Prosecuting Iraqi War Crimes: A Consideration of the Different Forum Options

S. Hrg. 108–174 PROSECUTING IRAQI WAR CRIMES: A CONSIDER- ATION OF THE DIFFERENT FORUM OPTIONS HEARING BEFORE THE COMMITTEE ON GOVERNMENTAL AFFAIRS UNITED STATES SENATE ONE HUNDRED EIGHTH CONGRESS FIRST SESSION APRIL 10, 2003 Printed for the use of the Committee on Governmental Affairs ( U.S. GOVERNMENT PRINTING OFFICE WASHINGTON : 88–244 PDF 2003 For sale by the Superintendent of Documents, U.S. Government Printing Office Internet: bookstore.gpo.gov Phone: toll free (866) 512–1800; DC area (202) 512–1800 Fax: (202) 512–2250 Mail: Stop SSOP, Washington, DC 20402–0001 VerDate 0ct 09 2002 08:18 Nov 05, 2003 Jkt 088244 PO 00000 Frm 00001 Fmt 5011 Sfmt 5011 C:\DOCS\88244.TXT SAFFAIRS PsN: PHOGAN COMMITTEE ON GOVERNMENTAL AFFAIRS TED STEVENS, Alaska GEORGE V. VOINOVICH, Ohio NORM COLEMAN, Minnesota ARLEN SPECTER, Pennsylvania ROBERT F. BENNETT, Utah PETER G. FITZGERALD, Illinois JOHN E. SUNUNU, New Hampshire RICHARD C. SHELBY, Alabama SUSAN M. COLLINS, Maine, Chairman JOSEPH I. LIEBERMAN, Connecticut CARL LEVIN, Michigan DANIEL K. AKAKA, Hawaii RICHARD J. DURBIN, Illinois THOMAS R. CARPER, Delaware MARK DAYTON, Minnesota FRANK LAUTENBERG, New Jersey MARK PRYOR, Arkansas MICHAEL D. BOPP, Staff Director and Chief Counsel DAVID A. KASS, Chief Investigative Counsel JOYCE RECHTSCHAFFEN, Minority Staff Director and Chief Counsel LAURIE RUBENSTEIN, Minority Chief Counsel CYNTHIA GOOEN LESSER, Minority Counsel DARLA D. CASSELL, Chief Clerk (II) VerDate 0ct 09 2002 08:18 Nov 05, 2003 Jkt 088244 PO 00000 Frm 00002 Fmt 5904 Sfmt 5904 C:\DOCS\88244.TXT SAFFAIRS PsN: PHOGAN C O N T E N T S Opening statements: Page Senator Specter ................................................................................................. 1 Senator Collins ................................................................................................. 1 Senator Carper ................................................................................................. 14 Senator Lautenberg .......................................................................................... 16 WITNESSES THURSDAY, APRIL 10, 2003 Hon. Pierre-Richard Prosper, Ambassador-at-Large for War Crimes Issues, U.S. Department of State 3 W. Hays Parks, Special Assistant to the Judge Advocate General of the Army for Law of War Matters ............................................................................ 6 Hon. David J. Scheffer, Senior Vice President, U.N. Association of the U.S.A., and former U.S. Ambassador-at-Large for War Crimes Issues (1997–2001) .. 19 Professor Ruth Wedgwood, Paul H. Nitze School of Advanced International Studies, Johns Hopkins University, U.S. Member of the United Nations Human Rights Committee ................................................................................... 21 Tom Malinowski, Washington Advocacy Director, Human Rights Watch .......... 23 ALPHABETICAL LIST OF WITNESSES Malinowski, Tom: Testimony .......................................................................................................... 23 Prepared Statement ......................................................................................... 50 Parks, W. Hays: Testimony .......................................................................................................... 6 Prepared Statement ......................................................................................... 30 Prosper, Hon. Pierre-Richard: Testimony .......................................................................................................... 3 Prepared Statement ......................................................................................... 27 Scheffer, Hon. David J.: Testimony .......................................................................................................... 19 Prepared Statement ......................................................................................... 33 Wedgwood, Professor Ruth: Testimony .......................................................................................................... 21 Prepared Statement ......................................................................................... 41 APPENDIX Responses to Questions for the Record submitted by Senator Lautenberg for: Hon. Pierre-Richard Prosper ........................................................................... 57 W. Hays Parks .................................................................................................. 62 Hon. David J. Scheffer ..................................................................................... 64 Professor Ruth Wedgwood ............................................................................... 68 Mr. Tom Malinowski ........................................................................................ 71 (III) VerDate 0ct 09 2002 08:18 Nov 05, 2003 Jkt 088244 PO 00000 Frm 00003 Fmt 5904 Sfmt 5904 C:\DOCS\88244.TXT SAFFAIRS PsN: PHOGAN VerDate 0ct 09 2002 08:18 Nov 05, 2003 Jkt 088244 PO 00000 Frm 00004 Fmt 5904 Sfmt 5904 C:\DOCS\88244.TXT SAFFAIRS PsN: PHOGAN PROSECUTING IRAQI WAR CRIMES: A CON- SIDERATION OF THE DIFFERENT FORUM OPTIONS THURSDAY, APRIL 10, 2003 U.S. SENATE, COMMITTEE ON GOVERNMENTAL AFFAIRS, Washington, DC. The Committee met, pursuant to notice, at 11:06 a.m., in room 340, Dirksen Senate Office Building, Hon. Arlen Specter presiding. Present: Senators Specter, Collins, Carper, Lautenberg, and Pryor. OPENING STATEMENT OF SENATOR SPECTER Senator SPECTER [presiding.] Good morning. I just came from a Judiciary Committee executive session and it feels like evening, let alone afternoon. The Governmental Affairs Committee will hear testimony on the issue of creating a war crimes tribunal for the war in Iraq. I have a few comments to make as an opening statement, but before doing so, I yield to the distinguished Chairman of the Full Committee with my appreciation for her scheduling the hearing and agreeing to let me chair. Chairman Collins. OPENING STATEMENT OF CHAIRMAN COLLINS Chairman COLLINS. Thank you very much. I want to begin by sa- luting Senator Specter for his leadership on this issue, which goes back for some time, and for his hard work in putting together this hearing. I am very pleased and honored to pass on the gavel to him today as we explore this extremely important issue. As Chairman of the Veterans Affairs Committee, Senator Specter has consist- ently fought for the needs of those who have fought for us. Truly, no one has done more for our Nation’s veterans than this remark- able Senator. As the regime of Saddam Hussein crumbles in Iraq, the subject of this hearing on how we can best hold those accountable for war crimes in that country takes on increasing significance. The admin- istration apparently has already begun to draw up plans to deal with both the historical offenses by the Iraqi regime against its own people and its neighbors as well as crimes committed by the regime during the current conflict. It is vital that Congress play a role in examining these issues, and this hearing is a vital starting point in that process. (1) VerDate 0ct 09 2002 08:18 Nov 05, 2003 Jkt 088244 PO 00000 Frm 00005 Fmt 6633 Sfmt 6633 C:\DOCS\88244.TXT SAFFAIRS PsN: PHOGAN 2 There can be no doubt that Saddam Hussein’s regime is respon- sible for many war crimes. The main question before this Com- mittee today is how best those crimes should be prosecuted. There are a number of options available, ranging from international tri- bunals sanctioned by the United Nations to the domestic courts of Iraq or perhaps even the United States. Whatever forum is used, the result must have legitimacy both for the Iraqi people and for the international community. The courts must also work effectively. The trials need to take place as quickly as possible. The procedures should not endanger sensitive intelligence information. And of course, most of all, the re- sults must ensure that justice is achieved. I look forward to Senator Specter’s continuing leadership as we explore this issue. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. Senator SPECTER. Thank you very much, Madam Chairman. A week ago Saturday, I noted reports of four U.S. soldiers killed when an Iraqi soldier dressed in civilian clothes detonated a car bomb. And the next day on international television, Deputy Foreign Minister Tariq Aziz commented, gloating over the incident, and saying that would be the policy of Iraq and that, in fact, they were recruiting 4,000 volunteers from the region to come in and act as suicide bombers, in contravention of the Hague and Geneva con- ventions. And those suicide bombings have been repeated. The fol- lowing Thursday, April 3, the Iraqi Government boasted about a woman, again disguised, detonating a bomb and killing three American soldiers. After the Saturday incident where four American soldiers were killed and the Sunday comments by Tariq Aziz, my staff prepared on Monday a resolution and, as our practice is to travel from our States on Monday, I came in late in the afternoon and went to the Senate floor and presented it, to do my best to put Tariq Aziz on notice, and the Iraqi vice president who had also sanctioned these practices, that when the war was over, it would not be over as far as they were concerned, that they would be tried as war criminals. Now, I do not know if anybody in Iraq pays any attention to what happens on the Senate floor when a Senator speaks. I know they pay attention when we pass a resolution authorizing the use of force, as we did on October 11—2 a.m., actually, on October 12. But to the extent that my voice could be heard, I wanted to do that. And since that time, a resolution has been prepared, a joint reso- lution, which Congressman Weldon has introduced in the House— the original resolution had more than 100 co-sponsors in the House—and Senator Biden and I have introduced the resolution in the Senate. And the Foreign Relations Committee has consented to a vote on it this afternoon. But we ought to do our best to tell the Iraqi war criminals what is going to happen to them. And it is a very complicated issue as to the legalities involved. There is no doubt that there have been war crimes on subterfuge, war crimes using mosques, war crimes using schools, and using ci- vilians. And how we approach it, whether it is a military court or court martial or a tribunal established by the United States, Great Britain, and the coalition nations, or whether other U.N. partici- VerDate 0ct 09 2002 08:18 Nov 05, 2003 Jkt 088244 PO 00000 Frm 00006 Fmt 6633 Sfmt 6633 C:\DOCS\88244.TXT SAFFAIRS PsN: PHOGAN 3 pants ought to be involved are all matters we are going to have to iron out. But I think it is a matter of enormous importance that we pro- ceed and that we be heard on the matter. And that is why I am so appreciative to Chairman Collins for scheduling this hearing. We have some very distinguished experts today, and without fur- ther comment, we will proceed to our distinguished witnesses. Our first witness is the Hon. Pierre-Richard Prosper, ambas- sador-at-large for war crimes. Prior to serving in this position, Am- bassador Prosper served as special counsel and policy advisor to the previous ambassador-at-large for war crimes, and from 1996 to 1998, he served as war crimes lead prosecutor for the United Na- tions International Criminal Tribunal of Rwanda, where a convic- tion was obtained for the head of state of Rwanda, who is now serv- ing a life sentence. Not too many people know that. You practically have to travel to Rwanda to find that out. It has gotten very little publicity. But it is a deterrent. White collar crime convictions are deterrents. I have seen a lot of that. Imprisoning heads of state is a deterrent, too. It does not happen very often. The Ambassador graduated from Boston College and has a law degree from Pepperdine. Thank you for joining us, Mr. Ambas- sador. The floor is yours. TESTIMONY OF HON. PIERRE-RICHARD PROSPER,1 AMBAS- SADOR-AT-LARGE FOR WAR CRIMES ISSUES, U.S. DEPART- MENT OF STATE Ambassador PROSPER. Thank you, Madam Chairman and Mr. Senator, for giving me this opportunity to speak before you on such an important—— Senator SPECTER. Let me note the clock, which will reset at 5 minutes. That has been the practice of this Committee. And I have been saying recently that I attended a memorial service for Ambas- sador Annenberg a few months ago, and the time limit was 3 min- utes for former President Ford and Secretary of State Powell and Arnold Specter and everybody else. So I just want you to know that 5 minutes is a very generous allocation of time. Ambassador PROSPER. All right, I will do my best to stay within the confines and also, noting your remark, I would like to introduce my written text into the record. Senator SPECTER. Without objection, it will be made a part of the record. Ambassador PROSPER. Thank you. Clearly, this is an important issue, of seeking accountability for the abuses that have occurred in Iraq. It is important and vital for reconstruction, and essential for reconciliation. If there is to be lasting peace and democracy, there must be justice. As Senator Specter noted, for the past 3 weeks, we have received disturbing information indicating that the regime has engaged in a consistent and systematic pattern of war crimes and atrocities. From the egregious conduct we have seen, it is clear that Saddam Hussein and his forces have a complete disregard for the law and human life. The Iraqi regime has intentionally removed the line of 1 The prepared statement of Ambassador Prosper appears in the Appendix on page 27. VerDate 0ct 09 2002 08:18 Nov 05, 2003 Jkt 088244 PO 00000 Frm 00007 Fmt 6633 Sfmt 6633 C:\DOCS\88244.TXT SAFFAIRS PsN: PHOGAN 4 distinction between combatants and civilians, often with the spe- cific intent to cause civilian casualties. As we know, the list of abuses that we have received reports on is long. The regime has reportedly killed civilians by opening mor- tar fire and machine gun fire upon them as they have tried to flee; used civilians as human shields, resulting in death; seized children from their homes and told families that males must fight for the regime or they will face execution; summarily executed military de- serters and former officers; positioned significant amounts of mili- tary weaponry in buildings such as hospitals, schools, mosques, and historical landmarks. Ambulances have also been used to transport death squads. There are also credible reports that Iraqi forces may have exe- cuted coalition soldiers following their surrender or capture and committed other crimes which my colleague Hays Parks, a leading expert on these issues, will discuss. The pattern of atrocities is not new. Saddam Hussein and his re- gime have inflicted brutality since taking power in 1979. They in- stitutionalized violence, torture, rape, murder, and mass extermi- nation. We know that over the 20-year period they have gassed the Kurds, causing the deaths of between 50,000 and 100,000 people; tortured Kuwaitis during their oppression of Kuwait in 1991, dis- placing millions of people, killing thousands, hundreds missing; brutally suppressed the Shi’ia Muslim insurgencies in Southern Iraq, attacks that killed more than 30,000 to 60,000 persons; and of course, there have been a series of violations within Iraq’s war with Iran. Senators we believe the end of brutality is near. We have been cataloging and documenting all this information on war crimes and atrocities both past and present. Our troops have the mission to se- cure and preserve evidence that they come across. It is our hope to find the leaders that are responsible for this, and ensure justice. The United States has been a leader, as you know, in pursuing justice for serious violations of the laws of war and of atrocities, from Nuremberg to the current ad hoc tribunals in the former Yugoslavia, Rwanda, and Sierra Leone. Iraq will be no different. There will be accountability, and there must be credible account- ability for these abuses. So the question presented today is, what are our options and what forms are available? For crimes committed against U.S. per- sonnel, including our American prisoners of war, we, the United States will prosecute. Mr. Parks can also discuss this in greater detail. For the regime’s crimes committed against other countries’ nationals, both present and in the past, the government of those nationals may also have the sovereign interest in seeking justice. For the regime’s crimes committed against Iraqi citizens, we be- lieve that those responsible should be held accountable before an Iraqi-led process, possibly ranging from tribunals to truth and rec- onciliation commissions. The international community has an obli- gation to help the Iraqi people move towards justice, the rule of law, democracy, and legitimate judicial institutions. The United States intends to help ensure that a strong and credible process is created. VerDate 0ct 09 2002 08:18 Nov 05, 2003 Jkt 088244 PO 00000 Frm 00008 Fmt 6633 Sfmt 6633 C:\DOCS\88244.TXT SAFFAIRS PsN: PHOGAN 5 While at this moment it is difficult to assess the degree of inter- national involvement needed—from minimal to substantial, from fi- nancial to legal experts and judges—all States, particularly those from the region, should be prepared to contribute. We have been in continued contact with the Iraqi Jurists Association, a group of experienced judges and attorneys who share these views, to devise a plan. Once the situation in Baghdad is stabilized, we will also work with the internal Iraqi jurists to identify credible practi- tioners, those untainted by the past, who can administer justice im- partially. Together we will find the right formula for achieving ac- countability. Senators we believe that the international practice should be to support sovereign States seeking justice domestically when it is feasible and credible. International tribunals are not and should not be a court of first redress, but of last resort. It is our policy to encourage and to help States pursue credible justice rather than abdicating their responsibility or having it taken away. Because justice and the administration of justice are the cornerstone of any democracy, pursuing accountability for war crimes, while respect- ing the rule of law by a sovereign state, must be encouraged at all times. I am aware that there are some who believe that the Iraqis are not up to the challenge. I have personally met with the group of Iraqi jurists and lawyers. I am convinced that there are qualified Iraqi jurists, both within and outside of Iraq, who are ready and willing to accept the mandate of justice. They have a thirst for this pursuit which should not be denied. It is our goal to help create the conditions that will allow them to make the essential decisions. As President Bush and Prime Minister Blair said in a joint state- ment on April 8, we will create an environment where the Iraqis can determine their own fate, democratically and peacefully. Senators, Iraqis should lead this effort to judge those who have committed crimes, the greatest crimes, against their people. They are a proud people. In the last couple of days, we have seen the beginning of the rebirth of a nation. Voices that were once silent by an oppressive regime are now beginning to speak. The Iraqi peo- ple who have been crying for justice and reconciliation will now have the hope of being heard. The seeds of reform will be planted, and the rule of law will emerge. The United States and the inter- national community have the obligation to support Iraqi people in their quest to end impunity in their country. Thank you. Senator SPECTER. I thank you very much, Ambassador Prosper. We now turn to W. Hays Parks, special assistant to the Judge Advocate General of the Army for the Law of War Matters. In that capacity, he advises the Army staff on matters ranging from special operations to directed-energy warfare. He had the primary respon- sibility for the investigation of Iraqi war crimes during Iraq’s 1990 to 1991 occupation of Kuwait and served as the U.S. representative for the law of war negotiations in New York, Geneva, the Hague, and Vienna. Mr. Parks occupied the Charles H. Stockton chair of international law at the Naval War College in 1984 and 1985. Welcome, Mr. Parks, and we look forward to your testimony. VerDate 0ct 09 2002 08:18 Nov 05, 2003 Jkt 088244 PO 00000 Frm 00009 Fmt 6633 Sfmt 6633 C:\DOCS\88244.TXT SAFFAIRS PsN: PHOGAN 6 TESTIMONY OF W. HAYS PARKS,1 SPECIAL ASSISTANT TO THE JUDGE ADVOCATE GENERAL OF THE ARMY FOR LAW OF WAR MATTERS Mr. PARKS. Thank you, sir. Madam Chairman, Senator Specter, as Ambassador Prosper did to shorten things, I would like to intro- duce my written text. Senator SPECTER. It will be made a part of the record in the full. Mr. PARKS. And I will give a summarized version of that, hitting the key points that the Chairman has asked that we look at today. Senator SPECTER. Thank you. Mr. PARKS. Thank you again for inviting me to testify on this very important subject. I have been asked to comment on the 1949 Geneva Conventions for the Protection of War Victims, Department of Defense policies with respect to the law of war in the current conflict with Iraq and Iraqi violations of the law of war. A very short summary on the 1949 Geneva Conventions: These were negotiated following World War II. There are four Geneva Conventions—one for military wounded and sick; one for military wounded, sick, and shipwrecked; one for prisoners of war; and one for civilians in enemy hands. Of the 194 Nations in the world, 190 are States Parties, including the United States and Iraq. There are in fact more governments States Parties to these conventions than Member States of the United Nations, making them some of the most widely accepted treaties. The protections apply when the members of the armed forces or civilians of one belligerent nation fall into the hands of an enemy belligerent. In the case of prisoners of war, this can happen through capture or surrender to enemy military forces. The United States and coalition forces conduct all operations in compliance with the law of war. That is a long-standing DOD pol- icy. No nation devotes more resources to training and compliance with the laws of war than the United States. U.S. and coalition forces have planned for the protection and proper treatment of Iraqi prisoners of war under each of the Geneva Conventions. These plans are integrated into current opinions. Before describing our policies, I should note that in Operation Desert Storm in 1991, the U.S. and coalition partners detained 86,743 Iraqi prisoners of war. These Iraqi prisoners of war were given all of the protections required by the Geneva Conventions. Our aims and acts are precisely the same in the current conflict. We are providing, and will continue to provide, captured Iraqi com- batants with the protections of the Geneva Conventions and other pertinent parts of the law of war. In particular, representatives from the International Committee of the Red Cross have been pro- vided access to Iraqi prisoners of war in coalition hands. Unfortunately, the Iraqi regime is not complying with the law of war, as Senator Specter identified in opening remarks. I offer ex- amples in my written statement, and Ambassador Prosper has pro- vided a detailed list. I should note that in Desert Storm in 1991, the Iraqis mistreated captured U.S. and coalition forces in numerous respects, including physical abuse and torture, forced propaganda statements, food 1 The prepared statement of Mr. Parks appears in the Appendix on page 30. VerDate 0ct 09 2002 08:18 Nov 05, 2003 Jkt 088244 PO 00000 Frm 00010 Fmt 6633 Sfmt 6633 C:\DOCS\88244.TXT SAFFAIRS PsN: PHOGAN 7 deprivation, denial of ICRC access until the day of repatriation, and much more. The Iraqis similarly mistreated Iranian POWs during the 8-year Iran-Iraq war in the 1980’s. The Iraqi regime has thus displayed a pattern of systematic disregard for the laws of war. Based upon initial reports, including those in the media, it ap- pears Iraq has once again committed violations of the law of war throughout this conflict. The position of the United States, as identified again, by Ambas- sador Prosper, is to do everything in its power to bring to justice anyone who, by action or inaction, is responsible for violations of the laws of war. A war crimes investigation by the Secretary of the Army to record Iraqi war crimes during the 1990–1991 Persian Gulf War resulted in a detailed report. Steps have been taken to begin a similar investigation and information collection effort. Responding to the question raised by the Chairman in the Chair- man’s opening remarks, that is, how we best can hold these ac- countable, let me at least list for you the statutory authority for war crimes trials by the United States. I should point out, to begin with, there is a treaty obligation to prosecute war crimes to ensure respect for the law of war. This is in Article 1, common to the four 1949 Geneva Conventions, which obligates each government to re- spect and ensure respect for the present convention in all cir- cumstances. The implementation within the United States is statutory—gen- eral courts martial in Article 18 of the Uniform Code of Military Justice, which is 10 U.S.C. Section 818; by military commissions, in 10 U.S.C. Section 821; or in Federal District Court, which is con- tained in 18 U.S.C. 2441. That concludes my remarks, sir. Senator SPECTER. Thank you very much, Mr. Parks. You are the first witness in my attendance at many hearings who ended exactly on time. Ambassador Prosper, you commented about finding the leaders. The question which is being asked again and again relates to Sad- dam Hussein. Do you have any information as to his whereabouts or what efforts should be undertaken to try to find him? Ambassador PROSPER. Well, at this time we do not have informa- tion as to his whereabouts or the status of Saddam Hussein. But as Secretary Rumsfeld stated yesterday, there are efforts under way either to capture or account for Saddam Hussein and the re- gime leadership that has been responsible for all these abuses. It will be a matter of time for us to make these determinations. Senator SPECTER. When you say we will make an effort to find the leaders, do you have any idea as to how many leaders we will be seeking; that is to say, how many leaders we have evidence of violation of war crimes to find and prosecute? Ambassador PROSPER. We have over the past several months and even longer, taken great care in looking at the history of this re- gime and identifying those who bear responsibility for, particularly, past abuses. And with the current abuses, we are, as we mentioned earlier, undertaking a process of documenting and analyzing the information. As of now, we have been looking at the very top lead- ership, that we have the most interest in. VerDate 0ct 09 2002 08:18 Nov 05, 2003 Jkt 088244 PO 00000 Frm 00011 Fmt 6633 Sfmt 6633 C:\DOCS\88244.TXT SAFFAIRS PsN: PHOGAN 8 Senator SPECTER. When you say top leadership, whom do you mean by that? Ambassador PROSPER. Well, from Saddam Hussein, his sons, per- sons such as Chemical Ali. There are other names which I can pro- vide to you later. But the list that we have compiled is, at a min- imum, nine. And then we begin to look down the list at other indi- viduals to see who is in that upper echelon of responsibility. But we have not limited our review to those top-tier folks. As part of our process, we have looked beyond that to determine the roles that others may have played in committing atrocities or viola- tions, and we are in the process of making assessments regarding those individuals. Senator SPECTER. Ambassador Prosper, when you say that the international tribunals should not be the first resort but the last resort, how would you contrast that with our policy and inter- national policy in denying the requests of Serbia, the former Yugo- slavia, to try war criminals there, but instead the insistence of the officials at the Hague to bring the war criminals arising from the atrocities in the former Yugoslavia, to bring them to the Hague? Ambassador PROSPER. Well, Senator, there is an important dis- tinction that can be drawn here. With the former Yugoslavia, we had a conflict which broke a country apart and created several dif- ferent borders. The United Nations decided to act under Chapter 7 as a measure to bring peace and stability in the region, to lit- erally impose a tribunal in order to bring the perpetrators to jus- tice. It was something that was needed at the time. But what we have done throughout time with the former Yugo- slavia is develop a policy where there is a shared responsibility for the pursuit of justice, where the tribunal in the former Yugoslavia will pursue the top-tier folks responsible for the violations, either from Serbia, Bosnia, or Croatia, while now the States in the region have the responsibility for adjudicating the cases, the mid-level perpetrators. We are beginning to see in Serbia efforts to hold war crimes prosecutions. We are also seeing an effort under way in Bos- nia, where the High Representative is establishing a localized proc- ess, and Croatia is doing the same. So the policy and the practice is moving toward sovereign respon- sibility. Senator SPECTER. But when it came to the key defendants, former President Milosevich and others, the prosecutor at the Hague insisted on jurisdiction there, and over the objections of the Serbian officials. Ambassador PROSPER. Well, at that time, for many of the cases in the former Yugoslavia, there was no showing that the local soci- ety would in fact do some of these war crimes prosecutions. And with Milosevich, the crimes for which he is indicted crossed the borders of Serbia, Montenegro, and deal with Croatia and Bosnia, where the infrastructure was not in place to deal with some of these crimes. Because of the cross-border nature of the crimes, it was appropriate for Milosevich to go to the Hague. Senator SPECTER. Well, when you talk about trying offenses against—as you articulated, regime crimes against the Iraqis, when you talk about trying that with Iraqi tribunals, are there Iraqi tri- VerDate 0ct 09 2002 08:18 Nov 05, 2003 Jkt 088244 PO 00000 Frm 00012 Fmt 6633 Sfmt 6633 C:\DOCS\88244.TXT SAFFAIRS PsN: PHOGAN 9 bunals in existence at the present time which can try those defend- ants? Ambassador PROSPER. The short answer is no, and they will have to be created. What we are finding is that there is a core group of personnel who want to play a critical role in bringing justice. Senator SPECTER. And who are they? Are they former judges? Ambassador PROSPER. Former judges—— Senator SPECTER. How do you constitute the appointment of judges in Iraq? Who is going to make the appointment? When you have a constitution—in the United States, we have a set procedure. We have a government in place. We have a President. Under Arti- cle 2, the President’s executive authority is to appoint judges. Under Article 1, the Senate has the confirmation power. How do you structure that, stated specifically, who is going to appoint the judges? Ambassador PROSPER. Well, these are things that will be deter- mined in a post-conflict setting. I think once we get into Baghdad and are able to actually stabilize the situation, begin to work with the internal and external personalities to begin to fill the various ministries and the various positions within government, these questions will—— Senator SPECTER. How do you do that? How do you fill the min- istries? You have to have someone appoint a minister. Who is going to make the appointment? We have a very delicate situation here, that the United States should not be seen as running the show, as dominating the show. What do we have in mind for provisional gov- ernment or the setting up of judges? Mr. Parks, would you care to try that one? Mr. PARKS. I am happy for Ambassador Prosper to be answering that, Senator. Senator SPECTER. Ambassador Prosper, are you happy to answer the question? Ambassador PROSPER. Yes, the basic plan that we have is, first, for General Garner to go in and begin to gain control of some of the various institutions. From there, the idea is to—— Senator SPECTER. Who is going to do that? Ambassador PROSPER. General Garner. Then from there, the idea—— Senator SPECTER. What is General Garner’s authority? Ambassador PROSPER. Well, he is responsible for the reconstruc- tion effort, if you will. Senator SPECTER. General Garner is responsible for the recon- struction effort? Ambassador PROSPER. Yes. He is in Kuwait as we speak. Senator SPECTER. Where did General Garner get that authority? Ambassador PROSPER. It comes from the President. Senator SPECTER. From the President. And does General Garner have the authority to appoint ministers? Ambassador PROSPER. Well, the initial plan will be for him to come in to begin to gain control of the various ministries. From there, we need to work with the Iraqi people to help develop and reshape the government of their choosing. It will really be the Iraqi people who will have the lead. We will be there in the support as- pect, if you will, to help them shape the various facilities. And VerDate 0ct 09 2002 08:18 Nov 05, 2003 Jkt 088244 PO 00000 Frm 00013 Fmt 6633 Sfmt 6633 C:\DOCS\88244.TXT SAFFAIRS PsN: PHOGAN 10 when we move into the area of a tribunal, this will be something that will be looked at. It may be something that is specialized and is not part of the overall judicial reform. It may take the enactment of additional authorities or legislation to do this. Senator SPECTER. What body of Iraqi law exists to use as the mechanism for prosecuting war criminals? Is there an Iraqi crimi- nal code? Ambassador PROSPER. There is an Iraqi criminal code. Senator SPECTER. Does the Iraqi criminal code provide for the death penalty? Ambassador PROSPER. Yes. Senator SPECTER. So Saddam Hussein could be tried in an Iraqi criminal court and could receive under Iraqi law the death penalty? Ambassador PROSPER. That is correct. Senator SPECTER. And what are the crimes for which the death penalty can be imposed under Iraqi law? Ambassador PROSPER. Well, I do not have, obviously, the entire code before me, but I think it calls for capital punishment, obvi- ously, for murder and acts of this nature. But what we are looking at within the—are working with the Iraqi jurists on, we look at the Iraqi code, look to see if additional authorities based on inter- national law are needed, such as the various war crimes, crimes against humanity, and so forth. And from there, a process will be developed working with both the internal and external Iraqi per- sonalities in order to bring the regime to account for the abuses of the past and present. Senator SPECTER. When was the Iraqi criminal code promulgated and in what manner? Ambassador PROSPER. I do not have that information before me, but we can provide it to you and answer a question for the record. Senator SPECTER. Mr. Parks, what is your view as to how to try others under a war crimes scenario, if you exclude regime crimes against Iraqis, what would your suggestion be as to regime crimes against U.S. soldiers? Mr. PARKS. Senator, like the Senator, I am a former prosecutor. I would ask some very basic questions. One of them, first, is who was the victim of the crime? Second, who committed the crime? And obviously, if the crime was committed against an American soldier, sailor, airman, or Marine, that, I believe, the United States could use its jurisdiction under one of the three statutory courts that I identified. If the individual is a member of—— Senator SPECTER. Could you repeat that? We could exercise juris- diction where? Mr. PARKS. Within any one of the three statutory courts that we have, before a military court martial, general court martial—— Senator SPECTER. Court martial. Mr. PARKS. Article 18 provides for trial of war crimes before gen- eral courts martial. Or before a military commission. Or before a Federal District Court. And I do not list those necessarily in any order or priority. The second thing, the question I would have as prosecutor would be what was the status of the individual who committed the crime? If he was a member of the Iraqi military, that might have some sway on which court he would go to. If he was a member of the VerDate 0ct 09 2002 08:18 Nov 05, 2003 Jkt 088244 PO 00000 Frm 00014 Fmt 6633 Sfmt 6633 C:\DOCS\88244.TXT SAFFAIRS PsN: PHOGAN 11 Fedayeen Saddam, then he might be subject to a different court. If he was a foreign national fighting for Iraq, then he might be con- sidered to be tried by one of those other courts. All of them could be tried for war crimes or for murder. But we would have jurisdic- tion within our own courts for those individuals. Obviously, if the victim was, let us say, a British soldier, and the individual is in our custody, then the case might be that the United Kingdom would ask for the custody of that individual so they could try them. Senator SPECTER. What has happened with the President’s direc- tives as to potential prosecutions against al Qaeda? Mr. PARKS. Those are proceeding, Senator. I certainly put them in a slightly different category because of the type of fighting that was going on within Afghanistan. Senator SPECTER. Well, the President issued an order shortly after September 11 which established procedures, and that was modified. For example, the procedure to have the death penalty im- posed on a two-thirds vote was changed to be unanimous. And some of the rules as to evidence were revised. But has anyone been brought to trial under those Presidential directives? Mr. PARKS. Not as yet. Senator SPECTER. There is consideration in the wings as to per- haps trying Zacharias Massoui in that court if the proceedings in the Federal criminal courts do not work out. It is a very touchy subject. We have an indictment against Zacharias Massoui, and the judge hands down some orders that the Department of Justice does not like and takes an appeal to, and you have the possibility of re- moving the case from the court and going to a military tribunal or a military commission. Would you think that can be done? Mr. PARKS. I suspect it could be. Again, these are the types of things that I think you would almost draw columns as to the pluses and minuses of particular fora. But the three fora are avail- able. And looking, again, at the offense, where the person is, if the person is an Iraqi soldier in a prisoner of war camp, I would guess that the chance of using a Federal District Court would be very un- likely, that the military tribunals of either general court martial or military commission would likely be the more preferred alter- natives. Senator SPECTER. Do you think a U.S. military commission would have the same credibility worldwide as an international tri- bunal? Mr. PARKS. I am sure that there would be people who would find fault with either an international tribunal or a military commis- sion. I think the charge of victor’s justice might come up. However, I think the thing that we would have to point out is that we do try our own personnel for the same crimes if they are committed. We tried and convicted and executed over a hundred U.S. service- men in Europe alone during World War II. I can speak from per- sonal experience that we prosecuted soldiers and Marines in Viet- nam for crimes that could have been characterized as war crimes. We prosecuted a member of the 82nd Airborne Division for murder and rape in Kosovo. Senator SPECTER. Our own troops? Mr. PARKS. Yes, sir. VerDate 0ct 09 2002 08:18 Nov 05, 2003 Jkt 088244 PO 00000 Frm 00015 Fmt 6633 Sfmt 6633 C:\DOCS\88244.TXT SAFFAIRS PsN: PHOGAN 12 Senator SPECTER. There is something different, though, from prosecuting our own troops—U.S. jurisdiction over U.S. personnel contrasted with a military commission trying Iraqis, where there is an overhang of questioning, especially in the Arab world, about the fairness. I think our courts are exemplary as you compare our courts with the judicial systems around the world; our constitu- tional protections are hallmarks—having had some significant ex- perience in the prosecution of criminal cases. But the perception of others is a very weighty consideration. And when I have proposed and others have proposed an international tribunal, it is with an eye to giving a sense of multilateralism so that the United States does not portray itself as the dominant force. There is no doubt that the United States and Great Britain and the coalition forces are entitled to the credit—not ‘‘great’’ credit, but all the credit. And to have the French come in and say that they do not want to debate the subject, it goes without saying—as the French foreign minister said last weekend, is surprising. You hear all over the world respect for the United Nations. The United Nations is going to have a tough time recovering from what has happened on the war in Iraq. But to the extent that there can be multilateralism—and that does not necessarily include the French or the Germans. It could include the British and the Australians and the coalition forces and, subject to the decision of the coalition forces, it could be broad- ened. And those are decisions that will have to be made in due course. But I just express those views as you articulate the three kinds of courts which could try these cases. And we are equipped; we have institutions in place. The Iraqis do not, I am aware; but we do. What do you think, Ambassador Prosper? You have had a lot of experience in the international field. Do you agree that there would be a better international tone if there was an international tribunal to try Iraqi war criminals who perpetrate acts against the United States? Put aside your categories. You articulated regime crimes committed against Iraqis. Suppose we leave those to the Iraqis. I have doubts about setting that up, but put those aside. And now you have regime crimes against U.S. soldiers. Would there be a substantial advantage in having an international tribunal handle those matters in terms of response by others in the world, espe- cially the Arabs, if there was a multilateral tribunal which goes be- yond the United States, picks up Great Britain, Australia, the coa- lition forces? Ambassador PROSPER. Well, it is my view that the practice has become, and it is accepted, that a state who was a victim, falls vic- tim to war crimes or atrocities, that has the capacity and the abil- ity to address these cases themselves, it has become accepted that these States have the sovereign right and ability to address these cases themselves. I mean, even if you look at, for example, the per- manent International Criminal Court, the supporters of that recog- nize that States have the right to at least begin prosecutions them- selves. VerDate 0ct 09 2002 08:18 Nov 05, 2003 Jkt 088244 PO 00000 Frm 00016 Fmt 6633 Sfmt 6633 C:\DOCS\88244.TXT SAFFAIRS PsN: PHOGAN 13 Now, we have other problems, other issues with that court. But the point I am making, it is recognized that we can do this our- selves. It will be accepted. One quick point on the Iraqi process. What we are saying is that it needs to be an Iraqi-led process, where there is ownership. It does not rule out the possibility of external participation. This is something that will have to be worked out with the—— Senator SPECTER. Now you are talking about regime crimes com- mitted against Iraqis. Ambassador PROSPER. Correct. Senator SPECTER. Yes, but come back to regime crimes com- mitted against U.S. or British or Australian, etc., soldiers. Do you not think there would be a better perception internationally if there was a multilateral jurisdiction as opposed to picking a U.S. jurisdiction, a court martial or, say, a military commission? Ambassador PROSPER. Well, my answer is ‘‘not necessarily.’’ Senator SPECTER. Why not? Ambassador PROSPER. Well, the reason being is we would have to look at the extent of the crimes. Right now, most of the crimes that we have seen have—obviously there have been crimes against U.S. personnel, we have heard of possible crimes against the U.K. British personnel. They may be to the extent where we each have the ability to do these cases ourselves. It is not a situation where the crimes were so indistinguishable that we have to come together to form some sort of a coalition for a tribunal process. So I think you can distinguish the crimes. It is recognized that States have this right and ability to do this, and we and U.K., for example, have credible judicial systems that can address this. So I do not think that by our prosecuting crimes committed against our own people, that there will be an international backlash for those actions. Mr. PARKS. Senator, may I offer a few comments on that? Senator SPECTER. Of course. Mr. PARKS. And again, this is weighing the pluses and minuses, which we all have to do. Certainly, I think one of the pluses that the Senator has mentioned is the public or international percep- tion. There are some minuses or downsides, I think, that we might want to consider. The historical precedent, the Nuremberg International Military Tribunal, tried only the major leaders, where there was no geo- graphic specificity for the offenses. On the other hand, each of the Allies—Australia, New Zealand, United States, United Kingdom, China—all tried individual military commission cases against indi- viduals accused for crimes where there was a specific victim and a specific locality. So there is a historical precedent. And certainly, within the law, the primary responsibility for trial of war crimes belongs to the individual government. We have generally turned to an international tribunal where that has not been possible. One other downside to this is I can anticipate the folks who might want to be on an international tribunal with those. Many of them do not have the death penalty. And that would be something that I suspect they would want taken off the table very rapidly. So I think that is another factor that we might wish to consider when we are weighing what is best in each case. VerDate 0ct 09 2002 08:18 Nov 05, 2003 Jkt 088244 PO 00000 Frm 00017 Fmt 6633 Sfmt 6633 C:\DOCS\88244.TXT SAFFAIRS PsN: PHOGAN 14 I think we may end up with multiple tribunals and jurisdictions, depending again on the crime, the victim, and what we are looking at. Senator SPECTER. When you talk about the death penalty, that is your best argument, in my opinion, Mr. Parks. There is a lot of controversy about the death penalty. My experience has been, in a city like Philadelphia, when I was D.A., 500 homicides a year. And the death penalty was reserved for the most atrocious cases. And I would not permit in the system to ask for the death penalty with- out my personal review. But there were a few cases each year which called for it. If you have a prisoner who is serving a life sen- tence kill a guard, what does an additional life sentence mean? Or some people with extraordinary callous conduct—contract killers, or killing witnesses to avoid prosecution or avoid conviction. There were some cases which called for—and there are different values in different cultures, but I think that is a value which we would want to preserve. And that would be well worth considering, al- though I believe there would be enormous value in trying Saddam Hussein as a war criminal and have him sit in jail for the rest of his life. That would be a constant reminder, which I think would have enormous therapeutic value. We will have to weigh those very carefully. Well, thank you very much for coming in, gentlemen. We appre- ciate your background, your experience. And we are going to be wrestling with this. Congress has authority under Article 1 to de- fine war crimes and set up tribunals. It is a congressional author- ity. One final question, Mr. Parks, as to the jurisdiction of Federal District Courts to try these cases. Did those courts have jurisdic- tion before the Terrorist Prosecution Act of 1986? Mr. PARKS. No, sir. That was enacted, I believe, around 1995 or 1996. Senator SPECTER. Senator Carper, your witnesses. OPENING STATEMENT OF SENATOR CARPER Senator CARPER. Thanks, Mr. Chairman. To our witnesses, we welcome you and I thank you. As most of my colleagues, I have a number of hearings going on this morning. I apologize for missing your earlier presentations. I have, really, a more general, broader question for you and then one specific question, if I may. To be honest, I have not read your testimony, and I may not read your testimony, although someone on my staff will. If you could just crystallize and summarize, maybe within a minute or two apiece, what you would have us take away from this hearing, what you think would be most important for us to be mindful of and knowledgeable about. What would that be? Ambassador PROSPER. Thank you, Senator. I will quickly begin. Regarding the options for prosecution, our policy is for crimes com- mitted against American service members, the United States will prosecute, and Mr. Parks can give you an idea of the various op- tions within there. For the crimes of the regime against third coun- tries, they have an opportunity to seek justice. For the crimes of the regime against its own people, we believe that it should be an VerDate 0ct 09 2002 08:18 Nov 05, 2003 Jkt 088244 PO 00000 Frm 00018 Fmt 6633 Sfmt 6633 C:\DOCS\88244.TXT SAFFAIRS PsN: PHOGAN 15 Iraqi-led process with international support. The degree of the sup- port is an open question right now. It could be minimal, substan- tial; it could be financial; and it could be legal experts sitting side- by-side. We are going to work with the Iraqis. Our goal is to have them have ownership. Because with ownership, it begins to plant the seeds of the rule of law, and they accept that responsibility that is necessary for any grown democracy. Senator CARPER. Thank you. Mr. PARKS. Senator, the United States has three statutory au- thorities, three different courts we could use. The Uniform Code of Military Justice, 10 U.S.C. Section 818, which is Article 18, pro- vides that we can try war crimes before a general courts martial. It has an advantage to the extent that Article 102 of the Geneva Prisoner of War Convention requires that we try prisoners of war by the same standards and the same courts as we would try our own persons. So we provide the same standards within the general courts martial for either our own persons we charge and try as we would for an enemy prisoner of war. Of course, we may have some people not entitled to prisoner of war status, such as members of Fedayeen Saddam. The second option we have is military commissions under 10 U.S.C. Section 821. And the third, that we were just discussing, is before the U.S. Federal District Court, which is contained in 18 U.S.C. 2441. My basic response, sort of a takeaway, is that different cases may have different requirements and different results, or needs for different results, different courts. So we would have to examine these on an individual basis. Senator CARPER. OK. Could either or both of you talk with us a little bit today about the status of negotiations that might be occur- ring between the U.S. and Britian on the issue of war crimes, how to prosecute, and where? Ambassador PROSPER. Well, we have been speaking with the British on this issue. It is an issue that we began discussions on quite some time ago because we both recognized that there is a need for accountability. They are aware of our policy. They have not displayed any discomfort with our policy. And in fact, we are working together to be sure to catalog and document any war crimes that have been committed during this conflict as well as in the past. And I believe that they, too, agree that we need to create a process that gives the ownership of the issue of justice back to the Iraqi people. But they recognize that help will be needed and we will have to determine what that degree of assistance will be. Senator CARPER. Mr. Parks. Mr. PARKS. I do not, sir. Senator CARPER. All right. Maybe one more, if I could. It seems to me that in deciding an appropriate forum for war crime prosecu- tion, we need to look carefully at how post-war Iraq will be gov- erned. If it is a multinational effort, an ad hoc tribunal would prob- ably be most appropriate. But if the U.S. occupies Iraq for an ex- tended period of time, something akin to what we did in Nurem- berg might be a more advisable approach. Could either of you talk with us about how the ultimate composition of a post-war govern- ment in Iraq might affect this decision? VerDate 0ct 09 2002 08:18 Nov 05, 2003 Jkt 088244 PO 00000 Frm 00019 Fmt 6633 Sfmt 6633 C:\DOCS\88244.TXT SAFFAIRS PsN: PHOGAN 16 Ambassador PROSPER. Well, I am not sure how much it would af- fect the decision because the key is to begin to return the govern- ment, the institutions back to the Iraqi people. And it will require a multilateral effort to come in and support. As both President Bush and Prime Minister Blair stated the other day, the United Nations will have a vital role in this operation. So what we see happening, particularly in the area of justice, is that we want the Iraqi people to be in the front, to have that responsibility, but they recognize and we recognize that there will be a need for support, assistance, participation by members of the international commu- nity. So we all need to stand ready to offer our services, whatever services are required, to ensure whatever process is ultimately de- signed is a credible and strong one that will bring the justice that we are all seeking here. Senator CARPER. Mr. Parks, do you want to add to or take away from that? Mr. PARKS. No, his comments were fine, sir. Senator CARPER. All right. My thanks to both of you. Thanks, Mr. Chairman. Senator SPECTER. Thank you very much, Senator Carper. Sen- ator Lautenberg. OPENING STATEMENT OF SENATOR LAUTENBERG Senator LAUTENBERG. Thank you, Mr. Chairman, and I thank the witnesses who appeared here. I am sorry I was not in the room to listen to all of their testimony. But I would ask consent, Mr. Chairman, to put my full written statement into the record. Senator SPECTER. Without objection, it will be done. PREPARED OPENING STATEMENT OF SENATOR LAUTENBERG Mr. Chairman, let me start by saying that I was an enlisted man in the Army and served in Europe during World War II. I can empathize with the brave young men and women in the Armed Forces as they serve their country in an unfamiliar place far from home. The purpose of this hearing is to consider the nature of the crimes the Iraqi re- gime has committed against its own people and crimes the regime has committed against Coalition forces since the war began. We will also consider the proper venue for prosecuting the people responsible for these crimes. Saddam Hussein’s regime is guilty of grave and systematic abuses of human rights. The regime is responsible for the death or disappearance of 250,000 to 290,000 Iraqis over the past two decades. This horrific total includes at least 100,000 people who were killed during the Anfal campaign against the Kurds, which included a chemical weapons attack in Halabja that killed 5,000 villagers living there. Even as we watch our Armed Forces fight their way to victory in Iraq, we recoil in horror from the desperate means of warfare employed by the Iraqi forces. We have seen the exploitative treatment of U.S. POWs, including their public humilia- tion, abuse and display on international television. Sgt. James Riley from Pennsauken, New Jersey, is one of these POWs. On behalf of his family and the families of the other POWs, I am committed to ensuring that the Iraqi forces responsible for such ill treatment will be prosecuted and punished to the fullest extent. We have seen Iraqi forces deliberately use women and children as shields, dis- guise themselves as civilians, and go so far as to feign surrender in order to lure our troops into dangerous situations. Such war crimes, known as ‘‘perfidy’’ by international law experts, not only im- pede our forces’ tactical strategies; they take cruel advantage of the American mili- tary’s concern for protecting innocent life in the midst of combat. One more war crime that particularly deserves mention: I am worried about the March 29 suicide bombing, when a man disguised as a taxicab driver drove up to VerDate 0ct 09 2002 08:18 Nov 05, 2003 Jkt 088244 PO 00000 Frm 00020 Fmt 6633 Sfmt 6621 C:\DOCS\88244.TXT SAFFAIRS PsN: PHOGAN 17 a check point in Najaf and then blew himself up, killing four American soldiers in the process, including Michael Curtin of Howell, New Jersey. We have learned from the Palestinian example, sadly, that suicide bombings be- come ‘‘contagious.’’ Iraqi diehards who know their regime is finished may well em- brace such a loathsome tactic. We need to send a message now that those who organize and employ suicide bombers will be severely punished. It might help deter future suicide bombers. As horrific as war is, there are international norms and laws governing its con- duct. We must hold accountable the people who are responsible for violating those norms and laws. That must be an early priority for the transitional administration in Iraq and, therefore, for the U.S. Government. The Iraqi families victimized by the current re- gime will have high expectations in this regard. We mustn’t allow such expectations to be frustrated. I look forward to hearing from our witnesses about what judicial institutions should be used or established to hold Iraqi war criminals accountable, and who will supervise these institutions. These are important questions we need to address now. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. Senator LAUTENBERG. Thank you. And having served in a war many years ago, when I was once young, and knowing the experi- ence of being in a battleground theater, I empathize with the brave young men and women serving in the armed forces in unfamiliar places far from home. And I am eager to learn more about what we intend to do to make sure that those responsible for war crimes in Iraq pay a price. We saw what happened in the Balkans, and obviously that punishment was meted out in pretty organized fash- ion; and when we see Mr. Milosevich being tried and, no matter what the ruse is, to make sure that the prosecution is vigorous. And that has to be an example, certainly, in this case with the his- tory that we know about, in Iraq. We want to make sure that oth- ers who have similar intentions in years ahead recognize that ulti- mately there is a price to be paid. So I want to say this. Where do we get the jurisdictional ability to decide where and what took place and who deserves punishment by groups other than ourselves, other than—or an international court? Is there a precedent for that? Because if we go back to World War II, the judges were comprised of an international body under international structure. How have we changed the structure so that we now can decide, and having it jurisdically sound, to decide which of these crimes—and I want to see it done, because there is reference to an old movie about mad as hell and want to do some- thing about it. We would hope that we can. So whatever comments you can give to kind of lead me through this. Mr. PARKS. Yes, sir. Actually, the processes are very much the same as they were during and after World War II. As I mentioned earlier, each Nation, as a State Party to the Conventions, has a re- sponsibility to respect and ensure respect to the law of war. And as such, it has the right to prosecute those who commit crimes against its own personnel. Now, in the case of the World War II era, because of the nature and breadth of the crimes committed, the major allies—the United States, the United Kingdom, and Russia—agreed in a declaration issued in Moscow November 1, 1943, that the leading Axis accused, Nazi accused would be brought before an international tribunal. So there was in essence a negotiation amongst the governments that this was too important and perhaps too broad for one government VerDate 0ct 09 2002 08:18 Nov 05, 2003 Jkt 088244 PO 00000 Frm 00021 Fmt 6633 Sfmt 6601 C:\DOCS\88244.TXT SAFFAIRS PsN: PHOGAN 18 to try these individuals. And that was the establishment of the international military tribunal that met in Nuremberg with multi- national distinguished judges. There were lesser offenses, those in which senior, particularly senior military officers, but also senior industrialists involved with the Nazi war machine, were brought before an intermediate-level court. It was a three-judge tribunal that was composed of distin- guished Federal District judges, individual State Supreme Court justices, and individuals. And then there was the third category, and those were the traditional military commissions, which was much like a court martial, that tried individual German officers and others who committed specific crimes against specific American soldiers. For example, General Anton Dossler was tried, convicted, and executed for ordering the murder of eight American prisoners of war that he had captured in Italy during World War II. As I noted, the United Kingdom, Australia, New Zealand, China, the Netherlands, any number of countries carried out similar mili- tary commissions for offenses that had a specific geographic loca- tion and were a specific offense. The same type of thing occurred with respect to the international military tribunal for the Far East, which also had representatives, judges from any number of dif- ferent nations. This was something that was developed through international agreement, negotiation amongst the interested gov- ernments to convene those courts. That did not stop the individual governments, however, from prosecuting those for individual spe- cific offenses that could be pinpointed down to one person. For ex- ample, we tried several different leading Japanese general officers for crimes in the Philippines and held the military commissions there. So it is going to be case-specific. We have the primary jurisdic- tion, but if we wish to surrender that as part of our sovereign rights and negotiate for that to be something convened and held through an international tribunal, we have the right to do that. Senator LAUTENBERG. Do we have the same proportion of partici- pants as we had at that time? There were lots more countries in- volved, and I think that the responsibility was almost by con- sensus, that America was chosen, or accepted, rather, as the lead country in that we had the largest—well, I am not sure that we had the largest participation, but there was huge representation from lots of countries. I am not a lawyer, but I am interested in how it is that we are going to make Iraq and its leadership pay the price and at the same time maintain a structure of law and process that continues to have us providing moral leadership as well as military leadership here. And Mr. Chairman, one comment if I may. I do not know wheth- er there was an explanation as to what changed the structure of the hearing today. Originally I thought there were supposed to be—and this is not to diminish the contribution at all by this panel and the others on the panel—heard by those who were in combat there, veterans. Senator SPECTER. Well, we had witnesses lined up, but the De- partment of Defense objected. And it is our hope we will bring them in again. The witnesses were anxious to testify, and they had appeared in the public media, and I had a discussion with Sec- VerDate 0ct 09 2002 08:18 Nov 05, 2003 Jkt 088244 PO 00000 Frm 00022 Fmt 6633 Sfmt 6601 C:\DOCS\88244.TXT SAFFAIRS PsN: PHOGAN 19 retary Rumsfeld about it yesterday. It is my view—was, is, and will be—that they ought to testify. Senator LAUTENBERG. Good for you. Senator SPECTER. Because that will really tell the world what happened. And we are going to pursue it, Senator Lautenberg. There will be another hearing. Senator LAUTENBERG. I know that you are diligent about process, and understand it fully. Because it is a disappointment not to be able to hear directly the views of those who were there. I thank you very much. Senator SPECTER. We are going to hear from them, Senator Lau- tenberg. It is a little hard to get hold of Secretary Rumsfeld and get him to focus on issues when he is fighting a war. Senator LAUTENBERG. I guess. Senator SPECTER. And when I talked to him yesterday, I started by saying, Do you have time to talk when you have to prosecute the war? And we had a short talk, but did not resolve the issue. But we will. Senator LAUTENBERG. Thank you. Senator SPECTER. Thank you very much, Ambassador Prosper and Mr. Parks. We will now call panel two, the Hon. David Scheffer, Professor Ruth Wedgwood, Tom Malinowski. Starting with Ambassador Scheffer, senior vice president at the United Nations Association. During the second term of the Clinton Administration, Ambassador Scheffer was ambassador-at-large for war crimes. He led the U.S. delegation at the U.N. talks on the es- tablishment of the international criminal court. He is a graduate of Harvard College and the law programs at Oxford and George- town universities. Thank you very much for coming, Ambassador Scheffer. We have had a lot of discussions in the past, and we look forward to your testimony. We are under somewhat of a time crunch, unfortu- nately, because there are other hearings scheduled, but we do want to have your views within the time allotted. TESTIMONY OF HON. DAVID J. SCHEFFER,1 SENIOR VICE PRESIDENT, U.N. ASSOCIATION OF THE U.S.A., AND FORMER U.S. AMBASSADOR-AT-LARGE FOR WAR CRIMES ISSUES (1997–2001) Ambassador SCHEFFER. Thank you very much, Mr. Chairman. May I submit my full written statement for the record? Senator SPECTER. The statement will be made a part of the record. Ambassador SCHEFFER. Thank you. I want to recognize the im- portance of your leadership in submitting S. Res. 101. There is good reason for the United States and its coalition partners to pros- ecute by trial or by tribunal violators of the International Law of Armed Conflict in connection with the current conflict in Iraq. That requirement is part of the mosaic of courts that will be required in the aftermath. I will focus my remarks on the merits of an inter- national criminal tribunal for Iraq. 1 The prepared statement of Ambassador Sheffer appears in the Appendix on page 33. VerDate 0ct 09 2002 08:18 Nov 05, 2003 Jkt 088244 PO 00000 Frm 00023 Fmt 6633 Sfmt 6601 C:\DOCS\88244.TXT SAFFAIRS PsN: PHOGAN 20 The Bush Administration’s articulation of its policy on this sub- ject at the Pentagon earlier this week, on April 7, and this morn- ing, remains fairly abstract. But it does provide the context within which we now should examine the different forum options. In my testimony I recite what I consider to be the understanding of their position on April 7. The Administration’s position offers considerable flexibility for the options that could be examined. It would appear that there is a heavy administration presumption in favor of some form of do- mestic Iraqi courts for past crimes and some combination of U.S. courts, military and civilian, for war crimes committed against U.S. personnel during the current conflict as well as the Gulf War. However, the administration has not ruled out an international criminal tribunal for the past quarter-century of the Iraqi regime’s atrocity crimes and has not ruled out the possibility that war crimes committed against Iraqi citizens in the current conflict could be prosecuted before Iraqi courts or even before an international tribunal. The briefing on April 7 at the Pentagon appears to reject an international tribunal for current abuses against U.S. per- sonnel, but does not necessarily reject one with respect to war crimes committed against Iraqi citizens in the past or present. For the moment, I would regard the administration’s flexibility as helpful in examining the overall issue of justice in Iraq. There will be a combination of courts required in the aftermath to inves- tigate and prosecute the Iraqi regime’s atrocity crimes. I have ar- gued the three major tiers of court should be established as the most practical means of achieving justice. Tier No. 1 would be an ad hoc international criminal tribunal to be established by the U.N. Security Council to investigate and prosecute that category of top leadership suspects that we have been discussing this morning, and that could also be top leaders with respect to their crimes against U.S. forces in the Gulf War or this war. The second category would be special Iraqi courts, to be estab- lished under presumably newly promulgated Iraqi law and sup- ported with international assistance, to investigate and prosecute mid- and low-level perpetrators. Third would be the military category that Hays Parks referred to—courts martial and military commissions established by the United States to investigate and prosecute that category of sus- pects, presumably the mid- and low level perpetrators, who have committed individual acts against U.S. personnel. Now, assuming that a fair number of the leaders of the Iraqi regime survive Operation Iraq Freedom, there would be ample jus- tification for the establishment of an international criminal tri- bunal by the U.N. Security Council acting under its Chapter 7 en- forcement authority. The enormity of the atrocity crimes committed over the last quarter-century against not only the Iraqi people but also against Iranians, Kuwaitis, and coalition forces in the Gulf War and the current conflict, and the responsibility of the Iraqi re- gime for those crimes, point to the imperative need for account- ability and punishment. During much of the Clinton Administra- tion, the official policy of the U.S. Government was to support the gathering of evidence of the Iraqi regime’s atrocity crimes and to VerDate 0ct 09 2002 08:18 Nov 05, 2003 Jkt 088244 PO 00000 Frm 00024 Fmt 6633 Sfmt 6601 C:\DOCS\88244.TXT SAFFAIRS PsN: PHOGAN 21 seek the ultimate establishment of an ad hoc criminal tribunal on Iraq. Although the success of Operation Iraqi Freedom will present the opportunity for Iraqi society to reconstruct and reform its domestic judicial system, that fact alone by no means excludes all of the ad- vantages during the immediate aftermath of Saddam Hussein’s tyr- anny of an international criminal tribunal for Iraq. Indeed, there may be even more reason and practicality now to establish such a tribunal. My written testimony sets forth eight reasons. I will brief- ly cite the lead sentences to each one. Reason No. 1: An international criminal tribunal established by the U.N. Security Council—with the required support or acquies- cence of France, China, and Russia—should be perceived in the Arab world and globally as a manifestly legitimate court of law be- fore which to prosecute the Iraqi regime’s leadership. Point No. 2: The diplomatic meltdown in the U.N. Security Coun- cil preceding the coalition military intervention into Iraq last month poses many challenges for future cooperation among Secu- rity Council members during the aftermath. Security Council ap- proval of a resolution establishing an international criminal tri- bunal for Iraq would be a practical first step in repairing relations among Council members. Senator SPECTER. Ambassador, we are going to have to stick closely to time, so if you could summarize, we would appreciate it. Ambassador SCHEFFER. Well, I will just state that there are many other reasons that would argue in favor of an international criminal tribunal. And I would close by stating that we face at the United Nations an enormous challenge now in resuming our relationship with other Council members. I know of no firm opposition in the Secu- rity Council at this time to an effort to look at this issue in terms of an international criminal tribunal. In fact, it could be the initial bridge that could bring us back into a working relationship with Council members with respect to the aftermath of Iraq. Thank you, Senator. Senator SPECTER. Thank you very much, Ambassador. We now turn to Professor Ruth Wedgwood, the Edward Burling Professor of Law and Diplomacy and Director of the International Law Organization at the Paul Nitze School of Advanced Inter- national Studies at Johns Hopkins University. Professor Wedgwood received her law degree from Yale University—a fine institution, Professor Wedgwood. The floor is yours. TESTIMONY OF RUTH WEDGWOOD,1 PAUL H. NITZE SCHOOL OF ADVANCED INTERNATIONAL STUDIES, JOHNS HOPKINS UNIVERSITY, U.S. MEMBER OF THE UNITED NATIONS HUMAN RIGHTS COMMITTEE Professor WEDGWOOD. Thank you, sir. Well, in order to use the time most effectively, let me contrast, if I may, my position with Ambassador Scheffer’s. I would not favor using a United Nations ad hoc tribunal here. They did venerable service in Rwanda and in Yugoslavia. Those are conflicts that were 1 The prepared statement of Professor Wedgwood appears in the Appendix on page 41. VerDate 0ct 09 2002 08:18 Nov 05, 2003 Jkt 088244 PO 00000 Frm 00025 Fmt 6633 Sfmt 6601 C:\DOCS\88244.TXT SAFFAIRS PsN: PHOGAN 22 in large part over and done with. And the particular problems we would face here are several. First of all, if you look at what kind of personnel you would have on such a tribunal, you would probably have at most one U.S. judge, one British judge. And trial chambers sit in threesies, so there might well be trial chambers where there was no allied judge. Second, there would probably not be a U.S. prosecutor. Third, as you yourself pointed out, there could be no death pen- alty because the United Nations has an objection to that as a mat- ter of policy, and our European allies. Fourth, you would face pretty daunting Security Council politics both in its formation and in its enforcement measures. Ad hoc tri- bunals are dependent on the Council for carrying out any of their orders that are defied. And finally—and here I stand my ground—we are going to have three cross-cutting equities when we try war crimes. I am very much in favor of bringing the leadership to account and vindicating the interests of our troops and the Iraqi people. But we are going to at times have to be doing business with people, carefully, pru- dently, both to locate caches of weapons of mass destruction, to run down all the terrorist links that the Iraqi regime may have to al Qaeda and Hamas, and third, even as the war concludes, to think about surrenders in place, if that will save allied and civilian lives. So when we give something over to the United Nations, we do lose this kind of operational control. The United Nations cannot handle intelligence, does not want to handle intelligence. So the kind of debriefings that we will want to do—before charging, even after charging—of people who have war crimes liability about WMD and terrorism is going to be wholly out of our universe if we give it over to the United Nations—much as I respect the United Nations and all of the work that it does in so many areas, like refu- gees and human rights norms. The solution I suppose I would favor is, first, for war crimes, to use the modality of military tribunals. It is the traditional way of enforcing the law of war. Article 84 of the Third Geneva Conven- tion actually demands that prisoners of war be given a military tri- bunal trial, lest GIs of the detaining power would themselves be tried through some other means. So military venue is the preferred venue under the Prisoner of War Convention. People often forget that. But it has also been the modality used in World War II and Nur- emberg and the Far East. It can be, in a sense, multilateral. You can have judges from many different nationalities. You can have British, or Australian. Even folks who were not fighting the war with us could be invited, if prudent, to sit as judges on such a com- mission. You would have to pick whether it was a military commis- sion or a military tribunal in the nature of a court martial. That might depend upon how one reads the Third Geneva and how one adjudicates the status of combatants like the Fedayeen versus reg- ular armed forces. But for war crimes I would favor using a military venue, which is the traditional place to develop battlefield law. We are out of the VerDate 0ct 09 2002 08:18 Nov 05, 2003 Jkt 088244 PO 00000 Frm 00026 Fmt 6633 Sfmt 6601 C:\DOCS\88244.TXT SAFFAIRS PsN: PHOGAN 23 habit because of the Rwanda and Yugoslav tribunals, but it is the way we have done it otherwise for decades and decades. For the crimes against the Iraqi people, the terrible Anfal gas campaign that killed so many hundreds of villagers and Saddam’s extermination of his political opponents and slaughter of the Marsh Shi’ia in 1991, my preferred suggestion would be to have what are now called mixed tribunals. It is the model used in Cambodia and in Sierra Leone. It goes to what I thought was your concern, that purely local courts may be seen as potentially biased, potentially unfair in a society that is still quite divided, where you have sig- nificant ethnic and tribal differences. So what it involves is a mixture of international and local per- sonnel, both as prosecutors and as judges. That gives the local folks some sense that people are watching, there will not be a campaign of ethnic revenge, of Shi’ia against Sunni or Sunni against Kurd. But at the same time, it brings the court home. It, I think, address- es Ambassador Prosper’s concern that this not be a removed proc- ess of justice in a far distant city, that this be something as part of the local reconstitution of the political culture of Iraq. So those are the two options I would put before the Committee as probably being the most prudent in light of the real-life interests that are at stake for us, for our allies, and for the Iraqi people. Thank you. Senator SPECTER. Thank you very much, Professor Wedgwood. Our final witness is Tom Malinowski, Washington Advocacy Di- rector for Human Rights. Prior to joining the Human Rights Watch, he was special assistant to President Clinton. He is a mem- ber of the Council of Foreign Relations, and has a political science degree from the University of California at Berkeley and Oxford University. Thank you for joining us, Mr. Malinowski, and we look forward to your testimony. TESTIMONY OF TOM MALINOWSKI,1 WASHINGTON ADVOCACY DIRECTOR, HUMAN RIGHTS WATCH Mr. MALINOWSKI. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. And let me add my appreciation to that of everyone else for the leadership that you have shown on this issue for many years. You are absolutely right, it is a matter, and has been, of utmost importance. As you can imagine, my organization has been waiting many years for the day when Saddam and his regime could finally face accountability under the law. We have spent almost two decades cataloging a long and harrowing list of grave abuses that should be prosecuted and, hopefully now, will be prosecuted. In terms of the venue, let me say that I agree with the adminis- tration that crimes committed by Iraqi forces during the present conflict, to the extent that they have been committed against coali- tion forces, can be prosecuted by coalition forces themselves in ei- ther military or civilian courts. But what about crimes committed in the past against the Iraqi people, which is, I think, the central question. Overall, we have es- timated that Saddam and his regime are responsible for murdering 1 The prepared statement of Mr. Malinowski appears in the Appendix on page 50. VerDate 0ct 09 2002 08:18 Nov 05, 2003 Jkt 088244 PO 00000 Frm 00027 Fmt 6633 Sfmt 6601 C:\DOCS\88244.TXT SAFFAIRS PsN: PHOGAN 24 or disappearing at least a quarter of a million Iraqi civilians since Saddam came to power in 1979. As of a few days ago, at least, Sad- dam was the only sitting world leader undeniably guilty of the crime of genocide. And the evidence of that crime and many others is vast, as you know. We have, for example, 18 tons of documents that were seized by Kurdish rebels after the post-Gulf War uprising in 1991, which were air-lifted to Washington, which contain an extraordinary treasure trove of information about what happened. We even have audio tapes of the man we all know as Chemical Ali now in which he boasts and brags about what he did, including one tape in which he simply says of his campaign against the Kurds, ‘‘I will kill them all with chemicals.’’ As the regime falls, as we watch it fall, clearly there will be an even larger mountain of evidence piling up about other crimes of the regime in the South against the Shi’ias, the Marsh Arabs, and so forth. And let me add as an aside here that it is very important this week and next week that coalition forces in the field make a special effort to secure prisons and police stations and the documents that reside within them so that this evidence can be preserved. We have seen reports of Iraqi civilians, understandably, carting these docu- ments away so that they can pursue their own quest for truth about what happened to their missing loved ones. But that is some- thing that we need to take control of so this whole system can work in the future. Now, how should those horrific crimes be tried, and by whom? We have heard from the administration that they favor an Iraqi- led process. I hope that David Scheffer is right, that does not nec- essarily rule out other options. But my sense, my reading of it is that they are ruling out either a United Nations tribunal or even the option that Ruth Wedgwood suggested, a mixed tribunal, which I think would be a very good compromise as well. I appreciate the administration’s desire to give Iraqis ownership of the process. Unfortunately, there are now only two broad groups of Iraqis from which judges and prosecutors could be drawn. They could be drawn from the existing Iraqi judicial system—which has been hopelessly compromised by totalitarian rule, or they could be drawn from the opposition, which has yet to establish any kind of democratic legitimacy inside Iraq. I think a court drawn from the opposition will have a hard time appearing impartial judging Baath Party crimes, or impartial prosecuting crimes that may have been committed by figures associated with the opposition. I think we need to keep in mind that a trial of senior Iraqi offi- cials will be watched intensely in every part of the world. It may be the single most important moment in Iraq’s transition from the rule of one man to the rule of law, the single most important oppor- tunity to demonstrate to the world the evil of this regime. There is an overwhelming need to establish a process that will be widely seen as impartial and fair. Trials conducted without any kind of United Nations authority by a government that has been in reality selected by the United States will widely be seen as American trials. They will not have credibility with many Iraqis or, in particular, with people in the VerDate 0ct 09 2002 08:18 Nov 05, 2003 Jkt 088244 PO 00000 Frm 00028 Fmt 6633 Sfmt 6601 C:\DOCS\88244.TXT SAFFAIRS PsN: PHOGAN 25 broader Arab world. They are unlikely to receive financial support from U.S. allies in Europe and elsewhere. And very importantly, they will have no authority to compel cooperation from third coun- tries. And we have seen reports that Iraqi officials may be fleeing to Syria. That is a very important practical consideration. A stand-alone international tribunal or a mixed tribunal com- posed of both Iraqi and international judges would be a far better option. It would enjoy tremendous legitimacy, I think, particularly if it draws its authority from the United Nations and many of its judges from the Arab world. It is clearly, I believe, the option pre- ferred by America’s British allies. It is the goal the Senate em- braced when it passed your resolution, Mr. Chairman, in 1998, call- ing for a U.N. tribunal—and, interestingly, a goal the Senate re- affirmed last week when it passed the War Supplemental, which contained an appropriation of $10 million to create an international war crimes tribunal. And it is an option that I hope the administra- tion will still consider, listening to all the advice that it has re- ceived on this question. Thank you very much. Senator SPECTER. Thank you very much, Mr. Malinowski. Ambassador Scheffer, can you give me a brief response as to what you think of Professor Wedgwood’s mixed commission con- cept? Ambassador SCHEFFER. I think there could be some difficulties with that. Our experience in the past with both Sierra Leone and Cambodia on this issue of mixed tribunals merited pursuing that process. But it was not easy. It required years of negotiation. And it remained a very difficult exercise. I would not presume that process would necessarily be the structure that would work for Iraq. It might. But then keep in mind, too, the advantage that if you had an international criminal tribunal, it would have that Chapter 7 authority with respect to any suspects who might be on foreign territory or documents or witnesses, namely the enforce- ment authority to obtain those documents or gain access to sus- pects or witnesses. Whereas a hybrid court would not have that au- thority. It is also possible that a tribunal in fact could be sited on the territory of Iraq so that you would have the benefit of the presence of that internationally legitimate court on Iraqi territory, but it would have all of the authority that is vested in the Yugoslav and Rwanda tribunals that are so useful to those tribunals. I do think, though, at some point there is value in having, obviously, the dia- logue with the new Iraqi leaders and those who are invested in this process to see what it is that will work for them. The administra- tion has a very clear point here. I will say, however, that in the past the Iraqi opposition has very firmly supported the creation of an international criminal tribunal. So I think we will need to see what the entirety of their viewpoint is on this before we start presuming that an Iraqi-led process in fact is not an international tribunal. Senator SPECTER. Professor Wedgwood, how can even a mixed commission project the kind of international legitimacy which would tend to bring the Arab doubters into the fold to believe that there was some real multilateralism in what the United States would be leading on the effort to prosecute war crimes? VerDate 0ct 09 2002 08:18 Nov 05, 2003 Jkt 088244 PO 00000 Frm 00029 Fmt 6633 Sfmt 6601 C:\DOCS\88244.TXT SAFFAIRS PsN: PHOGAN 26 Professor WEDGWOOD. Well, I was referring to the mixed commis- sion for military offenses against our troops and allied troops in the course of the war. There, I think, the proof is in the pudding. These would be in large part open trials, so that the world would see what the process was like. One could, if prudent, include not only judges from the actual coalition members but even from other countries. I do think we have to be realistic about the extent to which some countries may feel intimidated by their own popu- lations, so that the suggestion earlier on, for example, by a good friend of mine to try bin Laden in a court with 30 Muslim chief justices from around the world sounded great on paper, but not so good in real life. But I think by careful inclusion, varied personnel, and by having just a squeaky-clean procedure and dead-bang proof, I think that the merits of the charges can be put on their own bottom. If I may just say in response to David’s point on the need to get cooperation to make any of these courts work, any of the real effi- cacy of the Chapter 7 Security Council-created ad hoc tribunals de- pended on U.S. support and British support. They are not self-exe- cuting. You have to have the allies behind them. My worry, I guess, is in miring a court again in the very frac- tious politics of the Security Council. This is not a happy time in the Security Council. And nations will try to use these courts for their own purposes, in a worst-case scenario. I also worry, again, that even in the course of trials of local crimes that there may be equities about WMD, terrorist links, surrender in place that we cannot in any way vindicate through a tribunal that is wholly out- side of our particular influence. We will not have the prosecutor; we will have only one judge. Senator SPECTER. Mr. Malinowski, do you think it is important to preserve the option of the death penalty in this situation? Mr. MALINOWSKI. My organization opposes the death penalty, so we have a philosophical disagreement about that. I certainly appre- ciate your views, Senator. I would, perhaps, try to also put that in the context of inter- national perceptions and legitimacy, though. The death penalty, as you know, is widely unpopular in many countries around the world, including many that are close U.S. allies. And I think one thing that does need to be considered, whatever our individual views on the death penalty, is the perception of firing squads in Baghdad of senior Iraqi leaders. What perception that will have around the world, I think, is something that needs to be weighed in making that decision. Senator SPECTER. I have a great many more questions, but no more time. Senator Durbin has made a specific request that the record be left open for questions, and we will do that. I would like to submit some more questions to you as well. This is going to be an ongoing process. This is only the first hearing on this subject. I am going to be pressing the resolution this afternoon, and there is going to be a certain amount of tension, which is not unexpected, between the Executive Branch, especially the Department of De- fense, and Congress and our ideas. But these are very weighty matters, which we are going to pursue. Thank you all very much. 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