06-F-0803 Request for Coordination in Support of Iraq History Project Nov-18-2003

WASH INGTON , D.C. 20301-2500 SPEC IAL OPERATI ONS/ LOW- INTENSI TY CONFLI C T In Reply Refer to: I-03/015830 NOV I 8 2003 FOR: ADMINISTRATOR, COALITION PROVISIONAL AUTHORITY UNDER SECRETARY OF DEFENSE COMPTROLLER GENERAL COUNSEL OF THE DEPARTMENT OF DEFENSE DIRECTOR, DEFENSE INTELLIGENCE AGENCY DIRECTOR, JOINT STAFF DEPUTY UNDER SECRETARY OF DEFENSE FOR NEAR EAST AND SOUTH ASIA SUBJECT: Request for Coordination in Support of the Iraq History Project I request your coordination on the attached memorandum to the Secretary of Defense regarding the Iraq History Project. Please provide your coordination no later than close of business November 21, 2003 to my action officer, 116)(6) l SO/LIC Stability Operations atl<6X 8l ' · Thomas W. O'Connell FOR OFFIOIAL tJSE ONLY FOR OFFIOhtcl YSE. ONLY USD/P ACTION MEMO 1-03/015830 FOR: SECRETARY OF DEFENSE DepSec Action _ _ FROM: Thomas W. O'Connell, Assistant Secretary of Defense for Special Operations and Low-Intensity Conflict SUBJECT: Iraq History Project BACKGROUND (b)(5) FOR OFFIOl>'cl USE ONLY Preoared bv:J (b)(G) DASD Stabil it~ Operations ]l._l(b_l( 6_l --~ FOR OFFICbtcL tl9E 8NLV (b)(5) RECOMMENDATION: Sign memo at Tab A. AGREE DISAGREE OTHER - - ---- - ----- ----- COORDINATION: Tab C Attachments: As stated FOR OFFICbtcL tJSE ONLY THficMie~ML~ ONffNSE 1000 D EFENSE PENTAGON WASHINGTON. DC 20301·1000 CO MBA TANT COMMANDER, CENTRAL COMMAND SUBJECT: Iraq National Archive Project (b)(5) --- ,....,_,_,'WJ/r I I 1.-- -• •• .... I ....,.. I - • • ,_.., · - ---- •-• IRAQ SURVEY GROUP POSITION ON ALLOWING COALITION PROVISIONAL AUTHORITY ACCESS TO CAPTURED IRAQI DOCUMENTS j<bl(S) The Iraq Survey Group (ISG) strongly disagrees with the proposal to allow the Coalition Provisional Authority (CPA) access to ISG documents for its Iraq History Project prior to the documents being fully processed and exploited. The ISG believes allowing CPA this access will be severely detrimental to three distinct but equally critical areas: A. The National Security of the United States B. The internationally-vital ISG WMD mission C. The DoD's and CPA's Iraq History Project itself A. The National Security of the United States • Intelligence documents will be lost. ISG is continually discovering documents of high intelligence value from captured Iraq documents. Most of these docu- ments are found in the initial review, or 'triage' of the documents. Many are also found later in the exploitation process, to include during the latter ISG analyst and subject matter expert review process. Access and review of documents during any stage of this exploitation outside ISG will negatively impact the ability to properly identify and classify these highly sensitive documents. • Intelligence documents will be compromised. Building on the reasoning above, access and review of documents during any stage of ISG exploitation outside ISG will raise the risk of documents being inadvertently released to the public or others without a need to know. This will severely damage U.S. national security. Nothing outweighs taking all measures to ensure this does not occur. • Counter Intelligence (Cl) documents will be compromised. Any release of Cl documents, which the ISG also continually discovers throughout its exp~oitation process, would be extremely detrimental to the securit of the United States ~l! : -8?-~-H (b )(A),(b ~ Once a Cl document is publicly released, at best it can completely lose its intelligence value; at worse it could compromise the investigative process. B. The ISG mission • An already stressed DOCEX mission will be overwhelmed. Document access for the Iraq History Project will considerably disrupt the already taxed ISG DOCEX mission. ISG DOCEX physical space and expertise are limited. ISG uses specific priority intelligence requirements {PIRs) to guide the DOCEX mission. Additional Iraq History Project search requirements, regardless if more people are added to the process, will slow down the ISG DOCEX operational process. A parallel review of already exploited documents will also be required for the Iraq History Project, further upsetting the current ISG DOCEX mission. • Original documents needed for follow-on exploitation will be lost. Although ISG has digital copies of documents, this does not mean exploitation is complete. ~t Col/ISG CMPC-B/20 Oct 03 ISG often must use original captured documents for interviews with high value targets and other detainees. For effective operations, it needs immediate access to these documents; losing possession of them and retrieving them from CPA is not a viable alternative to current operations. Original documents are also sent for forensic analysis in the US and are used to confront High Value Detainees and other Iraqis suspected of involvement in Iraq's WMD programs. • CPA document review will be taken out of context. ISG experts, and ISG experts alone need to focus on Iraqi DOCEX during its WMD mission execution. CPA review and reporting of documents will result in efforts to assist the ISG in this mission. Although well intentioned, this will result in incorrect, incomplete, and/or inadvertently inaccurate conclusions. C. The Iraq History Project • A CPA review as new documents arrive degrades the Iraq History Project. ISG receives a constant flow of new captured documents every day. These are reviewed and appropriately prioritized relative to other documents. The, rush to review and obtain ISG documents for the Iraq History Project does not outweigh the increase in efficiency the CPA will have if it waits until after the ISG has completed its mission. Without waiting, the Iraq History Project will continually be reviewing, re-reviewing, and correlating new information with existing information until ISG document capture mission is complete. • A concurrent ISG WMD DOCEX and CPA Iraq History Project review dilutes ISG capability to fully assist in the Iraq History Project. ISG resources for its WMD mission are already at a premium. Sharing these with the Iraq History Project will be inefficient and cause undue competition among the two missions: ISG will be unable to assist CPA with the full capabilities it has to bear. On the other hand, if the Iraq History Project waits until after ISG mission completion, CPA will potentially have available more dedicated, expert resources to execute its mission. Based upon these basic reasons, the ISG highly recommends the CPA wait until after it completes its document exploitation mission before reviewing the documents ~Lt Col/ISG CMPC-B/20 Oct 03 COORDINATION Administrator, Coalition Provisional Authority Under Secretary of Defense Camptro!ler Under Secretary of Defense for Intelligence General Counsel Director, Defense Intelligence Agency Deputy Under Secretary of Defense for Near East and South Asia Director, Joint Staff President, National Defense University copy provided