarises my latest information on the Iraq Transition Planning Team (ITPT) as of last night Iraq time. It also seeks guidance on how we should engage with ITPT Washington. My sources include I land BG Ed Rice (CPA-W). Bearing Point have been contracted to produce a transition planning process. This is encoded into a matrix that covers 12 functional areas. This has been loaded onto a laptop since it is too large to email; it will be carried here either by BG Ed Rice, who is arriving early in the week or brought by b)(6) 'towards the end of the week. As you know, the ITPT is being formally stood up on Monday and is mandated to produce a report to the Secretaries by 1 April. The intention is to locate approximately 15 of the ITPT staff in Baghdad, starting late next week. Transition Planning Issues DepSecDef Wolfowitz was briefed Friday on the process the transition team plans to implement. Five key planning issues arose, which he wants to focus on in preparation for the 1 April plan to the Secretaries: I. Post-CPA endstate. ITPT wants a decision memo for the Secretaries to give a clear ruling on the best option and details of how this option may work in practice. 2. Governorate representation. Wolfowitz and PMO remain keen on a large number of offices; the DoS preference at present is for 3 large regional offices and a small number of political representatives. 3. Personnel management - Washington wants a gradual drawdown of CPA personnel (not a big bang on June 30) and wants clarity on ministry advisors. 4. Strat Comms - POTUS is concerned about the Stratcomm effort so there will be particular focus on planning for the future Stratcomm effort. 5. CPA operating budget — the ITPT has been mandated to resolve the current problems with the operating budget. UNCLASSIFIED -2- Request for Guidance on Engaging with the ITPT Washington would like us to share fully the work we are doing on transition planning (e.g. the ministry transition assessment) so that they can operate off the same information basis as us. My recommendation would be to be as open as we can with the ITPT; this may be the best way in which to ensure we influence and shape the transition planning process and results. RECOMMENDATION (1): Share our March 11 memo providing an interim assessment of ministry transition readiness with the ITPT. Approve: Disapprove: Approve with modification: RECOMMENDATION (2): You issue guidance to the CPA-Baghdad transition planning team on how to engage with the ITPT and how extensively to share internal CPA-B work in progress. Approve: Disapprove: Approve with modification: ATTACHMENTS: requirements March 11 memo Ministry Transition: Post-sovereignty support UNCLASSIFIED - COALITION PROVISIONAL AUTHORITY BAGHDAD INFO MEMO March 11,2004 FOR: THE ADMINISTRATOR FROM SUBJECT: Ministry Transition: Post-sovereignty support requirements Summary: The CPA senior advisor teams have been requested to outline their Ministries' requirements for support after July 2004. The intention is to have firm plans in place by the end of March to ensure a seamless transition. This report provides a first cut of the advisor support requirements detailing numbers, source and expected duration. We will continue to refine these assessments and will provide a further update by Friday March 19. State of Transition Plans The state of transition plans varies widely amongst advisory teams. A few ministries (e.g. Health) have very detailed transition plans with clearly identified advisory personnel needs and identified sources of support. Others (e.g. the new Ministries of Human Rights and Environment) will not be able to outline their advisor support needs until the end of the month. Personnel Requirements We have defined ministry advisors as personnel performing similar functions to those as the current Senior Advisor Teams. They provide policy and technical advice to Iraqi ministries. They are therefore distinct from personnel implementing technical projects — i.e., the bulk of the contractors working on Supplemental construction projects. Our current best estimate is that Iraq will require approximately 236 Ministry advisors from July 2004. Note that this figure is derived from expressed SA requirements. We have not yet reviewed this figure against CPA's overall priorities and against available funding. These advisors will provide technical and (in some cases) policy advice to the Iraqi Ministers and Ministries. In most cases, current plans call for these advisors to stay for approximately a year. However, certain ministries are planning for much longer periods (e.g. out to 2007 for the Ministry of Industry & Minerals). In addition to the ministry advisors, there will be a requirement for 107 prison advisors to be attached to the Ministry of Justice to assist with management of Iraqi prisons and mentoring of Iraqi Correctional Service Personnel. Ministry of Interior and Ministry of Defense requirements for several hundred police and military trainers are taken care of in the structure of the Office of Security Cooperation. In addition to the identified ministry requirements, advisors will be required for two additional tasks: • Public Administration Reform. The current DfID program on Public Administration Reform envisages a number of advisors (to be specified) to undertake generic capacity building tasks across the civil service. These advisors will offer generic training programs to all Iraqi ministries, as well as tailored support to three key ones. • Support to central executive and legislative branches. It is likely that the Iraqi Presidency, Council of Ministers and Transitional Assembly will require international technical assistance but these requirements cannot be scoped in detail until more detailed planning for these institutions is undertaken. In addition to these advisors are the following: • PM0 staff • IRMA management staff Sources of Personnel US advisory personnel are expected to be a mixture of government detailees from multiple USG agencies, temporary hires (3161) and contractors. We do not yet have a fine-grained breakdown of the sources of US personnel and US hires. Although the majority of personnel are likely to be US hires, a significant minority will be detailed or hired by other governments. Further work is needed on this with national representatives. Staff in the regions In many cases, Senior Advisors (SAs) are focused on building the capacity of the Baghdad ministry, leaving the regional offices and ministry functions to be supported by RCs and GCs. In the South, in particular, there is a large advisory presence supporting many of the ministry DGs and regional offices. Few ministries have actually detailed their requirements for support in the provinces: The SA for the Ministry of Justice has identified a need of from five to 18 regional advisors; other SAs, like the SA for Education, assume GCs will still be available for coordination after Jul. 1st; and the SA for Science and Technology has identified the need for a Nonproliferation Office but has not identified the manning requirements, either national or regional. Next Steps We need to work with Senior Advisors and with Regional and Governorate Coordinators to refine the requirements identified here in terms of numbers, sources and nationalities. We will contrast the (often Baghdad-centric) views of the Senior Advisors with the views of GCs and RCs who have been working with ministry DGs and regional offices on the ground. • We need your advice on the priority areas, as not every request may be affordable • Where they have not already done so, we should ask SAs to agree their needs assessments with their Ministers • We will work with each SA to provide a detailed transition plan by March 26 Coordination: COO (Jeff Oster) PMO ri,vA USAID (111(61 DfID (b)(6) UNCLASSIFIED 2 DirInf ATTACHMENTS: I: Summary matrix of support requirements 2: Ministry support assessment sheets UNCLASSIFIED 3 (-;`-1U 31 -,9 COALITION PROVISIONAL AUTHORITY BAGHDAD ACTION MEMO March 13, 2004 FOR: THE ADMINISTRATOR FROM: b6 SUBJECT: DRAFT letter to Ministers on Transition Resource requirements Several of the Senior Advisors in critical ministries and two others have submitted transitional policy and technical assistance requests for substantial support. It has been pointed out by other Senior Advisors that significant requirements for policy and technical support must be driven by the Minister to ensure optimal use of these valuable assets. Equally we do not want to start a bidding exercise with Ministers. In December of 2003, you requested each Minister to forward you their priorities. The resulting successful interchange of ideas indicates that once more a direct request from the Administrator would be appropriate to determine Iraqi commitment to the continuation of technical assistance in some form. The ministries where the Senior Advisor has submitted requests for substantial numbers of advisors (5 or over) review are: Interior, Oil, Electricity, Justice, Defence, Finance, Communications, Health, Housing, Planning and Development Cooperation, Displacement and Migration, and Culture. RECOMMENDATION (1): Sign and forward attached letter to the above Ministers for response by 3/21/04 Approve: Disapprove: Approve with modification: ATTACHMENTS: DRAFT letter to Minister COORDINATION: COO CPO UNCLASSIFIED COALITION PROVISIONAL AUTHORITY BAGHDAD Mr. Abdul Amir al-Abood Minister of Agriculture Baghdad, Iraq Dear Mr. Minister, When I met with all Ministers on March 7, I raised the issue of what assistance Ministries might want after a sovereign Iraqi administration takes over on July I. Both you in the Ministries and we in the Coalition need to make plans. The transition will go much more smoothly if we share a common view of the issues, and the level and type of support you are likely to want from us after July. I am therefore writing today to request your views on any policy and technical assistance your Ministry may require after June 30 . I look forward to a formal response to this request by 21 March 2004. Your Senior Advisor will work with you on details of this issue. Your response will enable us to work with you to try and meet any assistance needs. Thank you once again for your dedication to our common effort to ensure a better, democratic future for the Iraqi people. Sincerely, L. Paul Bremer III Administrator Pending CPA Orders & Regulations (10 March 04) Category Subject Description Status MISSION CRITICAL Political Transition Election Commission C Establishes a commission that will develop the rules and procedures for conducting fair and free elections. Political Transition Political Parties Order Establishes rules for the establishment, funding and conduct of political parties. Political Transition Housekeeping Order Conforms all other orders and regulations with provision in TAL regarding role of transitional Iraqi government as successor to CPA. National Security Order 17 National Security Revise to provide status beyond occupation. Ministry of Defence Establishes a new Ministry of Defence, which will be wholly separate and distinct from the MoD dissolved under CPA Order Number 2. Transfers the New Iraqi Army established under CPA Order Number 22 to the new MoD and disestablishes the Defense Support Agency created by CPA Order Number 42 (although if does transfer personnel/contractors currently employed/used by DSA to the new MoD). Provides that the interim Minister of Defence will be appointed by the Governing Council with the agreement of the Administrator. Sets out the elements of the MoD and the senior positions. .. General Governance Board of Supreme Audit Economic and Commercial Law Law Reform Economic and Commercial Law Reform Organic Budget Law Order Public Procurement law Reconstitutes the Board of Supreme Audit as an independent public agency empowered to enhance the economy, efficiency, effectiveness and credibility of the Iraqi government. Promulgates the Organic Budget Law, which provides limits on expenditures, exemptions from such limits, and allocations of contingency funds. Provides a transparent and competitive regime for government procurement. National Security Establishment of the Iraqi National Intelligence Service Establishes a new intelligence service for Iraq. Director General will be appointed by the head of government for a set term. INIS will provide strategic intelligence to Mol and MoD. Issue of authority to detain individuals is still under discussion To be drafted based on TAL. V To be drafted based on TAL. V To be drafted based on TAL. V To be drafted. Draft completed. Coordination 1.,..- underway. Draft completed. Coordination v , underway. Drafting underway. To be drafted. 1.7 OGA drafting charter. ,---- General Governance Interim Governmental Powers National Security Regulation of Armed Forces Within Iraq CPA Administration Program Management Office Defines respective authorities and responsibilities of Governing Council and interim Ministers, Governors and Deputy Governors, Provincial and Local Councils, Mayors, and Chiefs of Police, and specifically delineates powers that are reserved for centralized execution, and powers that are devolved for localized execution. The order would remain in effect from date of signature until revised or rescinded by the Transitional Administrative Law or legislative enactment of the new Iraqi government. Prohibits Armed Forces, to include Resistance Forces (e.g., the Peshmerga and Badr) and private security firms, from operating within Iraq except as provided for in the order. Exceptions include Armed Forces under Coalition control; security firms contracted by Coalition; and private security firms licensed by the Mol with no more than 100 armed employees. Provides that Resistance Forces that propose a transition plan accepted by the CPA by 1 May shall not be deemed to violate the prohibition, if they abide by the plan. Sets forth policies for transitioning Resistance Forces. Formally establishes Program Management Office and describes its composition, authorities, and program management, financial management and acquisition functions. VERY IMPORTANT General Governance General Governance General Governance Economic and Commercial Law Reform Economic Economic and Commercial Law Reform Central Government Functions Order Iraqi Communications and Media Commission Public Service Broadcasting Revisions to Banking law Establishes an office to support the Prime Minister and cabinet in developing and coordinating policy and providing administrative support. Establishes an independent commission responsible for licensing and regulating telecommunications, broadcasting and other media in Iraq. Establishes the Iraqi Broadcasting Network as the public service broadcaster for Iraq. Revises Banking Law promulgated under Order 40 to facilitate commercial banking operations in support of true market reforms. Banking Regulations Provides detailed guidance implementing Banking Law. Draft completed. Pending final coordination with GC. i.Z. Draft under revision. Draft completed. Coordination underway. To be drafted. 17 Submitted for signature. Submitted for signature. Drafting underway. Drafting underway. / Economic and Commercial Law Reform Economic and Commercial Law Reform Economic and Commercial Law Reform Economic and Commercial Law Law Reform Economic and Commercial Law Reform Economic and Commercial Law Reform Economic and Commercial Law Reform General Governance Economic and Commercial Law Reform National Security Company Law (Comprehensive Revision) Regulations for Commercial Agency Labor Law Retail Registration Regulations Bankruptcy Law Secured Transactions Law Anti-money laundering law Revision of visa system Intellectual Property Law Revision to Order No. 28, Iraqi Civil Defense Corps (ICDC) Comprehensive revision of Iraqi company law, designed to facilitate infusion of capital, implement Order No. 39, provide for establishment of foreign-owned corporations and remove unnecessary state controls. Implements Order 39 and amendments to Company Law with regard to Commercial Agency. Amends existing law to provide far greater flexibility in job creation, employment conditions and labor mobility, including equal treatment of Iraqis and foreigners. Provides procedures for registry of foreign investors intending to engage in retail business in Iraq. Amends existing law to modernize dissolution, liquidation and bankruptcy proceedings and creditor rights protection, while preserving aspects of existing law that are functional but unused. Provides for a registry and net of rules to ensure that property rights are protected. Provides rules and procedures to prevent and counter money laundering activities. Establishes a new system for control of entry into Iraq by non-Iraqis through new categories of entry visas. This will provide better border control and will constitute an integral part of the broader immigration control policy. Amends existing law to strengthen protection of patents, trademarks, trade names and copyrights. Drafting underway. 7 Drafting underway. V - \ Coordination underway. tb Comments due Ma_Lot___ 1 16 . ./ Draft completed. Coordination with Ministry ongoing. Coordination underway. v_. Interagency comments due March 8th. Coordination underway. Comments due March 12th. i Drafting underway. v To be drafted. ...-- Drafting underway. Y- CJTF-7 proposes expanding IC_DC's counteitsurgency roles. Removes Draft completed. Coordination, liqtatiellaLtasidrag OTI . CDC._ar s that Coalition Forces will task . underway. thelp_LC ) ...and-meke s necessary to reflect possible inclusion_withirLIVLQD. _ 1,1 General Governance Whistle Blower Protection National Security Revision to Order No. 22, New Iraqi Army (NIA) National Security Code of Discipline for Iraqi Civil Defense Corps Judicial Reform Omnibus Judiciary Order Reconstruction Levy Instructions Insurance law Economic and Commercial Law Reform Economic and Commercial Law Reform Economic and Commercial Law Reform Economic and Commercial Law Reform Pension Reform Law ,,-- ..., ,---- ,tocial security La,b \ ,--• Protects persons who come forward with evidence of corruption and official wrongdoing by providing civil penalties for retaliatory action and permitting criminal sanctions in egregious cases. IMPORTANT CJTF-7 proposes using Iraqi Armed Forces (IAF) (formerly NIA) in counter-insur e s u" elimi Order 2- 2 . ,,acjainst use of the IAF injotemal-(laftfoicerneraLLrojes. Draft revision expands internal operational roles for IAF, provides for operations by IAF under the control of the Coalition Forces, extends legal protections for IAF members when conducting operations and retains Administrator's control of IAF employment. Establishes a system of discipline for ICDC along the lines of the code for the new Iraqi Army. An overarching order dealing with the organization of an independent judiciary, judicial salaries, qualifications and appointments, security and administrative support. Provides detailed guidance for implementing Reconstruction Levy. Provides an insurance regime for Iraq. -- Amends existing law to update pension policies and permit private pension funds, deductibility of contributions, and generally updating pension policies. Establishes comprehensive social security scheme including unemployment compensation and limited welfare support. Draft completed. v/ Draft completed. Coordination underway. '7 1 , Being drafted • .0 G To be drafted. ,c, ,,- , , ,.._ To be submitted to Minister for signature. Draft expected mid-April To be drafted. r ,..g.34 gv , ii To be drafted. General Governance Economic and Commercial Law Reform Economic and Commercial Law Reform Economic and Commercial Law Reform Economic and Commercial Law Reform Economic and Commercial Law Reform Economic and Commercial Law Reform Economic and Commercial Law Reform Economic and Commercial Law Reform Economic and Commercial Law Reform Economic and Commercial Law Reform Revision to Order No. 45: Non-Government Organizations (NGO) Disposition of Military Industrial Company assets and personnel Consolidation of State owned enterprises Competition Policy Law Iraqi Interim Securities Law Order Public Debt Law Comprehensive Revision Securities Law Transportation Customer Funds National Oil Company Law Commercial leasing law Tax Law Although Order No. 45 has been signed into law, CPA is receiving suggested revision designed to enhance the security of Iraq while facilitating the participation of NGO's in Iraq. Authorizes reassignment of employees and assets of military industrial companies to other SOE's. Provides procedures for consolidation and merger of SOE's into ministries and other SOE's Establishes anti-monopoly policies and sets forth constraints on governments ability to practice price controls. Builds upon existing Iraqi securities law by applying certain aspects of modern securities law to facilitate transition to a market economy. (An entirely new securities law will subsequently be prepared to complete th legal framework furs market economy). Provides rures and procedures ter- issuance of government bonds. Comprehensive revision of securities law to provide the legal framework for a robust and transparent securities market. Establishes funds that will be financed through the collection of transportation-related fees, such as sea port charges and air over flight fees. Creates the Iraqi National Oil Company Provides procedures to ensure retention of property interests in leasing arrangements. Provides for rights of leasers or leases. Comprehensive revision of Iraqi tax law. Order under review for possible amendment. Draft completed. Coordination underway. . Coordination underway. Comments due March 9th. To be drafted. " C Coordination with lryis ongoing. ,I.,,, .. T I o, of, -.- I 1- Drafting underway. ,- - ,4 Draft being revised by SEC. tAeut-" To be drafted. To be drafted. To be drafted. V ‘ 1 Research underway. Economic and Consumer Protection Commercial Law Reform Economic and Commercial Law Funds transfer laws & Regs Reform Economic and Commercial Law International Trade Negotiation Law Reform National Security Iraqi Radioactive Source Authority National Security Weapons Registration Policy Provides basic rules for protection of consumers. Initial draft completed by Iraqi attorneys from University of Baghdad. Under review. To be drafted. National Security Iraqi International Center for Science and Industry General Governance General Governance Judicial Reform Higher Education Civil Service Law Investigations Order Judicial Reform Establish rules and procedures including reporting requirements for the transfer of funds into and out of Iraq. Sets forth procedures for conducting trade talks to include private sector participation. Establishes a regulatory agency, under the Ministry of Science and Technology for administrative purposes only, to implement, monitor and enforce regulations for beneficial uses of ionizing radiation. Creates Iraq-wide weapons control structure based on weapons badge or card. Addresses all persons who wish to possess weapons in Iraq, incLtdin_LCoalition Fcisces., Indicates which persons require a badge/card to possess a weapon, which do not, provides for revocation or suspension of the card/badge, and describes effect of revocations. US and UK will sign an international agreement forming this inter- governmental organizatrion to provide grants for projects that will employ Iraqi scientists, technicians and engineers formerly associated with WMD projects in projects for medical, commercial or other non-WMD related purposes. Revise existing regulations to streamline and decentralize the appointment and removal policies for university presidents and deans. Establishes a comprehensive civil service structure to include merit management and an oversight commission. Authorizes covert investigations under judicial oversight including wiretapping and electronic surveillance. Sets forth standards, procedures and approval authorities. Creates a new traffic code and court system, including licensing and registration procedures. V To be drafted. Ministry of Trade engaged in policy review Draft complete. Draft completed. Coordination underway. Drafting underway To be drafted. To be drafted. To be drafted. Traffic Code Order IV; 7 Drafting underway. - 044 0.113 -4 - Pending CPA Orders & Regulations (10 March 04) Category Subject Description Status MISSION CRITICAL Political Transition Election Commission C Establishes a commission that will develop the rules and procedures for conducting fair and free elections. Political Transition Political Parties Order Establishes rules for the establishment, funding and conduct of political parties. Political Transition Housekeeping Order Conforms all other orders and regulations with provision in TAL regarding role of transitional Iraqi government as successor to CPA. National Security Order 17 Revise to provide adequate legal protection to diplomatic, military and contractor personnel beyond occupation. National Security Ministry of Defence Establishes a new Ministry of Defence, which will be wholly separate and distinct from the MoD dissolved under CPA Order Number 2. Transfers the New Iraqi Army established under CPA Order Number 22 to the new MoD and disestablishes the Defense Support Agency created by CPA Order Number 42 (although it does transfer personnel/contractors currently employed/used by DSA to the new MoD). Provides that the interim Minister of Defence will be appointed by the Governing Council with the agreement of the Administrator. Sets out the elements of the MoD and the senior positions. National Security Iraqi Security Council General Governance Board of Supreme Audit Economic and Commercial Law Reform Economic and Commercial Law Reform Organic Budget Law Order Public Procurement law Creates the senior governmental body as well as the decision mechanisms used by that body to establish national security policies and priorities. Reconstitutes the Board of Supreme Audit as an independent public agency empowered to enhance the economy, efficiency, effectiveness and credibility of the Iraqi government. Promulgates the Organic Budget Law, which provides limits on expenditures, exemptions from such limits, and allocations of contingency funds. Provides a transparent and competitive regime for government procurement. To be drafted based on TAL. To be drafted based on TAL. To be drafted based on TAL. To be drafted. Draft completed. Coordination underway. To be drafted. Draft completed. Coordination underway. Drafting underway. To be drafted. National Security Establishment of the Iraqi National Intelligence Service General Governance Interim Governmental Powers National Security Regulation of Armed Forces Within Iraq CPA Administration Program Management Office General Governance General Governance General Governance Central Government Functions Order Iraqi Communications and Media Commission Public Service Broadcasting Establishes a new intelligence service for Iraq. Director General will be appointed by the head of government for a set term. INIS will provide strategic intelligence to Mol and MoD. Issue of authority to detain individuals is still under discussion Defines respective authorities and responsibilities of Governing Council and interim Ministers, Governors and Deputy Governors, Provincial and Local Councils, Mayors, and Chiefs of Police, and specifically delineates powers that are reserved for centralized execution, and powers that are devolved for localized execution. The order would remain in effect from date of signature until revised or rescinded by the Transitional Administrative Law or legislative enactment of the new Iraqi government. Prohibits Armed Forces, to include Resistance Forces (e.g., the Peshmerga and Badr) and private security firms, from operating within Iraq except as provided for in the order. Exceptions include Armed Forces under Coalition control; security firms contracted by Coalition; and private security firms licensed by the Mol with no more than 100 armed employees. Provides that Resistance Forces that propose a transition plan accepted by the CPA by 1 May shall not be deemed to violate the prohibition, if they abide by the plan. Sets forth policies for transitioning Resistance Forces. Formally establishes Program Management Office and describes its composition, authorities, and program management, financial management and acquisition functions. VERY IMPORTANT Establishes an office to support the Prime Minister and cabinet in developing and coordinating policy and providing administrative support. Establishes an independent commission responsible for licensing and regulating telecommunications, broadcasting and other media in Iraq. Establishes the Iraqi Broadcasting Network as the public service broadcaster for Iraq. OGA drafting charter. Draft completed. Pending final coordination with GC. Draft under revision. Draft completed. Coordination underway. To be drafted. Submitted for signature. Submitted for signature. Economic and Commercial Law Reform Economic and Commercial Law Reform Economic and Commercial Law Reform Economic and Commercial Law Reform 'Economic and Commercial Law Reform Economic and Commercial Law Reform Economic and Commercial Law Reform Economic and Commercial Law Reform Economic and Commercial Law Reform General Governance Economic and Commercial Law Reform Revisions to Banking law Banking Regulations Company Law (Comprehensive Revision) Regulations for Commercial Agency Labor Law Retail Registration Regulations Bankruptcy Law Secured Transactions Law Anti-money laundering law Revision of visa system Intellectual Property Law Revises Banking Law promulgated under Order 40 to facilitate commercial banking operations in support of true market reforms. Provides detailed guidance implementing Banking Law. Comprehensive revision of Iraqi company law, designed to facilitate infusion of capital, implement Order No. 39, provide for establishment of foreign-owned corporations and remove unnecessary state controls. Implements Order 39 and amendments to Company Law with regard to Commercial Agency. Amends existing law to provide far greater flexibility in job creation, employment conditions and labor mobility, including equal treatment of Iraqis and foreigners. Provides procedures for registry of foreign investors intending to engage in retail business in Iraq. Amends existing law to modernize dissolution, liquidation and bankruptcy proceedings and creditor rights protection, while preserving aspects of existing law that are functional but unused. Provides for a registry and set of rules to ensure that property rights are protected. Provides rules and procedures to prevent and counter money laundering activities. Establishes a new system for control of entry into Iraq by non-Iraqis through new categories of entry visas. This will provide better border control and will constitute an integral part of the broader immigration control policy. Amends existing law to strengthen protection of patents, trademarks, trade names and copyrights. Drafting underway. Drafting underway. Drafting underway. Drafting underway. Coordination underway. Comments due March 16th Draft completed. Coordination with Ministry ongoing. Coordination underway. Interagency comments due March 8th. Coordination underway. Comments due March 12th. Drafting underway. To be drafted. Drafting underway. National Security General Governance Revision to Order No. 28, Iraqi Civil Defense Corps (ICDC) Whistle Blower Protection National Security Revision to Order No. 22, New Iraqi Army (NIA) National Security Code of Discipline for Iraqi Civil Defense Corps Judicial Reform Omnibus Judiciary Order Reconstruction Levy Instructions Insurance law Economic and Commercial Law Reform Economic and Commercial Law Reform Economic and Commercial Law Reform Pension Reform Law CJTF-7 proposes expanding ICDC's counterinsurgency roles. Removes limitation on tasking of ICDC and provides that Coalition Forces will task the ICDC and makes other revisions necessary to reflect possible inclusion within MOD. Protects persons who come forward with evidence of corruption and official wrongdoing by providing civil penalties for retaliatory action and permitting criminal sanctions in egregious cases. IMPORTANT CJTF-7 proposes using Iraqi Armed Forces (IAF) (formerly NIA) in counter-insurgency roles, requiring elimination of the prohibition in Order 22 against use of the IAF in internal (law enforcement) roles. Draft revision expands internal operational roles for IAF, provides for operations by IAF under the control of the Coalition Forces, extends legal protections for IAF members when conducting operations and retains Administrator's control of IAF employment. Establishes a system of discipline for ICDC along the lines of the code for the new Iraqi Army. An overarching order dealing with the organization of an independent judiciary, judicial salaries, qualifications and appointments, security and administrative support. Provides detailed guidance for implementing Reconstruction Levy. Provides an insurance regime for Iraq. Amends existing law to update pension policies and permit private pension funds, deductibility of contributions, and generally updating pension policies. Draft completed. Coordination underway. Draft completed. Draft completed. Coordination underway. Being drafted To be drafted. To be submitted to Minister for signature. Draft expected mid-April To be drafted. Economic and Commercial Law Reform General Governance Economic and Commercial Law Reform Economic and Commercial Law Reform Economic and Commercial Law Reform Economic and Commercial Law Reform Economic and Commercial Law Reform Economic and Commercial Law Reform Economic and Commercial Law Reform Economic and Commercial Law Reform Economic and Commercial Law Reform Social security Law Revision to Order No. 45: Non-Government Organizations (NGO) Disposition of Military Industrial Company assets and personnel Consolidation of State owned enterprises Competition Policy Law Iraqi Interim Securities Law Order Public Debt Law Comprehensive Revision Securities Law Transportation Customer Funds National Oil Company Law Commercial leasing law Establishes comprehensive social security scheme including unemployment compensation and limited welfare support. Although Order No. 45 has been signed into law, CPA is receiving suggested revision designed to enhance the security of Iraq while facilitating the participation of NGO's in Iraq. Authorizes reassignment of employees and assets of military industrial companies to other SOE's. Provides procedures for consolidation and merger of SOE's into ministries and other SOE's Establishes anti-monopoly policies and sets forth constraints on governments ability to practice price controls. Builds upon existing Iraqi securities law by applying certain aspects of modern securities law to facilitate transition to a market economy. (An entirely new securities law will subsequently be prepared to complete the legal framework for a market economy). Provides rules and procedures for issuance of government bonds. Comprehensive revision of securities law to provide the legal framework for a robust and transparent securities market. Establishes funds that will be financed through the collection of transportation-related fees, such as sea port charges and air over flight fees. Creates the Iraqi National Oil Company Provides procedures to ensure retention of property interests in leasing arrangements. Provides for rights of leasers or leases. To be drafted. Order under review for possible amendment, Draft completed. Coordination underway. Coordination underway. Comments due March 9th. To be drafted. Coordination with Iraqis ongoing. Drafting underway. Draft being revised by SEC. To be drafted. To be drafted. To be drafted. Economic and Tax Law Commercial Law Reform Economic and Consumer Protection Commercial Law Reform Economic and Commercial Law Funds transfer laws & Regs Reform Economic and Commercial Law International Trade Negotiation Law Reform National Security Iraqi Radioactive Source Authority National Security Weapons Registration Policy Comprehensive revision of Iraqi tax law. Provides basic rules for protection of consumers. National Security Iraqi International Center for Science and Industry General Governance General Governance Judicial Reform Higher Education Civil Service Law Investigations Order Judicial Reform Traffic Code Order Establish rules and procedures including reporting requirements for the transfer of funds into and out of Iraq. Sets forth procedures for conducting trade talks to include private sector participation, Establishes a regulatory agency, under the Ministry of Science and Technology for administrative purposes only, to implement, monitor and enforce regulations for beneficial uses of ionizing radiation. Creates Iraq-wide weapons control structure based on weapons badge or card. Addresses all persons who wish to possess weapons in Iraq, including Coalition Forces. Indicates which persons require a badge/card to possess a weapon, which do not, provides for revocation or suspension of the card/badge, and describes effect of revocations. US and UK will sign an international agreement forming this inter- governmental organizatrion to provide grants for projects that will employ Iraqi scientists, technicians and engineers formerly associated with WMD projects in projects for medical, commercial or other non-WMD related purposes. Revise existing regulations to streamline and decenmtralize the appointment and removal policies for university presidents and deans. Establishes a comprehensive civil service structure to include merit management and an oversight commission. Authorizes covert investigations under judicial oversight including wiretapping and electronic surveillance. Sets forth standards, procedures and approval authorities. Creates a new traffic code and court system, including licensing and registration procedures. Research underway. Initial draft completed by Iraqi attorneys from University of Baghdad. Under review. To be drafted. To be drafted. Ministry of Trade engaged in policy review Draft complete. Draft completed. Coordination underway. Drafting underway To be drafted. To be drafted. lobe drafted. Drafting underway. COALITION PROVISIONAL AUTHORITY BAGHDAD ACTION MEMO March 13, 2004 FOR: THE ADMINISTRATOR FROM: (OPPA) (b)(6) SUBJECT: Transition Planning with Washington Summary: This memo summarises my latest information on the Iraq Transition Planning Team (ITPT) as of last night Iraq time. It also seeks guidance on how we should engage with ITPT Washington. My sources include ThTM and BG Ed Rice (CPA-W). Bearing Point have been contracted to produce a transition planning process. This is encoded into a matrix that covers 12 functional areas. This has been loaded onto a laptop since it is too large to email; it will be carried here either by BG Ed Rice, who is arriving early in the week or brought by Holzmann towards the end of the week. As you know, the ITPT is being formally stood up on Monday and is mandated to produce a report to the Secretaries by 1 April. The intention is to locate approximately 15 of the ITPT staff in Baghdad, starting late next week. Transition Planning Issues DepSecDef Wolfowitz was briefed Friday on the process the transition team plans to implement. Five key planning issues arose, which he wants to focus on in preparation for the 1 April plan to the Secretaries: 1.Post-CPA endstate. ITPT wants a decision memo for the Secretaries to give a clear ruling on the best option and details of how this option may work in practice. 2. Governorate representation. Wolfowitz and PMO remain keen on a large number of offices; the DoS preference at present is for 3 large regional offices and a small number of political representatives. 3. Personnel management - Washington wants a gradual drawdown of CPA personnel (not a big bang on June 30) and wants clarity on ministry advisors. 4. Strat Comms - POTUS is concerned about the Stratcomm effort so there will be particular focus on planning for the future Stratcomm effort. 5. CPA operating budget — the ITPT has been mandated to resolve the current problems with the operating budget. UNCLASSIFIED -2- Request for Guidance on Engaging with the ITPT Washington would like us to share fully the work we are doing on transition planning (e.g. the ministry transition assessment) so that they can operate off the same information basis as us. My recommendation would be to be as open as we can with the ITPT; this may be the best way in which to ensure we influence and shape the transition planning process and results. RECOMMENDATION (1): Share our March 11 memo providing an interim assessment of ministry transition readiness with the ITPT. Approve: Disapprove: Approve with modification: RECOMMENDATION (2): You issue guidance to the CPA-Baghdad transition planning team on how to engage with the ITPT and how extensively to share internal CPA-B work in progress. Approve: Disapprove: Approve with modification: ATTACHMENTS: requirements March 11 memo Ministry Transition: Post-sovereignty support UNCLASSIFIED Draft to Ambassador Bremer (3/13/04) Summary of Updated CPA 2004 Operating Budget and Shortfall Resolution Strategy Attached please find for your review and comment our updated CPA 2004 Operating Budget and shortfall resolution strategy, along with breakdowns for the key expense items. Hopefully, you will find this financial information helpful in your policy and transition discussions. Lead by COL. (b)(6) CPA Comptroller, and (-kVA) CPA Deputy Comptroller and Budget Officer, we have conducted extensive due diligence of each of the budget items. These items have also been reviewed with the key members of the CPA Washington financial team, and we are prepared to discuss in depth our methodology, findings and recommendations. As you will see from the attached, we have revised the estimated shortfall from $421 million (Dec. 2003 est.) down to $97 million. The material changes to the Budget have been a decline in estimated LOGCAP costs, a continued significant increase in security costs, (a 234% increase from the original $80mm budget to $267mm), and the expected reimbursement by PM0 when funding from the Supplemental becomes available. 4\ e've sought to close this shortfall primarily with three actions: 1. transferring the Iraqi Media Network's $96 million expense from the CPA operating budget to a DFUIRRF capital project funding; 2. properly charging the 2003 IFF budget $68 million for obligations incurred prior to the enactment of the Supplemental on 11/6/03 and 3. constraining personnel, communications and other costs to the minimum ($74 million). The net effect of these actions would be to reduce the estimated shortfall to $29 million. It should be noted that except for minimal changes to Security post July 1, we have not assumed any delays in the staffing of the security contracts in the regions or any changes by State to post-transition security which may reduce or eliminate the shortfall. With respect to personnel expenses, we have projected the number of 3161 peaking in ApriUMay i at 350 (currently 256) and declining to 250 in June and then to 50 from July through Sept. For transition purposes, we estimate the total cost of fifty additional 3161s at $938,000 per month. ( Of particular note, we have not factored into the FY 2004 budget any cost allocation either pre or post transition, using our current FY 2003 Operating Budget as a baseline case. We expect that a cost allocation approach will be put into place on July 1, 2004, either utilizing State's ICASS full allocation or some variation of per capita LOGCAP and communication expense allocation. The net effect to CPA's Operating Budget of a full cost allocation would be significant, reducing CPA/successor organization's operating expenses by an estimated 60-75% in Q4 and beyond. We see the advantage of using a July 1 date is that it provides all participating organizations sufficient notice that going forward they will need to budget for life support services, imposing a financial discipline that will undoubtedly impact headcount. We will also need the intervening ktime to set up a system to capture their usage of CPA facilities. We believe that by piggy-backing on the new DOS security ID system we may be able to accomplish this quickly and cost effectively. We have just started an in depth scrub of all expense items, and we expect that we will identify additional savings. A list of action items that we are pursuing follows at the end of the attached materials. We welcome your comments particularly suggestions where you think additional savings might be realized, which could then be better allocated to the overall CPA mission. We had originally planned to provide this report by bi-weekly, but upon further review, a monthly 1 report, as recommended by the Financial Management Assessment Team, would perhaps be more useful to you. Draft CPA FY 2004 Operating Fund Budget and Shortfall Resolution Strategy 1, 2 Approved Budget Revised ulniments December 2003 Current sends March 2004 ($ million) proposed budget adjustments dreantial LOGCAP 400 5)11 480 68 -12 Security 80 267 170 -17 Commsilt 100 88 -12 0 Resolution Strategy Properly charge '03 IFF with all obligations prior 10 1116; covers - S6EIM of LOGCAP. OMB working to establish prior expenses. Scrub requirements; post July 1. State Department requirements unknown, but may be lower, reducing/eliminating shortfall transfer unused budget to Security Personnel 126 1 0 93 -33 0 transfer unneeded budget to Security Iraq Media Network 96 0 -96 0 transfer unneeded budget to Security PM0 0 1 7 0 0 0 PM0 reimburses advances from supplemental funding Other 56 27 -29 0 transfer unneeded budget to Security Grand Totals 858 179 955 -29 shortfall 97 Footnotes, Base case assumes staff reduction posit July transition, but no cost re-allocation for FY. Significantly, after I July, a full !CASS re-allocation could shift 2/3 to 3/4 of CPA's operating expenses to participating organizations. Allocating LOGCAP/Communications expenses only would reduce the operating expenses an estimated one-third. 1) 2 Carly fonvard from P12003 IFF into FY 2004 totals $106M, and is reflected in the figures above. CPA FY 2004 Operating Fund Budget Summary ($M) Project title Proposed Allocation Budget Carryover I (3 Actual 2016 0015 OTR TOTAL Net 01 0/0 PERSONN EL 1 1 , !pyrull 60,5 67 .., , Cooed. Support 66.0, 8.5 Subtotal . Personnel 425,0 152 1501 j1 17 2.8. 21 160 4.0 1701 367 357 33.0 7.7 001001-Persoonu1 3211 45.2 77.1 7(111 22 CL 38.5 38.1 301 32.0t 83.7: 115.5. 106 4 :AO :1 CPA LOGCAP Oder.. .0 FCC LOGCAP - Task Order 63 Subtotal Logistics 635 115.0 130.0 130 0 .4475 447.0 . 00 56 14.0 14 0 33.0 3*0 5,55, 630 120 0 15311 1440 .1555 445.3 CORILIUNICATIONS111 1 L IRA1 7:1:::S1:081, tIMottla Network p Net of Carryover Mar Apr May June 5.6 5.7 57' 11.3 12.2 12 127 26.3 12.7 3655 49.0 5.3 34 45 13-Mar-04 Sep . TOTAL 234: 23.4 12.7. 12.7 3611 251 4.8; 7.0 00' 12 CO 225,0 . 114.7 340.3 40.0; 447.0 3.0 33.0 43 0 480.0 .44 4.8, 00' 48.0 6006 090 Supece .Lpsui- Apo pluOeei .4n5,451.-n 5,Sulototal,511 -55- Grand Totals, 858.0 0.01 0.0 0.05 , au Cl 23 9.5 285.8; 387.2 655 0.0, L. OUL„,.. 0.0 16.0 11.0 , 55 -17 267 255 1.51 . 351 954.4; 104.6' 110.4; 116.0; 114.7; 103 5 91.5 87.5, 11423 Personnel (3161 special hires) reduction in 4th quarMr is from high of 350 to SO after July. Average monthly cost for 50 additional hires would be $9385 Iraqi Media Network costs of $48M to date am zeroed Oct to remove their effects. CPA FY 2004 Security Cost Breakdown ($M) 3.13/04 TITLE AMOUNT PREFORMANCE MAR APR MAY JUN JUL AUG SEP Through 0/30 Fourth Quarter TOTAL COST Integrated Security System - funded with carryover 43.341 20 NOV 03-19 NOV 04 CMATT Security - funded with carryover 14.994 1 OCT 03 - 30 SEP 04 Governance Team Security - PSD costs 70.311 through 30 June Govemence Team Security- non-PSD costs 76.216 through 30 June GLOBAL Security -funded with carryover GLOBAL Security Follow-On MOD/OSA Security Detail - carryover through 3/31 M of I Senior Advisor Security Team - .rryover through 3/31 Force Protection Guards (Villa Security) Iraq Forum Security Amb. Bremer - PSO and Aerial Amb. Simmers Villa Security Detail PMO Personal Security Detachment (P/0 PMO Checkbook) POD Strat Comm Body Armor CPA South Security Govemance Team Security - NOC PMO PSD Suppt (Basra / Mosul / Baghdad) Northern Region Security 8.056 1 OCT 03 - 31 MAR 04 36.700 1.800 0.908 0.495 0.110 1 APR 03 - 30 SEP 04 1 OCT 03 - 31 MAR 04 1 OCT 03 - 31 MAR 04 1JAN 04 - 30 APR 04 1 JAN 04 - 30 JUN 04 6.900 per month -30 June 3.800 1 JAN 04-30 SEP 04 3.546 1 FEB 04 - 31 JUL 04 0.900 1 JAN 04 - 30 JUN 04 0.400 04 FEB 04 1.700 0.750 6.246 1 JAN 04 - 30 MAY 04 15 JAN 04 -31 MAR 04 1 FEB 04 - 31 JUL 04 0.273 1 OCT 03 - 15 P8804 3.612 1.250 11.719 12.703 1.343 0.300 0.151 0.124 0.018 1.725 0.422 0.591 -0.591 0.150 0.340 0.220 1.041 -1.041 3.612 1.250 11.719 12.703 6.117 0.300 0.151 0.123 0.018 1.725 0.422 0.591 -0.591 0.150 0.340 1.041 -1.041 3.612 1.250 11.719 12.703 6.117 0.300 0.151 0.124 0.018 1.725 0.422 0.591 -0.591 0.150 0.340 1.041 -1.041 3612 1.250 11.719 12.703 6.117 0.300 0.151 0.124 0.020 1.725 0 422 0.591 -0.591 0.150 1.041 -1.041 3.612 1.250 11.719 12.703 6.117 0.300 0.151 0.124 0.010 0.000 0.591 -0.591 0.150 1.041 -1.041 3.612 1.250 11.719 12.703 6.117 0.300 0.151 0.124 0.010 0.000 0.591 -0.591 0.150 1.041 -1.041 3.612 1.250 11.719 12.703 6.117 0.300 0.151 0124 0.018 0.000 0,591 -0.591 0.150 1.041 -1.041 25.282 11.250 70.794 76.216 8.058 18.350 2.700 1.359 0.743 0.110 10.350 2.532 2.955 -2.955 0.900 0.400 1.700 0.750 5.205 -5.205 0.273 10.835 3.750 35.156 38.108 0.000 18.350 0.900 0.453 0.372 0.054 0.000 0.000 1.773 -1.773 0.450 0.000 0.000 0.000 3.123 -3.123 0.000 36.118 15.000 105.950 114.324 8.058 36.700 3.600 1.812 1.115 0.164 10.350 2.532 4.728 -4.728 1.350 0.400 1.700 0.750 8.328 -8.328 0.273 34.076 38.629 38.630 38.292 36.143 36.143 36.143 231.767 108.428 340.195 Personnel 21.373 25,926 25.927 25.589 23.440 23.440 23.440 225.471 Physical 12.703 12.703 12.703 12.703 12.703 12.703 12.703 114.724 CPA FY 2004 Security Cost Breakdown Site Governance Team - Regional Team Security Cost Estimates 3/13/2004 ($0oo) Current Contract Pricing Totals PSD non-PSD six months annual six months annual six months annual Arbil Babil Baqubah Basrah Basrah Diwaiyeh Karbala Kirkuk Mayson Mosul Najaf Nasariyah Ramdi Samawah Tikrit Wasit 4,436.8 8,873.7 4,996.2 9,992.3 9,433.0 18,866.0 0.0 3,044.7 6,089.4 3,044.7 6,089.4 4,988.9 9,977.8 4 ,988 .0 9,976.0 9,976.9 19,953.8 4,828.0 9,656.0 4,989.8 9,979.5 9,817.8 19,635.5 0.0 4,989.8 9,979.5 4,989.8 9,979.5 2,896.5 5,792.9 4,076.0 8,152.1 6,972.5 13,945.0 Hillah 4,208.1 8,416.1 4,208.1 8,416.1 4,015.7 8,031.4 3,986.5 7,973.0 8,002.2 16,004.4 4,524.9 9,049.7 4,783.4 9,566.9 9,308.3 18,616.6 4,878.6 9,757.2 4,623.3 9,246.6 9,501.9 19,003.8 4,524.9 9,049.7 4,919.6 9,839.2 9,444.5 18,888.9 4,063.2 8,126.3 3,169.2 6,338.3 7,232.3 14,464.6 4,878.6 9,757.2 4,661.9 9,323.8 9,540.5 19,080.9 4,524.9 9,049.7 4,965.8 9,931.6 9,490.7 18,981.3 3,149.6 6,299.2 4,047.6 8,095.3 7,197.2 14,394.4 Sulaymaniyah 4,524.9 9,049.7 4,369.3 8,738.7 8,894.2 17,788.4 4,988.9 9,977.8 4,999.0 9,997.9 9,987.8 19,975.7 4,878.6 9,757.2 4,596.4 9,192.8 9,475.0 18,950.0 Totals 70,310.7 140,621.5 76,206.5 152,413.0 146,517.2 293,034.5 CPA FY 2004 Personnel Cost Breakdown ($M) 311304 Plan 10 Actual 20Th 3 010 4015 TOTAL Apr May June July Aug Sep TOTAL Personnel Payroll 3161 Hires (detail below) 60.0 15.0 13.3 17.8 2.8 48.9 6.6 6.6 4.7 0.9 0.9 0.9 48.9 Contracted Services 32.0 21.7 17.0 16.0 4.9 59.7 5.7 5.7 4.7 1.6 1.6 1.6 59.7 Linguists/Translators -FOLLOW-ON 0.0 1.8 0.000 0.597 0.597 0.597 13 MPRI Translators 0.1 0.7 0.7 0.0 0.228 0.308 0.228 Mal Translators 0.3 0.9 0.9 0.0 0304 0.304 0.904 SAIC-IRDC SMEs 10.2 9.3 9.3 0.0 3.105 3.105 3.105 18 Protocol Expert 0.6 0.1 0.1 0.1 0.035 0.035 0435 0495 0.035 0.3 S&K Admire experts 10.5 6.0 5.0 3.0 2.000 2.000 1,000 1.000 1.000 1.000 14.0 FDC CAC Operators 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.010 0.010 0.010 4010 0.010 0.010 0.1 Totals 92.0 36.7 30.3 33.9 7.7 108.7 12.2 12.2 9.4 2.6 2.6 2.6 108.6 3161 Hires - Census - average cost = $150K for 8 months = 518.75K per month Apr May June July Aug Sep Apr-Sept January- 200 hires @18.76 3/50 February 210 hires @ 18.75 3.938 March-SOS hires @ 18.75 5.625 April/May.- 350 hires @ 18.75 6.563 6.563 13.125 June -- 250 hires @ 18.75 4.688 4.688 July-Sep - 50 hires @ 18.75 0.938 0.938 0.938 2.813 6.563 6.563 4.688 0.938 0.938 0.938 33.938 Contracted Services monthly rates over contract period = contract value/number of months covered Linguists/Translators-FOLLOW-ON 1.193 6months @7.159M 0.597 0.597 0.597 1.8 MPRI Translators .911 for four months; 12/24 to 4/24 0.228 0.228 0.228 - 1.4 MZM Translators 1.214 for four months; 11/22 to 3/22 0.304 0.304 0.304 1.8 SAIC-IRDC SMEs Freeze at 150 SMEs, at 520.7K each; through 30 June 3.105 3.105 3.105 - 18.6 Protocol Expert .211 for six months 0.035 0.035 0.035 0.035 0.035 0.035 0.3 S&K Admin experts extended from 4/15 through 6/30 (RRB 04-0050) 2.000 2.000 1.000 1.000 1.000 1.000 14.0 FOC CAC Operators 8 months @83K 0.010 0.010 0.010 0.010 0.010 0.010 0.1 subtotals 5.682 5.682 4.682 1.642 1.642 1.642 38.0 CPA FY 2004 Communications / IT Cost Breakdown ($M) 3/13/04 RM. Pen 10 Ac10:31 2010 3 OTR 4016 TOTAL Mar Apr May June July Aug Sep TOTAL COMMUNICATIONS / IT 100.0 Communications/IT CEFMS 0.3 0.3 - 0.3 - - - 0.3 CPA IT Package (r.000 computer buy) 1.7 0.9 1.2 0.5 0.0 2.6 0.5 0.3 0.2 - - 2.6 CPA Information Systems Network (11 ) 68.5 21.9 26.8 9.7 9.9 68.3 3.2 32 3.2 3.3 3.3 32 3.3 68.5 CMATT C2 Requirements 2.9 2.9 - 2.9 - - 2.9 IRIS/IMU Phase /I 4.6 1.1 - IT Support/CPA Rosalyn Support Office 0.2 0.2 - 0.2 - - - - 0.2 Comm Support Office (COO) Requirements 2.3 0.0 1.5 - 1.5 0.5 - - - 1.5 International Media Center 0.9 0.0 0.9 - 0.9 - - - 0.9 IT Package (400 cornputers/115 peripherals) SOO. 'Me ',REIM 0.0 - - - - 0.0 RIO-TIDES (CH2M) 0.1 0.0 0.1 0.1 - - - 0.1 Miscellaneous - various 0.0 0.0 - - 0.0 COO Bandwidth & Comm. Svcs ((WWI below) 18.3 3.9 4.8 4.6 4.6 17.9 1.5 1.5 1.5 1.5 1.5 1.5 1.5 17.9 Totals 100.0 31.2 354 14.8 14.5 95.8 5.7 5.0 4.9 4.8 4.8 4.8 4.8 96.0 CSO Bandwidth & Comm Svcs MCI Cellphone - 307/roe Cellhire init/follow-on-INMARSAT -45/rev RESIDUE: Cellhire (Thuraya)/SATCOM NETCOM-INMARSAT - 650/11,0 NETCOM-DSN, SIPR, NIPR, VIC - 12.5/m0 JPSD - Iridium - 14/1 1,0 .0/SD - INMARSAT.360/roe JPSD - AT&T, Verizon 110/11n0 DISA - circuits & bandwidth - 135/ore Totals Mar AT, May tune July Aug Sep TOTAL 0.307 0.307 0.307 0.307 0.307 0307 0.307 2.8 0.045 0.045 0.045 0.045 0.045 0.045 0.045 0.4 - - - _ - 0.1 0.650 0.650 0.650 0.650 0.650 0.650 0.650 5.9 0.013 0.013 0.013 0.013 0.013 0.013 0.013 0.1 0.014 0.014 0.014 0.014 0.014 0.014 0.014 0.1 0.360 0.360 0.360 0.360 0.360 0.360 0.360 3.2 - - - - - 0.1 0.136 0.136 0.136 0.136 0.136 0.136 0.136 1.2 1.525 1.525 1.525 1 525 1.525 1.525 1.525 13.977 Page 1 of 5 Jones, Richard (AMB) From: (b)(6) Sent: Saturday, March 13, 2004 7:06 AM To: Jones, Richard (AMB1(3)(6) (h)(61 (1-11(1 Subject: FW: FW: Engaging with the Washington transition effort FYI (b)(6) Chief of Staff Director of Administration and Logistics Coalition Provisional Authority Baghdad DSN (h)(6 Commerciall(b)(6) Original Message From: (111(61 Sent: Friday, March 12, 2004 10:31 PM To: 11,111 Cc: (b)(6) Subject: RE: FW: Engaging with the Washington transition effort Amb. Holzman - FYI and perhaps you'd care to chime in on your thinking. (b)(6) Original Message From: 6)(6) Sent: Friday, March 12, 2004 1:37 PM To: (b)(6) Cc: \ Su jecr: Kt: r e Washington transition effort (b)(6 I listed the management eo le who I know were working on transition issues anyway; added DIA Ops CO , and AID rep (per their choice - probably admin type), agency rep, and then included (b)(6) and assumed a PD and POL type from the people already there. That was a first draft. Then we assume there will be a gradual assignment of PCSers (very gradual). Also I believe that (1:(6) 0 the RSO may be a part of this along with the 2 DS types who are doing FSN vetting. 's was a best guess with a short deadline before I departed. In the meantime, (b)(6 will be attempting to determine whether some poi, econ, PD folks can be assigned soon and deployed between now and May 15. >Fror (b)(6) >To.(b)(6) >CC:rAo) >Subject: FW: Engaging with the Washington transition effort >Date: Fri, 12 Mar 2004 16:07:27 +0300 (b)(6) 15 people? (b)(6) >Chief of Staff 3/13/2004 Page 2 of 5 >Director of Administration and Logistics >Coalition Provisional Authority >Baghdad >DSN: >Commercial: > Original Message >From: Rathmell, Andrew (SES1) >Sent: Friday, March 12, 2004 3:52 PM >To: Jones, Richard (AMB) >cc: (b)(6) FE-MC) >Subject: RE: Engaging with the Washington transition effort fb)(6) at DoD suggests the Baghdad based team may be around 15 >personnel -(b)(6) > >Andrew Rathmell >Office of Policy Planning & Analysis >Coalition Provisional Authority - Baghdad >Room M239 >DSN: (b)(6 >civ: (- >cell: ( > Original Message >From: Jones, Richard (AMB) >Sent: Friday, March 12, 2004 12:55 PM >To: Rathmell, Andrew (SES1) >Subject: RE: Engaging with the Washington transition effort >Thanks for the heads up. Did you get any impression of the size of the >ITP team? DJ > Original Message >From: Rathmell, Andrew (SES1) >Sent: Friday, March 12, 2004 12:24 PM >To: Jones, Richard (AMB) >Cc (b)(6) >(FE-MC) (OTHER); Oster, Jeffrey W. (0-9);Lby.6.1— >Subject: RE: Engaging with the Washington transition effort >Amb Jones, >Perhaps best to handle this offline but my understanding is that Amb >Bremer will receive a message from SecState and Defense in a day or so >mandating the establishment of the Iraq Transition Planning Team (ITPT), >including ITPT Baghdad. ITPT Baghdad will be headed by John Holzman and >will have the task of drawing up a detailed, timelined transition plan >by 1 April. ITPT will report to DoS and keep Amb Bremer "informed". >ITPT will rapidly take over CPA functions (starting with admin and >management, ending with policy and spokesman) allowing CPA to 3/13/2004 Page 3 of 5 >concentrate on key priorities (eg the political process) and on winding >up in an orderly manner CPA personnel. >The ITPT will accompany IMAIl and0317!lgrr— here late next week. >My sources are pretty reliable - CPA-W and DoS. >Office of Policy Planning & Analysis >Coalition Provisional Authority - Baghdad >Room M239 >DSN: >civ: (+ >cell: ( > Original Message >From: Jones, Richard (AMB) >Sent: Friday, March 12, 2004 9:33 AM >To: Rathmell Andrew (SES1) >Cc: i l 1)(6) -4pr (OTHER); Oster, Jeffrey W. (0-9); (b)(6) l v >(FE- C):(b) 6) (0-6) >Subject: RE: Engaging with the Washington transition effort >OK. Do you have any idea how big this forward team is? Have any >decisions been made on where they will live and work? DJ > Original Message >From: Rathmell, Andrew (SES1) >Sent: Friday, March 12, 2004 12:16 AM >To: Jones, Richard (AMB) >Cci(b)(A) OTHER); Oster, Jeffrey W. (0-9); >(FE-MC);(b 0-6) >Subject: RE: Engaging with the Washington transition effort >To ensure you are updated on this; having spoken to Mat CPA-W >tonight. >The new DoD-DoS transition team will be operational from Monday; their >mission is to produce a report by 1 April and then to plan and organize >the detailed transition to an Embassy and Mission. =-(b)(6) will be here at the start of the week. (b)(6) and will accompany the forward part of the team here towards the (b)(6) >end (A next week. This forward team will stay here through July. They >want to work with our specialists (comms, personnel, etc) to ensure a >joined up and integrated planning process. >This timeline means that it may be better to wait for their inbrief here >end of next week rather than putting another paper and a person to >Washington at the start of the week. rorm >Office of Policy Planning & Analysis >Coalition Provisional Authority - Baghdad 3/13/2004 Page 4 of 5 >Roo >DSN: >civ: ( >cell: ( > Original Message >From: Jones, Richard (AMB) >Sent: Thursday, March 11, 2004 9:55 AM >To: Rathmell, Andrew (SES1) >C4b)(6.) (OTHER); Oster, Jeffrey W. (0-9) >(FE -mu) >Subject: RE: Engaging with the Washington transition effort >Andrew: I support your recommendations 1 - 3. With respect to >recommendation 4, I understand that Washington is already planning to >request that we second three people from here for their effort. Wmay have more details. DJ > Original Message >From: Rathmell, Andrew (SES I) >Sent: Thursday, March 11,2004 7:41 AM >To: Oster, Jeffreiy. (0-9); Jones, Richard (AMB) >Cc (b)(61 M(OTHER) >Subject: Engaging with the Washington transition effort >Jeff passed me details of the new State-DoD transition planning team >being stood up in DC by 15 March; I have also had informal views on this >from colleagues in Washington. I am sure you have already worked on >this but my concern is to ensure that we shape and influence the debates >of this team proactively since I am not sure that CPA-W is always in a >good position to promote our views. >Aside from engagement at the senior level by youlland Amb >Bremer, we may want to think imaginatively how we shape Washington >thinlcing at the working level (recognising the limited staff resources >we have here). See what you think of this proposal: >1. We use LPB's last memo as the basis for a more in-depth paper that >fleshes out elements such as the relationship with the Iraqi govt and >the possible transition staffing requirements to prepare a formal input >to the process. >2. We send someone who knows this subject in depth to ensure the team >has our views over in the early days of the team (perhaps around 20-25 >March). I may have to do this and think it would be a valuable use of >my time. >3. We seek to embed in the team for its duration someone who knows CPA-B >well. One choice may be LTC(h)(6) I who helped establish OPPA from >the ORHA days and served as its deputy director until December. He is >currently on Army assignment in the Pentagon but could be freed up to >join the transition team through June. He knows the set-up here well, >the Washington process and knows well the problems with pre-ORHA >planning so will ensure that these are not repeated. 3/13/2004 Page 5 of 5 >4. We may consider in addition detaching a CPA-B staff member with an >overview of the issues for 1-2 months (the crucial period it seems to me >is March 15-mid-Ma to the team in Washin ton. Possible candidates >would beVhY6 r COL (b)(6) (from OPPA - he has led some >of our work on field transition and is also engaged in the analysis of >advisory personnel requirements). >Andrew Rathmell >Office of Policy Planning & Analysis >Coalition Provisional Authority - Baghdad >Room M239 >DSN: (b)(6) >civ: Create a Job Alert on MSN Careers and enter for a chance to win $1000! 3/13/2004 Transition Task Force Co-Chairs: Jones & Redd Exec. Dir. \ Cl: ( Personnel CPA/IRMA CJTF-7 STATE PMO COALITION 03: Operations CPA/IRMA CJTF-7 , STATE PMO COALITION 05: Policy CPAJIRMA CJTF-7 08: Budget CPA/IRMA CJTF-7 STATE STATE PMO PMO COALITION COALITION . C2: C4: Logistics / CPA/IRMA ; _ CJTF-7 -STATE CPA/IRMA CJTF-7 STATE PMO COALITION ; COALITION PMO C6: Comnns CPA/IRMA CJTF-7 STATE 09: C'vil Affairs / Regions CPA/IRMA CJTF-7 STATE COALITION PMO PMO COALITION . EMI MINI OM IMM MO EMI IM I= NM IMM SIM "MI Embassy Baghdad Facilities Path Forward March 2004 IIIIII =I NMI =I INN 11= MIN OBI IMO NM MI ININ INII 11111 IMO Ili DOS Baghdad Facilities Path Forward • Facilities Strategy • Population to be served • Funding Strategy • Execution Plan IND MIN INN MN NMI 11111 =I INN INN INN UN INN Planning Strategy • Provide interim facilities within presently available funding of $59.9 million • Provide limited unclassified facilities for the DoS Transition Team May by 15th and stand up new mission on July 1, 2004 • No new housing will be provided as part of the interim facilities, except "extremely modest" living space for the DoS Senior Transition Officer in the interim chancery • Acquire land […اقتُطع العرض هنا — النص الكامل في ملف التنزيل]