Minute naworynsky to quarry iraq security structures after 30 june

Duid IRAQ: SECURITY STRUCTURES AFTER 30 JUNE Development of the links between the Iraqis and the MN at national, provincial and local levels. Command and control arrangements still work in progress: important that the Iraqi Senior Military Adviser and Defence Minister are prepared to promote them robustly in public. It would be helpful to the forthcoming UNSCR debate if Iraqi Ministers were prepared to sign a letter covering the Iraqi/MN arrangements at least in broad terms. We are not convinced that Washington has grasped the extent to which the Iraqis will expect to take the lead after 30 June. Transition to "local control" will vary by province: MND(SE) making good progress, but the transition must be based on conditions rather than dates. Detail Tom Dodd's letter of 7 May provided an update on Iraqi Security Forces (ISF) and what might be done to enhance them. This note focusses on the interface between Iraqi and MN structures, and on the factors involved in moving to "local control" by the ISF. Although a number of issues remain to be resolved, and are the subject of ongoing work in theatre involving General McColl, structures bringing together the Iraqi authorities, IS and MN are beginning to emerge. At the national level, the Ministerial Committee for National Security (MCNS) is already effectively managing current crises. It should be chaired by the Iraqi Prime Minister from 1 July, with the MN Commander continuing to act as an advisor to the committee. To complement this, we envisage that the MNF Commander will run a Commanders' Council, bringing together the Ministers of Defence and interior, the iraqi National Security Advisor, the iraqi Senior Military Adviser, and the Director-General of the Iraqi National David Quarry Esq 10 Downing Street Racurled Pa DECLASSIFIFN The role of the MN representatives would be to provide advice, and co- ordination where necessary. At the district/local level, the focus should be on co-ordination of all security agencies through Joint Operations Centres, which should grow out of the current Joint Co-ordination Centres. At present these are largely informal and led by the MN, but the aim should be to move rapidly to formalised structures under Police leadership. Command and control structures will need to evolve. The Police will report through local Police Chiefs to the Ministry of the Interior, and should ideally always be the lead agency for internal security matters, with the Iraqi armed forces and MN in support. In practice, the security situation may sometimes require the MNF to take the lead, in co-ordination with the Police but without taking command of them. The Iraqi Armed Forces (IAF) and Iraqi Civil Defence Corps (ICDC) will be under the command of the Iraqi Ministry of Defence, which will be responsible for their manning, training and equipment with support from the MNF's Office of Security Co-operation. As Iraqi command and control structures develop, we would see the Iraqi Joint Headquarters - which staff from PJHQ are helping to develop - running operations involving the ISF, at local, regional and ultimately national level, with the MN playing a supporting rather than lead role. Initially, however, we expect that most lAF and ICDC units will need to be assigned to the Operational command and control of the MN, although we should try to maximise the extent of Iraqi-led operations from the start, where capabilities and local conditions permit. It is worth stressing that the exercise of Operational command and control does not mean that the ISF cease to be under Iraqi command and control: the situation is analogous to the arrangement whereby UK forces in MND(SE) work to the US-led CJTF-7, but under Rules of Engagement specified by the UK and with us retaining a "red card". It will be important that the Iraqi Senior Military Adviser and Defence Minister fully agree command and control arrangements for the IAF and ICDC, and are prepared to promote them robustly in public. Indeed, it would be helpful to the forthcoming UNSCR debate if Iraqi Ministers were prepared to sign a letter DECLASSIFIED depends on all elements of the IS reaching a certain standard, so the train can only move at the speed of the slowest coach. For the main internal security forces this involves: Iraqi Police Service: the ability to: (a) ' • Assist coalition forces to maintain law & order by proactive high-profile patrolling (including highways) • Investigate routine crimes under the supervision of coalition forces in accordance with Iraqi Criminal Proceedings • Conduct fair, impartial and accountable internal discipline procedures (b) Iraqi Border Police: the ability to: • Provide manning for designated border control points and patrol border areas • Co-ordinate with the customs and immigration authorities (c) Iraqi Civil Defence Corps: the ability to: • Plan and conduct mobile and foot patrols at up to company level • Provide static and mobile Vehicle Check Points • Provide force protection at base locations • Conduct basic self-administration, including pay etc. • Conduct cordon and search operations • Conduct UXO/EOD clearance DECLASSIFIED M NAWORYNSKY Private Secretary DECLASSIFIED