Minute dowse to private secretary iraq Wmd uk us talks 21-22 april

EU Pol Mil; EU Crisis Manager, Press Office Michael Williams, Special Adviser Minute balem La.c. truman 23/4 William Chrman Private Secretary SUBJECT: IRAQ WMD: UK/US TALKS, 21-22 APRIL 1. accompanied Martin Howard (DCDI) and other MOD and SIS representatives to Washingion on 21-22 April for discussions with the Americans on taking forward the hunt for tragi WMD. Washington telno 534 (attached) gives a good overview of the talks with DOD. State and NSC. I would highlight the following points. Immediate action 2. The immediate need is to ensure that both the US and UK are making best use of the quite substantial specialist military assets we have in theatre now, to pursue the search for evidence of WMD programmes. Our understanding is that the UK assets are not being used at all in their intended roles; the (500-strong) US 75th Exploitation Task Force is searching sites, but largely on an opportunity basis rather than in accordance with a coherent set of priorities. The commanders on the spot have - understandably - been focussed first on winning the war and then in responding to pressure to restore basic services to the Iraqi people. They now need to make a further gear-change, and put WMD at the top, of their priorities. DCDI will visit theatre early next week to make sure this message gets across to UK commanders. The Americans are taking parallel action with CENTCOM. 3 A particular concern is getting access to scientists and others involved in the Iragi programmes who, reporting suggests, are ready to spill the beans. We continue to believe thai this route is most likely to provide the evidence of Iraqi programmes that we need individuals; many others are unlocated, but the great Page 1 DECLASSIFIED reference to an "initial operating capability" by end-May is a little misleading. General Dayton, the commander-designate, is travelling to the theatre today to settle command and control arrangements with CENTCOM. Thereafter, he expects the ISG to roll out mcrementally from the start of May, as existing units are transferred to his command and «editonal assets arrive. Subject to Mr Hoon's approval, MOD have agreed in principle to a TOK conungent in the ISG of about 100 specialist personnel, including the Chief of Staff. The lustratians will also have a small team; the Americans are keen to involve other nationalities (though I suspect their ability to attract others may depend on the extent to which the ISG is seen as a competitor or collaborator with the UN). Davion appeared to envisage his task being completed in 6 months - terminating with the establshment of an Iraqi Interim Authority. Everyone else we saw thought this was unrealistic. (It certainly sits oddly with the ISG's supposed responsibility for elimination as well as discovery of WMD programmes. Dayton appeared to envisage handing this role over to other US agencies). But there was clear concern that the longer the operation lasted, the more it risked attracting Iraqi hostility. Managing Expectations n. All our interlocutors agreed on the urgent need to manage public expectations. This is not a matter of suggesting that we may not, in the event, find any evidence of WMD programmes on the contrary, we remain confident that we will. It is more a case of drumming home the twin messages that in will not be a quick process. Of course, we might get lucky and find a smoking gun omarow But the chances are that we will not: Saddam has had twelve years to hide the evidence and it is unreasonable to expect us to find it in a couple of weeks. (To date, less than Sint HMG's priority list of 146 suspect sites have been visited); on on evidence we tum up is less likely to be in the form of finished materiel - tockpiles of chemical or biological weapons, long-range missiles, etc - than testimony from Scientists and documentation about WMD development and production programmes. This is not a new time it is why from the outset we put such emphasis on the UN inspectors Page 2 DECLASSIFIED considering an early speech oy an administration nigure to get these points across. (CENTCOM have also begun to stress in their briefings the painstaking, multi-layered, nature of the process for verifying reported 'finds'). Validation 8. All our interlocutors took the initiative in mentioning the need for credible third-party validation of coalition findings. We made the point that what constituted credibility was inevitably going to be subjective - ie what was sufficient for the UK and US governments might not be enough for the audiences we really needed to convince, including the Security Council (and the UK media). Like it or not, it was hard to escape the fact that a UN seal of approval would be the most difficult for the critics to dismiss. We also needed to bear in mind that most of the other governments we might approach for 'validation' were likely raise questions about the UN role (we have already run across this with the Dutch). 9. The Americans did not seriously try to argue the point, but I doubt that we entirely overcame the deep reluctance - particularly in the Pentagon - to contemplate a further role for UNMOVIC. The US attitude is as much emotional as rational. Even at State, John Wolf (Assistant Secretary) said that he had been asked to speak to Blix before yesterday's Security Council meeting, but had refused. 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