Minute dfid junior official to dfid contractor dfid basrah issues paper 2

Civil Military Humanitarian Advisers to 1 Division CHAD OT Advisor to ORHA DFID BASRAH: ISSUES PAPER #2 Please find below an update to the DFID Basrah Issues Paper, 19 May. The aim of this paper is to provide a brief overview of the current situation in ORHA/CPA SE AOR, potential avenues for HMG/DFID support specific to the ORHA/CPA SE AOR and a recommended end date for the DFID Basrah Team deployment. 2. This overview is followed by more detailed annexes on key issues for the Iraqi population, ORHA/CPA structures (including GSTs, LGTs, USAID contractors), relevant UN agencies, NGOs, and the International Red Cross/Red Crescent Movement. 3. Many of the critical issues facing ORHA/CPA SE are structural/developmental and lie outside the traditional role of CHAD. Achievement of DFID strategic objectives for Iraq will require immediate attention from wider DFID/MENAD specialists and possible action-orientated deployment of a specialist team to support an ORHA/CPA SE upgrade rather than continued oversight of the DFID Basrah Team. As with the previous issues paper, this paper is drawn up within a fluid situation and some points have been mentioned in previous sitreps. Current Situation 4. While there is currently no humanitarian crisis in Southern Iraq, provision of basic International these issues are concerns around security, the degraded capacity of the Technical Directorates due to the conflict and the subsequent looting, and the slow response by ORHA/CPA SE to stand up Iraqi central administration and civil service functions. DECLASSIFIED MUST varied in part due to security constraints. 7. ORHA/USAID contractors are currently conducting assessments and planning in preparation for more intensive structural infrastructure rehabilitation and local governance strengthening. It is clear that the USAID contractors will not address all needs sector-wide or country-wide. Vital areas such as technical capacity building, training and support to development planning within Technical Directorates will likely not be covered by the USAID contracts. . 8. There is a continued vital role for the UN agencies beyond immediate response activities and a need for agencies to begin shifting strategic focus towards medium-long term programmes. The UN now struggles to find its place amidst the plethora of stakeholders currently intending to support Directorates. However, until USAID assessments are completed and plans publicised, it will be difficult for UN agencies to identify and plan to fill gaps. Early engagement between all stakeholders regarding longer-term programming is required and should be reflected in the revised UN Flash Appeal. 9. Coordination is slowly improving amongst stakeholders as agencies become established and channels of communication develop. Directorate staff are noticeably more involved in sectoral coordination, although they are still not directing the meetings or the assistance provided. ORHA/CPA will need to sit side by side with the Directorates and begin proactively coordinating assistance in line with a developing Directorate strategy (which also requires urgent attention). This will be a challenging task which ORHA/CPA and the Directorates should engage upon immediately. 10. Despite the arrival of a few additional personnel, ORHA/CPA struggles to establish itself, disseminate its mandate and actively undertake in its role as the Authority. This is compounded by continued insufficient policy direction coming from ORHA/CPA Baghdad. There is an urgent need for ORHA/CPA and/or UK pc to support ORHA/CPA SE and for ORHA/CPA SE to proactively engage or the substantial gains achieved by the UK military are at risk of being undermined 2 DECLASSIFIED 12. (Detailed elaboration of the key issues for the Iraqi population and activities of the international community to address them can be found in Annex 1.) DFID Short Term Objectives in Iraq: ) 13. As noted in the DFID Interim Strategy for Iraq, DFID's short term priorities include: • Re-establishing law and order: police working, courts functioning; minimising Arab / Kurd tensions in the north; • Getting public services running again: workers returning, salaries paid in a fair and transparent manner; Iraqi Ministries functioning; • Meeting the needs of the vulnerable: maintaining food pipeline and needed; resuming oil distribution; supplying emergency water where exports to finance humanitarian supplies; • Restoring public infrastructure: power; water, sanitation and sewerage; transport; telecommunications. depends on achieving the mutually 14. Progress against these objectives interdependent goals of re-establishing a stable security environment, operationalising the technical Directorates and establishing a functioning ORHA/CPA SE. ORHA/CPA, in coordination with the Coalition Forces is authorised and responsible (under Geneva and Hague Conventions and reiterated in CPA Regulation 1) to ensure that the above activities take place. However, ORHA/CPA SE must be supplied with sufficient human and financial resources to undertake its responsibilities together with and in support of the relevant Iraqi structures. Potential Future Support (DFID or joint UK pic) Security 15. Support to security sector reform is a niche for HMG/DFID. The need is unquestionable and DFID security sector advice could usefully dovetail into the UK 1 Div security strategy (stili not seen in its final form). DFID could consider secondment of 3 DECLASSIFIED 17. The arrival of additional staff to ORHA/CPA SE has resulted in a slightly increased profile at sectoral meetings and UN fora. ORHA/CPA SE currently has 15 staff on short (with two additional staff contracts. scheduled to depart in 4 weeks). Ambassador Ole Olsen Coordinator ORHA/CPA SE has returned to Basrah and is now fully operational. established herself as deputy and has to reformulate the office structure/functions to maximise current efficiency with the limited human and financial resources available and plan/drive forward expansion to cover responsibilities. In order to carry out the functions of ORHA/CPA SE, (and taking into account the DFID staff expected over the next week, through 1 Div) there remains an urgent need for further human resource support including (but not limited to): • An admin/support team to manage the office, including personnel, procurement, IT and vehicle fleet management; • Civit governance experts; • Water experts; • Infrastructure experts • Electricity experts • Justice experts • Customs (operations officer rather than policy specialist); • Human Rights Officer; • Education expert; • Information/communications officer; • Media Officer. 18. ORHA/CPA SE will be forwarding a complete list of human resource requirements to capitals by the end of the week. Numbers of staff required are not finalised but there will be a need for more than one expert in each sectoral area in order to cover government functions in the four governorates. 19. DFID should consider direct secondment of staff to ORHA/CPA SE rather than functional (not purely administrative) secondment to UK 1 Div. The objective is to 4 DECLASSIFIED 21. ORHA/CPA SE would benefit from a full office deployment kit including cars with a radio network (including base station) to enhance operational security and efficacy. and in four Governorates ORHA/CPA SE is expected to cover activities currently does not have positive communications during visits. A short-term deployment of operational staff could be useful to set up the offices and systems. 22. The security concerns raised in Baghdad regarding ORHA procedures could be The security situation in Basrah and the South is addressed in ORHA/CPA SE. considerably more stable than in Baghdad. If DFID secondees were supported with adequate equipment (communications, cars, protective gear) and a security plan (derived from the DFID Basrah security plan), they could be covered by an adequate security umbrella. Note: issues such as ORHA/CPA policy on carrying arms would still need to be addressed within any FID security plan. Reestablishment of Technical Directorates 23. DFID could have a substantial impact through the provision of advocacy (with HMG), policy and technical support to MoD/UK 1 Div to drive forward the QiPs plan as CMHA). The rehabilitation of proposed by UK 1 Div (drawn up by Directorate structures (Municipality, health, water and sewage, power, agriculture, education, finance, etc) and the overall reestablishment of the Technical Directorates is an urgent task. However, there is a need to avoid overlap with ongoing plans for support from other agencies, in particular OTI as implemented by IOM and the grants of the LGTs. Information 24. Support for independent media development is required. Previous DFID support to BBC WST humanitarian lifeline programming as well as the BBC WST media review could usefully be followed by further support to the media sector. BBC WST has submitted a proposal to HMG (through various offices) for media strengthening in Basrah. The UNOHCI is currently examining the feasibility of re-starting a Basrah- based newspaper. These proposals should be considered together with other relevant media-sector submissions. 5 DECLASSIFIED deployed as soon as possible to support ORHA/CPA SE. 27.A continued DFID team presence under the status quo will have diminishing returns Funding decisions continue to be made from London (which is appropriate) and policy issues are more effectively raised from London to the relevant agency headquarters. Additionally, DFID will benefit substantially from the establishment of a Baghdad Liaison and advocacy activities as well as presence with a country-wide remit. overseeing the longer-term implementation of the DFID strategy will be more effective at the central level, especially as the security situation improves in Baghdad. 28. We recommend therefore that the DFID Basrah team deployment ends by 10 June ‹ bearing in mind the issues as outlined above. 29. However, if a support package is deployed or substantial financial support extended to ORHA/CA SE, an operational DFID presence could be useful for an additional week to facilitate transfer of equipment/funds and general knowledge. 6 DECLASSIFIED • cmployment generatom development or baonves • Land Ownership/Property Rights (especially relating to IDPs and refugees). Security Increasing numbers of shops are open during the daytime and traffic is visible on the streets. More women are walking through the streets although many Iraqi women professionals reportedly arrive at UN meetings with male family members due to security concerns. Although the UK military has received fewer reports of incidents (including shooting) in the past week compared with previous periods, there is evidence of increased organised crime, including smuggling. Criminality continues to be a concern and while not targeted at the international community, there remains substantial risk of being in the wrong place at the wrong time. Movement during the evening hours remains limited in Basrah and shooting can be heard virtually every night. The capacity of the Coalition Provisional Authority (CPA) and the relevant Iraqi structures to restore law and order in Basrah remains limited. The scale down of the military presence continues to be a concern in the UK military AOR. Although the arrival of forces from other countries may offset some of the anticipated gaps, stretch of current force structure will be inevitable. 53 police stations are now functioning within UK 1 Div AOR with a gradually increasing armed police force now patrolling the streets. Telephone numbers for the relevant police stations have been disseminated (although usefuiness unknown as large parts of the population have no immediate access to a telephone). DFID Basrah do not have data on whether this has directly impacted on the number of incidents occurring in Basrah. A limited number of courts and prisons are set to open on 1 June which should have an impact on reestablishment of judicial process and serve as a deterrence factor. The scoping mission of Chief Constable Paul Kernahan is now completed and the subsequent recommendations should be issued imminently. The draft security sector strategy (from the Royal Military Police) is awaiting findings from this mission before final formulation and submission to PJHQ/MoD. A proposal (possibly to be sourced DECLASSIFIED These are positive developments, however, it is unclear how quickly financial support will be released to pay trained staff and whether such funding will be mirrored within all other relevant Ministries. Despite this uncertainty, the Oil Ministry has been able to hire a guard force to patrol oil pipelines in the Basrah Governorate. However, the Directorate of Water and UNICEF continue to cite looting of sites and damage to water (and sewage) pipelines as some of the key constraints to restoring basic services. WHO has secured agreement from ORHA to secure main warehouses and distribution chains, although specific information on which sites will be secured is not yet available. USAID contractors, such as Bechtel, have confirmed to the DFID team that while they are responsible for the security of their own staff and immediate offices, security of sites (both immediate and long term) will need to be arranged in coordination with Coalition Forces and Iraqi Police Forces. Stevedoring Services of America (SSA), the company that has received the USAID contract for administration of the Umm Qas port has hired 200 local security guards. The recent ORHA directive which provides a two-week amnesty period for the collection An of heavy/automatic weapons should have an impact on the security situation. information campaign will be conducted in UK 1 Div AOR between 1-7 June and the ) actual collection of weapons will take place between 7-14 June. An improved general security situation would help provide an incentive for individuals to hand in weapons. An intensified information campaign from the Directorates and ORHA will assist in encouraging stability and reassuring the population that Iraqi systems are being re- established. ORHA is addressing this information gap with the first distribution (30,000 copies in Basrah) of the Baghdad - produced ORHA newspaper this week. plans to take over the formerly CPA radio 'Nahrain' which should be broadcasting via AM and FM frequencies within the week. A TV station in Basrah is also planned ORHA plans to have eventually have an Iraqi media team of 59, including Iraqi staff to assist in production of radio programmes as well as production of an insert in ORHA newspaper. NOTE: These initiatives (and the subsequent programming) are ORHA- DECLASSIFIED The CIMOC has also been tasked to map the structures, capacities and needs of the Directorates as a basis for future engagement and assistance. This process is ongoing and, according to the recent FRAGO should be completed by 12 June. The initial incomplete feedback indicates the urgent need for operating budgets for all Directorates, renovation of some office buildings, basic office equipment, and in some cases, project equipment (garbage trucks, shovels, etc). Some Directorates have been requested to submit their current list of requirements to Ministries in Baghdad, presumably to inform the formulation of new budgets. However, release of initial funds in the interim (perhaps according to last year's budget) would assist Directorates in reclaiming their previous tasks/functions and alleviating some requirements for international community intervention. The Basrah City Council has now been disbanded and replaced by the functional heads of Technical Directorates. This may empower the existing heads to take required policy ongoing process but should be finalised by the end or Mayevel management. This is an USAID contractor Research Triangle Institute (see Annex 2) has begun deployment within Iraq and developing support to local governance structures. For example, RTI's Neighbourhood (Hai) Advisory Council project has developed neighbourhood councils in 83 Baghdad neighbourhoods. These councils will elect representatives to the nine Municipal councils who will then elect representatives to the Baghdad City Council. RTI plans to mirror this project in Basrah Governorate once it is fully established. Lack of cash to maintain or in many cases restart civil service functions. Although there does not appear to be a lack of funding in the pipeline for restarting civil service functions, minimal amounts have been disbursed to date. As noted above, ORHA Baghdad/Ministry of Trade has issued a directive indicating the release (timing unspecified) of $50,000 for each Governorate Directorate of Trade to restart civil service functions. This is positive, however, it is still unclear whether this will be mirrored within other Ministries. ORHA should clarity its forward strategy, including timelines for budgetary support to all line Ministries to facilitate planning at the Governorate level. 9 DECLASSIFIED wwat 1119 on guns tie one powell patt process is beginning with the former naval officers and if successful will be extended to the army. Part of the naval force is being considered as a future river security force and could potentially be integrated into a future Iraqi Defence Force. An organised and well- funded DDR programme (including job training and/or rehiring some individuals for a vetted new national defence force) should be implemented. Even a minimal DDR package could be beneficial to maintaining stability within this population. Governorate Support Teams (GSTs - see Annex 2) have been tasked with supporting the regeneration of government structures (priority as reportedly noted by Bremer) and immediate technical directorate activities. Rehabilitation of directorate buildings has been recognised as a priority and is being considered for potential QIPs support (from UK 1 Div, UN agencies, and IOM). governance interventions, including grants (which could be utilised for rehabilitation of civil administration structures) as well as technical/training support, will be made available through the USAID contractor, Research Triangle Institute (upper budgetary ceiling of $167.9 million - see Annex 2). They have already established a base in Basrah and begun to issue grants to assist in re-starting civil functions. Multi-agency initiatives such as the ORHA-led garbage collection initiative involving UNICEF, UNDP, HABITAT, IOM, CIMOC, and the relevant Directorates are positive indications that ORHA can grasp an issue and coordinate stakeholders in a proactive manner. It is hoped that the initial clean up will be followed by subsequent direct budgetary support from Baghdad to the Directorates to continue the initiative on a rolling basis. Partially functioning distribution system for humanitarian as well as recovery-related goods (the cause of this is often linked to security-related concerns). Due largely to security concerns throughout the distribution chain, many of the main Ministry of Health (MoH) warehouses have not been conducting their monthly distributions to Primary Health Centres and hospitals and have instead been distributing 10 DECLASSIFIED 2111 vul regul colayou supplies/foodstuffs to be imported). Normalisation of customs procedures and import tax issues should be addressed urgently and could assist in control of illegal imports (narcotics, weapons, etc). Employment generation/development of local commerce. Use of local contractors is having a limited, albeit positive impact on Governorate. UK 1 Div are subcontracting local companies for some QIP rehabilitation works. USAID contractors have expressed the intention to subcontract local firms as as maximising direct hire of Iraqi nationals (NOTE: the majority of the subcontracting conferences have been located outside Iraq so it is not clear how USAID contractors will open their tendering process to Iraqi businesses). More and more small shops are re-opening in Basrah city and markets are increasingly busy with small-scale trade. The HOC Kuwait City reports a decrease in attendance of humanitarian agencies and a marked increase in attendance of commercial companies seeking guidance on entry into Iraq. The lifting of sanctions opens the doors to increased investment in the Iraqi business sector. However, ORHA and the relevant Ministries will need to actively support the development of an independent Iraqi business sector, not one that is dependent on or subcontracted to external companies. FAO is now present in Basrah and has begun assessments with the Directorate of Agriculture and the Danish ORHA agricultural expert (on six month deployment). Initiatives to support poultry farming and the regeneration of the agricultural sector will soon begin on a limited basis (supported by DFID through the UN Flash Appeal). Land Ownership/Property Rights. Land ownership/property rights issues are rapidly emerging as a key complicating factor in IDP resettlement, refugee repatriation and has resulted in retribution attacks. Cases are extremely complex and in some instances will require tracing a piece of land through multiple owners across decades. For example, land seized by Saddam 11 DECLASSIFIED nowevel, no specte moractors regaramy proctos this claims commission has been disseminated. ORHA SE has not yet taken this issue forward in Basrah Governorate. A process should be identified and widely disseminated as soon as possible to avoid the population becoming disillusioned and taking action to reclaim land through violent means. 12 DECLASSIFIED The lack of policy guidance and general information flow from ORHA/CPA Baghdad continues to affect ORHA/CPA SE's ability to function. ORHA/CPA Baghdad still has not appointed one focal point for each regional office which would assist in facilitating efficient exchange of information. Information dissemination regarding ORHA/CPA mandate/decisions/intentions has been minimal to date. This is in part due to the lack of local media outlets but more to do with a lack of available information from ORHA/CPA. ORHA/CPA has recognised this weakness and is addressing the current vacuum by taking over the CPA radio 'Nahrain' and issuance of a biweekly newspaper from Baghdad (distributed for the first time this week in Basrah). Support to local government structures varies from Governorate to Governorate and depends largely on the personalities in situ. ORHA/CA absence at the Governorate level has resulted in NGOs or the CIMOC taking the lead on supporting technical directorates and coordinating the provision of assistance. It appears that direct programming will be a function of ORHA/CPA SE at regional office level via the USAID contractors RTI. ORHA/CPA SE should also benefit from the GSTs ability to identify and fund urgent QIP projects. Governorate Support Teams - GSTs ORHA/CPA and Coalition Forces are aware of the disconnect between the required ORHA/CPA presence and the current capacity of this structure. Recognising the need to fill this gap, General Garner noted the establishment of Coalition military Governorate Support Teams (GSTs) and Local Governance Teams (LGTs) and the establishment of interim local councils as two of his 12 objectives for the next 30 days (stated on 9 May). The current draft FRAGO lays the groundwork for establishing military GSTs to act as focal points, provide technical advice/support to the Iraqi Governorate staff and implement ORHA/CPA directives at the Governorate level. These GSTs will liaise with LGTs (civilian contractors - see below) and the ORHA/CPA Governorate representative to provide direct support to the Governorate structure. 13 DECLASSIFIED Governorates, ORHA/CPA SE will need to manage two different approaches to the GSTs rather than one cohesive, coherent approach. Directorates should be a standardised clear with structures through country-wide supported mandate to implement ORHA/CPA directives and provide necessary support. It is not clear how this will be managed in ORHA/CPA SE AOR. Local Governance Teams - LGTs The Research Triangle Institute has been contracted by USAID to undertake local governance support both to relevant Iraqi structures as well as to emerging civil society groups. Support will be provided by Local Governance Teams (LTs) who will be attached to the ORHA/CPA Governorate structure and provide technical advice, training as well as quick impact grants (which could be utilised for rehabilitation of civil administration structures). The budget for RTI is $7.9 million initially with up to $167.9 million over 12 months. Their mandate is broad, encompassing any activity which strengthens civil society and the civil service structures. RTI is now establishing its base in Basrah and has begun assessments throughout ORHA/CPA SE AOR. The staffing structure (including final numbers to be deployed) will be determined based on these assessments. However, undoubtedly these teams and their associated resources will be a substantial asset for ORHA/CPA SE. - USAID contractors USAID assessments are ongoing in ORHA/CPA SE AOR and the majority of the USAID contractors plan to initiate implementation works within the next few weeks. Communication between contractors and UN agencies varies depending on the sector and should improve once Bechtel and others are permanently based in Basrah. Daily meetings are held between ORHA/CPA SE, Bechtel, and RTI and efforts are being made to ensure a coordinated approach. ORHA/CPA SE will need to manage this process closely together with the Directorates to avoid overlap with other UN agencies (as seen already with UNDPs activities) and to ensure that tasks are 14 DECLASSIFIED social mobilisation to Materials for schools (desks, computers, equipment, etc), encourage student enrolment and development of education baseline indicators. Local Governance: Research Triangle Institute ) $7.9 million with up to $167.9 million over 12 months 'Strengthening of management skills and capacity of local administrations and civic institutions to improve delivery of essential municipal services such as water, health, public sanitation and economic governance; includes training programmes in communications, conflict resolution, leadership skills and political analysis.' Capital Construction: Bechtel $34.6 million initially with up to $680 million over 18 months 'Emergency repair or rehabilitation of power generation facilities, electrical grids, municipal water systems, sewage systems, airport facilities, the dredging, repair and upgrading of the Umm Qasr seaport and reconstruction of hospitals, schools, ministry buildings, irrigation structures and transportation links; goal is to repair or rehabilitate up to 100 hospitals, 6,000 schools (out of 25,000), up to six airports and one southern seaport.' NOTE: Geographic coverage for each section of this contract remains unknown. For example, in the education sector Bechtel has prioritised four Governates for the first 3 and a half months of school rehabilitation work. Airport Administration: Skylink $2.5 million initially with up to $15 million 'Assessment of civilian airports and collaboration for the timely repair; management of civilian airports for the expeditious reception and onward processing of humanitarian assistance, reconstruction material and personnel.' Public Health: Abt Associates $10 million initially with up to $43.8 million over 12 months 15 DECLASSIFIED 16 DECLASSIFIED activities will not support the rehabilitation of civil governance. Through its longer-term administration however, it will assist with programming, strengthening civil structures/functions through critical capacity building and technical support. NOHCI and ORHA have yet to establish a comfortable working relationship althoug is Is staring to improve as OKMA capacity increases and they beain to attend/cha relevant meetings. he HIC now has all required equipment and is engaging with agencies, UK mil and the Develonment of intermatior Iraqi Directorates on information management issues. management tools and assistance tracking will need to be done with a view to countrywide systems and eventual handover to Iraqi counterparts. HIC is aware of this issue and is working to integrate these considerations into its approach. UNHCR UNHCR currently has eight staff based in Basrah. This will rise to fifteen or more with the planned establishment of two field offices in Najaf and Al Amara. UNHCR Basrah is currently focusing on repatriation issues. There are 7-8,000 Iranian refugees in the Basrah AOR. 4,300 of these (living in Dujaila, Ali Gharbi, Kumeit) were registered by UNHCR and cleared by the Iranian authorities to return prior to the conflict. Approximately 1,000 were actually repatriated prior to the onset of hostilities. UNHCR is now witnessing movements towards an isolated, mined border checkpoint, Al Sharhani. 185 have crossed but have not been allowed to transport their tractors or livestock with them. UNHCR Iran has not been allowed to monitor the crossing on the Iranian side nor to follow the returnees to their destinations. The UK Embassy Tehran has been involved in discussions with UNHCR on this issue. UNHCR would prefer the main border crossing be changed from Al Sharhani to Khorram Shah, SE of Basra (they could provide transport for refugees if needed) which is more accessible and is lobbying with the Iranian authorities on this issue. Previously, UNHCR liaised with the Iraqi Ministry of Foreign Affairs and Ministry of Interior as well as BAFIA and the Iranian Ministry of Interior to arrange repatriation 17 DECLASSIFIED UNHCR currently has sufficient funding to implement its programmes, although it noted concern that its other global operations have received decreased levels of funding from other donors (not DFID). UNICEF UNICEF Basrah currently has approximately 20 international staff (including staff from OXFAM and NCA) and 12 national staff. These numbers will change as UNICEF increasingly uses local contractors and support to Iraqi structures (especially within the WES sector). UNICEF will possible begin rotating UNICEF staff through the governorates, however currently relies on day visits and contacts with NGOs partners. activities are on schedule. However, UNICE Basrah note that besides the emergency phase activities ongoing (water tankering, etc which will be phased out by August/September), they are beginning to shift focus towards medium-term country programmes including capacity building support to technical Directorate staff, teachers, health professionals, etc. Most of the key issues according to UNICEF include the need for policy direction from the Ministries and the relevant structures to be in place at the Governorate level (supplied by an operational budget). UNICEF Basrah highlighted the need for Bechtel school rehabilitation coverage to be extended to other Governorates and for a country- wide education strategy to be developed. UNMAS (MACT) The MACT is now established and fully functioning in Basrah. The expected Mine Tech EOD teams have arrived and together with teams from DCA and FSD, have begun An initial. rapid assessment indicates clearance operations through Basrah City. substantially more extensive contamination of the city than previously thought with an estimated 100's of tonnes of UXO requiring disposal. 18 DECLASSIFIED Merelyper awareness and mine risk education activities must become part of national as well as local structures/networks. The UNICEF MRE advisor is aware of this and is already scoping potential avenues for training/development. Due to time constraints, the following sections will be sent in the coming days. WHO FAO UNDP WFP IOM 19 DECLASSIFIED Ll1D 1U udoe corruns mothere accompany low now registration visits so that food parcels can be distributed on the spot. NGOs will continue to play a role in the coming months until Iraqi systems are up and running. However, as the Iraqi systems do begin to re-establish their leading role, UN agencies will likely shift focus from NGOs and either put contracts out to tender for local contractors (as. was done by UNICEF prior to the conflict in CSI due to minimal international NGO presence) or support Iraqi systems directly (WHO). There is a need to encourage NGOs to participate in existing coordination mechanisms. There are a number of NGOs present in Basrah that have yet to attend sectoral meetings or inform UN agencies or the relevant Directorate as to their activities - the potential for overiap is huge. In part, a more central role for the Iraqi Directorates, alongside ORHA, is required to register/approve all projects and therefore track assistance. Some of the larger NGOs present in ORHA SE AOR (SCF, GOAL) have benefited from cooperation agreements with USAID or direct grants from the DART teams. Flexibility of funding has been critical for some of these NGOs to initiate rapid interventions and have immediate impacts. A MENAD strategy for future development-related engagement with NGOs will become increasingly useful as Iraq moves from emergency into the recovery phase. 20 DECLASSIFIED cooramation meetings in relevant sectors. The capacity of the Iraqi Red Crescent Society is still being assessed but it appears that, similar to civil service structures, the majority of the top-level management is no longer in piace. Substantial organisational development activities will be required to re- establish the IRCS and strengthen existing structures. The role and activities of each component of the RC/RC Movement will need to be clearly defined between the ICRC, the Federation and the PNS to ensure coordinated and effective, need-based (rather than supply driven) support to the IRCS. The uncoordinated interventions of Participating National Societies in Basrah AOR continue to be a challenge to the overall RC/RC Movement response. 21 DECLASSIFIED