Letter Chakrabarti to Turnbull Iraq Rehabilitation, reform and development

Sir Andrew Turnbull KCB CVO NBU/ 093/001 Cabinet Office London 30 APR 2005 SW1 MEGIS i Lion lake. INDEX Dear Andrew, IRAQ: REHABILITATION, REFORM AND DEVELOPMENT At the Prime Minister's meeting this morning Clare Short welcomed the emerging ministerial consensus (and the excellent IPU paper) on what the core principles for a UNSCR (or UNSCRs) for rehabilitation, reform and development in Iraq should be. There will be follow-up meetings later this week and next: the IPU is providing further briefing. I thought it would be useful to set out in writing our views on two of the core principles for UN authorisation. I am also including our thoughts on what further work is needed across Whitehall and internationally to turn our vision for the future of Iraq into a reality the international community can deliver. Key principles and the UNSCR From DFID's experience of post-conflict reconstruction elsewhere, we see two key principles on which the UK cannot compror. ise. Without these there is a risk that UK and US post-conflict objectives will be seriously jeopardised. • We strongly agree that the primary principle should be a rapid political process leading to the establishment of an Iraqi Interim Authority with Iraqi and international political legitimacy. This means the process must be facilitated by the UN and start soon after conflict ends - if not before. We must find a way through the current diplomatic difficulties which allows and invites the UN to prepare for this role very soon. The period of quiet diplomacy the Prime Minister has asked for is an opportunity to explore with a range of countries and the UN itself alternative ways forward • A further core princiole is to secure a resolution that is supported by the international development community (particularly those who should be leading on the reform, rehabilitation and development of post- conflict Iraq) and so ensures that best practice from other post-conflict situations can be applied to Iraq In particular, the IFis and UN development agencies should be comfortable that they have sufficient 50€ proposed fit the IFs' respective mandates and competences, for example in the management of international trust funds (which HMT are discussing with their US counterparts). If the resolution does not pass these tests, then the financial burden will be insufficiently spread (with uncomfortable fiscal implications for the UK) and the effort to reform, rehabilitate and develop Iraq is unlikely to be as successful (with wider security and regional implications). With those two principles in mind, we have looked again at relevant UNSCRs in other post-conflict situations, notably Afghanistan. UNSCR 1378 - which Clare Short circulated at the Prime Minister's meeting on Saturday - set out the process for creation of an Afghan interim administration and was agreed (in November 2001) before military intervention had ceased. The text is strikingly short and simple. It is notable that the Secretary-General's Special Representative was already working on the political process before the SCR was passed, and that the UNSCR creating UNAMA was not passed until 28 March 2002. The start of UN involvement does not have to be postponed until a resolution has been passed; indeed getting the UN involved earlier may make it easier to convince other SC members to vote for an SCR. We are confident from our discussions with the World Bank that a copy of UNSCR 1378 or something close to it would give them the cover they seek (Tom Scholar will cover this also in his letter) The way forward across Whitehall The new ministerial and senior officials' groups on Iraqi rehabilitation (proposed in your letter of 28 March to Michael and me) seem the best way to take forward the detailed implications of any SCR's content, and what can be done before its passing I agree we should proceed rapidly on the lines of your letter. The key will be to agree very quickly on the work programme and to task those with the knowledge and experience in the subject areas to take the lead, while consulting others with an interest, and ensuring all the workstreams fit together into a coherent - and affordable - strategy We must draw on the lessons learnt from other post-conflict situations such as Afghanistan, Kosovo, East Timor, Sierra Leone and Bosnia CON declassified 12/01/10 development agencies, the te and other Key biatio Administration. This should ensure the widest possible buy-in, and also increase pressure for a rapid SCR from those involved in development. From our perspective, widening these discussions beyond US-UK is the best way to ensure their success. We would like to do this as part of a coordinated UK strategy, which might be a topic for early discussion at the senior officials' group I am copying this letter to Sir David Manning (No 10), Sir Michael Jay and Dominic Chilcott (FCO): Gus O'Donnell and Jon Cunliffe (HMT), Sir Kevin Tebbit (MoD), Desmond Bowen (CO) and to Tom Scholar (UKDel IMF/IBRD). Your, fune Suma Chakrabarti To start their work the ministerial and officials groups will need a work programme. No single paper has yet been written setting out a strategy for how the international community can help Iraq recover from war, sanctions, misrule and the consequent economic and political collapse, and the sequence of actions needed to get this process underway with adequate international support - particularly from the IFs. These notes suggest elements for such a paper. Its production could be coordinated by the Cabinet Office, in a process iterated with the detailed work being done on individual workstreams. UK policy objectives These are set out in broad terms in the Vision for Iraq and the Iraqi People. The Post- Conflict Objectives, when finalised, will be a more definitive statement. The challenge now is to set out in detail what needs to be done to realise the vision and implement the objectives. We should ensure that appropriate action is in hand, by us or others, to address all our commitments' What Iraq might look like in 5,10,20 years... Given Iraq's enormous oil reserves, well-educated workforce (and diaspora), and relatively functional public sector, it should be a prosperous middle income country. The a Iraqi people need to agree vision for using their own natural resources and endowments to generate sustainable economic growth which will regain and exceed GNP per capita levels of 25 years ago. This vision needs to be combined with broader international objectives on regional political stability, human rights, non-proliferation etc to set the context for international assistance. Although a major international effort will be needed to set Iraq on the path to rehabilitation in the short-medium term, it is unlikely there will be a substantial financing gap beyond 3-5 years ...but urgency of addressing key reforms quickly - with right advice. Only the Iraqi people can develop a legitimate long-term vision for their country's development. But some quick major decisions will be needed to kick start the process Where decisions cannot be postponed for an interim Iraqi authority to take later, they should be informed by the part of the international system best qualified to advise - often the IMF or World Bank US thinking on rehabilitation and reform is more advanced than ours. They may (through ORHA) want to take some decisions very quickly ' See paragraphs 6 and 7 of Desmond Bowen's 25 March draft of the Post Conflict Objestives i. Interim Iraqi civil administration structures (lIA) ii. Relationship between lIA, coalition and UN Process for constitutional reform/elections iii. iv. Ensuring security, and security sector reform V. Justice and human rights vi. Turning humanitarian relief into recovery, and reducing dependency Macroeconomic reform vii. viii. Sustainable debt and reparations strategy ix. Stimulating private sector growth and wealth creation x. Management of the oil sector Environmental clean-up and recovery xi. Public sector reform xii. xiii. Building service delivery capacity Infrastructure reconstruction xiv. Closure on WMD xV. xvi. Lifting sanctions against Iraq Iraq's regional and global integration xvii. There will also be an interest in arguing for fair opportunities for UK business in Iraq - although this will not be addressed through the UK development assistance programme, given the Government's policy to untie our aid (ie give no preference to UK companies) and persuade others to do the same, and will thus not directly inform strategy. While it is already clear who is leading on most areas, further agreement is needed on Whitehall leads, the interests of non-lead departments in being involved in other areas, and establishing the links between the different workstreams. OVERARCHING ISSUES These issues affect most or all of the workstreams. As several departments are already pursuing them with their counterparts in other countries and international organisations, they need to be coordinated and sequenced particularly carefully a. Building international political support for the appropriate framework b. Building international/Iraqi consensus (including |Fls) on priorities for Iraq c. Financing d. Coordination of international support once underway • Awareness across Iraq of international plans