08-F-0194 Doc 02

ler (i?Ctrg — riy; , ;L tr-Aa te-4 irvs 4" -- -404.414-00-01 1 44R*— . 26 MAY, 2003 MEMO TO: SECRETARY RI IMSFEED FROM: PAUL KREMER SUBJECT: IRAN III AS PROMISED IN MY NOTE OF YI7STERDAY, HERE ARE SOME INITIAL RECOMMENDATIONS FOR ACTION AGAINST libeilicNS--ihion,:- n • -• c.o./• IN IRAQ. MY RECOMMENDATIONS REGARDING THE SCIRI REFLECT 'WE rAcT '111AT SORI HAS A PRESENCE ON THE T.EADERSHII cOMmitrEE. ASSOmING WE ALLOW THAI TO CONTINt F. WE SHOULD I ISL. CIA CONTACTS TO OBTAIN INTELLIGENCE ON ITS PRECISE LOCATIONS MULE AKOIDINO YLISHINGSCIRI CLOSER iaawi ITH 'MAT IN MIND. I RECOMMEND THAT WE NOT CHALLENGE SCIRI ON EIS IN-COUNTRY RADII CORPS PRESENCE UNTIL AFTFR nw LATTER DECLARES LOCATIONS BY JUNE 1 AS REOLIRED BY OUR NEW WEAPONS POLICY. ONCE WE HAVE 'most% LOCATIONS, I Wilt RECOMMEND THAT WE MOVE PROMPT! V MAINS"! ANY UNDFCLARED HADR WEAPONS CAC] IFS. MEANWHILE. I HAVE ME FOLLOWING RECOMMENDATIONS FOR IN1MEDIA It ACTION: OCR APPROACI1ES 10 s(IRI AND THE. BADR CORN COMPLEMENT LACH OTHER. OUR MAIN TARGET \'‘.1111IN SCIRI IS . 111E INTFELIGENCL HUH- si lAYBANI. I HAVE - TASKED CIA 1,VITI! I OCATING S11. BA NI MORI: PRECISE( Y. ON( E I OCATI,D, WE \NOCE') I SE LI"FE 7 FORCH 10 DETAIN HINI OR FORCE. HIM BACK 10 IRAN. .. SCIRI AND VI IF BADR ORE'S NIAI HAVE GIVEN S .1[11- OPPORTI •NITN !LAVE BEEN SEFKINO BY 11.1.1.6A1.1 ,OCCOPYIN(,1 (JOVERNN1F.N. I BTU DINC;S IN B.ACIFID.ND. AND IN /4— SOME CASES USING FHESE FACILITIES FOR MID/TRY OF 'Pt BI .IC SERVICES. I HAVE REQUESTED AN INVES I IGATION. IF RI E. MV RLCOMMENDA II()N I i THA I CrIT-7 TAKE ACTON TO $ FOP St :CH AC1 IVITILS QCICKLY BEFORE THEY 1AKE IlnI.D AND DE (AIN .NNY BADR CORP OR SLIIZI MEN:MFRS FOlIND. IN ADDI'l ION, THE Al -Qt 1 EORCE Of *ME IRGC HAS BEGl. N SETTING UP LENA FRS FOR CLANDESTINE OPFRATIONS IN KARBALA. KIRBII • KAI AR, DARRANDIKHAN AND ELS - DAM- RE_ AS I HE IR(iC I I SELF CONTINITS INHI TR A IF NIFN ACROSS THE HOR DIR CLA WII I LOCA FE I I IF OPERA HONS CEN I ERS. ONCE 1.01 'ND. M‘r. R12CONIMI- \DA HON IS I -HAT C,E1T-7 RAID TIII.N1 AND DETAIN ANY FORCES FOUND. 4'r 7?oT zy K9' - asurtirer-N-Resmcri ( in/I/lion Pro i•is joint/ -loth wiry New Iraqi Corps (NIC) Concept 29 May 2003 Purpose Prostional Agana)* srcrtc T ,112CL lotCri WHIN Seek approval for organizing "New Iraqi Corps" as nucleus for armed forces of new Iraq 2 CECIZET / art mien Ten Assumptions / Key Principles ( .thelitiost Itglhorily Malin • Coalition in Charge; force will be under US/Coalition TACON • A force for Iraq, not U.S. model • De-Baathification; minimum role for senior ex-officers • Mission is external defense • Military is a National force - Apolitical, representative • NIC is an interim step: Fundamental decisions on Iraqi defense policy require Iraqi buy-in: but Coalition can start on organizing first elements • Speedy start essential; NIC a priority for effort, resources • Use Iraqi resources of money, people, facilities,equipment as much as legally possible • Training by US contractors; supervision by US/Coalition officers • Military not only opportunity to employ ex-soldiers. 3 What is the "New Iraqi Corps"? P1-011 .%/011di 11111011n• NI" • An interim lraqi military capability that contributes to defense of the country and is prepared to help Coalition Forces on public order tasks appropriate for military units. • Established in four stages: - Stage 1: Infrastructure preparation and recruitment - Stage 2: Organize, train and equip - Stage 3: Conduct initial operations - Stage 4: Transition to Iraqi national army (NIAF) • The end result will be three motorized infantry divisions located near Mosul, Baghdad and Basrah with the following missions: Border Security, Point Security to include sensitive sites, Convoy Security, Route Security, Patrolling, UXO awareness, identification, marking and reporting • Under US/Coalition TACON vs j :LC IVVV.I..ce 15) ,4) • laiftitistetstaistaKti*J4- :Ataiegtaii'?A-44 -_.: 4 3ce1?c fiCE-MSAI. Plan of Action Coalition ortsiond . futhmity MEI= • Short Term: Early start on recruiting, training, organizing, and employing a light infantry force: • Start with one Battalion, grow to up to 12,000 (1 Division) in first year, 40,000 (3 Divisions) in a further year • Missions: Territorial defense, Protect key facilities / LOC from high end internal threats - under US/Coalition TACON • Recruited by nominations from SLG, regional leaders, political religious groups. NOT by approaches to ex-generals. • Use Iraqi resources almost entirely - (except for US / contract trainers?) - (Note: Separate efforts to organize Iraqi security forces to guard fixed points / installations; stand up Iraqi construction companies, recruit additional police - all of which will use ex-soldiers) • Longer Term: - Work with HA on fundamental structural decisions - national security laws, national strategy, MOD structure, force structure, budget allocations - Restructure military-controlled Industries - devolve bona fide dual use to civil sector, close down useless / dangerous ones, keep a few for future military - "Grow" future Iraqi military leadership primarily from within new forces, not by co-opting former officers 5 3CCRET 1 fikL. Timeline CuriltImil Piot'Atonal :ufsvrin • Start contracting as soon as funds approved • Goal is first intake/start training early in July • Need to be sure facilities/trainers are ready — but speed critical • First BN "graduates" 9 weeks after entry — Sep if we start in July • A year from start — 3 "Brigades" of 3 BN each, deployed, one in each region • Operating under Coalition command 6 3! T RC t Action Requested Coalition Prorisional .luthority MIN • Approve concept ' Will open door to: ' Authorize/allocate money • Start Contracting • Finish staffing ' Start recruiting 7 Summary: MC Serves Coalition Objectives ( oalilitfrii Provisional I tedwrify • Iraqis taking increasing responsibility for Iraqi's future • Multi-ethnic force promotes unity of Iraq • Opportunity to instill basic principles for a constitutional government (Professional nonpolitical military) • MC capabilities support Coalition mission to secure environment • Strong element of Coalition participation • New force advances de-Ba'athification and security sector reform • Forms the nucleus of the new Iraqi armed forces • Counterweight to militias • MC assists Coalition military in the maintenance of territorial integrity / regional stability 8 -eug3a4Escen- -sesor-T-46R&L-AIGR- LZ fotve/ --,75-- ( °tuition Provisional luilsnriri New Iraqi Corps (NIC) Concept 21 May 2003 CECTIET „ FEEL MCFi Security Senor RefOrin Coultrum l'yoricioncil illusorily 11111111 • Dismantle Saddam's structure • But Iraq will still face security challenges - Crime, ethnic based violence, terrorism, Iranian interference, external attack • Requires a comprehensive approach to reform: - Police - Court and prison system - Gendarmerie • Also, a new non-political army for self defense • Fundamental decisions must be made by legitimate Iraqi government • But immediate steps essential to do jobs and to show the way ahead - Police recall, patrolling, and training (UK offer) - Stand up court system - Establish the New Iraqi Corps SECRET REL PACH 2 SECRET A ALL Atcn ProvAional .1whority • CPA establishes an interim Iraqi military capability (the New Iraqi Corps, MC) that contributes to defense of the country and is prepared to help Coalition Forces on public order tasks appropriate for military units. • The NIC will be established in four stages: - Stage 1: Infrastructure preparation and recruitment - Stage 2: Organize, train and equip - Stage 3: Conduct initial operations - Stage 4: Transition to Iraqi national army (NIAF) • The end result will be three motorized infantry divisions located near Mosul, Baghdad and Basrah with the following mission: 3 CPA ,i/ission Coalition Provi.sional .Ittthority Coalition Provisional Authority (CPA) organizes, trains and equips the New Iraqi Corps (NIC) in order for Iraq to have an interim military capability. On order, CJTF-7 assumes TACON of formed and trained NIC units for employment. • Key Tasks: - Identify usable equipment and potential training/garrison sites - Identify and refurbish infrastructure for New Iraqi Corps - Recruit, screen and train soldiers and leadership - Implement a pay and administrative system for the New Iraqi Corps - Establish a logistics and support system for the New Iraqi Corps - Conduct an aggressive 10/PA/PD campaign to encourage Iraqi and regional support of the program Stage I Coalition Provisional luthority • Approve MC concept and identify funding (OSD) • Secure cooperation of regional political and ethnic leaders to support the concept and identify potential recruits (CPA) • Consult selected Iraqi military and civilian personalities (CPA) • Assess recruiting centers and training garrisons (CJTF-7) • Determine uniforms, ranks, pay structure and unit designations (CPA) • Assess available equipment and critical gaps (CPA and CJTF-7) • Contract for (CPA) and execute (Contractors): Refurbishing sites and equipment - Screening and intake - Administering the pay system - Training - Procuring uniforms and other necessary equipment Logistical and administrative support • Execute Information Operations, Public Affairs and Public Diplomacy (CPA and CJTF-7) -.1.CaGati4•44-4LCL--A4C.44 5 19C-GPC-T-4 1 -14C4-4•06F4 Finding People (milldam Provisional .luthority MEIN • Explain concept to Leadership Group participants, regional and tribal leaders, and emerging local leaders • Invite nominations of potential recruits and officers from Leadership Group participants, regional and tribal leaders, and emerging local leaders • Nominated individuals report to the in-processing centers • Screen according to Coalition screening criteria • Plan numbers for significant attrition (weed outs and drop outs) • Identify potential NCOs during enlisted training • Use training performance as the basis for competitive selection (especially for officers) • Aim to promote field grade officers from within the officer ranks • Identify potential students for professional military education in Coalition countries 6 "'eel eel I? 1 - Stage 1 Screening Criteria Coalition Prirrisional .turhority MINN • Absolute disqualification: - Former regime security organization affiliation (RG and worse) - Senior Ba'ath party membership (per 16 May order) - Terrorist organization affiliation - Human rights violations and crimes against humanity - Prior rank of Colonel or higher • Waiverable: - Criminal history - Familial relationship to former regime - Non-Iraqi citizenship - Extremist organization contacts - Financial situation • Other considerations: - Medical and psychological suitability - Ethnic / regional balance - Military experience and special skills 7 EECRET Wel 8 fleck POI Coalition Provisional ,-tutho pity EMU Enlisted Training NCO con Officer I 1 1 I 0 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 WEEKS -CMATT directs contractors training the NIC Units -Officers, NCOs and enlisted initially train IAW separate POls *Seek to transition to the "Train the Trainer" model 8 Stages 2 and 3 Tim dines Coalition Provisional Inthott MINN Stage 2: Organize, Train and Equip 4 11110 411110 I ay twskilitaw Sts sites 7 st 1.310 Stage 3: Conduct Mittel Operations scam. r DEL men 9 Stage 3 MC Missions Coalition Provisional Authority WHIM • Upon completion of 8 week individual and unit training at Central Training Garrison, MC will be capable of performing: - Point Security to include sensitive sites - Convoy Security - Route Security - Patrolling - Border Security - De-mining • NIC Units TACON to CJTF-7 10 ECCRET REL mcrt Stage 4 Integration of the New Iraqi Corm Coalition Provisional Authority Nil" • New Iraqi Corps begins the Iraqi national army • MOD and military force structure TBD by Iraqis 14I F gr:i; !kir CIPMP•tas!. .4.41 ;111t9r*Frantr a n> 3 via !Alt7Pm .. immittgaitriF t;tA fki;o:vmvwi *04VA V Units TACON to CJTF-7 ECRET V PLL men = Notional Elements To be trained later -7 - - MC Units 11 mirEefier-wooc-t-mer-f- Office (/the Senior Advisor for the Ministry of Thfense, Iraq MINN Coalition Prori.sional . whorifr Senior Advisor Reach Back Team HON W Siocombe OSD Deputy Senior Advisor LTG L Feliu (ESP) Admin Support Team Chief of Staff Director. Office of MOD Organizational Reform & Management Director. Industrial Conversion 3E07E7- II na mon 12 (MATT Structure Coatitioir /1,y ;'iionuI .1 ltI1OJitU II Deputy, CMATT Support Section and CG Staff Manning and Administration Military Intelligence Contracting Officer and Comptroller Coalition Military Liaison for Training Iraqi Cadre 3x Coalition Training Teams (10 personnel each) Iraqi Cadre Contractors (TBD) -SECRET II (?CL PACr4— 13 Funding CoafitThn Prothionul Authority • Potential sources of funding: - Appropriated - $ 2.475 Billion - "Vested"- $ 1.7 Billion - "Seized" - $ 600 Million - Oil revenues $ TBD • Cost estimates for one year (JUN 03 to JUN 04) .... XXX SE PETS' nut mcri 14 3ECRE11/ l?EL NCH Command and Control Coalition Provisional Authority 11111111111 CMATT - Coalition Military Assistance Fa Training Team OSA - Office of the Senior Advisor to MOD and NIAF (Slocombe Group) IIA - Interim Iraqi Authority COCOM OPCON Coordination TACON Direct Support Advise, assist and evaluate training 4NE scaler Ain mcn 15 3ccrcr x Pa mon Task Responsibility (Stage 1) (. 01111. 11.011 PrO'iNiOlial .4 uth urity lull CJTF-7 Tasks CPA Tasks CPA Contractor Tasks SECRET /I (?EL PAW /6 Task Responsibility (Stage 2) Coalition l'rovi.iunal .1estle MUM CJTF-7 Tasks CPA (CMATT) Tasks ettOt tstor cilitankays tis CPA Contractor Tasks 17 Task Responsibility (Stage 3) ((1111111€)?: Provisional Authority CJTF-7 Tasks CPA (CMATT) Tasks CPA Contractor Tasks 18 Summary: NIC Serves Coalition Objective Coalition Provi.sirmal Authority Min • Iraqis taking increasing responsibility for Iraqi's future • Multi-ethnic force promotes unity of Iraq • Opportunity to instill basic principles for a constitutional government (Professional nonpolitical military) • NIC capabilities support Coalition mission to secure environment • Strong element of Coalition participation • New force advance de-Ba'athification and security sector reform • Forms the nucleus of the new Iraqi armed forces • Counterweight to militias • NIC assists in the maintenance of territorial integrity / regional stability :.:ECIVT /17EL Men 19 7 , _ ANif es Coalition Provisional .1iithoriti. 1111 1111111 • Resolve policy issues: - Screening standards - Kurd / Shia participation - Use of Iraqi military for internal stability operations - Heavy contractor role in establishment of NIC • Funding - Variety of sources possible - Urgency • Manning - Approval and immediate fill of CMATT force structure - Approval and immediate fill of OSA • Consultation with Iraqis 3CCRE T nit PACFI Coalition 15vr1.s1 I -lothority QUethOns? -44C4314441Glipareal- 21 8 Week POI (*militia, Provisional . uthurit.). 01111111111 CMATT oversees contractors training the NIC Units CECTIET ,k 1 REL AIM CICS Planning Instructions indiums Provisional uthinity • Planning Instructions require: - Recommended criteria for screening and employing former regime military personnel - List of tasks NIC will be expected to accomplish - Recommended level of training NIC is to receive - Proposed manning structure for both NIC and CMATT - Proposed timeline for implementation - Critical budgetary requirements and constraints • CENTCOM planning will address: - Infrastructure support for the organization, training, and sustainment of the MC - Security of NIC infrastructure and personnel during proposed operations in Stages 1 and 2 - As required, SOF, Civil Affairs, Psyops, and information operations planning in support the overall CPA plan - Potential administrative and logistics support, including theater transportation support as required "dirertif ' 23 Information Operations ( I of 4) ((within, I/Morin' 10 Objectives 1.Influence support for the New Iraqi Corps (NIC) ( IZ PSYOP, PA, PD) 2. Influence Iraqis to join the N1C; leaders to nominate candidates (IZ PSYOP, PA, PD) 3. Influence external elements to not interfere with the MC (PD, PA, CENTCOM PSYOP) Target Audiences • Iraqi youth (Obj: 1, 2) • Former RA soldiers (Obj: 1, 2) • Former RA military leaders (Obj: 1, 2) • Ethnic groupsttribes: Sunni, Shia, Kurd, Turkomen (Obj: 1, 2) • Political groups and leaders (Obj: 1, 2 [3?]) • Paramilitary, terrorist groups (Obj: 1, 2, [3?1 ) • Regional/International audiences (Obj: 1,2, 3) • Strategic 10 via Public Diplomacy (PD) and Public Affairs (PA) 24 4,CCRE T /I ;in_ men Information Operations (2 44) MUM t 'volition Provisional Authority Themes • Iraqi Self-Determination • Professionalism in Iraqi Government/military • Multi-Ethnic participation in Iraqi institutions • Temporary Coalition Presence cc-cm-7 7 nu sten Information Operations (3 of 4) Coalition Prorisimial hula oil!) 111111111 Messages • Appeal to professionalism of former RA leaders/soldiers • Pride in Iraq and the NIC • Set the example for all Iraqis • NIC will work for the good of all Iraq • Volunteer for an honorable profession • NIC not for internal repression • NIC for the protection of the Iraqi people • Coalition enables the MC and will help recruit, train, equip • Iraqis will be consulted on MC development • NIC is a capable force to protect the integrity of Iraq • MC will be a representative force of all ethnic groups in Iraq • Patience — NIC will take time to form • MC is new, not a continuation of the old army or of any militia 26 6EGSET REL toctri Information Operations (4 of 4) ('vu//lion Provisional .•luthority MINN Strategic PD, PA Messages • N1C is the beginning of the new professional non-political army to defend the country (PD, PA) • Don't interfere with the development of the NIC (PD, PA) 10 Issues • Require PD to shape the environment to ensure success • Recruiting mechanism required to disseminate messages throughout Iraq (print, radio, etc) 27 SECTIET At REL men Notional NW Battalion ( Provisional .iutitorify CDR X0 CSNI II SI S2 84 S3 (1/5) (1/5) (2110) (1/5) 125 (81117) 154 (6/148) 154 I:51 154 1X1 154 jXI (61148 (61148 (6/148 38 (1/37) t- 1. 4 3 (1/3 87)X 38 J>C1 38 (1137 (1/37 ) IX 15 (1/14) 38 (1 38 (1 3 /3 8 7)Z 38 (1137)0, 38 (1137 ) D;z3 30 (1/29) in in 38 38 171 38 Lk " 38 1,Ci ese (1/37) 0. (1/37 (1/37 (1)37 20 0/19) 20 (1/19 20 (1/19) 20 A nR (1/19) 26 (1/25 . 3'1 ti - - : t 1st:wet- • 26 (1/25 26 (1/25 (1/25 26 (1/25 e • NIC Battalion. 774 • 39 Officers • 735 Enlisted 28 SEC Transition of Command and Control Coutition PrTh'isiottal Authority MEM NIC Stage 4 OSD DOS CENTCOM CJTF-7 Coalition Forces Title XXII Authority CMATT - Coalition Military Assistanc• & Training Team OSA - Office of the Senior Advisor to MOD and NIAF (Slocombe Group) hA - Interim Iraqi Authority I-MOD Iraqi Ministry of Defense COCOM OPCON Coordination TACON Direct Support Advise, assist and evaluate training 411 4- 29 Coalition Participation ( oulilioti Provisionid (who; MUM 30 CECRET .y DEL men Alternative Concepts (0111111011 • "CCC" Construction BNs + Cheaper, no threat, faster - useful work - Why military? - Based for civil jobs, do with civilian contractors • "Top Down" - Vet reconstituted FtA units + Experience, structure, possibly faster - Revives old system, "Anoints" senior generals • "Cadre" - train officers / NCOs first, then main NIC + Iraqi face, controls officer / NCO selection, thorough training - Time, still need to pay for later unit training • "Go straight to NIAF" + Fully structured units, more capable balanced force - Time lost, no Iraqi buy-in • + Speed, ethnic Iraqi balance, useful missions - Lack of continuity / experience, coalition prominence, units not fully complete, will require coalition support operations 31 3ECRET7i DCL AIM Who Trains? ( indiums Prori‘ional AwItority WHIN • SOF? +Experience, flexibility, avoids duplication US models - Policy bar, very scarce resource • CJTF-7 Military? + Speed, integration with CJTF efforts - Ties US / Coalition military down, costs hidden • Other countries? + Reduces US label, US footprint, relevant - Time, capacity to do at required scale, who pays? • Contractors? + Experience, reduced burden on US / Coalition military - Cost, time (?), requires supervision (CMATT) 32 Memo for: Amb McManaway From: Amb Bremer Subj: Free Iraqi Fighting Forces FYI. v r 'ii' 5/21/2003 12:48am -tOK-*L4t6ilkit0f4 Information Paper L- AFRD-C3 15 Jr 03 MEMORANDOM FOR- ADC-0. ADC-S, Chief of Staff. C3 SUBJECT: Free Iraqi Forces (FiF/7 ") . 1 The Free Iraci Fighting Forces (FIFF) deployed from Bashu% Iraq on 4 Apr 03 to demonstrate indigerous support tc coalition operations during Operation IRAQI FREEDOM. CENT COM issued an execution FRAGO or 3 Apr 03 directing CFLCC to RSO&l, equip and integrate FIFF elements in support of combat operations. CFSOGC provided on ODB and four ODAs to train and support FIFF combat operations. 2. FIFE elements arrived at LSA Adder betweer 4-5 Apr 03 and began small unit irain;ng at an abandoned Iraci Army camp approximately 15 KM north of LSA Adder. FIFE were arrr.ea with captured AK-74s/PK machineguns and ammunition, provided US Army ()CIE and 'Chocolate Chip" OCUs FIFF training continued through 9 Apr 03, focusing on sm.ail unit operations including patrolling, individual movement techniques, fire arc movement. vehicle searches and check point operations. The final asseWrient was FIFF units woulo be empoyed in company-sized elements. accompaniediy an orik in suppercTVorps of --7 -- )er1icTefs _ ; FIFF companies supporting V Corps deployed between 14-16 Apr 03 and the company supporting I MEF deployed on 17 Apr 03. The FIFE company operating in Baghdad was dernobil:zed on 1 May. The "Baghdad" FIFF company created an adveff4fir - npi2 on coallion operations due to their association with Or. Chalets' and the Iraqi Naiic.mal Congress The remaining FIFF companies were demobilized from 1-5:2C May 03. 4 The FIFF company supporting t MEF was demobilized on 15 May 03 by I MEF, with assistance from the ODA supporting FIFF operations. The remaining FIFF companies supporting V Corps operations are currently demobilizing 3ID F;FF paid/demobilized 4iD FiFF paioidemobi!izatior continues. FIEF rnembeawillboy avilien clothes Itten_tirn inianiforms. Pay officer will move from 4ID to 101st tomorrow. Anticipate completing_ dernozation )422 May Uniforms. issued ecu;pment and ID cards were recovereo and turned over to 377 TSC for disposi:icn 5. POC is the undersigned at IfeX6) SIPR email is (b)(6 1(b)(6) (.)S CFI= C35 'Ware*leferim o3o51./-12- 14 May 2003 TASK FORCE JUSTICE: WHO: From I MEF Command Element WHAT: Exploitation and discovery of mass graves-potentially for identification of Kuwaiti POW and war crimes. To date have accomplished the followirg: • Initial assessment to include photos and diagrams of site • In custody at Umm Oasr:P*0 who was in charge of 38 others that apparently assisted in executions. • Excavated approximately 2000 bodies (men, women, small children) • Cr. Ratid - local doctor assisting with excavation. • Assisting /raqi onsite personnel with exploitation and life support (tents and water). WHERE) Currently conducting exploitation of AL HILLAR site. 12 of 26 mass gravesites are located in I MEF's area of operation. (As Samawah (6;; Al Hillah (3); Al Hadr (2); An Naaf HOW : Small, task-organized unit comprised of Reserve Major (FBI), Reserve GySgt (forsenics specialist); PAO, security detachment (platoon-size inf); 2x counter- intelligence specialists. On lb May, NCIS will send 2 x forensic specialists to assist in exploitation and identification of bodies. CI teams will conduct initial information gathering effort, to include potential witnesses of what may have happened at the site. . 10 May sr.i Memo ter .-Administrator, CPA Ftom • Walt Stocombe Subje.:t Sta:us of wont or. NIC pro:ect Jerry - as you will know front my e-mail last night, I briefed Sc. Kuinsfeld late yesterday evening on the NIC con.:ept (slides attached), and he apptoved it That has given me a license to ask Dee Lak)tcim to take the isceessary ticp ie approve :he funding and to start greasing the ways fcr highly-accelerated contra,ting proceis I have this morning submitted e format request to Dov for approval of funding- which our very preliminary esnmare would be about SI6, f payments to L'S contreeters I for the actual training and in-proecisingt; the ri kri'ig cpPri? ri 1raL Ln.. pnantLa1,ttcs tpaaesi-I have proposed that the money come front Iraqi sources. hut. is you know, the Hid appropriators ar: hikri, to lake the position that at least the payments to US contracturs have to come from LS appropriatei: money Lin the contriewig :runt, I met with LTG Tome Walter., head of the Defense Seewity Cooperation Agency, and he ag,reed to support a very ambitious schedule for competing and aweriline a connect fur the US trainer element of the effort. He is working with the Army - sexecutive agent tasked iu support ••• to get the contsauting manpower needed and to expedite the process. (Sole sourcing might Pie faster, and there is 3 irrIt of virile technical misstep in 3 limited competition effort leading to a protest, b•-tt I tilgilk it is in eventide's Interest to compete the contrail it :I can be de ne coitsisteot with the need Lot swung the ::1141.0 iseatcld:. Ai pieisible.) I :use., P.' IC with CF.NICUM, CITE and UKHA people in a tew hours. the main agenda 0:111 be making sure that the sitc identification is on track, and that the accessary preparations are being mode ter the :age antouto cf in-lraq , -- 7. -- t omaeiririfarii. s ill be needed . Vs c also wt.; deed ti stan planning for how t • mutt with rclvvantjfitl..I ,rou s and leaders ' which is important liui just to get their understanding and support, but as a sourest 0 trie.telitaise. I f“ic, A that we hove te keep that prueess in sync with the Moader political consultation effort. Cinen that we iced to have a fa:rly definite timetable assueed when we stall talking about Me idea 'Nubile!). this cotisuttnisinidiscussion probably can safely wait und: I get bile iv tu Baghdad. but if sou have A different jIrr.2 view. ple.isi. :et me kr.Lsvi v,e‘t•-e l.1 .,,,\ st , Ve- S c' tir‘ v I rr.ct yesterday with MG Luton, and briefed him on hia task. He is enthusiastic about the project. though consetous of the eliallengt lit summanzec his stew by saying. in substance, - This is what I know. how te do • take recruits arid tu.en them ;Mc same:iv:tent Infantrymen in about two nidetlis " He is MAw back at Ft Re1111,1q. working with h:s infante) training eepens to flesh out the detailed requirements ter the training operation tie will turn user his command on 9 June ;.ed arrive to Baghdad a few dais thercallee, Lii .short, we are gehing good support on rno%inc A3 (as' as possible. My target - a very ambitious one - is to Lave the first make oi trainees in early iely. That will require lots of moving parts to come together • Aid we need to be su:e we have a smooth it. with facilities and training ready to go - but lots of people arc erergiteii to make it happen Dunne, the metireg with SeeDet, the following spect:1: issues were ratted. • The relative priority of the NIC effort ' said this. in the areas I know anythtng &Wu:. it is second only to increased policing capability tic stressed that in his view a key value of the NW is that, besides territonal defense, it will xontribitc lo security :mine the covitry, by helping with border control and rodielsite security kind patrolhats dunes. lie asi‘ed about the planned_:inal size of the effon (duce ilic isions. 40K troops, in 27 11.1i:t-arid whether we planned to create an NCO corps (yes). On schedule, he emphasized..thr-naH-foc-apced. but commented that our proposed schedule (12K people - a division within a year is a lot faster than has been achieved in Afghanistan. I said it is an ambitious schedule, but there an many actvantagcs in Iraq over Afghanistan • :n parteular lots of people with experience in 4 relatively sophisticated military. • He expressed bafflement at the ins.stenet of the appropriators that payments to L S con ra- tor me fron US ax mone guligaragungrg_ v a es. NI the end of the bnct, he asked CJCS his view, Gen Myers replied that "it's a good idea and a good start Rumsfeld then said, - Laxiks good to me' and mid mc in move forward to implement (He asked me to brief the liepinies C orrim Mee next I uesday, so the interagency will know what is going on - ar.d OMJS brought on board the funding concept ) I d.d ;sive the reporting chain issue to SceDcf. because I had met briefly with CICS before the muting with SeeDet. In that meeting. I mentioned the issue of Gen. Franks' preference that, as the head of the training effort, MC Eaton report direstly to you. 1 explained the reasons I would prefer to have him report through me. pending the consersion of the entire OSAtMOD) into an Office of Military Cooperation that would. of course, report directly to the US ambassador to Iraq. Myers said he woald talk to Franks and see %ha: can be worked out. I agree this is not an issue to create a figh: over hurl thtnk it R discirahle Myers :an work it out, tine; if not. we' lisc with Franks' preference so far as ate winog diagram :s coneernc 47—S Purpose iSCORCT 9 RCL Marl uria.1 List NUM UI Seek approval for organizing "New Iraqi Corps" as nucleus for armed forces of new Iraq 2 Ten Assumptions / Key Principles .4, • -.a . a:a:a...2:j: . j, . , • ‘....not nor it! L.- r• 1111111”111 • Coalition in Charge; force will be under US/Coalition TACON • A force for Iraq, not U.S. model • De-Baathification; minimum role for senior ex-officers • Mission is external defense • Military is a National force - Apolitical, representative • MC is an interim step: Fundamental decisions on Iraqi defense policy require Iraqi buy-in: but Coalition can start on organizing first elements • Speedy start essential; N1C a priority for effort, resources • Use Iraqi resources of money, people, facilities,equipment as much as legally possible • Training by US contractors; supervision by US/Coalition officers • Military not only opportunity to employ ex-soldiers. 3 What is the "New Iraqi Corps"? • .! kr Nei • An interim Iraqi military capability that contributes to defense of the country and is prepared to help Coalition Forces on public order tasks appropriate for military units. • Established in four stages: - Stage 1: Infrastructure preparation and recruitment - Stage 2: Organize, train and equip - Stage 3: Conduct initial operations - Stage 4: Transition to Iraqi national army (NIAF) - The end result will be three motorized infantry divisions located near Mosul, Baghdad and Basrah with the following missions: Border Security, Point Security to include sensitive sites, Convoy Security, Route Security, Patrolling, UXO awareness, identification, marking and reporting • Under US/Coalition TACON When ready, the New Iraqi Corps (NIC) is available for territorial defense and to conduct stability operations subordinate to CJTF-7 and contribute to a stable and secure environment. 4 Plan of Action .* • - , . ; ." *1 NMI sr:4 114L Le. Zli; -444sua tat, • • .. . I. • • • Short Term: - Early start on recruiting, training, organizing, and employing a light infantry force: • Start with one Battalion, grow to up to 12,000 (1 Division) in first year, 40,000 (3 Divisions) in a further year • Missions: Territorial defense, Protect key facilities / LOC from high end internal threats - under US/Coalition TACON • Recruited by nominations from SLG, regional leaders, political religious groups. NOT by approaches to ex-generals. • Use Iraqi resources almost entirely - (except for US / contract trainers?) - (Note: Separate efforts to organize Iraqi security forces to guard fixed points / installations; stand up Iraqi construction companies, recruit additional police - all of which will use ex-soldiers) • Longer Term: - Work with IIA on fundamental structural decisions - national security laws, national strategy, MOD structure, force structure, budget allocations - Restructure military-controlled industries - devolve bona fide dual use to civil sector, close down useless / dangerous ones, keep a few for future military - "Grow" future Iraqi military leadership primarily from within new forces, not by co-opting former officers 5 CCCRET f?EL MCFI Timeline . . • • inl a • •••• rbk Aso MUM • Start contracting as soon as funds approved • Goal is first intake/start training early in July • Need to be sure facilities/trainers are ready - but speed critical • First BN "graduates" 9 weeks after entry - Sep if we start in July • A year from start - 3 "Brigades" of 3 BN each, deployed, one in each region • Operating under Coalition command 6 Action Requested MEIN • Approve concept • Will open door to: • Authorizeiallocate money • Start Contracting • Finish staffing ' Start recruiting 7 Summary: NIC Serves Coalition Objectives NIFINII 1•1 ea-AA • Iraqis taking increasing responsibility for Iraqi's future • Multi-ethnic force promotes unity of Iraq • Opportunity to instill basic principles for a constitutional government (Professional nonpolitical military) • NIC capabilities support Coalition mission to secure environment • Strong element of Coalition participation • New force advances de-Ba'athification and security sector reform • Forms the nucleus of the new Iraqi armed forces • Counterweight to militias • NIC assists Coalition military in the maintenance of territorial integrity regional stability 8 0 o> -- /--C.}1 SCCR&F- 1.1 01 01 00 SSSS TT ZYUW .„ (JCS wASHINCTON DC// CDR USCENTCOM MACOILL AFB, FL// mfimipsifiaharr immTm. PERSONAL FOR GEN FRANKS FROM GEN MYERS// msGio/GcNADmIN/C)C5// SUB)/PHASE IV OPERATIONAL RELATIONSHIPS AND GUIDANCE// KtF A/PREUDeNTIAL meP,DRANDuM/APPUINIMENT QF PKE5IUtNIIAL thvvY(9 MAY 03// KEF B/SECDEF mEMORANDum/SuB)EcT - DESIGNATION As ADMINisIKAtom Lw COALITION PROVISIONAL ALJTHORITY/13 MAY 03// HMKs/ 1. 4o4. iN iHt wAKt OF LAS1 WEEK'S APPOINTmEN1 Of. THE ADMINISTRATOR FOR THE COALITION PROVISIONAL AUTHORITY (A-CPA), REFS A AND 8 GERMANE, THIS MESSAGE SERVES TO CLARIFY THE INTENT FOR USCENTCOM'S DIRECT SUPPORT RELATIONSHIP WITH A-CPA, DELINEATE POLICY DEVELOPMENT RESPONSIBILITIES AND DESIGNATE NEAR-TERM PRIORTTTES IN ASSISTING THE A-CPA. 2. mts* DIRECT SUPPORT RELATIONSHIP WITH A-CPA: CDRUSCENTCOM WILL DIRECTLY SUPPORT THE A-CPA AND IS AUTHORIZED TO ANSWER DIRECTLY TO A- CPA'S REQUEST FOR ASSISTANCE. WHILE SECURITY IN IRAQ REMAINS THE KEY TO ALL OUR STABILITY OPERATIONS, ASSISTING THE A-CPA IN ITS WORK IN )3/333/n/ )SISC ALTERNATE MESSAGEFORM SECRET SECRET 02 04 XI ssss TT ZYUw THE NEAR TERM IS JUST AS CR/TICAL. CDRLSCENTCOm SHOuLD SUPPORT, WITHIN MEANS, ALL A-CPA DIRECT SUPPORT REQUESTS TO INCLUDE BUT NOT LIMITED TO PLANNING STAFF, COMMUNICATIONS, LOGISTICS, TRANSPORTATION SUPPORT, ENGINEERING AND cryll MILITARY OPERATIONS. CDRUSCENTCOM WILL IDENTIFY REQUIREMENTS BEYOND CURRENT MEANS. CONFLICTING PRIORITIES BETWEEN A-CPA REQUIREMENTS FOR DIRECT SUPPORT ANO EXISTING USCENTCOM PHASE TV MISSIONS THAT CANNOT BE RESOLVED wILL BE RAISED TO SECDEF FOR RESOLUTION, 4, 4.93pNEAR TERM PRIORITY FOR ASSISTING CPA: IMPROVING THE RELIABILITY AND BREADTH OF COMMUNICATIONS FOR THE A-CPA IS THE TOP PRIORITY. UNTIL AN IRAQI INFORMATION TECHNOLOGY INFRASTRUCTURE CAN BE REESTABLISHED, THE JOINT STAFF 3-6 WILL CONTINUE COORDINATING WITH A-CPA AND CDRLSCENTCOM FOR SHORT-TERM COmMERCIAL SUPPORT TO MEET NEAR-TERM REQUIREMENTS. AS A STOP GAP, USCENFCOM mUST ASSIST THE CPA WITH AN EFFECTIVE COMmUNICATIONS INFRASTRUCTURE USING APPROPRIATE IN- THEATER C4 ASSETS. 5. ,t1§4.. POLICY DEVELOPmENT RESPONSIBILITIES: BECAUSE Of THE UNIQUE RELATIONSHIP BETWEEN THE A-CPA AND CDRUSCENTCOM, THE FOLLOWING GUIDANCE FOR POLICY, MANNING AND FUNDING IS OUTLINED BELOW TO CLARIFY KEY RESPONSIRILITIES AND PROCEDURES: JSISC ALTERNATE MESSAGEFORM • ti4k-0141•PavriNi or As c-1\71105%PqAt3- 1 1"WAY7fiwu ex. , I110 .14 roc 1'4111 .'0W 4. 'Iry SECIICT 03 04 00 SSSS TT ZYUW A. POLICY DFvtLoPmENT: sEcDEF OR 4I5 DESIGNATED REPRESENTATIVE IS THE FINAL APPROVAL AuTHORITY FOR POLICY ISSUED TO A-CPA AND CDRuSCENTCOm. REQUESTS t-OR POLICY GUIDANCE MAY COME FROM THE INTERAGENCY, OSD, JOINT STAFF, CPA AND/OR CDRUSCENTCOM AND WILL BE FORwARDED TO LSU(P). USD(P) WILL DESIGNATE LEAD ORGANIZATION OR . - DRAFTING AND COORDINATING POLICY. OSO WILL COORDINATE DRAFT POLICY _ WilH int JOINT STAFF, THE CPA, AND INTERAGENCY AS APPROPRIATE. )0/NT STAFF WILL COORDINATE WITH USCENTCOM, USEUEOM AND SERVICES AS APPROPRIATE. APPROVED POLICY GUIDANCE APPLICABLE TO A-CPA AND CDRUSCENTCDM WILL BE DISTRIBUTED VIA mEMO FROM THE 5ECDEP TO A-CPA AND VIA MESSAGE FROM C3C5 TO USCENTCOM. IT IS IMPERATIVE THAT A-CPA AND CDRUSCENTCOM COORDINATE ON DETAILS Of POLICY IMPLEMENTATION. B.rRiiu.A-CPA POLICY IMPLEMENTING PRODUCTS DESIGNED TO COMMUNICATE APPROVED SECDEF POLICY TO THE IRAQI PEOPLE, SHALL BE SUBMITTED ¶000(P) FOR REVIEW PRIOR TO RELEASE. ..• . C.-WI-MANNING: A-CPA MILITARY MANNING WILL BE REQUESTED 79MOUGN OSO AS REQUIREMENTS ARE IDENTIFIED. OSO WILL COORDINATE REQUESTS THROUGH THE JOINT STAFF. CIVILIAN MANNING FOR A-CPA WILL ALSO BE REQUESTED THROUGH OSD. SECOEF IS THE APPROVAL AUTHORITY FOR ALL MANNING REQUESTS. 3SISC ALTERNATE MESSAGEFORM LooctmE-1\musitym,LmALs-wtsp\psiAst 11/ oPfiAncnim atoupansm:Ps & cajnykka noc 5£CRET 04 04 Oo SSSS TT zyuw o. 444. FuNDING AND REsOuRct ALLOCATION: CONTINUE TO woRR FUNDING ISSUES THROUGH NORMAL CHANNELS, RECALLING THAT AMBASSADOR BREmER HAS BEEN Lin/EN (Ht REsPoNSIBILITY BY THE PRESIDENT TO OVERSEE THE USE OF ALL USG APPROPRIATIONS, TO INCLUDE NON-Doe MONIES, IN ) IRAQ. oSO COmplKoLLER wIL4 INSM ISSUE'LiCTIONSIN THE NEAR FUTURE FOlk HANDLING AND RESOLVING FUNDING OR RESOURCE ALLOCATION ISSUES THAT I CANNOT BE RESOLVED BY TWE_A-CPA . 6. +4 REQUEST USCENTCOM ASSESS rHE MOST PRESSING DIRECT SUPPORT ISSUES WITH PARTICULAR 'EMPHASIS ON ADDITIONAL MILITARY SUPPORT REQUIRED, IF ANY BECAUSE SUCCESS IN IRAQ DEPENDS UPON EFFECTIVE AND TIMELY CPA OPERATIONS, EVERY EFEORT, INCLUDING DIRECT MILITARY SUPPORT, MUST BE MADE TO MAKE THOSE SUPPORTING ORGANIZATIONS AS EFFECTIVE AS POSSIBLE DURING THIS CRrTICAL PHASE. 7. (U) WARMEST REGARDS, DICK.// ; 3SISC ALTERNATE MESSAGEFORm SECRET cvloCumE-1\ HrmitvA\LOCALS-11TLOPNPhASL lv OPOILATIONAL ICATIONSAIPS GUlamiCCOCC , _ .1/2 - -- a d May 16.. 2803 7:12 AM TO. A/115131tPmer Gen. Myers Gen. Pace MItittotlar rrtr ittitnittc‘ CC. LTG Craddock bls1) FROM: Donald Rionsfeld VA SUBJECT: Priorities I asked several people to redo the priority lig we issued In early April. I know John Abizaid is working on it_ I did, however, want to send along Steve Carnbone's contribution. I think it is a prcuy good t;onstrurt. Why don't you folks look at it, and let's see if we ca!_;:iiii ianaleititlinhn Craddock and develop an agreed-upon so offf:griiies. That is no question but - _ that the ones from April 9 art out of date Thanks. Attach. Sit 903 Cambooe memo to SeeDef re: "Iraq--Pnormes" DKR 1th CIS I 603 2 Please respond by TIONIIIINCIVAL (*mummer's) DOCLARIKTPMCOMESUP.MaimICED DRAFT ASCREW— SECDEF HAS SEEN mAy 1 4 2003 15 May 2003, 1600 MEMORANDUM FOR THE SECRETARY OF DEFENSE FROM: YrEv E C AMBO4X-- SUBJECT: IRAQ—PRIORITIES (U) (U) You asked for my view on updating your April 9 paper on priorities (attached). -(€)-ita setting pnorities for the Iraq joint task force's (CITF-Ts) and, by extension, the Coalition Provisional Authority's effort in Iraq, I believe it is helpful to identify the main areas of work on which we want them to concentrate and then, within each area of work. priorities that they should follow in the allocation of resources over time. Resources include personnel, intelligence, logistics support. funding. etc. —(egirEelow is an outline of arras of work, with priorities and their tine &tunes for completion. The clock would start from the time this guidance is issued. I assumed existing guidance on "de-Baathification." etc. I. Military Operatioris: A. MEK/BADR Corps/IRGCJKDEK: Disarm and Neutralize Organized Military Resistance Within Iraq (begin immediately. through completion) B. Aggressive presence pairols (begin inuaediauely. thtuul suLls time as local police/paramilitary fortes can maintain public order) 1. Urban 2. Countryside 3. Border Areas C. Train and deploy Iraqi police/paramilitary (30-90 days) - D. Integrate foreip troops (66- [20 days) DRAFT DRAFT .SEeltel6 E Train Iraqi national security forces (90-180 days) II. Stability Operations A. Impose control in Baghdad to provide security (immediate-5 days) Fallow-on actions as required elsewhere (e.g., Tikrit) (15-30 days) B. Provide most urgent energy needs (e.g.. gasoline. propane, electrical service) (immediate) C. Impose, then develop indigenous capability fcr, jLcrisrol of k _synters (itrunediaie with aim of transition of authority in approximately 180(?) days) 1. Baghdad 1. An Najaf 3. Mosul D. Key ministry stand-Os (30-45 days).---' E. /Provide essential capabilities for internal conununications (45- 90 days), e.g., I.'Iliin-line" microwave (45 days) 2. Restoration of switched network (90 days) F. Other infrastructure restored to essential levels of service (6a- 180 days), e.g.. I. potable water 2. sewers/water treatment 3. reads G. Apprehend black list personalities (as opportunities arise, without impacting above) 1. Regime 2. War criminals DRAFT —SEW§Rf+- 2 DRAFT III. Survey and Exploitation Tasks A. Secure highest-priority known sites and critical ad hoc sites 1. Nuclear. biological, and chemical Note: Establish terms for international inspeenon Find, interview, interrogate second- and third-tier individuals with useful information on: I. WMD-related activities 2. Political activities, situations. etc. 3. Economic functions or the state 4. War crimes 5. tritelligencs notivitiot , etc. 6. Prisoners/Prisoners of war Note: Employ rewards, punishment, amnesty programs C. Triage documents cache D. DisusantleDestroy, as necessari. WMD- related facilities IV. External to Iraq (continuous through completion) A. Work with other countries to conduct survey and exploitation tasks in Iraqi embassies abroad (USDP/State) B. Pursue results of iriterviews/interrogations and document triage to locate Iraqi wealth deposited outside the country (USDPareasury) C. Work with other countries to manage Syrian, Iranian, Saudi, Turkish, and other NGOs' undue influence in Iraq (USDP/State) Attachment DRAFT "YEelift4. 3 DRAFT Apnl 9, 2003 5.44 PM irag—Kcy lak NOTE: THIS ja A LJST 01 KEY TASKS—Cs1 PRIORITY WIDER. WHAT IT IS NOT: IT IS NOT A WAR PLAN 11 13 NOT A HUMANITARIAN ASSISTANCE PLAN. IT LS NOT A STABILIZATION PLAN IT IS 1•40T A RECONSTRUCTION PLAN. SUCCESSFULLY ACCOMPLISHING MANY OF TASKS LISTED ON THE FOLLOWING PAGES MAY WELL HELP TO WIN THE WAR AND/OR HELP IN HUMANITARIAN ASSISTANCE. STABILIZATION Ars'D/OR RECONSTRUCTION BUT THAT IS NOT TILE PURPOSE OF THLS MEMO. wItAT THIS MEMO IS: THE PURPOSE OF THIS LIST OF KEY TASKS IS TO HIGHLIGHT THE IMPORTANT FACT THAT THERE ARE EXCEEDINGLY IMPORTANT TASKS 'THAT NEED TO BE DONE EARLY, BEFORE THE CESSATION OF HOSTILITIES AND/OR EFOPJ THE UN OR THE IIA HAVE A MAJOR ROLE AND BEFORE COALITION FORCES ARE PARED DOWN. AND TO SET PRIORITIES IN TACKLING THESE TASKS. USE OF U.S. AND COALITION CAPABILITIES FOR THESE PURPOSES SHOULD BE BALANCED AGAINST THE TASK OF WINNING THE WAR AND STABILIZING THE COUNTRY DRAFT -,SF.G4144- 43Ceeftef• DRAFT Foriate for US Activities_i Araq Period (—Period before cessation of hosti litier—the US will have the "rnaximurn- freedom of action Period 2—After Period I , and before an international coalition, the UN or the Iraqi Interim Authority (nA) wilt have a major role, the DS will have "medium" freedom of action Period 1—After Period 2, when an inernational coalition and/or the 11A assUMeS 1 Major Ceatttion Tasks: x / a rTo the extent possible, tackle a' a top pncrities those tasks that may require kinetics iri JA before the cessation of hostilities. yc._ Address the rest of the tasks miler kinetics end, bi.t before the coalition is restricted by the UN and/or the IIA. ggressively use "rewards programs," "amnesty," "war crimes tribunals" and "10" to accelerate adieving our key priorities ir all periods. Incorporate lessons learned from Easters Europe regime changes in fashioning the new Iraq government. r .,,kta L,.8. tablish exploitation and interrogation process to achieve US priorities. mines Amid focus US inlet collection efforts and use of military and OGA assets, I targets actually pursued will depend an the availability of good intel; we will act opportunistically. influence Office Res pon sibl e NNTCOM CIA C3NTCOM CIA CCJUSD(P)/ OGC USD(P) CC/JS CC Due Date N/A Rewards 29 Apr Arrtririty 15 Apr WCT 4/1903 to CC 4/15/03 Ongoing D RA FT .44,641446 2 trirAr ( e -€,ErC-44F÷ D AF7' _ Pet-fad 2 -After Period I, :ad before an taternatIonal coatitlas, the UN or the HA hove assumed a major role WMD sites lraq—crsoney, gold. etc.--and find documentation about Saddam leadership's w4 ii tside of the cow . _ te documents reLaiig to lçaqs Aar machine that comect sources of illeg,n1 proliferation. 7 1 : 4 -444 1e. Manage Syrian, Iranian, Saódi. Turkish and sun Iraq. onitor borders to prevent outflow of WMD and contriband.. Establish intr., inn Iraqi ii 14 4:s f z ein t b) means of IIA Rachaoa-iffirts coin _ Period 3—After Period 2. when an international coalition andJor the HA *saltine" sizafficant influence d bring to trial the top 50 on the black list Ind and bnn trial ving war criminals. Deal w 1:nqi embassies abroad. OKI 1.1, _ tniq narkisi 'A DRAFT -41F5C-1;04- CCeeete14 -4 , SC -4-- Dot Date - 1 Respoaalble Ongoing CC/LJ ACIetiii) SID(P)/ 5 P Ongoing US Dept Tress cc-"Glicro Ongoing CC/USD(P) Ongoing_i CC/USW) Ongoing CC Ongoing Office Respootible cc/et-A- CCIETA— t isD(PA2tr- Due Dale Ongoing Ongoing Ongoing 4 0 5a5/? -04 Bremer, Paul From: Sent: To: (DX6) Co: Subject Classification .460141•F Caveats. NONE glifKOWNTe ALCON. Todays notes - C;(1 concurred with DtRLAUTH between V Corps & ORHA in that it facillitates coordination & execution, but noted that when get in!o missioning & rsourc:ng, CJTF-7 frost cut FRAGOs - if dont, then will end up with the HOs working at cross-purposes. For example. could have overmissioning of units if ORHA & V Corps coordinate a misison w/o CJTF-7 visibility and then we put out a tasking thinking those foruestresciu-ces are available. - CG emphasized importance of a CJ1F-7 & ORHAJneelog tornorroviiukbaza_ORtikyd Itemize ail reauir .ii)ments accoss.ali.lues of oprKaLon ministnekand then prionhze them for CJTF-7 to allocate resources. CG guianCe to DCG- 0 :s that *uolioe are at or near toe too- of the prioritization - CG talked to CJTF-7 leaders about ongoing trans:tion of lead for civil reconstruction in lZ. Coalition Provisional Authority (CPA) is AM B Bremer who is now on board t-ie is in charge in 12 and ORHA is subsumed as part of his orgaiiization. CJTF-7 is in Divot Support to CPA. even as our cha:n-of-command remains to CENTCOM. CG made clear tnat CpA_p_%011a.s.are_eur_gnoritiesOhat what CPA needs done we will do all we can to do. CG noted there will be continued turbulance as ORHA personnel rotaVireoming days and weeics but that CJ1'F-7 needs to facilitate success so staff isn't to nesrtate to send personnel to Baghdad, link-up with ORHA and work things out. Does no good to point out shortcomings and wait tor someone else to fix them before acting. CG told CJTF-7 leadership not to get frustrated with ORRA & CPA if th.ngs are not as Gear-cut as we would like or are uste0 to- they come from different cultural base. CJTF-7 must and will support them - our sucCelit only comes with their success & CJTF -7 will support Police issues CG emphasized to staff, are PM0 in particular. he importance ot expeditieg delrvery of olice uniforms If they Come in tomorrow as scheduled. they oeeC to be broken dcw- i tomorrow & flown north immediatery - -want tnerr ostributed as • Regarding poi ce cars, suggestion made to paint them all ongre red for visibility ve a precinct number on trier • any reason hC! 10 Cu traC, pollee & zerhaps ether tasks too. ' Regarding 16th AASLT remain:in IZ anothe4 0•30 days. CG leoicated we wttl Lse them primarily to train - CJTF-7 - rahsrtion. O'COfS to ensure JMD & unit recommendations have CG review before going to CEN- COM. • CG mace clear that 1 UK Elvis on wm not change C2 relationships before 15 June. they will remain under 1 LIEF until I MEF departs and mann° presence goes to a MEB At that point, 1 UK becomes a multi-national div s nn under CJIF-7. Staff must think tnrougn ;he mp:ications as it will effect all battlefield functiors - comrno being a great example now deal vie SIPS TACSAT etc - Discussion about tne daily PAO Press Release that focuses on Security- CG wants statistic that 96 of 100 gas stations in Bagedad are now open (up from 40 last week) rchicee Beyond that, all need to know that every day the C2, C3 & PAO are wing a battle drill to put out a Carty press release that talks to security conditions cut all of Iraq, with some emphasis on Baghdaci PAO to provide the press release via XO, to CG daily St,aff needs to feed information appropriate for the re;ease into The . 7)A0 dal,y • rue' 0StrlDution CG wants to orchestrate 'Lie( cetrver in a preeictve way as opoosed to reacting to shortages as they are identitiee GS Ts report back trough 352c CA daily they need to report fuel status for their region • C9 to roll together all the GST reports da ly • C2 to do IPB of fuel infrastructure security for purpcse of devleoping an 'ISR like plan to use aerie! platforms :o enhance pipeline & fee infrastructure security CFLCC (CFLCC 'hal` CO(ps soon 377th TSC will control the camps CJTF-7 f before CJTF-7 TOA) to assume cenirol of KU redeployment camps from V - CG talked at length today about problem of soldier standards in theater - rnproper uniforms, operating vehicles w/o nettle! & seatOe;ts. Many offenders are new units failrng in or 6. learning bad standards Standards meat be integral part of RSOI & 377tr, to reinforce standards & standards enforcement as pan of RSOI CG is prepared to lake MPs our cf security m sison IZ f he has to since the chain-04-oommanc continues to fail to enforce, Out it will be last resort and he macte clear ne wit be Ospleased I he is forced to do that Standards enforcement near top of CG's list of important tn•ngs ane must be so with everybody. Related topic was allegation that units are going into and stopping to eat or shop in downtown Kuwait City - PMO to provide CG list of units caught doing that • CJT F-7 Transition • CG tod C,JTF 7 ieaders not to gat fixed on 15 June date for CiTF-7 TOA - t s a target. out - OA will be cent driven when CG & V Corps C,dr agree all the creicsitioes are met, not simple adherence to a pre-deterrnined cafe Staff to werk respective lanes to get TOA right; don't weat to be told & be senstve to overloading V Corps ay :List dumping tasks on them. ' 'NW TOA coes take place there wit be a phased withdrawal of CFLCC Forwatc HO in Baghdad tECP will be Die last piece out & it could remain there a while if there is a need • Ater TOA. our HO will retain tnree roles CFLCC (for a tong period of time unit tne last Marne & coalition soldier theater) ARCENT & 30 Army At leas: so-re of the Title X su)otxt we had otter doing for CJTF- 180 before Operation Iraqi Freedom wilt resume. • 7 2eganding iong-tenn ARCENT'3d .Army HO in theater. CG's intent is to figure out a smart way to cownsize h10 enough to eventual y allow for a rotation of permanently assignee personnel. particularly those who nave been here the last two 'ears - Perception Management cr,ticai !c, success in Iraq. media interface is where center of gravity seems 10 be [my term tor CG's thrustI CG said we wilt continue to do press confereeces the Press Releases is our OW 10 seize the nitiative Perception Management isl't Just task of CommanC Group G.0 s though. ail contribute by- 1) provide information for tne PAO to use 2) seek out press & engage them to tell the other 9 good rews stories that exist for each bad news story :hat gets reported - CO wants entire energy of the ESB, with 10 & PM0 leads, put Into implementing CJTF-7 Weapons Policy with proclamation this week CO reminded everyone AMB Bremer & SECDEF have approved for execution C3 to release an order implementing it C3 10 to work with 1$G Haddad's translation & cievelop a dissemination plan us,ng all 'neans availatie again, 10 be execute:: this week CO noted that policy does not disarm Z. will discuss Weapons Policy at 20 May 11A meearg. - CG tae a to CJ T7 leaaership about fact that we are kiilig a soldier or marine a day in non-hostile 3Ctt0113 - vehlote accidents. failing otf things. rev:gent discharges. UX0s. etc. Staff & particularty commanders need to figure out wnat they can to co helb sierr accidents Relates cJosety to standards discussed above CO noted that at Camp Doha can see vehic:es speeding & fialir,g other safety standards. Leaders need to step out & make corrections - never be too busy to make al on the spot correction as a leader CG spoke w/ anger of two leuttmants driving a tiMMWV 1-Shirts wdo heimets - Stopped by CSM :hey told him while laughing about II tnat "yes. they were wrong and would get in uniform' acknowledging failure and willingness to correct it made their behavior OK while their actions set standard for not only Ue r soldiers but al( the others tiny encourntered as well CO ended by telling leaders that success of the carripaing will be determined over the summer months - ail must "stay with It." - Regarding 507th Main Investigation, SJA to get invotved with process to determine releasataillty of information, who can & should see reaults aria how quickly 00th vermin the Army & outside the Army Seems dear some interna: Army organizations should hear the results quickly - TRADOC for example CO Ind icat ed that perhaps greatest peed that can resod from the 'nvestigation ve11 be improved equipping (e g. increase MICE aathorization fcr ring-mounts for at their crew Served weapons, MK-1a & 50 cal ) & training of CSS 'units - elven onaracleristes of modem warfare, CSS Jails will continue to finirl themselves in combat stuations in Arner,ca's future conflicts. (b)(6) COL . Cmc: Gra IDSN b)(6) Olisidixerm ClassificationeWiefairZe Caveats NONE o3 05 7Y-e), V kl‘ atilt G tv&1 4 1il 18 May 2003 MEMO FOR: Mr. Walt Slocombe FROM: (bX6) SUBJECT: Enforcing Deba'athification Military Assistant to Mr. Bremer Sir Please see Mr. Bremer's note on the attached. Very respectfully p ‘ . ,tik-ctioNA Ruse 1 of 4 Thoele, Daniel MAJ From: (t7X .3) LTC CFLCC-C3 Sent. Friday. May 16, 2003 11 21 AM To: ORHA.C33: Baltazar, Tom Subject: Ph' De-Baath,ficaeon Letter from AMB Brenner FOR ALL—ESPEC ALLY 'DIE 7RONT OFFICF LI Col Brunnaver --Original Message From: Lewis, Owen MA) CFI CC-51A Sent Frida , May 16, 2CO3 5:30 Pm To: COL CFLCC-C3; CFLCC LNO TO ORHA MAIN Cc: Ft. U PS ESB Subject: RE: De-Baathifcation Letter from AMB Brenner ClassiticationitailitEil+ Caveats NONE S Aracl et; below ife the V Corps 'ne-Beatn,ncation" products •or individuals retJrning to work One for former tibeis tosavr,Ni or e tor *hose who were not (denunciation' MA..I Lewis Or • 1- •,- From: =IMO OL CFLCC-C3 Sent: Fnday, May t , 2003 9:27 AM To: CFLCC INC TO OR-IA MAIN (E-ma,l) Cc: CFLCC-C35 FUOPS ES13 Subject FW De-Baathfcation Letter from AMB Brenner Classifica:ion .fitiiSfibfwin Caveats NONE LIC Jones — Frank Nee: you tr. Foss this or to ORHA letter Mat V Corps (s L,sina WO; t'a'e MAJ Lewis (SJA; send you the 5'16 2003 Page 2 o14 VR (b)(6) COL IN C3 FUOPS "C3!. - TO of the Ooerationa, Bayonet.' ----Onginai Message From Thurman, James MG CFLCC-C3 Sent: Friday, 16 May, 2003 12:10 To: (X6) IE•rnail), Subject: FW: De-BaathAcatton Letter from AMB Brenner Classit catorrOPEAC.f. Caveats: NONE OL CFLCC-C3 NOTE PASS TO HE LNOS Al ORHA THURMAN Original Message From: WALLACE, WILLIAM LTG (VCORPS CG) Sent: Friday, May 16, 2003 08:55 To: Thurman, James MG CFLCC-C3 Subject: RE: De-Baathification Letter from AMB Brenner Do we want to mu: e lad 11)..tt wien we fine low level. 1)eath parry beauieciats wiling to be part of :he so t, ter of forming a rew Iraq, and once they are vetted tro: criminals or bad-eclois) we arc tav,ng men sign a paper which declares melt renoncrition of the Baur party arid old (regime. and r alegiar;:e :lie now Iraq 4 they won't sign. wc don't place them trpositior . this is a policy t1C - LISIOn. Om out of rey /one. but wort a thought -Original Message- -- From: Thurman James MG CFLCC-C3 7maitto Imo) Sent: Friday, May 16, 2003 11:49 AM To; Stalder MaiGen Keith J; 1MEFDF G3 COC CUR OPS 0; 1MEFDM G3 ACS HAHN, DANIEL (BC CoS C5MAIN); Hieks5 (Hicks, Stepher, COL); C5CM-G3CHOP4K 8 9 DL) Cc: WI liam LTG (VCORPS CG)' 'Wallace ;E-mail) (E-mail); Conway LtGen James T Subject: FW; De-Baathification Letter from AMB Brenner Classification •618i114reii. Caveats NONt AL SEE AT AC HF I) THURMAN --- Message-- from: CFICC LNO 70 ORHA MAIN Sent: Friday, May 16, 2003 06:35 To: OM) !COL CFLCC-CMD GRP (EECP)4(b)(6) CIV CFLCC-CMD 5 16 2103 Page 3 (tr..; GRP (EECP); CFLCC-C3 CHOPS (FWD), CFLCC-C3 CHOPS (Main); Thurman, James MG CFLCC-C3; Blackman, Robert Ma}Gen CFLCC-CMD GRP; Blackman, Robert MalGen CFLCC-CofS (EECP); Della 2acoro, John COL CFLCC-CMD GRP;(b)(6) COL CFLCC- C3; McKiernar, David LTG C.PLCC-C.G (EECP); Webster, William MG CFLCC-DCG OPS (EECP) Subject: De-Baathtfication Lettet- from AMB Brenner Sr NAB Brenner is planning to announce the oeginnArig of De-aaathificatoon as early as a news conference today at I 300hrs cltrall00.40r.usle 'What heel% can ins military pertonn io *semi wrth inis process& anchetien cen we Mild theitil" I need contirmat:on that tne `Wowing are acceptable answers at !east as a start for tns question 1 Miltary forces have removed irtimboisof the regime, erx%Saddam in particular since they entered Iraq. Our forces will continue to remove these symbols as we encounter them andior assist tie Iraqi people in removing them Where military forces are asskshng with establishment of local governance structures, we are vetting emerging iraqi leaders to Identify previous key Baathist leaders Where oractrcal, former key Ela'ath personnel are not perform:rig roles in conjunction witn miiiWry forces However, per the Ambassador's comments at MIS rews conference yesterday, there are sCulle cases where former Ba'ath members are the onty personnel with particular skills or .(nowledge to accompl+sh given tasks. Over time. wel14011011.41eier inierapthon was thee* inOtvidueis Si other capaboe perecetr1014weidenitied or train. When aporoorrate !AW the 511 ' paragraph of Iris document millary forces may ehtotOefitertt officials in cSetainIng or eernovng unoesirabic Xcc'sl. Iraqi personnei. viZILTC Jones CFLCC LNO TEAM TO ORHA DSt J: ONr . T i(b)(6) C.assil cation Caveats NONE aassrficat.ongitr#14imi. Caveats NONE 7 lf) 100 ; Classift;:ation4 Caveats NONE Casstica:,o ' -T Caveats NONE Page 4 of 4 AGRFFNIFNI TO DISAVOW PAR IN AFFILIATION tsa I. frame). disa‘ow and renounce my membership _ _ in the Arab Sociaiist Renaissance Party o!' Iraq (Ra'ath Party). I understand that the Ba'alli Party is disestablished and abolished. e‘pressly reject and denounce the Ba'ath Pans and Saddam Hussein and his regime, as well as my previous association with it I aCkTIONk ledge that any continued association wail. or involvement in. the Ba'ath Pans or its ;tell% flies constitutes a violation of an order hy the C'oalition Provisional Authority. I pledge to cooperate fully with the Coalition Pros isional Authority in serving the people of (ray and building a new Iraqi go eminent. I will obey the laws of Iraq and all proclamations. orders and instructions of the Coalition Prvvisional Authority As 6od is my witness: ,:›c• Jx.' ) %ail! `:"°1-41 `.1 • )4• • .."11 ii LJ •:.:4141 ,Ar D 4 •• •46....aN %S.). -1....11 3( j i SI j j'..a1 4 3 ,:_11 4 .S ttllat 0 J41 ,V . I ;4 )121 4 11 , 142 ...1114.11 1 •...F.. .11 ,...ci31 OAT!: 2011:Z 2001 )11 "- (name of signator I ( JAB I (signature) (4t--iP) namc of %k liness Mgratill t ..b1.2411 (t4,1: ‘ 1 ) - _ ru.101.: 01 iincss 1 (signature) ("j) DENL1 \CIATION LisLA) 1. Owlet, am not. nor have I ever been, a member of the Arab Socialist Renaissance Party of Iraq (Ra'ath Party). I understand that the Ba'ath Party is disestablished and abolished. I expressly reject and denounce the Ba'ath Party and Saddam Hussein and his regime. I acknowledge that any association with, or involvement in, the Ba'ath Party or its activities constitutes a violation of an order by the Coalition Provisiotial Authority. I plcduc to cooperate fully with the Coalition Provisional Authority' in serving the people of ham and building a new Iraqi gov emment, I will obey thy laws of Iraq and all proclamations, orders and instruction$ of the Coalition Provisional Authority. As God is my 18 mins: k:)k•I JJ3 •,s434 *L'4 `_>•3• :;t-.) oil 3 ..31 .).` 21 a,t ....8.16 0610.) 4 .1')JUI ta jALIC: .s 9i .14 j t..s 4 .1 .0 4 1 .0 6114 :4061 j 3 )-4' 5 *. l. ;":*_)411 ..e;j1 iI 46 e:stla/ ,•3 jc ;AI :44 • ,1)03 2003 (name of signatory) tsignature) y.11 e7AP (name of witness) (siLt.T.tattirC) ;1),21 ) inane ofs ;mess) (sivilaturc (1 ,14P) 051S-61 ttINIPTIT (with attachment) 18 May 2003 MEMO FOR: Mr. Phil Carroll/ FROM: (b)(6) SUBJECT: it Syrian Pu7ases of Petroluem Products Sir Mr. Bremer asks: "Aie we encouraging Syrian oil purchases?" See attachment. Thanks. ...-e- , - ., . - , ,--• _ ',' j lee . ..... .1, / : , . .- ! .1. L % .. ,.1 .7 .j4st2U4.A1,:•:; e:;A:i e.... .:/444'i4, . 4.4 . 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