النص مستخرج آلياً من صورة الوثيقة أو من ملف قديم، وقد يحتوي أخطاء في بعض الكلمات أو ترتيب الأسطر. الملف الأصلي هو المرجع.
MA/COO
DASD
MA/CAS
D Strat Plans
PS/Policy Director
D Pol Planning
MA/DCDS(C)
MINISTER(AF) VISIT TO BASRA: 2 OCTOBER 2003
Reference: D/Min(AF)/A/7/1/5 dated 8 October 03
1. At reference you asked for advice on some issues arising from the Minister's visit. Two of the issues are addressed below. DCDS(Pers) and PJHQ will advise separately on the others.
2. The first point you raised was on the transition from war fighting operations to reconstruction activities. The Minister commented on the length of time it has taken to generate an effective operational CPA. This has clearly been a major difficulty in Iraq; indeed there are still a large number of gapped posts and military personnel doing jobs that should be done by civilian volunteers.
The lessons learned process should identify things specific to Op TELIC which could have improved the transition to civil administration, but there is also more general work underway which may be of interest to Mr Ingram.
3. The Foreign, Defence and International Development Secretaries agreed last month (minutes attached) to review HMG's approach to planning and preparation for post conflict situations nationally and then look at how we might influence other countries* preparations, with the EU as a high priority. It has also been raised in outline with the US and may be one of the defence themes of President Bush's visit next month. The Prime Minister's Strategy Unit is leading an initial six-month project to look at the HMG approach to failed states. D Pol Planning is leading on this work for MOD.
4. At the same time the Strategic Planning Directorate is developing a generic campaign plan which will run from the pre-conflict, prevention phase through military intervention to reconstruction and sustainment. This should identify common issues, decisive points to be reached if we are to achieve the desired end-state and a methodology for assessing progress. It is hoped that this will produce a model and common methodology from which bespoke plans could be produced for individual campaigns. The Strategy Unit work will DECPASSIFIED
system to secure money from CPA Baghdad more quickly than could CPA South. The Foreign Office is content that the design of the system for authorising the dispatch of money from CPA Baghdad to CPA South is sound, but difficulties arise because of the legacy of fear and intimidation left over from the Saddam regime. Iraqi bank officials who have to authorise payments have no experience of exercising delegated authority and are not accustomed to working to short time lines. This means that obtaining approval that we would regard as routine can often be a frustratingly slow process.
, 6. It is possible that the military may be able to put pressure on bank officials to speed up payments but the advantages of doing so will probably be purely short term. The development of a transparently fair and efficient banking system is on the critical path to the iraq we are trying to develop. A further eight financial advisers are being seconded to the CPA to aid this process, but as with many other development areas in iraq trying to change people's behaviour will take time.
David Johnson
Director Iraq
MB
DECLASSMIED