النص مستخرج آلياً من صورة الوثيقة أو من ملف قديم، وقد يحتوي أخطاء في بعض الكلمات أو ترتيب الأسطر. الملف الأصلي هو المرجع.
Coalition recruited sufficient numbers of Iraqi security forces.
Retention fell during Easter crisis but recovering. ICDC perform reasonably well, the police generally poorly. Iraqi Intelligence starting slowly but performing reasonably well. Training accelerated but more needed. Fresh equipment starting to come through but more required.
Iraqi command and control embryonic. To be successful Iraqi leaders needed. Army to be reorientated from external threat to counter- insurgency. A solution is to soften de-Ba'athification and rehire selected senior and middle-ranking officers of the former regime. Only just starting to happen.
Matthew Rycroft asked for a note on Iraqiisation: recruitment, retention, operational effectiveness and command and control. This is a revised version of the quick piece produced on 27 April, including new information and comments from departments. It also incorporates information on Iraqi requested.
civilian casualties and the security handover in MND (SE) subsequently Army
2.
Iraqi Army personnel were not involved in the recent security crisis. In response to recent events, the Iraqi Army is being tasked with internal counter-insurgency as well as external defence. The previous target of recruiting 35,000 soldiers by September has been brought forward. An Iraqi MOD is being established and an Iraqi Chief of Staff and other senior officers have been appointed. An Iraqi National Task Force, or internal mobile reserve, intended to be three battalions strong will start training on 1 May. Plans are in hand to form the first Iraqi Division and an Iraqi Joint HQ by 30 June. Recruiting for the Joint HQ is proceeding. 100 officers are in place, but it will be some time before the HQ can control the army and ICDC effectively. Lobbied by the UK, the US are working on MNF/Iraqi consultation mechanisms post-transition. Overall, only about 3,700 soldiers of the required 35,000 have been recruited. Pay has recently been increased as an incentive. To be capable, training will need to be more thorough than for the ICDC, but this will slow the prospects of deployment.
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recovering do solalers return. The special 36 battalion has since operated relatively successfully alongside US forces in Fallujah. Further leadership training and better equipment (a particular ICDC complaint) is to be given (although there are delays in existing equipment provision). The 5,500 ICDC in MND (SE) are fully recruited and have completed initial training. They are now capable of must be said that they have not faced the level of test of some other iDi units in Iraq).
Police
With 75,000 men, the Iraqi police are fully recruited. High wages have helped with retention, despite the threat of suicide bombings of police stations. Training was already being accelerated before the April violence.
However, fewer than 15,000 police have been properly trained so far, with another 4,000 in training. Poorly led, ill-disciplined, inexperienced, lacking equipment and local credibility, faced with armed confrontation in the Easter crisis, units faded away. (Most have now returned to their posts.) In the worst case, in both Najaf and Fallujah, individual policemen joined the opposition. Performance was also linked to the extent of relationships with local MN forces. With some contingents this has been limited.
Generally, the performance of the police remains poor. The exceptions are in the Kurdish areas in the north, where the police force developed some capacity prior to the occupation, and in MND (SE), where the police forces have faced less threat and, at least in Basra, have performed reasonably well in recent operations, for example, responding to the recent suicide bombings in a professional manner.
7.
In reaction to the problems identified, the Iraqi police units which performed least well are being reconstituted. Their police leaders will undertake one week refresher training, under the supervision of International Police Advisers starting to arrive. Police stations will be reoccupied with protection provided by the Iraqi Army and ICDC. Police will continue to be mentored by International Police Advisors thereafter (where available and the security situation allows). Police station security is to be improved. Efforts will also be made to improve command and control from 2 DECLASSIFED
supplied by the US. Currently, the US has just 300 in Iraq. Further deployments are on hold pending the arrival of equipment. In MND (SE), the deployment of the first of 40 UK police mentors is under review because of the security situation;
• strengthening Iraqi leadership both in the Iraqi police and other Iraqi security forces; and
• establishing working co-ordination mechanisms between Iragi security forces and the MNF.
Intelligence
9.
2004. Over
The Iraqi National Intelligence Service (INIS) was established in April operational officers agents, plus support staff, have been vetted and completed training. They will operate from a new HQ building in Baghdad shortly. The first outstation is also planned to open in Basra soon.
Other
regional offices are planned. The INIS has started to provide the Ministerial Committee for National Security with assessments. The national target is for operational agents by 1 July. This should be achieved. In addition, there will a separate INIS paramilitary unit of about
• There are
around
recruit more.
former Iraqi intelligence officers within the INIS and no plans to
10.
, the INIS was slow
to get started.
• However,
after the transition. The Interim Government could decide to remove officers with links to the old regime.
3
BEGLASSIFIED
coalition
Civilian Casualties
12. There are no accurate estimates for the number of Iraqi casualties since the start of combat operations. Numbers range from 5,000 to 20,000.
In response to Parliamentary and public questions, the MOD line has been that it is not possible to determine the number of civilian casualties. UK forces have taken every effort to minimise the impact of military operations on the Iraqi civilian population, consistent with their legal obligations. Since the end of major combat operations, UK forces in MND (SE) have only been allowed to use lethal force in self-defence and in response to a hostile act or intent. An initial assessment in February 2004 indicated that 36 civilians had died as result of UK actions since 1 May 2004. For this purpose, civilians who have attacked Coalition forces, and thus lost their protected status, are classed as civilians. UK forces, acting in self-defence, killed around 30 people during the upsurge of violence in Maysan province in recent weeks. The MOD are now undertaking a comprehensive assessment of unit records to produce a more accurate estimate of civilian casualties caused by UK actions. This started at the beginning of April and should be completed by the third week of May, when Ministers will be presented with figures. Even then, given that some Iraqis have been removed from firefights before assessment by UK forces or subsequently died of wounds, the figure will be subject to caveats.
Offices of the Ad Hoc Ministerial Group; PS/Home Secretary, PS/Caroline Scarlett; John Buck and Flint, PS/Paul Boateng; Desmond Bowen and George Fergusson; John MOD;
, IPU, FCO; lan Lee and David Johnson, , HMT; Cathy Adams, LOD;
, UKTI; Jim Acton, HO; and Jim Drummond, DFID.
TOM DODD
4
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