06-F-0803 Iraq National Archive Project

iouth Asia copy provided COORDINATION Administrator, Coalition Provisional Authority Under Secretary of Defense Comptroller Under Secretary of Defense for Intelligence NOV 2 1 General Counsel Director, Defense Intelligence Agency Deputy Under Secretary of Defense for Near East and South Asia Director, Joint Staff President, National Defense University copy provided FOR OFFIOl)f(L .JSE ONLY THE ASSIST ANT SECRET ARY OF DEFENSE WASHINGTON, D .C. 20301-2500 I-03/015831-SO NOV I 8 2 0 03 SPEC IAL. OPERATIONS/ L.OW· I NTENS ITY CON FL.ICT FOR: UNDERSECRETARY OF DEFENSE FOR INTELLIGENCE SUBJECT: Iraq History Project On 11 November 2003 you met with the Under Secretary of Defense for Policy on the Iraq History Project. A memorandum for the record is attached for your comments at Tab A. I appreciate your support for the Iraq History Project and request your assistance in gaining the support of the Iraq Survey Group. As you know, their cooperation is vital to the success of this project. Also attached at Tab Bis a draft memorandum to the Secretary. Please pro.vidJ vour coordination no later than COB 21November2003 to my action officer (b)(S) ~ at l(b)(S) I Thomas W. O'Connell IRAQ SURVEY GROUP POSITION ON ALLOWING COALITION PROVISIONAL AUTHORITY ACCESS TO CAPTURED IRAQI DOCUMENTS The Iraq Survey Group (ISG) strongly disagrees with the proposal to allow the Coalition Provisional Authority (CPA) access to ISG documents for its Iraq History Project prior to the documents being fully processed and exploited. The ISG believes allowing CPA this access will be severely detrimental to three distinct but equally critical areas: A. The National Security of the United States 8 . The internationally-vital ISG WMD mission C. The DoD's and CPA's Iraq History Project itself A. The National Security of the United States • Intelligence documents will be lost. ISG is continually discovering documents of high intelligence value from captured Iraq documents. Most of these docu- ments are found in the initial review, or 'triage' of the documents. Many are also found later in the exploitation process, to include during the latter ISG analyst and subject matter expert review process. Access and review of documents during any stage of this exploitation outside ISG will negatively impact the ability to properly identify and classify these highly sensitive documents. • Intelligence documents will be compromised. Building on the reasoning above, access and review of documents during any stage of ISG exploitation outside ISG will raise the risk of documents being inadvertently released to the public or others without a need to know. This will severely damage U.S. national security. Nothing outweighs taking all measures to ensure this does not occur. • Counter Intelligence (Cl) documents will be compromised. Any release of Cl documents, which the ISG also continually dFscovers throughout its exploitation recess would be extremal detrimental to the security of the United States ..... l~-B! ..... ~A~).<~6>~] (b ,(b)(7)( ) 7·~ __ ><_> __ -:-:----~~--;----~-:-0---;-.:--------...,....,i"""'r"-r---- ....................... ..J Once a Cl document is publicly released, at best it can comp e e y ose 1 sine igence value; at worse it could compromise the investigative process. B. The ISG mission • An already stressed DOCEX mission will be overwhelmed. Document access for the Iraq History Project will considerably disrupt the already taxed ISG DOCEX mission. ISG DOCEX physical space and expertise are limited. ISG uses specific priority intelligence requirements (PIRs) to guide the DOCEX mission. Additional Iraq History Project search requirements, regardless if more people are added to the process, will slow down the ISG DOCEX operational process. A parallel review of already exploited documents will also be required for the Iraq History Project, further upsetting the current ISG DOCEX mission. • Original documents needed for follow-on exploitation will be lost. Although ISG has digital copies of documents, this does not mean exploitation is complete. ~Lt Col/ISG CMPC-B/20 Oct 03 -~--:::-><~> ISG often must use original captured documents for interviews with high value targets and other detainees. For effective operations, it needs immediate access to these documents; losing possession of them and retrieving them from CPA is not a viable alternative to current operations. Original documents are also sent for forensic analysis in the US and are used to confront High Value Detainees and other Iraqis suspected of involvement in Iraq's WMD programs. • CPA document review will be taken out of context. ISG experts, and ISG experts alone need to focus on Iraqi DOCEX during its WMD mission execution. CPA review and reporting of documents will result in efforts to assist the ISG in this mission. Although well intentioned, this will result in incorrect, incomplete, and/or inadvertently inaccurate conclusions. C. The Iraq History Prolect • A CPA review as new documents arrive degrades the Iraq History Project. ISG receives a constant flow of new captured documents every day. These are reviewed and appropriately prioritized relative to other documents. The rush to review and obtain ISG documents for the Iraq History Project does not outweigh the increase in efficiency the CPA will have if it waits until after the ISG has completed its mission. Without waiting, the Iraq History Project will continually be reviewing, re-reviewing, and correlating new information with existing information until ISG document capture mission is complete. • A concurrent ISG WMD DOCEX and CPA Iraq History Project review dllutes ISG capability to fully assist In the Iraq History Project. ISG resources for its WMD mission are already at a premium. Sharing these with the Iraq History Project will be inefficient and cause undue competition among the two missions; ISG will be unable to assist CPA with the full capabilities it has to bear. On the other hand, if the Iraq History Project waits until after ISG mission comp, letion, CPA will potentially have available more dedicated, expert resources to execute its mission. Based upon these basic reasons, the ISG highly recommends the CPA wait until after it completes its document exploitation mission before reviewing the documents ~ L_Jlt Col/ISG CMPC-B/20 Oct 03 Ji'Olt OJi'FICIAL USE ONL¥ MEMORANDUMFORTHERECORD SUBJECT: Meeting on Iraq History Project 11 November 2003 Attendees: Under Secretary of Defense for Policy, Under Secretary of Defense for Intelligence, Deputy Assistant Secretary of Defense for Strategy, Deputy Assistant Secretary of Defense for Stability Operations • USDP began by referring to the decision memorandum on the Iraq History Project from the DASD for Stability Operations at Tab A. • The memorandum alerts USDP to the opposition of the Iraq Survey Group (ISG) and recommends narrowing the scope of the project to supporting the Iraq Special Tribunal. • USDP expressed his desire to move ahead with the project as originaUy conceived, noting that it was a Presidential priority. He also mentioned Kannan Makiya's plans for a museum in Baghdad. • USDP asked USDI about the opposition of the ISG. USDI expressed his overall support for the project, with the following comments: o The ISG should get "first cut" at the documents. o The majority of documents of interest to the Coalition Provisional Authority are in Doha (which means that they have already been screened once). o The ISG has had trouble recruiting translators. • USDP would like to move the project along as quickly as possible. The next step is to award a contract to process documents. • The main obstacle is funding. There is no funding set aside in the Supplemental for this project. • Many possible funding sources were mentioned-the National Archives, the Library of Congress, etc. However, most of them have already been asked. FOR OFFICIAL USIS ONI>¥