Paper greenstock iraq security

encourage the current insurgency to become a widespread, popular resistance. So we need to address the following areas: Military - Where more muscular action is needed, it must be effective, focussed and proportionate, and supported by a proactive information campaign. We need to do more to tackle use of IEDs; mortar and rocket attacks; and SAMs. We should seek to avoid further alienation of Sunni population. Overall approach needs to provide reassurance. - further action needed on border security to prevent infiltration and on arms/ammunition dumps. These are still being left unguarded around the country. Intelligence - Counter-insurgency operations are effective only when based on good, real time intelligence. We need much better coordination of intelligence collection and analysis. Intelligence sharing between the military and civilian Agencies must be improved. Agencies should liaise on staffing and resources, eg on the provision of Arabic speakers. growth of Iraqi intelligence capacity is vital. Now is the time to accelerate the establishment of Iraqi intelligence capability in the Ministry of the Interior. Our agencies are already working on this. - information produced by the military-led interrogations is not easily available to the intelligence agencies. A proper interrogation record keeping system needs to be put in place. A team of interrogation experts needed on the ground urgently. And a system of continuous operational coordination on the use to which this intelligence should be put in place, overseen by a regular meeting of the top civilian and military CPA personnel. Sunni strategy Sunni outreach remains critical even while pursuing crackdown on FRE activities in these areas. Civic and economic development projects must be a priority. And we must help the IGC to sell the new political process in the Sunni heartlands. DEOLASSIFIEDONY some acuvities by eg Iran and syria are unacceptable. We need to focus on getting them to be more helpful over Iraq. We plan to put some extra effort into this, using Sir J Greenstock. US and UK should liaise closely on joint strategy and tactics with neighbours. Information operations/communications - No coherent communications strategy or sufficiently strong press team yet in place. Iraqis must also get the message repeatedly from other Iraqis. We plan to send experts to Baghdad to help Gary Thatcher produce a strategy as soon as possible. Iraqiisation - must accept previously Baathist elements in the security forces, provided not linked with former repression. Militias - Peshmerga, Badr Corps - need to be brought in in an inclusive, transparent way, spread around in small units and under coalition command. Plans for this should be drawn up immediately with IGC. And we must make more use of tribes and religious leaders eg. disbursing funds to them to use their people to protect installations, pipelines. Economics - absolute priority must be given to job creation - reopening factories and using available workforce for labour intensive reconstruction. Other Arab investors could help with this. Creating a vibrant and modern private sector will need to be left till after June, but will then be a priority for the Iraq/international community partnership. Managing the transition/drawdown - Planning for withdrawal of 30,000 US troops by March needs to be re-assessed against the growing security threat. We must have a secure overall environment in the period running up to the caucus elections. The enemy will exploit any gaps. Better to lower domestic expectations now and link to positive progress on the political timetable. Conditions on the ground and the views of the Governing Council/Transitional Assembly must inform the decision. - On civilian side, must not adopt mindser that June represents a eut off point. Will have to stay engaged to assist the Iraqi transitional govemment find its feet. Need to start thinking now about how this should best done. DECLASSIFIED ONLY DECLASSIFIED NY