النص مستخرج آلياً من صورة الوثيقة أو من ملف قديم، وقد يحتوي أخطاء في بعض الكلمات أو ترتيب الأسطر. الملف الأصلي هو المرجع.
DID BASRAH: ISSUES PAPER
The DFID team in southern Iraq has been present in Basrah for the past ten During this time it has been engaged in UN, CIMOC, ORHA-led days.
coordination meetings as well as numerous bilateral meetings. The team has The ICRC (well also met with USAID, USAID contractors and the HOC.
established), UN agencies and NGOs are now gearing up for post conflict recovery through humanitarian intervention although output is not at full speed and some UN agencies (UNDP, FAO, HABITAT) are yet to be fully established here. As reported elsewhere the transition from Relief to Recovery has already begun although efforts must be made in areas of health, watsan, fuel (esp LPG) and protection to ensure that vulnerable populations do not slip into crisis. The late decision to establish an 'international' ORHA South (to replace the previous ORHA Office which relocated to Al Hillah) has resulted in late establishment of sudden erosion if not consolidated quickly and effectively. At this point, we initial ideas on how we might proceed over the next month. These are initial unpolished thoughts formulated within a fluid situation and some points have been mentioned in previous sitreps.
Key Issues for the Iraqi Population:
2. Key issues which will impact on recovery include (not an exhaustive list):
• Security.
• Lack of central guidance (from Baghdad ministries) as well as Governorate top-level management in civil services. ORHA directives reportedly discuss resumption of civil service by 1 June but do not detail the process nor operational requirements to achieve this objective. It is not clear how feasible this will be nor how effective these structures will be DECLASSIFIED
involved in supporting the reestablishment of the civil service and their ability to address immediate humanitarian needs (commensurate with the first three points). Note: As many issues will be time limited and given time constraints, this is not an exhaustive analysis but a quick and dirty issues paper for DFID staff both in London and in Iraq.
Support to Civil Administration:
ORHA
3. The lack of policy guidance from ORHA Baghdad continues to affect ORHA South's ability to function.
This coupled with the slow trickle of support and sectoral programme staff will undoubtedly continue to undermine ORHA South's efficacy until remedied. Considering current staff in the pipeline, it appears that ORHA South will just be coming on line during the last week of May. Note: It is ironic that ORHA Directive 2 reportedly instructs all civil service employees to return to work by 1 June while the structure meant to support this process is not yet functioning.
4. The Danish staff in ORHA South have received $500,000 from the Danish Government. This appears to be the extent of their immediately accessible funds. It is not clear where and when additional funding may arrive to support operational costs. NOTE: There is confusion both within and outside ORHA whether direct programming is a function of ORHA at regional office level.
ORHA would not be able to manage programme/grant-related funds without a specifically dedicated programme manager and clear programme procedures.
5. The ORHA South terms of reference and approach is not yet clear. Ideally this civilian structure would take over the lead role in civilian administration issues (currently supported by the UK mil) as soon as possible. It is clear that ORHA South barely has they do not currently have the capacity to do so.
enough staff to cover the most urgent regional issues (payment of salaries) and has not yet begun to address specific sectoral and governorate-level issues DECLASSIFIED
6. Expectations from the population are high and information dissemination has been minimal in ORHA South AOR. Perception is that the Occupying Power has been in Iraq for weeks, with assessments ongoing and limited results.
Dialogue has been conducted at varying levels, within sectors and although many quick fixes have been implemented (to varying degrees), visibility of activities as well as ORHA mandate/decisions/intentions has been minimal at best. This is in part due to the lack of local media outlets but more to do with a lack of available information from ORHA (DFID team continue in their search for copies of the first ORHA directives. NOTE: Neither ORHA South nor have been able to pass on the text). There is an urgent need for ORHA mandate, roles and responsibilities and all written directives to be disseminated to the population. ORHA could benefit from a public information officer.
7. Support to local government structures varies from Governorate to Governorate and depends largely on the personalities in situ. ORHA absence at the Goverorate level has resulted in NGOs or the CIMOC taking the lead on supporting technical directorates and coordinating the provision of assistance.
Nasiriyah is reportedly an exemplary example of a Civil Affairs group working closely with the technical directorates and one of the lead NGOs (GOAL) to In Basrah sectoral rapidly match urgent needs with available assistance.
coordination groups are being led by UN agencies with varying participation of some directorates. However, oddly enough, the UK mil (7*h Brigade) chairs the twice-weekly meeting of the technical directorates. Although these various coordination mechanisms are functioning with varying levels of progress, directorates need to be more central in these processes, initially side by side with ORHA.
are aware of the disconnect between the
8. ORHA and Coalition Forces required ORHA presence and the current capacity of this structure. Recognising the need to fill this gap, General Garner noted the establishment of Coalition military Governorate Support Teams (GSTs) and Local Governance Teams (LGTs) and the establishment of interim local councils as two of his 12 objectives for the next 30 days (stated on 9 May). CFC FRAGO 09-087 [Governorate DECLASSIFIED
formalise the de facto relationship between ORHA South and civil affairs teams/CIMOC, enhanced clarity regarding reporting lines and mandate is necessary for all involved. (NOTE: more detail on this process can be provided to London if necessary). Again, ideally ORHA civilian structures would already be supporting the Iraqi government structures. However, in the absence of this capacity, there is an urgent need for the Occupying Power to ensure this gap is filled and that directorates are supported country-wide through standardised structures with a clear mandate to implement ORHA directives and provide necessary support.
10. We are conscious of the current urban-centric focus of ORHA as well as UN should encourage GSTs to look more broadly across agencies.
Governorates to obtain a fuller picture, however, recognising that priorities will probably remain urban centres.
QIPs:
11. We have heard from many military units that they do not have the capacity to undertake QIPs to the extent they would like. We understand that the UK 1 Div is aware of the disconnect between their capacity and that needed to implement £29 million additional QIPs and is discussing how to address this issue.
12. There are urgent needs which could be usefutly addressed through QIPs including security-related support as well as material support to directorates. We again from Nasiriyah, regarding the flexible have heard glowing reports, delegated authority of certain NGOs to support directorates. As GSTs become established, ability to support directorates in a similar manner through rapid, flexible disbursement mechanisms would assist regeneration of government structures (priority as reportedly noted in ORHA Directive 2), and immediate technical directorate activities. We concur with the recommendations made by via email although given the scale of the funding and the urgent need to support civil administration, the above-noted should be considered.
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15. The UN mandate in the current context is a humanitarian one and much of their activities will not support the rehabilitation of civil administration.
16. UNOHCI and ORHA have yet to establish a comfortable working relationship.
This may settle once ORHA capacity increases and they begin to attend/chair relevant meetings.
USAID:
17. Local governance interventions, including grants (which could be utilised for rehabilitation of civil administration structures) as well as technical/training support, will be made available through the USAID contractor, Research Triangle Institute which has a budget of $168 million. It is expected that they will be present in Basrah within the next two weeks. ORHA may be able to tap into this grant for support in this sector.
DFID's Operational Objectives in Iraq:
18. DFID team welcomes guidance on CHAD/MENAD discussions regarding future DFID operational objectives country-wide as well as specific to Basrah AOR. These objectives may include:
• Continued overview of international community activities? This has been useful as agencies get in the ground and establish mechanisms for intervention/coordination.
• Input into ORHA South?
• Operational role?
• Long-term CHAD/MENAD presence in Basrah?
Current DFID Basrah Approach DECLASSIFIED
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• USAID approaches,
• Operational and facilitative sectoral activities of UK 1 Div.
20. Placement in Basrah has been useful to understanding the constraints faced within the current context. Country-wide policy issues have subsequently been raised with DFID London.
21. It should be noted, however, that the DFID team has only been present in an authoritative first-hand view of the Basrah City and therefore does not have situation, context and approaches in other Governorates within the South AOR.
Potential Future DFID Basrah Approach Continued DFID Basrah presence under current mandate:
22. Future DFID secondees to ORHA/UK 1 Div should maintain oversight of a number of the issues currently covered by the DFID team. They will be better placed to identify key issues of concern within ORHA South and address them.
They will also undoubtedly be best placed to monitor the engagement of USAID and its contractors. Within a few weeks time, the UN and ORHA South will have established a relationship, although it may always be slightly tenuous.
23. The added-value of a continued DFID team within this context would be independent reporting (although regular ORHA, 10 and CENTCOM reporting should be received through official channels already, constituting a partial remedy to this problem - London already advised of the need for this reporting).
Continued DFID Basrah Presence with Limited Delegated Authority
24. Provision of delegated authority to the DFID team would not provide added value in the current context. It is not in DFID interest to manage that type of operational programme when so many others are on the ground with more capacity and geographical reach. The DFID team's current added-value lies in DECLASSIFIED
visits to other AOks) would contribute to a more comprehensive approach to country-wide programming and would therefore be more advisable, security permitting Recommendation:
27. An overlap of the DFID team with new DFID secondees to ORHA South will be critical to ensure initial issues/concerns regarding ORHA South are raised with DFID London while these new staff get established. However, DFID team presence beyond the next few weeks under the status quo would have diminishing returns. We recommend that an updated assessment be made to London by 1 June as to recommended timeline bearing in mind the issues as outlined above.
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