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b)(6) 81/17/82 15:89!51 Via Fax -> ..._ _______ Paul Wolfawit2 ,,..ee,@ POLICYWATCH Ana{rsi.s of Near East Policy from the .scholars and tUsociates of THE WASHINGTON INSTITUTE Number five Hundred and Ninety-Four January 17, 2002 SPECIAL POLICY FORUM REPORT NUCLEAR ARMS INSPECTIONS IN IRAQ HANSBLIX On J4nuary 11, 2002, Hans Blbc, exl!cudve chai'rman of the United Nations Monitoring, Verification, and Inspection Committee (UNMOVIC), addressed The Wcuhingt011 I,ucitut11.'s Poli.ey Forum. Chairman Bluc al.Jo saved as dir«tor general of lhe /nurnalional Atomic Ene,:zy Agency from 1981 lo 1997. The following u a rapportG1r'.s summary of hu r9narla. Since September 11, there has been increased concern about terrori1r.s using weapom of mass destruction (WMD). It ii thus natural to return to the issue of Iraq, a country tha, has used biological and chemical agents against Iran and its own citizem. Indeed, Iraq violated the Non-Proliferation Treaty before 1990 and, prior to the Gulf War, was Qlimated to be a year away from developing worbble nuclear weapoM. The Inspection, Regime The United Nations Special Comminion (UNSCOM) fulfilled Inspection duties in Iraq from 1991 to 1998; UNMOVJC took over that role in 1999. UNMOVIC is more aligned with the rest of lhe UN system, rather than being supported by the major Western countries that have contributed much of the personnel and finances for UNSCOM. Two UN Security Council (UNSq resolutions are particularly relev:int to the inspec:tions. UNSC 687, passed in 1991, states that sanctions would be lifted if Iraq were lo eliminate all of its WMD illld cooperate with an inspection and monitoring program. UNSC 1284 w.15 passed in 1999 and reflecu:cl a lower ambit.ion about what ii required from Iraq and also what Iran would gel in return. Iraq only has lo ,how cooperation with UNMOVIC and progress toward WMD control, rather than eliminate all WMD. In return, sanctions on Iraq would be suspended, not ended. Neither resolution supercedc3. the other, and both are 1,till valid. Snould inspections once again resume, theoretic.illy, no 5ites in Iraq would be off-limits to inspectors. However, that does not. mean that inspectors would be frcz of \imitations. The aclual in1pcc:tion "work program" would be developed within the first sixty days; of the inspectors' arrival in Iraq, and then must be s;ubmitted to, and approved by, the UNSC. After that initial period, the work program ~y be expanded to include other sites, though that must also be approved by the UNSC. Any sites that Iraq feels should not be inspected, or any other grievances Iraq might have against the inspections, may be submitted lo the UNSC for review in lhc same manner, Unlike in a crimin.11 case, UNMOVIC is not required lo adhere to a "burden of proor• that Iraq still posseJSCS or is producing WMD. Similarly, there is no time limit within which UNMOVIC must produce specific evidence. Instead, the oommillce•s objective is lo ins.peel and review all evidence until, '&? TIIE WASHINGTON lNSTITUTE for N~ar E~t ,-oliey 1828 L S1ru1 • Suite 1050 • Wa•hir:gton, D.C. :x>OJG (202) 432-06S0 • FAX (202) 223-53154 • E-Mail: inCo@wuhlnstonimlllutc.orJ lnltefflll: www.wuhing1onin1lilulc.org 81/17/02 15:18:37 \fia Fax -> b)(6) Paul Uolfo11itz hge 882 rOLICYl'IA.TCH with reasonable certainty, inspcclol'l c.a.n slate lhal Iraq is WMD free, and that its dual-us.c production capabilities are being carefully monitored. · UNMOVIC's Work Si.nee 1998, the la.st dale: during which inspcctol'l were actually inside of Iraq, Ul'.MOVIC has diligently followed pouib!c illegal developments in Iraq using many different methods. First, UNMOVIC inspectors halfe made anangcmc:nl.5 with an American and a Fm1cb company Lo monit.o, media reports for any stories of potential relevance. The American firm has identified approximately 100,000 media reports about Ir~ or WMO, but found las than one percent to be relevant to UNMOVIC's work. Nonetheless, the media c:an be a very valuable tool, parlic:ularly when it makes use of defectors' :s.tories about Iraqi WMD. Second, information on Iraq has been gathered through satellite images provided by various UN member statu. UNMOVIC has access to a 14,000-piclure archive against which It can comp;ire new picrurcs. A third reliable source of information is direct intclligcnc:c. In order lo protect the infonnalion and integrity of the inspection team, all data passed to UNMOVIC is tightly conLrollcd and withheld from other organizations or governments.. The information goes to only two people: at UNMOVIC: the chairman and the officer in charge of intelligence, whc is at present a New Zealand general. If lnspcclions re:s.ume, intelligence information will be compared with other sources and, if it is deemed to be valid, will be paued on to the chief of operations and then di'"tly to the chief inspector for that area. Even with all of lJacsc sources of information, there are clear advantage, lo using human inspectors, which explains the importance of UNMOVIC ac:hieving acccis to Iraq. Inspectors CM\ get inside buildings to see the "hardware," while satellites can see only building types. Inspecton can solve unanswered disarmament issues and monitor installations. Additionally, they can monitor imports and make sure that they arc being used for peaceful programs. What Can Be Established There will always be a "residue of uncertainty"" about whether Iraq is complying fully, not hiding some weapons or weapons-production capability. Nuclear arms arc the simplest to find, as. they love "fingerprints" in the form of distinct chemical trails. However, chemi~l weapons (such .u those used by Iraq on its own populace and on Iran) and biological weapons (nch as those found hidden on an Iraqi chiden farm in 1995) are much harder 10 trace. That doubt will become much stronger as long as inspcction:s. arc: suspended. UNMOVJC hopes that Iraq will come to sec the benefits of inspections. Inspections would help Iraq to m;ilce the very ca,e that it has been pulling forward for years-namely, that it has no WMD. lf Iraq wants to be rid of sanctions, it :s.hould be more cooperative on this issue. Jnspections arc a privilege, not a penally, and inspectors can provide a credibllily ~al Iraq 1irnp\y cannot. establi5b on its own. Tlus Special Policy F orwn Rq,on -.s prttparm by A fan Lowinger. C, TAE WASHINGTON fNSTITUTEforNtar Easl 1"aliey . 1828 L Slretl • Suite 1050 • Washington, O.C. 20036 (202) 452·06S0 • FAX (202) 223-!5~64 • E-Mail; in£o@w11hingl0nin11l1u1e.org Internet: w-.wul>inglonin1tltu1e.org