النص مستخرج آلياً من صورة الوثيقة أو من ملف قديم، وقد يحتوي أخطاء في بعض الكلمات أو ترتيب الأسطر. الملف الأصلي هو المرجع.
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Work on Sensitive Site Exploitation (SSE) continues in iraq, and will become enhanced with the formation of the Iraq Survey Group, to which the UK will be making an important contribution. Although timelines for plow the establishment of the Group are still fluid, it is important to get the organisation and running right. This will not hold up work already Vury underway to detect and eliminate WMD but we need to keep the pressure on. We need to do more work on public handling.
Background
We wrote to you on 28 April with information on the US proposals for an iraa Survey Group, which is intended to address Iraci WMD and other post-conflict issues such as terrorism and war crimes Further details have become available as US thinking has developed, and we have been firming up the contribution that UK plans to make.
Al present, Coalition Forces are working from a list of over 500 stes potentially linked to the development, production and storage of WMD, overwhelming concentrated in the US area of operations. As at 22 May, coalition forces had initiated investigations into 122 of these sites. plus a further 55 sites identified since the conflict began. The most promising finds so far relate to mobile facilities. The Cabinet Office is receiving daily updates from the DIS ROCKINGHAM cel on all SSE activities.
US Plans
The US is planning to expand and provide better co-ordinatien of the existing coalition effort by bringing the current WMD activities, together with a range of other post-conflict activities, under the Iraq Survey Group The proposed mission of the ISG is attached. The US Commander of the ISG will Sir David Manning KCMG No 10 Downing Street 950, 303 + DECLASSIFIED
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issue of independent 3** Party verification of its findings has yet to be respived General Dayton intends to estabrish an initial ISG operating capability in Qatar by 1 June and to move the ISG Command Group to Baghdad by 10 June. after which other ISG elements will be activated on order.
While the first few weeks are likely to show some problems and bottlenecks, we believe that the essential plans are coming into place to get the ISG up and running, although we regard the timescales as still being fluid UK Involvement The UK wil be providing the 1* Deputy Commander (Brigadier John Deverell) who plans to deploy to Baghdad on 10 June. Brigad er Devereli will be running all ISG operations, with General Dayton addressing extemal and higher level ISG ssues. We will also assign to the ISG the UK WMD related units already in theatre or about to arrive, including
• The DIS Battlefield Intelligence Recovery Team
• The Joint Forces Interrogation Team
• 7630 (HUMINT) San RauxAF
• A Document Exploitation Team We are also investigating the most effective use of the Joint NBC Regiment and other assets in theatre, including EOD and the Deferce Science & Techrology Laboratory/Atomic Weapons Establishment's "silver" mobile laboratory. DIS Liaison Staff in Washinglon will be reinforced to support ISG work, with a ven to providing a UK presence in the SG Fusion Cell in Washington. The DIS is also providing individual reinforcements to ISG in thealre.
we are also actively recruiting a cacre of UK ex-UNSCOV and ex-UNMOVIC inspectors and others whom we believe will be useful to the inspection effort. We intend to establsh by l June a team of four inspecters who would be at short readiness to deploy to theatre when the ISG makes the order. The bulk of inspectors would be available to the ISG Commana from around the end of June. Botn General Dayton and DoU have been brefed on our dans and they fit in with their intentions DECLASSIFIED
Presentation
The Dublic handing of all this needs to be carefully considered. There continues to be considerable media interest in efforts to find Iraq WMD. There have also been numerous PQs on this and on the functioning of the ISG There is growing pressure for the Government to provide an assessment of how the WMD findings match the statements made in the September 2002 Dossier, the US are understood to be undertaking their own post-mortem in this There have been problems that US briefings in theatre and/or in Washington are not properly cleared with us, and we have taken steps to ersure the best co-ordination we can. More generally, there is a need for Whitehall to develop a ocherert and proactive PR strategy for the ISG work We will be ooking at this in consultation with colleagues as a matter of urgency.
I am copying this letter to Simon McDonald (FCO), John Scarlett and Sir David Omand (Cabinet Office) and Tony Brenton (Washington) lite P D WATKINS Private Secretary DECLASSIFIED
• Terrorism
• Iraqi intelligence
• WMO (Main Effort)
• Individuals associated with the Iraqi regime/leadership with WMD
• Individuals detained by the iraqi regime
• War crimes and crimes against humanity." DECLASSIFIED