Minute gibbons to manning wmd detection and elimination

yooterudy. 2. There are two points worth highlighting: a. The Iraq Survey Group (ISG) will clearly be the main focus of activity for WMD investigation in the longer term. However, we need a more systematic short term arrangement in place to pursue and exploit WMD leads. This would provide a platform on which the ISG can build when it is established. b. We are working up longer term ideas for international verification of WMD finds and supervision of its destruction, which might be acceptable to the Americans (and others). We hope to provide further advice on this next week. 3. Desmond Bowen and John Scarlett have discussed the question of Whitehall co-ordination. They concluded that that there is a requirement for Cabinet Office machinery to drive forward this work, probably led by Desmond. Perhaps this is something which could usefully be discussed at your meeting on Monday. Now flapse 1'4 Nil Gill NICK GIBBONS 11 April 2003 We need a clever plan for ta music gene The is wok in pyress. cates urgeney PS/PUS Hd Sec(Iraq). DCDS(C) Hd Sec(HSF) Policy Director DIW CDI D PACS CJO DI SA ACDS(Ops) DIST DG Op Pol DI Ops DGISP Cabinet Office - Mr Bowen DGCC FCO CPD Legal Adviser IRAQ: WMD DETECTION AND ELIMINATION Issue Next steps on WMD detection and elimination taking into account US proposals for an Iraq Survey Group. Recommendation That the Secretary of State: a approves the content of the attached draft note from you to David Manning, notably: 1. the importance of coalition commanders giving priority to this issue, particularly the identification and detention of WMD related scientists and staff. 2. UK participation in the proposed DIA-led Iraq Survey Group which is intended to cover WMD and other post-conflict issues such as terrorism and war crimes. DEGLASSIFHED c. Note that I will continue to pursue the MOD aspects of this through a task group including the relevant MOD policy branches and other government departments and agencies, and will report further to Ministers as necessary. Timing Urgent. The Prime Minister is due to speak to the President this evening. Background Most of the background is set out in the attached draft note for you to send to Sir whereat. David Manning. There is however one additional specific point of substance which the Secretary of State will wish to consider. We and the US have been considering for some time whether we should recruit ex UNMOVIC, IAEA and UNSCOM inspectors to bolster our WMD detection and exploitation capabilities. There are a number of UK ex-inspectors who could provide a significant boost to our capabilities. In principle I believe the Secretary of State should agree to our recruiting these individuals. There is however a presentational downside in that such activity could be construed, particularly in Europe, as undermining the UN. There are however strong counter-arguments, not least linked to the time it would take to bring UNMOVIC or other UN inspectors to bear even if we could persuade the US that this was a good idea. The short term recruitment of individuals who have left UN employment can be presented as being intended to deal with immediate issues of WMD detection and elimination. The Secretary of State might also want to note that there is some evidence that the US authorities are also approaching the individuals concerned. DECLASSIFED ML HOWARD DEDI DEGLASSIENED ranging from WMD materials through research facilities to documentation and IT records. Seven out of 146 suspect sites already examined by coalition forces. But years of concealment means that the most likely The in locations of WMD could be elsewhere. Interviews of scientists and other staff likely to be one of the most fruitful means of identifying evidence. Also essential to minimise risks of seientists and technicians "proliferating" elsewhere. US and UK commanders have access to details of personnel of interest and given direction to search them out and hold them. US proposals for phase IV post conflict activity on WMD elimination and other issues (the Iraq Survey Group). Proposals for UK involvement. Importance of third party verification of WMD finds. Proposed handling strategy both to deal with individual incidents and to moderate expeetations of very early progress. Points to make to President Bush. Detail As high intensity military action begins to draw to a close, and with the successful removal of regime control, our strategic priority in Iraq should be detection and elimination of undeclared WMD and delivery systems. DECLASSHINED US, a list of sensitive sites for WMD exploitation (SSEs), and both UK and US have assets deployed for the SSE role. As of II April, some seven sites out of a total of 146 have been examined with no confirmed finds of WMD materials so far. There have in addition been 12 inspections of so called "ad hoc sites" — ie those such as ammunition storage sites which aroused suspicion as coalition forces encountered them. Again testing has so far not revealed any WMD at these sites, though in some cases testing is continuing. Given Iraq's past history of deception and concealment, the likelihood is that evidence of WMD holdings will be found at sites identified by intelligence during the course of our activities in Iraq rather than at the pre-planned sites. Information about this may come from a number of sources, one of the most fruitful being the controlled and detailed interviewing of Iraqi scientists and other staff, both civilian and military, involved in Iraq's WMD programme. We must also as a matter of urgency try to prevent these key individuals escaping to Syria or elsewhere, taking their expertise with them. The identification and detention of these individuals is now therefore one of our highest priorities. The US and UK have compiled databases of names - the relevant UK database contains some 5,000 names. Details of these are already available to US and British commanders in theatre and they should be giving high priority to tracking down such individuals and where necessary detaining them (the legal DECLA SEINED terrorism, prisoners of war/missing in action, and war crimes. This body is being set up under the auspices of the US Defence Intelligence Agency and once deployed will report to General Abizaid and then to CENTCOM. At full strength it is likely to consist of some 1500 personnel including analysts, interviewers, IT experts and weapons experts. The main operational hub would be in and around Baghdad with sector organisations from which mobile teams would deploy across Iraq. The US are keen to integrate UK and Australian expertise into this organisation. We intend, in the first instance, to offer elements of the UK WMD expertise already deployed in theatre. This comprises weapons systems experts, document exploitation experts, NBC detection and protection assets, and HUMINT assets. The total of our personnel currently deployed in these areas is some 100, increasing to 120 later this month. We are also looking at whether we can provide other assets to support the US effort, including the UK laboratory currently in the process of being deployed to theatre. It will be important that any UK contribution works closely with the Iraq Survey Group and operates across the theatre as a whole, rather than in just the UK area of responsibility where sites and personnel of interest are thinner on the ground. In terms of timescale, given the complexity of the logistics and other arrangements that have to be made, it is very unlikely that the ISG will be fully DECLASS ONE initially tested at "silver" laboratories in the field and then, if positive, at "gold" OPCW accredited laboratories either in the US or UK. Given suspicions about coalition motives, positive results would have considerably more force if they were verified "separately" by a non US/UK laboratory. Ultimately we would like to see UNMOVIC or a successor body back in play. But US aversion means that this is unlikely to be achievable in the short/medium term. An alternative to UNMOVIC would be to involve other independent laboratories in a third country (the FCO are approaching the Netherlands). Detailed procedures would have to be very carefully worked out (and are being so), but the US reaction in principle has so far been reasonably positive. But if we do not have early retum of UNMOVIC, we will need to have prepared a robust position an when we think they would be able to return. In terms of handling, there are three issues. First, we will need to have an agreed handling plan with the US for the announcement of any positive results. This will need to take into account the fact that testing will take a considerable period to produce a conclusive answer and could be further complicated by the need for third party verification. Second, it is unrealistic to think that information will not leak out in the period between an initial discovery and any final announcement - we may want to alert our troops to the hazard immediately. We will therefore need generic defensive lines stressing caution DECLASSIFIED.Y DEGLASSHTED Interviews of Iraqi scientists and other staff, both civilian and military, likely to prove one of the most fruitful sources of information in this area. Coalition Commanders should give high priority to identifying and detaining such individuals so that they can be interviewed. Also critical to prevent them taking their WMD expertise elsewhere particularly as we move into Phase IV. We will continue to share our information on likely suspects with US both in Washington and in theatre. Will extend cooperation to Canberra if they choose to engage with us. Very much support proposals for an Iraq Support Group under DOD auspices. Understand this will pull together all WMD exploitation activities along with other post conflict issues such as terrorism and war crimes. Hope it can deploy into theatre as soon as possible to support existing effort. Grateful for invitation for UK participation in Iraq Survey Group. Will respond initially using already deployed assets in theatre. Our experts are already in touch. Independent verification of US/UK WMD finds would be extremely useful politically, though clearly a complicating factor. DEBIASSIFIED Public handling extremely delicate and will need close co-ordination. Key areas are handling announcements of positive results; handling leaks between initial discovery and final results; and more generally moderating expectations of a flood of early discoveries. We should work closely together on all these issues. DECLAESISLY