النص مستخرج آلياً من صورة الوثيقة أو من ملف قديم، وقد يحتوي أخطاء في بعض الكلمات أو ترتيب الأسطر. الملف الأصلي هو المرجع.
medium term.
UK Objective
Reform across the full range of security activities (armed forces, intelligence agencies, justice and law enforcement institutions) is an essential element of the overall Coalition strategy to establish a united and representative Iraqi government and to create the conditions under which the Coalition can eventually disengage.
The objective must be the transformation of Iraq's security institutions so that they play an effective, legitimate and democratically accountable role in providing external and internal security for Iraq's citizens. The approach should reflect international consensus on the key principles of SSR, and must be led by a properly representative Iraqi Authority supported technically and financially by Coalition actors. UK experience suggests that a coherent strategy will need effective burden sharing and realistically will also require the extended involvement of NGOs and other SSR actors. Immediate decisions and urgent action is needed to deal with the potential problems of unemployed and disaffected military and security service personnel.
US Approach
The US approach is embryonic, and differences of opinion in their administration are readily apparent. Nevertheless, it seems likely that the US favours a narrow approach to SSR. The recent IPU led v. sit to ORHA established that US planning for SSR was split across ORHA's different strands. Their approach sees SSR elements implemented through different DECLASSIFIED
novour lot the munety or borerror Slocombe is actively seeking Coalition partners to join his team and a number of key posts within the organisation have been identified for possible UK secondees.
Police and judicial reform (including prisons) is being planned and potentially executed by the Interior Ministry and Justice Sector / Civil Administration Pillar in ORHA
• Accordingly, we must recognise that influencing US views may prove difficult, and will undoubtedly require considerable resources and sustained effort. There is concern that:
a. The US approach lacks strategic vision across the security sector.
This could hazard achievement of the conditions that would allow the Coalition to reduce its presence in Iraq; and currently b. We are poorly positioned to influence the US decision-makers.
UK Immediate Priorities
Immediate Priorities are to:
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particularly from the UN and IFls. This will avoid fragmentation and bilateral donor leads; and d.
Identify and advise the Iraqi institutions that will be responsible for co-ordinating an overall security architecture.
UK Options: Near Term
Ministers have already agreed to UK engagement in ORHA and a significant deployment of officials is now in hand. Contact with US officials suggests that the UK will neither be required nor able to develop an independent policy on SSR in Iraq. A pragmatic focus must therefore focus upon refinement of US plans. UK military SSR scoping studies have been fed into CENTCOM and it is recognised that we have substantial practical cross-government experience to offer. In line with our policy of engagement with ORHA we should, as a minimum:
a. Seek to take up a senior appointment within Slocombe's organisation to ensure adequate UK oversight of the military process, b. Continue to maintain UK staff within ORHA's civil administration pillar;
and
c. Enhance our links with the US intelligence agencies on SSR issues.
While such an approach would maintain UK visibility of ORHA SSR activity it would not ensure delivery of effective re-training or cultural change in the Iraqi security sector. Nor would UK defence export opportunities be fully exploited.
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vvlmst tie bercnoe muvioury tcam vi comimnue tu suppott levol.
Iraq it must be recognised that the posts envisaged in ORHA are beyond the scope of DAT and will have to be met from across government. Finally, it should be acknowledged that these initiatives would enhanced by a willingness to engage Washington on SSR issues of substance.
Iraq Planning Unit
May 2003
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TATAL P.0S