Minute acds ops to rycroft how best to progress the iraqiisation of the security sector

MA/ACDS(Pol) CC Hampshire Constabulary MA1/DCDS(C) PS/Pol Dir SPS/DG Op Pol SPS/DGISP Iraq CCT Leader HOW BEST TO PROGRESS THE IRAQIISATION OF THE SECURITY SECTOR BACKGROUND The headline observations of the team looking at Iraqiisation of the Security Sector 1. Initial response of the Cabinet Office to that were contained in my report of 25 May 04'. report was to direct a follow-up piece focused on: How to develop an Iraqiisation strategy. a. b. How to influence work in support of that strategy. C. Determining tangible UK assistance in both the short and medium term. d. A summary of short term actions to put to the Prime Minister. To meet this remit I have ordered this report in the following way: a. The first section (paragraph 3) outlines the component elements of an Iraqisation Strategy. b. The second section (paragraph 4) outlines how we might influence such a strategy. C. The third section (paragraphs 5 - 7) gives a summary of resources that the UK might commit, or consider committing, in the short and medium term. It draws on a comprehensive review of the current state of Security Sector Reform (SSR) at Annex A. d. The fourth section (paragraph 8) derives from the first three, and is a summary of actions the PM may consider pursuing in the short term. ' DCts(Ops)(073-04y dated 25 May 04. DECLASSIELEDONY geograpnic distribution or each element of te hay secamy sector. this architecture will involve some key policy decisions. For example: Iraqi Police Service(IPS). There needs to be agreement on the principle of Police Primacy (or not) in Internal Security (IS) issues. Will the Police Service be controlled nationally or regionally? Will it be trained in Public Order and Counter Terrorist skills? Will it have a special weapons and tactics capability; if so how much and under whose control? Will it have an EOD capability? (2) Iragi Civil Defence Corps (ICDC). Is the ICDC a temporary or a permanent creation? What is its longer term destiny: a general reserve for the Army or a third force for IS duty? Or will it be subject to a DDR programme when the conditions for its existence pass? (3) Iraqi Army. What is the role of the Iraqi Army in IS? What legal instrument should activate its involvement in IS? Is the Iragi National Task Force a specialist IS formation within the Iraqi Army? If so, who tasks it, where is it based, what skills does it have, and what is its C2 relationship to the IPS. (4) Infrastructure Police. Does it make sense for the Infrastructure Police to be controlled by the wide range of Essential Service Ministries? Should they be brought under centralised control? Con Contractors The current Iraqi Security Sector is awash with contractorised capability. Are these short term expedients or do they form part of the longer-term vision? Note; these issues are examples only, not exhaustive. C. Policy Framework. This architecture should inform a policy framework for a range of issues relating to each element of the Security Sector. Key policy issues would be such things as priority for recruitment, training and equipment; pay, pensions, redundancy and terms of service. The need to resolve quickly a policy regarding police redundancy has already been identified as key to the future effectiveness of the IPS DECLASSED some may need to feature as part of the longer term accepted Security Architecture. A policy for militias is starting to emerge. Legal/Emergency Powers. Even in western democratic states it is accepted that certain special Legal/Emergency powers need to exist in order to deal with extreme IS situations. Such powers inevitably constrain the rights of the individual in pursuit of the common good. Such powers may cover such issues as preventative detention. Finance. The assumption of Sovereign authority by the lIG, the advent of new Iraqi ministries and the demise of the CPA, combine to threaten a major discontinuity in resourcing the Security Sector. At its simplest, unless ministries such as the MOl and MOD submit properly costed operating budgets to the Ministry of Finance, and unless the Iraqis have developed internal distribution and pay mechanisms; then elements of the Iraqi Security Forces (ISF) may not get paid this summer. It is understood that the US led Major Subordinate Commands (MSC) are putting in place back-up schemes to ensure that the IS get paid. The UK should do the same. (6) Information Operations/Strategic Communications (10/SC). It is axiomatic that a strategy for Iraqiisation must be supported by a comprehensive IO/SC plan. Current evidence, however, is that extant plans have: focused too much on 30 Jun as a watershed; focused too much on external/regional audiences; have dealt too much in promises and have not focused enough on achievements and tangible successes. e. Timescale. Finally the strategy needs a timescale. Key elements informing that timescale will be: (1) Key political milestones. (2) Iraqi wishes. (3) Local and regional security conditionality (4) The willingness to take operational risk. DEOLASSIFIED Y INFLUENCING THE STRATEGY 4. Many of the elements of the above strategy depend upon securing agreement between key IIG, ISF, MNF-I and international diplomatic figures. The time has already passed when a strategy could have been imposed on the Iraqis and there is a danger that we may now be trying to develop one too late. What is clear, however, is that the strategy needs to be authored, owned and executed in theatre. It is at these three elements we should direct our influence. a. Ownership. Ownership of the overall strategy will need to rest with the National Security Council (NSC). Specifically they will need to demonstrate public ownership of the vision and the overall Security Sector Architecture. Ideally an outline of these elements should form part of any early public announcements by the IIG. The more that is in the public arena, as an early statement of Iraqi intent, the better. It is important, therefore, that the Iraqi Prime Minister and key departmental Ministers (MOI, MOD) and principal police and military chiefs achieve early consensus. This argues for early engagement with the NSC with coherent policy options for the overall strategy b. Authorship. In order to achieve such early engagement the strategy needs to be negotiated and written. This task best falls to the Office of Security Transition (OST) headed by Lt Gen Petreus. Given the current manning shortfalls in the OST the UK could offer Lt Gen Petreus a strategic planning team, based either on D Strat Plans, UK JFHQ or the Defence Advisory Team (DAT) to take this work forward quickly. The difficult thing will not be the authorship of the plan, but the achievement of consensus regarding the overall security sector architecture. This might best be achieved through some form of NSC 'lock-in' facilitated by the OST and the strategy authors. Separately the UK will need to influence the authorship of sub-elements of the strategy eg: Capacity Building: through our two UK one-stars in CPATT and CMATT. (2) Interim operational C2: through SBMR-I (3) Militias: through SBMR-I DEGLASSIFIEDNY MNC-I should be taken off operational security tasks and put on to training and mentoring tasks. Evidence from within Theatre indicates that the best way to grow genuine capability within the IS is to embed coalition troops and International Police Advisors (IPA) inside Iraqi units. How many more resources to send? In a UK context the question of how many new resources to send is intimately tied in with considerations about sending: 40 Cdo RM to replace 1 A and SH in MND(SE). If HQ ARRC and 3 Cdo Bde are deployed, their involvement in achieving greater coherence and generating greater capacity within the IS will need to be factored in. UK RESOURCE REQUIREMENT 5. The requirement for the UK to commit, or consider committing, additional resources to Iraqiisation of security derives from two principal sources: a. The need to author, inform, influence and help execute the strategy. The need to resolve clear shortfalls in the current and anticipated status of b. capacity and capability building in the Security Sector. The assessed requirement which follows draws directly from the SSR assessment at Annex A. For the purposes of this assessment short-term is defined as resources that can be committed prior to 1 Jul 04 and medium-term those that can be committed in the period from 1 Jul to the elections in Jan 05. Notwithstanding any additional resources to be committed is the clear requirement to sustain the current level of military and police staffs, for example in the CPATT, CMATT and Baghdad Police Security Academy. 6. The Short Term. Consideration to be given to: A Strategic Planning Team, with appropriate legal advisor, to be made available to the OST for up to 4 weeks. (UK MOD to provide). A small team specialising in pay and pensions issues to be made available to b. the OST. (DfID). DECLASSIEEI WESTONE a. The SSR role of HQ ARRC and 3 Cdo Bde, if deployed. (MOD). b. The balance of 54 police mentors to deploy between 20 Jul and 31 Aug in accordance with the MND(SE) call forward programme. (FCO IPU). C. In the light of OST manning difficulties deploy additional staff support to OST and additional manpower to the MNF-I Strategic Comms Unit. (SBMR-I to scope). Take responsibility for selected specialist police courses such as: senior executive leadership; organised crime; post bomb blast investigation. (IPU/Home Office). e. Host visits in UK of Senior Border Enforcement and Customs Officials in order to develop expertise and pass on best practice. (HMCE). Source and facilitate the provision of customs mentors to the DBE. (HMCE). f. Increase UK support for prison management and training. (DfID/FCO). Continue leadership of the Iraqi Coastal Defence Force project until FOC in 9 Oct 04. (MOD). h. More widely, scope and provide places for IS personnel on courses at UK academies. POSSIBLE SHORT TERM ACTIONS FOR THE PM 8. It was requested that a list of possible short term actions be put to the PM for his consideration: a. In respect of POTUS Stress: The need to put pressure on IIG ministers to declare their (1) vision and architecture for the future Iraqi Security Sector as advised by the OST and agreed in the NSC. The need to take operational risk in Theatre to commit additional resources to building capacity/capability in the security DECLASSIFIEDILY The need to take operational risk, advised by local (2) commanders, to achieve local and regional control by IS in accordance with political milestones. The need for the Ministry of Finance to agree initial operating budgets for key Iraqi ministries such as MOD and MOl. In respect of Lt Gen Petreus. If an office call can be arranged, stress: C. (1) The need for a strategy and offer UK support in its authorship. (2) The need for early NSC consensus on the strategy. The need to balance operational risk with increased Iraqi (3) control of security. d. In more general public statements. In support of the strategic 10 campaign, stress: Significant progress already made in capability/capacity building within ISF. IS already achieving local control in some areas and already taking part in some high profile and successful operations. Need to maintain a sensible balance of risk in progressing (3) Iragiisation with the operation realities of the security situation. The relevant time scale is spring 06 for us to assume strategic stand-off. ACDS(Ops) Annex: A. Status of SSR in Iraq as of 25 May 04. DECLASSIFIERY support to date, together with predicted equipment delivery timelines. They also outline next key steps and areas in which the UK could provide resource and training support in the short term (until 01 Jul 04) and medium term (Jul 04 until Jan 05). The current structure of the Iraqi Security Forces is: THE IRAQI SECURITY STRUCTURES Ministerial Nationaliserty ... Ministry of Interior Ministry of Defence Other Ministries Iraqi Police Department Iraqi Armed Forces Service for Border Enforcement Iragi Army Iraqi Special Iraqi Civil Iraqi National Iraqi Air Iraqi Coastal Force Defence Force Defence Corps Task Force Operations Force IRAQI POLICE SERVICE (IPS) (Appendix 1) 3. Ministry. Ministry of Interior. DECLASBIFIED 6. Status. Ine Ubt has successtully been reconstituted with over 19,000 Iraqis now in roles as border police, customs officers, immigration officers and nationality and passport officers. FACILITIES PROTECTION SERVICE (FPS) 7. Ministry. Ministry of Interior (theoretically for functional standards). 8. Status. The FPS was created under the authority of the MOl, but is now managed by each Ministry requiring facilities protection. Training is the responsibility of the MOl. Manpower ceiling of 73,992 achieved. Construction of National FPS HQ with 14 regional co-ordination centres underway. JUDICIAL AND PRISON SYSTEMS (Appendix 3) 9. Ministry. Ministry of Justice / Iraqi Correctional Service. 10. Status - Judicial. The Ministry came under full Iraqi control on 30 May. The Judiciary operates independently of the Ministry. Higher Judicial Council established in Baghdad and processing up to 3000 cases a week. Buildings allocated in Baghdad to house; Federal Supreme Court, Court of Cassation, the Council of Judges/Higher Juridical Council and the Central Criminal Court of Iraq. The courts are functioning reasonably well. Status - Prisons. 18 prison facilities, with a capacity of 5,500 are 11. operational and under the jurisdiction of the Iraqi Correctional Service (ICS). A further 16 facilities with a capacity of 23,000 are planned (capacity to increase to 11,000 by the end of 04). In May 04 3,269 officers were employed in the ICS. Plans to recruit further 2,000 over the next four months. National training academy for ICS officers under construction. IRAQI CIVIL DEFENCE CORPS (ICDC) (Appendix 4) 12. Ministry. Final policy decision awaited but likely to be Ministry of Defence A-2 DECEASSIMED It is generally assumed that Option 3 will be taken. ICDC, locally recruited and lightly equipped, working in support of IPS and Coalition. More successful in the North and South compared to the Centre where training effort has suffered because of focus on combat operations and not security sector training. IRAQI ARMED FORCES (IAF) (Appendix 5) 14. Ministry. Ministry of Defence. 15. Status. IAF originally established for external security only. However, in light of internal security situation it is intended that the Armed Forces will be used internally when a particular situation is deemed to be beyond the capabilities of the IPS/ICDC. Current status of each element as follows: Army. 5 Bns of planned 27 Bns trained. 3,939 on trained strength with 2,763 in training. Iragi National Task Force. Medium term initiative to establish 3 Bdes (9 Bns) of the Iraqi Army optimised for employment on Internal Security (IS) duties beyond the capability of the IPS / ICDC. First Bn ready by 30 Jun; full capability by 30 Oct 04. Iraqi Coastal Defence Force. 5 Patrol Boats and 5 smaller vessels for boarding operations now based in Umm Qasr. Designed for patrolling and interdiction operations in co-operation with Iraqi Riverine Patrol Service. 10 Commanding Officers trained in UK. 280 personnel out of 410 undergoing training. Iragi Air Force. Effort focussed on creating Air Transport capability. 148 (ranging from pilots to Air Traffic Control) out of planned 500 force in training. Appendices: 1. Iraqi Police Service A-3 DECLASSIRED DEGLASSELD 2. Coalition: • Coalition Police Assistance and Training Teams (CPATT) established Mar 04, commanded by UK - Brig A Mackay. • TIP training established • Jordan new entry training academy - increase to 3,000 every 8 weeks from July. • Baghdad new entry training academy - increase to 2,250 every 8 weeks from July. • Total of 20,000 IPS trained out of a total strength of 91,276. Redundancies of approx 20,000 required • Train the Trainer courses - increasing Iraqi training of Iraqi police. • Mentoring of Senior Police Chiefs and within police stations. • 304 out 500 International Police Advisers deployed UK 3. • Over 100 British police officers are involved in training, mentoring and advisory roles of the Iraqi Police Service in Baghdad, across the south of Iraq and at the Jordan International Police Training Academy. UK support to the police effort is one of the major planks of our security sector reform strategy in Iraq and essential to civilian primacy in security matters. NEXT STEPS Short Term: 4. • Continuation of the basic recruit and TIP training with an aim to hand over TIP to Iragi trainers by 30 June 04 DECLASSIELERY • Completion of 9 regional training stations. • Completion of refurbishment and equipping of 435 police stations. • Development of leadership/ middle management training. Focus on developing and progressing skills acquired in basic training. • Mentoring/ monitoring of IPS by International Advisors to ensure continued progress and improvement and ensure standards are adhered to. UK ASSISTANCE 6. Short Term: • Continued provision of UK Police officers delivering specialist training in Iraq and Jordan. Action: FCO 7. Medium Term: • The UK to take responsibility for selected specialised courses; senior executive leadership courses, intelligence. organised crime and post bomb blast investigation. • The continuation of the post of Assistant Director of the Baghdad Police Security Academy in Aug 04. Action: FCO/Home Office • Mentoring ArmourGroup under contract from the FCO will deploy in accordance with the following programme: - 6 personnel (PAX) - Recce/ specialist Advance Party training - 20 Pax - Basra City/Rural - NLT 30 Jul Main Body (MB) 1 - 12 Pax - Maysan - NLT 9 Aug MB 2 - 11 Pax - Dhi Qar MB 3 - NLT 20 Aug - 11 Pax - Al Muthanna - NLT 31 Aug MB 4 Action: FCO/MOD DECLASSLELERY DECLASSIFIED Indiv Equip Fielding (E) >= 90% 70-90% IPS Equipment 50-70% MAY JULY AUG JUNE SEPT OCT <50% NOV DEC JAN Vehicles Vehicles Vehicles Vehicles ( Vehicles Vehicles Vehicles Vehicles Vehicles G MNB-N Radios Radios Radios Radios Radios Radios Radios Radios Radios Weapons Weapons Weapons Weapons @ Weapons Weapons O Weapons Weapons Weapons Vehicles Vehicles Vehicles Vehicles Vehicles / Vehicles O Vehicles O Vehicles O Vehicles O 1 ID Radios Radios Radios Radios Radios Radios Radios Radios Radios Weapons Weapons ® Weapons Weapons Weapons WeaponsO Weapons Weapons Weapons Vehicles Vehicles Vehicles Vehicles Vehicles C Vehicles O Vehicles C Vehicles O Vehicles O 1 CAV Radios Radios Radios Radios Radios Radios Radios Radios Radios Weapons Weapons WeaponsO Weapons Weapons Weapons Weapons Weapons Weapons Vehicles Vehicles Vehicles Vehicles Vehicles Vehicles Vehicles Vehicles O Vehicles O 1 MEF Radios Radios Radios Radios Radios Radios Radios Radios Radios Weapons Weapons Weapons Weapons Weapons Weapons Weapons Weapons Weapons Vehicles Vehicles Vehicles Vehicles Vehicles Vehicles Vehicles Vehicles O Vehicles O Radios Radios Radios Radios MND (CS) Radios Radios Radios Radios Radios *218% on Ak's *Weapons Weapons Weapons Weapons Weapons Weapons Weapons Weapons Weapons Vehicles Vehicles Vehicles Vehicles Vehicles Vehicles Vehicles Vehicles / Vehicles C MND (SE) Radios Radios Radios Radios Radios Radios Radios Radios Radios Weapons ( Weapons Weapons Weapons Weapons Weapons Weapons Weapons Weapons Items status shown are based on released contracts only. DECLASSIFIED SUFFURT IU DATE Coalition: 2. • Recruitment and training of Border Police Service. • DBE successfully reconstituted - Border police (12,376), Civil customs 1,800 (total 2900), immigration 400 (total 1000) and Nationality /Passport office 4,144. UK: 3. • HMC&E has been greatly involved in standing up the Department of Border Enforcement and Customs which is now fully functional. Consequently, the customs department has now successfully begun to collect revenue through established crossing points. • Royal Navy lead in developing Iraqi Riverine Patrol Service. NEXT STEPS Short Term: 4. • Continue training. Equipment delivery is expected in the near future. Medium Term: 5. • The construction of a National Training Academy is underway B and C posts by • Infrastructure programme to complete all class A, end of year Ensure a mentoring/ monitoring programme for the DBE. DECLASSIFIED CONFIDENTIAL UK EYES ONLY 7. Medium Term: • Following the co-operation between the Iraqis and HMC&E, sign a Memorandum of Understanding to ensure continued development between the two countries. Action: HMCE • The UK will also aim to source and facilitate the provision of customs mentors to the DBE in liaison with coalition allies. Action: HMCE DEGLASSIFLELY DECLASSIFIED IBP Equipment Indiv Equip Fielding (E) >= 90% 70-90% 50-70% <50% ОСт MAY JULY AUG SEPT NOV DEC JUNE JAN Vehicles Vehicles Vehicles Vehicles Vehicles Vehicles Vehicles Vehicles Vehicles @ MNB-N Radios Radios Radios Radios Radios Radios Radios Radios Radios WeaponsO WeaponsO Weapons Weapons Weapons O Weapons Weapons® Weapons Weapons Vehicles Vehicles Vehicles Vehicles Vehicles Vehicles Vehicles Vehicles Vehicles @ 1 ID Radios Radios Radios Radios Radios Radios Radios Radios 11 Weapons Weapons Weapons Weapons Weapons Weapons Weapons Weapons Weapons Vehicles Vehicles Vehicles Vehicles Vehicles Vehicles Vehicles Vehicles Vehicles C 1 MEF Radios Radios Radios Radios Radios Radios Radios Radios Radios Weapons Weapons Weapons Weapons Weapons Weapons WeaponsO WeaponsO Weapons® Vehicles Vehicles Vehicles Vehicles Vehicles Vehicles Vehicles Vehicles C Vehicles O MND (CS) Radios Radios Radios Radios Radios Radios Radios Radios Radios Weapons Weapons Weapons Weapons Weapons Weapons WeaponsO Weapons Weapons Vehicles Vehicles Vehicles Vehicles Vehicles Vehicles Vehicles Vehicles Vehicles MND (SE) Radios Radios Radios Radios Radios Radios Radios Radios Radios Weapons Weapons Weapons Weapons Weapons Weapons Weapons@ Weapons Weapons O Items status shown are based on released contracts only. DECLASSIFIED SUPPORT TO DATE 2. Coalition: • Judicial - MOJ established together with independent judiciary • Prisons - CPA Order 7 (the Penal Code) dated 6 June 2003 and Order 10 (Management of Detention and Prison Facilities) dated 5 June 2003 sets out basic provisions for standards in prisons. • The CPA has a Baghdad based US Senior Advisor for prisons. The US state they will keep 107 prison advisers within the country until 2006, and are planning a heavy programme of mentoring. There are no UK staff in Baghdad. 3. UK: • The UK responsible for prisons within MND(SE). • СРА(South) prison strategy is overseen by a Senior Prisons Advisor seconded from the UK Prison Service. • Monitoring of the prisons in CPA(South) is principally provided by 3 members of the UK Military Prison Service and 2 TA officers who are UK prisons officers in their civilian careers. NEXT STEPS 4. Short Term: • 12 Justice specialists will remain attached to the US Embassy after transition • Publication of CPA legislation in the Iraqi Gazette required before it can take effect in Iragi Law. Process still behind schedule. Not all orders will have been published by 30 Jun. • Prisons Suitable buses and vans to transport prisoners to Central Criminal Court from other areas in Iraq to be delivered pre-30 Jun. DECLASSITIED graduated will require additional in-service training UK ASSISTANCE 6. Short Term: • Ensure that the numbers of UK advisors to the Iraqi Correctional Service are maintained at the current levels and replaced on a roulement basis. Action: Home Office/FCO Medium Term: 7. • DFID involved in training elements of judiciary alongside the US. It will take time to build the capacity of the judiciary as a truly independent body. Action: DFID • UK's support for prison management and training will increase significantly within the next few months. GCPP bid being prepared by FCO/ DID to ensure the continued support to the Iraqi Prison Service to include: • Continued provision of three Senior UK Prisons Advisors and an additional two legal advisers to work in an advisory capacity; • Six prison mentors and three correctional services officers to oversee the prisons across MND(SE); • Three Military Provost staff in a mentoring capacity. • Establishment of train the trainers courses and mentoring of Iragi Prisons staff. • Develop and implement an inspection regime and deploy monitors/ mentors to continue the reviewing of standards within prisons and implementing knowledge acquired through training. Provision of two legal advisors to assist in the management of prisons. Further development of prisons strategy. Action: DFID/FCO DEOLASSIFLED 2. Coalition: • 34 of 45 Battalions manned above 70% (32,484 personnel - target total 40, 680) 3. UK • MSC's man, train, pay and sustain their ICDC. MND (SE) responsible for 6 Bns. • Brigade HQ, EOD Company and all 6 Bns have been recruited and trained (total 5,068) • Specialist training (medical, communications, driver) has commenced but hampered by lack of some specialist equipment, especially communications. • ICDC capable of planning and conducting ops at Platoon level and progressing at Company level with close mentoring. NEXT STEPS 4. Short Term: Critical - Publish long term policy for the ICDC Switch the focus of military operations to training and mentoring away from combat operations, particularly in the Centre where only 1 out of 6 Bns trained 5. Medium Term: • Complete generation to 45 Bns by Aug 04 • Establish appropriate Command and Control and conform to the IPS boundaries. • Increase the level of leadership training • Complete equipment plan. DEGLASSIFIED • Monitor equipment delivery programme, especially communications. Action: MOD/MNC-I • Continue mentoring ICDC. Action: MOD DECLASSIFIED Ind.- Equip Fielding (E) >= 90% 70-90% ICDC Equipment 50-70% 16-31 1-15 1-15 1-15 16-31 16-31 1-15 <50% June MAY June July July Aug May Vehicles Vehicles Vehicles Vehicles Vehicles Vehicles Vehicles O MNB-N Radios Radios Radios Radios Radios Radios Radios Radios 20th BDE Weapons Weapons Weapons Weapons O Weapons Weapons Weapons Weapons O 3a111 Vehicles Vehicles Vehicles Vehicles Vehicles Vehicles Vehicles ( Vehicles Vehicles O 1 ID Radios Radios Radios Radios Radios Radios Radios Radios Radios 30th BDE Weapons Weapons Weapons Weapons Weapons Weapons O Weapons O Weapons Weapons Vehicles Vehicles Vehicles Vehicles Vehicles Vehicles Vehicles O Vehicles O Vehicles O Radios Radios Radios Radios Radios Radios Radios 1 CAV Radios Radios 40th BDE Weapons@ Weapons Weapons Weapons Weapons Weapons Weapons Weapons O Weapons Vehicles Vehicles Vehicles Vehicles Vehicles Vehicles Vehicles Vehicles Vehicles Radios Radios Radios MND (CS) Radios Radios Radios Radios Radios Radios 50th BDE Weapons Weapons Weapons Weapons Weapons O Weapons Weapons Weapons Weapons Vehicles Vehicles Vehicles Vehicles Vehicles Vehicles Vehicles Vehicles Vehicles C 1 MEF Radios Radios Radios Radios Radios Radios Radios Radios Radios 60th BDE Weapons Weapons Weapons Weapons Weapons Weapons Weapons Weapons WeaponsO Vehicles Vehicles Vehicles Vehicles Vehicles Vehicles Vehicles Vehicles Radios Radios Radios Radios Radios Radios MND (SE) Radios Radios 70th BDE WeaponsO Weapons Weapons Weapons Weapons Weapons Weapons Weapons O Weapons Vehicles Vehicles Vehicles Vehicles Vehicles Vehicles Vehicles C Vehicles C 13CC Radios Radios Radios Radios Radios Radios Radios Radios Weapons Weapons Weapons Weapons WeaponsO Weapons Weapons Weapons O Weapons DECLASSIFIED SUPPORT TO DATE 2. Coalition: • Coalition Military Assistance and Training Team (CMATT) established mid-03 to oversee development of Iraqi Armed Forces (IAF). • Office of Security Transition commanded by Lt Gen Petreus with a UK Deputy (formerly DCG CMATT) stood up May 04 MOD: • MOD building (Phase 1) complete and Minister in post • Ministry stood up with Joint Headquarters collocated (capacity 200 people total) • JHQ staff training completed (by UK Joint Warfare Staff) Army: • Jordanian Army training majority of officers • Coalition training NCOs (Kirkush Military Training Base) • 4 Battalions trained (plus 5* MP Bn) - further 22Bns by Dec 04. • 3,939 on trained strength with 2,763 in training. Iragi Air Force • 148 AF personnel in training ranging from pilots to ATC. Initially force will be 500 strong • Agreement established for transfer of Air Transport and helicopters from Jordan • Jordanian Air Force training continuing for of aircrew and ground support personnel for air transport and support helicopter force • Offer of 'gift ' of aircraft received from Royal Jordanian Air Force DECLASSIFIED CONFIDENTIAL UK EYES ONLY DECLASSIFIED Indiv Equip Fielding (E) >= 90% IAF Equipment 70-90% 50-70% <50% November October June December May January July September August Iraqi National Task Force Vehicles Vehicles Vehicles Vehicles Vehicles Vehicles Vehicles Vehicles IST Bde Vehicles © Radios Radios Radios Radios Radios Radios Radios Radios Radios Employable • Theater Weapons Weapons Weapons Weapons Weapons Weapons Weapons WeaponsO Weapons O Wide Vehicles Vehicles Vehicles Vehicles Vehicles Vehicles 2D Bde Radios Radios Radios Radios Radios Radios (South) Weapons Weapons Weapons Weapons Weapons N/A Weapons N/A N/A MND CS Vehicles Vehicles Vehicles Vehicles Vehicles Vehicles 6TH Bde Radios Radios Radios Radios Radios Radios (West) Weapons N/A Weapons Weapons Weapons N/A N/A WeaponsO Weapons C I MEF DECLASSIFIED Patrol boat crews and boaraing leams formed, undergoing specialist training by the Coalition. • 5 × 7.2m RIBs (for boarding operations) delivered to Umm Qasr with Yamaha 100cc twin outboard motors on each. • 110 trainees at Kirkush Military Training Base (KMTB) for initial training 09 May 04 3. UK. Under the auspices of CMATT: • Training at Kirkush Military Training Base - Major plus 12 NCOs. • Advising on the establishment of the Iraqi Military Academy - Lt Col • СМАТТ C5 (Policy and Plans) - Gp Capt • Leading the Coalition effort for the ICDF, expected to reach IOC in Jun and FOC by 30 Sep - Capt plus 58 RN/RM personnel. • Assisting in the development and recruiting into the Iraqi Air Force - 1 Wng Cdr • Legal Adviser in Baghdad - 1 x Lt Col Additionally: • 10 CDF Commanding Officers completed training at BRNC, Dartmouth in Apr 04. And outside the auspices of CMATT, UK is: Providing a Defence Advisory Team (DAT) to the Iraqi MOD. • Providing a JFHQ team from PJHQ to train the Iragi JHO. NEXT STEPS Short Term: 4. • JHQ Initial Operating Capability 15 Jun 5 Medium Term • MOD Building (Phase 2) complete 15 Jul (capacity 500) Centre-South Bde based at An Numinayah. • Complete training of all lAF Battalions by Dec 04 Iraqi Air Force: • Transfer of 2 C130s from Jordan. This will form nucleus of 12 aircraft squadron to be based at BIAP. • Transfer of up to 16 UH-1 helos from Jordan to be based at Taji • Contracting for interim light aircraft capability for border/pipeline/electricity reconnaissance; to be flown by military pilots • Determine refurbishment requirement and upgrade of avionic equipment; secure spares and maintenance support for C130 and UH1-H ac • Contract for acquisition of permanent air surveillance platform Iraqi Coastal Defence Force: • 130 trainees at KMTB for initial training 25 Jul 04. • Selection and training of Iraqi RIB coxswains. • Consolidation of Iraqi Boarding Ops training. • Intensive training of 5 Iraqi Patrol Boat crews on their respective Patrol Boats. UK ASSISTANCE 6. Short Term: • Continue training and mentoring ICDC/IPS in MND (SE). • Determine policy guidelines for the release of UK funds to SSR Access to funds is set to become more complex from 01 July. We will in a national context have access to Quick Impact Project money. £20 million, through DfID, although these projects are aimed primarily at reconstruction and not SSR and £17 million, through the GCPP, which is aimed at Governance and SSR DEGLASSIELEDLY • Increase our commitment to the MNF-l and MNC-l at statt level in the intelligence, operations and planning branches as advised by Theatre. • Focus on training the leadership cadre of the lAF. • Continue our commitment to advising the MOD and the JHQ. • Continue leading the Iraqi Coastal Defence Force project until FOC (30 Sep 04). • Provide places on courses at UK military academies. Action: MOD/SBMR-I/OST RECHASE EED DECLASSIFIED indiv Equip Fielding (E) >= 90% IAF Equipment 70-90% 50-70% <50% June May August July December October September November January 3D Division Iraqi Army Vehicles Vehicles Vehicles ( Vehicles Vehicles 4TH Bde Radios Radios Radios Radios Radios MNB N Weapons N/A N/A N/A Weapons Weapons N/A Weapons Weapons Vehicles Vehicles Vehicles Vehicles Vehicles 5TH Bde Radios Radios Radios Radios Radios MNB N Weapons Weapons Weapons N/A N/A N/A N/A Weapons O Weapons Vehicles Vehicles 9TH Bde Radios Radios HID Weapons N/A N/A N/A N/A N/A N/A N/A Weapons 5TH Division Iraqi Army Vehicles Vehicles Vehicles Vehicles Vehicles Vehicles Vehicles 3D Bde Radios HID Radios Radios Radios Radios Radios Radios Weapons Weapons N/A N/A Weapons Weapons Weapons WeaponsO WeaponsO Vehicles Vehicles Vehicles Vehicles Vehicles 7TH Bde Radios Radios Radios Radios Radios MND CS N/A N/A Weapons Weapons N/A Weapons N/A Weapons Weapons C Vehicles Vehicles 8TH Bde Radios Radios MND SE N/A N/A N/A N/A N/A Weapons Weapons N/A N/A DECLASSIFIED