06-F-0803 Iraq History Project Nov-6-2003

FILE ACTION MEMO ~® Xo1uc&. NOV 6 'lfJ0311fl./IJ I-03/014012-SO EF-7186 FOR: UNDER SECRETARY OF DEFENSE FOR POLICY FROM: Joseph J. Collins, Deputy Assistant Secretary of Defense 11 bTO~ ta 1 1ty perattons;-n.vb.:S ""''° , SUBJECT: Iraq History Project -y.~ ;,..erf" ~ .. 11"1_~~. v.>~ p,ft c,,•'p 1"~:..sc.. .J (If.> J • You and the DASD for Strategy last briefed the Iraq History Project to the Secretary on 21 June. • The goal of the Iraq History Project is to expose the true nature ofBa'athist rule in Iraq through public access to Iraqi regime records. Specifically, the creation of an Iraq National Archive, a digital archive, and a grant program. • Without the support of the Iraq Survey Group (ISG), which possesses the majority of Ba'athist regime documents, the scope of this project will be severely limited. • I recently received a allowing access to d< fully processed and e 11(101•3 outlining his opposition to roject before they have been 1)1ScuSJ t,..;j+Je.._t,...,,'"" • He is willing to allov which could take yea (otl;..,f has completed its mission, • The Coalition Prov·isi for use in an Iraqi Sp • In light of these new o OPTION I direct the Ii Tab A). v'" *" c"' ""<l(." ck:... ~ w \:.LI (.,,..Jo.. I. ~ "-<'. ''-j . ¢lc~k"' + Cell. "i Skc 4 +Lt_; C.; v ~ tt"" s ~o ~ Sc: \<-. .J,,""'-' 1 ""' "'- d,rc.H . 1l '1f o Iraqi regime documents ths forward: 1end that the Secretary ments (sample memo at DISAGREE. ______ OTHER. _____ _ AGREE.~~~~~ o OPTION 2: Focus on the immediate goal of supporting the Iraqi Special Tribunal and recommend the Secretary direct the ISG to allow the CPA access to those documents necessary for the Iraqi Special Tribunal (sample memo attached Tab B). A~1KJ::r. ______ DISAGREE, ______ OTHER, _____ _ 07-11-03 1J o24 IN 2)::!r ASD SO/LIC &. NOV . 6 2003hf1./P. ACTION MEMO I-03/014012-SO EF-7186 FOR: UNDER SECRETARY OF DEFENSE FOR POLICY ~ FROM: Joseph J. Collins, Deputy Assistant Secretary of Defense£ !ability Operat10ns;n.,,;,_, Y-''- , -n.~ I ,,;il> -(" ...,c.e SUBJECT: Iraq History Project )" _,.~ •If" pp··. " v->~ P"" f,. r_rJ' 1'""''..-- ,...(.. --i) IV 0"' J.} • You and the DASD for Strategy last briefed the Iraq History Project to the Secretary on 21 June. • The goal of the Iraq History Project is to expose the true nature ofBa'athist rule in Iraq through public access to Iraqi regime records. Specifically, the creation of an Iraq National Archive, a digital archive, and a grant program. • Without the support of the Iraq Survey Group (ISG), which possesses the majority of Ba'athist regime documents, the scope of this project will be severely limited. • I recently received a position paper from MG Dayton's office outlining his opposition to allowing access to documents in support of the Iraq History Project before they have been fully processed and exploited (Tab C) • He is willing to allow access to documents only after the ISG has completed its mission, which could take years. • The Coalition Provisional Authority wants immediate access to Iraqi regime documents for use in an Iraqi Special Tribunal. • In light of these new developments, there are three possible paths forward: o OPTION 1: Stick with the original plan and recommend that the Secretary direct the ISG to allow the CPA access to Iraqi documents (sample memo at Tab A). AGREE. ______ DISAGREE ______ OTHER o OPTION 2: Focus on the immediate goal of supporting the Iraqi Special Tribunal and recommend the Secretary direct the ISG to allow the CPA access to those documents necessary for the Iraqi Special Tribunal (sample memo attached Tab B). AGREE____ _ __ DISAGREE ______ OTHER _____ _ 07-11-03 11 :24 IN I ' o OPTION 3: Support the ISG's position that documents should not be released until they have been fully processed and exploited. • The ISG will oppose Options 1 and 2. The CPA will oppose Option 3. I tend toward recommending Option 2. • The success of the Iraqi Special Tribunal is imperative to the long term stability of Iraq. It is important that the ISG support it even if doing so impinges on its other missions. • Please give us your guidance on this matter. COORDINATION: None Attachment: As stated cc: Under Secretary of Defense for Intelligence Deputy General Counsel for International Affairs Deputy Assistant Secretary of Defense for Strategy Director, Joint Staff President, National Defense University 6 6 Prepared by: '---l (b_H _l ____ I SO/LIC Stability Operations, __ [(b -)( _) ___ _, THE SECREillMF DEFENSE 1000 DEFENSE PENTAGON WASHINGTON, DC 20301·1000 DIRECTOR, IRAQ SURVEY GROUP SUBJECT: Iraq National Archive Project (b)(S) cc: Administrator, Coalition Provisional Authority Director Central InteJligence 0 DRAFT .. THE SECRE,Il.M'F DEFENSE 1 000 DEFENSE PENTAGON WASHINGTON, DC 20301 · 1000 DIRECTOR, IRAQ SURVEY GROUP SUBJECT: Iraq National Archive Project (b)(5) cc: Administrator, Coalition Provisional Authority Director Central Intelligence 0 DRAFT IRAQ SURVEY GROUP POSITION ON ALLOWING COALITION PROVISIONAL AUTHORITY ACCESS TO CAPTURED IRAQI DOCUMENTS The Iraq Survey Group (ISG) strongly disagrees with the proposal to allow the Coalition Provisional Authority (CPA) access to ISG documents for its Iraq History Project prior to the documents being fully processed and exploited. The ISG believes allowing CPA this access will be severely detrimental to three distinct but equally critical areas: A The National Security of the United States B. The internationally-vital ISG WMD mission C. The DoD's and CPA's Iraq History Project itself A. The National Security of the United States • Intelligence documents will be lost. ISG is continually discovering documents of high intelligence value from captured Iraq documents. Most of these docu- ments are found in the initial review, or 'triage' of the documents. Many are also found later in the exploitation process, to include during the latter ISG analyst and subject matter expert review process. Access and review of documents during any stage of this exploitation outside ISG will negatively impact the ability to properly identify and classify these highly sensitive documents. • Intelligence documents will be compromised. Building on the reasoning above, access and review of documents during any stage of ISG exploitation outside ISG will raise the risk of documents being inadvertently released to the public or others without a need to know. This will severely damage U.S. national security. Nothing outweighs taking all measures to ensure this does not occur. • Counter Intelligence (Cl) documents will be compromised. Any release of Cl documents, which the ISG also continually discovers throughout its exploitati ~m'T'l"..., process, would be extremely detrimental to the securit of the United States. (b)(7XE) ),(b)(7)(E) (b )(A).(b)(7XE> Once a acumen 1s pu 1c y re ease , at est 1t can completely lose its intelligence value; at worse it could compromise the investigative process. B. The ISG mission • An already stressed DOCEX mission will be overwhelmed. Document access for the Iraq History Project will considerably disrupt the already taxed ISG DOCEX mission. ISG DOCEX physical space and expertise are limited. ISG uses specific priority intelligence requirements (PIRs) to guide the DOCEX mission. Additional Iraq History Project search requirements, regardless if more people are added to the process, will slow down the ISG DOCEX operational process. A parallel review of already exploited documents will also be required for the Iraq History Project, further upsetting the current ISG DOCEX mission. • Original documents needed for follow-on exploitation will be lost. Although ISG has digital copies of documents, this does not mean exploitation is complete. E::Ju Col/ISG CMPC-B/20 Oct 03 . ' ISG often must use original captured documents for interviews with high value targets and other detainees. For effective operations, it needs immediate access to these documents; losing possession of them and retrieving them from CPA is not a viable alternative to current operations. Original documents are also sent for forensic analysis in the US and are used to confront High Value Detainees and other Iraqis suspected of involvement in Iraq's WMD programs. • CPA document review will be taken out of context. ISG experts, and ISG experts alone need to focus on Iraqi DOCEX during its WMD mission execution. CPA review and reporting of documents will result in efforts to assist the ISG in this mission. Although well intentioned, this will result in incorrect, incomplete, and/or inadvertently inaccurate conclusions. C. The Iraq History Protect • A CPA review as new documents arrive degrades the Iraq History Project. ISG receives a constant flow of new captured documents every day. These are reviewed and appropriately prioritized relative to other documents. The rush to review and obtain ISG documents for the Iraq History Project does not outweigh the increase in efficiency the CPA will have if it waits until after the ISG has completed its mission. Without waiting, the Iraq History Project will continually be reviewing, re-reviewing, and correlating new information with existing information until ISG document capture mission is complete. • A concurrent ISG WMD DOCEX and CPA Iraq History Project review dilutes ISG capability to fully assist in the Iraq History Project. ISG resources for its WMD mission are already at a premium. Sharing these with the Iraq History Project will be inefficient and cause undue competition among the two missions; ISG will be unable to assist CPA with the full capabilities it has to bear. On the other hand, if the lr. aq History Project waits until after ISG mission completion, CPA will potentially have available more dedicated, expert resources to · execute its mission. Based upon these basic reasons, the ISG highly recommends the CPA wait until after it completes its document exploitation mission before reviewing the documents l(b)(G) l u Col/ISG CMPC-B/20 Oct 03