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MA/DeJO(Ups) PS/PUS 144. MA/CNS MA/ACDS(Ops) PS/DGCC MA1/CGS i contement getstry tA caprity PS/DTIO PSO/CAS (9) In their the numbe crocuty called PS/VCDS HD Sec(Iraq) MA/CDL PS/DNO PS/CDI PS/DMO (b) cable; no an additind PS/DAO MA1/DCDS(C) nate fit to he tope with MA/DCDS(EC) DI Ops the westfit Canni L TERIC CURRENT AND FUTURE COMMITMENTS - RELATIVE PRIORITIES and FRESCA, 1 remment thut the treats I stali ISSUE clanfication of nuntes high level of commitment. White is justifits (and recena) lo call onto TIMING alditimal tA permne for Mou-TERIC and FRESCO Тіня - канні ген те ри. Priority. A paralle submission is being made on the TA issue summarised RECOMMENDATION 1 la aspiration for the Ice, inho hammy" Ca. encil di cnne duri cos The Secretary of State is invited to note that: 3. " Apri a tea; pontical and procate. cagnuh. TELIC demands, that we should plan to cover. There are a number of new commitments, including further potential gr There are two options for providing the capability to deal with these sarget the say shoes get with thant- further commitments: member gia the sprap rearra, Merene at omnine cateral (nade SECRET i suppuant ti deal wa 645) ponit it is won erpheinig the DECLASSIFEDI TA MANY A Ministers are aware of the level of commitment to Op TELIC and Op FResco. 4. In addition there are numerous standing, home security and Ministerially directed tasks - either ongoing, or contingent. On Wed 26 Mar COS took a routine update on the overall level of operational commitments' 1. The key deductions were: Operational commitments are running at a level unsustainable beyond the Summer/Autumn. This is particularly the case for the Army, but holds true for the RN and the RAF. We are placing particular pressure on our enabling forces. Notably we have effectively committed the entirety of the Defence Medical Services to operations. C. Our ability to generate forces to deal with additional contingencies is very limited. We could only contemplate generating forces at Small Scale non- warfighting (and these would have to compete for scarce airlift). The RN could not deliver forces even at this level without withdrawing from Ministerially directed tasks in the Mediterranean or the Caribbean. The situation is compounded by the considerable potential for short notice homebase tasks (eg terrorist incidents, or a rise in the terrorist threat leading to an increase in the alert status to Bikini AMBER). If AMBER was declared, the exact manpower bill would be dependent on the specific measures implemented by TLBs but could affect the core outputs of predominantly military TLBs within 2 days. The current level of activity has only been achievable at penalty, such as gapping of RN commitments, extension of operational tour lengths, postponement of post-operational leave, and the cancellation of a large number of exercises. 5. Separately, we know that the level of operational commitments is placing pressure on our people. This year's Armed Forces Pay Review Body Report noted that the incidence of untaken leave (when reported) was increasing, as were the hours worked. This trend looks set to continue for much of this year. 'D/DAO/24/3 "Commitments on a rolling 12-24 months ahead - Managing the Means" dated 26 Mar 03 2 SECRET DECLASSIFIED • There may nevertheless be a achieve stabilisation success in Phase IV requirement to increase our commitment to Op TELIC in the short term (for additional PW handling tasks, or to replace forces already in theatre). In due course, perhaps as early as July, there will be a requirement to roule elements of the in-place force, which will require units to be removed from FRESCO. Other operational priorities should, in principle, be subordinate to Op TELIC. Economy of effort is required elsewhere. Force levels on our other operational commitments should be kept at the minimum necessary and should be reviewed frequently. We should assume that we will continue to train forces at BATUS (required to provide collective training for those LAND forces needed to deliver trained high readiness forces for 04 and for Op TELIC follow-on). We should also assume that we will commence the BOWMAN fielding , and do our best to sustain it thereafter. Similarly the re- programme in Jul 033 equipping/re-organisation of key force elements should continue (e.g. Typhoon, MRA4, ASTOR, Joint Force Harrier and MFTS). Beyond the next few months there are other potential commitments - both discretionary, and non-discretionary: UK command of a EUFOR (Bosnia) formation by Mid 04, whilst subject to further consideration, both on policy and the resource bill, cannot be discounted; Sierra Leone may require further deployments over the next 12 months; and we will be looking to set up a PRT in Afghanistan in Summer 03. RELEASING CAPABILITY 9. Work has been done to identify how best we might release capability. There are two options: a. Find new sources of capability. = Ministers have given guidance on the scale of our Phase 4 commitment - agreeing in principle to a reduction to one-third of current levels, maintaining a Joint Force of a 2* HQ, a Bde plus enablers, and maritime and air assets. * The programme includes a number of contractual obligations. Most critically, a delay in fielding will reduce military capability. The in-service radio equipment is already obsolete. This will tie up 12 Mech Bde until at least Mar-Apr 04. 3 SECRET DECLASSIFIED and it has been the practice not to deploy them in domestic situations where they may be required to face civil protest or disorder, although there is no legal bar to this. There are also some disadvantages in deploying Reserves on static guarding tasks in UK. It would be unpopular, could result in a high number of exemption applications and could have an adverse long-term effect on recruiting and retention. However, the Reserve Forces Act 1996 does allow the employment of Reserves on these tasks. Troops from the Services training and personnel organisations. Large numbers of individuals have already been deployed as individual augmentees from Second Sea Lord, Adjutant General and the RAF Personnel and Training Command. In addition, we currently have some 140 personnel from the latter deployed at RAF FAIRFORD. Given the serious long-term consequences for sustainable manning of the Forces resulting from denuding the training base we would not wish routinely to repeat this, or draw further upon the training stream. In addition, there may be retention difficulties post-TELIC (previous experience suggests this and it is therefore essential to maintain the health of the training machine. Use of the Spearhead Land Element (SLE). The SLE battalion is held at very high readiness as the UK's strategic reserve. It is currently multi-hatted against UK overseas contingencies, homebase security contingencies and, from mid-Apr, as the UK's rear based Balkans Operational Reserve Force. Furthermore, it provides the means to reinforce Sierra Leone, as seen recently on Op KEELING. If deployed, a stand-up capability to replace it can only be generated at risk to Op FRESCO. Reduction of Commitments. There are 3 areas in particular where it has been 11. suggested we might be able to release capability: Op BANNER. Military support to the Police in NI is significant and the situation remains unpredictable. We are entering a critical time in the peace process and any subsequent normalisation is not guaranteed. If there is a breakthrough it will bring a reduction in military forces levels in the medium term, but, paradoxically, in the short run, there will be a greater demand on forces. * Reducible to 39 days in urgent circumstances. 3 Assumes a decision to mobilise by 2 Apr. 4 SECRET DECLASSIFIED albeit with extension of guard lengths. Implementation of a similar process could release up to 200 personnel. Furthermore, cancellation or reduction of PD would result in cancellation of Her Majesty's Birthday Parade on 14 Jun. Although this is already under consideration, such a step might be interpreted as an admission of overstretch. Separate advice will be provided on this. C. FRESCO coverage. But these savings have been consumed by other high educing long on end ton one tong p BATUS). Restructuring will still leave at least 16,000 committed to Op FRESCO. Assuming that the tempo of Op FRESCO continues along recent lines (ie sporadic) then it is recommended that we be prepared to use FRESCO manpower (at risk) for any short term homebase security tasks (e.g Heathrow Airport and KP security). Such deployments will need to be considered on a case by case basis. Dependent on future FBU action, there may be a requirement for COS and Ministers to prioritise Homebase security and Op FRESCO. Op FRESCO is the only commitment with significant resources from all 3 services. GUIDANCE In summary, it would be helpful if Secretary of State could endorse the following 12. broad guidance for managing commitments over the next 6 - 9 months. a. Op TELIC is Main Effort. b. Op FRESCO remains the second priority, but is at risk from higher priority homebase tasks and Op TELIC roulement C. We must protect future capability in priority areas: Army BATUS training for high readiness/TELIC follow-on forces (and equivalents for the Navy and Air Force). (2) The Training Stream. (3) BOWMAN 5 SECRET DECLASSIFIED f. Direction be given to GOC NI that the Rear Based Mainland (MLD) Bn will remain under his OPCOM, but is to be prepared to deploy on higher priority tasks. From a commitments perspective, there is no requirement for the steady- state Public Duties to be affected. From a presentational perspective, it may be essential that they be maintained. The potential of employing contractors to assist in security tasks, or to augment existing guards, in the event of the BIKINI Alert State being raised, should be explored further. 13. In the forthcoming weeks Ministers will be invited to give further guidance on: Early Apr. Possible decision on resourcing additional EPW/rear area security requirement for 1(UK) Armd Div. Mid Apr. Decision required on whether Naval Task Group 03 (NTG03) should proceed. A decision on arrangements for continuing with her Majesty's Birthday Parade will be needed by mid-April. A decision on the mobilisation of 3500 Reservists for Op TELIC roulement will be required 61 days in advance of deployment. For an early-mid July deployment this would be as early as 8 May. In addition, there will be a number of more minor decisions requiring COS/Ministerial approval. These will be put forward as they arise. Ian Lee IAN LEE DG Op Pol 6 SECRET DECLASSIFIED