04-F-1972 My Visits to Saudi Arabia Oman 10-06-2001

- .. . . ------ ,._:_ ...... .. -------- ------:------'-- ~· THE SECRETARY OF DEFENSE 1000 DEFENSE PENTAGON WASHINGTON. DC 20301·1000 October 6, 2001 MEMORANDUM FOR THE PRESIDENT CC: Subject: . Vice Presjdent Richard B. Cheney. Honorable Colin PowelJ Honorable Condoleezza Rice My Visits to ~audi Arabja, Oman, Egypt, Uzbekistan and Turkey Saudi Arabia (October 3) E.O. 13526, section 1.4(b)(d) The Saudis realize that the September 11 attack has hanned the Moslem world, and the Arabs. generaliy, in the eyes of many around the world. The Crown-Prince and Defense Minister made much of your Mosque v!sit in Washington and your other acts and s~atements clarifying that the ~------~------------- war on terrorism is not directed against Islam or any people or country. The importance of this cannot be overstated. In discussing terrorism,' the Saudis·urged diligence and precision in the USG's investigation of the September 11 attacks. I made clear th'at we do not view the problem as simply a law enforcement matter. · You are determined, 1 said, to make a broad-based effort against terrorists and.their state supporters and to sustain thjs effort over years, drawing on all the in~truments ofUS national.power, including the $Upport of our friends abroad. The terrorist threat is especially grave in light of the danger of weapons of mass destruction in the hands. of states that sponsor terrorism. E.O. 13526, section 1.4(b)(d) Prince Sultan expressed delight with my visit, especially the press appearances we made together, at which, as noted, I explained that I was not in the Kingdom to make specific requests of the Saudis. Oman (October 4) Sultan Qaboos ~eceived us in an open tent in the middle of a very hot and humid desert. He vowed continued support for US efforts against terroris~, stressing that Oman is pleased to assist discretely, but wholeheartedly. Oman has been easy to work wi~ compared with most other Gulf states. He referred in passing to those in the region who are friends when they need assistance, but not when the US requests assistance ( .. hypocrites,". he called them). 2 / Qaboos- thoughtful, British educated, soft-~poken - focu~ed on the need to transform the moral climate as to teJTqrism. He urged me to "hint" to the Eg)'P.tians that their leading clerics should be more vocal about . Islamic prohibitions against killing innocent people, because that could change the· way young Moslems think about the morality of terroriSt ac~s. Noting that terrorists 4'live in sh~dow and plan in darlmess," he asked bow we can "prevent these people from having facilities and funds to do their evil work.'' He said the US effort against them wiJl take time, but if it is sustained- he stressed tbe key word- perhaps we'll see a great decline in these activities. · This tragedy, Qaboos obseiVe4, can be an important opportunity. Perhaps God has arranged that it happened, in this way, at this time, to prevent even worse things frsrn happening in the future. Perhaps because of this tragic w.aming, we wiJI. have an opportunity to prevent weapons of mass destruction from being used by terrorists. ·. He said that ls1amic terrorists aim to overthrow governments such as his to create an Islamic Khalifate- religious rule by a single "Deputy of Allah'' over the whole Moslem world. Oman rejects this, he said:~ as; a country proud of its long independence. Qaboos took pains to note that. Oman was never part of the Ottoman Empire. Oman kept its independence for a few hundred years by Jinking itself to the leading Western power (Britain then, the US now) to protect itself against the Saudis, Persians, and other strong neighbors. The last point was, I th~ his implied message when he. spoke of doing all he can to help the US in the war against terrorism. Qaboos repeatedly returned to the·problems caused by Arab media t:eports, in particular from the al-Jazira·television station, that promote the terrorists' point of view. He urged the US to highlight the·humanltarian aid . aspects of our campaign and to refrain fro~ action during Ramadan. He summarized his views succinctly: "We. trust you. We're allies. I have nothing else to add." 3 .. ·. .I Egypt (October 4) In my lively talks with President Mubarak, before and during dinner, ·he bad his. agenda and I had mine. Mine included conveying the Om ani Sultan's suggestion about Egyptian religious leaders speaking out against tmorlsm. For his part, Mubarak made repeated and forceful calls for U.S. pressure on Israel's PM Sharon to "solve" the lsraeli-Palestfnian conflict. Mubarak asserted that 60 to 70 percent of the terrorism problem would go . away if that conflict were solved. I suggested through my questions that I was skeptical of that and that 1 see the terrorists as aiming beyond Israel to overthrow moderate regimes throughout the Arab and Moslem world. He agreed with that view, but thought that greater success on the peace process would reduce support for the teJTOrists. Mubarak offered much advice on the war on terrorism: The U.S. should use inte11igence operations as ·an alternative to "too much bombing." "Don't be in a hurry, take it easy." Bombing of caves by the U.S. in AfghanistaJl wiU be ineffective, like Egypt's bombing of caves in Yemen in the 1960s. ''Put your money into buying allies on the ground in Afghanistan., I told Mubarak: ''We will do something in Afghanistan,, but our action will be measured. I said President Bush is detennined and purposeful about this effort and is declaring by word and deed that our enemy is not Islam or the Afghan people, but terroriSDl and its state suppotters. I highlighted tbat states supporting terrorism are also pursuing weapons of mass destruction. He agreed, saying that the effon against terrorism "is necessary to save the planet." · . Immediately after the September 11 attacks, Mubarak bad made several unhelpful comments and suggestions. For example, he said Egypt's cooperation would hinge on proofoftlie US case against bin.Laden. Mubarak also proposed an international conference as a way to head off US action against the terrorists. But in my discussion with him, no mention was made by him (or me) of his earlier comments. Mubarak is an ebul1ient man and seemed pleased with our meeting · · and dinner talk. Though his agenda {the Israel-Palestinian issue) and my. agenda (fighting terrorism) diverged somewhat, the exchanges were friendly and should foster a higher degree of cooperation than would we get in the absence of such face-to-face consultations. SECRET 4 '· Uzbekistau (OctoberS) Though tizbek President .Karimov began, Soviet-style, with a half- hour speech, delivered from notes, which was not c~anning, he eventually loosened up and engaged well He was so upbeat and complimentary in our post-meeting joint press conference that the US press cotps was asking me what's up with Karimov. Karimov opened by Jis~ing what be has agreed to allow US forces to do and what h~ has not agreed to. The latter category includes land operations and air strikes from Uzbek territory, all of which he said were '11ot quite ripe, not quite ready." .. He· clearly had Russia on his mind. He said that Moscow is pressuring all tbe Central Asian states to work tbro~gh Russia if they are going to help the US in the war on terrorism. Russia seeks thereby (1) to stymie Uzbekistan ,s independepce and (2) to win US concessions in retum for the Central Asia states' cooperation. Russia seeks dividends regarding Chechnya and the ~M Treaty, be said. He said we should deal directly · with Uzbekistan and not through Russia. I pointed out that I had come to Uzbekistan, not Moscow. - He warned that Russia's offer to share intelligence is· a "''nq-los~ game" for Russia. In a private side comment to me, Karimov said the intelligence from Russia will be worth little, or worse. The Uzbek MOD; also in a side conunent on the ride to the airport, cautioned that the US should take care of the infonnation it ge~s from Russia, for Russia had relationships with the ~jor terrorist networks and still does. . K~rimov stated that toppling the Taliban would require only isolating them .from Pakisian. He said that Pakistan's intelligence seryice is still · helping ~e Taliban. Echoing Mubarak's.advice, Karimov said: "You can buy ~nd sell anything in Afghanistan."· Humanitarian aid wiD do a lot of good and wi11 produce results more effectiveJy than weaponry will .. "You can buy any war .Jord and neuualiz~ him. You don't need to persuade him to join tbe Northern AJJiance, just neutralize him." He pressed his point: "In Afghanistan, only Afghans should fight." · When 1 got to reply, I noted that Uzbekistan registered in my mind as . important wel1 before September 11, which is why l arranged a one-on-one s ~; .. ·. !<i -: .... . . ....... ::• . .: ~ ... •. .. ~ .. .. i .• . . .. t; . ~ ~ I, • meeting with. the Uzbek Defense Minister in Brussels last spring. l said that US policy is to·deal d~ectly with· Uzbekistan, not through Moscow or any other party. As· we value our own sovereignty and independence, so we ·value Uzbekistan's. Our hop~ and·intention is for a long-term relatio~bip with Uzbekistan and w~ seek no quid p~o quo with any other countries. . · As for cooperation in thew~ effort, I said that we are content to continue to work on the written agreement now under negotiat~on. ''We've indicated what would be helpful to us but what you do is clearly yoilr choice. If greater cooperation ripens (to use ~our word), it could be helpful to us. If not, we'll go abo~t our ta~ as best we can=,, Karimov brightened and said he is "very. satisfied" with our measured approach. ''I'm happy to d~ with you directly." He concluded the meeting witb an interesting poinl about how modem Moslem countries like Uzbekistan "must save traditional Islam from radical elements., At the preSs conference, he restated before the cameras most of the points about cooperating ~ith the US-what he bas agreed to and what he . has not yet agreed to - in more or less the same language that ~e used in our private meeting. The US reporters picked up on his ''not yet" fonnulation regarding agreement on the possible use ofUzb~k territory for US Special Operations Forces action -into Afghanistan. When they asked him about this, he said that more disc~ssion is required about the developing. relationship witb tbe US. I am told his candor before the journalists was unusual and that the local press was surprised he took questions from them .. ..• I Turkey (Odobe.J:" 5) At my meeting with the Turkish Prime Minister, Bu1ent ~ceVit, the Foreign and Defense Ministers and the Chief of the General SttJff, the Turks made the following two major points: · · First~ the Taliban regime is a menace to Js)am, Turkey and the world. "Even ifbin Laden disappears, we shouldn't let this cruel regime in Afghanistan continue,". though land operati~ns in the rough temlin there are difficult. The Northern Alliance groups should be made to cooperate With .the US, Turkey and each other. These groups need arms and supplies ~d 6 .. they can then deal with the Taliban . themselves. Turkey can provide rililitary training in northern Afghanistan. Turkey will cooperate with the US '\vith all of our faCilities." · Second, the Turks expressed conc~rri and indeed fear that Russia's role in the coalition with the US will undennine their. interests. They see Russia as trading its cooperation for US pennission, as it were, to keep troops o. n Russia's southern flank in violation of the existing conventional forces treaty, to isolate Turkey from the Central Asian states, to undo the Caspi~ Sea-Turkey oil pipeline, to win a free hand in Checqnya and to . launch ·military operations in Georgia. The Turks received weJ1 my assurances t11at we shared their interests . and would be attentive to their CQncems. They were eager to help us, clear- sighted and tough-minded as always. They are superb allies. Would that all our NATO friends worked with u~ as Turkey does. Under Secretary of Defense ,Doug Feith, who accompanied me . throughout, split off after the Turkey meeti~g and is on his way to visit officials in Jordan, Kuwait, Qatar, Bahrain and the United Arab Emirates. . . 7