Paper reith operation telic phase 4 the joint commanders draft operational concept

resistance from the Iraqi Regular Army is minimal and likely to remain so, whilst that offered by the Republican Guard remains to be determined. However, regime die-hards and zealots are actively engaging coalition forces at a low level. This tactic has achieved some limited success in urban areas, offering the possibility of a more sustained asymmetric conflict, but has had little operational level impact thus far. Phase 4 operations will begin in southern Iraq within days. Yet the strategic backdrop to their implementation is uncertain and changing. Difficult but important issues, principally of governance, UN engagement and military involvement, remain unresolved. And the baseline conditions from which they will commence are far from clear. More positively, significant resources have been made available for humanitarian assistance from both governmental and other agencies. Ministers have delegated appropriate levels of funding to the Jt Comd for that purpose. 3. An enduring, operational level, concept is required to provide clarity and direction in a situation which is presently ill defined and which could develop in a number of ways. AIM 4. The aim of this paper is to define an operational concept for the employment of UK forces in Iraq throughout phase 4 of Operation TELIC CONSTRAINTS 5. The following constraints have been assumed: a. A UNSCR mandate for phase 4 operations is not guaranteed and in any event is unlikely to be in place for several weeks. During the period when a UNSCR is not in place military operations will, in varying degree, be both directed and constrained by the Hague and Geneva Conventions. c. The strategic level context is presently uncertain and will change over time. 1 of 8 DECLASSIFIED by the nature of phase 3 operations. Governance. The US approach to establishing an Interim Iraqi Authority (IA) lacks clarity and a number of bold assumptions have been made. There is also disagreement both within the US administration, and between the US and the international community, over the role of the UN. It is highly probable that considerable military co-ordination will be required, at least in the early stages. Whilst an early UNSCR enabling Oil for Food appears achievable, discussions to secure a further resolution authorising transitional arrangements in phase 4 are in their infancy. The latter resolution would underpin US and UK attempts to build a wider coalition. CFLCC Concept. As warfighting operations end, CFLCC will transition his forces to establish a coalition presence throughout Iraq and establish a secure environment. This transition period will be uncertain and of indeterminate duration. With security established at an appropriate level, his intent is to encourage existing Iraqi government structures and provincial authorities to function as normal. Where they cannot, he recognises the need to provide a military lead at provincial level until normal functioning resumes or alternative structures are put in place. The provincial level provides the link between central and local government, and military boundaries should be co-terminus with provincial boundaries. Once the lIA is established, in whatever form, and governors appointed, the principal role of the military should reduce to the provision of security. However, strong links between coalition and Iraqi military and civil organisations at all levels will continue to be essential. The design for establishing a secure environment will initially be based on in-place forces conducting framework operations, but should change as quickly as possible to focus on the control of difficult areas supported by quick response forces within the designated AOR. Legal Basis. operational directive? The legal basis for Op TELIC has been clearly defined in CDS' , which remains extant. For phase 4 operations without a UNSCR, the Hague and Geneva Conventions have particular significance. The international legal and other obligations that these conventions place on an occupying force are extensive, not least to protect the civilian population, and they apply to the whole of Iraq. Should the UN authorise the coalition operation it is likely, based on precedent, that the responsibilities Managing the Means; D/COSSEC/40/1/4 dated 23 Mar 03. ' Briefed to COS on 10 Mar 03 2 of 8 DECLASSIFPED Force Levels. There is a recognised need for additional forces in Iraq to secure ground already taken, show Iraq-wide coalition presence, and provide CFLCC with operational flexibility. 4(US) ID and 3ACR will achieve full capability around the end of April. This represents a significant uplift in combat power, but not for a month. Further US force deployments are planned. If approved by SECDEF, they could become available during June. To date there has been no firm commitment from other coalition partners to provide ground forces. Such offers as have been made are on an informal basis at up to battalion strength only. 12. Endstate. The UK has now issued its military campaign objectives. The end-state remains our intent to see Iraq become a stable, united and law abiding state, within its present borders, co-operating with the international community, no longer posing a threat to its neighbours or to international security, abiding by all its international obligations and providing effective representative government for its own people. The objectives also make it clear that UK forces should withdraw as soon as possible. That aspiration will require at least some success in achievement of the other objectives. KEY DEDUCTIONS 13. The following key deductions can be drawn: a. The strategic context to the operation lacks certainty. Internationalisation is likely to be slow as nations take a view on the likelihood of overall success before committing themselves. b. The operational design must be sufficiently flexible to remain coherent within an ill-defined strategic context which is likely to change. * Boundaries define a geographical AO assigned to a commander and may change over time. This allocation of space is essential for the successful conduct of all military operations. Within the AO the commander has both responsibilities and freedoms in the conduct of operations. His ability to meet these is the key determinant to establishing force levels. 3 of 8 DECUASSIFIED the legal and other obligations of an occupying power must be met. The AOR may not necessarily be contiguous from the outset, but we should aim for this as soon as possible. If there is no effective governance in place, forces will have responsibilities for co-ordinating, and in some cases delivering, many aspects of life in Iraq. h. The military role in support of the civil sector could be prolonged. i. In Iraq the provincial level provides the link between central government and local administration. Military boundaries should be co-terminus with provincial boundaries, which will, in turn, define an AOR. j. There may be a need for more rather than less coalition forces in the short term, depending on the nature and outcome of phase 3 and the level of consent established as a result. The US will have no further formations available until late April. DESIGN FOR OPERATIONS In essence, the operational design should be predicated on the empowerment of Iraqi institutions and mechanisms of governance appropriately supported by international military and other organisations. Whilst the degree of support afforded will change in function and strength over time, the method by which it is applied must be consistent throughout. Underpinning this design is the maintenance of a secure environment, the establishment of an effective liaison structure and the achievement of consent. THE JOINT COMMISSION STRUCTURE 15. The Joint Commission (JC) Concept. The JC is a proven and familiar model enabling effective civil-military crisis co-ordination. It allows the military to exercise authority and influence, yet promotes and fosters a sense of civilian ownership in the decision making process. Initially the military would lead on a JC pulling together local authorities, and other organisations including Iraqi military where feasible, into a single decision-making ' Either in some transitional or final form. 4 of 8 DECLASSIFPED MOU could be developed. Second, and perhaps more importantly, it would provide the clearest possible statement of coalition purpose to the Iraqi people, reinforcing the primacy of their governance and institutions and providing firm evidence of our intention not to establish a permanent presence. The Iragi Armed Forces. Coalition plans for Security Sector Reform (SSR), including the future shape and size of the Iraqi armed forces are undetermined. When necessary the UK will also establish liaison with the appropriate military levels of command to provide oversight. Incorporating these security aspects into the wider JC structure will be key to building early confidence in the Iraqi's ability to maintain progress towards the desired UK end-state, enabling earlier drawdown of coalition forces. We should attempt to retain as much of the Iraqi regular army intact as possible, since it will be required to maintain the country's territorial integrity in future and will thus be a contributing factor in our exit strategy. CONSENT 18. The extended UK 'box' for phase 3 extends north into Wasit province. We should anticipate that the US will ask the UK to assume responsibility for this province, as well as those to the south - Al Basrah, Dhi Qar, Maysan. All are predominately Shia and are generally not pro-Regime. However, varying internal and external influences determine the overall threat and level of consent. Anti-Coalition sentiment is predicted as low in all provinces. However, in the immediate post-conflict period, UK forces could become involved in peace enforcement operations between opposing factions. Internal tensions are greatest in Wasit and probable in Mayson and Dhi-Qar. Al Basrah should be the easiest province to govern, and is the most important in terms of geography, population and economic potential. * For example, the mayor of Basrah and his council. 5 of 8 DECLASSIFED Support Transformation of Iraqi Armed Forces Joint Commission / Liaison structure and dedicated Training Teams. Carry out Emergency UXO Clearance. RE Specialist Capability. CIMIC supported by manoeuvre forces. Support HOC (10 / NGO Activity). Defeat Terrorism J2 Specialist Capability supported by manoeuvre forces Facilitate Remedial Environmental Action Commercial Contractors supported by Specialist Capability. 21. Force Levels. The proposed SOR for MND-SE Iraq' recommends a 2-star HQ based in Basrah, three manoeuvre brigades, including combat and combat support elements. It also recommended an aviation brigade as a reserve, generating a final SOR of four brigades. This was developed following an assessment of troop to tasks, examination of population size and assumed the presence of consent. However, the ratio of one formation to each province is coincidental. For example the SOR for MND-SW Iraq, an area of 5 provinces, requires a single formation only. A UK assessment, based on anticipated levels of consent, is at Annex A. This predicts all provinces becoming areas of high consent over a period of time. UK Capability. The accuracy of the threat assessment for phase 4 at Annex A will be determined by the nature of the conflict, adjusted by a continuous assessment of risk. However, assuming internal tensions are high, initial operations are likely to involve a continuous effort to preserve and sustain a consensual framework. This will potentially require a brigade level of command for each province. At the present scale of effort the UK has the capacity to do this, accepting some operational risk. However, commitment on this scale could prejudice our ability to reduce force levels in the short term. This would have wider impact on the UK's ability to generate and sustain forces for other tasks and should be avoided if possible. Therefore, any extension of UK responsibility beyond Basrah province should preferably be achieved through support from other coalition partners, operating under a UK 2-star divisional HQ. Liaison teams would be established providing Indicators and Warning (I&W) with mobile, quick reaction reserves held near main population centres. Iragi Reactions. As internal tensions subside, consent in Iraq will grow dependent on confidence in the US inspired IIA, engagement of local Iraqi governance and growth of HA / immediate reconstruction to improve quality of life. The Iraqi population must also be ' This has not yet been approved by CFLCC, but has been developed by his staff 6 of 8 DEELASSIFED 25. Engagement with US. The UK has no option but to use UK forces initially nedium scale as rapidly as possible - which must be balanced against achieving our widelo political objectives in Iraq - the issue of UK responsibilities in phase 4 needs to be concluded with the US. The UK would wish to concentrate in one area of Iraq, potentially Basrah, for ease of command and control and logistic support; this division of responsibility has yet to be agreed formally. This will require CJO engagement with CFC. Agreement to an AOR would allow planning for phase 4 to be taken forward in confidence. In the future the ORBAT for the later stages of phase 4 should be task-based. This would potentially see an increased multinational presence, possibly a move away from armour, but with the retention of armoured / mechanised infantry. In addition some specialist capabilities could be much in demand. CONCLUSIONS 26. The operational concept for phase 4 should flow from the following principles: a. Military boundaries should be co-terminus with provincial boundaries and define an AOR. Within an AOR, forces should be deployed according to need on an intelligence-led rather than framework basis with emphasis on 1& W and mobility. b. The operational design should be predicated on the empowerment of Iraqi institutions and mechanisms of governance appropriately supported by international military and other organisations. The Joint Commission structure balances the military imperative with the needs of the Iraqi people, and is a proven and familiar model enabling effective civil- military crisis co-ordination. UK forces should adopt it. Success will require resolution by conciliation rather than force. Consent is therefore the key determinant. It is this that will determine the size, shape, capabilities and focus for a military force. However, the true nature of phase 4 operations is as yet not clear. A continuous 27. assessment of risk over time needs to be made, set against the following factors: 7 of 8 DECLASSIFED operating at full capability. Thus the UK needs to be prepared to bridge the gap in force levels providing a larger presence over a longer period of time than perhaps it would desire. RECOMMENDATIONS 27. COS are invited to agree that: a. Our linkage with the Iraqis should reflect their system of governance and should thus be arranged on a provincial basis. b. UK forces should use the joint commission model. C. Forces should be deployed on an intelligence-led rather than framework basis with emphasis on I&W and mobility. d Any extension of UK responsibility beyond Basrah province should preferably erate under a UK 2-sfar divisional ition partners, who would deploy forces to J G REITH Lt Gen CJO Annex: A. Threat Assessment and Force Levels. 8 of 8 DECLASSIFIED