Minute jay to secretary of state fco iraq orha uk support attaching note iraq orha regional offices

Secretary of State SUBJECT: IRAQ: ORHA: UK SUPPORT 1. I wanted to update you on progress on increasing UK support to ORHA, following your minute to the Prime Minister of 15 April. Timing 2. ORHA now plans to start deploying to Baghdad on around 20 April. Allowing a fortnight to establish itself on the ground, the first UK Whitehall secondees are likely to be needed in theatre by about the first weekend in May. ORHA staffing 3. The UK's pre-deployment contribution to ORHA is already being enhanced: during this week we expect to have increased the number of UK secondees from 12 to 20. This includes an addition of three staff in the ORHA media operation, which has been identified as a particular priority. 4. We have now received General Cross's recommendations on focussing UK support after ORHA deploys to Baghdad. Your minute to the Prime Minister of 15 April emphasised the need for ORHA to draw on expertise from across Govemment. I followed up at the regular meeting of Whitehall Permanent Secretaries today, stressing the role of ORHA in carrying Coalition success in the military campaign into Phase IV. There was a positive response from, among others, DCMS, the Home Office and MOD. 5. I have since discussed the next steps with Andrew Turnbull and with Suma Chakrabarti. Andrew and I reached provisional agreement on the modalities for deploying experts from central government, plus specialists from eg the NHS and local government. Suma pointed out that there may also be suitable call down contracts from DfID. The IPU are working on the details over the Easter weekend and we will finalise them next week, as the basis for an early approach to individual Whitehall departments for secondees with the specific skill sets required. The ORHA requirement includes advisers in the Iragi MFA. We are considering how the FCO might help meet this, and will submit advice separately on this point. DECLASSIFIED 8. The Treasury have provided DfID with an initial tranche of £120 million from the Reserve for humanitarian work, in addition to £90 million set aside for Iraq from DfID's own allocation. It may also be possible to provide support to ORHA with some of the £30 million allocated 10 MoD for humanitarian work. In principle therefore, funding should not be a problem. Suma Chakrabarti has, however, told me today that he thinks there may need to be further collective Ministerial discussion before Clare Short will agree 10 DID funds being used. He has, however, agreed that we should not delay on pushing ahead with the necessary preparatory work. 9. I am copying this minute to Andrew Turbull. Tricharm Michael Jay DECLASSIFIED commitment until a scoping study has been carried out (within / days), 10 determine what the practical implications would be, including costs. 3. Decide that we should not do so. We recommend the second option. Timing Events are moving rapidly. ORHA will deploy into Iraq within days of cessation of hostilities. If we wish to influence the shape of ORHA's regional arrangements we need to act very quickly - before the US make their own dispositions. Background Ministers agreed last week that we should increase our support for ORHA as it assumes its post conflict responsibilities in Iraq. Work is in hand on the nature and scope of the UK's overall commitment to ORHA. The Coalition Provisional Authority (i.e. ORHA) will, within days of cessation of hostilities, administer Iraq on a country wide basis. The central authority in Baghdad will be supported by three or more regional teams, each responsible for one region of Iraq. These offices will act as ORHA's eyes and ears on the ground. They will not be responsible for execution of policy at the local level: they will perform a co- ordinating role in the delivery of centrally managed ORHA resources. Earlier US plans had envisaged three regions - North, Central (including Baghdad) and South - each headed by a senior US military officer or official. Consideration is now being given to a different arrangement involving more than three regions, primarily to avoid creating an artificial division along existing ethnic or religious lines, but also partly for practical reasons and to get away from a structure resonant of arrangements under the Ottoman Empire. Ideally the US would like a regional office in each of Iraq's 18 provinces. But ORHA does not yet have the resources to do this. So the US are considering a four-region structure • Baghdad, Northem and Eastern border provinces, Central, and Southern. Other structures might also be feasible. DECLASSIFIED Irom ours. The proposed Mou - which deals win the acumes or onas - nou not extend to possible actions by US forces. We need therefore to decide whether in principle we wish to offer to lead a regional office, covering a region coterminous with that in which 1 Div is responsible for maintaining security. Arguments For • We want to influence the way ORHA is run at the operational level as well as the policy level. Leading a regional office would enable us to demonstrate in practice how we think the coalition should handle the civil administration of Iraq. • If the UK-led ORHA region corresponded with 1 Div's area of responsibility, it would enable the UK to promote an exemplary approach to the relationship between the civil and military arms of the Coalition in the arca in which UK forces are the occupying power. • This would not involve the UK taking responsibility for ORHA's costs, e.g. paying Iraqi public servants or providing humanitarian relief. ORHA will resource its activities in Iraq on an Iraq-wide basis. But see below. Arguments Against • This proposal would create a region of Iraq in which the UK would have a very high profile. If the Coalition Provisional Authority ran into difficulty - locally or nationally - this would impact on the UK's standing in Iraq to a greater degree than if we remained a (junior) partner in ORHA without a clear regional responsibility. Our resources are limited. There is an opportunity cost to focusing resources on one region of Iraq that could be used to support our objectives in other ways. Although we envisage a multinational office led by a UK appointee, we would need to commit perhaps 15-20 people to ensure its proper functioning. The costs of providing logistical support to these officers would almost certainly fall to us (at present ORHA funds the in-country costs of UK secondees). • If ORHA (i.e. the US) failed to resource those activities needed to fulfil the coalition's obligations in the UK-led region, we could be faced with the choice of doing so ourselves or being seen to fail to deliver in the eyes of the local population and more widely. DECLASSIFIED We 801. This is best done through a joint scoping study by interested departments: this would need to be completed within the coming week We would need also to think through the link between our commitment to ORHA and our commitment of forces. ORHA's role as the Coalition Provisional Authority will be shon-lived. But it will have a longer term - and evolving - role in support of an emerging Iraqi Interim Authority, We would not wish to lock in an open-ended commitment either 10 provide support to ORHA's civil functions or to deploy substantial military forces in Iraq. Iraq Planning Unit 16 April 2003 DECLASSIFIED