النص مستخرج آلياً من صورة الوثيقة أو من ملف قديم، وقد يحتوي أخطاء في بعض الكلمات أو ترتيب الأسطر. الملف الأصلي هو المرجع.
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Mr McDermott, ACC MDP
Mr
- IPU, FCO
Subject: IRAQ AND THE UK POLICE SERVICE - MEETING 23/4/03 " indicated at the conclusion of our meeting that I would document my understanding of our discussion and, in particular, our agreed action plan.
Firstly, can I say how grateful I am that you convened the meeting so quickly, as it enabled all interested parties to establish a common base of knowledge, including as Mr Rumsfield might say 'the things we know we don't know'.
I found John Chorley's [MOD] input particularly helpful and we all appear to accept that the Prime Minister is committed to contributing to a unified effort via ORHA.
Chief Inspector Paul McLaughlin was also an important contributor in that he alone has recent experience of Iraq post- regime change.
Actions Agreed:
1. It was agreed that [subject to the approval of Chief Constable MDP] the MDP would deploy two officers [Supt & Insp/Chief Insp] to enhance the police advice available to GOC 1 [UK] Armoured Division. This would ensure a non military police presence in Basra which could both support the GOC and also input to OHRA thinking and FCO/ACPO/Home Office/MDP in London.
2. FCO would pursue the nomination process to ORHA of Chief Inspector Jones, as previously discussed. This would ensure a civil police input to ORHA and also crucially ensure a reporting capability back to FCO/ACPO/Home Office/MDP
3. However, it was recognised that a Chief Inspector placed in ORHA would not be able to undertake a strategic assessment or authoritatively discuss with the ORHA command element their vision and requirements in relation to the future of internal security in Iraq. In that context I agreed to undertake a visit to ORHA in Baghdad of not more than one week. The purpose of that visit being to establish a clear understanding of the direction OHRA was taking and the needs arising there from. It was anticipated that the visit would furnish enough information to enable FCO/ACPO/Home Office to plan the UK's contribution, including possibly the attachment of a senior officer to OHRA for an extended period I believe it would be fair comment to say that at this point in time there is no clear shared vision of the future but Instead a strong determination by the agencies represented to provide meaningful support based on a professional assessment of the situation. For my part, I feel I must see the situation myself so that i can properly advise the Home Secretary and colleagues. I could not request others to serve in Iraq if I had no personal insight in to the situation and the overall strategy/vision for security sector reform 1look forward to receiving details of when you would like me to deploy to Baghdad and would merely ask for 48 hours