Military Implications of NATO Enlargement and Post-Conflict Iraq

S. HRG. 108–526 MILITARY IMPLICATIONS OF NATO ENLARGEMENT AND POST-CONFLICT IRAQ HEARING BEFORE THE COMMITTEE ON ARMED SERVICES UNITED STATES SENATE ONE HUNDRED EIGHTH CONGRESS FIRST SESSION APRIL 10, 2003 Printed for the use of the Committee on Armed Services ( U.S. GOVERNMENT PRINTING OFFICE WASHINGTON : 94–843 PDF 2004 For sale by the Superintendent of Documents, U.S. Government Printing Office Internet: bookstore.gpo.gov Phone: toll free (866) 512–1800; DC area (202) 512–1800 Fax: (202) 512–2250 Mail: Stop SSOP, Washington, DC 20402–0001 VerDate 11-SEP-98 12:05 Jul 29, 2004 Jkt 000000 PO 00000 Frm 00001 Fmt 5011 Sfmt 5011 94843.CON SARMSER2 PsN: SARMSER2 COMMITTEE ON ARMED SERVICES JOHN MCCAIN, Arizona JAMES M. INHOFE, Oklahoma PAT ROBERTS, Kansas WAYNE ALLARD, Colorado JEFF SESSIONS, Alabama SUSAN M. COLLINS, Maine JOHN ENSIGN, Nevada JAMES M. TALENT, Missouri SAXBY CHAMBLISS, Georgia LINDSEY O. GRAHAM, South Carolina ELIZABETH DOLE, North Carolina JOHN CORNYN, Texas JOHN WARNER, Virginia, Chairman CARL LEVIN, Michigan EDWARD M. KENNEDY, Massachusetts ROBERT C. BYRD, West Virginia JOSEPH I. LIEBERMAN, Connecticut JACK REED, Rhode Island DANIEL K. AKAKA, Hawaii BILL NELSON, Florida E. BENJAMIN NELSON, Nebraska MARK DAYTON, Minnesota EVAN BAYH, Indiana HILLARY RODHAM CLINTON, New York MARK PRYOR, Arkansas JUDITH A. ANSLEY, Staff Director RICHARD D. DEBOBES, Democratic Staff Director (II) VerDate 11-SEP-98 12:05 Jul 29, 2004 Jkt 000000 PO 00000 Frm 00002 Fmt 0486 Sfmt 0486 94843.CON SARMSER2 PsN: SARMSER2 C O N T E N T S CHRONOLOGICAL LIST OF WITNESSES MILITARY IMPLICATIONS OF NATO ENLARGEMENT AND POST-CONFLICT IRAQ APRIL 10, 2003 Wolfowitz, Hon. Paul D., Deputy Secretary of Defense ........................................ 5 Pace, Gen. Peter, USMC, Vice Chairman, Joint Chiefs of Staff .......................... Page 17 Jones, Gen. James L., USMC, Supreme Allied Commander, Europe and Com- mander, United States European Command ..................................................... 20 (III) VerDate 11-SEP-98 12:05 Jul 29, 2004 Jkt 000000 PO 00000 Frm 00003 Fmt 0486 Sfmt 0486 94843.CON SARMSER2 PsN: SARMSER2 MILITARY IMPLICATIONS OF NATO ENLARGEMENT AND POST-CONFLICT IRAQ THURSDAY, APRIL 10, 2003 U.S. SENATE, COMMITTEE ON ARMED SERVICES, Washington, DC. The committee met, pursuant to notice, at 10:25 a.m. in room SD–106, Dirksen Senate Office Building, Senator John Warner (chairman) presiding. Committee members present: Senators Warner, Inhofe, Roberts, Allard, Sessions, Collins, Levin, Byrd, Akaka, E. Benjamin Nelson, Bayh, Clinton, and Pryor. Committee staff member present: Judith A. Ansley, staff director. Majority staff members present: Charles W. Alsup, professional staff member; Mary Alice A. Hayward, professional staff member; Gregory T. Kiley, professional staff member; Patricia L. Lewis, pro- fessional staff member; and Lynn F. Rusten, professional staff member. Minority staff members present: Richard D. DeBobes, Democratic staff director; and Peter K. Levine, minority counsel. Staff assistants present: Michael N. Berger, Andrew Kent, and Jennifer Key. Committee members’ assistants present: James Beauchamp, as- sistant to Senator Roberts; Jayson Roehl, assistant to Senator Al- lard; James P. Dohoney, Jr., assistant to Senator Collins; D’Arcy Grisier, assistant to Senator Ensign; James W. Irwin, assistant to Senator Chambliss; Aleix Jarvis, assistant to Senator Graham; Henry J. Steenstra, assistant to Senator Dole; Russell J. Thomasson, assistant to Senator Cornyn; Christine Evans, Barry Gene (B.G.) Wright, and Erik Raven, assistants to Senator Byrd; Richard Kessler, assistant to Senator Akaka; Peter A. Contostavlos, assistant to Senator Bill Nelson; Eric Pierce, assistant to Senator E. Benjamin Nelson; Rashid Hallaway, assistant to Senator Bayh; Andrew Shapiro, assistant to Senator Clinton; and Terri Glaze, as- sistant to Senator Pryor. OPENING STATEMENT OF SENATOR JOHN WARNER, CHAIRMAN Chairman WARNER. The committee meets today to receive the testimony on two important subjects: the North Atlantic Treaty Or- ganization (NATO) enlargement and the post-conflict Iraq. We wel- come our witnesses: Deputy Secretary of Defense Paul Wolfowitz; General Peter Pace, Vice Chairman of the Joint Chiefs; and Gen- (1) VerDate 11-SEP-98 12:05 Jul 29, 2004 Jkt 000000 PO 00000 Frm 00004 Fmt 6633 Sfmt 6633 94843.042 SARMSER2 PsN: SARMSER2 2 eral James Jones, the Supreme Allied Commander, Europe, and Commander of the U.S. European Command. We commend you, General Jones, for the award you received last night from a very prestigious organization, the Eisenhower Award. It is very much deserved. We thank you for making the trip back to join this committee and give us your views on these extremely important subjects. On March 27, the committee received testimony from Under Sec- retary of State Marc Grossman and Under Secretary of Defense Douglas Feith on the future of NATO. The information received at that hearing will provide a basis for our discussions today. On March 26, 2003, representatives of the NATO member coun- tries signed the protocols of accession that, once ratified, would per- mit Bulgaria, Estonia, Latvia, Lithuania, Romania, Slovakia, and Slovenia to join NATO. The Senate will soon be asked to fulfill its constitutional duty to provide advice and consent to these protocols to the North Atlantic Treaty. Today’s hearing on the military implications of NATO enlarge- ment is a key element of this committee’s contribution to the up- coming Senate consideration of these protocols. NATO is first and foremost a military alliance. Its enlargement by seven additional nations, the largest enlargement in alliance history, would have dramatic implications for NATO’s ability to function as an effective military organization. During today’s hearing the committee will examine a number of key questions, including: Will these seven nations enhance the military effectiveness of the alliance? How would their entry into NATO affect the capabilities gap that is a current challenge to NATO, an example being the airlift? Should NATO consider chang- ing its operating procedures so that it is not in all cases bound to act by consensus? Is there any thinking along the lines of a Secu- rity Council decisionmaking body within NATO somewhat like they operate in the United Nations (U.N.)? Does NATO need a suspen- sion mechanism for decisions for nations that fail to uphold NATO’s basic charter principles? What organizational military changes, if any, will NATO consider in order to continue to be an effective alliance? The committee looks forward to hearing the views of our wit- nesses on all these matters and any other issues you consider rel- evant to the military implications of this proposed round of NATO enlargement. With respect to post-conflict Iraq, in January of this year Presi- dent Bush designated the Department of Defense as the agency of the U.S. Government to coordinate the inter-agency and inter- national activities during the post-conflict phase of our involvement in Iraq. Therefore, it is appropriate that this committee conduct an oversight hearing on the responsibilities and authorities of the De- partment of Defense. From the very initiation of consideration of this conflict and throughout its operation, President Bush has said it is an operation to liberate and free the people of Iraq from the regime of Saddam Hussein. Clearly, securing the peace is as important as prevailing in the conflict phase of the ongoing war in Iraq. There has been much discussion in recent days about the desire of some to inter- VerDate 11-SEP-98 12:05 Jul 29, 2004 Jkt 000000 PO 00000 Frm 00005 Fmt 6633 Sfmt 6633 94843.042 SARMSER2 PsN: SARMSER2 3 nationalize the post-conflict phase by giving the United Nations a central role. Clearly, the U.N. should be involved. The U.N. can play a significant role in these humanitarian and reconstruction ac- tivities where it has substantial expertise, such as the Oil for Food program, provision of food aid through the World Food Program, and the resettlement of refugees and other displaced persons. But, as Secretary Powell said, the United Nations would be a partner, and I respectfully add, not a managing partner, for that role of the management most properly falls to the coalition of the willing that conducted these operations. This coalition bravely fought the war. They are in the process now of liberating Iraq and have borne the sacrifices and also have extensively planned and or- ganized themselves for the stabilization and reconstruction phases that lie ahead. The coalition partners can and will manage the near-term activities until a functioning interim representative Iraqi authority can assume responsibilities. We look forward to receiving testimony on who will be conduct- ing the principal U.S. official responsibilities in Iraq for post-con- flict activities, what will be the chain of command, how this effort will evolve during this period of time, and what will be the require- ments placed on U.S. military forces both in terms of quantity and duration in post-conflict Iraq. Finally, this appearance serves as General Jones’ first posture hearing as Commander of U.S. European Command. We welcome your insight, General Jones, on developments in your area of re- sponsibility (AOR) as well as your assessment of the 2004 defense budget request. General Jones, you graciously accepted the invita- tion to visit with Senator Levin and myself as well as Senator Rob- erts and Senator Rockefeller when we came through London on the way home from the AOR of Central Command (CENTCOM). You shared with us some ideas about possible changes in the size and structure of U.S. forces in Europe. Perhaps you can add that as a part of your testimony today. We welcome our witnesses and we look forward to participating with you in the success thus far that we have achieved in the Iraq campaign and with NATO enlargement. Senator Levin. STATEMENT OF SENATOR CARL LEVIN Senator LEVIN. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. Let me first join you in welcoming our witnesses: Deputy Secretary of Defense Paul Wolfowitz; Vice Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff General Peter Pace; and NATO’s Supreme Allied Commander, Europe, General Jim Jones. General Jones is here for the first time in his new ca- pacity, so we give him a special welcome. The enlargement of the North Atlantic Treaty Organization is a major development with great military and political implications. A significant aspect of any enlargement to the United States, of course, is that it will represent a commitment by us to treat an armed attack on any of the seven additional nations, like the exist- ing member nations, as an attack on the United States. In 1997 at the time of the Senate’s consideration of the enlarge- ment of NATO to include Poland, Hungary, and the Czech Repub- lic, it was decided that the security of those Central European na- VerDate 11-SEP-98 12:05 Jul 29, 2004 Jkt 000000 PO 00000 Frm 00006 Fmt 6633 Sfmt 6633 94843.042 SARMSER2 PsN: SARMSER2 4 tions was important enough to make such a commitment. We are faced with a similar decision today relative to the candidates for admission into NATO. One topic of discussion in 1997 was the reaction of Russia to the enlargement of NATO to include former members of the Warsaw Pact. Such enlargement was not intended to be threatening and, appropriately, it was not perceived as a threat by Russia, which wanted to establish a constructive relationship with the United States and the other members of NATO. As a matter of fact, Rus- sia’s decision on that matter was so clear that its position relative to NATO membership for the former Soviet Republics—Latvia, Lithuania, and Estonia—is not even an issue today in looking at these new candidates for membership. Our task now is made easier by NATO’s decision in April 1999 to launch the Membership Action Plan to assist countries that wished to join the alliance in their preparations for membership. The Membership Action Plan, which covers political, economic, de- fense, resource, security, and legal aspects of NATO membership, enabled the applicant nations, as well as the existing members of the alliance, to track their progress, including most importantly the future members’ commitment to the fundamental principles of the NATO alliance—democracy, individual liberty, and the rule of law. We are assisted in that regard by a report from the President con- taining an analysis of the progress of each aspirant nation. Our hearing on March 27, which the chairman referred to, on the future of NATO with the Under Secretaries of State and Defense, was a valuable backdrop to today’s hearing. As a result of that hearing, Under Secretary of State for Political Affairs Marc Gross- man has raised with the U.S. Ambassador to NATO Nick Burns two issues that I have consistently raised and raised again at that hearing—namely whether given the continuing growth of the alli- ance, there is an increasing need of a process to suspend the mem- bership of a nation that was no longer committed to the fundamen- tal values of the alliance and whether, in the aftermath of the dis- pute over whether to plan for the defense of Turkey, the require- ment for consensus needed to be reconsidered. Secretary Grossman has subsequently advised us that Ambassador Burns has agreed to raise that issue at the North Atlantic Council. The second issue of this morning’s hearing has to do with post- conflict Iraq. There was no doubt in the mind of this committee about the outcome of the military campaign against Saddam Hus- sein. The coalition of American, British, and Australian servicemen and women has performed with extraordinary courage, valor, and professionalism, as we knew they would. There are still military challenges ahead of us in Iraq, but military history has clearly been made already and has been made dramatically. Relative to the post-Saddam reconstruction challenge, President Bush and Prime Minister Blair said the following in a joint state- ment last Tuesday: ‘‘As the coalition proceeds with the reconstruc- tion of Iraq, it will work with its allies, other bilateral donors, and with the United Nations and other international institutions. The United Nations has a vital role to play in the reconstruction of Iraq. We welcome the efforts of U.N. agencies and nongovern- mental organizations in providing immediate assistance to the peo- VerDate 11-SEP-98 12:05 Jul 29, 2004 Jkt 000000 PO 00000 Frm 00007 Fmt 6633 Sfmt 6633 94843.042 SARMSER2 PsN: SARMSER2 5 ple of Iraq. As we stated in the Azores, we plan to seek the adop- tion of new United Nations Security Council resolutions that would affirm Iraq’s territorial integrity, ensure rapid delivery of humani- tarian relief, and endorse an appropriate post-conflict administra- tion for Iraq.’’ The joint statement also included the following statement: ‘‘The Iraqi Interim Authority will be broad-based and fully representa- tive, with members from all of Iraq’s ethnic groups, regions, and di- aspora. The Interim Authority will be established first and fore- most by the Iraqi people, with the help of the members of the coali- tion and working with the Secretary General of the United Na- tions.’’ I welcome President Bush and Prime Minister Blair’s statement that they will seek an U.N. Security Council endorsement of an ap- propriate post-conflict administration for Iraq. Such involvement of the world community in the selection of the interim Iraqi govern- ment is important to demonstrate, particularly to Muslim nations, that the interim government will be selected by the Iraqi people and will not be just picked by the coalition that was engaged in re- moving Iraq’s tyrant. The involvement of the world community, act- ing through the United Nations, will add significant credibility to and confidence in the interim Iraqi government and give the lie to those who propagandize that the removal of Saddam was motivated by a desire to dominate Iraq or control its resources. I look forward to the testimony of our witnesses. Thank you very much. Chairman WARNER. Thank you, Senator Levin. Today’s record, we will admit to it such communications as we may receive from Ambassador Burns regarding the points raised in the course of this hearing. Secretary Wolfowitz, we welcome you. STATEMENT OF HON. PAUL D. WOLFOWITZ, DEPUTY SECRETARY OF DEFENSE Secretary WOLFOWITZ. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. I will give an abbreviated version of my statement and submit the entire state- ment for the record. Chairman WARNER. All the statements of all witnesses in their entirety will be placed in the record. Secretary WOLFOWITZ. I think it is particularly fitting at a cru- cial stage in another war to defend freedom that we are here to take stock of an alliance that has been integral to the preservation of peace and the protection of democracy for more than half a cen- tury now. I can personally claim to have had some involvement in U.S.-NATO affairs for 30 of those 50 years. As I think back on that history, I am struck that at almost every point in NATO’s history there have been doubters and naysayers, some who say that NATO has outlived its usefulness, and some who suggest that it is not even useful at all. I remember in the summer of 1990 being privileged to attend what was NATO’s first post-Cold War summit. It was held in Lon- don and the host was Prime Minister Thatcher. She opened the meeting with remarks that were clearly intended to be ironic, say- ing that ‘‘Europe stands at the dawn of a new era, as promising VerDate 11-SEP-98 12:05 Jul 29, 2004 Jkt 000000 PO 00000 Frm 00008 Fmt 6633 Sfmt 6633 94843.042 SARMSER2 PsN: SARMSER2 6 in its own way as 1919 or 1945.’’ She clearly meant that promise can sometimes encounter harsh reality, but I doubt if even the Prime Minister thought that just a month later we would be con- fronting an Iraqi invasion of Kuwait. The world is a world full of promise, but it is also a dangerous and uncertain place. I am struck at how regularly NATO has gainsayed the doubters. Whether we go back to the mid–1970s when some people in this country said we should not have any troops in Europe any longer, NATO stuck it out. I think it contrib- uted substantially to the peaceful end of the Soviet empire. In the early 1980s, when people said NATO would not be able to stand up to the test of deploying intermediate range nuclear forces in Europe or that if it did stand up to the test it would not be capable of negotiating an arms control arrangement with the So- viet Union, NATO was able to do both. When the Berlin Wall came down, I remember President George Herbert Walker Bush being asked at a press conference, why did we need NATO any longer now that the threat had gone away, and his answer was: ‘‘There is still a threat and it is called uncer- tainty.’’ Some people thought that was not a very threatening threat, but I think in fact the history of the 1990s demonstrated once again that there are dangers in Europe and NATO has been an extraordinarily successful instrument for addressing those dan- gers, most significantly in the Balkans. Indeed, I think NATO demonstrated impressively its capability in the Balkans, and I recall in many of those debates some echoes that one hears more strongly today, that American leadership in NATO was heavy-handed, that we were pushing and bullying the Europeans, and we would be fracturing the alliance or, alter- natively, from the other end that we would be following NATO into some kind of Balkan quagmire where thousands of Americans would be killed. I think neither of those great fears have been real- ized and instead I think we can point proudly to a NATO mission that has saved lives and helped to stabilize an important part of the newly free Europe. If I could just make one more example, which is the enlargement that you referred to, the first round of enlargement when Poland, the Czech Republic, and Hungary were brought into NATO, and some people feared, and I think not without some reason, that this would be building a wall down the center of Europe that would be excluding Russia. I think experience has demonstrated that, in- stead of building a wall, we have built a bridge across Europe, a bridge on which Russia has been able to move closer to Europe, both in security terms but also in political terms. Now at the beginning of the 21st century, NATO continues to be the central instrument for solidifying peace in Europe and drawing nations on both sides of the Atlantic closer together. In response to the extraordinary new threat posed by international terrorism, NATO for the first time in its history invoked article 5, calling on all members to defend the country that was attacked, and the country was the United States. No one would have predicted that. NATO sent NATO Airborne Warning and Control System (AWACS) aircraft here to this country to help defend America’s skies and NATO is supporting the deployment of German and VerDate 11-SEP-98 12:05 Jul 29, 2004 Jkt 000000 PO 00000 Frm 00009 Fmt 6633 Sfmt 6633 94843.042 SARMSER2 PsN: SARMSER2 7 Dutch forces in their newly assumed leadership role in the Inter- national Security Assistance Force in Afghanistan. Few would have predicted that NATO or NATO countries would be doing anything in a country as far away and as remote as Afghanistan, but it is. It is against that background that I think we address this issue of a second round of enlargement, against the background of cer- tain fundamental constants: that NATO is and will remain the an- chor of the U.S. security relationship with Europe; that NATO is and will remain the central framework, not only for trans-Atlantic military cooperation, but also for the West’s mobilization of its com- prehensive collective power to defend our common interests; and of course, Europe remains essential to the forward presence of Amer- ican forces. It is with those constants in mind that President Bush has force- fully supported a round of NATO enlargement, one that will extend NATO from the Baltic to the Black Sea. As I mentioned, the last round of enlargement did not, as some naysayers feared, build a new wall down the middle of Europe. Instead, NATO has built bridges across the continent, providing incentives for countries to reform their political systems, to strengthen their relationships with their neighbors, and to bring their military forces under civil- ian control. A historically significant political development of this past dec- ade is the bridge that has been extended to Russia, encouraging democratic Russia to have a closer relationship with NATO and in- deed with all of Europe. The enlargement of NATO continues the vision of a Europe that is secure, undivided, and free, and work is under way to enlarge the alliance further. My colleague at the State Department, Under Secretary Marc Grossman, noted in his testimony here a couple of weeks ago that the addition of these seven countries is about the future of NATO. I could not agree more. As we look to the future of NATO, we might see its further enlargement in terms of two imperatives, moral and strategic. The moral imperative calls us to help new de- mocracies formerly subjected to the yoke of tyranny consolidate and secure their own freedom and sovereignty. The strategic imperative suggests that a united Europe of com- mon values will help avoid the major wars that continent experi- enced in the 19th and 20th centuries. A united Europe will be a better partner to the United States in dealing with world affairs. A united Europe will provide a context of security that can encour- age reform in the Ukraine and Russia. A Europe so united is revi- talized by nations who have recently thrown off the yoke of authoritarianism and have a fresh commitment the freedom and democracy through NATO’s responsibilities. Further enlargement of NATO remains based on sound reform of any aspiring nation, including military reform of national strategy, secure communications systems, upgrading facilities to NATO standards, improved training, logistical support, personnel, and military spending at a minimum level of 2 percent of gross domes- tic product. Mr. Chairman, you also asked us to address in this hearing the future of post-Saddam Iraq. I think this is the appropriate place to pay tribute to the extraordinary young men and women, and in- VerDate 11-SEP-98 12:05 Jul 29, 2004 Jkt 000000 PO 00000 Frm 00010 Fmt 6633 Sfmt 6633 94843.042 SARMSER2 PsN: SARMSER2 8 deed a few older men and women who are their commanders, for a heroic, professional, humane, and truly brilliant performance, and also to pay credit to their predecessors who have stood on the lonely lines in Germany and the Cold War, who shed blood in Korea and in Vietnam, who helped to bring about the peaceful end of the Soviet empire, and who have contributed so much to secur- ing and advancing that freedom which we know the greatest gen- eration fought to restore in World War II. The debt that this country owes to its fighting men and women, the gratitude we owe to them and to their families, is really im- measurable, and this is a day to comment on it particularly. Chairman WARNER. We thank you for those remarks, Mr. Sec- retary. We very much share your sentiments. Secretary WOLFOWITZ. It is great to be surrounded by marines. I would like to quote two paragraphs from a statement Secretary Rumsfeld made yesterday in commenting on those spectacular scenes of the toppling of statues of another tyrant. The Secretary said: ‘‘The scenes of free Iraqis celebrating in the streets, riding American tanks, tearing down the statues of Saddam Hussein in the center of Baghdad are breathtaking. Watching them, one can- not help but think of the fall of the Berlin Wall and the collapse of the Iron Curtain. We are seeing history unfold events that will shape the course of a country, the fate of a people, and potentially the future of a region. ‘‘Saddam Hussein is now taking his rightful place alongside Hitler, Stalin, Lenin and Ceaucescu in the pan- theon of failed, brutal dictators, and the Iraqi people are on their way to freedom.’’ The Secretary went on to say: ‘‘The General who led our war of liberation, George Washington, once said’’—and I am now quoting General Washington: ‘‘ ‘My anxious recollection, my sympathetic feeling, and my best wishes are irresistibly excited whensoever in any country I see an oppressed nation unfurl the banners of free- dom.’ As we watch Iraqis today unfurl the banners of freedom, all Americans share in their joy and celebrate with them.’’ That quotation from Washington, Mr. Chairman, made me think that if someone had asked George Washington on the eve of the battle of Yorktown or even after the end of it what his plans were for post-King George America, he probably would have been guess- ing in the dark. I think it is worth emphasizing that by definition a democratic process is not one that can be done according to a blueprint. It is not one that can be dictated by outsiders. Our goal in Iraq is a democratic Iraq that truly represents the wishes of the people of Iraq, with leaders who are chosen, not by us or by any outsiders, but by the Iraqi people. That means we can set up some param- eters for a process, but we cannot write a blueprint. I think, considering all of that, we have come pretty far in laying out some of those key building blocks, and I would like to just sketch them for you here this morning. Let me start with the re- sponsibilities of the international community, including the United States and our coalition partners. To help Iraq take its place among peace-seeking nations, the international community has a responsibility to ensure that that democratic vision becomes a re- ality. The coalition is committed to working with international in- VerDate 11-SEP-98 12:05 Jul 29, 2004 Jkt 000000 PO 00000 Frm 00011 Fmt 6633 Sfmt 6633 94843.042 SARMSER2 PsN: SARMSER2 9 stitutions, including most importantly the United Nations. We wel- come support from U.N. agencies and from nongovernmental orga- nizations in providing immediate humanitarian assistance to the Iraqi people. The larger role of the U.N. will be determined in co- ordination with the Iraqi people themselves, with other members of the coalition, with the Secretary General, and other members of the United Nations. Based on the lessons of previous conflicts, we have learned that postwar reconstruction requires the close coordination of military and civilian efforts. Progress toward rebuilding, or in this case to some extent building, because there was a lot of palaces but not much else that this tyrant built, naturally promotes security. But if local business people and foreign investors do not feel secure, eco- nomic reconstruction will be hindered. A secure environment is key to enabling a democratic political process to proceed. So establish- ing security through law and order is a fundamental necessity. For the first time in decades, the wealth of Iraq will be devoted to the welfare of its people, not to palaces or armies or instruments of repression. Economic development will require the protection of Iraq’s natural resources and infrastructure. Much has been achieved already by what I would call a brilliant military plan, but additional efforts are under way to protect Iraq’s oil fields in the north and to preserve all of them as a national asset and to restore oil production as quickly as possible to provide the Iraqi people with their primary source of revenue. But let me emphasize that decisions regarding the long-term de- velopment of Iraq’s oil resources and its economy will be the re- sponsibility of a stable Iraqi government. The United States is dedicated to ensuring that Iraq’s oil resources will remain under Iraqi control, for the use of the Iraqi people. All of Iraq’s resources belong to Iraq’s people. One of the greatest responsibilities of the coalition will be to help Iraqis create a new government, if I could paraphrase Abraham Lincoln, a government of the Iraqi people, by the Iraqi people, and for the Iraqi people. Let me say we have three elements in achiev- ing that effort. As part of it, there is the Office of Reconstruction and Humani- tarian Assistance (ORHA). The purpose of this office in the first phase as coalition forces gain control over all of Iraq will be to over- see the delivery of humanitarian assistance and initial efforts to re- sume the provision of essential services to the Iraqi people. That office will be the key, for example, to meeting basic needs like med- ical care, water, electrical services, and making sure that the Iraqi civil servants who administer those programs get paid. The ORHA, if I can use an acronym, is not a provisional govern- ment for Iraq. Let me repeat: It is not a government for Iraq. The ORHA is the multinational coalition effort, including representa- tives from a range of U.S. governmental agencies, including the De- fense Department, the State Department, USAID, and advisers from outside the government including some very distinguished former government servants. Jay Garner, who will head ORHA, will report to General Tommy Franks, who will receive his instructions from the President through the Secretary of Defense and General Franks. As soon as VerDate 11-SEP-98 12:05 Jul 29, 2004 Jkt 000000 PO 00000 Frm 00012 Fmt 6633 Sfmt 6633 94843.042 SARMSER2 PsN: SARMSER2 10 basic services are running once again, their administration would be turned over as soon as feasible to the Iraqi Interim Authority, which I will describe in just a minute. Over time ORHA will as- sume increasingly an advisory role. I would like to make one note about Jay Garner, whom I first met in a helicopter flying over northern Iraq in July 1991, the same time I first met General Jones, who was commanding a Ma- rine battalion in the north at the time. General Garner has many remarkable qualifications for this task, but perhaps none as impor- tant as the leading role that he played in Operation Provide Com- fort in 1991 in assisting the people of northern Iraq to establish a governing authority in the territory under their control. That proc- ess enabled coalition forces to withdraw completely—I underscore, completely—without any peacekeepers behind, 6 months after Op- eration Provide Comfort had created a sanctuary in the north for free Iraqis. It is in my opinion one of the more remarkable achieve- ments of the use of our military to advance a political and economic agenda for people. Chairman WARNER. Mr. Secretary, it would be helpful if you would place in the record subsequent to the hearing a very detailed biographical sketch of the General, what he has done since he left active duty until he was asked to come onto this role. A number of us tried to reach him before he departed and we were not able to do so. My colleague and I reviewed the possibility of going over there to see him, but at this point in time it just was not conven- ient for either my colleague or myself and other members of this committee or the General. Secretary WOLFOWITZ. We will provide that for the record, Mr. Chairman. [The information referred to follows:] Lieutenant General (Retired) Jay M. Garner assumed the duties as the President of SY Technology, Inc. on September 1, 1997. His last assignment was with the United States Army where he served as the Assistant Vice Chief of Staff of the Army (AVCSA). Jay Garner was born in Arcadia, Florida on April 15, 1938. He graduated from Florida State University with a Bachelor’s Degree in History. He obtained a Masters Degree in Public Administration from Shippensburg University in Pennsylvania. His military service began with the Florida Army National Guard. He continued his service to this Nation as an enlisted marine and in 1962 was commissioned a Sec- ond Lieutenant in the United States Army. General Garner served as Commanding General of the U.S. Army Space and Stra- tegic Defense Command (USASSDC), headquartered in Arlington, Virginia. He also served as the Assistant Deputy Chief of Staff for Force Development, Office of the Deputy Chief of Staff for Operations and Plans, Washington, DC; Deputy Command- ing General, V Corps Frankfurt Germany; Commanding General, Joint Task Force Bravo-Operation Provide Comfort Northern Iraq; and Deputy Commanding General, U.S. Army Air Defense School. He commanded at Brigade and Battalion level in VII Corps in Europe. He served two tours in Vietnam, 1967–1968, 1971–1972. His awards include the Distinguished Service Medal with oak leaf cluster, the De- fense Superior Service Medal with oak leaf cluster, the Legion of Merit with five oak leaf clusters, the Bronze Star Medal, the Meritorious Service Medal with oak leaf cluster, the Air Medal, the Joint Services Commendation Medal, the Army Com- mendation Medal, the Combat Infantryman Badge, the Parachutist Badge, and the Army General Staff Identification Badge. He has served as a member of the Army Science Board in 1998–1999 and was appointed by Congress as a member of the Commission to Assess United States Na- tional Security Space Management and Organization in 2000–2001. He is currently serving on the USSTRATCOM Strategic Advisory Board. Following the acquisition of Coleman Research Corporation by L–3 Communica- tions, also the parent company of SY Technology, Garner assumed the presidency VerDate 11-SEP-98 12:05 Jul 29, 2004 Jkt 000000 PO 00000 Frm 00013 Fmt 6633 Sfmt 6621 94843.042 SARMSER2 PsN: SARMSER2 11 of Coleman Research Corporation on May 1, 2002. SY Technology and Coleman Re- search Corporation are in the process of merging under Garner’s leadership. Jay and his wife, the former Connie Kreigh, have one daughter, Lori Gibson, and two granddaughters, Courtney and Brittany. Secretary WOLFOWITZ. The second element of a post-Saddam Iraq will be something to be called the Iraqi Interim Authority. That au- thority should assume increasingly greater responsibility over time for the administration of Iraq. The Iraqi Interim Authority will draw from all of Iraq’s religious and ethnic groups, to include both Iraqis from currently outside the country and those inside. It will provide a way for Iraqis to begin immediately to direct the political and economic reconstruction of their country. The authority would include not only members of the free Iraqi groups that fought Saddam’s tyranny and the independents among the expatriate community, but will also draw from local leaders who have already begun to participate with the coalition in the lib- eration of Iraq. As people throughout the country become free to express their views—and it is happening, obviously, at a spectacu- lar pace—more and more people will emerge from within Iraq who can become a part of that leadership. The Interim Authority’s most important responsibility will be to set in motion a process leading to the creation of a new Iraqi gov- ernment, for example, by setting up local elections or drafting a new constitution. This is a process that foreigners cannot direct. It must be a process owned by Iraqis. Our task is to create the condi- tions, including the security conditions, in which Iraqis can formu- late a process and pick their leaders freely. An Interim Authority would be a bridge from the initial administration of basic services by the coalition to an eventual government that represents the Iraqi people. In the final phase, an Iraqi government would assume sov- ereignty on the basis of elections in accordance with a new con- stitution. Our intention is to leave Iraq in the hands of Iraqis themselves as soon as we can. As President Bush has said, ‘‘The United States intends to stay in Iraq as long as necessary, but not 1 day more.’’ That the people of Iraq want a voice in their own government there can be no doubt. The Ayatollah Ali Sistani, who was under house arrest since 1988, is now free from Saddam’s tyranny, re- cently issued what is perhaps history’s first pro-American fatwa. He advised believers ‘‘not to hinder the forces of liberation and help bring this war against the tyrant to a successful end for the Iraqi people.’’ Sistani, referring to recent events, was reported to have quoted the Prophet Mohammed, saying, ‘‘There is good in what happens,’’ and added himself: ‘‘Our people need freedom even more than air. Iraq has suffered and it deserves better government.’’ Mr. Chairman, this administration, as well as our whole country, is committed to helping Iraqis achieve that better government, a government that represents all ethnic and religious groups. We look forward to working with you and Members of Congress to meet both the challenges that face the trans-Atlantic community and the people of Iraq. Thank you. [The prepared statement of Secretary Wolfowitz follows:] VerDate 11-SEP-98 12:05 Jul 29, 2004 Jkt 000000 PO 00000 Frm 00014 Fmt 6633 Sfmt 6602 94843.042 SARMSER2 PsN: SARMSER2 12 PREPARED STATEMENT BY HON. PAUL WOLFOWITZ Mr. Chairman and members of the committee: America has long enjoyed the strong leadership and bipartisan support of this committee. Your example consist- ently demonstrates that America’s security concerns transcend party or politics. On behalf of the men and women who serve our country so faithfully and so well, we are indeed grateful for your support. I appreciate the opportunity to discuss with you today the Defense Department’s perspective on the future of both NATO and Iraq. During this war to defend freedom, it is fitting that we take stock of an alliance that has been integral to the preservation of peace and the promotion and protection of democracy. I would add a word here about brave Americans and their coalition partners who, this very moment, are doing their part to protect freedom; they are fighting a very fierce fight against a vicious regime to free us from an enormous threat. From Baghdad and Kabul to the Persian Gulf and the Mediterranean, whether on the ground, in the air, or on the sea, they are performing their missions with incredible courage and skill, and we are enormously proud of them. Our thoughts and prayers are with the families of those who are missing, have been taken prisoner or have made the ultimate sacrifice to protect the freedoms that we treasure as Americans. NEW SECURITY ENVIRONMENT In the summer of 1990, I was privileged to attend NATO’s first post-Cold War Summit, which was hosted by then-Prime Minister Margaret Thatcher. That was a time when many people questioned the relevance of NATO since the Berlin Wall had been torn down. In opening that historic conference in London, the British Prime Minister, in a tone suggesting she was quite conscious of the irony, began with an observation that Europe was standing at the dawn of a new era, as promis- ing in its own way as 1919 and 1945. Clearly, Mrs. Thatcher’s reference to earlier post-war eras was intended not only to underscore the promise of the moment, but also to underscore the uncertainty of the future and the danger of believing that— simply because a particular threat that had loomed so large for so long was gone— every other conceivable threat had disappeared, too. NATO’s doubters existed on both sides of the Atlantic. In President George H.W. Bush’s first press conference after the Wall came down, he was asked, what need was there for NATO now that the threat had disappeared? Many people at the time discounted President Bush’s answer that a threat did remain, and that threat was ‘‘uncertainty.’’ The intervening years have demonstrated both the promise and the dangers of the post-Cold War era and the continuing relevance of NATO to realize the one and avoid the other—as well as the wisdom of Prime Minister Thatcher’s and former- President Bush’s assessments about continuing threats to our security. Indeed, barely a month after the London NATO summit, Iraq attacked Kuwait, and we found ourselves facing the first major conflict of the new post-Cold War era. During the 1990s, NATO not only welcomed three new members, but became the instru- ment of ending ethnic aggression and genocide in the Balkans and leading that troubled region closer to a just and lasting peace—an important effort that has en- joyed bipartisan support here at home. Now, at the beginning of the 21st century, NATO continues to be the central in- strument for solidifying peace in Europe and drawing nations on both sides of the Atlantic closer together. In response to the extraordinary new threat posed by inter- national terrorism, NATO can certainly claim its own historic contributions—such as its invocation of Article V to defend the United States after September 11, the commitment of NATO AWACS to defend America’s skies, as well as its recent sup- port for Germany and The Netherlands in their leadership of the International Se- curity Assistance Force in Afghanistan. In the latter case especially, we see a mis- sion that brings NATO’s support well outside its traditional geographic domain. Despite those initial doubts about NATO’s relevance, in fact, an impressive con- sensus has developed in this country about the importance of America’s commitment to Europe. Arguably there has been less disagreement about the importance of NATO during this past decade than during the entire period of the Cold War. This strong bipartisan support among Americans for an alliance that has been the foun- dation of stability in Europe for over half a century is testimony to the strength of what is perhaps the most successful alliance in history. That NATO has endured and grown in membership and missions is also a reflection of the ability to adapt and adjust to a new security environment in which the confluence of terrorist net- works and states that sponsor terrorism with weapons of mass destruction poses to- day’s most lethal and urgent threat. President Bush gave voice to this fact in Berlin VerDate 11-SEP-98 12:05 Jul 29, 2004 Jkt 000000 PO 00000 Frm 00015 Fmt 6633 Sfmt 6621 94843.042 SARMSER2 PsN: SARMSER2 13 when he said plainly, ‘‘Those who despise human freedom will attack it on every continent.’’ NATO recognizes this fact today. NATO has shown that an alliance based on the same core values has more staying power than any previous alliance built purely on a narrow coincidence of interests. I am confident that will be the case for the next 50 years. NATO’S FUNDAMENTAL CONSTANTS For more than half a century, a dedication to protecting freedom and democracy, human rights and the rule of law has bound NATO together. For that reason, NATO is and will remain the anchor of the U.S. security relationship with Europe. Indeed, as we have waged the global war against terrorism, we have been reaping the benefits of more than 50 years of joint planning, training and operations in the NATO framework. That will continue. NATO is and will remain the central frame- work, not only for transatlantic military cooperation, but also for the West’s mobili- zation of its comprehensive collective power to defend its interests. Through NATO, the West combines the strengths of its military, intelligence, eco- nomic, political and cultural assets. Of course, Europe remains essential to the for- ward presence of U.S. military forces. But beyond its purely military role, one of NATO’s most important effects—one that Americans and Europeans may sometimes take for granted—is the critical role that this alliance has played in bringing peace to a continent that has had such a troubled past. That Europe’s future looks so peaceful and promising is due in no small part to the stability that NATO has brought to European security. NATO ENLARGEMENT It is with these constants in mind that President Bush has forcefully advocated a round of NATO enlargement, one that stretches from the Baltic to the Black Sea. Indeed, after the end of the Cold War, NATO has served as a beacon for democ- racies emerging in Central and Eastern Europe—inspiring them to move forward with confidence to build free institutions and representative self-government. Con- tradicting the gloomy predictions heard at the time, the last round of NATO en- largement in which Poland, Hungary and the Czech Republic entered the alliance’s ranks did not dilute NATO’s effectiveness. Instead, these new members have been active force contributors to NATO operations such as KFOR and SFOR, as well as in the war against terrorism. In fact, in a move that took some political courage, Hungary volunteered to host a training camp for free Iraqi forces—who are now on the ground in Iraq. Poland has joined with the United States to form a Defense Transformation Group and is one of four coalition partners with troops on the ground in Iraq. The Czechs have deployed a chemical/biological weapons defense unit into Kuwait. All three nations have consistently stood with the United States at the North Atlantic Council—in important issues such as missile defense, NATO’s role and contribution to ISAF, and, most recently, Article 4 support to Turkey. Indeed the last round of NATO enlargement did not, as some naysayers feared, build a new wall down the middle of Europe. Instead, NATO enlargement has built bridges across the continent, providing incentives for countries to reform their politi- cal systems, strengthen their relationships with their neighbors and bring their military forces under civilian control. Ukraine, for example, has been an active par- ticipant in the Partnership for Peace and welcomed Poland’s accession as an en- hancement to its own security. Ukraine has publicly asserted its own desire to join NATO. An historically significant political development of this past decade is the bridge that has been extended to Russia—encouraging a democratic Russia to have a closer relationship with NATO. NATO enlargement, instead of isolating Russia, has been the catalyst for the joint NATO-Russia Council, which stood up last May. Also, Rus- sia has been a partner in the global war against terrorism. Relations between Po- land and Russia have markedly improved since Poland’s entry into NATO, rolling back literally centuries of suspicion. For Russia to completely cross the bridge that NATO is building, a long journey remains. But, the journey has, nevertheless, begun. The enlargement of NATO continues the vision of a Europe that is secure, undi- vided and free, and work is underway to enlarge the alliance further. My colleague at the State Department, Under Secretary Marc Grossman, noted in his testimony here a couple weeks ago that the addition of these seven countries is about the fu- ture of NATO. I couldn’t agree more. The recent signing of the accession protocols for the NATO aspirants—Bulgaria, Estonia, Latvia, Lithuania, Romania, Slovakia, and Slovenia—was another step in achieving the vision of a Europe whole and free. VerDate 11-SEP-98 12:05 Jul 29, 2004 Jkt 000000 PO 00000 Frm 00016 Fmt 6633 Sfmt 6621 94843.042 SARMSER2 PsN: SARMSER2 14 These seven countries have already been de facto allies—participating in NATO’s Balkan missions, in Operation Enduring Freedom and the Kabul peacekeeping force. Several have deployed troops to the Iraq theater. As we look to the future of NATO, we might see its further enlargement in terms of two imperatives: moral and strategic. The moral imperative calls us to help new democracies, formerly subjected to the yoke of tyranny, consolidate and secure their own freedom and sovereignty. The strategic imperatives suggest that a united Eu- rope of common values will help avoid the major wars as experienced in the 20th century. A united Europe will be a better partner to the United States in dealing with world affairs. A united Europe will provide a context of security that will en- courage reform in Ukraine and Russia. A Europe so united is revitalized by nations who’ve recently thrown off the yoke of authoritarianism by their fresh commitment to freedom and democracy through NATO’s responsibilities. Further enlargement of NATO remains based on sound reform of any aspiring nation—including military reforms of national strategy, secure communications systems, upgrading airfields and ports to NATO standards, improved training, logistical support, personnel, and military spending at a minimum level of 2 percent of gross domestic product. PRAGUE SUMMIT’S TRANSFORMATIONAL AGENDA NATO’s future rests not only on enlargement, but also on its ability to take mili- tary action quickly and efficiently. One of NATO’s biggest challenges is to address gaps in military capabilities. During last November’s Prague summit, NATO’s lead- ers made important and far-reaching decisions to continue alliance efforts to adjust to the changes in Europe’s strategic landscape and the global security environment. The Prague summit not only extended membership to seven Central European de- mocracies, but also featured a new focused capabilities initiative and a streamlined command structure. NATO Response Force Also out of the Prague summit came a decision to establish a NATO Response Force (NRF), which promises to provide the alliance the ability to quickly deploy a force that is capable of executing the full range of missions NATO may be called upon to carry out. If the NRF is implemented according to the standards that the U.S. has proposed, the NRF will be lethal, technically superior to any envisioned threat, and readily deployable on short notice. The goal for initial operational capa- bility for training is October 2004, with full operational capability proposed by Octo- ber 2006. The NRF, we expect, will become the focal point of NATO transformation efforts to meet new threats facing the alliance. Prague Capabilities Commitment In Prague, the heads of state and government also approved the Prague Capabili- ties Commitment, in which the allies promised to address long-standing shortfalls in areas such as communications, strategic lift, nuclear, biological and chemical de- fense equipment, and precision-guided munitions. In short, the European allies agreed to pool their resources, spend smarter, and pursue specialization. Allied con- tributions to NRF rotations must possess the critical capabilities targeted by the Prague Capabilities Commitment if the NRF is to evolve beyond a concept. Streamlined Command Structure In Prague, the heads of state and government also approved the broad outline of a streamlined NATO command structure, which will reduce operational commands from 23 to 16 commands to ensure a more efficient use of financial and manpower resources. It will also provide NATO commanders with more mobile, joint and inter- operable headquarters—critical to 21st century military operations. The establish- ment of a new functional command, Allied Command Transformation in Norfolk, Virginia, will provide a new vehicle to drive military transformation across the alli- ance. Recent Division in NATO France’s recent efforts to block steps to enhance Turkey’s security against attack from Iraq was regrettable and, in fact, blocked initiatives important to the greater alliance. It did raise the issue about NATO’s decisionmaking process and its ability to honor its obligation to member countries. I would add that the Statement of the Vilnius 10 and the letter of eight European leaders expressed support for the U.S. with regard to Iraq. Clearly, the majority of NATO’s members value the alliances and security that NATO provides. If the goal of the leadership of France—or any other member—is to weaken NATO, the rest of the alliance needs to resist attempts VerDate 11-SEP-98 12:05 Jul 29, 2004 Jkt 000000 PO 00000 Frm 00017 Fmt 6633 Sfmt 6621 94843.042 SARMSER2 PsN: SARMSER2 15 at hobbling or dissolving an organization that has done so much for the peace of Europe and the world. Turkey I would like to say a few words about Turkey, a staunch NATO ally through 40 years of Cold War, a stabilizing force in Central and Eastern Europe, and supporter of peacekeeping efforts in Bosnia, Kosovo and Afghanistan. Turkey is the country in the Muslim world with the longest experience of democracy. It is a model that we hope other countries can emulate, and we have a great stake in Turkey’s future. There is no question that we were disappointed by the failure of the Turkish Par- liament to achieve the absolute majority required to approve the transit of Turkey by American ground troops (although a majority of members voting were in favor). We believe that decision ran counter, not only to our interests, but to the interests of Turkey as well. In the wake of Secretary Powell’s recent trip to Turkey, there are indications that Turkey wants to work with us to restore and reinforce the stra- tegic partnership. We will continue to find ways to work with Turkey during this conflict, recognizing its serious concerns about the territorial integrity of Iraq. We expect Turkey will be an important partner in the future as a majority Muslim country and the only democratic neighbor of the new democracy that we hope will emerge in Iraq. IRAQ: POST SADDAM U.S. Coalition Objectives In a press conference earlier this week, Secretary Rumsfeld assured the Iraqi peo- ple that life without Saddam is no longer a distant dream—it will soon be their re- ality. He said, we are going to great lengths to prepare a smooth transition from Saddam’s tyranny to a new Iraqi government, a government chosen by Iraqis them- selves. Consistent with the goal to leave Iraq in the hands of Iraqis as soon as possible, we will work to achieve the following objectives: • The United States continues working to liberate Iraq and its people—we have no desire to occupy Iraq or control its economic resources; • We will help Iraqis build an Iraq that is whole, free, and at peace with itself and its neighbors; • We will help destroy the structures that maintained Saddam’s tyranny and eliminate the Baathist influence from Iraq’s government, military and security services; • We will help eliminate Iraq’s chemical and biological weapons and its nu- clear weapons programs. This is a complex, but necessary, task, one that will require a military presence into the post-conflict period; • We will help Iraqis eliminate Iraq’s terrorist infrastructure—its training camps and support for terror; and • We will help make it possible for the Iraqi people to begin to rebuild Iraq’s economic and political systems so that Iraq will become prosperous and free. Many specific ways of achieving these goals are being worked out now. But many can only be fully developed once Saddam’s regime has been removed, and we can freely assess the state of Iraq’s natural resources and infrastructure. We envision a free Iraq in which some 24 million Iraqis have a means of deter- mining their own destiny in a system based on the rule of law and individual lib- erty. We are committed to working with Iraqis to achieve our vision of an Iraq that seeks to live peacefully with its neighbors, and no longer poses a danger to the world at large with weapons of mass destruction and through support or sympathy for terrorists. We will work with those who fought against Saddam’s tyranny from northern Iraq and abroad and those who suffered under this tyranny in Iraq. Such an Iraq would be a friend to the United States and to the international community of nations. RESPONSIBILITIES OF THE INTERNATIONAL COMMUNITY International support To help Iraq take its place among peace-seeking nations, the international com- munity has a responsibility to ensure this vision becomes reality. The coalition is committed to working with international institutions, including the United Nations. We welcome support from U.N. specialized agencies and non-governmental organi- zations in providing immediate assistance to the Iraqi people. The precise role of VerDate 11-SEP-98 12:05 Jul 29, 2004 Jkt 000000 PO 00000 Frm 00018 Fmt 6633 Sfmt 6621 94843.042 SARMSER2 PsN: SARMSER2 16 the U.N. will be determined through coordination with the Iraqi people themselves, coalition members and U.N. officials. Based on the lessons of previous conflicts, we have learned that post-war recon- struction requires a close coordination of military and civilian efforts. Progress to- ward rebuilding naturally promotes security. But, if local business people and for- eign investors do not feel secure, economic reconstruction will be hindered. A secure environment is key to enabling a democratic political process to proceed. So, estab- lishing security through law and order is a fundamental necessity. For the first time in decades, the wealth of Iraq will be devoted to the welfare of its people, not to palaces and armies and instruments of repression. Economic de- velopment will require the protection of Iraq’s natural resources and infrastructure. Much has been achieved already but additional efforts are underway to protect Iraq’s oil fields and preserve them as a national asset, and to restore oil production as quickly as possible to provide the Iraqi people with their primary source of reve- nue. While the coalition will be involved at the outset, the goal is to have production and marketing responsibility in the hands of a stable Iraqi authority as soon as pos- sible. Iraqis themselves and Iraqi organizations will be involved from the beginning. Decisions regarding the long-term development of Iraq’s oil resources and its econ- omy will be the responsibility of a stable Iraqi government. The United States is dedicated to ensuring that Iraq’s oil resources remain under Iraqi control. All of Iraq’s oil belongs to all of Iraq’s people. BUILDING AN IRAQI GOVERNMENT One of the greatest responsibilities of the coalition will be to help Iraqis create a new government, to paraphrase Abraham Lincoln, of the Iraqi people, by the Iraqi people and for the Iraqi people. The coalition countries and the international com- munity as a whole will have a role to play, but that role is to enable the Iraqi people to take control of their own destiny as soon as possible. Establishing a permanent government for Iraq would basically involve three phases, the first two of which will very likely overlap. Office of Reconstruction and Humanitarian Assistance In the first phase, as coalition forces gain control over Iraq, the Office of Recon- struction and Humanitarian Assistance will oversee the delivery of humanitarian assistance and the initial efforts to resume the provision of services to the Iraqi peo- ple. It will be key, for example, to meeting basic needs like medical care, water, elec- trical services, and making sure Iraqi civil servants who administer those programs get paid. The ORHA is not a provisional government for Iraq. The ORHA is a multi- national, coalition effort, including representatives from a range of U.S. Government agencies, including the Defense Department, the State Department, the Justice De- partment, USAID and advisors outside the government. Jay Garner, who will head the ORHA, will report to CENTCOM Commander, General Tommy Franks; he will receive his instructions from the President through the Secretary of Defense and General Franks. As soon as basic services are running once again, their administra- tion would be turned over as soon as feasible to the Iraqi Interim Authority. Over time, ORHA will fulfill more of an advisory role. Among Jay Garner’s many remark- able qualifications for this task is the leading role he played in 1991 in assisting the people of northern Iraq to establish a governing authority in the territory under their control. That process enabled the complete withdrawal of coalition forces just 6 months after Operation Provide Comfort created a sanctuary in Northern Iraq free of Saddam Hussein’s control. Iraqi Interim Authority The second element of a post-Saddam Iraq will be an Iraqi Interim Authority (IIA), which will assume increasingly greater responsibility for the administration of Iraq. The IIA will draw from all of Iraq’s religious and ethnic groups—to include Iraqis currently inside and outside Iraq—and will provide a way for Iraqis to begin immediately to direct the economic and political reconstruction of their country. The authority would include not only the members of the free Iraqi groups that have fought Saddam’s tyranny and the independents among the expatriate community, but will also draw from local leaders who have already begun to participate with the coalition in the liberation of Iraq. As people throughout the country become free to express their views, more and more people will emerge from within Iraq who can be a part of this leadership. Over time, the IIA would take control of an increasing number of administrative functions. But the Interim Authority’s most important responsibility will be to set in motion the process leading to the creation of a new Iraqi government, for exam- ple, by setting up local elections and drafting a new constitution. This is a process VerDate 11-SEP-98 12:05 Jul 29, 2004 Jkt 000000 PO 00000 Frm 00019 Fmt 6633 Sfmt 6621 94843.042 SARMSER2 PsN: SARMSER2 17 that foreigners cannot direct; it must be a process owned by Iraqis. Our task is to create the conditions, including the security conditions, in which they can formulate a process and then pick their leaders freely. An Interim Authority would be a bridge from the initial administration of basic services to an eventual government that rep- resents the Iraqi people. Iraqi government In the final phase, an Iraqi government would assume sovereignty on the basis of elections in accordance with a new constitution. Our intention is to leave Iraq in the hands of Iraqis themselves as soon as we can. As President Bush has said, the United States intends to stay in Iraq as long as necessary, but not a day more. That the people of Iraq want a voice in their own government, let there be no doubt. The Ayatollah Ali Sistani, under house arrest since 1988, and now freed from Saddam’s tyranny, recently issued what may be history’s first pro-U.S. fatwa. He advised believers ‘‘not to hinder the forces of liberation, and help bring this war against the tyrant to a successful end for the Iraqi people.’’ Sistani, referring to re- cent events, was reported to have quoted the prophet Muhammed, saying: ‘‘There is good in what happens,’’ adding further: ‘‘Our people need freedom more than air [to breathe]. Iraq has suffered, and it deserves better government.’’ This administration is committed to helping Iraqis achieve that better govern- ment, a government that represents all ethnic and religious groups. To achieve this, the U.S. looks forward to working with the Iraqis themselves and international com- munity. Whether we’re talking about the future of NATO or the future of Iraq, it is clear that the security of the United States and free peoples around the globe rests on collective cooperation. We look forward to doing our part to work with the Members of Congress to meet the challenges that face the trans-Atlantic community and the people of Iraq. Thank you. Chairman WARNER. Thank you very much, Mr. Secretary. General Pace. STATEMENT OF GEN. PETER PACE, USMC, VICE CHAIRMAN, JOINT CHIEFS OF STAFF General PACE. Mr. Chairman, thank you. Sir, in the interest of saving as much time as possible for your questions, in addition to my written testimony I would simply like to offer a very sincere ‘‘thank you’’ to you and all the members of this committee from all of us in uniform for the strong, sustained, and bipartisan support that has enabled us to recruit, train, and equip the magnificent young men and women who are doing our country’s missions right now in Afghanistan and Iraq. This committee and the Senate has had enormous sway and influence on the quality of that force, sir, and we thank you. [The prepared statement of General Pace follows:] PREPARED STATEMENT BY GEN. PETER PACE, USMC Mr. Chairman, members of the committee: Thank you for the opportunity to meet with you here today to discuss the U.S. military’s role in NATO enlargement and post-war Iraq. I’d like to first thank you for the continued bipartisan support that you give to the men and women of our Armed Forces. That support is appreciated, and it is critical to our operational success. NATO continues to prove its relevance today while members and aspirants alike transform to be relevant in the future. Recently, the alliance provided support for Turkey and sent the correct message to Iraq—NATO will defend its members. NATO also continues to support the war on terrorism. The alliance is conducting counter-terror operations in the Mediterranean, escorting unarmed ships through the Strait of Gibraltar, conducting maritime intercept operations off the Horn of Af- rica, and relieving the United States in a number of areas with critical support. NATO’s military capabilities will be enhanced with the addition of the seven invited countries. VerDate 11-SEP-98 12:05 Jul 29, 2004 Jkt 000000 PO 00000 Frm 00020 Fmt 6633 Sfmt 6621 94843.042 SARMSER2 PsN: SARMSER2 18 NEW MEMBERS At the Prague summit, NATO invited Bulgaria, Estonia, Latvia, Lithuania, Roma- nia, Slovakia, and Slovenia to join the alliance because each of these nations has demonstrated the ability to make a contribution to the alliance. They have made a firm commitment to the basic principles and values set out in the North Atlantic Treaty, and to the stability and security of the North Atlantic area. The accession of each of these nations will enhance NATO’s military effectiveness. Already these nations exhibit ‘‘member-like’’ behavior and demonstrate their read- iness to accept the responsibility of membership. Each is providing military forces to operations in the Balkans. All seven are providing forces, capabilities, or assets in support of the ongoing operations in Afghanistan and to the U.S.-led coalition in Iraq. For example, Bulgaria provides basing for U.S. aircraft in support of oper- ations in Afghanistan and Iraq and has a nuclear, biological, and chemical (NBC) detection unit deployed as part of the coalition forces in Iraq. Estonia deployed an explosive, ordnance, and disposal team to Afghanistan in support of the Inter- national Security Assistance Force (ISAF). Two Latvian medical teams have de- ployed to Afghanistan to support ISAF. A Lithuanian Special Operations Force unit is deployed in Afghanistan to support Operation Enduring Freedom and a medical team is deployed with ISAF. Romania deployed—and transported with its own air- lift—an infantry battalion and a military police platoon to Afghanistan. It also de- ployed an NBC unit to Iraq, and is providing basing for U.S. forces in support of both operations. Slovakia deployed an engineer unit to Kabul and an NBC unit to support the war in Iraq. Slovenia donated three battalions worth of arms and am- munition to the Afghan National Army Training Project. By their military contribu- tions to these ongoing operations, each of these nations has demonstrated an imme- diate relevance and a capacity to bring special capabilities that are in great demand. Yet these nations contribute more than just forces and capabilities; they also pro- vide access to critical infrastructure that is of great military value to the alliance and the United States. While they continue to develop special capabilities, they also continue to restruc- ture and to modernize their armed forces. Participation in the Membership Action Plan (MAP) and in NATO’s Partnership for Peace (PfP) programs over the years has enabled these countries to make significant strides in reforming their armed forces, making them more capable, more deployable, and more interoperable. The reforms underway are significant and will take several years to complete. The 1999 round of NATO enlargement, which resulted in the accession of the Czech Republic, Hungary, and Poland, taught us many lessons. First, we learned that a larger alliance is still able to achieve consensus on issues of critical impor- tance to its members. Second, new members bring energy, enthusiasm and a strong desire to demonstrate their willingness to share the responsibilities of membership. Third, we have learned that new members are eager to share with invitees and as- pirants their own experiences in defense reform and in preparing their militaries to join NATO. Finally, we were reminded that real defense reform and development of a truly professional force is a long-term process. NEW CAPABILITIES As it grows larger in membership, NATO must also grow militarily more relevant to 21st century threats. The alliance has begun to make significant progress under the banner of ‘‘New Capabilities.’’ At the Prague summit, Heads of State and Gov- ernment made a commitment to a new concept for the alliance, to create a NATO Response Force that is rapidly deployable and capable of expeditionary operations. They also agreed to streamline an inefficient and unnecessarily large command structure, and to make real improvements in the military capabilities of member na- tions through what is called the Prague Capabilities Commitment. The current NATO command structure has 31 headquarters or other entities dis- tributed on both sides of the Atlantic Ocean. In its current form, the command structure is inefficient, regionally focused, and not suited for today’s challenges. In June, however, we expect allied defense ministers to approve a much improved com- mand structure. The new NATO command structure will be considerably leaner, having shed 14 headquarters. This will enable the alliance to realize personnel savings and to fully man the headquarters that remain. Important portions of the new command structure will be deployable and built for joint operations—another significant change for NATO. The alliance has the oppor- tunity to break out of its Cold War structure and create a capability to conduct oper- ations wherever and whenever needed. VerDate 11-SEP-98 12:05 Jul 29, 2004 Jkt 000000 PO 00000 Frm 00021 Fmt 6633 Sfmt 6621 94843.042 SARMSER2 PsN: SARMSER2 19 The proposed Allied Command for Transformation based in Norfolk, Virginia will be responsible for the training of NATO staffs and deployable headquarters, for com- mon military education, doctrine, and force planning for the alliance, and for docu- menting lessons learned from operations. The NATO Response Force is well on its way to becoming a reality. It will be a truly joint combined force that can execute the range of alliance missions from hu- manitarian assistance to combat operations. It will be a rotational force that con- sists of land, air, and maritime forces that have trained and exercised together. This initiative will not only give NATO a credible and rapidly responsive force, it will serve as a vehicle for alliance transformation. Nations will be responsible for ensuring that the elements they contribute to each rotation of the NATO Response Force have been the focus of their capabilities improvement efforts and resources. Over time, the number of these more capable and experienced units will increase, leading to an overall improvement in alliance military capabilities. This force is scheduled to have an initial operational capability by October 2004, and to achieve full operational capability by October 2006. The Prague Capabilities Commitment (PCC) rounds out the ‘‘new capabilities’’ ini- tiative by seeking specific, short-term, focused military procurement by Allies. Heads of State and Government agreed on these capabilities as essential to fielding a force that will prevail in modern combat or stability operations. Nations commit- ted to specific measures and timelines to fix capability shortfalls in four priority areas: transporting and sustaining allied forces; connecting allied forces; fielding more modern combat elements; and nuclear, biological, and chemical (NBC) and missile defense. All agreed to implement all aspects of the PCC as quickly as pos- sible. For the PCC to succeed, allies will have to make the financial commitment to obtain required military capabilities. The military changes NATO has undergone since 1991 have been substantial, but the changes in 2003 and 2004 will be more significant and executed in a much shorter period of time. The alliance is making the effort to become more relevant to the new security environment. NATO continues to serve as an important part of U.S. military strategy to protect and defend our trans-Atlantic interests. POST-WAR IRAQ Although difficult tasks remain, the coalition’s continued military success dem- onstrates that the liberation of Iraq is at hand. My focus today is on what we envi- sion the military’s responsibilities to be in post-war Iraq. Our primary military tasks in post-war Iraq are security and stabilization. The establishment of a secure environment will enable the provision of humanitarian as- sistance, preservation and repair of key infrastructure, elimination of WMD, and restoration of civil services and representative government. Essential post-war stabilization tasks cover a broad range of issues, touching on virtually every sector of the Iraqi economy and system of governance. Since we do not know at this moment the exact condition of the country after the termination of hostilities, we do not know exactly what military forces will be required, nor for how long they will be required. However, we are planning across the range of condi- tions, whether the country stabilizes quickly and the security environment is rel- atively benign, or in the worst case, where the situation is more chaotic and there are more tasks requiring the use of coalition forces. As a secure environment is established, we will assist in the process of rapid tran- sition to Iraqi control. The Office of Reconstruction and Humanitarian Assistance (ORHA), under the command of General Franks, the Commander of U.S. Central Command, includes staff from all relevant U.S. departments and agencies. The ORHA has already moved to Kuwait, and is working in close partnership with inter- national institutions, including the U.N. and our coalition partners. It will deploy to Iraq as soon as possible to coordinate the post-war effort. The coalition military forces have demonstrated speed, flexibility, and precision throughout this war. They stand ready to provide a secure and stable environment for post-conflict activities, allowing the people of Iraq the opportunity to make their own decisions regarding their future. Thank you. Chairman WARNER. We thank you, General, for the leadership that General Myers, yourself, other members of the Joint Staff, and right on down to General Franks’ Central Command and his staff for their extraordinary planning and execution of what appears to be an operation that will succeed in the goals as laid down by the VerDate 11-SEP-98 12:05 Jul 29, 2004 Jkt 000000 PO 00000 Frm 00022 Fmt 6633 Sfmt 6602 94843.042 SARMSER2 PsN: SARMSER2 20 President, the Prime Minister of Great Britain, and other coalition partners. Thank you, sir. General Jones. STATEMENT OF GEN. JAMES L. JONES, USMC, SUPREME AL- LIED COMMANDER, EUROPE AND COMMANDER, UNITED STATES EUROPEAN COMMAND General JONES. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. It is a great honor and a pleasure to be here at this witness table with the Deputy Secretary and my lifelong friend in the United States Marine Corps, now the Vice Chairman, General Peter Pace. Chairman WARNER. It is a remarkable coincidence that both po- sitions are filled by Marines. But being a former Marine, I take due note of that. Senator ROBERTS. I think it is divine intervention, Mr. Chair- man. Senator INHOFE. I would observe that I am flanked by two Ma- rines, too. Chairman WARNER. General Jones. General JONES. Thank you, sir. Mr. Chairman, as you pointed out, I have the privilege of wear- ing two unique but complementary hats, first, as the Allied Com- mander in Europe and, second, as the Commander of U.S. Forces in Europe. I would like to just make a few comments about each one of those. It seems to me that the most recent gathering of our world’s leaders to discuss NATO at Prague revealed a solid political sup- port for the viability of this most important organization, indeed a very unique organization, on the face of the planet today. This po- litical support was expressed by having the members unanimously agree to expand by 7 new nations, growing from 19 to 26 countries. It also signaled a political support for the vitality and the con- tribution that NATO can make in the 21st century, although while recognizing the tremendous record of achievement that it made in the 20th century. NATO is going from being a defensive alliance arrayed against a very clearly defined enemy, an enemy that is be- coming a friend and has become a friend, to a more focused alliance hinged on the military capability of engagement both in a regional context and, to witness the current discussions going on in Brus- sels, perhaps even in a global context, ranging from the Balkans all the way to Afghanistan. From a military perspective, it is an alliance that is in transition as it changes from being defensive in nature to adopting a more flexible, more useful, more capable, and, yes, more credible and more efficient force. The instrument of that military transformation in NATO in my judgment is called the NATO Response Force. The NATO Response Force in its full potential is generating a lot of ex- citement in not only the military circles in Europe, but also the po- litical leadership circles. I believe that it is quite possible that within a very short period of time that the NATO Response Force will become a transformational capability that will finally take the Cold War force that NATO is and has been, composed of 2.3 million people under arms with a vast array of legacy systems that are in dire need of transformation and modernization, to become a more VerDate 11-SEP-98 12:05 Jul 29, 2004 Jkt 000000 PO 00000 Frm 00023 Fmt 6633 Sfmt 6602 94843.042 SARMSER2 PsN: SARMSER2 21 capable force that will be more useful to respond to the array of asymmetric threats that not only face the United States, but face all freedom-loving people who comprise the alliance. I should also signal, although he is not represented here at the table, the role of Admiral Giambastiani as the impending Com- mander of Allied Command for Transformation, which is the new title replacing the Supreme Allied Commander Atlantic (SACLANT). As the operational commander, I will shortly assume the responsibility for the SACLANT’s previous operational commit- ments. In his role as the Allied Commander for Transformation, he will be the engine for transformation of military cultures and con- cepts that will take us into the 21st century. So in my opinion, this is an exciting time to be in NATO, as NATO redefines itself, as it expands, as it becomes more useful in terms of being able to respond to those challenges it faces—wheth- er it be in the Balkans, in Afghanistan, in the Mediterranean with the highly successful operation involving the Standing Naval Forces, the deployment of NATO AWACS, theater missile defense, and NBC capabilities recently to the defense of Turkey—were all indications of the vast array of challenges and capabilities that NATO must have in the future. It is truly an exciting place to be assigned. With regard to the European Command, the Unified Command Plan of 2002 added 16 percent more land mass and 28 percent more sea space to the responsibilities of the European commander. It is an active area of responsibility, comprised of 93 countries, 46 million square miles of land and water. It too has seen its success in the history of the 20th century in bringing about with our allies the demise of the Soviet Union and the transformation of the Euro- pean land mass, and now we are looking at how we can support the alliance by looking at our basing strategy, which sees 84 per- cent of our bases centered in three different countries, to see how best we can support the new responsibilities and the new focus of attention that we must bring to bear on areas of our theater that are causing increasing concerns and will be of increased concern to our Nation and to our alliance in the future. New threats to the region are manifest by the asymmetric threats portrayed by extreme fundamentalism, crime, narco- trafficking, terrorism, creeping instabilities, and increased concern not only to our east and southeast, but to the south, and notably the increasing threats that we face from the Magreb and sub-Saha- ran Africa. We will need to have new basing models. Mr. Chairman, the Armed Forces of the United States were reduced between 35 and 40 percent following Operation Desert Shield and Operation Desert Storm, and we used the energy that we cultivated from that reduc- tion to project into the very capable and awesome force that we were able to bring to bear, not only on the field of battle but on the field of engagement, which is equally important during the in- tervening years between wars. The new basing models of the U.S.-European Command will be flexible and agile. They will be able to do more with the same amount that we have. They will recognize the new realities of the NATO alliance itself as it expands and acquires new members. VerDate 11-SEP-98 12:05 Jul 29, 2004 Jkt 000000 PO 00000 Frm 00024 Fmt 6633 Sfmt 6602 94843.042 SARMSER2 PsN: SARMSER2 22 They will be based on not only permanently based forces, but also rotational forces that can come into our area and make an imme- diate impact. As an example of this, I would submit that the U.S. forces cur- rently stationed in Bosnia-Herzegovina are 100 percent National Guard Forces based in the United States and they are doing a truly remarkable job in their rotation. As they depart, they will be replaced by another such force. So in sum, Mr. Chairman, the relationship between the U.S. Eu- ropean Command and NATO is as strong as it ever was. We will reevaluate our footprints. We will reevaluate how we do things. We will take advantage of the transformational aspects that have been so successfully implemented over the past few years to provide this Nation with the reassurance and the security that it deserves and the guidance and the help and, if needed, the leadership in the alli- ance that we are privileged to enjoy in what is in my opinion the most important military alliance the world has ever seen. It is a great honor for me to be here representing the men and women of the U.S. European Command and also to be appearing before you as the Allied Commander, Europe. Thank you, sir. [The prepared statement of General Jones follows:] PREPARED STATEMENT BY GEN. JAMES. L. JONES, JR., USMC INTRODUCTION Chairman Warner, Senator Levin, distinguished members of the committee, it is my privilege to appear before you as Commander, United States European Com- mand (USEUCOM), to discuss our operational missions, the viability and impor- tance of the NATO alliance, and to chart a way ahead for the future. On behalf of all the men and women in USEUCOM who proudly serve this Nation, as well as their families, I want to thank the committee members and staff for your unwaver- ing support over this past year. Your determined commitment to improving the joint warfighting and crisis response capabilities of our Nation’s Armed Forces, and to im- proving the quality of life of our men and women in uniform, underwrites our efforts to shape the international environment in order to bring about a more secure and stable world. Your efforts have provided us with the resources to be successful, and have enabled us to do our part to protect our democracy and to contribute to the security of our Nation. Your dedication to improving the welfare of our families and that of our men and women in uniform is both recognized and greatly appreciated. During my brief time as Commander of United States European Command, I have been struck by six defining characteristics of our area of responsibility: (1) its expan- siveness and diversity; (2) the inherent responsibilities and challenges of a region of this size; (3) the continuing importance of the NATO alliance, and the critical role of the U.S. within the alliance; (4) the contribution of our allies to meeting the emerging security requirements in the early days of the new century; (5) the nu- ances of the geo-strategic environment and its impact on our operational capabili- ties; and last, but not least, (6) the overarching realization that our current force posture requires a fuller adaptation to the requirements of a changing region and to the emerging realities of a challenging 21st century. With the committee’s indulgence, I would like to discuss these characteristics in a manner that illustrates the scope of USEUCOM’s responsibilities, the depth of our involvement to meet those responsibilities through current operations, the level of cooperation with our European partners to enhance security, and the key theater investment needs to both maintain and employ our forces in a manner that reflects the intent of our National Security Strategy. More importantly, I want to underscore the need for continuing transformation, and to help articulate a strategic vision that will enable us to better meet our strategic goals, and the challenges and threats that will be omni-present in the 21st century. HISTORICAL PERSPECTIVE Since my predecessor, General Joe Ralston, last testified, USEUCOM has contin- ued to operate at full capacity. We are a supporting command to the Central Com- VerDate 11-SEP-98 12:05 Jul 29, 2004 Jkt 000000 PO 00000 Frm 00025 Fmt 6633 Sfmt 6621 94843.042 SARMSER2 PsN: SARMSER2 23 mand’s effort in Operations Enduring Freedom and Iraqi Freedom. We are fully en- gaged in prosecuting the war on terrorism, executing ongoing operations, forging un- precedented organizational and operational changes within the NATO alliance, and adjusting to the significant expansion of our area of responsibility, to include the addition of Russia, Iceland, Greenland, and the Azores. We are simultaneously im- plementing a mandated 15 percent headquarters manning reduction in our major theater headquarters. The USEUCOM area of responsibility encompasses a vast geographic region cov- ering over 46 million square miles of land and water (Figure 1). The new Unified Command Plan, effective 1 October 2002, directs that our area of responsibility includes 93 sovereign nations, stretching from the northern tip of Norway to the southern tip of South Africa, and from Greenland in the west to Rus- sia’s eastern coastline. The very title ‘‘U.S. European Command’’ is a misnomer and no longer representative of the vastness of our area of operations. The astonishing diversity of our area of responsibility encompasses the full range of human condi- tions: some nations in our region are among the wealthiest of the world, while oth- ers exist in a state of abject poverty; some are open democracies with long histories of respect for human liberties, while others are struggling with basic concepts of representative governments and personal freedoms. Our missions are complex. The men and women of the command operate through- out Europe, Africa, the Levant, Eurasia, and the Middle East, more specifically in Iraq. In addition to many bilateral and multi-national operations, we also serve in the Balkans in support of the North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO) stability operations and prosecute the war on terrorism on land and at sea, throughout the theater. To fully appreciate where USEUCOM is today, and more importantly where we are going, given the scope of responsibilities and challenges of a region this large and diverse, it is important to reflect briefly on our extremely successful history. U.S. Forces in Europe, in concert with our NATO allies, played a pivotal role in bringing about the demise of the Soviet Union and Warsaw Pact. Since the fall of the Berlin wall in October 1989, USEUCOM has undergone a reduction in forces of approximately 66 percent, from 248,000 in 1989 to 109,000 in 2002. In addition, VerDate 11-SEP-98 12:05 Jul 29, 2004 Jkt 000000 PO 00000 Frm 00026 Fmt 6633 Sfmt 6621 94843.042 SARMSER2 PsN: SARMSER2 24 we have closed 566 installations over the past decade, along with over 356 sites and training areas. This reduction equates to a 70 percent shift in personnel and facili- ties as compared to the Cold War era peaks. At the same time, EUCOM’s 21st cen- tury area of responsibility has expanded by 16 percent on land and 28 percent on the seas. My predecessors each recognized that a change in the strategic environment was occurring and instituted measures that were both appropriate and prudent. The dra- matic decline of installations and accompanying reduction and realignment of our force structure in-theater, in the Post Cold War era, was accomplished without a corresponding reduction in the scope of our mission. In effect, we were tasked to do much more with considerably less. As our Nation emerged from the Cold War era, we discovered that the security landscape was changing in many ways, and we were increasingly confronted by new and challenging asymmetries. We now better understand that our world has changed dramatically—from being a bi-polar and symmetrical, to being multi-polar and asymmetrical. Our theater has become an absolutely unpredictable environment replete with new and diverse challenges. It must be said that ours is a world in which Americans, perhaps for the first time, feel threatened inside their national borders; in their own homeland. Today, the developed world faces threats that are sub-national and supra-national; threats which are based on ideological, theological, cultural, ethnic, and political factors. Our new adversaries do not recognize inter- national law, sovereignty or accepted international norms of behavior. As such they are able to exploit the seams of international order. This realization, and our under- standing of the challenges of new world ‘‘disorder’’, brings with it unique challenges that require new and different approaches, and different metrics by which we allo- cate resources and develop strategies to protect our national interests and shape our environment. The dynamics of a new and challenging security environment and the need to embrace a different approach to deal more effectively with varied and emerging threats is not lost on our allies. Adaptation is the engine of survival and the NATO alliance is embarking upon a path that will ensure its future existence. We, and our allies, require a strategy that matches our resources in a manner that optimizes our ability to meet the challenges and threats of the 21st century. As we look at the map of our AOR, and the current location of our bases in-theater, some might be struck by the fact that the current disposition of our forces reflects a positioning in keeping with the symmetrical threats of the last century. Present day strategic interests reveal those areas where our interests will be threatened in the future, suggesting new realities, which will affect the requirements of a more appropriate construct of forces and basing plans that are more apt to achieve the goals laid out in our National Security Strategy. In doing so, we will move from the incremental process of transition towards the more dynamic promising process of transformation in depth. STRATEGIC VISION Transformation Although many think of transformation uniquely in terms of the new technology and new weapons systems, transformation in depth results from the synthesis of new technologies and revolutionary 21st century operational concepts, which are en- abled by agile, adaptive organizations. Transformation is accomplished through in depth reforms within four areas; technological innovation, new operational concepts, institutional reforms, and dramatic reform in our business and acquisition methods. Today, we find ourselves at a veritable crossroads between two centuries. The new century will allow us to escape the limitations of the former; and we can and must evolve from the doctrine of ‘‘attrition’’ to ‘‘maneuver’’ warfare, from symmetrical to asymmetrical options, from reliance on mass effect to reliance on precision effect, from large logistical stockpiles to a revolutionary integrated logistics concept, and we must change from antiquated terrain-based military criteria to that of effects- based operations. As the United States emerged on the scene as a world power after World War II, our Nation’s role on the face of the earth was forever changed. We recognized, indeed we embraced, our new responsibilities, and for 50 years we faced the com- petition. We are proud of the fact that we prevailed. We did so for a variety of rea- sons, but none more important that the realization that our future depended on more than pure military might to succeed; it depended on a free market economy, an expanding cultural base, and a passionate belief in a system of government that enables its citizens to rise to their full potential in a free society. The realization that those pillars, of which the investment in the military capability became an en- abler for the other three, ensured that our position as a nation of influence, on all VerDate 11-SEP-98 12:05 Jul 29, 2004 Jkt 000000 PO 00000 Frm 00027 Fmt 6633 Sfmt 6621 94843.042 SARMSER2 PsN: SARMSER2 25 matters, became the defining factor of our identity for the balance of the 20th cen- tury. For that we should rejoice, and from that we should draw upon the hard learned lessons as we enter the fractured world of the 21st century. More than any other nation, we have shown that we understand that we have a military capability that can and should be used to the betterment of world conditions, and only in the instances of last resort, applied to the conflicts for which there is no other solution, do we commit our men and women in uniform to the field of battle. In short, Amer- ican military power is not simply a tool to be used only in a time of crisis. It is an instrument of peacetime engagement and reassurance to our friends and allies. Security provides stability, and within that stability the seeds of democracy can and will flourish. ‘‘Sovereignty’’ will be our Nation’s challenge as we respond to the realities of the new century. Our 20th century basing models have served their purpose and it is now time to apply transformational options to provide our Nation with forces that are more agile, capable, sustainable, and credible in relation to our goals and aspira- tions as a nation. The world has changed in many ways; among them is the fact that it is ‘‘smaller’’ in terms of being able to project influence. The ‘‘tyranny of dis- tance’’ is no longer as daunting. There are different ways to achieve our goals. Many of our 20th century facilities in USEUCOM are in dire need of repairs. Current esti- mates project a significant investment will be needed over the next 6 years in order to provide adequate housing for our service members and their families currently assigned to USEUCOM. Contemporary issues pertaining to sovereignty, encroach- ment, and environmental constraints at many of our bases marginalizes training, impedes operations and erodes readiness. The ability of USEUCOM forces to attain and sustain required levels of readiness to meet current and future challenges depends on the quality, accessibility, afford- ability and the realism of our training. Joint training ranges of adequate size, capa- bility, and instrumentation are vital. The training ranges we have used histori- cally—mostly in Western Europe—have diminished utility due to increasing restric- tions on operating hours, costs, limitations on the weapons that are authorized to be employed, and the size of forces that can maneuver on these ranges. Urbaniza- tion and environmental restrictions affect our ability to train in many ways. As a result, we have identified new training opportunities, primarily in Central and Eastern Europe and Northern Africa, where a number of countries have ex- pressed interest in providing suitable training ranges, at less expense, with consid- erably less restrictions, and which are much more available than those we are his- torically tied to. These same potential host nations have also indicated an interest in establishing a new form of basing relationship for our forces. As we contemplate the imminent eastward expansion of NATO itself, it is clear that our traditional al- lies are also committed to ‘‘out of area operations’’ for NATO as well. USEUCOM and NATO are engaged in parallel actions, which are truly trans- formational in mutually supportive directions. NATO is adding seven new members from Central and Eastern Europe to the alliance, and USEUCOM is examining how it can best support the alliance with an appropriate force and new basing concepts. In order to do this, I recommend we consider the following: To offer a way ahead, I would suggest three areas for renewed focus: First, we need to critically evaluate every facet of our organization. Central to our conceptual transformation is the continued reduction/realignment of a ‘‘legacy’’ in- frastructure that, in large measure, remains arrayed to support the Cold War pos- ture of the 20th century. We should re-orient our forces towards the southeast and south, in a manner that reflects our expanding strategic responsibilities and the un- questioned emergence of new regional and global realities. Second, we must need to reassess how we deploy and assign forces to our theater. We need to have forces that are joint, agile, flexible, sustainable, and highly mobile. The combination of permanent and rotational forces deployed for 6 months, accom- panied by an expeditionary component construct is better suited to meet the de- mands of our fluid, complex, and multi-faceted security environment. We must rec- ognize that the landscape of today may not be the landscape of tomorrow. Truly ex- peditionary forces, by their nature can better and more readily adjust to the geo- political shifts and the emergence of unanticipated threats, than can traditional forces without a genuine mobility or true expeditionary capability. Third, we will need to adopt operational concepts that capitalize on innovation, experimentation, and technology in order to assert ourselves in a manner that achieves the greatest effect. We are witnessing a sudden shift in our past century reliance from the quantitative characteristics of warfare, mass and volume to a real- ization that qualitative factors (speed, stealth, precision, timeliness, sustainability, and interoperability) are predominant in understanding modern warfare. The lethality of the modern battlefield calls for forces to be lighter, less constrained, and VerDate 11-SEP-98 12:05 Jul 29, 2004 Jkt 000000 PO 00000 Frm 00028 Fmt 6633 Sfmt 6621 94843.042 SARMSER2 PsN: SARMSER2 26 more mobile, without diminution of capability. The principle of maneuver, attained by leveraging technologies, reduces a unit’s vulnerability while increasing its lethality and survivability. High speed troop lift, precision logistics, in-stride sustainment, and intuitive C2 architectures are enablers that translate into power projection. By capitalizing on the gains we achieved through the consolidation and restruc- turing of our bases over the past decade we are now ready to apply the more revolu- tionary concept of transformation. Re-orienting our forces, forging multiple and newer, basing options composed of task organized, often rotational formations, stra- tegically arrayed, and capable of leveraging our technological advancements, is nec- essary to support our strategy which seeks to ‘‘assure, dissuade, deter and defeat any adversary’’. An example of how we might attain our strategic objectives is to build more for- ward operating bases such as ‘‘Camp Bondsteel’’ in Kosovo. From such semi-perma- nent expeditionary bases we can more effectively engage and influence the stability of a region. Such bases have proven the merit of this approach and demonstrate a visible presence at a fraction of the cost of a ‘‘small American city’’ base, more em- blematic of the past. Africa, an example of an area long neglected, but whose transnational threats and abject poverty are the future breeding grounds for networked non-state adversaries, terrorism, narco-trafficking, crime, and unspeak- able human conditions, is essential to our strategic plans for the future. It lends itself perfectly to the flexible basing options of the future. The utilization of a rotational basing model, more flexible and along the lines of an expeditionary construct, will complement our forward-basing strategy and enable us to reverse the current adverse proportions of the ‘‘tooth to tail’’ ratio. Rotational forces requires less infrastructure in-theater and provide the agility to respond to changing environments at significantly lower costs than that generally associated with closing and moving bases. It is much easier to relocate or close a Camp ‘‘Bondsteel’’ than it is a Camp ‘‘Baumholder.’’ In this regard, rather than enabling our operations, some of our ‘‘legacy’’ bases (those that are not strategic enablers), can become modern day liabilities as we strive to deal with the security challenges of the new century. While this may represent a dramatic shift in how USEUCOM operates, it is not a foreign concept to our the Service Chiefs. The Navy-Marine Corps team, for example, has been a predominantly expeditionary force since its in- ception. The Air Force has already created and implemented the Air Expeditionary Force model. The Army is in the process of creating lighter and more agile forces. We will need to continue to develop this capability in order to achieve our goals. Our global presence, of both sea-based and land-based units, redistributed more strategically, will achieve the desired result of our National Military Strategy. United States Special Operations Command (USSOCOM) and the Marine Corps are already working to leverage joint capabilities by invigorating Theater Special Operations Capable (SOC) and Amphibious Ready Group (ARG)/Marine Expedition- ary Unit SOC integration. USSOCOM announced in January 2003 that it will seek to emphasize interoperability, working relationships, capabilities briefings, pre-de- ployment training, and integrated exercises. Concurrently, U.S. Marine Corps Forces, Europe and SOCEUR are developing the framework for regular training, theater engagement and operational relationships. These relationships will bring USEUCOM SOF and U.S. Marine Corps (specifically the Marine Expeditionary Units) together in a way that will allow a force multiplication that is long overdue. This new teamwork will provide the momentum necessary to leverage the signifi- cant capabilities of both organizations to support USEUCOM at a level not pre- viously achieved. This approach to transformation is not intended to undermine the consolidation and revitalization process related to the ‘‘enduring’’ infrastructure of our vital stra- tegic bases. Rather, it is a continuation of our effort to increase efficiencies and pro- vide greater effectiveness for our forces. We have several bases in Europe, which are key strategic enablers of our national strategy. They will continue to enable our theater throughput requirements, enhance the capabilities of our theater rapid reac- tion forces, and facilitate our concept of precision logistics. Through the proper blending of forward-basing with new and more agile expeditionary components, we will achieve the desired capability and the right balance necessary to ensure our rel- evance, and continued influence, in the 21st century European theater and the NATO alliance. The issue of transformation is not lost on our NATO allies. They fully realize the benefits of this concept and its link to military relevancy and modern capability. The recent NATO summit in Prague ushered in perhaps the most potentially profound change and re-commitment to the alliance since the signing of the Washington Trea- ty in 1949. The themes of ‘‘New Capabilities, New Members, and New Relation- VerDate 11-SEP-98 12:05 Jul 29, 2004 Jkt 000000 PO 00000 Frm 00029 Fmt 6633 Sfmt 6621 94843.042 SARMSER2 PsN: SARMSER2 27 ships’’ were seeds planted at the summit, which could yield transformational capa- bilities in a short period of time. Several initiatives were launched that will help achieve NATO’s transformation from an alliance equipped for a defensive war on the homeland to a flexible, deployable, and sustainable force equipped for a full range of operations and capa- bilities, both inside and outside NATO’s boundaries. One initiative, the Prague Capabilities Commitment (PCC), furthers such a trans- formation by committing nations to fund specific capability shortfalls within the alli- ance. As part of the continuing effort to improve and develop new military capabili- ties for modern warfare in a high threat environment, individual allies have made firm and specific political commitments to improve their capabilities in the areas of enemy air defenses; strategic lift; air-to-air refueling; sea-lift; precision-guided muni- tions; UAVs and other key areas necessary for the alliance to be able to fulfill range of new missions. While there remain some significant shortfalls, this initiative is a giant step forward in recognizing that alliance capabilities must be improved. The establishment of the Allied Command for Transformation, replacing the old SACLANT, highlights NATO’s commitment to transforming its military structures and concepts. The current headquarters structures are, quite appropriately, under- going a critical review and evaluation to meet NATO’s needs of the 21st century. This new structure will include one strategic operational command headquartered in Europe and one strategic functional command for transformation and training headquartered in Norfolk, VA. One will focus on transformation and the other on operations. This newly emergent relationship between SACLANT and SACEUR will be extremely important to the alliance. It helps bridge the existing high-tech gap between European and U.S. Forces, while establishing a continuity of dialogue that will enhance effectiveness and reduce friction. The implementation of this command structure will likely have a very positive impact on the current resource strategy, which is ‘‘over capacity’’ in low tech and ‘‘under capacity’’ in high tech investment. The task at hand is converting one into the other. Additionally, it will give us more efficient and effective control of the training and employment of forces while main- taining the fundamental ties of the transatlantic link. NATO nations’ commitment to the Prague capabilities and interest to change their command structure, dem- onstrates member nations’ willingness to embrace the transformation pillars of in- stitutional reforms and technological innovation. NATO’s commitment to transformation is best illustrated by its enthusiasm to embrace the concept of the NATO Response Force (NRF). The NRF allows us to SHAPE, working to establish an initial element of the NATO Very High Readiness Force-Element in the not too distant future. The new element we are proposing is expeditionary in nature and complements the deployable and follow-on forces cur- rently articulated in the work-in-progress on a military concept for the NATO Re- sponse Force. The intent is to announce the establishment of this Very High Readi- ness Force-Element (VHRF–E) of the NATO Response Force by the Defense Ministe- rial later this year, and to establish an initial operating capability in the near term. The exact composition of the standing force and mission capabilities are currently subject to an ongoing SHAPE mission analysis. The initial concept is that the range of missions could include direct action; strategic and operational reconnaissance; de- terrent presence; non-combatant evacuation operations; humanitarian assistance/ disaster relief; and a wide range of peacekeeping operations. The intent is the creation of an NRF consisting of a technologically advanced, flexible, deployable, interoperable and sustainable force with land, sea, and air ele- ments, which will be capable of deploying rapidly (regionally or globally), as decided by the North Atlantic Council or Defense Planning Committee. The NATO Response Force should be built around a ‘‘tiered’’ level of readiness construct. The first tier would be a very agile, task-organized element that will be formed from land forces that nations already possess, an aviation component, and a very capable maritime component. Drawing on existing forces precludes the requirement to create or gen- erate new forces. The Very High Readiness Force-Element of the NRF, combined with a headquarters realigned from an existing headquarters, will create a nec- essary NATO capability in the near term a more conventional deployable force (2nd tier), with elements compatible to the first tier, would follow within a reasonable timeframe. The third tier would be the large follow-on force capable of responding to a major conflict. This tiered response provides a seamless, ‘‘effects-based,’’ scal- able capability that can help shape the international security environment across the full spectrum of crisis and conflict. This expeditionary element of the NATO Response Force will not necessarily be U.S. led, and, in fact, will be largely manned by European members of NATO. To date, Secretary General Lord Robertson, the Chairman of the Military Committee General Harald Kujat, the Permanent Representatives, Chiefs of Defense, the Na- VerDate 11-SEP-98 12:05 Jul 29, 2004 Jkt 000000 PO 00000 Frm 00030 Fmt 6633 Sfmt 6621 94843.042 SARMSER2 PsN: SARMSER2 28 tional Military Representatives at SHAPE, and the staff have all embraced this con- cept and endorse its rapid establishment. With the NRF, NATO will have a visible, credible capability to show legitimate progress in meeting modern security chal- lenges and attaining a level of relevancy that will have far reaching implications for the future of the alliance. Transformation This will be a difficult process, but it is very necessary. To achieve our goals we must be willing to embrace institutional change and a shift from our previously un- derstood paradigms. The current direction taken by the Service Chiefs coupled with the adaptation of the principles inherent to successful transformation, reinforces our efforts in this regard. The importance of moving this process along quickly is heightened in light of the current disposition of our facilities and installations. The average age of USEUCOM’s 36,435 facilities in our 499 installations is 32 years. It is worse in the family housing area where the average age of family housing in U.S. Army Europe is 48 years, in U.S. Air Forces Europe, it is 43 years, and in U.S. Navy Europe, it is 35 years. Inadequate resources provided for the paucity of funds committed to in- frastructure, since 1989, has resulted in 19,090 of our 32,100 government quarters being defined as being ‘‘inadequate.’’ Rather than invest significant sums of money into facilities, some of which may not be necessary to meet our future basing needs, nor to our force requirements, we can seize the moment to apply newer metrics of transformation to determine how best to spend, and where best to spend, our resources intended for our installa- tions in the new century. It is possible to achieve significant reductions in our old and costly infrastructure in the near future. Our current infrastructure evaluation program, coupled with im- proved technologies leveraged by the Services, will lead to further reductions. We have come a long way since the days of the Cold War, yet there is much to do. As we review our current infrastructure inventory and assess its merit through the lens of transformation we can shape our forces and develop a better basing strategy for our contemporary needs. We must remember the Cold War was not merely a U.S. victory, but a NATO vic- tory that demonstrated the tremendous strength, which can only be achieved through the solidarity of like-minded nations. I firmly believe that NATO remains the most important alliance in the world. Our strength is enhanced through trans- formational concepts that are integrated with, and complement the efforts of our al- lies. The development of the NATO Response Force, in concert with our effort to es- tablish a more robust expeditionary component, using a rotational model, strategi- cally deployed in-theater, will enable us to achieve the desired effect—security and prosperity for the next 50 years. CURRENT OPERATIONS The nation continues to call upon USEUCOM to conduct a wide range of oper- ations, many of which are still ongoing today. We do all of this with a reduced force presence, of almost 40 percent since the end of the Gulf War in 1992, and with only 8.4 percent of our Nation’s active duty military force. Many of these operations have been augmented through a myriad of cooperative measures with our European allies and this has bolstered our relationship with them. War on Terrorism USEUCOM has contributed significantly to, and continues to play a major role in, Operation Enduring Freedom (OEF). To support U.S. Central Command, U.S. Army Europe soldiers deployed to Headquarters U.S. Central Command, Kuwait, Uzbekistan, Turkey, Italy, and the Republic of Georgia. U.S. Army Europe airborne riggers built and configured the 2.4 million daily rations delivered to Afghanistan during the air campaign. Wounded U.S. and allied soldiers were transported for treatment to Incirlik Air Base, Turkey, and the Landstuhl Regional Medical Center in Germany. U.S. Army Europe intelligence specialists worked to provide timely, ac- curate information to our commanders and national leaders. Army Europe soldiers provided linguistic support for Maritime Intercept Operations (MIO) in the Medi- terranean Sea. The Air Force’s C–17 aircraft deployed to Ramstein Air Base, Ger- many, flew 197 humanitarian assistance airdrop sorties delivering 2,439,740 hu- manitarian daily rations, 1,200 tons of wheat, 78,160 blankets, 5,896 sets of cold weather gear, and 58,560 pounds of dates. MC–130 aircraft based at Incirlik Air Base, Turkey, flew 129 airdrop sorties and 6 airland sorties, delivering over 1,809,000 pounds of lethal and non-lethal supplies. Our KC–135 tankers provided refueling support to these missions. Additionally, we provided advanced basing sup- VerDate 11-SEP-98 12:05 Jul 29, 2004 Jkt 000000 PO 00000 Frm 00031 Fmt 6633 Sfmt 6621 94843.042 SARMSER2 PsN: SARMSER2 29 port to U.S. Central Command and U.S. Transportation Command at Incirlik, Tur- key; Burgas, Bulgaria; Ramstein and Rhein Main, Germany; and Souda Bay, Greece. We also assisted in the transfer of more than 600 detainees from the U.S. Central Command area of responsibility to Guantanamo Bay, Cuba. In addition to humanitarian and re-supply missions, USEUCOM continues to deploy personnel and equipment to support U.S. Central Command missions. USEUCOM personnel provided support to base operations, helicopter airlift, distinguished visitor air oper- ations, Joint Surveillance Target Attack Radar System missions, medical facilities and mortuary affairs. USEUCOM personnel also contributed to patriot air defense expertise and augmented a contingency response team establishing airfield oper- ations. Beyond Operation Enduring Freedom, USEUCOM has focused significant efforts to the fight against terrorism. In the Balkans, intelligence cooperation established within the contexts of Stabilization Force (SFOR) and Kosovo Force (KFOR) contin- ues to yield substantial leads for identifying and disrupting terrorists and their sup- porters. In October 2001, USEUCOM formed a dedicated Joint Planning Group (JPG) to conduct operational level planning for counter-terrorism operations. Since November 2001, we have invited seven countries to join the USEUCOM Counter Terrorism Force coalition. These countries have provided senior level planners to the JPG, integrating their national plans and capabilities into our counter-terrorism planning efforts. USEUCOM formed a Joint Interagency Coordination Group (JIACG) a little over a year ago to strengthen the relationship with critical U.S. Government agencies on terrorist activities. The JIACG exploits internal and external governmental agency capabilities for the command, assisting with the overall synchronization of non-mili- tary efforts with our military capabilities against terrorism. The JIACG has success- fully supported KFOR, SFOR, and maritime intercept operations through stream- lined inter-agency and coalition coordination. We created USEUCOM’s Joint Force Maritime Component Command, made up of USNAVEUR’s Sixth Fleet and allied NATO units, in December 2001 to conduct Maritime Intercept Operations (MIO) in the Mediterranean. Operation Active En- deavor is the NATO response to the U.S. request for support in this effort. To date, the command has hailed over 20,000 ships and boarded and searched 14 merchant vessels suspected of providing transportation, logistics, or financial support to des- ignated terrorist groups. NATO allies and other partner nations, working alongside U.S. naval units, have contributed significantly to this effort. NATO’s Standing Naval Force Atlantic and Standing Naval Force Mediterranean have tracked and monitored suspect vessels. Turkey, Italy, Algeria, Malta, and Croatia have con- ducted boardings of suspect vessels within their territorial waters at U.S. request in support of the war on terrorism. These boardings resulted in numerous arrests and, in at least one case, seizure of illegal arms and weapons components. Oper- ations have recently been expanded to include escorting allied non-combatant ves- sels through the Strait of Gibraltar. Finally, USEUCOM’s Security Cooperation program with allies and friends has produced tangible results since the tragic events of September 11. Years of coopera- tive activity—small unit training and interoperability exercises; equipment sales and transfers; staff exchange visits; and humanitarian projects—have laid the foun- dation for significant support for the war on terrorism from a majority of the coun- tries in USEUCOM’s area of responsibility. International Military Education and Training (IMET) in particular has been an invaluable tool in our efforts to encour- age and support fledgling democracies in this AOR. Your continued support of this program through the current budget is greatly appreciated. Increased intelligence sharing and improved staff coordination and planning are paying dividends as allied and friendly nations help protect U.S. forces and facilities, as well as identify and apprehend terrorist suspects. Operation Iraqi Freedom (OIF) USEUCOM has contributed significantly to, and continues to play a major role in, Operation Iraqi Freedom. Over 16,000 U.S. Army Europe soldiers have deployed to the U.S. Central Command area of responsibility (AOR) and are currently partici- pating in or supporting combat operations there. Most recently the 173rd Airborne Brigade from the U.S. Army Southern Europe Airborne Task Force (SETAF) trav- eled 2,200 miles to successfully complete a ‘‘combat jump’’ into northern Iraq. Euro- pean-based U.S. Patriot Air Defense systems have been deployed to Turkey and Israel reassuring these key allies of the United States’ reliability and concern for their defense. Wounded and injured U.S. and allied soldiers from the Iraqi Theater of Operations (ITO) are transported to the Landstuhl Regional Medical Center in Germany for treatment. European-based intelligence specialists from every branch VerDate 11-SEP-98 12:05 Jul 29, 2004 Jkt 000000 PO 00000 Frm 00032 Fmt 6633 Sfmt 6621 94843.042 SARMSER2 PsN: SARMSER2 30 of the U.S. Armed Services are providing timely, accurate, and actionable intel- ligence to U.S. Forces engaged in combat in Iraq, our commanders and national leaders. U.S. Air Force European-based C–130 aircraft are moving supplies and equipment bound for the ITO through Europe. Additionally, we are providing ad- vanced basing support to U.S. Central Command and U.S. Transportation Com- mand at Burgas, Bulgaria; Constanta, Romania; Ramstein and Rhein Main Air Bases, Germany; Souda Bay, Greece; Akrotiri, Crete; Aviano, Italy; Rota, Spain; and RAF Fairford, and RAF Mildenhall in the United Kingdom. U.S. Naval Forces in the European theater are flying combat sorties into Iraq from two U.S. Navy air- craft carriers stationed in the eastern Mediterranean. Surface and sub-surface units have launched Tomahawk Land Attack Missiles (TLAM) against targets in the ITO. Other U.S. Naval units on station in the eastern Mediterranean are providing early warning against potential missile attacks launched against Israel and U.S. Marine Forces Europe are providing the command element for the Joint Task Force to as- semble and marshal free Iraqi forces and their subsequent deployment. USEUCOM enjoys a robust and secure transportation network in Germany that provides a tremendous power projection capability. There exists no better combina- tion of rail, road, inland river, and air infrastructure system from which to deploy combat forces. This superb network leads to the largest and most mature seaports in the world. For Operation Iraqi Freedom, this mature infrastructure was instru- mental, and used substantially, in the deployment of 32,000 soldiers and their equipment to Kuwait, Turkey, Israel, Hungary, Romania and many other countries. The deployments continue as we speak. Additionally, the German government pro- vides large numbers of soldiers, police and border guard forces to help secure our installations, housing areas and communities. Given the multiplicity of deployment infrastructure and nodes, Germany provides a more rapid deployment infrastructure than many of our best platforms in CONUS and also has the advantage of being an ‘‘Ocean Closer.’’ Our global reach capability is maintained by five USAFE-supported European enroute infrastructure bases, enabling the U.S. to project power in both USEUCOM and USCENTCOM. With our forward presence, these bases provided a springboard from which U.S. forces could rapidly transition to support USCENTCOM efforts for Operation Iraqi Freedom. So far, this airlift bridge has moved over 26,165 pas- sengers and 45,188 short tons of equipment and provided a departure point for spe- cial operations aircraft, bombers, as well as tankers to support a myriad of coalition forces. In addition to our six main operating bases, four forward operating bases were established to support coalition operations. Most significantly, our forward presence enabled our B–52s operating from RAF Fairford to strike targets in Iraq with half the number of air refuelings and two-thirds the quantity of fuel. Ulti- mately, this presence enabled us to double our sortie generation rates by turning bombers and crews in 18 hours or less versus 48 hours from locations in the U.S. This was crucial not only to strike assets such as B–52s but also for C–17s operating out of Aviano AB, Italy, which dropped over 1,000 Army airborne troops into North- ern Iraq, opening up the northern front. Reduced timelines mitigate strains on PERSTEMPO, lessen impact on operational assets (wear and tear), and provide commanders greater flexibility on the battlefield. USEUCOM’s contribution to Operation Iraqi Freedom cannot be measured merely in terms of its supporting role during the war; it must also be viewed within the context of strategic initiatives that provide the foundation from which operational successes can be generated. Theater capabilities are the derivative of operational concepts that have been validated through combined and joint exercises. The Marine Corps’ strategic agility and operational reach capability was demonstrated during the Dynamic Mix exercise conducted in Spain last year by the 2nd Marine Expedi- tionary Brigade. The derivative of this exercise is Task Force Tarawa, which has played a vital role in the war in Iraq. Exercising strategic enablers in theater, such as the Maritime Positioning Squadron (MPS) assets of the 2nd Marine Expedition- ary Brigade, provides valuable lessons, increases efficiencies, and leads to oper- ational success. Operation Northern Watch (ONW) The Combined Joint Task Force Operation Northern Watch, consisting of forces from the U.S., Turkey, and the United Kingdom, continued, until recently, to en- force the Northern No-Fly Zone over Iraq and monitor Iraqi compliance with appli- cable U.N. Security Council Resolutions. These missions were dangerous; last year Iraqi air defense forces fired at coalition aircraft over 250 times. We responded 16 percent of the time, generally against those targets that were of the greatest threat. This mission has been terminated with the start of offensive operations in Iraq. VerDate 11-SEP-98 12:05 Jul 29, 2004 Jkt 000000 PO 00000 Frm 00033 Fmt 6633 Sfmt 6621 94843.042 SARMSER2 PsN: SARMSER2 31 Balkan Operations Operation Joint Forge continues to enforce the General Framework Agreement for Peace by providing a military presence in Bosnia-Herzegovina to deter hostilities, promote a stable environment, and support a transition to civil authority. Force numbers have been reduced from 60,000 (20,000 U.S. troops) when the mission began to just over 12,000 (1,800 U.S. troops) today. Europe as a whole has endeav- ored to live up to its personnel and financial support commitments to Balkan oper- ations. Currently, 35 nations contribute forces to SFOR, with 28 European nations comprising 75 percent of the combined force. The way ahead in Bosnia remains contingent upon the international community’s ability to help its citizens build viable civil institutions and promote the rule of law. Our focus in SFOR, among other things, should be to assist in developing a single unified military, out of the ethnically separate entity armed forces that exist today. I regret to report that such an effort is still in its infancy, and that, despite the great efforts of the senior representative, we still have much to do. Bosnia remains an open door to the west for the exportation of radical fundamentalism, crime, and lawlessness. U.S. Operation Joint Guardian remains the linchpin of NATO military operations in Kosovo. KFOR has just over 27,000 (3,000 U.S. troops), 7,000 less than last year. This force is drawn from 37 nations, including Russia. The Europeans have stepped up to the KFOR commitment with 31 European countries now deploying over 80 percent of the total force. Substantial progress returning the rule of law to Kosovo is allowing significant reduction of international forces. The Organization for Security and Cooperation in Europe’s Kosovo Police Service School has graduated over 5,200 multi-ethnic officers since its inception in September 1999. The U.N. policing plan is on target and con- tinues to put officer graduates alongside U.N. Mission in Kosovo (UNMIK) veteran international officers. The ultimate goal of this endeavor is to replace the U.N. po- lice force entirely, turning law enforcement responsibilities over to the Kosovars. While encouraging, it is too early to claim success at this time. Both SFOR and KFOR have been active in supporting the International Criminal Tribunal for the Former Yugoslavia (ICTY). In Bosnia-Herzegovina, ICTY issued 105 indictments within SFOR’s area of responsibility. Of these indictments, 82 have been detained or died leaving 23 that we are still seeking. The two most wanted war criminals of the period, Radovan Karadzic and Ratko Mladic have not yet been brought to justice for alleged war crimes in Bosnia. In February of this year, KFOR forces arrested three Kosovar Albanians inside Kosovo and police in Slovenia ar- rested a fourth. This marked the first time ICTY indictments were issued for alleged war crimes associated with the Kosovo conflict. One detainee was erroneously in- dicted by the ICTY, but this does not detract from the success of the operation. Macedonia has successfully met extraordinary challenges in its security environ- ment. Peace and stability have returned with only isolated incidents of violence. Borders were secured and the forces assigned to Operation Amber Fox successfully supported European monitors during national elections in September 2002. The elections were free and fair, and they have resulted in the peaceful transition of power to a new government, which is determined to make a fresh start domestically and in full cooperation with NATO. Operation Amber Fox ended in December 2002, and was replaced with the NATO led Operation Allied Harmony. As a result of re- duced U.S. requirements and manning levels in Macedonia, U.S. Army Europe has withdrawn all military personnel from Camp Able Sentry after 9 years of use as a U.S. operating base. The European Union assumed operational responsibility of this mission on 31 March. It has been renamed Operation Concordia. Georgia Train and Equip Mission (GTEP) USEUCOM, in coordination with the Departments of Defense and State, devel- oped GTEP in an effort to help Georgia provide better security and deal with transnational terrorists that may be operating in areas such as the Pankisi Gorge. The program is designed to enhance the capability of selected Georgian military units through a flexible, tailored program, to include both classroom and tactical in- struction. Up to 150 U.S. military personnel will be involved during the course of this program and our European allies have offered to contribute equipment to the Georgians. On 15 Dec 2002, Marine Forces Europe assumed the GTEP mission from the Special Operations Command Europe in order to release Special Forces for po- tential operations in support of the war on terrorism. GTEP will train approxi- mately 2,600 Georgian soldiers when the mission is completed in May 2004. GTEP and other security cooperation activities are examples of tactical programs that produce strategic dividends. VerDate 11-SEP-98 12:05 Jul 29, 2004 Jkt 000000 PO 00000 Frm 00034 Fmt 6633 Sfmt 6621 94843.042 SARMSER2 PsN: SARMSER2 32 THEATER SECURITY COOPERATION The value of security cooperation cannot be overstated. Since September 11, 2001, nearly every nation in the USEUCOM AOR has offered or provided intelligence, basing access, and over-flight rights, forces, and equipment as well as other forms of key support in our efforts to combat terrorism. The degree of support we have received is directly related to the effort and attention we have given to the security cooperation program that was in place well in advance of the current conflict. Our strategic vision is best achieved in concert with allies, partners, and friends, and USEUCOM aggressively pursues a number of programs that create conditions for coordinated, combined military action. Other security cooperation efforts in thea- ter include working with our friends throughout Africa to improve their peacekeep- ing capabilities and overall regional stability, increasing military cooperation with Russia, and developing new relationships with countries of the Caucasus and Cas- pian regions. These efforts have protected and strengthened important U.S. eco- nomic and security interests, while assuring our European friends that the U.S. re- mains committed to European security. Defense Cooperation and Security Assistance programs are vital to attaining for- eign policy and national security objectives. They promote interoperability with U.S. forces and help to build professional, capable militaries in friendly and allied na- tions. We support military security cooperation in partnership with 43 Offices of De- fense Cooperation, 25 Defense Attach Offices, and for countries that do not have those offices, directly with 24 U.S. embassy country teams. • Foreign Military Financing (FMF) provides critical resources for mod- ernizing the military forces of our friends and allies and remains an essen- tial instrument of U.S. influence during the dynamic transformation of Cen- tral and Eastern Europe and key African partners. FMF assists nations without the means to acquire U.S. military goods, services, and training and provides access to U.S. expertise in defense restructuring and manage- ment. • Likewise, Foreign Military Sales (FMS) of $2.86 billion for fiscal year 2002 demonstrate the continued primacy of Trans-Atlantic defense relation- ships to U.S. security interests. FMS encourages interoperability between forces within USEUCOM’s area of responsibility, helps modernize the militaries of new friends and part- ners, and maintains a strong U.S. presence in the development and imple- mentation of the Prague Capabilities Commitment (PCC). USEUCOM, the Defense Security Cooperation Agency, and the military Services have en- sured that the fiscal year 2004 President’s budget request reflects USEUCOM’s priorities. • International Military Education and Training (IMET) is one of our best tools for promoting long-term beneficial change in foreign militaries, be- cause it allows foreign military and civilian leaders to encounter firsthand the American civil-military culture. It focuses on professional development, the role of the military in a democratic society and English language train- ing. In fiscal year 2002, the program trained approximately 1,700 military and civilian students both in the U.S. and by Mobile Education Teams in the host country. In Sub-Saharan Africa, IMET is particularly important. It provides educational opportunities that emphasize and reinforce civilian control of the military and promote domestic stability in a region where ar- mies are often the principal organizing factor in society. The increase in funding for fiscal year 2004 is absolutely the right course of action, provid- ing an invaluable return for a relatively small investment. The George C. Marshall European Center for Security Studies is at the forefront of our regional security cooperation efforts in Europe as well as Eurasia. Jointly funded by the United States and Germany, the Marshall Center strengthens secu- rity cooperation among European and Eurasian nations and serves as an indispen- sable institution for bilateral, regional, and multilateral activities with military and civilian leaders throughout the theater. The Marshall Center is also an important part of our interaction with Russia, the largest participating nation with 717 grad- uates, followed by Romania (662), Bulgaria (615), and Ukraine (308). The Marshall Center’s 2,400 course graduates and 7,700 conference participants across 49 coun- tries is one prime reason the U.S. has succeeded in building coalitions against ter- rorism. Marshall Center resident course graduates boast an excellent record of mov- ing into positions of increasing influence in their militaries and governments. Alum- ni now include over 137 Ministers/Deputy Ministers of Defense, Chiefs/Deputy Chiefs of Services, cabinet officials, parliamentarians, ambassadors, and flag offi- cers. VerDate 11-SEP-98 12:05 Jul 29, 2004 Jkt 000000 PO 00000 Frm 00035 Fmt 6633 Sfmt 6621 94843.042 SARMSER2 PsN: SARMSER2 33 The NATO School (SHAPE) is a USEUCOM supported activity under the oper- ational control of Supreme Headquarters Allied Powers Europe. Its primary mission is to conduct courses, training and seminars in support of NATO strategy and pol- icy, to include cooperation with non-NATO countries. During 2002, the NATO School educated nearly 8,000 students from 50 nations and conducted 144 iterations of 57 different courses, 16 conferences, and 9 mobile training events, including missions to Uzbekistan, Tunisia, Algeria, Azerbaijan, Croatia, and Slovenia. In 2003, the school will respond to NATO enlargement by deploying up to 12 mobile training and education teams. The NATO school responded aggressively to the terrorist attacks on the U.S. and the alliance’s invocation of Article V by adapting or developing courses in counterproliferation, counterterrorism, special operations, civil emergency planning, civil-military cooperation, weapons of mass destruction, and force plan- ning. NATO has committed to expand the facilities, infrastructure, and manning under the NATO Security Investment Program. USEUCOM and the National Defense University established the Africa Center for Strategic Studies in December 1999. The Africa Center continues to provide a series of seminars, symposia, conferences, and outreach programs designed to promote sta- ble governance and democratic values in the African defense and security sectors. Supporting the war on terrorism, the Africa Center is developing an agenda that encourages regional cooperation. It visibly confirms America’s long-term commit- ment to work with our partners in Africa, while enhancing our national strategy through relatively low cost, high-impact security cooperation opportunities. Africa will be of increasing concern and importance in the region in the near future. The program formerly known as the Africa Crisis Response Initiative has evolved into a more focused, tailored program, the Africa Contingency Operations Training and Assistance program. Various African partners have agreed upon the program as the appropriate next step in preparing African militaries to deal with the full range of peace support operation challenges. It has two primary objectives: (1) to enable Sub-Saharan African militaries to develop and improve sustainable capac- ities to deploy and conduct peace support and humanitarian relief operations and (2) to improve African militaries interoperability in order to facilitate sub-regional and regional operations. USEUCOM supports the addition of new partner nations such as Botswana, South Africa, Nigeria, Tanzania, Zambia, Namibia, Niger, Cam- eroon, and Gabon and continues to assist current partners in sustaining proficiency. The mission of the Near East South Asia Center for Strategic Studies (NESA CSS) is to enhance stability of the region by providing a professional academic envi- ronment to address regional issues, develop mutual understanding, strengthen re- gional partnerships, and foster regional cooperation. Like the Africa and Marshall Centers, the NESA CSS provides a low-cost, high-return engagement opportunity that solidifies America’s commitment to work with Near East and South Asian part- ners in a way that supports our national strategy and objectives. Although OSD pro- vides oversight of NESA and the Africa Center, USEUCOM provides input on topics to ensure the course of study supports our regional objectives. The State Partnership Program is an important security cooperation program car- ried out by the National Guard. This program matches emerging democracies in the AOR with partner states in the U.S. It assists partner nations in making the transi- tion from authoritarian to democratic governments. Currently, there are 20 states partnered with 18 foreign nations in the AOR and this past year’s program was, again, an unqualified success. National Guard soldiers and airmen conducted over 250 events with partner nations contributing to USEUCOM’s security cooperation efforts. New partnerships were established between Azerbaijan and Oklahoma, Ar- menia and Kansas, and Bosnia-Herzegovina and Maryland. The establishment of these new partnerships, and the continued success of previous partnerships, will greatly assist USEUCOM in achieving security cooperation goals. Partnerships that began as focused military-to-military contacts within the part- nerships have blossomed into associations encompassing nearly all levels of soci- ety—unit partnerships, sister cities programs, student exchanges, scientific collabo- rations, medical exchanges and economic initiatives. The ability of the National Guard to orchestrate the pairing of State or local governments, organizations and associations from a respective U.S. State with corresponding entities in the partner nation is the key strength of the State Partnership Program. The program has been so successful in the Central and Eastern European regions that USEUCOM is working to expand the program to Africa. Although the chal- lenges faced by African nations differ from those of Central or Eastern Europe, many nations are ready for the opportunity that the State Partnership Program pro- vides. For a modest investment, we can provide candidate nations access to the ex- pertise of the National Guard military organization in a State plus an entire State government infrastructure ranging from public health to wildlife management. The VerDate 11-SEP-98 12:05 Jul 29, 2004 Jkt 000000 PO 00000 Frm 00036 Fmt 6633 Sfmt 6621 94843.042 SARMSER2 PsN: SARMSER2 34 program will serve as a tremendous complement to our traditional African security cooperation activities. The State Partnership Program affords USEUCOM continued access to emerging nations and enables us to shape the conditions for future suc- cesses. North Atlantic Treaty Organization NATO will remain the preeminent European security institution. NATO’s dem- onstrated willingness to embrace transformation will have far reaching implications that will enable us to attain a much higher degree of interoperability while provid- ing an impressive number of capable and relevant partners able to respond and meet security challenges in the 21st century. New Members Seven nations—Bulgaria, Estonia, Latvia, Lithuania, Romania, Slovakia, and Slo- venia—received invitations to join the alliance during the Prague summit. The rati- fication process for membership is expected to be finalized at the next NATO sum- mit in May 2004. These invitees are already contributors to NATO operations in the Balkans, Afghanistan, and the war on terrorism and are expected to augment NATO’s future capabilities. New Relationships NATO is forging productive ties with Russia, Ukraine, the Caucasus, Central Asia, non-aligned nations, the Mediterranean Dialogue Countries, and the European Union. Developing security cooperation architectures with Russia and Ukraine promises to diffuse tensions and provides an effective means of pooling resources in the war against terrorism as well as in other areas of common interest and mutual benefit. NATO has engaged with the Russian military and political leadership and has rou- tinely conducted high-level consultations on a wide range of security issues with the Russian Foreign Ministry, Defense Ministry and General Staff. This effort became even more robust with the creation of the NATO-Russia Council last May. This council discusses such issues as counter-terrorism; controlling the spread of nuclear, chemical and biological weapons; missile defense; peacekeeping and management of regional crises; civil defense; search-and-rescue at sea; military reforms; and arms control. NATO also established Military Liaison Missions in Moscow and Kiev to im- prove communications and facilitate day-to-day coordination of activities. NATO is working to develop and implement a robust mil-mil program with Russia built around key interoperability objectives. This will be a key effort and focus of atten- tion for the NATO military in 2003. USEUCOM’s support for NATO’s Partnership for Peace (PfP) Program continues to be an integral component of the changing European security architecture. Such substantive relationships have enabled cooperation in responding to the new secu- rity challenges, including terrorism. In addition, the Presidential waiver on restric- tions under Section 907 of the Freedom Support Act has allowed assistance to Azer- baijan and Armenia. Partnership countries in Europe, the Caucasus, and Central Asia seek closer cooperation with NATO and familiarity with NATO procedures. PfP’s significant role is illustrated by the substantial contribution of partner coun- tries to the alliance’s peace support operations in Bosnia and Kosovo, which in turn, reduces the requirement for U.S. troops. KEY THEATER INVESTMENT NEEDS Antiterrorism/Force Protection We continue to enhance our security posture both through physical site improve- ments at our installations and by improved intelligence gathering, analysis, and sharing with our coalition partners and law enforcement agencies. Our programs and posture have increased dramatically in recent years in the areas of public awareness, training, physical security upgrades and formal agreements with U.S. ambassadors that clearly delineate force protection responsibilities for DOD person- nel throughout the theater. We have established a USEUCOM Antiterrorism/Force Protection Technology Working Group to coordinate component actions, and we ac- tively seek technologies that can enhance our force protection efforts to reduce, where possible, our extensive manpower requirements. USAREUR, in partnership with the Defense Data Management Center, began development of an integrated In- stallation Access Control System that will be operationally tested in the spring of 2003 at two installations before initial fielding begins throughout Germany. USAREUR has also fielded four Consequence Management Assessment Teams capa- ble of providing on-scene assessments of chemical, biological, radiological, nuclear, and high-yield explosive hazards. Each team, under the operational control of the VerDate 11-SEP-98 12:05 Jul 29, 2004 Jkt 000000 PO 00000 Frm 00037 Fmt 6633 Sfmt 6621 94843.042 SARMSER2 PsN: SARMSER2 35 on-scene commander, provides a technical assessment to establish situational awareness and identifies requirements for follow-on forces. The team advises Host Nation ‘‘first responders’’ regarding immediate appropriate actions and facilitates re- quests for additional assistance. During the last year, our military service components greatly benefited from the Defense Emergency Response Fund and fiscal year 2002 supplemental funds, and they were able to complete several needed security site improvements. In addition, we received $2.2 million from the fiscal year 2003 CJCS Combating Terrorism Read- iness Initiatives Fund. As we execute the war on terrorism, it is imperative that we continue to adequately resource our critical force protection manpower and secu- rity requirements to allow us to meet the many challenges of the future and protect our personnel and facilities. We will invest wisely in defense intelligence transformation efforts, and address programmatic shortfalls in intelligence core mission capabilities. Sustaining the $9 million intelligence supplemental funds required in fiscal year 2003 for additional analytic manpower and data base enhancements is critical to our success in the war on terrorism. Our highest intelligence priority remains having sufficient numbers of well-trained personnel. Theater Command, Control, Communications and Computers (C4) Modernization Theater C4 infrastructure is one of our most critical concerns. The ability to com- mand and control sets us apart from every other military but we must continue to improve information superiority and dominance. USEUCOM looks forward to ad- vancements in C4 capabilities from Department of Defense-sponsored programs like Teleport, Global Information Grid Bandwidth Expansion, and the Mobile User Ob- jective System. Focused attention upon our own tactical networks, the Defense In- formation Infrastructure, and the transmission systems supporting our fixed and de- ployed installations will enable us to harness the increased bandwidth capacity, im- prove interoperability, guarantee network assurance, and enable information man- agement capabilities required by the warfighter. Intelligence, Surveillance, and Reconnaissance The imperatives of the war on terrorism, coupled with the dearth of intelligence, surveillance, and reconnaissance assets due to global reallocation, provide clear re- quirements to maximize the efficiency of the remaining assets and develop flexibil- ity. A robust and modernized joint command, control, communications, computers, intelligence, surveillance, and reconnaissance (C4ISR) capability is a top priority that supports the warfighter’s need for a common operational picture and the com- mander’s requirement for predictive battle-space analysis. Leveraging technology will allow this transformational effort to coordinate forces through blue, red, and gray force tracking. Joint C4ISR is a primary focus in USEUCOM’s Integrated Pri- orities List and Joint Quarterly Readiness Review reports. The architecture linking our C4ISR assets must become fully interoperable, connecting key sensors command and control nodes and shooters through a global grid. C4ISR infrastructure must provide deployable data, voice, video, and web access to support designated joint force component commanders. DOD initiatives to provide unified commanders with organic, multi-discipline in- telligence collection capabilities—to include airborne collectors such as unmanned aerial vehicles and measurement and signature intelligence capabilities—coupled with flexible, deployable exploitation architectures are particularly helpful. We ap- preciate your support for these and similar initiatives that enhance our intelligence, surveillance, and reconnaissance architecture. Theater Training Requirements Components’ fund support, not only their Service and Joint training requirements, but also fund the training requirements of the Combatant Commander’s operational headquarters. Previously, the cost to the Components supporting this headquarters was minimal. However, with the establishment of a permanent crisis action team, joint planning group, joint interagency coordination group and, with the pending for- mation of the standing joint force headquarters, the costs of supporting HQ USEUCOM’s own training have become very significant. Service joint training oper- ations and maintenance incremental funding has not traditionally been structured to accommodate these costs. The continuing use of Service Component funds to sup- port higher headquarters overburdens already stressed budgets and leaves little near-term flexibility to accommodate shifting priorities during execution. Infrastructure In a memorandum dated 1 August 2001 to the Chairman of the Joint Chief of Staff, the Secretary of Defense requested that Combatant Commanders review their VerDate 11-SEP-98 12:05 Jul 29, 2004 Jkt 000000 PO 00000 Frm 00038 Fmt 6633 Sfmt 6621 94843.042 SARMSER2 PsN: SARMSER2 36 overseas basing requirements and study opportunities for joint use of land and fa- cilities by the Services. This Overseas Basing Requirements Study was completed in March 2002 and it included the development of a Real Property Inventory, an evaluation tool the command was previously without. Analysis of the Real Property Inventory determined that 80 percent or 402 of the existing 499 installations in the- ater were ‘‘enduring’’ (Tier I)—that is to say, vital to the execution of U.S. strate- gies, and worthy of regular funding/improvement, without which U.S. missions could risk failure. It was established that future MILCON expenditures were both appro- priate and necessary for these installations. Our fiscal year 2004 military construc- tion program focuses on these enduring installations and provides vast improvement for 80 percent of the infrastructure deemed necessary by our basing studies. The study found there were 14 percent (68 installations) that were ‘‘important’’ to thea- ter operations (Tier II) and the command would not voluntarily choose to live with- out; however, they could be returned to host nations should circumstances dictate. What is important to glean from this study is that 6 percent (29 installations) were judged to be not ‘‘enduring’’ (Tier III), or of ‘‘non vital’’ importance to the accomplish- ment of our missions. All but four of the Tier III installations are in the closure process. The component commanders are conducting their final review on the four remaining installations and a decision to move on these closures will be made short- ly. Tier III installations only receive minimal sustainment (operations and mainte- nance) funding to keep them useful and safe until they are closed. They do not re- ceive any MILCON funding. All of USEUCOM’s projects in the fiscal year 2004 President’s budget are for Tier I installations. USEUCOM is using the Overseas Basing Requirement Study as a benchmark, which will enable us to align our infra- structure with our new strategy. It is important to understand the criteria used to evaluate U.S. strategies. The March 2002 study met the strategy requirements set forth for that study which was primarily for fixed forces. A fixed force strategy is very different from a strategy using rotational forces working and training out of semi-permanent expeditionary bases. We have begun a new evaluation of our basing requirements, using different criteria, with an operational premise of employing some rotational units in-theater. I have asked Deputy Commander of USEUCOM and our Component Commanders to vigorously review and evaluate our current infrastructure program to ensure that funds requested for European infrastructure will be for ‘‘strategically enduring’’ fa- cilities which support a strategic vision of blending our strategic bases with an array of semi-permanent forward operating bases in order to achieve a greater stra- tegic effect, covering our new requirements, at reduced expense. As important as they are, the pressing requirements associated with infrastruc- ture and maintenance must not distract us from our greatest challenge—that of adapting our strategic posture to the demands of the complex international security landscape that confronts us. CONCLUSION The United States European Command is engaged fully in representing our na- tional interests in 93 sovereign nations, and in fulfilling our responsibilities within the NATO Alliance. That we are engaged in a dynamic, challenging, and vitally im- portant theater, comprised of roughly one half of the nations on Earth, is beyond question. Yet, despite the energy and vitality of our many and diverse missions, we find ourselves at an important crossroads, literally between two centuries. The NATO Alliance is changing and we perceive that the nature of our own American presence in this most important theater must also evolve in order to shape the con- ditions under which we can continue to be a nation of great influence in an uncer- tain world. We look forward to working with the members of this committee as we further define the nature and extent of the evolution of the European Command. We will also look forward to the advice and assistance of each of the Services in determining our course for the future, and we will reach out to our allies to reaffirm our solidar- ity with our oldest friends, all the while reaching out to new members of the alli- ance and beyond. Thank you for the opportunity to appear before you today. I look forward to re- sponding to your questions. Chairman WARNER. Thank you, General Jones. It is an excellent statement. I know your profound respect for your predecessor, General Ral- ston, but I wish to commend you on some initiatives that you have said in this statement today and other times about how you wish VerDate 11-SEP-98 12:05 Jul 29, 2004 Jkt 000000 PO 00000 Frm 00039 Fmt 6633 Sfmt 6602 94843.042 SARMSER2 PsN: SARMSER2 37 to leave your own imprimatur on this important post to which the President has assigned you. General JONES. Thank you, sir. Chairman WARNER. This hearing today as we open it, we have very much in mind the families who have lost their loved ones in this conflict, the families who must care for the wounded, the sick, and most particularly those families who are still concerned about those that could be prisoners of war. The Senate expressed its sen- timents yesterday with regard to the prisoners of war, Mr. Sec- retary, and I take note of that. Furthermore, as we are conducting this hearing on post-conflict Iraq, by no means do we not take into consideration the messages that have been sent by not only the President, but Secretary Rums- feld and yourself, as well as the CENTCOM Commander, that this fight is still under way. As we are holding this hearing members of the coalition forces are enduring risk as they bravely carry out the mission. Now, Mr. Secretary, we learned here shortly, in the last few hours, that the heads of state from Russia, France, and Germany are going to meet. Did you have any consultation with regard to this meeting taking place? What can you tell us about that meet- ing? Thus far it has been my observation, I think a correct one, that our President and the Prime Minister of Great Britain have not made any references of recrimination for those nations that did not join us at the time when we were hopeful that the Security Council could have taken an action that could have avoided the use of force. But that did not take place, for reasons we all know, and also the very tragic chapter in the history of NATO when members objected to NATO providing the security that a member nation, Turkey, felt was necessary. So with that background, what can you tell us about this meet- ing? Secretary WOLFOWITZ. First, just to make the record clear, ulti- mately it was only one member that objected. We went to a mecha- nism that we had used a great deal in the 1980s and early 1990s, I think, of the decision at 18, and we did get the assistance to Tur- key. I think the discussions with those countries about whatever their plans are in Moscow obviously are being conducted by the State Department and I think the only comment I would like to make is I hope that they will think about how they can contribute to help- ing the Iraqi people get on their feet and build a better country; there is a great deal that they can do. I hope, for example, they will think about the very large debts that come from money that was lent to the dictator to buy weapons and to build palaces and to build instruments of repression. I think they ought to consider whether it might not be appropriate to for- give some or all of that debt so the new Iraqi government is not burdened with it. There is a great deal that they can do and I know we would wel- come their help and I imagine the Iraqi people would welcome their help. This is a time to think about the future. VerDate 11-SEP-98 12:05 Jul 29, 2004 Jkt 000000 PO 00000 Frm 00040 Fmt 6633 Sfmt 6602 94843.042 SARMSER2 PsN: SARMSER2 38 Chairman WARNER. I looked over your written statement and lis- tened carefully to your oral delivery with respect to the United Na- tions, and you say the precise role of the U.N. will be determined through coordination with the Iraqi people themselves, coalition members, and U.N. officials. The Secretary of State said that they would be a partner. But it would be my hope, just speaking for my- self, that the partners that would manage the early stages post- conflict would be those of the coalition nations, primarily the United States and Great Britain. Am I not correct in that? Secretary WOLFOWITZ. You are absolutely correct in that, and I think what we are trying to avoid is a situation that we have seen in other places in the world where Iraq might become a sort of per- manent ward of the international community. There is no reason for that to happen. This is a country that has every capability of administering itself and handling basic functions, and I believe cre- ating a viable government. The more quickly that happens, the better; and in the early stages when things like food and water and medicine and basic services have to be delivered, the coalition has a responsibility to make sure that that happens efficiently. So your description is ex- actly right, but we see the U.N. as a very important partner in that exercise. Chairman WARNER. It is the coalition that will have to provide the basic security, indeed for a period of time the essential of a po- lice force, in small towns as well as large cities. That could not be provided by the U.N. in any way. Secretary WOLFOWITZ. Certainly, it cannot be overseen by the U.N., I would say if the U.N. can help in places where it might be useful. Chairman WARNER. You have stated those places very clearly where they can. Secretary WOLFOWITZ. Right. Chairman WARNER. They will be a partner in that context. Secretary WOLFOWITZ. I would note, Mr. Chairman, we are hear- ing from the British that already some of the police are coming back to work in Basra and seem to be acceptable to the local popu- lace. If that were to prove true, for example, that is the best kind of way to proceed. Chairman WARNER. I think the employment of the clerics, the re- ligious establishment, to help us has been an interesting chapter. Turning to the NATO, speaking again for myself, I had some misgivings about the last round. This time I am very supportive. One of the reasons that I have become a supporter is the doctrine, the niche doctrine, whereby these new nations each have some rec- ognized capability that is needed by NATO right now. They cannot be expected to provide, and I have heard it described as, a 360-de- gree military, that is air, land, and sea forces; rather, that they should take and draw upon such expertise as they now have and have an interest in developing to contribute to NATO. Could you expound on that? Secretary WOLFOWITZ. Absolutely. I think General Jones alluded to the fact that we are no longer dealing in a world where the main requirement is for the large tank formations in the central plains VerDate 11-SEP-98 12:05 Jul 29, 2004 Jkt 000000 PO 00000 Frm 00041 Fmt 6633 Sfmt 6602 94843.042 SARMSER2 PsN: SARMSER2 39 of Europe to counter massive Soviet invasion. We are talking about generally much more agile and flexible and deployable forces. I was interested to learn that not only do the Romanians, for ex- ample, have some very capable Special Forces who deployed to Af- ghanistan, but apparently the Romanians were able to deploy them themselves, which was an interesting point. We see a great need for, unfortunately, chemical-biological pro- tection capabilities. The Czechs are one of the countries that have a very real capability in that regard. I would note that the Czech Republic is one of our coalition partners that is actually participat- ing in Operation Iraqi Freedom. So there are specific capabilities where small countries can make a big difference. Chairman WARNER. Good. I thank you. General Jones, you and I have talked privately on this subject, and it is quite clear that the concept that NATO could provide, should we say, some security forces in the Iraq situation post-con- flict is one that deserves consideration. There would have to be ex- tensive political consultations between the NATO member coun- tries. But in the event that the political consultations resulted in an expression of interest, you as the overall commander, could you give us today your opinion as to the capability of NATO to under- take such a mission if called upon by the North Atlantic Council (NAC)? General JONES. If tasked with the proper political guidance, as the Allied Commander my immediate challenge would be to re- spond very quickly with a number, a range of options, which is a traditional way of the modalities of NATO. Clearly, one of the ad- vantages in the geographical context is the location of the conflict on the borders of NATO itself. Presuming the willing partnership of all of the nations, to include that of Turkey, you certainly have an appropriate route of advance into the region that we are talking about. NATO has a lot of capability that it can bring to bear, ranging from peacekeeping to humanitarian relief operations to stability op- erations. There could be any number of things that, given the prop- er legal and international support of the alliance, we could do mili- tarily. I have submitted, in response to political guidance, a range of options for the possible employment of NATO forces in Afghani- stan, as an example. So clearly the membership of the alliance is thinking in regional goals, in regional terms, and in global terms as well. Chairman WARNER. I thank you, General. I think internation- alism in both the Afghanistan AOR as well as the post-conflict Iraq is a very worthy goal to achieve and I think, should NATO decide to do it, it would provide a very valuable addition to international- ize that situation. Senator Levin. Senator LEVIN. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. General Jones, can you tell us whether or not the strains that exist at the civilian leadership level of NATO are felt at all in the military leadership? General JONES. Generally not, Senator Levin. The relationships among the member nations’ militaries have been extraordinarily VerDate 11-SEP-98 12:05 Jul 29, 2004 Jkt 000000 PO 00000 Frm 00042 Fmt 6633 Sfmt 6602 94843.042 SARMSER2 PsN: SARMSER2 40 strong and consistent throughout, certainly throughout my brief pe- riod there. In consultation with General Ralston in my turnover with him he also expressed the fact that, even in difficult times where diplomatically or politically there is disagreement, the com- munications and dialogue between the member nations of NATO at the military level remain very strong. Senator LEVIN. Secretary Wolfowitz, President Bush and Prime Minister Blair have made a statement now twice that they plan to seek United Nations Security Council support of a post-conflict ad- ministration for Iraq. I think there is great wisdom in that commit- ment, both in terms of creating worldwide confidence in such an in- terim government and also in sharing the burdens that the post- conflict reconstruction will place on all of us. Yet we continue to hear reports that the Department of Defense is somehow or other more reluctant than the State Department to provide that central role for the United Nations. Is there any accu- racy in those reports? Secretary WOLFOWITZ. I would add that to a large pile of inac- curate reports, Senator. We agree very strongly that we need the U.N. We need the U.N. functional agencies that have historically played a very large role in things like refugee assistance and hu- manitarian relief. In fact, the World Food Program has already en- gaged what you alluded to as one of the most important functions, which is helping to mobilize international support for the Iraqi peo- ple. There are a great many countries that have indicated a will- ingness and desire to contribute, and of that a number have said it will either be necessary or at least desirable if it is part of a U.N. effort. The World Bank and the International Monetary Fund (IMF) can play important roles and, again, for them it is important that it have a U.N. endorsement. Senator LEVIN. Do you include in your comments U.N. endorse- ment of the interim government? Would you include that? Secretary WOLFOWITZ. Certainly that would be a desirable thing, yes. Senator LEVIN. Mr. Secretary, can you tell us how the Office of Reconstruction and Humanitarian Assistance is structured and how it will include Iraqi leaders? Secretary WOLFOWITZ. It is structured really in parallel with the various Iraqi ministries and it is set up to provide coalition advis- ers, and not just Americans. We are talking to the British, the Aus- tralians, and the Poles about contributing advisers as well, who would help in the initial oversight of the ministries, to figure out what changes need to be made. Our hope is that in some of the more basic ministries, like health or electricity, that the issue of Baathist influence is not going to be a major issue. Hopefully, they can be treated in a fairly technical way and be allowed to function and continue providing basic serv- ices to the Iraqi people. Our goal is to have as much of an Iraqi administration continue to function as is consistent with creating an atmosphere that is free and where people clearly understand that the terror apparatus of the old regime is gone. Obviously, there are certain ministries that have to be dismantled completely, but that is going to be the exception. VerDate 11-SEP-98 12:05 Jul 29, 2004 Jkt 000000 PO 00000 Frm 00043 Fmt 6633 Sfmt 6602 94843.042 SARMSER2 PsN: SARMSER2 41 Senator LEVIN. On each parallel office that we have, will any of those offices that are parallel to an Iraqi ministry be headed by an Iraqi? Secretary WOLFOWITZ. It might be headed by an Iraqi-American, but our notion is that over time as it develops increasing com- petence and increasing legitimacy the Iraqi Interim Authority could have Iraqis appointed to head ministries, and that over time even- tually you would have all of the ministries reporting directly to the Iraqi Interim Authority and run by Iraqis. But I think it is going to be a handoff kind of procedure. Senator LEVIN. General Jones. Secretary WOLFOWITZ. I guess I should emphasize, that is our no- tion at the moment. When we get on the ground, it will probably change. Senator LEVIN. General Jones, I noted something in my opening statement, and you and I have talked about this on a number of occasions. Namely, I have been concerned for a long time about the lack of a mechanism to suspend the membership of a NATO nation that somehow or other turns bad and no longer is committed to fundamental principles or values in the NATO Alliance—democ- racy, individual liberty, and the rule of law. We hope that will never happen and this in no way relates to the particular can- didates for accession at the moment. But as the alliance gets larger and larger and grows to 26 nations, which we hope it will, the pos- sibility that could some day happen increases just statistically. So the question is whether or not there should not at least be consideration for suspension of that member so that we avoid such a member having a veto over NATO operations. This question also relates to the question of consensus. We saw that problem relative to the defense of Turkey in recent months. Assuming we approve the enlargement, which again I think is likely and desirable, that consensus is going to be more and more difficult to achieve with the larger number of nations in NATO. Can you comment on whether or not it might be desirable to have some discussion about that increasing statistical probability? General JONES. The decision to embark on that kind of dialogue, of course, will be a political decision made by the leadership of the member nations. As the Allied Commander, it would be probably inappropriate for me to make a recommendation on that score, ex- cept to say that obviously as memberships expand and historical times change, it is useful, like the military is trying to do in sup- port of NATO, to reexamine the basic foundations of the ingoing agreements to the way the alliance works. We are transforming the military capability of NATO. There is no question about the fact that it has to be done and there is a cer- tain eagerness to do that. At the political level, our leaders will have to come to those kinds of decisions on their own for their own reasons in order to make sure that a very important institution has a functioning framework necessary to be successful in the 21st cen- tury. The penalty for any institution, military or civilian, not taking into account its relevance to the environment and the time that it is in is that it is subjected to the possibility of new alliances and VerDate 11-SEP-98 12:05 Jul 29, 2004 Jkt 000000 PO 00000 Frm 00044 Fmt 6633 Sfmt 6602 94843.042 SARMSER2 PsN: SARMSER2 42 new coalitions circumventing the framework for which the original institution was created, and that would be regrettable. Senator LEVIN. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. Chairman WARNER. Senator Inhofe. Senator INHOFE. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. Chairman WARNER. Before you proceed, Senator. Mr. Secretary, this committee will require considerably more detailed explanations of, for example, the concepts that you currently have for the in- terim government, the responsibilities of General Garner and what the organization will be, and the overall management by the coali- tion partners for the time being of the post-war situation. We just need some documents. Secretary WOLFOWITZ. We can give you that for the record. [The information referred to follows:] CONCEPTS FOR INTERIM GOVERNMENT OF IRAQ At present, there are several options for governing Iraq. There is much uncer- tainty regarding what will be left of Saddam Hussein’s government by the time ORHA reaches Baghdad. The conditions that will evolve in the country following the arrival of ORHA are also very unclear. Due to this uncertainty, no single option for interim government has been settled upon. What is clear right now is that two initial steps must be taken, regardless of the ultimate choice. The first is to provide for the immediate needs of the populace: water, food, shelter, and medical attention. The second is to prepare the government ministries to resume operation. The latter step is necessary because, we believe, no one knows better how to run Iraq than the Iraqis, so it is the most likely path to success in the effort to establish a working government. It is also the most likely path to success in the first phase mission (the ORHA mission) which is to prevent the immediate post-war disintegration of Iraq as a state. Therefore, it is inevitable that the first step toward establishing any interim gov- ernment will be the reconstitution of as many of Iraq’s 24 ministries as necessary. Each of these reconstitution efforts will have to be largely self-contained, reporting to ORHA leadership only as needed. Some mechanism will be required to ensure that reconstitution efforts do not inadvertently also reconstitute the Baath party’s means of observation and control within each ministry. High level or important Baathi will have to be identified and replaced. Reconstruction efforts other than the reconstitution of ministries will largely con- cern the restoration of public services. At some point, those will have to be rec- onciled with the ministries that would normally oversee such services. However, that will not be necessary until the ministries are well on their way to full oper- ation. The interim government, then, will be of at least two kinds. First, there will be an initial period in which the people are being cared for while the parts and pieces of a government are assembled. Then there will be a second period, in which the assembled parts are brought together under executive direction of some sort, and assume the functions of caring for the people. This executive body will have to be almost totally manned by coalition personnel, rather than by Iraqis, and it will not be representative of the Iraqi population at all. However, it might take advice from elders, clerics, and other popular or traditional leaders. Inevitably, an Iraqi executive will have to be designed by Iraqis, with coalition assistance. This might be done in the context of a national constitution. Any such executive design or constitution would have to be ratified in some manner before it could be implemented. This activity might take place during the second period. It is foreseeable that a third period of interim government might be required in order for the Iraqi executive to assume control from the coalition. Such a hand-off will likely require an impartial ‘‘umpire,’’ which might be some as yet unnamed mul- tinational organization. The chief concern during this period will be validation of the checks and balances which will be needed to keep one Iraqi party or another from co-opting the government by obtaining control of important posts or resources. The duration of the first period is not entirely predictable, since it depends upon the progress in the ministries, and the rate at which the coalition can assemble the staff and equipment needed for the second period. However, the first period cannot be allowed to run on indefinitely, because there are important governmental func- tions that are not provided for in ORHA. For example, ORHA does not have any VerDate 11-SEP-98 12:05 Jul 29, 2004 Jkt 000000 PO 00000 Frm 00045 Fmt 6633 Sfmt 6621 94843.042 SARMSER2 PsN: SARMSER2 43 means of controlling entries into and exits from the country. Nor does it have any assets for establishing law and order. It cannot open (or close) Iraq’s embassies and consulates around the world. Most importantly, it does not have a ‘‘legal personal- ity’’ enabling it to enter into contracts on Iraq’s behalf, which would be necessary for such things as selling gate times at Saddam International to commercial air- lines. For these and other reasons, an indefinite stay in the ORHA phase is imprac- tical. Even if little progress is made on other fronts, Iraq will soon require a real, if interim, government—probably within 3 or 4 months. For the first period, ORHA will have a ‘‘matrixed’’ structure similar to large aero- space manufacturers. It will have three ‘‘project managers’’ who will draw support for their projects from three ‘‘resource pools.’’ Specifically, the project managers will be directors in charge of all reconstruction activities in three geographical zones— north, south, and central. The resource pools, referred to in ORHA as ‘‘pillars,’’ are groups of experts assembled from all participating U.S. departments and agencies. There will be three pillars, differentiated by expertise between humanitarian assist- ance, civil administration, and reconstruction. The operations of this matrixed orga- nization, and of the top ORHA management, will be supported by a team composed mainly of uniformed military specialists in deployments and overseas operations. The top ORHA management will be directed by Mr. Jay Garner, as the Interim Transitional Coalition Administrator. Mr. Garner’s job will be to construct a strat- egy for the reconstruction and reconstitution effort across the entire country, in order to achieve the objectives set for him by the President. To construct this strat- egy, Mr. Garner will be obliged to synthesize the positions and plans of the various U.S. departments and agencies at work in Iraq, because ORHA was created to ‘‘co- ordinate,’’ rather than ‘‘direct,’’ those disparate positions and plans. As a result, he will be dependent upon the advice of the senior representative of each department or agency, and upon the advice of the heads of each of ORHA’s ‘‘pillars,’’ and also upon the reports of the actual conditions encountered in the country by his three zone directors. If disputes develop between departments or agencies regarding the overall objective or a particular course of action, Mr. Garner is not empowered to resolve these by fiat. Instead, resolution will be achieved through the inter-agency process, under National Security Council guidance. Mr. Garner will interface directly with ORHA participants seconded from other coalition countries. These coalition partners most likely will be seconded for specific purposes, and so Mr. Garner will not have to decide where or how to employ them. The choice to accept or decline partner participation will not rest with Mr. Garner, since it is not an ORHA issue but rather a coalition issue, related to the whole of U.S. foreign policy. Likewise, if a difference of opinion develops between Mr. Garner and a partner representative to ORHA, Mr. Garner will refer it to the inter-agency process for resolution. This is the way that CENTCOM presently handles relations with partners on the military side of the coalition, which is longstanding. The result is that operational matters are discussed and handled at the coalition headquarters in Tampa, Florida, while disputes over coalition management are handled through diplomatic channels in Washington. ORHA will operate as a coalition instrumental- ity in much the same way. Mr. Garner will represent the ORHA mission to the Iraqi people and to the world at large, but he will not be a functioning head-of-state. He will not assume control of coalition troops in Iraq and he will not have any of the other powers normally associated with a head-of-state. (He will not be able to enter into treaties or inter- national agreements on Iraq’s behalf, for example.) Coalition troops will remain under the control of U.S. Central Command, and ORHA will remain subordinate to Central Command, for security and safety purposes. Reconstruction and reconstitu- tion issues will not fall under the purview of Central Command. They will be dealt with within the ORHA structure, or raised to the inter-agency process. The two areas of operational overlap between Central Command and ORHA will be the de- ployment and operation of ‘‘security forces’’ such as Military Police, and those of ‘‘Civil Affairs’’ units. ORHA and Central Command will have to reach agreement re- garding the optimal sharing of these resources. When it is clear that Iraq, as a state, will not disintegrate, and when the min- istries are reconstituted, or nearly so, ORHA will be modified into a larger organiza- tion that can address functions that are characteristic of a true government. This follow-on organization should be a multi-national effort, possibly along coalition lines. Its headquarters must be far more robust than that of ORHA, since it will have to address the full spectrum of international relations and internal operations. While the exact design of this interim governmental authority are not yet clear, it will likely have to oversee the rebuilding of an Army, Air Force, and Coast Guard capable of deterring aggression against Iraq. (Security for Iraq during this interim will remain CENTCOM’s responsibility.) It will also have to impose control over VerDate 11-SEP-98 12:05 Jul 29, 2004 Jkt 000000 PO 00000 Frm 00046 Fmt 6633 Sfmt 6621 94843.042 SARMSER2 PsN: SARMSER2 44 ports, airports, border crossings, and the border areas, generally, by rebuilding an immigration and border patrol service. International postal, telephone, and tele- graph service will have to be restored. Another part of the ‘‘authority’s’’ effort will have to be directed toward issuing passports and visas, and reopening Iraqi con- sulates for that purpose. It will also have to continue reconstruction and reconstitu- tion efforts started by ORHA, and broaden them in some cases. The ‘‘top down’’ gov- ernment structure used by Saddam to impose control at the provincial and munici- pal levels will probably have to be replaced. The economy and fiscal design of the country will also require overhaul. The ‘‘authority’’ will most likely not have a matrixed shape like ORHA, but will attempt to carry out most of the above-mentioned reforms through the ministries. Therefore it can be expected to feature a very robust top management section, and a structure to apply close supervision and assistance to the pertinent ministries. As mentioned above, during this phase an effort might be made to encourage the Iraqis to design their own executive ‘‘authority,’’—or perhaps even to design their entire government, in the form of a national constitution. If this is undertaken at this point, the top management section will require an office to facilitate meetings of the Iraqis who will be involved in the design, and a separate office to present to the Iraqi members of the design team a coalition point of view. The facilitation office will have to be much more than a simple secretariat, since it can be expected that long-standing anti-democratic parties will put themselves forward as can- didates to participate in this discussion. The process of selecting thoughtful, demo- cratically-minded, pragmatic participants who are not motivated by self-interest will be very challenging, and is likely to require many man-hours of research, travel, and discussion. The selection, since it would not be done by Iraqis, would also re- quire a great deal of explanation to the Iraqi public if it is not to be seen as self- contradictory. This explanation will, of necessity, rest on the nation-wide ratification process, which the coalition ‘‘authority’’ must underwrite. The actual hand-off of government from the coalition to Iraqis can be done in a graduated way—ministry by ministry—or it can be done all at once. If it is grad- uated, the last ministry to be handed off will likely be defense. The Iraqi armed forces would be place under the operational control of CENTCOM from the time they first returned to operational readiness to the last moment of hand-off. That will permit CENTCOM to establish their dispositions and support arrangements to ade- quately defend the country while the defense ministry concentrates on its transition to Iraqi control. The graduated hand-off provides an opportunity for coalition tute- lage while the Iraqis actually begin to operate their government themselves. If the hand-off is done all at once, certain conditions will have to be met before that can occur, and a third party will be required, in order to avoid misunderstand- ings or charges of ‘‘foot-dragging’’ or abandonment on the coalition’s part. Most im- portantly, there must be a ratified constitution that describes how Iraqis will govern themselves at the national level. As a minimum, the defense, justice, foreign affairs, finance, and oil ministries must be fully competent. The Post Office must work reli- ably. There must be a transparent government budget and a transparent budgeting system in place. A system of tariffs, taxes, or other revenues to make up the budget must be in place. The financial and aid arrangements with foreign countries and institutions, which are needed to keep the budget working, must be fully worked out. A national banking system and adequate currency must be in place. All border disputes with neighboring countries must be resolved. The governments of each province and each city must be in place and have a means of collecting sufficient revenue to operate. A head-of-state must be ready to assume office. A list of these and similar requirements would be submitted to the third party, negotiated with Iraqi representatives, and then used as indicators for when the coalition should be prepared to disengage. For an all-at-once disengagement, the third party should be agreed upon by both the coalition and the Iraqis. It could be a single country, a multi-national organiza- tion such as the OSCE, or one of the non-governmental organizations that specialize in elections or bilateral arbitration. Chairman WARNER. Your testimony is a very helpful start, but we will aid you in exactly the information we need. Secretary WOLFOWITZ. Okay. Chairman WARNER. I thank the Senator for allowing me to make that comment. Senator INHOFE. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. VerDate 11-SEP-98 12:05 Jul 29, 2004 Jkt 000000 PO 00000 Frm 00047 Fmt 6633 Sfmt 6602 94843.042 SARMSER2 PsN: SARMSER2 45 I thought it was very appropriate, the George Washington meta- phor, Mr. Secretary. Senator Allen’s brother pointed out another one that I think is worthwhile putting at this time; it is Isaiah 21, verse 9: ‘‘The Lord said, Babylon is fallen, is fallen, and all the carved images of her gods he has broken to the ground.‘‘ I have three questions real quick for rather brief answers, and anyone can respond. This is the one I always do ask, and that is the end strength problem that we are facing right now, with some 35,000 troops in Korea, with of course Kosovo, Bosnia, Afghanistan, and then more will be committed here. What does that look like in terms of what you would look for in the future for a future force structure and maybe a realignment? Any comments on that? How does the Guard and Reserve figure into this? Secretary WOLFOWITZ. I think Secretary Rumsfeld has been pushing all of us to look in a fundamental way at whether the foot- print that we have, which is in many ways a legacy from what we had 20 or 30 or 50 years ago in some cases, is the right footprint for where we should be even before we had Operation Iraqi Free- dom, and now of course in the post-Saddam world it has changed considerably. There are a lot of questions that arise in the case of the Euro- pean theater. General Jones is looking at a number of ideas. The new Korean government has actually spoken openly about the de- sire to look at how we are structured in Korea and there are a number of ideas that we are discussing with them. I think one of the things that we have just finished demonstrat- ing in Afghanistan and now again in Iraq is that the kinds of forces you need in the 21st century are structured very differently from the relatively heavy, relatively manpower-intensive forces that we have had in the past. So I think the first place we are going to look is to how we can accomplish our goals and meet our security com- mitments without as much use of personnel, because clearly the current posture is straining our people a great deal. It is making heavy use of the Guard and Reserve—very heavy use. Senator INHOFE. That is my point, Mr. Secretary and General Pace. Would you have any thoughts along those lines? You guys are real close to the Guard and Reserve in all of the deployments we have had. Secretary WOLFOWITZ. They have been magnificent, by the way. Senator INHOFE. I know they have been great, but can you con- tinue that? Can the employers continue? Any comments on that, General Pace? General PACE. Sir, thanks. The Guard and Reserve have been magnificent and we are relying very heavily on them. As you would expect, the Joint Staff has been doing some long-range planning and assessments of the size of the force and whether or not all the missions that we currently are conducting around the world plus Iraq were doable. We assessed to the Secretary that they were. I would repeat very quickly that obviously there is still a great deal of work left to do in Iraq. But yesterday, 3 weeks into the bat- tle, when Baghdad for the most part had fallen, the total ground force on the ground was 100,000, give or take, U.S. and about 20,000 coalition. The reason I say that is because all of that was well within the planning estimates that we used. VerDate 11-SEP-98 12:05 Jul 29, 2004 Jkt 000000 PO 00000 Frm 00048 Fmt 6633 Sfmt 6602 94843.042 SARMSER2 PsN: SARMSER2 46 So we do believe that current missions and projected future mis- sions are well within the scope of what we have. However, we do need to take a very hard look at the Reserve-active mix and how much we are going to rely on Reserves in the future, because Re- serves should be just that, Reserves. They are great Americans and they are willing to do what we need them to do, but we need to not continually go to that well if we can design ourselves better for the future. Senator INHOFE. That is exactly the point. General Jones, I think you have probably been more outspoken in the restructuring of the European forces and facilities. Any comments there on how cre- ative and active we are going to be in trying to do something there? General JONES. Senator, thank you for that question. I think there is great optimism in this moment in time to not only do some transformational thinking with regard to how our forces are based and utilized, but to also reshape the force so that it is of greater utility and draws from a fuller plate of available assets that are not only located in our forward bases in Europe, which are critically important. In support of Operation Iraqi Freedom, the European Command is the supporting command and without those interim bases for throughput and being able to deploy the forces that we have, we would have been hard pressed to do as well as we have in as short a time. Having said that, I think that the post-conflict period will see our European basing evolve into a series of bases that are the main op- erating bases, which are strategically relevant to what we need in the 21st century that currently exist. Senator INHOFE. I will actually ask these questions, the first one of Secretary Wolfowitz. You can answer for the record. Would it be advisable, if this restructuring is going along, to delay the realign- ment and all the things we are talking about doing in the United States until we find out what this is going to look like overseas? [The information referred to follows:] Yes. A review of global footprint is intimately tied to an assessment of post-war strategy and capabilities, and the Department is currently examining its overseas basing in light of new circumstances. The Department also continually updates its force posture and activities so that they align with the Defense Strategy. An in- creasing reliance on the Guard and Reserve for certain elements of the strategy is an acknowledged part of that. Senator INHOFE. The second question I would like to ask to be responded—you can respond for the record if you would like—is, all the dancing in the streets and the things we went through, and I am so proud of all of our troops and of the Brits and what they have done. It is just, just really remarkable. Since we are the ones mostly responsible for it, I think that Senator Levin brought up a very good question and there are a lot of things in the press about who would be most responsible for the reconstruction of the post- war Iraq. I might suggest that we can satisfy both sides. It can be done, supervised, and performed by the United States and Great Britain and have the cost of it deducted from our United Nations dues. You can respond for the record on that. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. [The information referred to follows:] VerDate 11-SEP-98 12:05 Jul 29, 2004 Jkt 000000 PO 00000 Frm 00049 Fmt 6633 Sfmt 6602 94843.042 SARMSER2 PsN: SARMSER2 47 We will pursue the reconstruction issue in several ways. We will appropriate funds for our own bilateral effort in support of a wide range of programs. We will also launch a major international effort, involving many countries. A number of countries have already expressed interest in supporting such an effort. Chairman WARNER. Thank you, Senator. Senator Byrd. Senator BYRD. Secretary Wolfowitz, both you and Secretary Rumsfeld have issued stern warnings to Syria in recent days to stop sending military supplies to Iraq. You said on a Sunday talk show that, ‘‘Syria will be held accountable for actions it is taking to support the regime of Saddam Hussein’’ and that there has to be a change in Syria as well. Just yesterday, I believe, Secretary Rumsfeld said that Syria is continuing to send supplies to Iraq and senior Iraq officials are fleeing to Syria. What are you implying by these comments? I ask the same with respect to Secretary Rumsfeld. Secretary WOLFOWITZ. Senator Byrd, only that there is a problem there. The Syrians are behaving badly. They need to be reminded of that. If they continue then we need to think about what our pol- icy is with respect to a country that harbors terrorists or harbors war criminals or was in recent times shipping things to Iraq. It is very dubious behavior and by calling attention to it we hope that in fact that may be enough to get them to stop. Senator BYRD. What discussions are under way in the event that that is not enough? Secretary WOLFOWITZ. I would say so far we are just keeping an eye on them, hoping their behavior will change. Senator BYRD. Does the Defense Department intend to take any action against Syria to stop the movement of goods and people across the border with Iraq? Secretary WOLFOWITZ. Senator, that is not a decision the Defense Department makes. That is obviously, if we are talking about ac- tion against Syria, would be a decision for the President and Con- gress. We are taking action inside Iraq to stop both the exit and the entry of dangerous people and dangerous goods. Senator BYRD. Are there any plans to send any U.S. forces into Syria? Secretary WOLFOWITZ. None that I know of, sir. Senator BYRD. I wish to expand on some of Senator Levin’s ear- lier questions about the role of the U.N. It is increasingly clear that rehabilitating Iraq will be an arduous and expensive endeavor. It would seem to be in our best interests to share this burden with those who are willing to assist us. The United Nations seems to be clamoring for a role in post-war Iraq. So far the administration has only made vague assurances that there will be a role for the U.N. Once the military action is complete and if we do not have broad international assistance, the United States will find itself thrust into the position of undertaking the most radical and ambitious re- construction of a country since the occupation of Germany and Japan after World War II. It will be costly, both in terms of financ- ing and of manpower. It will mean a significant sacrifice by the American people, a sacrifice that will be even larger if we turn away offers of assistance from the U.N. VerDate 11-SEP-98 12:05 Jul 29, 2004 Jkt 000000 PO 00000 Frm 00050 Fmt 6633 Sfmt 6602 94843.042 SARMSER2 PsN: SARMSER2 48 Should we not jump at the chance, Mr. Secretary, to include the U.N. with all of its nation-building experience in our coalition of the willing for a post-war Iraq? Secretary WOLFOWITZ. Senator, we would jump at the chance, we do jump at the chance to have the U.N. participate and assist. Let me say one thing, too. When we use words like ‘‘reconstruction’’ and ‘‘rehabilitation,’’ we think of it as a post-war phenomenon. I think we are already discovering that most of the rehabilitation that is needed in Iraq is needed from 30 years of a tyrant who spent the country’s money on other things. Senator BYRD. I understand that. Secretary WOLFOWITZ. But it is a big job, and our goal, our de- sire, is to have that job taken over as quickly as possible by the Iraqi people, with as much international assistance as possible. Clearly, the U.N. is a very important vehicle for mobilizing that as- sistance and we hope the U.N. will play that role. I do not think we want to see a situation like we do in Bosnia, for example, where 8 years after the Dayton Agreement and the U.N. is still running Bosnia. We want to see a situation where power and responsibility is transferred as quickly as possible to the Iraqis themselves. Senator BYRD. Why is the United States being so coy with re- spect to U.N. entreaties for a substantial role in rehabilitating Iraq beyond just providing food and medicine? Secretary WOLFOWITZ. Senator, we are not clamoring for an American role and we are not being coy about a U.N. role. We are talking with the U.N. about what its role can be. As I have said repeatedly, we think it has an important role. We would like it to be playing that role as quickly as possible. In fact, we welcome the fact that the U.N. has already passed one resolution to extend the Oil for Food Program for 45 days to continue its functioning in Iraq. It has a very important role to play and we are talking with them actively about how to do that. Senator BYRD. Do we have a coalition of the willing to contribute to our Iraqi reconstruction or just a coalition of the willing to let the United States handle reconstruction virtually alone? Secretary WOLFOWITZ. I think we actually have a larger coalition of the willing to participate in reconstruction than we did in the actual combat. That is hardly surprising. There are a number of countries that have already stepped forward and said they want to contribute, some with stability forces, some with money, some with both. There are a great many things that countries can do. As I noted earlier, there is an enormous amount that those three coun- tries who are meeting in Moscow can do in the financial area. Senator BYRD. What have our friends and allies pledged to con- tribute to the reconstruction of Iraq? Secretary WOLFOWITZ. So far we are still in the early stages of that. I think some people were, frankly, a bit taken by surprise by the images they saw on television yesterday. I think it is already changing the way people think about this issue. We are going to be pressing all of our friends and allies to con- tribute as much as they can, and I think when they realize what the Iraqi people need and deserve I think they will be very gener- ous. VerDate 11-SEP-98 12:05 Jul 29, 2004 Jkt 000000 PO 00000 Frm 00051 Fmt 6633 Sfmt 6602 94843.042 SARMSER2 PsN: SARMSER2 49 Senator BYRD. I see my time is up, but let me urge you to pursue this course, Mr. Secretary. Secretary WOLFOWITZ. Senator Byrd, I agree emphatically. I will claim, a little bit on a personal level, that in 1990 it was my office that said we ought to be going to allies to get contributions to Op- eration Desert Shield and what later became Operation Desert Storm, and that was a spectacularly successful effort in raising international support. It was a lot harder this time because of the political controversy. I think as people realize what is taking shape in Iraq, realize what is at stake in Iraq, and realize what the Iraqi people need we will be able to do much more than we could in the last 6 months. Senator BYRD. Thank you, Mr. Secretary. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. Chairman WARNER. We thank you, Senator Byrd, particularly for that inquiry regarding Syria. I think that is extremely important. Senator Sessions. Senator SESSIONS. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. The problem with the United Nations, as I see it in a post-Iraq situation, is they have had it wrong from the beginning. We had to push them, push them, push them when their own resolutions were in violation. During this whole 12 years or so after the first Gulf War, we have had an embargo that has hurt the people of Iraq every year, but yet the United Nations and none of us have been able to figure out a way to break that cycle that would con- tinue indefinitely, it seemed. So they are not able to make good, quick decisions. It tends to be a lowest common denominator organization. I certainly hope we can work with them. I hope the United Nations can learn from this process, but direction or approval or endorsement of what we do now to try to liberate, improve, and help this country become a great nation again is something that I am dubious about, Mr. Sec- retary. So we have some disagreement around here about that. I do not know if you would like to comment. Secretary WOLFOWITZ. I think the Chairman captured it cor- rectly. The U.N. can be an important partner and I think it is in fact a chance to demonstrate that it can play a much more positive role in the future than, as I think you have correctly noted, it played in the past. I hope it will and I think there is reason to think that it can and will. But it cannot be the managing partner. It cannot be in charge. We need to make sure that certain func- tions are working smoothly from day one, and I think the goal should be to pass that responsibility as quickly as possible to the Iraqis. As I noted earlier in talking about Jay Garner—General Jones can speak personally to this—one of the most successful examples I know of of transferring responsibility directly to the people in- volved was in northern Iraq in 1991, and that was entirely a coali- tion of the willing working with indigenous Iraqis. Senator SESSIONS. If we were to give a leadership role to the U.N., would not that action be subject to a veto by France or Ger- many or any other Security Council Member, China or Russia per- haps, at least the fundamental plan? VerDate 11-SEP-98 12:05 Jul 29, 2004 Jkt 000000 PO 00000 Frm 00052 Fmt 6633 Sfmt 6602 94843.042 SARMSER2 PsN: SARMSER2 50 Secretary WOLFOWITZ. I think we would have to come to an un- derstanding with the U.N., including obviously the members of the Security Council, on what that U.N. role will be. I hope again that we can get some of the past behind us in this regard and focus on what needs to be done, and I hope France will see it that way also. Senator SESSIONS. I hope so, too, although in terms of the situa- tion with France I think their actions have been so egregious and so serious, subjecting American soldiers and Iraqi people to more risk than would otherwise have been the case, that we cannot just lightly walk away from that. There is going to have to be some se- rious long-term discussions about fundamental issues. Just to meet together next week and shake hands and act like it did not happen, I do not think you would agree that that is possible, for great na- tions to act in that way. Secretary WOLFOWITZ. I agree the French have behaved in ways, particularly since we are here to talk about NATO, that have been very damaging to NATO. I think France is going to pay some con- sequences, not just with us but with other countries who view it that way. But I do not think we want to make the Iraqi people the victims of that particular quarrel. Senator SESSIONS. Well said. With regard to the NATO expansion and the unanimity rule, Senator Levin and I back in 2000 asked Secretaries Feith and Grossman about this and what was going to happen. I asked, as we expand NATO does not that add to a limitation on our ability to put together a coalition that fits the mission? Secretary Gross- man said: ‘‘But NATO would have to decide as a group, yes, we are going to take on that mission, and then it would fall to General Ralston to carry out that mission with a group of countries that would be interested in doing so.’’ A coalition of the willing, I as- sume he meant. Then Secretary Grossman said: ‘‘We believe that if the countries are in NATO that they signed up to these values, that they will in the end do the right thing. As I say, that has been our practice, it has been our experience, really for 50 years.’’ He said: ‘‘You and Senator Levin might be right and we may all be here 5 or 6 years from now with a big problem on our hands.’’ So it looks like we do have a problem. First of all, General Jones, could you tell us—maybe General Ralston—what is this unanimity or consensus rule that we have in NATO? Could one nation block anything that is done? Do we not have to confront that? If we leave any one of 20-some odd nations with the ability to say ‘‘no’’ to any action, does that not really require us to go around NATO and have other operations, thereby undermining NATO? Secretary WOLFOWITZ. If I could say a couple things. With all re- spect, I do not think it is a statistical problem. If we had added seven new countries, we would have found ourselves in a situation, instead of 18 to 1, it would have been 25 to 1. There is a special problem in NATO. We have had work-arounds for it in the past. It was called the Defense Planning Committee to meet at 18, or I guess it was 15 originally. We have revived that mechanism. There are mechanisms for dealing with the absence of consensus. This is a very legitimate question that we need to think about and talk about and confront. But there are some virtues in the con- VerDate 11-SEP-98 12:05 Jul 29, 2004 Jkt 000000 PO 00000 Frm 00053 Fmt 6633 Sfmt 6602 94843.042 SARMSER2 PsN: SARMSER2 51 sensus principle before we throw it out. It is not the small coun- tries generally that have raised problems. I think the consensus principle is important because it gives them a feeling that they have a voice. But most of them understand that their voice is not a dominant voice, and at the end of the day I think when NATO has needed to act it has been able to achieve that consensus. When it has not achieved that consensus, it has nevertheless pro- vided a very important mechanism for members to achieve things. I do not believe that we would be operating as smoothly with our British allies in Iraq today if it were not for all the mechanisms that are worked on a daily basis through NATO. One has to stop and think whether if you give up the consensus principle, are you ultimately going to have a lot of countries saying, ‘‘Well, wait a minute, NATO has just made six decisions, I was in the minority on every one, why am I still a member of this organi- zation that purports to act in my name?’’ So it is not simple. The French have created a big problem and we need to think about how we deal with it. But as I said in my opening statement, we have had problems in this organization over decades and yet it is correctly described as the most successful alli- ance in history. Senator SESSIONS. General Jones? General JONES. The Secretary said it all and said it correctly, sir, in my view. Thank you. Senator SESSIONS. It is a wonderful alliance. It has done great things. We certainly need to strengthen it, not undermine it. But if nations go off on their own as we have seen here, it does jeopard- ize the trust that is essential for its success. Chairman WARNER. Thank you, Senator. Secretary WOLFOWITZ. You are right about that, Senator. Chairman WARNER. Thank you very much. Senator Bayh. Senator BAYH. Let me begin by thanking the Generals for your service to our country. I hope you will convey our appreciation to the men and women in the Marine Corps for the valor that they have demonstrated these last several weeks. We have, unfortu- nately, lost a couple members of the Corps who are from Indiana and we honor their service. I hope you will convey our sentiments to everyone. Having said that to the Generals, I hope you will not feel slight- ed if I direct my questions to the Secretary. Mr. Secretary, I hope you will not feel slighted, either. I have four or five questions and I have only 5 minutes, so I am going to try and be succinct, and I appreciate your efforts in that regard as well. We have had a lot of discussion, Mr. Secretary, about the role of the United Nations. We have had some experience with the U.N. in other jurisdictions on activities somewhat similar to this, in Haiti, for example, in Bosnia, and some other places. Could you give us your opinion about the experience that the United Nations has had in some of these other jurisdictions and to the extent that that experience reflects upon their competence and, therefore, the credibility that they will have or not have in undertaking similar functions in Iraq? The reason I raise this question is I am told that their past experience has not been terribly confidence-instilling. VerDate 11-SEP-98 12:05 Jul 29, 2004 Jkt 000000 PO 00000 Frm 00054 Fmt 6633 Sfmt 6602 94843.042 SARMSER2 PsN: SARMSER2 52 Secretary WOLFOWITZ. Some of those are extremely hard cases, on the other hand. I think every case is different. Kosovo remains indefinitely under a U.N. administration that people are not enor- mously happy about, but we do not know what the solution is be- cause no one is willing to—and I am not saying I am either—face up to what is the political future of Kosovo. The U.N. took on an impossible task in Cambodia. I would not blame the U.N. for failing. The U.N. has a very difficult chore in East Timor. I think it is doing that reasonably well. Senator BAYH. There is the headline from this hearing, Mr. Chairman. There is the headline: ‘‘Wolfowitz Defends U.N.’’ Secretary WOLFOWITZ. No, I am trying to defend the Iraqis. I keep coming back to this example of northern Iraq because it was spectacularly successful. The Iraqis have demonstrated in very dif- ficult circumstances some ability to manage their own affairs. It is a sophisticated country with organized ministries for delivering things that did not even exist and may never exist in Bosnia. So we do not want to reproduce a Bosnia model or a Kosovo model or an East Timor model. We want to go on a model that moves as quickly as possible from efficient delivery of services by the coalition to a government that is Iraqi. Senator BAYH. So just as circumstances in Iraq are unique, so too the role of the U.N. in Iraq should be specific to the conditions there? Secretary WOLFOWITZ. I think so, and it can be huge, but it is not to manage the place. Senator BAYH. My second is not really a question. It is just an observation or a suggestion. If I were in your shoes, I would be giv- ing a lot of thought, as we transition in this process and include others in it, to how to incorporate as quickly as possible some secu- rity forces from another Islamic nation that shares our approach with regard to Iraq. I think that would send a very powerful signal, whether they are from Morocco or Jordan or another country. That would send a very powerful signal to the Iraqis that this is not a clash of cultures, that we are there truly for the reasons that we have espoused. That is just an observation I would make. Secretary WOLFOWITZ. Actually we have two Muslim majority countries already in the coalition, Albania and Azerbaijan. I would not jump to conclusions right away about how the Iraqis feel about other Arab countries. We are going to have to see how that sorts out. But I think from our own purposes, our own image internationally, and our image in the Arab world, your point is very important and we would like to see as much participation from Muslim majority countries as possible. Senator BAYH. Mr. Secretary, you have fielded some questions about Syria. I would like to follow up on that with regard to both Syria and Iran. It is possible that neither one of those two nations will want us in the neighborhood for very long. Syria, as has been discussed, has had material coming from it into Iraq, perhaps some Iraqi individuals going into Syria. People have transited through Syria into Iraq for purposes of fighting our forces. Iran, there have been suggestions that they have supported the Ansar Al-Islam group in northeastern Iraq. They have been long- time supporters of Hezbollah and so forth. VerDate 11-SEP-98 12:05 Jul 29, 2004 Jkt 000000 PO 00000 Frm 00055 Fmt 6633 Sfmt 6602 94843.042 SARMSER2 PsN: SARMSER2 53 I would like to ask about your concern that either the regime in Syria or Iran might be supportive of either indigenous or outside groups with links to terrorist organizations that might perpetrate acts such as in Lebanon for the purpose of driving us out of the country. Is that a significant concern of yours? Secretary WOLFOWITZ. It is a concern. In fact, the concern we are raising about Syria is that in recent days the Syrians have been shipping killers into Iraq to try to kill Americans. We do not wel- come that. We have stopped it when we found those people. So it is a problem. I think it is important that Iraq’s neighbors not meddle with Iraq. We have had very clear discussions with Turkey, which has very legitimate concerns about northern Iraq, and the Turks have behaved themselves very well. But Secretary Powell was just on the phone this morning with Foreign Minister Gul to assure the Foreign Minister that there was no need for a Turkish intervention because we were looking after the proper conduct of people in the city of Kirkuk, for example. I think it is important for Iraq not to become a threat to its neighbors, as Turkey is concerned. It is even more important or equally important that its neighbors not try to undermine Iraq and destabilize it. Senator BAYH. It is troubling when there are public statements from the Islamic Jihad organization, headquartered in Damascus, that they have individuals in Baghdad willing to commit acts of terror. Some reports that some at least loosely affiliated with Hezbollah have come into Iraq, with the longstanding ties of both Iran and Syria to that organization. So I am glad you are keeping your eye on this. The one final thing I would mention, Mr. Secretary, is that as Islamic charities become involved in trying to provide assistance to the people of Iraq, as you are probably aware, there are some of those entities that have at least funding ties or have been used, wittingly or unwittingly, to fund terrorist organizations. That prob- ably is something we should keep our eye on as well, which char- ities come in, how they are involved, that sort of thing. Secretary WOLFOWITZ. You are absolutely right about that. I think we all have a tendency to think that ‘‘NGO’’ means good, and the truth is there are some NGOs like this World Assembly of Mus- lim Youth or Al-Haramein which have very disturbing ties to al Qaeda and terrorist organizations. We cannot just say anybody who is willing to come and spend money inside Iraq is welcome. I think they have to be people who are committed to supporting a peaceful and free and democratic country. Senator BAYH. Thank you. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. Chairman WARNER. Thank you very much, Senator, for your very good questions. Senator Allard. Senator ALLARD. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. Before I start my questions, I had a delegation from Bulgaria yesterday visit with me. There was the ambassador and representatives from the four major parties in Bulgaria. I just wanted to thank them in a public way for their support, as well as support from other Eastern Euro- VerDate 11-SEP-98 12:05 Jul 29, 2004 Jkt 000000 PO 00000 Frm 00056 Fmt 6633 Sfmt 6602 94843.042 SARMSER2 PsN: SARMSER2 54 pean nations, during our standoff at the United Nations in regard to the Iraq issue. I am trying to understand more fully some of the motivations be- tween France and the position that they have taken. They are only a member of the alliance with NATO and they are not a part of the military structure. What advantage does this give France? I wondered if maybe you, Secretary Wolfowitz and perhaps General Jones, could give us some insight on that. Secretary WOLFOWITZ. Let me ask the General to address the de- tails of it, if he might. General JONES. I think a little history might be in order. Back in 1996–1997 timeframe, there was some active discussion going on where, if I recall correctly, France was actively considering military integration into NATO. This did not materialize because of the fact that there was no agreement reached on the regional command that France wished to obtain. So the consummation of that re- integration was not achieved. But the French military has been occupying a number of posi- tions at Supreme Headquarters Allied Powers Europe (SHAPE) since those days and is actively involved in virtually all aspects of military planning that SHAPE headquarters responds to to the senior headquarters at NATO in Brussels. So the answer to your question in general is that France plays roughly the same role in formulating military positions in response to taskings from the North Atlantic Council as does any other member nation. Senator ALLARD. Secretary Wolfowitz. Secretary WOLFOWITZ. I think we need to look very carefully at where France is benefiting from a one-way street where they bene- fit and do not contribute. It was called to my attention the other day that the French were making great claims for what the EU was doing in Macedonia and did not bother pointing out that the EU would not be able to act in Macedonia without NATO support. We have supported the idea of strengthening this European de- fensive entity, which is one of the favorite projects of France, on the idea that doing so would strengthen NATO and not undermine NATO. I think we need to have a look at that and make sure that that is still the case if that is the way the French want to treat the alliance. Senator ALLARD. General, would you want to elaborate on what ways France’s unique role complicates NATO’s military planning? General JONES. I do not think it complicates our planning. I should probably emphasize that in the case of both France and Germany throughout Operation Iraqi Freedom we have enjoyed ac- cess to the air space of France on a continual basis and all of the basing and basing requirements that are required for throughput in Germany. In Germany’s case, German armed forces have con- tributed significantly and very capably to the force protection meas- ures at our bases. It is perhaps an example of how military to mili- tary cooperation continues in most circumstances. But I am not aware of any, other than the fact that all nations at SHAPE headquarters are represented appropriately in accord- ance with the wishes of the North Atlantic Council. There is great value in having all different views come to the military table in VerDate 11-SEP-98 12:05 Jul 29, 2004 Jkt 000000 PO 00000 Frm 00057 Fmt 6633 Sfmt 6602 94843.042 SARMSER2 PsN: SARMSER2 55 planning an operation. So the construct of what countries are rep- resented and how they are represented is one that is handed down to us, not one that we shape. Senator ALLARD. Secretary Wolfowitz, the media was reporting about a month ago that Lord Robertson, NATO Secretary General, would support that the NATO alliance be given a role in Afghani- stan and that the administration was supportive of that suggestion. Sharing the responsibility seems to make sense, given the mission our military is currently undertaking. Has the administration decided whether to hand NATO this new responsibility in Afghanistan? Secretary WOLFOWITZ. It is not a matter of handing NATO the responsibility, but looking to NATO to play a supportive role. NATO is—and I ask General Jones to elaborate on it—contributing in the planning mechanism to helping the Germans and the Dutch manage their leadership of the International Security Assistance Force (ISAF) peacekeeping force in Kabul, which is a crucial role. I think it is possible, although I guess I am leaping ahead here, as we look at expanding the notion of provincial reconstruction teams, which is a way of trying to extend the reconstruction-civil affairs presence out into key cities, that we are looking for coalition participation and that might be another opportunity for NATO, or at least NATO members individually, to play a role. Senator ALLARD. France and Germany have been supportive of the NATO mission in Afghanistan? Secretary WOLFOWITZ. France has actually made some significant contributions in Afghanistan and I think that we should note that. The French on a bilateral basis frequently do things with us that they then do not support in NATO. I think General Jones has re- ferred to this earlier. If we just looked at our military relationship, you would get a reasonably healthy view of things. It is the politi- cians I guess that we have an issue. Senator ALLARD. Mr. Chairman, I see my time has expired. Thank you. Chairman WARNER. Thank you for your contribution, Senator, very much. Senator Ben Nelson. Senator BEN NELSON. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. At this point in time, no matter how many times the question has been answered, I have not asked it. Mr. Secretary, I am very intrigued by the idea of a new relationship that would develop a coalition to where the United Nations can have a role in Iraq, but also NATO and other supportive nations could have a role, too, in the reconstruction of Iraq. I am intrigued by that because I think that probably is the new model that for this particular situation will work to establish, if you will, credibility in the area, but world credibility as well, which I think is important, nearly as important but not as important as the success, because success will also help that credibility. France may see a new world geopolitical order and they could very well be right. It may or may not involve them, but I hope that we do not try to exaggerate the quarrel that we have with France at the moment. But they may be seeking a new world order and they may be less a part of it than they might imagine. VerDate 11-SEP-98 12:05 Jul 29, 2004 Jkt 000000 PO 00000 Frm 00058 Fmt 6633 Sfmt 6602 94843.042 SARMSER2 PsN: SARMSER2 56 That being the case, as we move forward I really hope that the role of NATO can be a significant part of the effort to reconstruct Iraq. The former Soviet satellite nations that will be part of NATO as it is expanded have some experience in rebuilding civil society from a change in their government direction not that long ago. I think they could provide a great deal of support in that effort. Do you think that this model that is being talked about, although it may turn out to be different once we are on the ground will be the precursor for a new world order of relationships down the road, or is that too futuristic a question at the moment? Secretary WOLFOWITZ. I guess I do not like that phrase and I tend to think each case has such unique qualities to it. I do think that what you are talking about is a possible model that can work and that can have some application, I would agree with very strongly. I think you alluded to the idea, which I think is, if I am not putting words into your mouth, that France has been isolating itself and hopefully it will decide to stop doing that. Senator BEN NELSON. That is exactly my point. Secretary WOLFOWITZ. Certainly we would welcome them not doing that. You mention the Central and East Europeans and you are abso- lutely right. We are already actively engaged in discussions with them about how to draw on their experience. There is a wonderful Iraqi joke which I will not bother you with now, but it refers spe- cifically to Romania as an example that Saddam Hussein was terri- fied of. It is not an accident that in our active forces with us in the Gulf, Poland is one of the four countries that has forces in Iraq, and the Czech Republic, Lithuania, Albania, and the Slovak Republic have small units there. Those countries still understand what it means to be under a tyrant and to be liberated from tyranny. They, as you mentioned, have real technical expertise. We are looking for all the help we can get. We will listen to all the advice that we can get. But we want to make sure that this process works and not have so many hands on the steering wheel that the vehicle goes into the ditch. Senator BEN NELSON. That is why I think that if you can estab- lish a partnership that involves both organizations in a meaningful way, each doing what it can do best, because that very well may satisfy the credibility of the world, but also make it work, improv- ing credibility significantly. Secretary WOLFOWITZ. I appreciate those comments. I agree with them. Senator BEN NELSON. Thank you. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. Chairman WARNER. I associate myself with your observations about NATO. Senator BEN NELSON. Thank you. Chairman WARNER. I really do. General Pace, you have established a real leadership role in your tenure, certainly on the Joint Staff, and prior thereto, on jointness. I would think that it would be helpful in the record of today if you could say a few words and then amplify it about the high water mark that jointness has been achieved, because we hear about op- VerDate 11-SEP-98 12:05 Jul 29, 2004 Jkt 000000 PO 00000 Frm 00059 Fmt 6633 Sfmt 6602 94843.042 SARMSER2 PsN: SARMSER2 57 erations and then down in the second or third paragraph the force that did it, say SOF, was Army, Navy, Marines. Why do you not talk a little bit about it. General PACE. Sir, thank you for your comments. Chairman WARNER. You and General Myers have really worked on this and I think you have achieved it when the history is writ- ten. General PACE. Again, I thank you. I think it goes directly back to Goldwater-Nichols and all that that act was designed to do. I will just use one small example, a very important example, but one example of the incredible jointness that happens every day on the battlefield. That is the very brave and successful rescue of Private First Class Jessica Lynch. Every single arm of the Armed Forces was working hand in glove in that operation to make it successful, to include CIA. So you had not only Special Operations Forces, soldiers from the Army, Marines, Air Force, and Navy, but also CIA involvement in getting the proper force on the ground in response to very exquisite intelligence. That is happening as we sit here right this instant. You have all the Armed Forces working hand in glove to do what they are doing. It is an incredible accomplishment, directly attrib- utable to the impetus of Goldwater-Nichols. Chairman WARNER. Thank you very much. Also, I am sure the Joint Staff are looking at lessons learned from this conflict. Perhaps there could emerge from the preliminary assessments some requests or concepts that could be integrated into the 2004 authorization bill because of the need of the urgency to address the problem. This is an important piece of legislation that is now being formulated by this committee. We hope to present it to the full Senate in the month of May. I have to say with my good friend of 25 years sitting next to me, I kind of thought that tanks were destined to go into museums, but I believe they have gotten a new extension of life program, would you not say? Senator LEVIN. I wish we still produced them. Chairman WARNER. Yes, well, I know. When you came on many years ago, you were called ‘‘Tank Commander.’’ Well, they are working. Secretary WOLFOWITZ. We flew a handful of them up north and they were much appreciated. Chairman WARNER. I saw that. General PACE. Sir, uniquely to this operation, right now the Joint Forces Command has already established a lessons learned team that is embedded with General Franks at every level of his com- mand structure. So literally as we are executing the day-to-day missions of his command, the team is culling out the lessons to be learned and feeding them both to the commands in the field so they can take immediate action and then back to us so we can rearrange our training and education. Chairman WARNER. All I say is you know full well the train is in motion, and I think this committee would be highly receptive if you and the Secretary had some views that could be incorporated in this legislation. General PACE. Yes, sir. VerDate 11-SEP-98 12:05 Jul 29, 2004 Jkt 000000 PO 00000 Frm 00060 Fmt 6633 Sfmt 6602 94843.042 SARMSER2 PsN: SARMSER2 58 Chairman WARNER. General Jones, last night again we had the pleasure of being together when you were honored. But you spoke out very sincerely, and I also added a few comments when I had the privilege of saying some words, about the importance of the in- dustrial base. We daily observe the magnificence of the perform- ance of the uniformed personnel, but it is the equipment that the Department of Defense has conceived, researched, developed, and produced together with the support of Congress that in large meas- ure makes possible the gains that we have made so far, and cer- tainly in the example given by General Pace of that SOF rescue op- eration, the extraordinary equipment that was used there. I point out, Mr. Secretary, the briefings that we receive each morning here in the Senate by the senior members of your Depart- ment, which have been excellent, by the way. We had one day the modern day soldier who is on the battlefield in Iraq, in full equip- ment come up and demonstrate what he and she are wearing. It is in the multiple thousands of dollars. Indeed, the weapon itself is over $20,000 in value, and the night vision equipment and the armored protective vest. It is extraordinary. But again, that is the innovation of America’s industrial base that has brought to bear a high degree of protection against harm for these very troops to operate in. So I want to thank you, General Jones, and I want this hearing record to reflect your thoughts on that as well as my own. Turning to another issue, on lessons learned, Mr. Secretary, you will come forward. I got a call from the Secretary yesterday on a matter that is near and dear to his heart. By the way, tell him I am going to go to work with it. I am going to meet with the House and see what I can do on that posting of a particular individual in a particular country, and you know of what I speak. Secretary WOLFOWITZ. I know what you mean. Chairman WARNER. But on the Middle East, the President of the United States in meeting with the Prime Minister of Great Brit- ain—and what a magnificent partnership those two men have formed and the leadership they have provided—made direct rela- tionship to the need for our country to proceed to the work of the Quartet on the strategy for resolution of the Middle East situation. Could you have a few comments on where that stands now, be- cause I think there is a direct relationship between our Nation join- ing Great Britain and others in trying as best we can to work with the respective governments of Israel and what I perceive as a po- tential government now with the prime minister of the Palestinian country towards some resolution. I think that ties into the post- Iraq conflict because to the extent we can succeed in the post-Iraq resolution of problems it could be influenced by hopefully a lessen- ing of the tensions emanating from that tragic crisis between the peoples of those two nations in the Middle East. Secretary WOLFOWITZ. We need someone from the State Depart- ment here to comment on the details of the negotiations, but let me make two strategic observations. Chairman WARNER. Do not be modest. You have spent your life in foreign affairs, Mr. Secretary. Secretary WOLFOWITZ. Well, I know. VerDate 11-SEP-98 12:05 Jul 29, 2004 Jkt 000000 PO 00000 Frm 00061 Fmt 6633 Sfmt 6602 94843.042 SARMSER2 PsN: SARMSER2 59 Chairman WARNER. I know you try and stay on your side of the river. Secretary WOLFOWITZ. Exactly. Therefore, let me comment on it from a strategic perspective. I think, number one, you are abso- lutely right that it is going to help us enormously in our overall posture in the Arab world, indeed in the Muslim world, in the whole war on terrorism, if we can follow up what I think is enor- mous success in Iraq—although there is still a lot of work to do, with progress on the Arab-Israeli issue. It will particularly be important in how Arabs view us. There are negatives in what has just happened, although I think ultimately, hopefully, people will understand that this was the liberation of an Arab people. I hope they will understand, by the way—the Ameri- cans need to understand—this was not just an American or coali- tion fight, that thousands of Iraqis have died fighting this dictator. That they did not rise up immediately this time is partly because tens of thousands of them were slaughtered the last time. That we had a secure base to operate out of in the north was because the Iraqis in the north, primarily Kurds but other Muslims as well, had successfully liberated that part of the country. But it will be important to our image in the Arab world that we be doing more than just military action in an Arab country, and I think particularly that we can make some progress on the Arab- Israeli issue. The other comment I would make is I am cautiously optimistic that the removal of Saddam Hussein as a major disturber of peace and as a man who financed terrorism and rewarded suicide bomb- ers will improve the atmosphere for negotiations between Israel and the Palestinians. Chairman WARNER. My concluding question before turning to Senator Levin. Much has been said about this very interesting indi- vidual, yet controversial, Chalabi. Could you clarify what you un- derstand his role to be, because your Department fostered his trip into Iraq presumably, together with several hundred persons, ei- ther former Iraqis or of Iraqi descent, that want to participate in the concluding phases of this operation. What is his role specifically and those that accompanied him? Secretary WOLFOWITZ. Let me put it in a broader context. Our Department and another agency of the government have been sup- porting all kinds of resistance groups with material assistance, in- formation assistance, in some cases with weapons, some of it overt- ly, some of it through other channels. This is not a unique case. I find some of the press commentary on the subject verges on paranoia. Chalabi is one of a number of Iraqis who have played a significant role during the darker period of the 1990s in calling attention to the plight of the Iraqi people and trying to unify and mobilize them. I recall the experience in 1991 when he took the initiative and was able to bring together six Iraqi leaders—the two chief Kurdish leaders, two Shia and two Sunni—to meet with Secretary Baker and National Security Ad- viser Scowcroft. He is not an insignificant figure. But we are also not trying to anoint him or anyone else as the future leader of Iraq. You cannot talk about democracy and then go around and say that we are going to pick the leaders of a democ- VerDate 11-SEP-98 12:05 Jul 29, 2004 Jkt 000000 PO 00000 Frm 00062 Fmt 6633 Sfmt 6602 94843.042 SARMSER2 PsN: SARMSER2 60 racy. What we hope to have is a process that will certainly be unique in Iraq’s modern experience, but not unique in American experience, where people get up, speak, and debate. Their neigh- bors say, ‘‘oh, I think that makes sense’’ or they say, ‘‘well, that may make sense, but that SOB was actually working for Saddam and killed my brother.’’ You need a process of exposure. I would note—it is an interesting picture—that Chalabi spoke in Nasiriyah to a crowd of some 10,000 people. We did not assemble them. It is interesting that he can summon a crowd of 10,000. It is useful, as reported by our people on the ground, that he had a calming effect in Nasiriyah. But we are not singling him out. I am a little puzzled at how much press commentary that suggests that we are singling him out. He is one of many Iraqis that we hope will debate and discuss and give the Iraqi people, who are increasingly free to voice their views, a chance to decide who they like and by what process they want to pick their leaders. Chairman WARNER. I think that clarifies exactly the question that I raised and I thank you, because I have studied him. I have not met him, but I think I would be interested in meeting him some day. But he seems to be an individual of great courage and has a love for the history of Iraq and hopefully some day the res- toration of that nation to its prominent and important role in the world scene that it once had. Secretary WOLFOWITZ. He is all of that, Senator. But his status as a political leader is going to have to be decided by Iraqis, not by Americans. Chairman WARNER. I venture a view that I think we will live to see the day when Iraq becomes a very influential country in a posi- tive way throughout the region. I hope that is the end result of the tremendous sacrifices that have gone about to make it possible. Thank you. Secretary WOLFOWITZ. I hope so very strongly. I remember 20 years ago when people were saying that Marcos was the best lead- er you could find in the Philippines, saying the Koreans were in- capable of democracy—all kinds of pessimism about what other people can do. We hear a lot of that pessimism now about Arabs. I think it is misplaced and wrong, and I hope the Iraqi people now have a chance to show the whole world that it is wrong. Chairman WARNER. We are fortunate to have your service in public office today because you draw on an enormous background of experience and observation over many years. Thank you. Secretary WOLFOWITZ. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. Chairman WARNER. Senator Levin. Senator LEVIN. Secretary Wolfowitz, the news this morning indi- cates that the Iraqi Kurds have apparently taken over the city of Kirkuk, and that is a strategic place for many reasons, including their oil fields. I know that we have some Special Forces in there and that there are more forces apparently, I gather, on the way. Do you see any possibility here that the Kurds are going to attempt to maintain control over Kirkuk? They now have, I gather, a large number of tanks that were abandoned by the Iraqi Army. Do you see any possibility of that? VerDate 11-SEP-98 12:05 Jul 29, 2004 Jkt 000000 PO 00000 Frm 00063 Fmt 6633 Sfmt 6602 94843.042 SARMSER2 PsN: SARMSER2 61 Secretary WOLFOWITZ. The numbers are growing as I speak, so let me not try to put a number on it. Large elements of the 173rd Airborne Brigade have moved into Kirkuk to establish coalition control over the city and to reassure everyone, including notably the Turks, that this concern of theirs that somehow the city would be taken over by the Kurds and the Turkish population of the city, which is substantial, would be mistreated or even driven out. We have invited the Turks to have some, I guess you would call them, observers or liaison officers in there with us so they can have transparency into that. I alluded earlier to Secretary Powell’s conversation today with Foreign Minister Gul in which he assured the Turks that we were on top of the situation and trying to manage it successfully. I am reasonably optimistic that that will be the outcome. We have said repeatedly to the Kurds that this is one of those things that cannot be allowed to happen, that Kirkuk is potentially explosive situation if they were to try to assert themselves unilater- ally. I think we do need to have a process going forward, and it is going to take some time, to resolve some really tragic issues, be- cause the Iraqis made it a practice of driving Kurds and, I think to some extent, Turks out of their homes and replacing them with Arabs. Their goal was to make it a city that they could control, and that is a process that has to be re-examined, but in a legal and peaceful manner. Senator LEVIN. What is the percentage of Turkmen versus Kurds in Kirkuk? Do you know it offhand, roughly? Secretary WOLFOWITZ. I do not think we can know it because a lot of the Turks, in fact a lot of people in general, were pressed to Arabize their names. There is no realistic census. There are large numbers of both. Senator LEVIN. Do you know whether we have more forces in there now than the numbers of Kurdish fighters at this moment? Secretary WOLFOWITZ. No, I do not know the numbers. I know we have more capable forces. Senator LEVIN. General Pace, in the last few days it is obvious that, with the destruction of Saddam’s control, that there is a lack of law and order and that local police have apparently also dis- appeared in Baghdad and in other cities. Does that mean then that our military personnel, who are not particularly trained in law en- forcement, are going to have to, for at least some time, be there re- storing law and order? General PACE. Senator, I think it is true that we are going to need to provide stability throughout the country as we liberate the various sections. One of the things that we are trying to do is ex- actly what the British are doing as part of the coalition right now, which is to seek out the former police officials, check them as best they can, determine their acceptability to the local population to continue to provide law and order, and then enable them to do that. But either the coalition forces themselves or the police force re- constituted will need to provide stability in that nation. Senator LEVIN. Are we seeking help from other countries to pro- vide police forces, gendarmerie? VerDate 11-SEP-98 12:05 Jul 29, 2004 Jkt 000000 PO 00000 Frm 00064 Fmt 6633 Sfmt 6602 94843.042 SARMSER2 PsN: SARMSER2 62 General PACE. Sir, we have given to our State Department a list of capabilities that we believe would be useful, to include police type functions, in the post-Saddam rebuilding of the country. Our State Department is going out to other nations asking them to con- tribute along those lines, yes, sir. Senator LEVIN. Have we had any success yet, do you know? General PACE. Sir, I do not know. Senator LEVIN. Then finally, Mr. Secretary, back to you relative to the Office of Reconstruction and Humanitarian Assistance. What role, if any, will that office play in the establishment of the Iraqi Interim Authority? Secretary WOLFOWITZ. By the way, we probably should have named it the Office of Construction and Humanitarian Assistance, because a lot of it has to just be done from scratch. But anyway, sorry for the side comment. I think the establishment of the Iraqi Interim Authority is going to be something that is going to have to be worked out really at a higher political level. We are talking about how to have a process that legitimizes what is admittedly nonetheless a kind of transi- tional arrangement. Clearly, that office will be our key bridge to the Interim Authority and our key point of contact with the In- terim Authority, but it is not the main organization to set up the Interim Authority. Senator LEVIN. Actually there was one other question. Senator Warner is also on his way back. On April 8, Dr. Condi Rice said that Afghanistan might not be a perfect guide, but there is some experience with interim authori- ties. Is there any possibility that there might be something like the meeting that was held in Germany which selected Dr. Karzai as the Afghan interim leader and that that might be used as a model for the Iraqi interim administration? Secretary WOLFOWITZ. One thing that certainly would not be a model would be to hold it outside of Iraq. We were in unique cir- cumstances in Afghanistan. We had to do it in a foreign country. What we are hoping to start with this meeting that is scheduled to take place next week is to have a kind of rolling dialogue where Iraqis that we can identify as notables, potential leaders, or those with distinguished credentials of one sort or another can come to- gether and begin to debate the issues and, indeed, to begin to de- fine what the issues are. I do not know if this is a fair way to de- scribe it, but we would envision a series of town hall assemblies in different parts of the country, where the issues can get elevated by Iraqis, not by foreigners, where I think the whole world, most im- portantly Iraqis, can get some idea of who are the people that can articulate positions well, who seem to speak for more than just themselves. That out of that process we would hopefully be able to reach some kind of a consensus on how to set up this Interim Au- thority. It is a much more developed society than Afghanistan. It does not have the tribal structure that Afghanistan had. So the idea of an Interim Authority I think applies, but the constitution of it is very different. VerDate 11-SEP-98 12:05 Jul 29, 2004 Jkt 000000 PO 00000 Frm 00065 Fmt 6633 Sfmt 6602 94843.042 SARMSER2 PsN: SARMSER2 63 Senator LEVIN. Will the Office of Reconstruction and Humani- tarian Assistance be organizing those meetings around Iraq, start- ing with the one next week? Secretary WOLFOWITZ. The main focus of that office is to get the food, water, and electricity flowing. Senator LEVIN. Who will be organizing the meetings? Secretary WOLFOWITZ. General Franks is going to be the host of the meetings. We are organizing them in partnership with the three coalition countries that have troops on the ground, the U.K., the Australians, and the Poles. We are inviting the U.N. and other coalition partners to come as observers. We are basing it on the various ways which we have had of iden- tifying people as potential leaders. That includes people we have dealt with over many years as part of the external opposition. It includes people in the north who have established themselves as clear leaders in the north. But increasingly, and this is the phe- nomenon we are dealing with, it is people who are coming forward out of liberated areas in the south and identifying themselves as representing something substantial. Our only criterion is that to come to this you need to have a com- mitment to a free and democratic Iraq and not be a Baathist killer. Senator LEVIN. If you would supply to the committee for the record the procedures, the description of who is invited to these meetings, I think it would be helpful to us. [The information referred to follows:] Senator Levin’s question refers to the two political meetings that were held in April immediately following the fall of Baghdad and the liberation of Iraq. The list of invitees for these meetings was drawn from a number of sources. Prominent Kurdish leaders were included, from areas which had been governed autonomously under the protection of Operation Northern Watch throughout the 1990s. Iraqi oppositionists who had been living in exile were also invited. Additionally, the coali- tion invited individuals who had been living under Saddam’s rule inside Iraq for many years. They were known to us largely by word-of-mouth, and we actively solic- ited recommendations for prominent individuals to include from our friends in the external Iraqi opposition. The only criterion for participation in these meetings was a commitment to democratic principles and an eagerness to work with the coalition to effect the reconstruction of Iraq. Secretary WOLFOWITZ. I would emphasize that it is a process more than a blueprint. We will keep you posted as it rolls. Senator LEVIN. Thank you. Chairman WARNER. Senator Levin, I think that is a very impor- tant line of questions. Really, I somehow wish that this very valu- able segment of your testimony had been shared by more col- leagues. I think you have laid it out quite well here in this conclud- ing colloquy with my good friend and colleague. Secretary WOLFOWITZ. I appreciate the questions. I imagine the two of you understand it better than I because you have been in the midst of the rough and tumble of American politics. Democracy is a messy thing. Senator LEVIN. It does not show, though, does it? Secretary WOLFOWITZ. As Churchill said, though, it is so much better than the alternatives. People who said that this horrible dic- tator provided stability should ask themselves what kind of stabil- ity was he providing. But we should understand that there is a lot of uncertainty and unpredictability about a democratic method. Chairman WARNER. I think Churchill said he knew of no better. VerDate 11-SEP-98 12:05 Jul 29, 2004 Jkt 000000 PO 00000 Frm 00066 Fmt 6633 Sfmt 6602 94843.042 SARMSER2 PsN: SARMSER2 64 Secretary WOLFOWITZ. Okay, thanks. I stand corrected. Chairman WARNER. I am fascinated with that chapter in history. When we ask questions about General Garner, do not mis- construe. This committee wants to be supportive. We think this is—I think I can speak for the committee—a constructive step to give this distinguished officer, now retired, these challenges. Is there a document which gives him a mission statement or the pa- rameters in which you are to operate? Perhaps you can provide that to the committee so we understand it. Secretary WOLFOWITZ. I would be happy to. [The information referred to follows:] ORHA was established by National Security Presidential Directive 24 on Post- War Iraq Reconstruction. It was signed on January 20, 2003. The classification of the document is Secret. This information is contained in a Presidential Document (NSPD) which is unreleasable for the record. Chairman WARNER. Senator Levin and I visited with the Sec- retary the other day. He said he hopes to have him physically, to- gether with his organization, in country—he may well be there now for all I know—showing that he is to step up even before the final phases of this operation militarily and begin to undertake his task. He will be reporting directly to CENTCOM, is that correct? That is his chain of reporting? Secretary WOLFOWITZ. That is correct. Events have really outpaced any plans we drew, so the thought is to move him up here sooner, up north sooner than we had thought. Chairman WARNER. I just want you to depart here with the feel- ing that the committee wants to be supportive, and to the extent we are informed I think better enables us to be supportive, because hopefully in the near future there will be some chain of events which will signal to the world and certainly the leaders of the coali- tion forces that their goals have been achieved. Now, whether that will be a dramatic event whereby suddenly Saddam Hussein comes out and is either captured or admits defeat, I do not know. He is so enigmatic that we cannot speculate as to what he might do if he is still alive. But nevertheless, it could well be that there will be a chain of events where you have to reach a conclusion that this operation has achieved its initial goals, albeit that the country will have small pockets of instability and threat both to the citizens and to the military forces. But then we move towards I think this very in- teresting chapter that you bring up, allowing the Iraqis to begin a dialogue amongst themselves, town forums, whatever the case may be. If you had an opportunity to sit down and do a time line, how soon do you think an interim government might be constituted? Secretary WOLFOWITZ. You mean as opposed to an Interim Au- thority? Chairman WARNER. Yes. Well, the Interim Authority I think; that is CENTCOM and General Garner that are a part of the In- terim Authority, is it not? Secretary WOLFOWITZ. No. Chairman WARNER. Let us get these definitions then straight. VerDate 11-SEP-98 12:05 Jul 29, 2004 Jkt 000000 PO 00000 Frm 00067 Fmt 6633 Sfmt 6602 94843.042 SARMSER2 PsN: SARMSER2 65 Secretary WOLFOWITZ. It is important. Let me not guess at the term. There is a notion that you have an initial administration, which is the Garner operation or the Garner operation assisting the existing Iraqi administration. Chairman WARNER. I look upon it as CENTCOM as the initial. Secretary WOLFOWITZ. Fine. That is coalition actually. Chairman WARNER. Garner is an important adjunct of CENTCOM to get a variety of tasks achieved which are not the di- rect responsibility of a trained professional military. Secretary WOLFOWITZ. Right. Then at some point, and one would like it sooner rather than later, you have an Interim Authority. The reason you do not want to try to go and propose the composi- tion of that Interim Authority right now or even its size or its structure is that there are an awful lot of Iraqis who might be good candidates to be in that who are not free to even speak right now or some who may be free to speak but their families are not. While we are going to have a big say in how the Interim Authority is set up, we would like our judgments to be based on what we can dis- cern to be a kind of consensus of Iraqi views. Once that Interim Authority is established, then it has two tasks. One is to facilitate the transition of the administration from the co- alition under General Franks’ control to the Interim Authority. But even more important is to facilitate the process by which a perma- nent government is established to do the things like the organiza- tion of a constitutional convention and the processes by which a constitution would be ratified and maybe some process, starting with local elections, leading to national elections, but to begin to develop by Iraqis institutions that legitimately represent Iraqis. It is foolish to try to put a timeframe on it. I mentioned the other day and probably got myself in trouble that in northern Iraq, where it was a much simpler task and they did not establish a per- manent government but they have done amazingly well. We were gone in 6 months. It is a much more complicated country. I do not think that is realistic. But what the northern Iraq experience brings out—and you have somebody who lived through all of it sitting on my left—is that to some extent the faster you push people the better they do. It is like the problem, if you leave the training wheels on a bicycle too long the kid never learns to ride. So we want to keep it moving. We want to push it. But we want to make sure that when the training wheels are off the bicycle does not fall over. Chairman WARNER. Let me just push a little bit on the definition of Interim Authority. Would that be, let us call it a council of, say, 12 individuals with the majority vote as the decision of the Interim Authority? Or will they will elect their own leader, say the chair- man of the council? Can you give us some idea of the fabric of what the Interim Au- thority plans on doing? Secretary WOLFOWITZ. I could sketch a notion, but the problem is that would be my notion. I think one of the things we would like to have in these meetings, of which the first one will be next week, is for Iraqis to lay out their own notions of what they would like to see. We are going to have to try to discern in that a consensus on something that to us makes sense, because we do have a say VerDate 11-SEP-98 12:05 Jul 29, 2004 Jkt 000000 PO 00000 Frm 00068 Fmt 6633 Sfmt 6602 94843.042 SARMSER2 PsN: SARMSER2 66 in the Interim Authority. We do not have a say in the final govern- ment of the country. I guess to try to answer your question, I think it should have both representative capacity, which tends you toward large num- bers, and some executive capacity, which tends you toward small ones. So I think if I were an Iraqi, I would say let us have a council of size 3X and a management committee of size X and the manage- ment committee will do the administration piece. But they may have a different view. Chairman WARNER. I think somebody has to start and it seems to me a group of persons, call it a council for lack of a better term, and then they themselves elect that individual or decide on a deci- sion process. We have seen enough indecision in groups so far. Let us structure it or hopefully structure it so it can reach a decision, for better or for worse, and move forward with that decision. Secretary WOLFOWITZ. I think when it is structured it has to be a group that is capable of reaching decisions. I think that is clear. Otherwise it is not going to function. Chairman WARNER. We certainly agree on that. Senator Levin, I think we have had an excellent hearing. We thank you, Mr. Secretary. We thank you, General Pace. We welcome and thank you, our good friend, General Jones. General JONES. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. Chairman WARNER. Nice to have you back, and from all reports you are just doing marvelously in your new assignment, and enjoy- ing it with your very wonderful wife. General JONES. Very much so. Thank you, Senator. Chairman WARNER. Thank you. Good day. We are adjourned. [Questions for the record with answers supplied follow:] QUESTIONS SUBMITTED BY SENATOR EDWARD M. KENNEDY LAW AND ORDER IN IRAQ 1. Senator KENNEDY. Secretary Wolfowitz and General Pace, we see a continuing problem for law and order, with looting in many cities. In Basra, government offices, banks, shops, hotels, and homes have been stripped bare. Ambulances were even used to carry off looted goods. The British are quoted in the Washington Post as saying that looting and disorder are problems, but they are not there as a police force. U.S. Brigadier General Vincent Brooks told a news briefing at Central Com- mand that there is often a ‘‘temporary vacuum’’ of control in areas that had just been liberated. If not the United States or Britain, who is there to meet the policing needs of Iraq? Secretary WOLFOWITZ. We are working to identify Iraqi national police officers who are not associated with the abuses of the former regime and can therefore re- sume their activities. Coalition military forces are working with these Iraqi police to maintain basic law and order, including stopping looting. General PACE. Coalition forces arriving in urban areas had as their first priority the mission of engaging the enemy, as combat operations were still ongoing. In many instances throughout the conflict, Iraqi organized military resistance collapsed and enemy troops fled very rapidly, often before the U.S. military even arrived on the scene. Although organized military resistance collapsed, our forces continued to face snipers, terrorists, and fighters loyal to Saddam Hussein. Coalition forces are responsible for providing a stable and secure environment to allow the Iraqi people to take charge of their own government and their own future. We are working closely with our allies, the Office of Reconstruction and Humani- tarian Assistance (ORHA), nongovernmental organizations, the international com- munity, and re-emerging elements of the Iraqi police to restore order in Iraq as quickly as possible. This process can be expected to take some time to complete. VerDate 11-SEP-98 12:05 Jul 29, 2004 Jkt 000000 PO 00000 Frm 00069 Fmt 6633 Sfmt 6621 94843.042 SARMSER2 PsN: SARMSER2 67 2. Senator KENNEDY. Secretary Wolfowitz and General Pace, what is being done right now to deal with this growing law and order problem? Secretary WOLFOWITZ. Coalition forces are conducting joint patrols with Iraqi po- lice officers not associated with the abuses of the former regime. General PACE. Coalition forces are working to restore law and order in Iraq as quickly as possible. Civil affairs personnel are currently assessing the situation on the ground and are preparing recommendations on needs and conditions. Coalition forces are working with local authorities and Iraqi police to restore law and order. Coalition forces have appealed to local police to return to work. Thousands have al- ready responded in Baghdad alone. Initially, the returning Iraqi police will be un- armed and patrol jointly with coalition forces. I am confident that these measures will go far to restore law and order. 3. Senator KENNEDY. Secretary Wolfowitz and General Pace, how will it be ad- dressed in a more permanent way over the next 6 months? Secretary WOLFOWITZ. In the medium- to long-term, ORHA will implement a training program to develop a cadre of police officers, judges, and corrections officers who are able to operate in a democratic system based on the rule of law. These pro- grams will be similar to programs undertaken in Kosovo, Bosnia, Haiti, and other countries to develop professional, well-trained judicial officials. General PACE. Our desire is to return full responsibility for maintaining law and order to the Iraqis as soon as possible. In the interim, several of our coalition part- ners have volunteered constabulary forces and gendarmerie to help. The ORHA will assume oversight for reconstituting the Iraqi police force. Between the soldiers on the ground, the solid offers of assistance from our international partners, and ORHA’s efforts, I am confident that Iraqis themselves will soon begin to assume greater responsibility for maintaining law and order in a post-Saddam Iraq. HUMANITARIAN CRISIS 4. Senator KENNEDY. Secretary Wolfowitz, the Red Cross has been reporting that the humanitarian situation in Baghdad is ‘‘extremely critical.’’ Hospitals have been overwhelmed with wounded people—some with 100 new patients per day. Medical facilities have no electricity or water. The only significant relief agency in the coun- try is the Red Cross/Red Crescent, and they’ve suspended humanitarian operations because of the chaos in Iraq. What plans are in place to work with the U.N. and international relief agencies waiting for the opportunity to help? Secretary WOLFOWITZ. In recent public remarks the President of the International Committee of the Red Cross Kellenberger clearly stated his impression, based on a recent visit to Iraq, that there is no current humanitarian crisis in Iraq. Through a combination of careful interagency planning and the skill of our combat forces, the coalition has averted a humanitarian crisis in Iraq. There have been no widespread or sustained population displacements, no perva- sive food shortages, no significant disease outbreaks, no flood of civilian casualties, and no systematic ethnic reprisals. With regard to the health system, we are seeing improvements everyday. Hospital facilities are being refurbished and hospital workers are returning to work. The coa- lition is working with the United Nations to reestablish the Iraqi Ministry of Health. Most hospitals have adequate supplies and the medical supply distribution system is being restarted. With regard to the United Nations and other international relief agencies, the co- alition initiated outreach to these groups well in advance of the conflict in order to promote and facilitate their activities within Iraq. The coalition, under the direction of the Kuwaiti government, established a Humanitarian Operations Center in Ku- wait to facilitate and share information regarding humanitarian operations. The USG has also provided hundreds of millions of dollars to these organizations to pre- pare for and respond to humanitarian needs within Iraq. Most of the major U.N. sectoral agencies are already back at work in Iraq with hundreds of international and national staff on the ground. 5. Senator KENNEDY. Secretary Wolfowitz, how are you addressing the NGO com- munities’ needs to provide aid and yet maintain independence from the coalition’s military structure? Secretary WOLFOWITZ. Even before the conflict in Iraq, DOD, working with the interagency, conducted outreach with a cross-section of NGOs and relief agencies in order to hear their concerns and facilitate their humanitarian preparations and re- sponse. The coalition, under the direction of the civilian side of the Kuwaiti govern- VerDate 11-SEP-98 12:05 Jul 29, 2004 Jkt 000000 PO 00000 Frm 00070 Fmt 6633 Sfmt 6621 94843.042 SARMSER2 PsN: SARMSER2 68 ment, helped establish a Humanitarian Operations Center in Kuwait to promote NGO access to Iraq, facilitate preparations, and share information. NGOs have not been and will not be forced to give up their independence and have not and will not be controlled by the coalition. The coalition goal is to provide a permissive environment in which NGOs can operate and to facilitate these oper- ations to the extent possible. The coalition military structure is also closely aligned with the USG Disaster Assistance Response Team and other USG civilian struc- tures, which serve as the USG/coalition interface with NGOs. In addition the coali- tion is promoting and facilitating an active U.N. role in interfacing with NGOs. TUG OF WAR BETWEEN THE DEPARTMENTS OF STATE AND DEFENSE 6. Senator KENNEDY. Secretary Wolfowitz, the media have widely reported on the battle between the State Department and the Pentagon over who will have respon- sibility for which reconstruction issues. Press reports say that the Pentagon vetoed the entire team of eight officials, proposed by the State Department, to step in and begin to run a post-war Iraq. The other week Secretary Powell had to ‘‘clarify’’ in a letter to the Pentagon that the teams coordinating with the various relief agencies would report to AID—and not to General Garner. Can you clearly tell us which re- sponsibilities the State Department will have and which the Pentagon will have? Secretary WOLFOWITZ. Ambassador Paul Bremer is the Administrator of the Coa- lition Provisional Authority. As such, he is the senior coalition official in Iraq. The Ambassador reports to the President through the Secretary of Defense. ROLE FOR THE U.N. 7. Senator KENNEDY. Secretary Wolfowitz, President Bush and Prime Minister Blair have met to discussed post-war Iraq. Both of them spoke of a ‘‘vital role’’ for the U.N. in rebuilding Iraq. There seems to be a large difference between what President Bush means by ‘‘vital role’’ for the U.N. and what the British mean. Are you willing to go to the U.N. to ask for support by the Security Council for the re- construction of Iraq? Secretary WOLFOWITZ. The U.N. will play an important role in Iraq. U.N. func- tional agencies have historically played a very large role in areas like refugee assist- ance and humanitarian relief. The World Food Program is already engaged in Iraq. We welcome the fact that the U.N. has already passed one resolution to extend the Oil-for-Food program for 45 days to continue it functioning in Iraq. 8. Senator KENNEDY. Secretary Wolfowitz, do you believe we can and should pur- sue the reconstruction and stabilization efforts in Iraq alone—troops, peacekeeping, civil administration—or do you think that we will need and want international help? Secretary WOLFOWITZ. There is definitely plenty of work for everyone. The U.N.’s World Food Program is already engaged in Iraq and the U.N. has already passed one resolution to extend the Oil-for-Food program for 45 days to continue its func- tioning in Iraq. The larger role of the U.N. will be determined in coordination with the Iraqi people, and with other members of the coalition. The World Bank and the International Monetary Fund can also play very useful roles with their financial re- sources and expertise. 9. Senator KENNEDY. Secretary Wolfowitz, what are your willing to do to patch things up with our allies? Secretary WOLFOWITZ. Allied participation in the Iraqi reconstruction has been great. To date, over 20 countries have forces on the ground in Iraq or are providing support within theater. As a more stable and permissive environment is achieved, we expect even broader coalition participation. We have also had a surge in offers of medical support to assist with humanitarian efforts and we are moving quickly to integrate these assets into our overall effort. Right now, the U.K., Australia, Den- mark, Spain, and Romania have personnel who are part of the ORHA staff. Seven- teen other countries have expressed an interest in sending personnel to take part in ORHA’s activities. $1.7 billion of humanitarian assistance has been pledged to date by a number of countries. In the longer term, we are working closely with our coalition partners to integrate additional forces into our stability and security oper- ations. VerDate 11-SEP-98 12:05 Jul 29, 2004 Jkt 000000 PO 00000 Frm 00071 Fmt 6633 Sfmt 6621 94843.042 SARMSER2 PsN: SARMSER2 69 WEAPONS OF MASS DESTRUCTION 10. Senator KENNEDY. Secretary Wolfowitz, a big issue is whether or not we are finding any weapons of mass destruction, and whether there are any. How long will it take to find convincing proof that Saddam Hussein did in fact have large quan- tities of these weapons? Secretary WOLFOWITZ. • As I have previously said, it has always been unlikely that we are going to stumble upon weapons of mass destruction. What is more likely is that we will find people who are willing and able to provide us with detailed in- formation concerning the location of the various elements of Iraq’s WMD program. • The coalition is actively seeking cooperation from Iraqi personnel—not just scientists, but also technicians, engineers, managers, and security per- sonnel who watched over them—related in any way to Saddam Hussein’s WMD programs. We are encouraging these individuals to come forward and cooperate with the coalition. • Coalition forces are conducting sensitive site exploitation missions at a number of sites identified as possibly being linked to Iraq’s WMD programs. In addition, we are conducting sensitive site exploitation operations at a number of ad hoc sites that have been identified through human intel- ligence and document exploitation. 11. Senator KENNEDY. Secretary Wolfowitz, I understand the administration has resisted the idea of inviting the U.N. inspection teams back into Iraq, and that it has hired a number of these inspectors for our own inspections team. However, even they are expressing concerns about delays and approaches to the U.S. inspection re- gime. If we find weapons of mass destruction that way, how will you convince the rest of the world about it? Secretary WOLFOWITZ. • The U.S. has incorporated a number of former U.N. inspectors and other foreign experts into its WMD discovery and exploitation teams. These per- sonnel bring with them an invaluable amount of experience, expertise, and independence. • We have also engaged the media on the issue of WMD discovery, and have allowed them to join our teams as we conduct our investigations of suspect sites. We have been forthcoming with regard to our operations and what has been found at these sites. • Finally, as we come upon suspect materials and items, we are careful to follow a very strict chain of custody requirements to ensure the integrity of any samples taken. These samples are then sent to U.S. labs for analysis; we are also exploring arrangements with qualified foreign labs to double- check and validate any findings. • That said, despite our efforts, our transparency, and the evidence we present, there will always be some people who we will be unable to con- vince. 12. Senator KENNEDY. Secretary Wolfowitz, why doesn’t it make sense to let an independent team of inspectors do the job, given all the continuing doubts about our credibility on the issue? Secretary WOLFOWITZ. • The incorporation of former U.N. inspectors and foreign experts into U.S.- led teams provides us with the expertise, experience, and independence needed to accomplish the WMD discovery mission, without jeopardizing in- telligence sources, operational efficiency, or the security and safety of team members. • Iraq remains an unstable and dangerous place, not to mention that these teams are searching for very hazardous items and materials. • We are confident that our plan and organizational structure, and the transparency measures that we have made part of this process, will allow us to accomplish this important mission in a safe, effective, and credible manner. VerDate 11-SEP-98 12:05 Jul 29, 2004 Jkt 000000 PO 00000 Frm 00072 Fmt 6633 Sfmt 6621 94843.042 SARMSER2 PsN: SARMSER2 70 CONSULTATIONS WITH CONGRESS 13. Senator KENNEDY. Secretary Wolfowitz, there has been continuing speculation on whether the administration may have similar plans for regime change in Iran and Syria. Can you tell us if there is a plan for regime change in those countries? Secretary WOLFOWITZ. As President Bush stated in his 28 January 2003 State of the Union speech, ‘‘Different threats require different strategies. In Iran, we con- tinue to see a government that represses its people, pursues weapons of mass de- struction, and supports terror. We also see Iranian citizens risking intimidation and death as they speak out for liberty and human rights and democracy. Iranians, like all people, have a right to choose their own government and determine their own destiny—and the United States supports their aspirations to live in freedom.’’ We have concerns about Syrian support of terrorism and we have conveyed these concerns to the appropriate parties. During his early May visit to Damascus, Sec- retary Powell discussed with President Asad our growing frustration with Syrian behavior, in the hope that a frank discussion might provide the impetus for a change in Syrian policy. 14. Senator KENNEDY. Secretary Wolfowitz, will you make a commitment that the administration will come to Congress first, before taking action? Secretary WOLFOWITZ. We will continue to fulfill our obligations to consult with Congress in its constitutionally mandated oversight role. CENTRAL COMMAND 15. Senator KENNEDY. General Jones, Secretary Rumsfeld has talked about reduc- ing the number of U.S. troops deployed in Germany. You have been recently quoted as ‘‘. . . looking for more flexibility’’ and ‘‘. . . a more modern approach to how you sustain [the] Armed Forces throughout the European theater.’’ In addition, there are reports circulating on changing the Cold War presence of our military in Europe. I am reminded of the way that Central Command has trans- formed over the years into an expeditionary presence in the theater with the major headquarters and supporting infrastructure being based within the continental United States. Your recent comments in the media appear to support a Central Command type of model for European Command. Is this a fair assessment of your vision for the future and if it is, do you have a target timeline for implementation? General JONES. No, we are not adopting any existing models but we have evalu- ated the unique challenges and requirements of the U.S. European Command Thea- ter. While the center of gravity in EUCOM’s area of responsibility (AOR) is aligned with Western Europe, the center of activity is expanding south and east; therefore, my component commanders and I have determined that the current footprint in EUCOM may not adequately support our mission in the future. Therefore, we have developed a strategic transformation plan for presentation to Secretary Rumsfeld before the end of May. This plan is based on the following seven assumptions, the United States: (1) Desires to maintain its current position as a nation of global influence through leadership and efficient and effective application of informational, military, eco- nomic, and diplomatic power; (2) Remains committed to its friends and allies through commitments to global and bilateral organizations and institutions, and supports treaties and international agreements to which it is a signatory; (3) Remains committed to a global strategy, a cornerstone of which is forward based and forward deployed forces in key areas which contribute to the first line of defense; (4) Supports in-depth transformation of its Armed Forces and basing structure, as required in order to respond to 21st century threats and challenges; (5) Will continue to seek ways to mitigate, or offset, obstacles posed by 21st century global sovereignty realities through a re-orientation of its land, sea, and space presence; (6) Recognizes that the current concept and disposition of U.S. basing within EUCOM may not adequately support either the strategic changes attendant to an expanded NATO alliance, or the national requirements of a rapidly changing area of responsibility; and (7) Will seek to preserve those assets which are of enduring value to its missions, goals, and national interests so long as their location measurably contributes to our global strategy, the NATO Alliance, and our bilateral engagements within theater. VerDate 11-SEP-98 12:05 Jul 29, 2004 Jkt 000000 PO 00000 Frm 00073 Fmt 6633 Sfmt 6621 94843.042 SARMSER2 PsN: SARMSER2 71 The timeline for full implementation of our strategy will occur upon approval of our plan by the Secretary of Defense. We have already commenced with a partial implementation of that plan, which is reflected in the fiscal year 2004 military con- struction (MILCON) amended budget submission, approved by Secretary Rumsfeld. The revisions within this amended budget submission represented over $150 million reductions in fiscal year 2004 MILCON projects that did not support our long-term basing strategy. Our revised fiscal year 2004 requirements will only fund those projects that support our strategic ‘‘enduring’’ bases and installations. U.S. European Command has downsized the force structure and the number of facilities in theater for over a decade. We have undergone a reduction in forces of approximately 66 percent, from 248,000 (in 1989) to 109,000 (in 2002). We have closed 566 installations along with over 356 sites and training areas. This reduction equates to 70 percent shift in personnel and facilities compared to Cold War era peaks. To respond to the dangerous and unpredictable threats of the 21st century, we are developing a strategy that matches our resources to needed capabilities. The uti- lization of a rotational basing model, more flexible and along the lines of an expedi- tionary construct, will complement our forward-basing strategy and enable us to re- verse the adverse proportions of our theater ‘‘tooth-to-tail’’ ratio. Rotational forces require less theater infrastructure and increase our agility to respond to changing environments at significantly lower costs. Compatible with our rotational forces will be a basing plan that establishes forward operating bases and forward operating lo- cations to the south and east of our AOR. These expeditionary bases will be inex- tricably linked to our main operating bases in Western Europe. Changing our basing strategy to respond to the dramatically different challenges of the new century is a key element of our transformation plan. USEUCOM, an ‘‘ocean closer,’’ is a strategic enabler. With our forward presence, bases in USEUCOM provide a springboard from which U.S. forces are able to rap- idly support efforts to the far corners of our theater and beyond our AOR. USEUCOM enjoys a robust and secure transportation network that is a tremendous power projection capability, which provides our Nation immense capability and flexi- bility to carry out our National Security Strategy. Nowhere is this better dem- onstrated than in the ongoing operations in Afghanistan and Iraq. Through the proper blend of our strategic bases with newer and more agile forward operating bases and forward operating locations, in conjunction with an expeditionary force construct, we will be positioned to more aptly influence the center of activity. 16. Senator KENNEDY. General Jones, what would be the requirements for relocat- ing your permanent headquarters? General JONES. There is no compelling requirement to relocate the headquarters within U.S. European Command. Our NATO commitment and engagement strategy make Stuttgart, Germany the most effective location for our headquarters. GENERAL JAY GARNER 17. Senator KENNEDY. Secretary Wolfowitz, on April 9, Ahmad Chalabi, head of the Iraqi National Congress, said on CNN: ‘‘Where is General Garner now? The people need assistance here in Nasiriyah. Why are they not here? Why don’t they work to rehabilitate the electricity and water? This area is in great need of assistance now. People are hungry. Their supplies are going to run out. Basic services have to be restored. This is true all over the town. Where are they?’’ Now that Baghdad has fallen, when will General Garner and his team begin work in Iraq? Secretary WOLFOWITZ. As soon as Baghdad fell, Iraqis began working with the co- alition to help restore basic services to their cities and neighborhoods—services like clean drinking water, electricity, security, health care, food assistance. Ambassador Bremer, the Coalition Provisional Authority, is now in Baghdad and has made great progress in improving the standard of living of the Iraqi people. [Whereupon, at 12:39 p.m., the committee adjourned.] Æ VerDate 11-SEP-98 12:05 Jul 29, 2004 Jkt 000000 PO 00000 Frm 00074 Fmt 6633 Sfmt 5012 94843.042 SARMSER2 PsN: SARMSER2