Telegram 51 basra to fco london south iraq before and after transition

VULY FM BASRA TO FCOLN 051445Z DEC GRS 1158 ESTRICTED FM CPA BASRA TO IMMEDIATE FCO TELNO 51 OF 051445Z DECEMBER 03 INFO IMMEDIATE CABINET OFFICE, DFID, WASHINGTON REF: YOUR TELNO 9 TO BASRA SUBJECT: SOUTH IRAQ: BEFORE AND AFTER TRANSMISSION please PASS TO IRAQ REP AND PJHO SUBJECT: SOUTH IRAQ: BEFORE AND AFTER TRANSITION SUMMARY 1. Grateful for recruitment efforts up to now. Adequate human resources are yet more important within a compressed timetable. Come recommendations, drawing on impressions from my calls in ..ondon last week, for approaches up to and beyond dissolution of CPA. Feedback requested DETAIL 2. I am grateful for the considerable efforts which have been made to fulfil my requests for staffing and armoured vehicles (TUR). I realise that this intrinsically complex task has been made more difficult by the widely held perception that secondment to Basra might involve danger, discomfort and long hours with little reward (although, seen from here, some of these concerns are exaggerated). 3. But, without wishing to seem to complain. I must point out the long timescale involved in actual delivery (para 3 of TUR) and the implications of this for the future. In practice, a third of the 37 staff requested in early September are not expected to arrive until somé time in January (para 3 of TUR), a lead time of DECLASSIFIED " was put to me in London last week that the search for candidates had been rendered more difficult by lack of specificity over job descriptions, or by modifications to my original bids in the meantime. While I sympathise with this, I must emphasise that is reflects the very nature of the problem. As I have repeatedly stressed, the needs on the ground are virtually limitless. Tasks cannot be given precision until there is an expert on the ground who is capable of making an informed assessment. In the early stages my small team were almost entirely generalists. Once we have had experts in place we have found, almost invariably, that they successfully decide what needs to be done and get on with it. (It is particularly galling to have a new arrival in Baghdad pronounce on what is or is not appropriate in Basra with no prior consultation here (para 4 of TUR)). 6. These considerations have a bearing on future efforts over maintaining staff levels. It would be a mistake to take the view that the needs will fall away on 30 June, for the reasons in para 4 above. So we shall continue to need: expertise in fields for which we have already bid; replacements for existing staff; and, possibly, other staff to deal with unforeseen issues which may arise in the interim. Specifically: 'a) There is a mismatch between Ministers' emphasis to me last eek on the political importance of our activity and Michael Jay's account of Whitehall Permanent Secretaries' concerns over duty of care. The latter may increase the difficulty of recruiting even willing civil servants (we have seen specific examples of this in relation to certain ministries). I am glad that Michael resolved to have another go. (b) Further efforts may be needed to encourage recruitment of officials. An enhanced financial package might help (I am not convinced by the judgment conveyed to me by several officials last week that it would make no difference: that was not the case, in my experience, either here or when times were hard in Pakistan) In any event, officials will cost the taxpayer far less than those recruited on the open market (c) Because of the long lead times regrettably involved, the question of succession needs to be addressed at an earlier stage than hitherto (which has led to several officers leaving without replacement). This will be particularly relevant for key officers such as the Director of Law and Order whose contract is due to DECLASSIFIED 7. My wider thoughts on the role and purpose of CPA (South) are set out in my paper of 12 November. Since it did not prove possible to discuss this collectively in London last week, and in he absence of any negative comment from either London or Baghdad, i and my staff shall continue to be guided by it. We have now also prepared a detailed Action Plan for each sector, taking account of the new timescale. We shall revise this in the light of further revisions of the Baghdad Strategic Plan, as and when these appear. 8. The foregoing relates only to the South. There may be a But, having different balance of argument in other parts of Iraq. invested so much in the South up to now, it would be a shame if the considerable beneficial results were to dissipate between now and June or thereafter. To prevent this will require a continued and sustained effort. 9. I should be grateful for feedback on this telegram. If my propositions are accepted, could I be assured of consequential and specific follow-up? If they are not, I would be glad to take the debate further. Either way, views on such matters will affect the direction of our efforts over the next seven months. I have shown this to Andy Bearpark in draft. SYNNOTT SYNNOTT YYYY MAIN 13 IRAQ/KUWAIT 13 IRAQ POLICY UNIT CONSULAR D 0 PROTOCOL D//PALACE 0 0 PS MR OBRIEN PS MR RAMMELL ADDITIONAL 1 IRAQ/KUWAIT DECLASSIFIED