08-F-0194 Doc 10

(, X6) From: Sent: To: Subject: (b)(6) 1C1V, OSD Fncay, Oc:oer 17, 2003 2:27 AM Kennedy, Patrick AMB, Executive Secretariat CPA: Norwood, Scott 17 Oct SVTC on Transition Strategy - Joint Staff Slides Iraq Transition Iraq Campaign Iraq Campaign SVTC 17 Octobe... Plan, 031016.doc... Pia n. nto All. Please note the time change below. Reuben asked me to provide you with the attached. These are intended to provide some foundation for the conversation to come on the Transition Strategy. > • From: • Sent: TO: (IDX6) MX8) Or:ginal Messaae- 16 October 2CC3 5:50 PM > > S u ject: 1/ oct SVTC on Trans,tion Strategy > • CLASSIFICATION: .F.F.GB.Famp Scheduled time for SVTC is now 1300 14C0 in tSC. USDP will be • senior rep from OSD. LTG Sharp will be senior rep from Joint Staff. please note time change for ESC scheduling. CENTCOM Rear alrea SVTC. advised of time change. No need to include CENTCOM forward in please advise CPA Baghdad of time change. Slides will be distributed as soon as they are available, v/ r com 1 "Well"- DRAFT WORKING PAPERS 111111111111 A Framework for Strategic Transitions in Iraq SVTC 1300-1400 (EDT) 17 Oct 03 -61-414€ 4- DRAFT WORKING PAPERS Purpose & Attendees Minn • Purpose: To provide planning guidance in preparation for upcoming DOD Senior Leader discussions on "Strategic Transitions" • Attendees: USD (P) JS J5 CPA — Wash (Mr Jeffery or Mr Smith) CPA - Baghdad ( Amb Kennedy) CENTCOM — RADM Robb & MG Whitcomb UNCLASSIFIED DRAFT WORKING PAPERS Framework for Strategic Transitions NUMMI itu)(5) "Gara - DRAFT WORKING PAPERS Concept for SECDEF "Off-Site" . . . • . X5) 4 October lb, 2003 TO: Reuben Jeffery FROM: OP) SUBJECT: Iraq Campaign Plan • You asked me to find out more about the "strategy discussion" that went on earlier today. This is a preliminary response. o TAB A. The attached outline from Policy was used to guide the discussion at today's lunch (with SD, Feith, Cambone, Di Rita, Craddock, et al). o 'FAB B. The Joint Stan' has prepared a short brief to help provide a framework for discussion at tomorrow's SVTC (with Feith, Sharp, Kennedy) o I will be seeing Mr. Di Rita tomorrow morning on this subject. • Some time ago, the Secretary asked CJTF-7 and CPA to work closely to develop a strategy that would address Phase IV Operations, e.g. post-conflict activities. o The Services sent planners to CJTF-7 with this type of expertise to help develop the requested product. o Part of the difficulty is that there is no model to follow. • There will be a series of meetings in corning days, some or all of which will address this issue. o Friday • 0700-0730: SecDef / Bremer phone call • Policy / Joint StatTSVTC with Pat Kennedy o Monday •- Tuesday • SVTCs with SD, Bremer, Abizaid, et al. Policy October 16, 2003 Iraq Campaign Plan Objectives: 1. Unity of Command 2. Critical Path for troop exit Define goals: What it is.... o Iraqis in charge of their own country. o Set conditions so that they have a good chance to keep Iraq on the path to freedom and prosperity. o Get them launched. What it is not.... o To establish prosperity o To establish a stable government o To achieve political and economic end state o To establish all their institutions o To establish all their laws Doll-to-State transition: DoD needs to take the Iraqis to the point where Iraq is a sovereign state. From there, Department of State can get the Iraqis the items on the "What it is not" list. Security — DoD's mission: o Increase Iraqis' capability to maintain security in Iraq. o Improve the security situation in Iraq. o Turn security responsibility over to the Iraqis as soon as they can handle it. FRI MI: :VC)( COM PROVISIONAL A uTi lourry C "" rA I" A ' 1 DATE: 8-Nov-03 'I III: ADMINIS'IltAl I )12 1:x eetaive Serietatial 13ttsiness Develoliment 'omniii ice Slim% flake Attached is Tom Foley's resporisc to So:10m.y Itutildletd's soolvIlake re 13iisint, -ss De‘.celopment Commitlec. Original Snowflake attaubed as well AlTACTIMFN'l S. As Stated (I hailed by c.151: 1 4)k COMA HON l'IMV1‘.1()NAI. Al1. 111( )121'I Ng' 11..\( jilt )Al No \, ember 200 M EMt) FOR: Sco etauy Rumskh FROM: Paul firen4‘k. ‘• ; Sl111.11:Cl Business Development Committee there is no approval or permission required for those interested in ink esting or otherwise doing business in hag. Howe% er, the process of registering a corporation is currently complicated and tedious. There are two efforts underway to eliminate this 'nutrient 'the first is that a new company law is being drafted which we hope to ha % c ready by December 15. The new law will make r4iiripany registrations much easier. Me second is a protect in the Trade Ministry to streamline the corporate registration process and impithe the communication and facilitation capability at tlw Ministry. We have a number of initiatives underway to stimulate the private sector economy. We are confident that these initiatives combined with strong foreign interest in investing in Iraq will provide a strong stimulus to the economy and provide models for Iraqi businesses. -;\ Best available copy 1••' ,,• • 1 I .0. Li lit ritit•I etti 11\ 1.111.1. 1.1 • 1111 1 I 11,1 .! .11t.• I 1,. .1 ,,• 111 l‘tit••I'. • S, • .I,1 III It 1 ..01 11 ...I.. ..1 .1.11 III. .1. .1.... it . •.. 1 I..1!•I! 1. 1 % 1 .11111.11 011 ,1111,, I 1111 ' • 1.. 1 I. I I 'tI . . , .1. 41`1111.: I, 1 I 11 • • III . !III II. 111.il •,111. 111•••1111 I , • II.• • •••.• • .111.1 ••1 'III.I, ii it Page 1 of 1 63//4-16 (P02) From: Soot: 0103) (FS01) Saturday, November 08, 2003 2:25 PM To: (0-3) Cc: Executive Secretary Subject: RE: Memo to SECDEF - WITHDRAW We will work on it — use collective Executive Secretary in addition to me personally. ploo Executive Assistant. CPA Administrator Head of CPA Executive Secretariat ----Ori inal Messa From: (0-3) ber 08, 2003 2:20 PM To: (FS01) Sub eimo to SECDEF Importance: High Please pull this memo. We have received more guidance and will have to make changes. I apologize for the confusion. ' 7'7 --Oh nal Messa From: (FS01) Sen November 08, 2003 12•45 PM To: (0-3) Sub act: RE: Memo to SECDEF hanks (h)(6) Executive Assistant, CPA Administrator Head of CPA Executive Secretariat M From: b)(6) (0-3) Se ur a November 08, 2003 12:29 PM To: X6) FS01) Sub ect: Memo to SECDEF I wIl be dropping a hard copy of this off to you Let me know if you need anything else. 1(bX6): 1 1 i8/2003 Page 014 (b)(5) Page 015 (b)(5) Page 016 (b)(5) Page 018 (3)(5) Page 019 (b)(5) Page 020 (b)(5) JUL 2 I 2003 MEMORANDUM FOR ADMINISTRATOR, COALITION PROVISIONAL AUTHORITY (AMB L. PAUL BREMER) FROM: Douglas J. Feith, Under Secretary of Defense for Policy SUB!: Using the Governing Council to Generate International Contributions to Stability Forces in Iraq • Some countries, such as MI whom we have asked to provide troops for stability operations, have replied that they need a more explicit UN mandate as political "cover." • The Governing Council, by asking countries — in the name of the Iraqi people — to provide such troops, may be able to provide useful political "cover." • Do you think the Governing Couniil would be willing to ask countries such as MIX AO to provide forces? • Are there any steps that Washington can take to help in this regard? 29 August 2003 MEMO FOR: Secretary Rumsfeld FROM: Paul Bremer SUBJECT: Appointment of Reuben Jeffery as Deputy Administrator, Coalition Provisional Authority (('PA) Request you issue a memo to DoD and the interagency that announces the appointment of Reuben Jeffery as Deputy Administrator, CPA. I recommend the memo identify him as the CPA's single point of contact for coordination on all matters with Washington D.C. I also recommend that the memo specify that he reports to you through me. DORRANCE SMITH Dorrance Smith is a veteran television producer, political consultant, and media strategist who has spent 30 years in television and politics. In 2001. Smith was designated by FEMA Director Joe Allbaugh to handle all media following the events of September I 1 In this capacity Smith was responsible for FEMA's media strategy for mint, radio and television. During this time Smith coordinated live interviews with ABC. CBS, NBC. CNN. CNBC. Fox, and MSNBC as well as dozens of live radio and local station interviews. Smith organized and distributed the now famous FEMA video feeds from Ground Zero. Additionally he served as the ‘',hief speechwriter for the Director. lie then reorganized the Public Affairs Office to meet the post September media demands. A four time Emmy Award winning ABC News and Sports producer, he has held a number of positions at the network, including serving as the first executive producer of "This Week with David Brinkley." In 1991 Smith left ABC News to become Assistant to the President for Media Affairs at the White House. In this capacity Smith handled all television and radio events involving President Bush. members of the White House staff and Cabinet. In addition his office handled all regional media; coordinated media strategy for administration officials seeking confirmation; and organized the debate preparation during the 1992 political campaign. From 1989 until 1991. Smith was the executive producer of ABC News "Nightline.." During his tenure he was responsible for the weeklong "Nightlinc" series originating from South Africa, which covered the release of Nelson Mandela. The broadcasts won an Emmy award. In addition he served as executive producer of the prime time special "Tragedy at Tiananmen-The Untold Story," which was honored with the duPont Columbia University Award, the Overseas Press Club Award and an Emmy. "Nightline" also won an Emmy in 1991 for outstanding news coverage of the Iraqi invasion of Kuwait. Pnor to his work on -Nightline," Smith was the executive producer of the number one rated Sunday public affairs program. - ibis Week with David Brinkley," a post he held from the programs inception in 1981 until 1989.During his tenure the broadcast received the firm Joan Barone Award, the George Foster Peabody Award, and was named the Best National TV Interview Discussion Program by the readers of the Washington Journalism Review. At ABC News, Smith became executive producer of all weekend news programming in 1980. He was responsible for the production and programming of "World News Saturday," "World News Sunday," "The Weekend Report," and "The Health Show," Prior to his weekend assignment, Smith was Washington producer of ABC News' "The Iran Crises: America Held Hostage." He also served as ABC News Senior Producer at the 1980 Winter Olympics, the 1984 Winter and Summer Games, and the 1988 Winter Olympics in Calgary. From 1978-1979, Smith served as ABC News' White House producer. Smith joined ABC News as a Washington producer in 1977. Previously he was staff assistant to President Gerald Ford. He began his broadcasting career at ABC Sports in 1973 us an assistant to the producer. In 1974 he was made Manager of Program Planning for ABC's Wide World of Sports. Smith is a member of the Advisory Council for the George Bush Library in College Station, Texas. He graduated from Claremont Men's College in 1973 with a Bachcloi of Arts degree. He lives in McLean. Virginia. 2, 0 5 1 3 - 07- • ." SECRETARY OF DEFENSE 1000.0morent PINTAGOM . WASHIPaerratt Pc mo1. two MEMORANDUM FOR PRESIDENTIAL ENVOY TO IRAQ SUBJECT: Deaignaticas as Administrator of the Coalition Provisicmal Authority Pursuant to the Preirdeni's letter of May 9, 2003, appointing you as Presidential Envoy to Iraq, and toy antheoity =dor applicialsle law, I hereby dosiginete you as (be head of the Coalition Provisional Authority, with the titleof Admstrator. Youlhaiibc responsible for the temporary governance of Iraq, and shall oversee; direct and.coontinate an executive, legislative rold judicial functions necesuay to catry ow this totpoodbility, including humanitarian relief and reconstruction and assisting in the formation of an Iraqi interim authority. As tbe Conareauxier at Coalition Pomo, the Commander of U.S. Contra ceemniciid shall directly support the Coalition Provisional Authority by desenting hostilities; maintaining Iraq's territorial integrity and security; searching for, securing and destroying weapons of miss destruction; and assisting in carrying nut U.S. policy genesany. cc: Chainnan of the Joint Chic ' fa of Staff Commander of U.S. Central Ccctumand cc, 0 cR.c. ; 03- (K- 0 Final. per discussion of 2230 18 May 03 c Oek Message from ACPA to See,Dtsf Mt:6-41 . ' 4 1—) c7 sc Subject: Dissolution of Vaaispar• end to issue the attached order (Tab A) carrying forward the dc-Baathification effort by dissolving Saddain's key security ministries. In conjunction with that action, I also intend to implement the policies in Tab 13 on payments related to the dissolved entities. I believe it is highly desirable to issue these orders as soon as possible to maintain the momentum of our de--Baathification campaign. c The entities to be dissolved were the core of the Saddam system. Th ptoperty of these entities will vest in the CPA and their employees will be dismissed. also makes clear , we isrui-will - fish ijcw armed forces for the new Iraq,. la., Q•a•-1,..t. %44. " \eclk k C- r% N•4-Te‘C'e rK c cs-snars.i.a..s st\tr The generally positive reaction to the earlier de-Baathification order of 16 May 03 leads mc to believe this order will generate a good deal of public support, despite its impacting many more people. In any event, it is a critical step in our effort to destroy the underpinnings oririrtl$ regime and to demonstrate to the Iraqi people that we have done so. and that neither Saddam nor his gang is coming back‘ \\A -S• V-14c 113 44wIeto "a 46" cl " ksrc \"c ci Some organizations that were undoubted ,)' in large part also part of the system are left in existence at this stage. For example, Mlntcrior is-not-inetutied•because it oversees the police, which wc arc using to help restore order, as well as customs and, incredibly, the sewer system: the Ministry (or commission) of Military Industrialization, because it runs SOEs with significant civil functions; and the Ministry of I ligher Education and Science because it administers universities that we are working to re-open. Elements of those entities will likely be dissolved atler further review. The order will affect large numbers of people. There were some 400,000 employees of the MOD alone. Therefore it is necessary to establish a policy on payments to employees arid retirees of the dissolved entities. I intend to adopt tlic payment policy outlined in Tab That policy continues pension payments for people who were drawing a pension front dissolved entities before the war ended, provides for a termination payment to employees of dissolved entities, and authorizes employment of such persons as i ndividuals in civilian jobs by other Iraqi and Coalition agencies. All this is subject to the overriding principle that no payments will be made to "disqualified persons," i.e., people barred from government employment by the de-Baathilication order (notably those in the top three ranks of the IRk. All military officers with the rank of Colonel and above will be presumed to be Disqt Vied Persons, unless they can establish otherwise. Moreover, the policy reserves the r 'In to revoke pensions as a penalty for past or future illegal conduct, as well as to modify pension arrangements to eliminate special privileges granted by the old regime. c..ai r 7Ar' L,, ) There is obviously somcthidg that catches in the craw about paying anything to people who worked at the heart of addam's regime. However, my view, and the advice I have received, from both military land civilian sources, is that, so long as disqualified persons arc not paid, undertaking to iiay all pensions, including those of these military retirees who retired before lit Apnifand also to make a termination payment to employees of the dissolved entities (other than disqualified persons), is important to the public's acceptance that we are being fair to the large number of relatively low level people caught up in the old system. It will also help to minimize the risk of serious discontent and economic hardship if we were to cut off all military and security sector pensioners in a heavily militarized society. There will be some delay in making these payments, because, in contrast to the situation for most civilian agencies, we do not, for the most part, have employee rosters, or contacts with administrative officials of the dissolved entities. In coMunction with the intelligence community, we are starting to assemble the necessary data and make the necessary mechanical preparations for the payments envisioned by the policy. When we have those data, at least in approximate limn, we will estimate the likely costs and Ar‘ragrauge, pursuant to the procedures for civilian agency payments, an allocation of Iraqi funds needed for payment. The mechanics of payments will follow, in so far as possible, the process that has worked fairly well in the case of the "emergency" and salary payments to civil servants in civilian agencies. In short, I believe these policies, taken together, arc necessary to show both out determination to root out Taeiu re, at the same time mitigating th di.scoment-that- tiltiaemuoamicso magh t othc isc causc. ? cc%\so.v•vi‘VAP% - 0 o g MEMORANDUM FOR OSD CABLES J.ROM7 Sam Rascolf o/b/o Ambassador L. Paul Bremer Please retransmit thts fax to Jaymic Durnan at home and ask that he call Ambassador Breinei Mkt review and alter 10 AM EST 1" 643, hi , ( e74 -44 7: ss 64.4.214 Jayme Please send/read following to SecDef Mr. Secretary .I note that the latest draft of the UN resolution we have seen here(late Saturday night our time) has one useful and one potentially troublesome change. The oraft changes the name of the "Iraqi interim Authority" to the "Iraqi Interim Administration. We believe that this change will be a modest help to us here since the Iraqis I met with Friday night were very hung up on the word 'authority' The objections are two: first that the Afghans had an "authority' but also immediately had sovereignty(of course they also had Kharzai), second,though unstated openly, "authority' reminds them of the Paiestinlan Authority which also has not led to full statehood. If change sticks, we will be able to claim some credit with the Iraqi leaders for having listened to their complaint on this score. Troubling however is the new phrase which explains how we ere to work with the Iraqis(para Sc). This now says that the UN Special Representative will work with the CPA 'including by jointly facilitating a process leading to an internationally recognized representative government of Iraq'. I take this to mean that we will be required to work directly with the UN to steer the democratic process here. It will be difficult enough, as we have already found, to work through the Rubics cube which is Iraqi politics on our own. But to add the dimension of the UN', a multi headed hydra itself uncertain of its goals, could render the process nearly impossible. It will at the least make it more difficult to assure that the outcome serves our interests. Since we are at the end of a rather king and uncertain communications line, we may also be out of touch with the exact wording of the draft or the rationale for the changes. But I am sufficiently uneasy with this change to want to draw it to your immediate attention. As instructed, we are preparing to be able to offer Iraqi oil for sale on May 22 Jerry u o o ( May 19, 2003 6:07 PM TO: Jerry tircmer FROM: Donald Rumsfela SUBJE(:1': Briefings for (7odels You might want to have Phil Carroll brief Congressmen or Senators when they are out there. I le seems to do a pretty good job. Thanks. OUR db 01903.50 Plecae respond by 03 0 5 o 5- 2 I — ` - ti \ Ai N \, c . 11/7 72,1 — May jet, 2003 2:36 PM TO: Jaymic Duman FROM: SUBJEW. hilk'' DPI DoD Audit Support of Iraq Contracts Here is this memo from Dov Zakheim. Would you please process it through Doug Fcith, so hc can make sure it makes sense to Bremer, then through the General Counsel and Paul Wolfowitz„ Then please get it to me for signature. Sec if you can pull that off in one week. Thanks. Attach. 50/03 USINC) memo to SecDcf rc: Don Audit Support of Iraq Contracts [U06713/031 DHRAb 051703-12 Please respond by PN1 0.4d41 OMB) - e?2_uirrlan C_C- I UNDER SECRETARY OF DEFENSE I 100 DEFENSE PENTAGON WASHINGTON DC 20301, 1100 ACTION MEMO May 21, 2003, 5:00 pm eebIPT1101-11,1 FOR: SECRETARY OF DEFENSE THROUGH: DEPUTY SECRETARY OF DEFENSE FROM: Dov S. Zakheim SUBJECT: DoD Audit Support of Iraq Contracts a Defense Contract Audit Agency (DCAA) is playing a major role in auditing the Oil- for-Food ((.W) propam. • Specifically. a team of DoD contract auditors (DCAA) and contract administrators (DCMA) are supporting the OSD Policy-led, Oil-For-Food Program evaluation. To date. DCAA has found numerous questionable OFF contracts and cost estimates. These findings need to be bricfcd to U.N. program officials. One example best illustrates these initial findings - there are a total of five Oil-For-Food contracts (totaling $247 million) to provide Mercedes Benz saloon cars and other similar brand luxury cars to Iraqi officials. Not only do these contracts appear overpriced, they obviously have nothing to do with humanitarian relief. Even where contracts appear justified (for example, wheat and powdered milk), there arc also clear indications of substantial contract overpricing. DCAA, with the OSD(P) support, will continue to press the UN for contract price analyses to further define its audit position. • RECOMMENDATIONS: • Anthori7e DCAA, with OSD(P) support. to ce k.jiJtance sm the U.N. Secretary General, or his designees, to clarify and provide audit support for all high risk contracts identified by thTala i • Authorize DCAA, with OSD(P) support, to work with State Department officials in order to obtain voluntary refunds, through U.N. coordination, wherever contracts have been awarded and payments made, and contract ovetpricing is apparent: and • Authorize DCAA. with OSD(P) support and in coordination with the U.N., to initiate negotiations to eliminate any apparent contract overpricing where contract payment has not been made.. APPROVE DISAPPROVE OTHER COORDINATION: Tab A Prepted By. (b)(6) Classification. S I - 3C-1142 -C T COALITION PROVISIONAL AUTHORITY EXECUTIVE SECRETARY Response to: OX6) Date: FOR: Afr1.6_,____Ii/4 CC: TRACKING n: RE: 03olos TASK. \,14) DUE DATE: . Q3 M.),A1 03 jgooL C\ • KCHET ` -6 TO: Jerry Bremer CC: Doug Feith FROM: ---15onald Rumsfeld 'VA DATE: May 24, 2003 SUBJECT: Iraq \S \ 'Ste t. 7\r`' f^-t It is all second hand, but I am told that for whatever reason, what's happeningXarSia, one of - the Shiite holy areas, under the supervision ofjust a hattalinn of Marinit goins Yory unkruthly, and they have gotten good cooperation from both religious and secular leaders. I wondesAthat might be a model for some other places such as Najaf_ Why don't you take a look at that and let me know what you think Thanks. 05240)X0IS Please rearm, by: Reason: 1.4 Dec 1raLIZ /AI To: SECDEF(uc) (E-mail); JOINT STAFF(uc) (E•mail) WHITE HOUSE COMMUNICATIONS CENTER WASHINGTON DC, WHITE HOUSE DOMESTIC COUNCIL WASHINGTON DC: WHITE HOUSE MILITARY OFFICE WASHINGTON DC. WHITE HOUSE OF MIL ASST TO PRESIDENT WASHINGTON DC; WHITE HOUSE OMB WASHINGTON DC; WHITE HOUSE SITUATION ROOM WASHINGTON DC: NATIONAL SECURITY COUNCIL WASHINGTON DC, SECSTATE WASHINGTON DC Telegraphic Communications Established Subject: Importance: Low UNCLASS CPA 001 F.O. 12356: N/A SUBJECT: Telegraphic Communications Established DOD PLEASE PASS APPROPRIATE AGENCIES AND COMMANDS DOS PLEASE PASS ALL DIPLOMATIC AND CONSULAR POSTS 1.Classified and Unclassified telegraphic communications have been established to/from the Coalition Provisional Authority in Baghdad. 2. This is a limited capability and CPA requests that messages of important interest, equivalent to that which would be sent to a post on Minimize, be addressed to: HEADQUARTERS COALITIoN PROVISIONALAUTHORITY BAG! (DAD. rx.), 3. UNCLASSIFIED routing indicator: 4. CLASSIFIED routing indicator: (bXe) BREMER (bX6) From: (bX8) To: Sent: Your message Tuesday, May 27, 2003 9.1/ PM Subject: Delivered. Telegraphic Communications Established To: NATIONAL SECURITY COUNCIL WASHINGTON DC; SECSTATE WASHINGTON DC; WHITE HOUSE COMMUNICATIONS CENTER WASHINGTON DC; WHITE HOUSE DOMESTIC COUNCIL WASHINGTON DC, WHITE HOUSE MIUTARY OFFICE WASHINGTON DC; WHITE HOUSE OF MIL MST 70 PRES1GENT WASHINGTON DC, WHITE HOUSE OMB WASHINGTON DC, WHITE HOUSE SITUATION ROOM WASHINGTON DC; WHITE HOUSE TRANSPORTATION AGENCY WASHINGTON DC; NATIONAL SECURITY COUNCIL WASHINGTON DC; JOINT STAFF(uc) Sobjec t • Teiesiraphic Communications Established Sent: 5/27/2003 9:26 PM via $ dowered to the following reopient(s): t ,G ‘A"-k- \* X. A cs uSt Lx... 4/1/ 0 i1N- --14 0- 3---IT4S-Pfvt- TO: welefritetit's CC: Gen. Myer FROM: ona urns SUBJECT: Missing Persons Attached is a copy of a letter received. My understanding is that these folks have some very good technology and can be helpful. You have the responsibility for this activity. Plens.e consider taking advantage of this offcr. Regards. Attach. 5/19/03 Kimsey Itr o SecDef DIJR:6b 052903.21 Plecoe respond by .10 0 5/21 . /13 12:03 VAX Me) . JANUS V. KINSRY 0003 SECREF HAS SEEN MAY 2 9 NO) JAMES V. KIMSEY bX6) WA5,4p4rInm. DC: ZOODG May 19. 2093 fr•d'y p1 1) \l e lif;( J 4 14 r j *4° Pell" fil4 "ilic Honorable Donald H. Runisfeld /be I 0$4t1 Secretary of Defenue 1D r: i, • 0 10011 Defense Pentagon s Washington, DC 20301-1000 Dear Mr. Secretary; /6 1j)1'°j In light of rrecnt evc.ntc in Iraq, I would like to contribute the services trx. technology el the International Commission on Missing Persons (1CMP) to support the Department of Iletense in dealing with the rnass gatves tbund and it _iii iI t tht ir_t_11L113 Of ftneeiti ; _ ilisappearimcz under the regime of Saddatu Ilussein. I assumed Cluiirmansitip of the IChe at the request of Secretary or State Colin Powell more than two years ago. As you may know, the ICMP was established in 1996 to address tbe issue of the roissing in the regions of the former Yugoslavia. The successes of our projects in Bosnia-lIerzegovirm demonstrate the inagninale of the contribution we might make in Iraq. I woof(' like to take a team from the 1CMP with our equipment to Iraq to search for and identify human remains. I ant asking_kr y&umrunpofl in this endeavOr. Your support would put the ICMP in a position to seek additional funds to complete its v:ork in Bosnia- Ilerregovina and the possible extension of its operations into Iraq in light of the zitiiisu1 tluti Ira.% bums lc:vulva) towauf post-contin:t activities in Iraq, it seems obvious that there could be some immediate benefit in taking advantage of the proven capacity of the ICMP I will bc traveling to Bosnia-Herzegovina and then hopefully into Iraq in mid-June to further assess ICMP's potential invOlvement in the identification of the missing (here. need your assistance to make this happen. (00) my Chief of Staff, will be in touch with your oilier immediately. Sincerely, j.) Aamti C) 14/11 1, 4.(Arc, ice V. Kimsey, Chairman emotional Coinniission cin Missing Persons rtiONC NG) FACS404ILE (o)(6) 0 b D MEMO TO SECDEF 6.3.03 From; Ambassador tircinW(2 2 ? Subject: Mass Graves As you know well, the mass graves situation in lraq has received a lot of attention, as it deserves. I have been reviewing what more we should be doing, especially with regard to the possibility of bringing those responsible to justice in the future. This is in addon to the Coalition presence provided by the British Forensic Team currently at work in Iraq_ I believe that we should move with some speed to augment the U.K. effort with a robust American Mass Graves Team. 'Fite expertise required is highly spezi fie. The full team for the complete processing of a grave site will take some time to assemble, as it should include expertise from several agencies, as well as the capability to conduct the three stages of excavation: I) Site Assessment, 2) Forensic Recovery, and 3) Identification. However, we need not wait to have this full team to get started with an American presence. My recommendation is that we move quickly to field (I) a Forensic Support Unit, which will request C.ITF-7 to provide, and (2) a Site Assessment Team from the States led and manned by the Armed Forces Institute of Pathology (Aft'), with the possible exception of one specialty (Forensic Archeologist/Geophysicist), which may have to come from the private sector. We should also request independent observers to verify the independence of all mass grave investigations. This will enable us to get started in a professional way without further delay. There has been discussion of a role for the FBI, but my review suggests that the Bureau is not prepared to move as quickly as lye need. I believe that it is • f, more effective to have one U.S. agency responsible, and that agency should be the Army: I have sent the details to Doug Fcith and will appreciate your support. I only bring this to your attention because of the media focus on this situation, and to keep our effort focused in one lead agency. *low&letttini— (6 .3(1:t_p03 June 3, 2003 MEMO FOR: Secretary Rum:40d FROM: Paul Bremekq,( SUBJECT: Iraqi Police Force Bernie Kerik and his team have just completed their preliminary assessment of the Iraqi Police Service. The highlights will give you an idea of the direction we plan to take. We are coordinating this closely with C.ITF-7 and Walt Slocombe. • Iraqi police arc not prepared for the task of providing law enforcement without a major training program which we must provide. • Under Saddam, the police force was a quasi-military institution. As a result, its modus operandi and approach to human rights are totally unsuited for modern policing. New legislation will he needed. • The police infrastructure was badly damaged or destroyed by the looting. More police return to work each week hut their ability to operate effectively is hampered by a substantial lack of equipment. • The recruitment and training of new recruits, untainted by the association with the former regime, will infuse the Police Service with new ideas challenging existing personnel to rethink now unacceptable behavior. • Aggressive professional standards will hold officers to a set of internationally accepted policies that will guide the police force long after international advice and assistance have ended. • Acceptable criminal intelligence gathering legislation will be addressed quickly. Many disenfranchised former governmental officials are poised to begin a new career in organized crime, Saddam's emptying of prisons adds to this threat to Iraq's future. • We will encourage the separation of regulatory from enforcement duties to minimize opportunities for corruption. • Administrative and regulatory tasks not requiring the skills of a police officer will be "civilianized." • Reform of the police is a long-term program requiring considerable international assistance including financial, in-kind contributions and qualified police personnel to train. • Standing up a new police force in Iraq will take time, but the Iraqi people need a vision of their future police. Ownership of this process by civil leaders, religious leaders, politicians, the public and especially the police will be crucial to the success of this undertaking. Comment: Overhanging all else is the major decision to he made concerning the overall structure of the police force -- will it he national, regional or bifurcated. The ultimate decision will be made by the eventual Iraqi government and will reflect decisions they reach on the degree of federalism in the constitution. I lowever, as long as we are here my guidance is to do all we can to influence the direction toward a federal "one Iraq" police force to reduce the chances of regional power centers coming into being. 0 .ToLoy_oy KHANANIA MARLANKIIA IV CATItOlIalS tATRIARCII OF TUE A-SSYRIAN OIURC1OF 11IF EAs t e0011 anto AvEtin.n2 MORTON CIILOVE,, ILL 601:1) USA. 2W3 I .s. — 5 Lic.i)L. April 29, 2003 Honorable Donald H. Rinnsfeld Secretary of Defense 1000 Defense Pentagon Washington, DC 20301-1000 VIA EXPRESS MAIL Dear Mr. Secretary: I write concerning a matter of extreme importance to my people, the kalYrinna of Iran and the Assyrian Church of the East. A.s the ancient inhibittnts of Mesopotamia, now reduced to a minority among Kurds, Arabs, and others, we feel we tuive need of representation to those who art charged with the task of drawing up the draft of a new constitution for the newly liberated peoples of Iraq. We rely heavily upon the good will of the United States, and welcome the intervention undertaken by the Coalition Forces on behalf of the Iraqi people. Because of discrimination and harassment of Christians us the past, we feel a need for the safety and security of Christians to be given due consideration, and for their voices to be heard among others in this constitution-budding process. We accordingly request the privilege of appointing representative to giVc input expressing our felt needs, fears, hopes, and expectations. Kindly regard this request as a matter of some urgency. We wish to be a contributing part of the multi-ethnic democratic society that President liosli envisions for the Iraq of the future. Respectfully yours, p +s cti Khanania Mardiakha, IV Catholicos-Patrianch Assyrian Church of the East ta Cs. The White Howe UO6717-103 r -o3/004,z 6/ 65cap-t SECRETARY OF DEFENSE 1000 ocrentst rCTITACON WASHINGTON. OC 203011000 cotinDuiTIAL JUN 9 2003 MEMORANDUM FOR L. PAUL BREMER FROM: Donald Rurnsfeld SUBJECT: Why We Need an IA Sooner Rather Than Later (1.1) (11) I agree with you on the need to move quickly to Cleatc a leadership council for the Interim Administration. My thoughts on this include the following: • ..feK'ret.4.-cyt5tku. lk will put an liami facc on wheu ia now a Coalition. military presence. Overnight, the perception (internationally and internally) will shift from occupation to a shared Coalition/IT/4i enterprise. • 4Q-Positive News: The very fact of our refereeing a cohesive Utesm structure out of Iraq's ethnic/political diversity will be an important achievement. Delayefruscrations in restoring public utilities will he seen in perspective. Overnight, much of the attention will shift to the political plane. • 4.0.)-94rsah Support: Arab leaders told me on my recent trip that they would like to see an HA soon. It would put an Iraqi face on what is happening and give them Iraqis to work with • 4r 4.)-4raqi Impatiesucc Indications are that Iraqi political/ethnic groups are restless. Standing still may lead to unraveling. Progress toward an IIA may be essential to retard centrifugal forces. • -44+ ' Countering the Bad Guys: Regime remnants are coalescing to some degree and stepping up sabotage. Their dream is a guerrilla insurgency. But guerrilla insurgencies depend on popular support Progress toward an IIA will help neutralize if not dry up that popular support ZsL CONFIDE!' ITIAL 15 axe =mu X01873 /03 DRAFT: CPA/CiOV: APPROVE: CDA — Amb. Bremer CLEAR: CPA/GOV Anil). Crocker FROM: HQ COALITION PROVISIONAL AUTHORITY BAGHDAD TO: SECDEF WASH DC SECSTATE WASHDC C1NCCE,NT MCDILL AFB FL CPA 0012 . GDS SUBJECT: Ambassador firemer's June 9' Economic Consultation Meeting -C-An4SSIFIED BY ANIDAA, CtI VOY I. SUMMARY: Ambassador Bremer met yesterday. June 9, 2003 with a group of Iraqi economic experts, along with IMF, World Bank and UN representatives, to discuss issues facing the Iraqi economy, The participants included Iraqi representatives from the ministries, recommended participants from the political parties, independent husinesspeople and academies. The discussion centered around job creation, but other broad issues were raised such as (1) the future of the Iraqi currency; (2) the role of foreign direct investment; (3) invigorating the private sector; (4) reopening banks; (5) the impact security has on economic growth; (6) the need to establish a legal framework and (7) construction projects as a short term solution for job creation. The group also planned to discuss the demobilization of military and Ministry of Information personnel but the number of people eager to speak on job creation prevented the group !Tom getting to the next point on the agenda, END SUMMARY 2. On June 9, 2003 Ambassador Bremer attended a meeting with Iraqi economic experts and representatives from international institutions. Attendees included 22 Ira( is, including ([NA). (INC). (IN( (SC1R1) (SC1RI) K1)1') (PL1K) (b)(6) b)(61 [ID). (b)(0) ADM). (b)(6) b)(6) (Ministry of Trade). (Ministry of industry f3ank (b)(6) Kit (b)(6) (b)(6) businesswoman). )(6) businesswoman ),(b)(6) Ministry of Trade), 100) Central nustry 01 l'itianee),PbX6) iNtinistry ol'Plannin Ministry of Industry). On ) rcp of Ove Arup), and accountant). (13)(6) ((ME) were also in a was tepresented by 03X6) World Bank), (b)(6) UNDP), an en mice. in addition to Ambassador Bremer, the Coalition and other staff. 5650(a - 1E) 3. Ambassador Bremer began by welcoming, the group and reiterating President Bush's vision for a democratic. peaceful and economically viable Iraq. He statcd that he was actively seeking advice and proposals from Iraqis on these issues. He invited Mr. or the Central Bank to begin with his opening remarks, which were brief. IMF and World Bank representatives also made opening remarks outlining the issues to bc addressed in order to invigorate the Iraqi economy. (6) of the IMF expressed concern that state expenditures not be too heavily relied on to jumpstart the economy and that targeted community based projects arc needed to stimulate the private sector. He also spoke of the need to solve the currency crisis, reopen banks, and promote lending. M(6) of the World Bank agreed with his general point and spoke of the need to establish a legal regulatory framework for business development. . 4.It was stated by all participants that many of the problems facing Iraq's economy require long terms solutions, but that short term actions can, and need, to be taken to alleviate unemployment. Mr of the UNDP highlighted the work they WCJV doing in terms of funding small e projects targeted to particular communities and sectors to repair schools. hospitals. sewers, etc. He suggested this model as one that can be used throughout all of Iraq to create jobs in the short term and to relieve distress in the communities. 5.Ambassador Bremer asked for statistics on unemployment. Mr. of the National Democratic Party volunteered the results of a study that he submitted to UNDP on unemployment, but some of the participants expressed skepticism regarding their accuracy. There was broad agreement among particinants, how e% cr. that unemployment was high perhaps in the range of 40%. (b)(6) of the Ministry of Trade stressed the need to examine the structure of unemployment before policy decisions are made to address the problem. Ile saw foreign direct investment as a long term solution for job creation. He proposed the creation of a Business Center as a coordinating mechanism. Ambassador Bremer said that he planned to announce the opening of such a center and foreign firms have indicated their interest in establishing operation in Iraq but were uncertain due to ownership laws. 7. Roth) and0X6) tiointed to the fact that legal issues, such as ownership laws, need to be worked out before foreign firms have the inducement to invest in Iraq.146k a KDP representative, was concerned that the unresolved decision on what a new Iraqi currency would be is stifling investment, but that he was pleased that salaries are being paid and that budgets are being worked out. of the Ministry of Planning brought up the issue of joh creation in the private sector as a way to improve standard of living. He was concerned that we were relying on too many projects that require government expenditures. He felt there needed to bc more focus on private sector job creation. 9. Adcr Samarrai of thc Ministry of Industry countered by stating that it all comes down to government expenditures and that much ofour efforts need to be focused there as a means to keep the economy running- even if we run de1imi1s.11111.11=also of -{444101i44441‘444111 SECRETARY OF DEFENSE tow ur.t. kNSE P LIS AGON WASHINGTON, DC 20301• 1030 JUN 1 9 1003 MEMORANDUM FOR JERY4R1MER FROM Donald H Rumcfeld SUBJECT: Response to your "should we pay the ex-military'' proposal I agree with the need to address the unemployment situation among Iraq's ex- military personnel. The longer we wait to address this problem the more susceptible they will become for recruitment by organized crime and/or I3aathist elements. (believe your first option —"paying them on a continuing basis an amount less than what they would have received had they retired" -- 16 preferable to the other options. Payments distributed in this manner reduce the incentives for foimer military personnel to engage in anti-coalition activities. 'This option should buy us time for tormer military personnel to reintegrate into Iraqi society. However, the preferred option is to hire thcm to do real work that is needed in Iraq--police, border guards, oil industry protection, trash removal, construction, etc. X 0 2 0 5 6 / 0 3 HihrAvio4w04,6041ppirkmmeim .411401wip‘Alei 15 June 2003 To: Secllef From: Ambassador Bremer Subject: Should we pay the ex-military? We have been studying the problems that the disband/xl lraqi armed forces pose to force protection, general security, and law and order. When we dissolved the MOD and the old armed forces, we dis1ni55e4 their employees. That has left SOMC 2341,000 officers and NCOs unemployed. At the time of dissolution, we decided to continue to pay pensions to widows and disabled and also to officers who had retired prior to April 16,2003, and, consistent with the basic de-Baathification edict, we made clear we would not pay anything to those in the top four party ranks, who turn out to number about 9000. That still leaves tens of thousands, some of whom have been demonstrating in cities around lraq protesting their not having been paid. This discontent among a respected group with training in weapons and with networks of contacts and loyalties presents a significant threat. Virtually all above the rank of LTC, and about half those below, would have been eligible to mire under the regime's laws. The issue is how, if at all, they should be paid. There are essentially three options: (1) pay on a continuing basis an arnount not too much short of what they would have received had they retired; (2) make a single termination payment; and (3) defer the issue until there is an Iraqi body that can at least share in the decision. k The military commanders here strongly favor the first course, because they believe it would forestall an increasingly vocal and violent opposition from the former military dial threatens to become a grave danger to both our troops and our mission but could be reclaimed by such payments. Paying the necessary amounts would, however, mean a big disparity between what the military and civil service retirees get, with heavy pressures for very expensive equalization of benefits. The second option is what the dissolution order contemplated, but one-time payments would be far less likely to cairn military protests. the third option forces the Iraqis to shale in a hard decision, with long-term implications, but it leaves the issue a continuing source or controversy with an inta easingly impatient group of officers which will pose a further risk to our troops here— and may accelerate the debate over how the HA will participate in decisions that affect security. I would wcicorne your guidance during our call Monday afternoon, since I intend to raise the issue at this Thursday's Political Committee meeting. I will seek to get their sense of how a decision for any of the thre.e options would be received by the general public and affect the attitudes of former military and how the emerging political leadership would view a decision to defer the issue until the LIA can participate. c., - (5 June 19, 2003 MEMO FOR FOR Secretary Rumsfe1d FROM: L Paul Brembh,V. 41 SUBJECT: Former Army Rank Structure 1 may have misinformed you Monday about the rank structure in the former army. It now appears from the army rosters which have come 111l0 our possession, that NCOs made up 113,000 or a total force of 506,000 (conscripts accounted for 315,000.) June 20, 2003 TO: Secretary Rumsfeid FROM: L. Paul Bremer 1, 14 SUBJECT: June 19 Political Consultation with Iraqis UK Ambassador John Sawers and I met yesterday with 21 Iraqis, ranging from political leaders, to independents, to government bureaucrats and professionals. UN SRSG Dc Mello's chief of staff sat in as an observer at the meeting. Three issues were discussed: the overall political process. the currency and what to do about payments to the dissolved military. During the discussion regarding the political process, Iraqi participants stressed that immediate needs — such as security, and regular electricity - must take priority in order to create the conditions necessary to successfully form stable national bodies. Some of the participants, including several political party representatives, argued that because the Constitutional Conference is so critical, and will "shape Iraq's destiny", there should be direct elections for the delegates even if this meant delay. Conversely, many participants argued that the political process must move forward as soon as possible, and that the lack of a formal Iraqi entity to date was causing confusion and insecurity on the street. Both the KDP and SCIRI representatives asked that a specific hinefrarne and date be announced for the formation oldie Political Council (to which I replied that both the Council and thc Constitutional Conference would he set up by the end of July). A brief discussion on currency issues indicated a consensus among all but one of the Iraqi participants that the CPA should use Swiss Dinars as the official Iraqi currency prior to the creation Dia new currency, designed and issued by a future Iraqi government. Walt Slocombe gave a shoit briefing on the future of the Iraqi military and the formation of the new Iraqi army. While there were few questions about Slocombes comments, the participants were unanimous in their reaction to my presentation of three possible options for dealing with the ex-military: do nothing, pay one lump sum, or pay a stipend to those eligible for retirement pending a decision by an Iraqi government. All argued that we shouid continue to pay "the salaries" of former military members; many made the point that the regular army was as much of a force for Saddam to manage as it was a source of support for him. Participants felt that such payments made scnsc on security, humanitarian, legal, and other grounds Interestingly, participants did not distinguish between "pensions" and "salaries," with most maintaining that payments should be made to all ex-military, not only those of retirement age. Page loll Kennedy, Patrick AMB From: Sent: To: Kennedy, Patrick AMB Friday, June 20, 2003 1:31 PM (bX6) IV, OSD FVV: Final Memo to SecDef on Pal Consults Subject: Importance: High Please pass SECDEF G/20/2003 03ac Z -7 — .7: 6re • THE SECRETARY OF DEFENSE 1000 DEFENSE PENTAGON .04ASI-itNGTCN DC 20301.10CC JUN 19 2003 The Honorable Bill Frist Majority Leader United States Senate Room H-230 Capitol Washington, DC 20310 Dear Mr. Leader: have talked to the Commander of Central Command (CENTCOM), General Tom Franks. lie believes the situations in Iraq and Afghanistan have improved to the point that it is possible now to further loosen the arrangements with respect to Congressional delegations in the region. 1 suggest that we open it up and treat Afghanistan and Iraq like other countries in CENTCOM, with the understanding that their situations may vary from month to month. There may still be practical issues in moving around the countries, and there may be sonic limitations on staying overnight. Within these broad guidelines, we will work with delegations to fashion programs that arc appropriate for them and that fit the situation and capabilities of the. ITI.; 1 i tary to assist. We look forward to cooperating fully with the Congress in its oversight responsibilities. U0 5 5ti / 0 3 Coalition Provisional Authority Highlights for Secretary lturnsfeld 20 June 2003 Security: • Appropriated funds for New Iraqi Army (NIA) training contracts cleared the Congressional notice period on Thursday. On 24 June, CPA will review bids from Iraqi contractors to reconstruct a training base site a I LCID) cep Working with CJIF-7 on a plan to integrate training and integrating with other command initiatixes—.„ • Briefed Ir roliticalCom yesterday on NIA and received a favorable response. Most in m ers, including those known to be quite critical of the old army. felt strongly that we should continuelo-inilitary. Considering options and expect to forward a note on this subject in the near future. • Developing a plan to hire ir:agi contractors to refurbish Police Training Academies in Mosul, Baghdad, and Basra. Str4tegy for mid-term development of Irajilicc and security forces including international support will be ready i Implementing "Security Guard Synchronization Board" process to coordinate military and Ministry security guard requirements and funding requests. Economy: • April salary payments have been fully completed in Baghdad except for the Ministry of Youth and Sport, which will be completed on Saturday_ May/June salary payments will begin on Saturday. • Three million dollars in 250 iraqi dinar notes was delivered to the Iraqi Central Bank yesterday. The notes will be available for exchange with 10000 dinar notes. OWFuel: is 6") LPG domestic production and imports averages around 2400 tons per day, about 57 % of the historical average daily consumption. Distribution of LPG cylinders in the Baghdad area continues at over 80,000 cylinders, 60 % of the normal prewar usage in the Baghdad area • The gasoline inventory exceeds 50 million liters in the Baghdad area. • Crude oil export sates remain on schedule; all deliveries anticipated to be completed by the ipd of the mIth. C . ''' Health Affairs: • Agreed with Dr. Rice that Operation Hope representatives would visit Iraq to conduct an assessment of pediatric hospitals. We will consider a plan to refurbish existing hospitals and raise private donations for a new, state-of-the- art referral center. • Hayman meeting with David Nabarro of World Health Organization (WHO), who expressed interest in providing technical assistance/expertise and other support. WHO is due to lose its staff on 21 Nov when the Oil for Food program ends. Political Process: ▪ Meeting yesterday with 21 Iraqis including political leaders, independents A government bureaucrats and professionals. UN SItSaDs: bekllo's COS .-3-CS participated. Three issues were discussedrffi- eoverall political processLthe currency and what to do about payments to the dissolved military. • Political team members returned from Mosul and Basra areas where they met with professionals, intellectuals, university professors, lawyers groups, tribal shaykhs, and others. In Amara (capital of Maysan Province), the team also met -N1-41 with the supervisory council, including its leader, resistance fighter Abu 7 Hatem. In each meeting the teams briefed the plan for the national political process and sought to identify individuals who might play a part in the national political process. • Over the weekend, teams will travel to AI-Samawah and Al-Nasirya to continue the national consultative process. - Public Affairs: • Taped weekly TV/radio/print address to the Iraqi people; focus was on new z criminal justice initiatives. Interviewed by BBC Arabic Radio. Submitted oped on Iraq economic reform to the WSJ, for print in their US,. Europe, and Asian editions. Working on possibspl - iding Iraqi journalists covering donor's conference toArigiiington, In. for interviews and meetings. Other Comments: • Promulgated two financial management regulations: Regulation for the Development Fund for Iraq and a Regulation for CPA's Program Review Board (PR.13).. The PRB will prioritize funding requirements for relief and recovery activities in Iraq and develop funding plans that propose allocations of resources. v•vyk.‘,... 2 ( S egitm C 6 'V per ( e vaAcci skykkett_ tesc sei-Rosite QAtbeiti LL \Tht-, ZSG -- s c i CC L - kic rk.pkt, krtf; . te 1 /4 ‘,1 2 Juky 2003 EMORANDUM - - .k ,.\-t-4. -- \-S -. " --CC-- \ '10: Secretary Rumsfeld FROM; L. Paul Bremer, III RI: CPA CPA Priority Issues ' Electricity O Prior to recent sabotage, running about 3200M.W nationwide and 1300MW in Baghdad. Now at approximately 950M W in I3aglidad and 3000MW nationwide, but on the WilY back up, • Security: Iplementing . 'w_sccurifir electrical inl-rastructurel m • Short-term plan: Expect to reach previous goal of 4000MW by 25 July, , which will provide approx. 16-20 his throughout Iraq Investing $2m in repairs to increase efficiency of existing equipment and $.3m in communications equipment. Istablished task force to locale and repair 200-300 generators of 10MW and higher throughout country within ne,it three weeks. • Mid-term: Will purchase and install 400MW generasnrs ($200m): Won't be in place this season, but will bc helpful next summer. • t.ong-terni: Evaluating plan to provide additional 1200M W/ yr. for each of next 4-5 years with goal of ROOOMW by 2009. ($L2b1ri Also considering $500m/yr. for transmission distribution. Governance Council • Timing: Next two weeks. a Process: Vetting IR names with Leadership Council (see attachment): another 7 or so names will be added over the next few days. Once vetted, group meets and declare themselves, with our endorsement, to be the "Governance Council." • (3oals: ) narrow majority of Shi'as; 2) at least one Turkoman and one Christian: 3) roughly equivalent numbers of Sunnis and Kurds; 4) more internals than externals: 5) several women. • Challenges: Basra rep; Sunni women. • Constitutional Conf.: Will proceed after establishment of Governance Council. The South/ British Concerns - • Pace of funding: O In last six weeks, the Coalition has initiated almost a billion dollars on projects in Iraq, much or which has been focused on the South. Examples: Irrigation -- 3000 workers employed; cleared 350 kilometers of irrigation channels. By end of the month, expect to have 50,000 at work on over 5000 km of channels. Port -- Now dredged to 12 meters and open for commercial activity; nearly 2 million cubic meters of material have been cleared. $26m being spent for dredging; wreck removal and security; $ 1 lm for startup of Grain Facility. The "British USAID" has also committed £1 50m to UN agencies, the Red Cross/ Red Crescent and NGOs for humanitarian assistance. o Cong. notice period will soon begin on additional amounts for South including: Transmission lines: $4.2m to erect a tower and lines; Water: $42m for water and wastewater treatment. O Ad ion needed: F.nsore rapid implementation of one-day training course for contractors. • Priority: o Fully aware of importance of the South. Focus of nat'l political process and of local efforts. o Najac: Governor arrested for corruption. News of arrest received enthusiastically by Najaf resident and senior Shi'a clergymen in Baghdad. W/in one week, town council, by caucus, will designate a new Governor. When new Governor is elected, CPA will announce package of Najaf development projects. ifi c 221 5c•••c•--‘--% GOVERNANCE COUNCIL • 18 names: Mobsen Abdulhameed (Sunni, internal Bahgdad); Ayad Alawi (Shi'a, external Baghdad); Masud Barzani (Kurd, internal. Irbil); Mohammed Bahr al-Ulum (Sill - a, external, Baghdad! Najaf); Naseer Chadirji (Sunni, internal, Baghdad); Ahmed Chalabi (Shi'a, external; Baghdad); PX!)) (woman, Shra, internal. Babel); Abdcl Aziz Hakim (Shi'a external, Baghdad/ Najal); Ibrahim Jaafari (Shi'a, external. Baghdad); Ayad Jamal al Din (Shi'a, external. Nasiriyah); 1bx6) (Shi'a, internal, Karbala); Yonadam Kanna (Assyrian, internal, Irbil); Karim Muhammadawi (Abu I latim) (Shi'a, internal, Maysan); (1)X6) (woman. Turkmen, Kirkuk); Adnati l'achaQhi (Sunni, external, Baghdad): Farqad Qiiwini (Shi'a, internal, 1 lilla); Jalal Talabani (Kurd, internal, Sulayinaniyalt); Uhazi al Yawr (Sunni, external, Mosul). • Additional names under consideration: Lina Abood (woman, Sunni, internal, Baghdad); Sharif Ali (Sunni, external, Baghdad); Dara Nor al Din (Kurdish, internal, Baghdad); Khosra Goran (Kurd, internal, Mosul); Akila I lashimi (woman. Shi'a, internal, Najaf/ Baghdad): (bX6) (woman, Sunni, internal, Baghdad); Mowalfau al-Rubai (Shi'a, external. Baghdad); (WM (Shi'a, external, Basra); Saila Soubail (woman, Shi'a, external, Baghdad); Alau Talabani (woman, Kurd, external, Baghdad); _ (woman, Kurd, internal, Kirkuk); Ahmad al-Barak Abu Sultan (Shi'a, internal, Babel). 4e cfr -tLAA-Q-LA rage 110 b)(1).(b)(5).(b)(6) ge 111 il.1050 -101 —04 , 7 July 2003 MEMORANDUM TO: Secretary Rumsfeld FROM L. Paul Bremer, Ill RE: CPA Priority Issues Turkey a Arrest of special forces o Of 32, 8 released almost immediately; 24 detained at BIAP. 1 UK handed to British. 23 others returned to Sulaymaniyah and will be held at the compound pending resolution of the investigation. o Information that COL (0(6) a subject of the allegations) is back in Northern Iraq as part of the investigative delegation. o We will want to clarify what prior understanding, if any, existed between the U.S. and Turkey regarding the presence of TUSF in Iraq. Then we must address the future of such forces here. o Turkish general from Silopi met with PUK PM Barham Salih July 6; said Turkey intends to restaff the office in Sulaymaniyah. Salih replied that the issue of restaffing the office was a decision for the CPA. We should not permit this. • Recommendations forwarded with respect to Turkish offers of non-military assistance. We recommended against accepting offers to reopen Consulate General offices in Mosul or open additional border crossing. Iraqi Budget • Approved budget for remainder of '03. • Assumes! $3.4b in receipts from oil sales; $900m from military downsizing and elimination of regime's "special programs"; $200m from Oil for Food refunds; $60 from Iraqi taxes and other revenues. • Allocates: $610m for capital expenditures (compared to $473m for Jul-Dec '02); $862m for operations (compared to $404m for Jul — Dec. '02). Despite increases, austere budget situation for remainder of year. Total expenses are foreseen to be $2 billion more than revenues this year. • Going forward: develop longer-term salary scale by late August; restore revenue sources (electricity, water, passports, luxury taxes, etc.); develop '04 budget by October. • Will forward proposal for '04 supplemental request by early September. Currency • Will announce today our intention to print and issue new Iraqi banknotes. • Will begin distribution on 15 October. The period of exchange will last for three months. • The design will be similar to the so-called Swiss dinars in circulation in the north; currency denominations will be similar to thc so-called Saddam dinar that circulates in Baghdad and the south. • Conversion rate between the Swiss and Saddam dinars was selected following consultations with leaders in the north. 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't I. • i 11; ANI:111;:it 4; Pt le 1 .1( t. :(111.),11:_1. 030Th - -0146. 1Rf I I July 2003 MEMORANDUM TO: Secretary Rumsfeld FROM L. Paul Bremer, Ill RE: CPA Priority Issues IRANIAN ENCROACHMENT: • Next steps? MEK WEAPONS: • What is the status of the request to use MEI< weapons for new Iraqi Police and Army? GOVERNING COUNCIL: • On track for a Sunday announcement. IRAQI CIVIL DEFENSE FORCE ▪ Plan to stand up 8 battalions quickly (next 45 clays}, KADEK: • As C7ENTCOM develops COAs, caution that we not divert military forces away from a fragile security situation. " September 16,2403 TO: Honorablo Cohn Powell (by hand) CC: Gen. Dick Myers Paul Butner Paul Wollowitz Reuben Jeffery FROM: Donald Rumafeld7/ . SUBJECT: Iraq Personnel I understand you believe there ere two or three hundred State Department personnel awaiting some sort of clearance to get to Baghdad and help staff the CPA. Could you please send me the list, so I can help pugh that along? Thanks. 0914:442 •-‘ rt; 1 .1(1 wrFICS;111. Captured Personnel in Iraq OASD SOil AC July 19, 2003 • Siolifeim • 00/914Eb. Disposition of EPWs and MEK Enemy Prisoners of War (EPN‘'s) • Since the cessation ui major combat operations. EPV: captures are rare. PVis remain in custody as of 17 July 2003. • CENTCON1 continues to screen and release EIM's as appropriate. • Policy Guidance 0.12 t(.1 Apnl 2003) authnnres CI.NWONS in tC{COSC nOtI COMtlatanIS who are nni subject so prowcui ion or cony:lend 3 UCtintY threat and to parolc 1:PVt's if the vet not In Ige op VIM against the Call inn. • Those suspected of atrocities may he toed by Iraqi or other courts 60Cent. aGireiiiPT• Disposition of Criminal Detainees / Civilian Internees Criminal Detainees • In most cases they will be tried by Iraqi courts, including the new Central Criminal Court of Iraq (CCCI) • Irani Criminal Cuktc haa betn csiabhhtil • centrai rriminal Court has been crated • CPA Examining %hays to lutist...me (bX1) 4664:11. .mforreR61 61 BACKUPS .t.rdefittry 3 (bXi) 4 - ....40••••=•••• 0.1•••=1.1M.,41:77.i. .111•••••••• . July 24, 2003 The I lonorable Donald Runisfelcl Secretary of Defense U.S. Department of Defense 1000 Defense, The Pentagon Washington, DC 20301 Dear Mr. Secretary: I don't want to flood your in-box, but I do want to share the results of a seminar we just held on building a new Iraqi Constitution. Immediately following Undersecretary Feith's presentation at CSIS on July 8, we gathered together a small group of comparative constitutional scholars, policy veterans, Iraqi nationals and members of thc business community. Their task was to think specifically about the problems of creating a solid basis for the long-term political environment in Iraq. Several of the participants had traveled independently to Iraq in recent months and had held wide-ranging conversations with a variety of people there. I hope the insights from this seminar can help inform and enrich the discussions you are having internally, both in Washington and Baghdad. Several conclusions emerged from the discussions. The first is that the most important prerequisite for a successful political transition in Iraq is adequate time, There is indeed urgency in having Iraqis take responsibility for their own future. But the experts were in unanimous agreement that rushing political reconstruction will critically handicap it, locking in a permanent advantage for well-organized groups whose interests arc inimical to our OWL. Based on their experiences with coustitution-writing processes in other regions, the experts argued that, at this stage, wc need to buy some time. In particular, they suggested that the interests of long-term stability would be best served by directing short-term energy into the creation of an interim document resembling a Bill of Rights. Such a document should ct ground rules for future political activity in the country arid lay down a clear marker for how Iraq's future will differ front its past. At the core of such a document must be the determination that one's rights in the new Iraq derive from status as an individual, and not from membership in a sectarian group. If such a document were tied to an international standard, such as the Universal Declaration of Iluman Rights, it would undermine critics who w ould see such a document as set-% mg American, rather than Iraqi, interests. Building the immediate political tasks in Iraq around rights rather than processes allows time for Iraqis to be educated politically. It also gives them time to think of themselves in ways to which they have not yet become accustomed. Further, an emphasis on individual rights rather 2 than group rights or the division of spoils along sectarian lines decreases the likelihood of a future Iraq in which various parties battle For assets to support massive patronage networks. Carrying this off would certainly involve a coalition-led public education effort. Equally importantly, it would require recruiting a group of Iraqis to lead a grass-roots effort to guide their own country toward democracy. Extending the timeline would also give members of the recently appointed Governing Council a chance to prove themselves and to deepen their networks in Iraq. Many on the ground have stronger networks and interests quite. contrary to our own In addition. extending the timeline would create opportunities for popular political leaders whom we have not yet identified to emerge from the Iraqi populace. Drawing on their other experiences, the experts also underlined the importance of immediately placing a stress on local governance. By local, they meant largely municipal issues, not about federalism or polities at the provincial level. A stress on local governance would help convince Iraqis they are responsible for their own future, build a cadre of political leaders who acquire credibility through competent stewardship, and help shape the development of issue- oriented, rather than ideology-oriented politics. In such a sequence, democracy would grow from the grass roots, rather be extended down by a collection ofeapital-city elites dividing the spoils in constitutional conventions. The experts' final theme was one that our tnp report stressed, and is in many ways self- evident for Iraqis 10 support U.S.-led political change, they must believe that the U.S. has helped improve their lives. These suggestions seem sound to mc, and I hope they seem sound to you. To my mind, they reflect some thoughtful directions for future action that have some perspective and comparative experience behind them. The director of our Middle Nis( Program, Dr. Jon 13. A Itemian. ran the July 8 meeting, lie would be happy to follow up with your staff on any of the issues contained here- Ile can be reached by phone at (202) 775-3295, and by email at jaltennacsis.org. As always, we remain willing to help in any way we can. Sincerely. John J. Harm President and CEO CS1S - - Creating Strategic Insights and Solutitms • June 21, 2003 TO. Jo" ettfiter CC: Paul Wolfowitz Doug Feith FROM: Donald Rumsfeld 7 SUBJECT: Romania's Lessons for Iraq Here is an interesting report from Paul Wolfowitz that you might find helpful. Thanks. Attach. 01(Axth 0621034 6/17/03 DepSecDef memo to SecDef re: Impressions from Romania Regarding Iraq Please respond by