Note blair to bush

(d) to deal with any WMD/intelligence issues. The idea should be to get to September with the ability to bring it all together in a comprehensive way, showing how terrorism can be countered and security enhanced by a combination of tough action and intelligent diplomacy in order to spread freedom and democracy, in particular in the greater Middle East. Here is a possible timetable and strategy: 1. Iraq Week of 21 June: The IIG publishes an action plan on Iraqiisation of Iraq's security. Iraqi PM hosts a meeting of MNF defence chiefs in Iraq to launch it; requests NATO training; and does interviews. 27- 29 June. Iraqi Defence Minister meets MNF Defence Ministers (? in Rome) - to give political blessing to Iragi plan and set out agreed MNF strategy after handover. NATO agrees training support for Iraq in response to IIG request. DECLASSIFIED obvious. The numbers in the police etc are there. But not the quality or equipment, e.g. only 7,000 of the 80,000 police are Academy trained; 62,000 have no training; only 9% have proper body armour; only 30% of the required vehicles are in place. Apparently the logjam on resources and equipment is now broken. But it will take time. And the Iraqi Army isn't really started yet. All of this is now urgent. We should ask General Petraeus for weekly reports on progress. I have told the Iraqi PM to feel free to pick up the phone if there are problems he can't resolve at the MNF level. We need a clear, forward-looking announcement by Allawi next week. This will need help from US/UK. Afghanistan DECLASSIFIED 3. MEPP I have now re-read all the papers on this. You were right. The problem is that the Roadmap assumes, for Phase I, security and political change in the PA through empowered Ministers that hasn't happened. As a result Israel has not been under pressure to deliver their side. So the problem is not absence of support for the Roadmap in theory; just that the practical steps aren't in place to get into the Roadmap process. To be fair the Quartet statement in May 2004 recognised this and calls for further work. But I'm not sure this is being driven with the urgency and focus it needs. DECLASSIFIED Minister free from Presidential interference and under the sole authority of the PM. The Egyptian/Israeli proposals-can be written into this plan. There should be a US/UK/Egypt/PA/Israel/Jordan* steeting group on security; *(c)* an economic plan; with money routed through the World Bank Frust Fund, drawing on priorities established by the Ad Hoc-Liaison.an Committee; (d) Israeli action to ease conditions now in the West Bank and Gaza. In parallel, we should pursue privately a deal that allows Arafat to travel on the basis he cedes full power to the Ministers. We should then aim to have all this sanctioned by a new UNSCR, in September/October, working to a timetable for implementation in time to take advantage of Sharon's disengagement plan, which is due to start not later than 1 March 2005. DECLASSIFIED At present the public debate lurches between two extremes: pro-war people insist the intelligence was right, but the plain fact is no WMD has been found; anti-war people claim it was all a fraud, as if Saddam never really had any WMD, which is plainly fatuous. From what I can gather, the ISG thinking, and probably the truth, is somewhere in between. He was developing long range ballistic missile capability in breach of UN Resolutions; he probably had no or no large stockpiles of tactical CW or BW weapons; but he retained the capability and expertise to recommence production as soon as he could, again in breach of UN Resolutions. And, of course, with the missile capability, he could fit any warhead he wanted at the appropriate time. So he had strategic intent and capability on WMD; and an active programme on ballistic missiles. Such an explanation would mean that some of the intelligence upon which we acted was wrong; but that nonetheless the threat was there, as was the breach of UN Resolutions. It would also explain why the picture was so confused and why, whilst the exact basis of action was not as we thought, the action was still justified. DECLASSIFIED If Duelfer is thinking along these lines, it makes sense to me to get the ISG report out at the same time, i.e. provide the clear evidential basis for saying there was indeed a threat, even if different in nature to the one we anticipated. We should investigate this urgently. It may be impossible but if at all possible we should have this issue dealt with and lanced all at the same time. Therefore, a possible timetable would be this. Week of 21 June: Iraqiisation plan 27-29 June NATO: Iraqi training support, meeting. between MNF Defence Ministers and Iraqi Defence Minster Afghan re-commitment 30 June: Iraq handover end June/early July: Quartet MEPP Plan July: National Iraqi conference mid July: WMD reports/ISG early Sept: International Conference on Iraq Sept/Oct: UNSCR on MEPP DECLASSIFIED DECLASSIFIED