Iraq: U.S. Military Operations

Order Code RL31701 CRS Report for Congress Received through the CRS Web Iraq: U.S. Military Operations Updated October 2, 2003 Steve Bowman Specialist in National Defense Foreign Affairs, Defense, and Trade Division Congressional Research Service ̃ The Library of Congress Iraq: U.S. Military Operations Summary Iraq’s chemical, biological, and nuclear weapons programs, together with Iraqi long-range missile development and support for terrorism, were the primary justifications put forward for military action. On March 17, 2003 President Bush issued an ultimatum demanding that Saddam Hussein and his sons depart from Iraq within 48 hours. On March 19, offensive operations began with air strikes against Iraqi leadership positions. By April 15, after 27 days of operations, coalition forces were in relative control of all major Iraqi cities and Iraqi political and military leadership had disintegrated. On May 1, President Bush declared an end to major combat operations. There was no use of chemical or biological (CB)weapons, and no CB weapons stockpiles have been found. The major challenges to coalition forces are now quelling a persistent Iraqi resistance movement, restoring civil order, and providing basic services to the urban population. U.S. troops continue to come under sporadic attacks, primarily in central Iraq. Though initially denying that these attacks were the work of an organized resistance movement, DOD officials have now acknowledged there is at least regional organization, with apparently ample supplies of arms and funding. CENTCOM commander Gen. Abizaid, has characterized the Iraqi resistance as “ a classical guerrilla-type campaign. DOD believes the resistance to comprise primarily former regime supporters, however others are concerned that growing resentment of coalition forces and resurgent Iraq nationalism, independent of connections with the earlier regime, may be contributing to the resistance. As of October 1, 310 U.S. troops have died in Iraq operations. Of these deaths, 173 have occurred since May 1, 2003. Approximately 129,000 U.S. troops are in Iraq, with perhaps an additional 40,000 elsewhere in the region. Approximately, 20,000 of these troops are reservists, and an additional 10,000 reservists are on mobilization alert. DOD has not released an official and current list of other nations contributing forces, however press reports indicate that between 21,000-29,000 non-U.S. troops are also in theater, with Britain, Poland, Spain, the Netherlands, Italy, and the Ukraine being the largest contributors. Other nations reported to be contributing troops include: Azerbaijan, Bulgaria, the Czech Republic, Denmark, the Dominican Republic, El Salvador, Estonia, Georgia (Gruzia) Honduras, Hungary, Kazakhstan, Latvia, Lithuania, Macedonia, Mongolia, Nicaragua, Norway, Portugal, Romania, Slovakia, and South Korea Congress approved a $62.37 billion FY2003 supplemental budget request for Iraq operations (H.Rept. 108-76), and DOD currently estimates the cost of military operations to be $3.9 billion per month. President Bush has submitted an emergency supplemental FY2004 appropriations request for $87 billion, of which $51 billion is for military operations in Iraq. This report will be updated as events warrant. Contents Background . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1 Military Planning & Combat Operations . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1 Options Considered . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 2 Combat Operations Prior to May 1, 2003 . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 3 Post-May, 2003 Operations Iraqi Resistance Force Level Debate Non- U.S. Forces . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 4 . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 5 . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 6 . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 7 Costs . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 7 Legislation . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 9 Additional Reading . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 9 Iraq: U.S. Military Operations Background Iraq’s chemical, biological, and nuclear weapons programs, together with Iraqi long-range missile development, and support for terrorism are the primary justifications put forward by the Bush Administration for military action. Since Iraq originally ended cooperation with U.N. inspectors in 1998, there has been little information on the state of Iraq’s weapons of mass destruction (WMD) arsenal; however, Administration officials were convinced that Iraq had reconstituted significant capabilities. Initially, leading Administration officials, most notably Vice- President Cheney, Defense Secretary Rumsfeld, and his Deputy Paul Wolfowitz, stressed that “regime change” or the removal of Saddam Hussein from power. Later in 2002, WMD disarmament was emphasized as the primary objective. Expanding on this theme, President Bush, in his speech before the United Nations on September 12, 2002 specified the following conditions for Iraq to meet to forestall military action against it: ! Immediately and unconditionally forswear, disclose, and remove or destroy all weapons of mass destruction, long-range missiles, and all related material. ! End all support for terrorism and act to suppress it. ! Cease persecution of its civilian population. ! Release or account for all Gulf War missing personnel. ! End all illicit trade outside the oil-for-food program and allow United Nations administration of its funds.1 On March 17, 2003 President Bush issued an ultimatum demanding that Saddam Hussein and his sons depart from Iraq within 48 hours. On March 19, offensive operations commenced with air strikes against Iraqi leadership positions. Military Planning & Combat Operations The Department of Defense released only limited official information concerning war planning or preparations against Iraq prior to the onset of offensive operations. There were, however, frequent and significant news leaks which provided a range of details. News reports indicated that the military options that were under discussion varied significantly in their assumptions regarding Iraq military capabilities, the usefulness of Iraqi opposition groups, the attitude of regional governments, and the U.S. military resources that would be required. 1 President Bush’s Address to the U.N. General Assembly, September 12, 2002. CRS-2 Options Considered In the wake of the successful operations in Afghanistan against the Taliban, some Administration officials advocated a similar operation, entailing use of special operations forces in cooperation with indigenous Iraqi opposition forces, coupled with an extensive air offensive to destroy Hussein’s most reliable Republican Guard units, command & control centers, and WMD capabilities. This approach assumed that the regular Iraqi army would prove unreliable, and could even join opposition forces once it is clear that defeat is imminent. To encourage this, significant emphasis would be placed on an intensive psychological warfare or “psyops” campaign to undermine the morale of Iraqi soldiers and unit commanders, persuading them of the hopelessness of resistance.2 While having the advantage of not requiring large staging areas (though some regional air basing would be required) or months to prepare, this was generally considered the riskiest approach. The weakness of Iraqi opposition military forces and their competing political agendas place their effectiveness in question, and predicting the behavior of regular Iraqi Army units under attack is problematic. This option also did not address the possibility of stiff resistance by Republican Guard units in the environs of Baghdad, nor the troop requirements of a post-conflict occupation. This “lite” option stood in contrast to the operations plan originally offered by U.S. Central Command. This option, often called the “Franks Plan”, after Army Gen. Tommy Franks, the U.S. Central Command (CENTCOM) commander who first briefed it to the President, calls for a large-scale ground force invasion. News reports initially indicated, however, that this “heavy” approach did not receive the support of the DOD civilian leadership or White House advisors. Questions over the reliability of the regional support that would be necessary for staging areas and the length of time required for deployment were the major concerns.3 However, the White House rejection of the “Franks Plan” came prior to the decision to take the Iraq issue to the United Nations Security Council. When it became clear that Security Council deliberations and the re-introduction of U.N. inspectors to Iraq could delay the possibility of military action for several months, it was apparently decided that this interlude would allow time both to negotiate regional cooperation and to deploy more substantial forces to the Persian Gulf region, and military operations today appear to adhere closer to CENTCOM’s original recommendations. As the ground force offensive has slowed, however, there was increasing criticism of DOD’s civilian leadership for not permitting the deployment of even more ground forces prior to onset of operations.4 2 “Timing, Tactics on Iraq War Disputed; Top Bush Officials Criticize Generals’ Conventional Views “, Washington Post, August 1, 2002. p. 1 3 “The Iraq Build-up, II”, National Journal, October 5, 2002. p. 2866. 4 “Rumsfeld’s Role as War Strategist Under Scrutiny”, Reuters, March 30, 2003. CRS-3 Combat Operations Prior to May 1, 2003 Offensive operations combined an air offensive and simultaneous ground offensive, in contrast to the 1991 campaign which saw weeks of air attacks to soften Iraqi resistance. U.S. Central Command’s operational plan employed a smaller ground force than the 1991 Desert Storm operation, reflecting an assessment that Iraqi armed forces were neither as numerous nor as capable as they were ten years ago, and that U.S. forces are significantly more capable. This option depended upon the continued cooperation of regional nations for substantial staging areas/airbases and required months to deploy the necessary forces. Though press reports differed somewhat, reportedly over 340,000 U.S. military personnel were in the Persian Gulf region (ashore and afloat). The 3rd Mechanized Infantry Division, the 101st Airborne Division (Air Assault) , the 7th Cavalry Regiment, and the 1st Marine Expeditionary Force formed the bulk of the U.S. ground offensive. The 4th Mechanized Infantry Division arrived late in theater. Ships bearing its equipment remained off Turkey for weeks awaiting the outcome of negotiations to permit establishing a northern front attacking from Turkey, and then were diverted to the Persian Gulf when these negotiations fell through. The U.S. Navy deployed five of its twelve naval aircraft carrier battle groups. The Air Force had approximately 15 air wings operating in the region. Strategic bombers operated from the British airbase at Diego Garcia, and airbases in the Middle East, Europe, and the United States. The United Kingdom deployed over 47,000 personnel, including a naval task force, an armored task force, a Royal Marine brigade, a parachute brigade, a Special Air Service regiment, and a Special Boat Squadron. The majority of these British forces were engaged in southeastern Iraq, securing the Umm Qasr and Basra region. Australia deployed approximately 2,000 personnel, primarily special operations personnel, and one F/A-18 attack aircraft squadron. Poland had 200 special operations troops around Basra. (For more detailed information, see CRS Report RL31763, Iraq: A Summary of U.S. Forces and CRS Report RL31843, Iraq Foreign Stances Toward U.S. Policy) The invasion of Iraq was expected to begin with a 72-96 hour air offensive to paralyze the Iraqi command structure, and demoralize Iraqi resistance across the military-civilian spectrum. Intelligence reports indicating the possibility of striking Saddam Hussein and his immediate circle led to an acceleration of the operations plan, and an almost simultaneously onset of air and ground offensive operations. CENTCOM air commanders stressed that significant efforts would be made to minimize civilian casualties and damage to Iraqi physical infrastructure, and they were mostly successful in this effort. With twenty-five days of offensive operations, coalition forces had relative control of all major Iraqi cities, including Baghdad, Basra, Mosul, Kirkuk, and Tikrit. CENTCOM pursued a strategy of rapid advance, by-passing urban centers when possible, pausing only when encountering Iraqi resistance. CENTCOM spokesmen characterized Iraqi resistance as sporadic and uncohesive. Oilfields and port facilities throughout Iraq were secured, as have all major air bases in Iraq. Though a few oil wells were set afire, all were quelled, and there has been no widespread environmental sabotage. Allied forces did not encounter the mass surrenders characteristic of the 1991 campaign, however DOD reported that over 6,000 Iraqis CRS-4 were taken prisoner, and believes that many more have simply deserted their positions. Iraqi paramilitary forces, particularly the Saddam Fedayeen, engaged in guerrilla-style attacks from urban centers in the rear areas, but did not inflict significant damage. Nevertheless, greater attention than anticipated had to be paid to protecting extended supply lines, and securing these urban centers, particularly around an-Nasiriyah and Najaf, and in the British sector around Umm Qasr and Basra. Though CENTCOM commanders expressed confidence in the adequacy of their force structure in theater, the Iraqi attacks in rear areas and the length of the supply lines to forward units led some to suggest that insufficient ground forces were in place to continue the offensive while securing rear areas and ensuring uninterrupted logistical support. These critics faulted DOD civilian leadership for overestimating the effectiveness of a precision air offensive and curtailing the deployment of more ground troops, suggesting that an ideological commitment to smaller ground forces and greater reliance on high-tech weaponry had dominated military planning.5 With collapse of the Iraqi regime, however, this criticism muted. Without permission to use Turkish territory, CENTCOM was unable to carry out an early ground offensive in Northern Iraq. However, Special operations forces, the 173rd Airborne Brigade, and air-lifted U.S. armor, operating with Kurdish irregulars seized Mosul, Kirkuk, and Tikrit. Cooperation with Kurdish militias in the north has been excellent. Even a mistaken airstrike against a allied Kurdish vehicle convoy, killing or wounding senior Kurdish leaders, did not adversely affect this cooperation. Potentially complicating the situation in the north, was a Turkish desire to possibly augment the 8,000+ troops it has had stationed in Kurdish-held territory in order to block possible Kurdish refugees and influence the accommodations made to the Kurds in a post-conflict Iraq. Turkish miliary spokesmen have indicated that no additional Turkish forces will move into Iraq at this time. The U.S. has assured Turkey that the Kurdish forces involved in seizing Mosul and Kirkuk would be withdrawn and replaced with U.S. troops. Post-May, 2003 Operations With the onset of widespread looting and the breakdown of public services (electricity, water) in the cities, coalition forces were confronted with the challenges of restoring public order and infrastructure even before combat operations ceased. Though U.S. forces have come under criticism for not having done more to prevent looting, the transition from combat to police roles is a difficult one, particularly when an important objective is winning popular support. Harsh reactions risk alienation of the population, yet inaction reduces confidence in the ability of coalition forces to maintain order. Indicative of the seriousness of the civil disorder, U.S. officials in Iraq authorized U.S. troops to shoot looters if necessary.6 In addition to looting, 5 “Questions Raised About Invasion Force”, Washington Post, March 25, 2003. p. 17 6 “U.S. Military Chief Vows More Troops to Quell Iraqi Looting”, New York Times, May (continued...) CRS-5 coalition forces also have to ensure that factional violence and does not derail stabilization efforts. U.S. forces, however, are spread relatively thin throughout Iraq, and many argue that additional troops in theater could improve the pace and breadth of stabilization operations. The attitude of the Iraq population is the key element, and depends upon a variety of factors, such as the nature and extent of infrastructure damage and economic dislocation, the demands of ethnic and religious minorities, and the speed with which a credible government can be established. A short-term post-war occupation was initially expected by some Administration officials, however it is now considered likely that a continued deployment of substantial military ground forces will be necessary for several years. For comparison, in the relatively benign environment and considerably smaller areas of Bosnia and Kosovo, after eight years of peacekeeping operations, NATO still maintains a deployment of about 60,000 troops. Iraqi Resistance Coalition troops continue to come under sporadic attacks, primarily in central Iraq. Though casualties have been relatively light, the potential for attack affects the pace and mode of reconstruction and stabilization operations. Troops must assume a potentially hostile environment, yet try to avoid incidents or actions that erode popular support. In addition to continuing attacks on coalition personnel, there have been attacks on infrastructure targets (e.g., oil/gas pipelines, electrical power stations and lines) hindering efforts to restore basic services to the civilian population. Attacks on oil pipelines also threaten to further delay the use of Iraqi oil exports to fund reconstruction programs. Though it is virtually impossible to fully protect these pipelines from sabotage, it is hoped that ongoing efforts to recruit a civilian Iraqi militia will provide coalition troops some assistance in this mission. Though initially denying that these attacks were the work of an organized resistance movement, DOD officials have now acknowledged there is at least regional organization, with apparently ample supplies of arms and funding. CENTCOM commander Gen. Abizaid, has characterized the Iraqi resistance as “ a classical guerrilla-type campaign.7 DOD believes the resistance to comprise primarily former regime supporters such Baathist party members, Republican Guard soldiers, and paramilitary personnel. However, others are concerned that growing resentment of coalition forces and resurgent Iraq nationalism, independent of connections with the earlier regime, may be contributing to the resistance.8 There are also reports of bounties of from $1,000-$5,000 being offered for killing coalition troops, taking advantage of the severe economic dislocation which has many Iraqis with no regular income. Captured documents have given some indication that 6 (...continued) 15. p. 21. 7 DOD New Briefing July 16, 2003. 8 “Iraqis Skeptical Over U.S. Explanation for Continuing Attacks on Coalition”, London Financial Times, August 4, 2003. p. 5. CRS-6 preparations for a resistance movement were made prior to the war, including the caching of arms and money. In response to these attacks on coalition forces, CENTCOM has undertaken operations to locate and detain suspected resistance members. These operations have resulted in the detention of hundreds of individuals, the capture of some high-ranking officials of the former regime, the seizure of very substantial caches of weapons and money, and the deaths of Saddam Hussein’s sons. These operations have, in some cases, engendered significant resentment among the local populations, and have been scaled back to reduce tensions with local populations. Force Level Debate The question of how many military personnel are required for stabilization operations has been a subject of controversy since well before the onset of operations. This controversy reflects the great difficulty in predicting how the political and military situation in post-war Iraq will evolve, and how long a military presence will be required before an acceptable and stable Iraqi government can be established. The continued Iraqi armed resistance has reinvigorated the debate over whether the United States has committed sufficient troops to the Iraqi operation. The rapid success of the combat offensive quieted critics who argued that a substantially larger ground force should have been deployed, but the question is now being raised whether a more robust military presence in Iraq is needed to bring stability. Secretary Rumsfeld and out-going CENTCOM commander Gen. Franks both maintained in congressional testimony that the number of troops in Iraq is adequate for the mission, though CENTCOM is currently reviewing troop requirements under its new commander, Gen. Abizaid. If it is decided that additional forces are required, this will present a challenge to the Army. Of its 33 combat brigades, 16 are already deployed in Iraq, and three of the remaining brigades have other assigned missions (e.g., Afghanistan, the Balkans, Korea) or are in strategic reserve. Thus, even at current levels, troop rotation has proven problematic. This was demonstrated when two brigades of the 3rd Infantry Division had their return to the United States twice postponed. DOD has now prepared a rotation plan for duty tours in Iraq, which calls for units to spend a one-year tour of duty in the region. It will, however, require much greater use of National Guard and Reserve units, and may require the participation of U.S. Marine units in stabilization operations. A Congressional Budget Office report has examined manning options available to DOD, and concluded that “the active Army would be unable to sustain an occupation force of the present size beyond about March 2004 if it chose not to keep individual units deployed to Iraq for longer than one year without relief.”9 The possible need for additional troops in Iraq has rekindled the debate over whether the U.S. Army personnel end-strength should be increased. Currently, the congressionally mandated end-strength is 480,000. In reporting the FY2004 Defense Authorization Act, the House Armed Services Committee noted the “inadequacy of military manpower, especially active component end-strength, as indicated in the 9 An analysis of the U.S. Military’s Ability to Sustain an Occupation of Iraq. Congressional Budget Office. September 3, 2003. CRS-7 need to activate 33,000 reservists annually”. The report further noted that the Army had estimated its manpower shortfall to be between 41,000 to 123,000 personnel. DOD’s civilian leadership intends to address shortfalls in specific functions by moving personnel from lower priority assignments, and by increasing the use of civilians in some functional areas to free up active duty military personnel. The newly confirmed Army Chief of Staff, Gen. Schoomaker, has indicated that a further review of Army personnel requirements is underway, and will provide recommendations in the context of the FY2005 DOD budget request. Non- U.S. Forces A key element in the Defense Department’s consideration of troop requirements in Iraq is the willingness of other nations to contribute ground forces. DOD has not, however, released an official and current list of other nations’ force contributions to operations in Iraq. Press reports based upon unattributed DOD officials indicate that between 21,000-29,000 non-U.S. troops are in theater, with Britain, Poland, Spain, the Netherlands, Italy, and the Ukraine being the largest contributors. Other nations reported to be contributing troops include: Azerbaijan, Bulgaria, the Czech Republic, Denmark, the Dominican Republic, El Salvador, Estonia, Georgia (Gruzia) Honduras, Hungary, Kazakhstan, Latvia, Lithuania, Macedonia, Mongolia, Nicaragua, Norway, Portugal, Romania, Slovakia, and South Korea. Most of these nations have deployed relatively small numbers of troops, and questions remain about their operational capabilities.10 Some nations that the United States has approached for assistance ( e.g. Turkey, Pakistan, India, and Japan) have indicated that their participation would be dependent upon, at a minimum, a United Nations resolution authorizing operations in Iraq. Unlike stabilization operations in Bosnia and Kosovo, where contributing nations assume the cost of their troop deployments, in Iraq the United States is assuming much of the cost for non-U.S. force deployments. In July, Deputy Secretary of Defense Wolfowitz estimated that maintenance of 15,000 foreign troops for six months would cost $276 million. The President’s FY2004 supplemental budget request includes $1.4 billion for the support of non-U.S. forces, however this amount also includes funding for operations outside Iraq, and the Administration has not released a break-out of funding specifically for non-U.S. forces in Iraq.11 Additional funds dedicated to the transport and maintenance of non-U.S. forces may also be included in the Operations and Maintenance accounts of the individual armed services. Costs Predicting the cost of military operations is a task that DOD did not undertake prior to the peace-keeping deployments to the Balkans, and it remains a somewhat conjectural exercise. Learning from the attempts to estimate costs for military 10 “G.I.’s Doubt Foreign Troops Readiness”, Chicago Tribune. September 7, 2003. p. 1. 11 “Cost of Non-U.S. Troops in Iraq Has Become Fuzzy”, Wall Street Journal. September 26, 2003; Presidential Communication to Congress, September 17, 2003. CRS-8 operations in the Balkans and elsewhere, DOD has now developed a computer model based upon previous actual costs (Contingency Operations Support Tool). Though initially Secretary Rumsfeld expressed his opinion that “it is unknowable what a war or conflict like that would cost”, in early 2003 he estimated a cost of under $50 billion. Other DOD officials anticipated an $80-85 billion cost, assuming a 6-month follow-on occupation.12 On March 25, 2003 The Administration submitted a $74.7 billion FY2003 supplemental appropriations request, of which $62.6 billion was for Department of Defense expenses related to the war in Iraq through September 2003. Specifically, this request included funds for preparatory costs incurred, costs associated with military operations, replenishing munitions, and funds to support other nations. The Administration stated that this supplemental request was “built on the key assumption that U.S. military action in Iraq will be swift and decisive.”13 Both the House and Senate approved the legislative conference report to H.R. 1559 (H.Rept. 108-76), which provided $62.37 billion. DOD now estimates that Iraq military operations are costing $3.9 billion a month. On September 17, President Bush submitted an $87 billion emergency FY2004 supplemental budget request, of which $51.8 billion is for military operations in Iraq (Operations and Maintenance- $32.3; Personnel $18.5). (For a detailed discussion, see CRS Report RL32090 — FY2004 Supplemental Appropriations for Iraq, Afghanistan, and the Global War on Terrorism: Military Operations & Reconstruction Assistance) Prior to the war, a number of cost estimates were put forward. Michael O’Hanlon of the Brookings Institution, pegged a 250,000-strong invasion at between $40-$50 billion with a follow-up occupation costing $10-$20 billion a year. Former White House economic advisor Lawrence Lindsay estimated the high limit on the cost to be 1-2% of GNP, or about $100-$200 billion. Mitch Daniels, Director of the Office of Management and Budget subsequently discounted this estimate as “very, very high”, and stated that the costs would be between$50-$60 billion, though no specific supporting figures were provided for the estimate.14 In its most recent cost estimate, the Congressional Budget Office put deployment costs at about $14 billion, with combat operations costing $10 billion for the first month and $8 billion a month thereafter. CBO cited the cost of returning combat forces to home bases at $9 billion, and the costs of continued occupation of Iraq to run between $1-4 billion.15 The American Academy of Arts and Sciences has published a much more wide- ranging report which covers the possibility of an extended occupation, in addition to 12 “War Could Cost More Than $40 billion”, Knight-Ridder Wire Service, September 18, 2002; “Iraq War Costs Could Soar, Pentagon Says”, Los Angeles Times, February 26, 2003. 13 Office of Management and Budget, Press Release No. 2003-6, March 25, 2002. 14 Bumiller, Elisabeth. “Budget Director Lowers Estimate of Cost of War”, New York Times, December 31, 2002. p. 1 15 Congressional Budget Office. An Analysis of the President’s Budgetary Proposals for Fiscal Year 2004: An Interim Report. March 2003 CRS-9 potential long-term economic consequences and concludes that potential costs could range from $99 billion to $1.2 trillion.16 For comparison, the cost to the United States of the Persian Gulf War in 1990-91 was approximately $60 billion, and almost all of this cost was offset by international financial contributions.17 Legislation P.L. 108-87, H.R. 2658 Makes appropriations for the Department of Defense for the fiscal year ending September 30, 2004, and for other purposes. Introduced July 2, 2003. Enacted into law September 30, 2003. H.R. 1588 (Hunter) Authorizes appropriations for fiscal year 2004 for military activities of the Department of Defense, for military construction, and for defense activities of the Department of Energy; prescribes personnel strengths for such fiscal year for the Armed Forces, and contains provisions for other purposes. Introduced April 3, 2003. In House/Senate Conference September 25, 2003. H.R. 3132 (Thompson, Mike) Requires amounts appropriated under any Act making emergency supplemental appropriations for the reconstruction of Iraq and Afghanistan and the war on terrorism for fiscal year 2004 to be made available in allotments and in accordance with certain reporting requirements. Introduced September 17, 2003; referred to Committees on International Relations, and Armed Services September 17, 2003. S. 1689 (Stevens) An original bill making emergency supplemental appropriations for Iraq and Afghanistan security and reconstruction for the fiscal year ending September 30, 2004, and for other purposes. Introduced September 30, 2003; laid before the Senate October 1, 2003. Additional Reading CRS Report RL31339, Iraq: U.S. Regime Change Efforts and Post-War Governance. CRS Report RL31871, Post-War Iraq: Potential Issues Raised by Previous Occupation and Peacekeeping Experiences. 16 War with Iraq: Costs, Consequences, and Alternatives. American Academy of Arts and Sciences. Dec. 2002. [http://www.amacad.org/publications/monographs/Iraq_Press.pdf] 17 Persian Gulf War: U.S. Costs and Allied Financial Contributions. CRS Issue Brief IB91019. September 1992. CRS-10 CRS Report RS21404, U.S. Occupation of Iraq? Issues Raised by Experiences in Japan and Germany. CRS Report RL31763, Iraq: Summary of U.S. Forces. For a full listing of available CRS reports concerning Iraq, see the CRS homepage: [http://www.congress.gov/erp/legissues/html/isfar12.html]

Order Code RL31701 CRS Report for Congress Received through the CRS Web Iraq: U.S. Military Operations Updated August 4, 2003 Steve Bowman Specialist in National Defense Foreign Affairs, Defense, and Trade Division Congressional Research Service ̃ The Library of Congress Iraq: U.S. Military Operations Summary Iraq’s chemical, biological, and nuclear weapons programs, together with Iraqi long-range missile development and support for terrorism, are the primary justifications put forward for military action. On March 17, 2003 President Bush issued an ultimatum demanding that Saddam Hussein and his sons depart from Iraq within 48 hours. On March 19, offensive operations began with air strikes against Iraqi leadership positions. By April 15, after 27 days of operations, coalition forces were in relative control of all major Iraqi cities and Iraqi political and military leadership had disintegrated. On May 1, President Bush declared an end to major combat operations. There was no use of chemical or biological (CB)weapons, and no CB weapons stockpiles have been found. The major challenges to coalition forces are now quelling a persistent Iraqi resistance movement, restoring of civil order, and providing basic services to the urban population. U.S. troops continue to come under sporadic attacks, primarily in central Iraq. Though initially denying that these attacks were the work of an organized resistance movement, DOD officials have now acknowledged there is at least regional organization, with apparently ample supplies of arms and funding. CENTCOM commander Gen. Abizaid, has characterized the Iraqi resistance as “ a classical guerrilla-type campaign. DOD believes the resistance to comprise primarily former regime supporters, however others are concerned that growing resentment of coalition forces and resurgent Iraq nationalism, independent of connections with the earlier regime, may be contributing to the resistance. As of August 4, 250 U.S. troops have died in Iraq operations. Of these deaths, 114 have occurred since May 1, 2003. Approximately 148,000U.S. troops are in Iraq. DOD’s most recent statement, on July 15, reports that there are 13,273 non-US troops in Iraq from 19 countries, and that an additional 14 countries are committed to deploy another 12,000 troops during the course of the year. The DOD has not, however, released an official and current list of these nations and their contributions. A range of press reports, based upon unattributed DOD statements, have indicated that those nations contributing over a 1,000 troops include: Poland, Spain, the Netherlands, Italy, and the Ukraine. Poland will assume command of an international division that will be based in Karbala, and Spain is to command an hispanic division which will include troops from Central American and Caribbean countries. Nations that have been reported in the press to be contributing troops include: Azerbaijan, Bulgaria, the Czech Republic, Denmark, the Dominican Republic, El Salvador, Estonia, Georgia (Gruzia) Honduras, Hungary, Japan, Kazakhstan, Latvia, Lithuania, Macedonia, Mongolia, Nicaragua, Norway, Portugal, Romania, and Slovakia Congress approved a $62.37 billion FY2003 supplemental budget request for Iraq operations (H.Rept. 108-76), and DOD currently estimates the cost of operations to be $3.9 billion per month. Iraq operations’ costs are not included in the FY2004 DOD budget, and will be addressed through supplemental budget requests. This report will be updated as events warrant. Contents Background . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1 Military Planning & Combat Operations . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1 Options Considered . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 2 Combat Operations Prior to May 1, 2003 . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 3 Post-May, 2003 Operations . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 4 Costs . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 7 Iraq: U.S. Military Operations Background Iraq’s chemical, biological, and nuclear weapons programs, together with Iraqi long-range missile development, and support for terrorism are the primary justifications put forward by the Bush Administration for military action. Since Iraq originally ended cooperation with U.N. inspectors in 1998, there has been little information on the state of Iraq’s weapons of mass destruction (WMD) arsenal; however, Administration officials are convinced that Iraq has reconstituted significant capabilities. Initially, leading Administration officials, most notably Vice- President Cheney, Defense Secretary Rumsfeld, and his Deputy Paul Wolfowitz, stressed that “regime change” or the removal of Saddam Hussein from power. Later in 2002, WMD disarmament was emphasized as the primary objective. Expanding on this theme, President Bush, in his speech before the United Nations on September 12, 2002 specified the following conditions for Iraq to meet to forestall military action against it: ! Immediately and unconditionally forswear, disclose, and remove or destroy all weapons of mass destruction, long-range missiles, and all related material. ! End all support for terrorism and act to suppress it. ! Cease persecution of its civilian population. ! Release or account for all Gulf War missing personnel. ! End all illicit trade outside the oil-for-food program and allow United Nations administration of its funds.1 On March 17, 2003 President Bush issued an ultimatum demanding that Saddam Hussein and his sons depart from Iraq within 48 hours. On March 19, offensive operations commenced with air strikes against Iraqi leadership positions. Military Planning & Combat Operations The Department of Defense officially released limited official information concerning war planning or preparations against Iraq prior to the onset of offensive operations. There were, however, frequent and significant news leaks which provided a range of details. News reports indicated that the military options that were under discussion varied significantly in their assumptions regarding Iraq military capabilities, the usefulness of Iraqi opposition groups, the attitude of regional governments, and the U.S. military resources that would be required. 1 President Bush’s Address to the U.N. General Assembly, September 12, 2002. CRS-2 Options Considered In the wake of the successful operations in Afghanistan against the Taliban, some Administration officials advocated a similar operation, entailing use of special operations forces in cooperation with indigenous Iraqi opposition forces, coupled with an extensive air offensive to destroy Hussein’s most reliable Republican Guard units, command & control centers, and WMD capabilities. This approach assumed that the regular Iraqi army would prove unreliable, and could even join opposition forces once it is clear that defeat is imminent. To encourage this, significant emphasis would be placed on an intensive psychological warfare or “psyops” campaign to undermine the morale of Iraqi soldiers and unit commanders, persuading them of the hopelessness of resistance.2 While having the advantage of not requiring large staging areas (though some regional air basing would be required) or months to prepare, this was generally considered the riskiest approach. The weakness of Iraqi opposition military forces and their competing political agendas place their effectiveness in question, and predicting the behavior of regular Iraqi Army units under attack is problematic. This option also did not address the possibility of stiff resistance by Republican Guard units in the environs of Baghdad, nor the troop requirements of a post-conflict occupation. This “lite” option stood in contrast to the operations plan originally offered by U.S. Central Command. This option, often called the “Franks Plan”, after Army Gen. Tommy Franks, the U.S. Central Command (CENTCOM) commander who first briefed it to the President, calls for a large-scale ground force invasion. News reports initially indicated, however, that this “heavy” approach did not receive the support of the DOD civilian leadership or White House advisors. Questions over the reliability of the regional support that would be necessary for staging areas and the length of time required for deployment were the major concerns.3 However, the White House rejection of the “Franks Plan” came prior to the decision to take the Iraq issue to the United Nations Security Council. When it became clear that Security Council deliberations and the re-introduction of U.N. inspectors to Iraq could delay the possibility of military action for several months, it was apparently decided that this interlude would allow time both to negotiate regional cooperation and to deploy more substantial forces to the Persian Gulf region, and military operations today appear to adhere closer to CENTCOM’s original recommendations. As the ground force offensive has slowed, however, there was increasing criticism of DOD’s civilian leadership for not permitting the deployment of even more ground forces prior to onset of operations.4 2 “Timing, Tactics on Iraq War Disputed; Top Bush Officials Criticize Generals' Conventional Views “, Washington Post, August 1, 2002. p. 1 3 “The Iraq Build-up, II”, National Journal, October 5, 2002. p. 2866. 4 “Rumsfeld’s Role as War Strategist Under Scrutiny”, Reuters, March 30, 2003. CRS-3 Combat Operations Prior to May 1, 2003 Offensive operations combined an air offensive and simultaneous ground offensive, in contrast to the 1991 campaign which saw weeks of air attacks to soften Iraqi resistance. U.S. Central Command’s operational plan employed a smaller ground force than the 1991 Desert Storm operation, reflecting an assessment that Iraqi armed forces were neither as numerous nor as capable as they were ten years ago, and that U.S. forces are significantly more capable. This option depended upon the continued cooperation of regional nations for substantial staging areas/airbases and required months to deploy the necessary forces. Though press reports differed somewhat, reportedly over 340,000 U.S. military personnel were in the Persian Gulf region (ashore and afloat). The 3rd Mechanized Infantry Division, the 101st Airborne Division (Air Assault) , the 7th Cavalry Regiment, and the 1st Marine Expeditionary Force formed the bulk of the U.S. ground offensive. The 4th Mechanized Infantry Division arrived late in theater. Ships bearing its equipment remained off Turkey for weeks awaiting the outcome of negotiations to permit establishing a northern front attacking from Turkey, and then were diverted to the Persian Gulf when these negotiations fell through. The U.S. Navy deployed five of its twelve naval aircraft carrier battle groups. The Air Force had approximately 15 air wings operating in the region. Strategic bombers operated from the British airbase at Diego Garcia, and airbases in the Middle East, Europe, and the United States. The United Kingdom deployed over 47,000 personnel, including a naval task force, an armored task force, a Royal Marine brigade, a parachute brigade, a Special Air Service regiment, and a Special Boat Squadron. The majority of these British forces were engaged in southeastern Iraq, securing the Umm Qasr and Basra region. Australia deployed approximately 2,000 personnel, primarily special operations personnel, and one F/A-18 attack aircraft squadron. Poland had 200 special operations troops around Basra. (For more detailed information, see CRS Report RL31763, Iraq: A Summary of U.S. Forces and CRS Report RL31843, Iraq Foreign Stances Toward U.S. Policy) The invasion of Iraq was expected to begin with a 72-96 hour air offensive to paralyze the Iraqi command structure, and demoralize Iraqi resistance across the military-civilian spectrum. Intelligence reports indicating the possibility of striking Saddam Hussein and his immediate circle led to an acceleration of the operations plan, and an almost simultaneously onset of air and ground offensive operations. CENTCOM air commanders stressed that significant efforts would be made to minimize civilian casualties and damage to Iraqi physical infrastructure, and they were mostly successful in this effort. With twenty-five days of offensive operations, coalition forces had relative control of all major Iraqi cities, including Baghdad, Basra, Mosul, Kirkuk, and Tikrit. CENTCOM pursued a strategy of rapid advance, by-passing urban centers when possible, pausing only when encountering Iraqi resistance. CENTCOM spokesmen characterized Iraqi resistance as sporadic and uncohesive. Oilfields and port facilities throughout Iraq were secured, as have all major air bases in Iraq. Though a few oil wells were set afire, all were quelled, and there has been no widespread environmental sabotage. Allied forces did not encounter the mass surrenders characteristic of the 1991 campaign, however DOD reported that over 6,000 Iraqis CRS-4 were taken prisoner, and believes that many more have simply deserted their positions. Iraqi paramilitary forces, particularly the Saddam Fedayeen, engaged in guerrilla-style attacks from urban centers in the rear areas, but did not inflict significant damage. Nevertheless, greater attention than anticipated had to be paid to protecting extended supply lines, and securing these urban centers, particularly around an-Nasiriyah and Najaf, and in the British sector around Umm Qasr and Basra. Though CENTCOM commanders expressed confidence in the adequacy of their force structure in theater, the Iraqi attacks in rear areas and the length of the supply lines to forward units led some to suggest that insufficient ground forces were in place to continue the offensive while securing rear areas and ensuring uninterrupted logistical support. These critics faulted DOD civilian leadership for overestimating the effectiveness of a precision air offensive and curtailing the deployment of more ground troops, suggesting that an ideological commitment to smaller ground forces and greater reliance on high-tech weaponry had dominated military planning.5 With collapse of the Iraqi regime, however, this criticism muted. Without permission to use Turkish territory, CENTCOM was unable to carry out an early ground offensive in Northern Iraq. However, Special operations forces, the 173rd Airborne Brigade, and air-lifted U.S. armor, operating with Kurdish irregulars seized Mosul, Kirkuk, and Tikrit. Cooperation with Kurdish militias in the north has been excellent. Even a mistaken airstrike against a allied Kurdish vehicle convoy, killing or wounding senior Kurdish leaders, did not adversely affect this cooperation. Potentially complicating the situation in the north, was a Turkish desire to possibly augment the 8,000+ troops it has had stationed in Kurdish-held territory in order to block possible Kurdish refugees and influence the accommodations made to the Kurds in a post-conflict Iraq. Turkish miliary spokesmen have indicated that no additional Turkish forces will move into Iraq at this time. The U.S. has assured Turkey that the Kurdish forces involved in seizing Mosul and Kirkuk would be withdrawn and replaced with U.S. troops. Post-May, 2003 Operations With the onset of widespread looting and the breakdown of public services (electricity, water) in the cities, coalition forces were confronted with the challenges of restoring public order and infrastructure even before combat operations ceased. Though U.S. forces have come under criticism for not having done more to prevent looting, the transition from combat to police roles is a difficult one, particularly when an important objective is winning popular support. Harsh reactions risk alienation of the population, yet inaction reduces confidence in the ability of coalition forces to maintain order. Indicative of the seriousness of the civil disorder, U.S. officials in Iraq authorized U.S. troops to shoot looters if necessary.6 In addition to looting, 5 “Questions Raised About Invasion Force”, Washington Post, March 25, 2003. p. 17 6 “U.S. Military Chief Vows More Troops to Quell Iraqi Looting”, New York Times, May (continued...) CRS-5 coalition forces also have to ensure that factional violence and does not derail stabilization efforts. CENTCOM headquarters intends to “greatly increase” the number of troops patrolling Iraqi cities.7 U.S. forces, however, are spread relatively thin throughout Iraq, it is clear that additional troops in theater could improve the pace and breadth of stabilization operations. The question of how many military personnel will be required for stabilization operations has been a subject of controversy since well before the onset of operations. This controversy reflects the great difficulty in predicting how the political and military situation in post-war Iraq will evolve, and how long a military presence would be required before an acceptable and stable Iraqi government can be established. The attitude of the Iraq population is the key element, and will depend upon a variety of factors, such as the nature and extent of war damage, the demands of ethnic and religious minorities, and the speed with which a credible government can be established. A short-term post-war occupation was a possibility, however given that so far the Iraqi population has not demonstrated an unqualified acceptance of coalition forces, it is now considered likely that a continued deployment of substantial military ground forces will be necessary for several years. For comparison, in the relatively benign environment and considerably smaller areas of Bosnia and Kosovo, after eight years of peacekeeping operations, NATO still maintains a deployment of about 60,000 troops. Coalition troops continue to come under sporadic attacks, primarily in central Iraq. Though casualties have been relatively light, the potential for attack affects the pace and mode of reconstruction and stabilization operations. Troops must assume a potentially hostile environment, yet avoid incidents or actions that would erode popular support. In addition to attacks, there have been attacks on infrastructure targets (e.g., oil/gas pipelines, electrical power stations and lines) hindering efforts to restore basic services to the civilian population. Attacks on oil pipelines also threatens to further delay the use of Iraqi oil exports to fund reconstruction programs. Though it is virtually impossible to fully protect these pipelines from sabotage, it is hoped that ongoing efforts to recruit a civilian Iraqi militia will provide coalition troops some assistance in this mission. Though initially denying that these attacks were the work of an organized resistance movement, DOD officials have now acknowledged there is at least regional organization, with apparently ample supplies of arms and funding. CENTCOM commander Gen. Abizaid, has characterized the Iraqi resistance as “ a classical guerrilla-type campaign.8 DOD believes the resistance to comprise primarily former regime supporters such Baathist party members, Republican Guard soldiers, and paramilitary personnel. However, others are concerned that growing resentment of coalition forces and resurgent Iraq nationalism, independent of 6 (...continued) 15. p. 21. 7 Ibid. 8 DOD New Briefing July 16, 2003. CRS-6 connections with the earlier regime, may be contributing to the resistance.9 There are also reports of bounties of from $1,000-$5,000 being offered for killing coalition troops, taking advantage of the severe economic dislocation which has many Iraqis with no regular income. Captured documents have given some indication that preparations for a resistance movement were made prior to the war, including the caching of arms and money. In response to these attacks on coalition forces, CENTCOM has undertaken operations to locate and detain suspected resistance members. These operations have resulted in the detention of hundreds of individuals, the capture of some high-ranking officials of the former regime, the seizure of very substantial caches of weapons and money, and the deaths of Saddam Hussein’s sons. The continued Iraqi armed resistance has reinvigorated the debate over whether the United States has committed sufficient troops to the Iraqi operation. The rapid success of the combat offensive quieted critics who argued that a substantially larger ground force should have been deployed, but the question is now being raised whether a more robust military presence in Iraq is needed to bring stability. Secretary Rumsfeld and out-going CENTCOM commander Gen. Franks both maintained in congressional testimony that the number of troops in Iraq is adequate for the mission, though CENTCOM is currently reviewing troop requirements under its new commander, Gen. Abizaid. If it is decided that additional forces are required, this will present a challenge to the Army. Of its 33 combat brigades, 16 are already deployed in Iraq, and but three of the remaining brigades have assigned missions (e.g., Afghanistan, the Balkans, Korea) or are in strategic reserve. Thus, even at current levels, troop rotation has proven problematic. This was demonstrated when two brigades of the 3rd Infantry Division had their return to the United States postponed for the second time until an indefinite date in the Fall. DOD has now prepared a rotation plan for duty tours in Iraq, which calls for units to spend a one- year tour of duty in the region. It will, however, require greater use of National Guard and Reserve units, and may increase the participation of U.S. Marine units in stabilization operations. The possible need for additional troops in Iraq has rekindled the debate over whether the U.S. Army personnel end-strength should be increased. Currently, the congressionally mandated end-strength is 480,000. In reporting the FY2004 Defense Authorization Act, the House Armed Services Committee noted the “inadequacy of military manpower, especially active component end-strength, as indicated in the need to activate 33,000 reservists annually”. The report further noted that the Army had estimated its manpower shortfall to be between 41,000 to 123,000 personnel. DOD’s civilian leadership intends to address shortfalls in specific functions by moving personnel from lower priority assignments, and by increasing the use of civilians in some functional areas to free up active duty military personnel. The newly confirmed Army Chief of Staff, Gen. Schoomaker, has indicated that a further review of Army personnel requirements is underway, and will provide recommendations in the context of the FY2005 DOD budget request. 9 “Iraqis Skeptical Over U.S. Explanation for Continuing Attacks on Coalition”, London Financial Times, August 4, 2003. p. 5. CRS-7 A key element in the Defense Department’s consideration of troop requirements in Iraq is the willingness of other nations to contribute ground forces. DOD’s most recent statement, on July 15, reports that there are 13,273 non-US troops in Iraq from 19 countries, and that an additional 14 countries are committed to deploy another 12,000 troops during the course of the year. DOD has not, however, released an official and current list of these nations and their contributions. A range of press reports, based upon unattributed DOD officials, have indicated that those nations contributing over a 1,000 troops include: Poland, Spain, The Netherlands, Italy, and the Ukraine. Poland will assume command of an international division that will assume responsibility for southwestern Iraq, and Spain is to command an hispanic division which will include troops from Central American and Caribbean countries. Nations that have been reported in the press to be contributing troops include: Azerbaijan, Bulgaria, the Czech Republic, Denmark, the Dominican Republic, El Salvador, Estonia, Georgia (Gruzia) Honduras, Hungary, Japan, Kazakhstan, Latvia, Lithuania, Macedonia, Mongolia, Nicaragua, Norway, Portugal, Romania, and Slovakia. Costs Predicting the cost of military operations is a task that DOD did not undertake prior to the peace-keeping deployments to the Balkans, and it remains a highly conjectural exercise. Methodologies tend to be relatively crude and based upon historical experience, i.e., “the last war”. Though initially Secretary Rumsfeld expressed his opinion that “it is unknowable what a war or conflict like that would cost”, in early 2003 he estimated a cost of under $50 billion. Other DOD officials anticipated an $80-85 billion cost, assuming a 6-month follow-on occupation.10 On March 25, 2003 The Administration submitted a $74.7 billion FY2003 supplemental appropriations request, of which $62.6 billion was for Department of Defense expenses related to the war in Iraq through September 2003. Specifically, this request included funds for preparatory costs incurred, costs associated with military operations, replenishing munitions, and funds to support other nations. The Administration stated that this supplemental request was “built on the key assumption that U.S. military action in Iraq will be swift and decisive.”11 Both the House and Senate approved the legislative conference report to H.R. 1559 (H.Rept. 108-76), which provided $62.37 billion. DOD now estimates that Iraq military operations are costing $3.9 billion a month, but has declined to offer any long-term estimates of funding requirements. Prior to the war, a number of cost estimates were put forward. Michael O’Hanlon of the Brookings Institution, pegged a 250,000-strong invasion at between $40-$50 billion with a follow-up occupation costing $10-$20 billion a year. Former 10 “War Could Cost More Than $40 billion”, Knight-Ridder Wire Service, September 18, 2002; “Iraq War Costs Could Soar, Pentagon Says”, Los Angeles Times, February 26, 2003. 11 Office of Management and Budget, Press Release No. 2003-6, March 25, 2002. CRS-8 White House economic advisor Lawrence Lindsay estimated the high limit on the cost to be 1-2% of GNP, or about $100-$200 billion. Mitch Daniels, Director of the Office of Management and Budget subsequently discounted this estimate as “very, very high”, and stated that the costs would be between$50-$60 billion, though no specific supporting figures were provided for the estimate.12 In its most recent cost estimate, the Congressional Budget Office put deployment costs at about $14 billion, with combat operations costing $10 billion for the first month and $8 billion a month thereafter. CBO cited the cost of returning combat forces to home bases at $9 billion, and the costs of continued occupation of Iraq to run between $1-4 billion.13 The American Academy of Arts and Sciences has published a much more wide- ranging report which covers the possibility of an extended occupation, in addition to potential long-term economic consequences and concludes that potential costs could range from $99 billion to $1.2 trillion.14 For comparison, the cost to the United States of the Persian Gulf War in 1990-91 was approximately $60 billion, and almost all of this cost was offset by international financial contributions.15 12 Bumiller, Elisabeth. “Budget Director Lowers Estimate of Cost of War”, New York Times, December 31, 2002. p. 1 13 Congressional Budget Office. An Analysis of the President’s Budgetary Proposals for Fiscal Year 2004: An Interim Report. March 2003 14 War with Iraq: Costs, Consequences, and Alternatives. American Academy of Arts and Sciences. Dec. 2002. [http://www.amacad.org/publications/monographs/Iraq_Press.pdf] 15 Persian Gulf War: U.S. Costs and Allied Financial Contributions. CRS Issue Brief IB91019. September 1992.

Order Code RL31701 Report for Congress Received through the CRS Web Iraq: U.S. Military Operations Updated May 14, 2003 Steve Bowman Specialist in National Defense Foreign Affairs, Defense, and Trade Division Congressional Research Service ̃ The Library of Congress Iraq: U.S. Military Operations Summary Iraq’s chemical, biological, and nuclear weapons programs, together with Iraqi long-range missile development and support for terrorism, are the primary justifications put forward for military action. On March 17, 2003 President Bush issued an ultimatum demanding that Saddam Hussein and his sons depart from Iraq within 48 hours. On March 19, offensive operations began with air strikes against Iraqi leadership positions. By April 15, after 27 days of operations, coalition forces were in relative control of all major Iraqi cities. Iraqi political and military leadership had disintegrated. The major challenge to coalition forces is now the restoration of civil order and the provision of basic services to the urban population. As the U.S. ground offensive approached Baghdad, DOD civilian leadership came under criticism for not permitting the deployment of sufficient U.S. ground forces to maintain the offensive, protect lines of supply, and secure rear areas where sporadic Iraqi resistance continues. With the fall of Baghdad, Mosul, and Kirkuk, this criticism muted. There was no use of chemical or biological (CB)weapons, and no CB weapons stockpiles have been found, though two mobile labs believed to be biological agent production facilities have been discovered. Though press reports differ somewhat, and DOD has not released official figures, it appears that over 300,000 U.S. military personnel are in the Persian Gulf region (ashore and afloat). Ground forces include the 3rd Infantry Division, the 101st Airborne Division, the 7th Cavalry Regiment, and the 1st Marine Expeditionary Force. The U.S. Navy is sending two aircraft carrier battle groups back to their home station, leaving three in the region. The Air Force is recalling some of the 15 air wings in the region, and strategic bombers are operating from the British airbase at Diego Garcia, and airbases in the Middle East, Europe , and the United States. (See CRS Report RL31763, Iraq: A Summary of U.S. Forces.) The United Kingdom deployed an task force of approximately 47,000 troops. Australia deployed 2,000 troops, and 200 Polish special operations forces are also engaged. Key arrangements for the use of regional military facilities are in place with Kuwait, Bahrain, Qatar, and Oman. Saudi Arabia is permitting limited overflight rights and use of air command centers, and Turkey has granted limited overflight rights and permission for humanitarian aid transit. (See CRS Report RL31843, Iraq Foreign Stances Toward US. Policy). The Administration submitted a $62.6 billion FY2003 DOD supplemental appropriation request for military operations. The House and Senate have approved the conference report (H.Rept. 108-76) to H.R. 1559 granting $62.37 billion of the request. This report will be updated as events warrant. Contents Background . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1 Military Planning and Operations Options Considered Combat Operations . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1 . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 2 . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 3 Issues for Consideration . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 5 Roles and Attitudes of Other Nations . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 5 Improved U.S. Military Technology . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 7 Chemical and Biological Weapons . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 7 Post-War Requirements . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 9 Costs . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 10 Iraq: U.S. Military Operations Background Iraq’s chemical, biological, and nuclear weapons programs, together with Iraqi long-range missile development, and support for terrorism are the primary justifications put forward by the Bush Administration for military action. Since Iraq originally ended cooperation with U.N. inspectors in 1998, there has been little information on the state of Iraq’s weapons of mass destruction (WMD) arsenal; however, Administration officials are convinced that Iraq has reconstituted significant capabilities. Initially, leading Administration officials, most notably Vice- President Cheney, Defense Secretary Rumsfeld, and his Deputy Paul Wolfowitz, stressed that “regime change” or the removal of Saddam Hussein from power. Later in 2002, WMD disarmament was emphasized as the primary objective. Expanding on this theme, President Bush, in his speech before the United Nations on September 12, 2002 specified the following conditions for Iraq to meet to forestall military action against it: ! Immediately and unconditionally forswear, disclose, and remove or destroy all weapons of mass destruction, long-range missiles, and all related material. ! End all support for terrorism and act to suppress it. ! Cease persecution of its civilian population. ! Release or account for all Gulf War missing personnel. ! End all illicit trade outside the oil-for-food program and allow United Nations administration of its funds.1 On March 17, 2003 President Bush issued an ultimatum demanding that Saddam Hussein and his sons depart from Iraq within 48 hours. On March 19, offensive operations commenced with air strikes against Iraqi leadership positions. Military Planning and Operations The Department of Defense officially released limited official information concerning war planning or preparations against Iraq prior to the onset of offensive operations. There were, however, frequent and significant news leaks which provided a range of details. News reports indicated that the military options that were under discussion varied significantly in their assumptions regarding Iraq military capabilities, the usefulness of Iraqi opposition groups, the attitude of regional governments, and the U.S. military resources that would be required. 1 President Bush’s Address to the U.N. General Assembly, September 12, 2002. CRS-2 Options Considered In the wake of the successful operations in Afghanistan against the Taliban, some Administration officials advocated a similar operation, entailing use of special operations forces in cooperation with indigenous Iraqi opposition forces, coupled with an extensive air offensive to destroy Hussein’s most reliable Republican Guard units, command & control centers, and WMD capabilities. This approach assumed that the regular Iraqi army would prove unreliable, and could even join opposition forces once it is clear that defeat is imminent. To encourage this, significant emphasis would be placed on an intensive psychological warfare or “psyops” campaign to undermine the morale of Iraqi soldiers and unit commanders, persuading them of the hopelessness of resistance.2 While having the advantage of not requiring large staging areas (though some regional air basing would be required) or months to prepare, this was generally considered the riskiest approach. The weakness of Iraqi opposition military forces and their competing political agendas place their effectiveness in question, and predicting the behavior of regular Iraqi Army units under attack is problematic. This option also did not address the possibility of stiff resistance by Republican Guard units in the environs of Baghdad, nor the troop requirements of a post-conflict occupation. This “lite” option stood in contrast to the operations plan originally offered by U.S. Central Command. This option, often called the “Franks Plan”, after Army Gen. Tommy Franks, the U.S. Central Command (CENTCOM) commander who first briefed it to the President, calls for a large-scale ground force invasion. News reports initially indicated, however, that this “heavy” approach did not receive the support of the DOD civilian leadership or White House advisors. Questions over the reliability of the regional support that would be necessary for staging areas and the length of time required for deployment were the major concerns.3 However, the White House rejection of the “Franks Plan” came prior to the decision to take the Iraq issue to the United Nations Security Council. When it became clear that Security Council deliberations and the re-introduction of U.N. inspectors to Iraq could delay the possibility of military action for several months, it was apparently decided that this interlude would allow time both to negotiate regional cooperation and to deploy more substantial forces to the Persian Gulf region, and military operations today appear to adhere closer to CENTCOM’s original recommendations. As the ground force offensive has slowed, however, there is now increasing criticism of DOD’s civilian leadership for not permitting the deployment of even more ground forces prior to onset of operations.4 2 “Timing, Tactics on Iraq War Disputed; Top Bush Officials Criticize Generals' Conventional Views “, Washington Post, August 1, 2002. p. 1 3 “The Iraq Build-up, II”, National Journal, October 5, 2002. p. 2866. 4 “Rumsfeld’s Role as War Strategist Under Scrutiny”, Reuters, March 30, 2003. CRS-3 Combat Operations Offensive operations combined an air offensive and simultaneous ground offensive, in contrast to the 1991 campaign which saw weeks of air attacks to soften Iraqi resistance. U.S. Central Command’s operational plan employed a smaller ground force than the 1991 Desert Storm operation, reflecting an assessment that Iraqi armed forces were neither as numerous nor as capable as they were ten years ago, and that U.S. forces are significantly more capable. This option depended upon the continued cooperation of regional nations for substantial staging areas/airbases and required months to deploy the necessary forces. Though press reports differ somewhat, it appears that over 340,000 U.S. military personnel are in the Persian Gulf region (ashore and afloat) and more en route. The 3rd Mechanized Infantry Division, the 101st Airborne Division (Air Assault) , the 7th Cavalry Regiment, and the 1st Marine Expeditionary Force formed the bulk of the U.S. ground offensive. The 4th Mechanized Infantry Division arrived late in theater. Ships bearing its equipment remained off Turkey for weeks awaiting the outcome of negotiations to permit establishing a northern front attacking from Turkey, and then were diverted to the Persian Gulf when these negotiations fell through. The 1st Cavalry Division, 1st Armored Division, and 1st Mechanized Infantry Division were all alerted for deployment, but reportedly most elements of these divisions remained at home bases in Europe and the United States. Some aviation and armor elements of the 1st Air Cavalry and 1st Armored Division were, however, deployed The U.S. Navy deployed five of its twelve naval aircraft carrier battle groups, and has now ordered two of these to return to home stations. The Air Force had approximately 15 air wings operating in the region, but many of these aircraft have returned to home bases. Strategic bombers operated from the British airbase at Diego Garcia, and airbases in the Middle East, Europe , and the United States. The United Kingdom deployed over 47,000 personnel, including a naval task force, an armored task force, a Royal Marine brigade, a parachute brigade, a Special Air Service regiment, and a Special Boat Squadron. The majority of these British forces are engaged in southeastern Iraq, securing the Umm Qasr and Basra region. Australia deployed approximately 2,000 personnel, primarily special operations personnel , and one F/A- 18 attack aircraft squadron, most of whom have now returned to Australia. Poland has 200 special operations troops around Basra. (For more detailed information, see CRS Report RL31763, Iraq: A Summary of U.S. Forces and CRS Report RL31843, Iraq Foreign Stances Toward US. Policy) The invasion of Iraq was expected to begin with a 72-96 hour air offensive to paralyze the Iraqi command structure, and demoralize Iraqi resistance across the military-civilian spectrum. Intelligence reports indicating the possibility of striking Saddam Hussein and his immediate circle led to an acceleration of the operations plan, and an almost simultaneously onset of air and ground offensive operations. CENTCOM air commanders have stressed that significant efforts would be made to minimize civilian casualties and damage to Iraqi physical infrastructure. With twenty-five days of offensive operations, coalition forces had relative control of all major Iraqi cities, including Baghdad, Basra, Mosul, Kirkuk, and Tikrit. The Iraqi political and military leadership had disintegrated, although the CRS-4 whereabouts of many senior leaders, including Saddam Hussein, remain unknown. CENTCOM pursued a strategy of rapid advance, by-passing urban centers when possible, pausing only when encountering Iraqi resistance. CENTCOM spokesmen characterized Iraqi resistance as sporadic and uncohesive. Oilfields and port facilities throughout Iraq have been secured, as have all major air bases in Iraq. Though a few oil wells were set afire, all were quelled, and there has been no widespread environmental sabotage. Allied forces did not encounter the mass surrenders characteristic of the 1991 campaign, however DOD reported that over 6,000 Iraqis were taken prisoner, and believes that many more have simply deserted their positions. Iraqi paramilitary forces, particularly the Saddam Fedayeen, engaged in guerrilla-style attacks from urban centers in the rear areas, but did not inflict significant damage. Nevertheless, greater attention than anticipated had to be paid to protecting extended supply lines, and securing these urban centers, particularly around an-Nasiriyah and Najaf, and in the British sector around Umm Qasr and Basra. The anticipated support for the invasion from the Shiia population in southern Iraq was slow in developing, but greater cooperation is forthcoming, despite some outbreaks of factional fighting. Though CENTCOM commanders expressed confidence in the adequacy of their force structure in theater, the Iraqi attacks in rear areas and the length of the supply lines to forward units led some to suggest that insufficient ground forces were in place to continue the offensive while securing rear areas and ensuring uninterrupted logistical support. These critics faulted DOD civilian leadership for overestimating the effectiveness of a precision air offensive and curtailing the deployment of more ground troops, suggesting that an ideological commitment to smaller ground forces and greater reliance on high-tech weaponry had dominated military planning.5 With collapse of the Iraqi regime, however, this criticism has muted, and the CENTCOM operations plan appears vindicated. Without permission to use Turkish territory, CENTCOM was unable to carry out an early ground offensive in Northern Iraq. However, Special operations forces, the 173rd Airborne Brigade, and air-lifted U.S. armor, operating with Kurdish irregulars seized Mosul, Kirkuk, and Tikrit. Cooperation with Kurdish militias in the north has been excellent. Even a mistaken airstrike against a allied Kurdish vehicle convoy, killing or wounding senior Kurdish leaders, has not adversely affected this cooperation. Potentially complicating the situation in the north, was a Turkish desire to possibly augment the 8,000+ troops it has had stationed in Kurdish-held territory in order to block possible Kurdish refugees and influence the accommodations made to the Kurds in a post-conflict Iraq. Turkish miliary spokesmen have indicated that no additional Turkish forces will move into Iraq at this time. The U.S. has assured Turkey that the Kurdish forces involved in seizing Mosul and Kirkuk will be withdrawn and replaced with U.S. troops. 5 “Questions Raised About Invasion Force”, Washington Post, March 25, 2003. p. 17 CRS-5 CENTCOM headquarters reported that intelligence sources indicated authority for the use of chemical and biological weapons was issued to Iraqi regional subordinate commanders.6 CENTCOM headquarters consequently believed that the possibility of CB weapons use would increase as coalition forces moved closer to Baghdad, but it never materialized. Indeed, the failure to find any confirmed CB weapons caches has led to questions about the existence of the suspected Iraqi CB arsenal. Issues for Consideration Roles and Attitudes of Other Nations7 The State Department has identified those nations whom it characterizes as having “agreed to be part of the coalition for the immediate disarmament of Iraq”. The list includes those contributing combat units (noted above), those offering basing or overflight rights, and those who simply “ want to be publically associated with efforts to disarm Iraq” – Afghanistan, Albania, Angola, Australia, Azerbaijan, Bulgaria, Colombia, Costa Rica, Czech Republic, Denmark, Dominican Republic, El Salvador, Eritrea, Estonia, Ethiopia, Georgia, Honduras, Hungary, Iceland, Italy, Japan (post conflict),Korea, Kuwait, Latvia, Lithuania, Macedonia, Marshall Islands, Micronesia, Mongolia, Netherlands, Nicaragua, Palau, Panama, Philippines, Poland, Portugal, Romania, Rwanda, Singapore, Slovakia, Solomon Islands, South Korea, Spain, Tonga, Turkey, Uganda, Ukraine, United Kingdom, and Uzbekistan. In addition to the countries listed, the State Department stated that there are 15 countries who have requested their support of military operations not be made public.8 The fluctuating international political environment regarding cooperation with U.S. offensive operations against Iraq confronted military planners with complex challenges. It has been suggested that some nations’ public opposition to military action against Iraq does not reflect the nature of “private” diplomatic conversations which indicated a greater willingness to support U.S. policy. If true, this may have resulted in unacknowledged or covert assistance, or perhaps more overt cooperation after a U.S. victory became assured. Saudi Arabia, a previous opponent of military action, is permitting use of the U.S. air command center located on its territory, and the use of other air force facilities for non-strike aircraft (e.g., aerial tankers, search and rescue). After malfunctioning cruise missiles from U.S. ships operating in the Mediterranean landed in Saudi Arabian, the Saudi government limited overflight rights. Concerned that U.S. facilities in Saudi Arabia would not be available for full operations against Iraq, the United States established defense agreements, and expanded or upgraded airbase and logistics facilities in Bahrain, Kuwait, Oman, 6 “Lightening Strikes, Then March to Baghdad”, Washington Times, March 18, 2003. 7 See also, CRS Report RL31843, Iraq Foreign Stances Toward US. Policy 8 Department of State, “Excerpt: Boucher Announces Coalition for Immediate Disarmament of Iraq”, Washington File, March 18, 2003. CRS-6 Qatar, and the United Arab Emirates – countries whose support of U.S. policy in the region is judged the most reliable.9 Each of these countries permitted use of airbases to support U.S. military operations in Afghanistan, while Saudi Arabia allowed only the use of the air operations command center on its territory. The Department of Defense has announced its intention to move its air operations center from Saudi Arabia to newly constructed facilities located in Qatar. Given the range of facilities and prepositioned U.S. equipment in these countries, their continued cooperation will be crucial to the military operations in Iraq. The extent of cooperation from these nations was thought to probably greatly depend upon the results of U.N. arms inspections and the further approval of the U.N. Security Council. However, since the onset of conflict, there has been no diminution of support for U.S. operations. The United States and Bahrain have a defense cooperation agreement regarding prepositioning war materiel. The U.S. Navy 5th Fleet headquarters is in Bahrain, and the Air Force currently has use of Bahrain’s Shaikh airbase. Since the Gulf War, the United States has maintained a troop presence in Kuwait and it is serving as the main staging area for coalition ground forces. The U.S. Air Force has use of two Kuwaiti airfields – Ali al Salem and Ali al-Jabiru. In Oman, through a cooperative agreement, the Air Force has access to four airbases – al-Musnanah, Masirah, Seeb, and Thumrait – which it has been upgrading to handle a full range of air operations. Qatar has developed a very close cooperative defense relationship with the United States, permitting the prepositioning of enough equipment for three U.S. Army brigades and the construction of an operations command center at al-Udaid airbase comparable to that located at Prince Sultan airbase in Saudi Arabia. This facility has been extensively used to support operations in Afghanistan, and Central Command Headquarters deployed there in mid-September, 2002. In the United Arab Emirates, the U.S. Navy has access to port facilities and the Air Force is using the al-Dhafra airbase. 10 The attitude of the Turkish government towards U.S. military action against Iraq was a very important consideration for U.S. military planners. The Turkish parliament’s rejection of a proposal allowing U.S. ground troops to operate from Turkey delivered a setback to CENTCOM planners, though CENTCOM spokesmen downplayed the impact of the Turkish decision upon their prospects for a successful operation.11 Turkey granted only overflight rights, and would not permit basing or offensive operations from its soil. As noted, the 4th Mechanized Infantry Division, originally intended to attack from Turkey, was diverted to Kuwait as follow-on support for post-conflict operations. There have been press reports, however, that Turkey has did facilitate U.S. upgrading of airfields located inside northern Iraq. Aside from permitting air operations from Incirlik and other bases, Turkish cooperation would also have provided an easier approach for a northern front for U.S. ground operations. Northern operations, though proceeding more slowly than would 9 For further information, see CRS Report RL31533, Persian Gulf: Issues for U.S. Policy, 2003. 1 0 “ C u r r e n t U . S . O r d e r o f B a t t l e ” , G l o b a l S e c u r i t y . O r g [http://www.globalsecurity.org/military/ops/iraq_orbat_030120.htm] 11 “General Dismisses Rebuff by Turkey”, Washington Post, March 4, 2003, p. 1 CRS-7 have been the case with Turkish cooperation, have gone well. The major cities and oilfields are under coalition control and, after extended bombardment of Iraqi defensive positions, were seized without significant resistance. Improved U.S. Military Technology Significant technological advancements, particularly in precision-guided munitions, led DOD spokesmen to emphasize that the air campaign against Iraq will be considerably more efficient and more militarily devastating than Operation Desert Storm. In 1991 only ten percent of the aerial munitions used were precision-guided. That ratio was almost reversed in this air campaign. This allowed a greater number of targets to be destroyed far more rapidly, using fewer aircraft and with less collateral damage. The greater availability of precision-guided munitions (PGMs) worked well for attacks against stationary targets, and moving targets in open terrain. There was some question raised about the level of PGM inventories after the Afghanistan campaign, but stockpiles remained adequate for operations against Iraq.12 Major improvements have also been achieved in the ability of the intelligence community to communicate targeting information directly to combat platforms (e.g. attack aircraft, missile launchers) in almost real time. This greatly enhanced the value of PGMs, providing them with critical targeting data when the information is most useful. Military operations in an urban environment were anticipated to limit the effectiveness of air power and armor units, however the relatively open configuration of Iraqi cities permitted quite effective use of these systems. Rules of target engagement and avoidance of “friendly fire” casualties remained prime concerns throughout the campaign. U.S. military planners paid particular attention to the problem of Iraqi missiles. In 1991, the allied coalition was unable to locate and destroy any SCUD mobile launchers, and U.S. intelligence believes that Iraq still possesses at least 24 missiles, some possibly armed with chemical or biological warheads. Using new equipment, such as the Tactical Airborne Warning System (TAWS) and the PAC-3 air defense missiles, DOD greatly reduced the time from missile launch detection to intercept, improving the chance of both destroying the launched missile and the missile launcher. Improvements in satellite reconnaissance, communications, and unmanned aerial vehicles now available to ground commanders are also seen as major advances over Desert Storm capabilities. The PAC-3 air defense system worked well in Kuwait in intercepting the few Iraqi missiles which threatened populated areas, though it has also downed a British fighter aircraft in a “friendly fire” incident. Though initial reports indicated some of the Iraqi missiles were the prohibited SCUDs, this identification was later retracted. Chemical and Biological Weapons. The Bush Administration believed that Iraq retained chemical and biological stockpiles from before the Persian Gulf War, and continued covert CBW development and/or production since. Some CBW facilities that were destroyed during the Persian Gulf War were been re-built. Iraq is known to have produced blister agents (“mustard gas”) and both persistent and 12 “The Tools Of War Expecting a rerun of Gulf War I? Think again, thanks to high tech and smart bombs”, Time, October 21, 2002. CRS-8 non-persistent nerve agents (VX and Sarin). Biological agents produced include anthrax, aflatoxin, and the toxin agents botulinum and ricin. Though unconfirmed, it is possible that Iraq may also possess the smallpox virus cultured from natural outbreaks of the disease in Iraq prior to its world-wide eradication in the early 1970s. Iraq is known to have developed a variety of means to disseminate CBW, including bombs, artillery shells, missile warheads, mines, and aerial sprayers for both manned and unmanned aircraft. 13 Though Iraq did not use CBW in the Persian Gulf War, many believed that Saddam Hussein’s restraint in this regard would be not repeated. This view was based on the assumption that, given that the U.S. objective would now be the destruction of his regime rather than the more limited objectives in the Persian Gulf War, Hussein would have “nothing to lose” by their employment. As events turned out, there was no use of CB weapons, and no CBW stockpiles have been discovered. Given that operational planning called for suspected CBW sites to be among the first objectives to be seized or neutralized, the apparent failure to find any of these weapons, though certainly heartening to combat commanders, has led to questions about the Administration’s assertions of Iraq’s CBW capabilities. CENTCOM spokesmen have indicated that more extensive searches for these weapons will take place over time.14 Though perhaps better prepared than any other military to deal with CB warfare, U.S. forces have not actually encountered the use of CB weapons since World War I. U.S. commanders had to ensure adequate supplies of protective and decontamination equipment for an invasion force, and may again be eventually confronted with the possibly problematic issue of vaccinations and prophylactic pharmaceuticals that has led to the “Gulf War illnesses” controversy. Indicative of this latter problem, even though production of anthrax vaccine has been restored, DOD has still not re-instated its service-wide vaccination policy. This concern may be compounded with the smallpox vaccine. To date, however, no controversy has developed, despite the vaccination of all troops deployed the Persian Gulf. In October 2002, the General Accounting Office reiterated its concerns over “serious problems” in the adequacy of the armed forces CBW training, availability of specialist personnel, and defensive equipment inventories 15 Given that chemical and biological weapons were not used in the conflict, the adequacy of training and specialist personnel were not tested. With regard to GAO’s concerns over CBW suit defects, DOD spokesmen have noted that troops deployed to the Persian Gulf have all been issued the newly-designed Joint Service Lightweight Integrated Suit 13 Iraq’s Weapons of Mass Destruction: A Net Assessment. Center for International and Strategic Studies. September 2002. Iraq’s Weapons of Mass Destruction Programs. Central Intelligence Agency. October 2002. 14 CENTCOM Press Briefing , March 25, 2002 15 General Accounting Office. Chemical and Biological Defense: Observations on DOD's Risk Assessment of Defense Capabilities GAO-03-137T, October 1, 2002 CRS-9 Technology (JSLIT), which does not have the manufacturing defects detected in some of the older Battle Dress Overgarment.16 Post-War Requirements With the onset of widespread looting and the breakdown of public services (electricity, water) in the cities, coalition forces were confronted with the challenges of restoring public order and infrastructure even before combat operations have ceased. Though U.S. forces have come under some criticism for not having done more to prevent looting, the transition from combat to police roles is a difficult one, particularly when an important objective is winning popular support. Harsh reactions risk alienation of the population, yet inaction reduces confidence in the ability of coalition forces to maintain order. Indicative of the seriousness of the civil disorder, U.S. officials in Iraq have authorized U.S. troops to shoot looters if necessary.17 In addition to looting, coalition forces also have to ensure that factional violence and retribution against former government supporters do not derail stabilization efforts. CENTCOM headquarters intends to “greatly increase” the number of troops patrolling Iraqi cities.18 U.S. forces, however, are spread relatively thin throughout Iraq, it is clear that additional troops in theater could improve the pace and breadth of stabilization operations. The question of how many military personnel will be required for stabilization operations has been a subject of controversy since well before the onset of operations. This controversy reflects the great difficulty in predicting how the political and military situation in post-war Iraq will evolve, and how long a. military presence would be required before an acceptable and stable Iraqi government could be established. The attitude of the Iraq population is the key element, and will depend upon a variety of factors, such as the nature and extent of war damage, the demands of ethnic and religious minorities, and the speed with which a credible government can be established. Though a short-term post-war occupation may be a possibility, given that so far the Iraqi population has not demonstrated an unqualified acceptance of coalition forces, it is possible that a continued deployment of substantial military ground force will be necessary for several years. For comparison, in the relatively benign environment and considerably smaller areas of Bosnia and Kosovo, after eight years of peacekeeping operations, NATO still maintains a deployment of about 60,000 troops. In testimony before the House Armed Services Committee on September 18, 2002 Defense Secretary Rumsfeld declined to speculate upon what might be the military requirements for the United States in post-war Iraq, assuming Saddam Hussein’s ouster. On February 25, 2003, testifying before the Senate Armed Services Committee, Army Chief of Staff. General Eric Shinseki expressed the 16 “U.S. Troops’ Chemical Suits Do Not Leak, Army Insists”, Washington Post, March 4, 2003. Department of Defense Press Briefing, March 3, 2003. 17 “U.S. Military Chief Vows More Troops to Quell Iraqi Looting”, New York Times, May 15. p. 21. 18 Ibid. CRS-10 opinion that up to “several hundred thousand” troops could be required to maintain an occupation of Iraq. This estimate was almost immediately dismissed by DOD’s civilian leadership.19 Currently, there are about 158,000 coalition ground troops in Iraq. Their commander, Lt. Gen. McKiernan, has acknowledged that is an insufficient number to secure the entire country.20 Not only the number of troops, but also the type is of critical importance. The vast majority of coalition forces are combat troops, but there is general agreement that military police or constabulary- type forces (e.g. the Italian Carabinieri, or Spanish Guarda Civil) are better suited to stabilization operations. However, as the Army’s Deputy Chief of Staff testified before the House Armed Services Committee, there is now a DOD-wide shortage of military police personnel, given the heightened security environment since the September 11, 2001 terrorist attacks. Nevertheless, about 8,000 MP’s are being deployed to Iraq.21 The Bush Administration is seeking to recruit other nations to supply troops for stabilization operations in Iraq, but there has been a limited number of responses. On May 3, Secretary Rumsfeld announced that 10 nations will contribute forces to stabilization operations in Iraq. Poland, which may assume command of operations in northern Iraq, plans to deploy about 1,500 troops, contingent upon U.S. financing their support. Spain intends to send 1,500 troops, but will prohibit their participation in any combat operations. Honduras and Nicaragua will contribute to the Spanish deployment, if reimbursed for the costs. Italy will send about 1,500 army and carabinieri personnel, and Denmark is deploying approximately 380 troops. Ukraine has agreed to send a battalion to assist in the search for chemical and biological weapons. Both Bulgaria and Romania are contributing about 500 personnel apiece. Latvia, Lithuania, and Estonia may also contribute small units to stabilization operations. Costs22 Predicting the cost of military operations is a task that DOD did not undertake prior to the peace-keeping deployments to the Balkans, and it remains a highly conjectural exercise. Methodologies tend to be relatively crude and based upon historical experience, i.e. “the last war”. Though initially Secretary Rumsfeld expressed his opinion that “it is unknowable what a war or conflict like that would cost”, in early 2003 he estimated a cost of under $50 billion. Other DOD officials anticipated an $80-85 billion cost, assuming a 6-month follow-on occupation.23 19 Secretary Rumsfeld, Defense Press Briefing, February 28, 2003. 20 “Baghdad Anarchy Spurs Call for Help”, Washington Post, May 13, 2003. p. 1 21 “Shortage of MPs Complicates Iraq Occupation”, Newhouse.com ., May 12, 2003. 22 For greater detail on cost estimates, see CRS Report RL31715, Iraq War: Background Issues and Overview. Updated periodically. 23 “War Could Cost More Than $40 billion”, Knight-Ridder Wire Service, September 18, 2002; “Iraq War Costs Could Soar, Pentagon Says”, Los Angeles Times, February 26, 2003. CRS-11 On March 25, 2003 The Administration submitted a $74.7 billion FY2003 supplemental appropriations request, of which $62.6 billion was for Department of Defense expenses related to the war in Iraq through September 2003. Specifically, this request includes funds for preparatory costs incurred, costs associated with military operations, replenishing munitions, and funds to support other nations. The Administration stated that this supplemental request was “built on the key assumption that U.S. military action in Iraq will be swift and decisive.”24 Both the House and Senate have approved the legislative conference report to H.R. 1559 (H.Rept. 108-76), which provides $62.37 billion. Michael O’Hanlon of the Brookings Institution, pegged a 250,000-strong invasion at between $40-$50 billion with a follow-up occupation costing $10-$20 billion a year. Former White House economic advisor Lawrence Lindsay estimated the high limit on the cost to be 1-2% of GNP, or about $100-$200 billion. Mitch Daniels, Director of the Office of Management and Budget subsequently discounted this estimate as “very, very high”, and stated that the costs would be between$50-$60 billion, though no specific supporting figures were provided for the estimate.25 In its most recent cost estimate, the Congressional Budget Office put deployment costs at about $14 billion, with combat operations costing $10 billion for the first month and $8 billion a month thereafter. CBO cited the cost of returning combat forces to home bases at $9 billion, and the costs of continued occupation of Iraq to run between $1-4 billion.26 The American Academy of Arts and Sciences has published a much more wide- ranging report which covers the possibility of an extended occupation, in addition to potential long-term economic consequences and concludes that potential costs could range from $99 billion to $1.2 trillion.27 For comparison, the cost to the United States of the Persian Gulf War in 1990-91 was approximately $60 billion, and almost all of this cost was offset by international financial contributions. 24 Office of Management and Budget, Press Release No. 2003-6, March 25, 2002. 25 Bumiller, Elisabeth. “Budget Director Lowers Estimate of Cost of War”, New York Times, December 31, 2002. p. 1 26 Congressional Budget Office. An Analysis of the President’s Budgetary Proposals for Fiscal Year 2004: An Interim Report. March 2003 27 War with Iraq: Costs, Consequences, and Alternatives. American Academy of Arts and Sciences. Dec. 2002. [http://www.amacad.org/publications/monographs/Iraq_Press.pdf]

Order Code RL31701 Report for Congress Received through the CRS Web Iraq: U.S. Military Operations Updated April 14, 2003 Steve Bowman Specialist in National Defense Foreign Affairs, Defense, and Trade Division Congressional Research Service ̃ The Library of Congress Iraq: U.S. Military Operations Summary Iraq’s chemical, biological, and nuclear weapons programs, together with Iraqi long-range missile development and support for terrorism, are the primary justifications put forward for military action. On March 17, 2003 President Bush issued an ultimatum demanding that Saddam Hussein and his sons depart from Iraq within 48 hours. On March 19, offensive operations began with air strikes against Iraqi leadership positions. As of April 13, after 25 days of operations, coalition forces are in relative control of all major Iraqi cities. Iraqi political and military leadership has disintegrated, though few of these officials have been captured Though sporadic firefights continue, the major challenge to coalition forces is now the restoration of civil order and the provision of basic services to the urban population. As the U.S. ground offensive approached Baghdad, DOD civilian leadership came under criticism for not permitting the deployment of sufficient U.S. ground forces to maintain the offensive, protect lines of supply, and secure rear areas where sporadic Iraqi resistance continues. With the fall of Baghdad, Mosul, and Kirkuk, this criticism has been muted. There has been no use of chemical or biological (CB)weapons, and no confirmed CB weapons caches have been found. Though press reports differ somewhat, and DOD has not released official figures, it appears that over 340,000 U.S. military personnel are in the Persian Gulf region (ashore and afloat) or en route. Ground forces include the 3rd Infantry Division, the 101st Airborne Division, the 7th Cavalry Regiment, and the 1st Marine Expeditionary Force. Elements of three other Army divisions are en route or on alert for deployment. The U.S. Navy is sending two aircraft carrier battle groups back to their home station, leaving three in the region. The Air Force has about 15 air wings in the region, and strategic bombers are operating from the British airbase at Diego Garcia, and airbases in the Middle East, Europe , and the United States. (See CRS Report RL31763, Iraq: A Summary of U.S. Forces.) The United Kingdom has deployed an task force of approximately 47,000 troops. Australia has deployed 2,000 troops, and 200 Polish special operations forces are also engaged. Key arrangements for the use of regional military facilities are in place with Kuwait, Bahrain, Qatar, and Oman. Saudi Arabia is permitting limited overflight rights and use of air command centers, and Turkey has granted limited overflight rights and permission for humanitarian aid transit. (See CRS Report RL31843, Iraq Foreign Stances Toward US. Policy). The Administration submitted a $62.6 billion FY2003 DOD supplemental appropriation request for military operations. The House and Senate have approved the conference report (H.Rept. 108-76) to H.R. 1559 granting $62.37 billion of the request. This report will be updated as events warrant. Contents Background . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1 Military Planning and Operations . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1 Options Considered . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 2 Current Operations . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 3 Factors for Consideration . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 5 Roles and Attitudes of Other Nations . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 5 Improved U.S. Military Technology . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 7 Iraqi Military Capabilities . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 8 Conventional Forces . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 8 Chemical and Biological Weapons . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 8 Post-War Requirements . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 10 Other U.S. Military Resource Requirements . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 11 Costs . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 12 Iraq: U.S. Military Operations Background Iraq’s chemical, biological, and nuclear weapons programs, together with Iraqi long-range missile development, and support for terrorism are the primary justifications put forward by the Bush Administration for military action. Since Iraq originally ended cooperation with U.N. inspectors in 1998, there has been little information on the state of Iraq’s weapons of mass destruction (WMD) arsenal; however, Administration officials are convinced that Iraq has reconstituted significant capabilities. Initially, leading Administration officials, most notably Vice- President Cheney, Defense Secretary Rumsfeld, and his Deputy Paul Wolfowitz, stressed that “regime change” or the removal of Saddam Hussein from power. Later in 2002, WMD disarmament was emphasized as the primary objective. Expanding on this theme, President Bush, in his speech before the United Nations on September 12, 2002 specified the following conditions for Iraq to meet to forestall military action against it: ! Immediately and unconditionally forswear, disclose, and remove or destroy all weapons of mass destruction, long-range missiles, and all related material. ! End all support for terrorism and act to suppress it. ! Cease persecution of its civilian population. ! Release or account for all Gulf War missing personnel. ! End all illicit trade outside the oil-for-food program and allow United Nations administration of its funds.1 On March 17, 2003 President Bush issued an ultimatum demanding that Saddam Hussein and his sons depart from Iraq within 48 hours. On March 19, offensive operations commenced with air strikes against Iraqi leadership positions. Military Planning and Operations The Department of Defense officially released limited official information concerning war planning or preparations against Iraq prior to the onset of offensive operations. There were, however, frequent and significant news leaks which provided a range of details. News reports indicated that the military options that were under discussion varied significantly in their assumptions regarding Iraq military capabilities, the usefulness of Iraqi opposition groups, the attitude of regional governments, and the U.S. military resources that would be required. 1 President Bush’s Address to the U.N. General Assembly, September 12, 2002. CRS-2 Options Considered In the wake of the successful operations in Afghanistan against the Taliban, some Administration officials advocated a similar operation, entailing use of special operations forces in cooperation with indigenous Iraqi opposition forces, coupled with an extensive air offensive to destroy Hussein’s most reliable Republican Guard units, command & control centers, and WMD capabilities. This approach assumed that the regular Iraqi army would prove unreliable, and could even join opposition forces once it is clear that defeat is imminent. To encourage this, significant emphasis would be placed on an intensive psychological warfare or “psyops” campaign to undermine the morale of Iraqi soldiers and unit commanders, persuading them of the hopelessness of resistance.2 While having the advantage of not requiring large staging areas (though some regional air basing would be required) or months to prepare, this was generally considered the riskiest approach. The weakness of Iraqi opposition military forces and their competing political agendas place their effectiveness in question, and predicting the behavior of regular Iraqi Army units under attack is problematic. This option also did not address the possibility of stiff resistance by Republican Guard units in the environs of Baghdad, nor the troop requirements of a post-conflict occupation. This “lite” option stood in contrast to the operations plan originally offered by U.S. Central Command. This option, often called the “Franks Plan”, after Army Gen. Tommy Franks, the U.S. Central Command (CENTCOM) commander who first briefed it to the President, calls for a large-scale ground force invasion. News reports initially indicated, however, that this “heavy” approach did not receive the support of the DOD civilian leadership or White House advisors. Questions over the reliability of the regional support that would be necessary for staging areas and the length of time required for deployment were the major concerns.3 However, the White House rejection of the “Franks Plan” came prior to the decision to take the Iraq issue to the United Nations Security Council. When it became clear that Security Council deliberations and the re-introduction of U.N. inspectors to Iraq could delay the possibility of military action for several months, it was apparently decided that this interlude would allow time both to negotiate regional cooperation and to deploy more substantial forces to the Persian Gulf region, and military operations today appear to adhere closer to CENTCOM’s original recommendations. As the ground force offensive has slowed, however, there is now increasing criticism of DOD’s civilian leadership for not permitting the deployment of even more ground forces prior to onset of operations.4 2 “Timing, Tactics on Iraq War Disputed; Top Bush Officials Criticize Generals' Conventional Views “, Washington Post, August 1, 2002. p. 1 3 “The Iraq Build-up, II”, National Journal, October 5, 2002. p. 2866. 4 “Rumsfeld’s Role as War Strategist Under Scrutiny”, Reuters, March 30, 2003. CRS-3 Current Operations Current offensive operations combine an air offensive and simultaneous ground offensive, in contrast to the 1991 campaign which saw weeks of air attacks to soften Iraqi resistance. U.S. Central Command’s operational plan is employing a smaller ground force than the 1991 Desert Storm operation, reflecting an assessment that Iraqi armed forces are neither as numerous nor as capable as they were ten years ago, and that U.S. forces are significantly more capable. This option is dependent upon the continued cooperation of regional nations for substantial staging areas/airbases and required months to deploy the necessary forces. Though press reports differ somewhat, it appears that over 340,000 U.S. military personnel are in the Persian Gulf region (ashore and afloat) and more en route. Currently the 3rd Mechanized Infantry Division, the 101st Airborne Division (Air Assault) , the 7th Cavalry Regiment, and the 1st Marine Expeditionary Force form the bulk of the U.S. ground offensive. The 4th Mechanized Infantry Division has arrived in theater, but not yet entered Iraq. Ships bearing its equipment remained off Turkey for weeks awaiting the outcome of negotiations to permit establishing a northern front attacking from Turkey, and then were diverted to the Persian Gulf when these negotiations fell through. It is anticipated that it will be late April before the 4th Infantry will be ready to enter action. The 1st Cavalry Division, 1st Armored Division, and 1st Mechanized Infantry Division have all been alerted for deployment, but reportedly most elements of these divisions still remain at home bases in Europe and the United States or have just begun to deploy. Some aviation and armor elements of the 1st Air Cavalry and 1st Armored Division have, however, already deployed The U.S. Navy deployed five of its twelve naval aircraft carrier battle groups, and has now ordered two of these to return to home stations. The Air Force now has approximately 15 air wings operating in the region. Strategic bombers are operating from the British airbase at Diego Garcia, and airbases in the Middle East, Europe , and the United States. The United Kingdom has deployed over 47,000 personnel, including a naval task force, an armored task force, a Royal Marine brigade, a parachute brigade, a Special Air Service regiment, and a Special Boat Squadron. The majority of these British forces are engaged in southeastern Iraq, securing the Umm Qasr and Basra region. Australia has deployed approximately 2,000 personnel, including special operations personnel in western Iraq, and one F/A-18 attack aircraft squadron. Poland has 200 special operations troops around Basra. (For more detailed information, see CRS Report RL31763, Iraq: A Summary of U.S. Forces and CRS Report RL31843, Iraq Foreign Stances Toward US. Policy) The invasion of Iraq was expected to begin with a 72-96 hour air offensive to paralyze the Iraqi command structure, and demoralize Iraqi resistance across the military-civilian spectrum. Intelligence reports indicating the possibility of striking Saddam Hussein and his immediate circle led to an acceleration of the operations plan, and an almost simultaneously onset of air and ground offensive operations. CENTCOM air commanders have stressed that significant efforts will continue to be made to minimize civilian casualties and damage to Iraqi physical infrastructure. With twenty-five days of offensive operations, coalition forces have relative control of all major Iraqi cities, including Baghdad, Basra, Mosul, Kirkuk, and Tikrit. The Iraqi political and military leadership has disintegrated, although the CRS-4 whereabouts of senior leaders, including Saddam Hussein, remain unknown. Though pockets of resistance continue to be encountered, and individual suicide attacks remain a threat, the major elements of the military campaign appear near completion. CENTCOM has pursued a strategy of rapid advance, by-passing urban centers when possible, pausing only when encountering Iraqi resistance. CENTCOM spokesmen have characterized Iraqi resistance as sporadic and uncohesive. Oilfields and port facilities in southern Iraq have been secured, as have two air bases in western Iraq. Though a few oil wells were set afire, all were quelled, and there has been no widespread environmental sabotage. Allied forces have not encountered the mass surrenders characteristic of the 1991 campaign, however DOD reports that over 4,000 Iraqis have been taken prisoner, and believes that many more have simply deserted their positions. Iraqi paramilitary forces, particularly the Saddam Fedayeen, have engaged in guerrilla-style attacks from urban centers in the rear areas, but have reportedly not inflicted significant damage, and have now declined significantly in frequency. Nevertheless, greater attention than anticipated had to be paid to protecting extended supply lines, and securing these urban centers, particularly around an-Nasiriyah and Najaf, and in the British sector around Umm Qasr and Basra. The anticipated support for the invasion from the Shiia population in southern Iraq was slow in developing, but now greater cooperation is forthcoming, despite some outbreaks of factional fighting. Though CENTCOM commanders expressed confidence in the adequacy of their force structure in theater, the Iraqi attacks in rear areas and the length of the supply lines to forward units led some to suggest that insufficient ground forces are in place to continue the offensive while securing rear areas and ensuring uninterrupted logistical support. These critics fault DOD civilian leadership for overestimating the effectiveness of a precision air offensive and curtailing the deployment of more ground troops, suggesting that an ideological commitment to smaller ground forces and greater reliance on high-tech weaponry has dominated military planning.5 With collapse of the Iraqi regime, however, this criticism has muted, and the CENTCOM operations plan appears vindicated. Without permission to use Turkish territory, CENTCOM was unable to carry out an early ground offensive in Northern Iraq. However, Special operations forces, the 173rd Airborne Brigade, and air-lifted U.S. armor, operating with Kurdish irregulars have now seized Mosul and Kirkuk. Cooperation with Kurdish militias in the north has been excellent. Even a recent mistaken airstrike against a allied Kurdish vehicle convoy, killing or wounding senior Kurdish leaders, has not adversely affected this cooperation. Potentially complicating the situation in the north, has been the Turkish desire to possibly augment the 8,000+ troops it has had stationed in Kurdish-held territory in order to block possible Kurdish refugees and influence the accommodations made to the Kurds in a post-conflict Iraq. Turkish miliary spokesmen have indicated that no additional Turkish forces will move into Iraq at this time. The U.S. has assured Turkey that the Kurdish forces involved in seizing Mosul and Kirkuk will be withdrawn and replaced with U.S. troops. 5 “Questions Raised About Invasion Force”, Washington Post, March 25, 2003. p. 17 CRS-5 CENTCOM headquarters reported that intelligence sources indicated authority for the use of chemical and biological weapons was issued to Iraqi regional subordinate commanders.6 CENTCOM headquarters consequently believed that the possibility of CB weapons use would increase as coalition forces moved closer to Baghdad, but now that possibility appears remote Indeed, the failure to find any confirmed CB weapons caches (though some defensive equipment has been encountered) has led to questions about the existence of the suspected Iraqi CB arsenal. The most significant unknowns remain the extent and intensity of Iraqi resistance within Baghdad, and whether chemical or biological weapons will be employed. Factors for Consideration Roles and Attitudes of Other Nations7 On March 18, the State Department released a list of thirty nations whom it characterizes as having “agreed to be part of the coalition for the immediate disarmament of Iraq”. The list includes those contributing combat units (noted above), those offering basing or overflight rights, and those who simply “ want to be publically associated with efforts to disarm Iraq” – Afghanistan, Albania, Australia, Azerbaijan, Bulgaria, Colombia, Czech Republic, Denmark, El Salvador, Eritrea, Estonia, Ethiopia, Georgia, Hungary, Italy, Japan (post conflict),Korea, Latvia, Lithuania, Macedonia, Netherlands, Nicaragua, Philippines, Poland, Romania, Slovakia, Spain, Turkey, United Kingdom, and Uzbekistan. In addition to the countries listed, the State Department stated that there are 15 countries who have requested their support of military operations not be made public.8 On December 20, Administration officials referred to 35 nations as members of the coalition, without specifying nations. The fluctuating international political environment regarding cooperation with U.S. offensive operations against Iraq confronted military planners with complex challenges. It has been suggested that some nations’ public opposition to military action against Iraq does not reflect the nature of “private” diplomatic conversations which indicate a greater willingness to support U.S. policy. If true, this may have resulted in unacknowledged or covert assistance, or perhaps more overt cooperation after a U.S. victory appears assured. Saudi Arabia, a previous opponent of military action, is permitting use of the U.S. air command center located on its territory, and the use of other air force 6 “Lightening Strikes, Then March to Baghdad”, Washington Times, March 18, 2003. 7 See also, CRS Report RL31843, Iraq Foreign Stances Toward US. Policy 8 Department of State, “Excerpt: Boucher Announces Coalition for Immediate Disarmament of Iraq”, Washington File, March 18, 2003. CRS-6 facilities for non-strike aircraft (e.g., aerial tankers, search and rescue). After malfunctioning cruise missiles from U.S. ships operating in the Mediterranean landed in Saudi Arabian, the Saudi government limited overflight rights. Concerned that U.S. facilities in Saudi Arabia would not be available for full operations against Iraq, the United States established defense agreements, and expanded or upgraded airbase and logistics facilities in Bahrain, Kuwait, Oman, Qatar, and the United Arab Emirates – countries whose support of U.S. policy in the region is judged the most reliable.9 Each of these countries permitted use of airbases to support U.S. military operations in Afghanistan, while Saudi Arabia allowed only the use of the air operations command center on its territory. Given the range of facilities and prepositioned U.S. equipment in these countries, their continued cooperation will be crucial to the military offensive against Iraq. The extent of cooperation from these nations was thought to probably greatly depend upon the results of U.N. arms inspections and the further approval of the U.N. Security Council. However, with the onset of conflict, there appears to be no diminution of support for U.S. operations. The United States and Bahrain have a defense cooperation agreement regarding prepositioning war materiel. The U.S. Navy 5th Fleet headquarters is in Bahrain, and the Air Force currently has use of Bahrain’s Shaikh airbase. Since the Gulf War, the United States has maintained a troop presence in Kuwait and it is serving as the main staging area for coalition ground forces. The U.S. Air Force has use of two Kuwaiti airfields – Ali al Salem and Ali al-Jabiru. In Oman, through a cooperative agreement, the Air Force has access to four airbases – al-Musnanah, Masirah, Seeb, and Thumrait – which it has been upgrading to handle a full range of air operations. Qatar has developed a very close cooperative defense relationship with the United States, permitting the prepositioning of enough equipment for three U.S. Army brigades and the construction of an operations command center at al-Udaid airbase comparable to that located at Prince Sultan airbase in Saudi Arabia. This facility has been extensively used to support operations in Afghanistan, and Central Command Headquarters deployed there in mid-September, 2002. In the United Arab Emirates, the U.S. Navy has access to port facilities and the Air Force is using the al-Dhafra airbase. 10 The attitude of the Turkish government towards U.S. military action against Iraq was a very important consideration for U.S. military planners. The Turkish parliament’s rejection of a proposal allowing U.S. ground troops to operate from Turkey delivered a setback to CENTCOM planners, though CENTCOM spokesmen have downplayed the impact of the Turkish decision upon their prospects for a successful operation.11 Turkey has granted only overflight rights, and will not permit basing or offensive operations from its soil. As noted, the 4th Mechanized Infantry 9 For further information, see CRS Report RL31533, Persian Gulf: Issues for U.S. Policy, 2003. 1 0 “ C u r r e n t U . S . O r d e r o f B a t t l e ” , G l o b a l S e c u r i t y . O r g [http://www.globalsecurity.org/military/ops/iraq_orbat_030120.htm] 11 “General Dismisses Rebuff by Turkey”, Washington Post, March 4, 2003, p. 1 CRS-7 Division, originally intended to attack from Turkey, is now being diverted to Kuwait as follow-on support for ground units in the south of Iraq. There have been press reports, however, that Turkey has facilitated U.S. upgrading of airfields located inside northern Iraq. Aside from permitting air operations from Incirlik and other bases, Turkish cooperation would also have provided an easier approach for a northern front for U.S. ground operations. Northern operations, though proceeding more slowly than would have been the case with Turkish cooperation, have gone well. The major cities and oilfields are under coalition control and, after extended bombardment of Iraqi defensive positions, were seized without significant resistance. Improved U.S. Military Technology Significant technological advancements, particularly in precision-guided munitions, have led DOD spokesmen to emphasize that the air campaign against Iraq will be considerably more efficient and more militarily devastating than Operation Desert Storm. In 1991 only ten percent of the aerial munitions used were precision- guided. That ratio could well be the inverse in the air campaign today. This would allow a greater number of targets to be destroyed far more rapidly, using fewer aircraft and with less chance of collateral damage. The greater availability of precision-guided munitions (PGMs) bodes well for attacks against stationary targets, and moving targets in open terrain. There have been some question raised about the level of PGM inventories after the Afghanistan campaign, but DOD has insisted they remain adequate for operations against Iraq.12 Major improvements have also been achieved in the ability of the intelligence community to communicate targeting information directly to combat platforms (e.g. attack aircraft, missile launchers) in almost real time. This has greatly enhanced the value of PGMs, providing them with critical targeting data when the information is most useful. Military operations in an urban environment would ,however, limit the effectiveness of air power and armor units. Rules of target engagement and avoidance of “friendly fire” casualties remain prime concerns. U.S. military planners have paid particular attention to the problem of Iraqi missiles. In 1991, the allied coalition was unable to locate and destroy any SCUD mobile launchers, and U.S. intelligence believes that Iraq still possesses at least 24 missiles, some possibly armed with chemical or biological warheads. Using new equipment, such as the Tactical Airborne Warning System (TAWS) and the PAC-3 air defense missiles, DOD has greatly reduced the time from missile launch detection to intercept, improving the chance of both destroying the launched missile and the missile launcher. Improvements in satellite reconnaissance, communications, and unmanned aerial vehicles now available to ground commanders are also seen as major advances over Desert Storm capabilities. The PAC-3 air defense system has so far worked well in Kuwait in intercepting the few Iraqi missiles which threatened populated areas, though it has also downed a British fighter aircraft in a “friendly fire” incident. Though initial reports indicated some of the Iraqi missiles were the prohibited SCUDs, this identification was later retracted. 12 “The Tools Of War Expecting a rerun of Gulf War I? Think again, thanks to high tech and smart bombs”, Time, October 21, 2002. CRS-8 Iraqi Military Capabilities Conventional Forces. There is little disagreement that Iraqi armed forces are significantly degraded from their condition during the Persian Gulf War in 1991. Manpower stands at roughly 50% or less of its 1991 level or about 350,000-400,000. Unclassified estimates put equipment levels at about 2,000-2,600 tanks, 3,700 armored vehicles, and 300 combat aircraft.13 A number of factors are believed to hamper Iraqi military effectiveness. A decade of arms embargo has resulted in much equipment now being obsolete or inoperable. Many of Iraq’s regular army divisions were undermanned and all comprised mostly conscripts. Large unit and combined arms training is lacking, and combat experienced non-commissioned officers and commanders were relatively few. Logistical support was almost non-existent, was very vulnerable to air interdiction. Saddam Hussein’s fear of internal coups has served to make regime security a paramount concern, which could have a detrimental effect on Iraq’s military effectiveness. Most of the best equipped and most reliable troops, the Republican Guard, were kept near Baghdad for regime protection. The officer corps was subject to intense scrutiny for loyalty and subject to unpredictable purges. The distribution of weaponry and supplies was curtailed among regular army units to forestall attempts to overthrow the regime. There also exist tensions, to some extent purposely encouraged, between regular and Republican Guard units, which could have hampered coordination.14 The Iraqi military, including Republican Guard divisions, have been unable to mount a coherent, organized defense against coalition forces. Iraq’s leadership turned to an urban strategy to reduce the effectiveness of U.S. airpower. By choosing to defend primarily urban centers with irregular forces, Iraq appears to be trying to force the United States and Britain to commit troops to urban combat – one of the most difficult types to conduct – and simultaneously constrain U.S. Air Force targeting because of concerns over collateral damage and casualties. But even within urban areas, no Iraqi forces were able to mount sustained resistance. With little operational leadership, limited equipment and supplies, and subjected intense aerial bombardment, Iraqi forces simply disintegrated in the face of coalition operations. Chemical and Biological Weapons. Iraq is believed to have possibly retained chemical and biological stockpiles from before the Persian Gulf War, and may have continued covert CBW development and/or production since. Some CBW facilities that were destroyed during the Persian Gulf War reportedly have been re- built. Iraq is known to have produced blister agents (“mustard gas”) and both persistent and non-persistent nerve agents (VX and Sarin). Biological agents produced include anthrax, aflatoxin, and the toxin agents botulinum and ricin. Though unconfirmed, it is possible that Iraq may also possess the smallpox virus cultured from natural outbreaks of the disease in Iraq prior to its world-wide 13 For a detailed examinations, see Cordesman, Anthony. Iraq’s Military Capabilities in 2002, Center for Strategic and International Studies. September 2002.; and The Military Balance 2002-2003. International Institute of Strategic Studies, October 2002. 14 See also, CRS Report RL31339, U.S. Efforts to Change the Regime. CRS-9 eradication in the early 1970s. Iraq is known to have developed a variety of means to disseminate CBW, including bombs, artillery shells, missile warheads, mines, and aerial sprayers for both manned and unmanned aircraft. There have been some questions about the effectiveness of these delivery systems, but they remain unanswered. 15 One of the unique qualities of CB weapons is that the employment of even a small number or amount can have an effect significantly out of proportion to the casualties actually inflicted. Trace amounts will force military units to “suit up” and can severely degrade their performance. Logistics facilities (e.g. ports), often staffed by unprotected civilians, could be shut down by relatively small amounts of persistent nerve agent because the workforce refuses to return. Civilian ships chartered for military transport are particularly vulnerable to threats of chemical or biological attacks and, as occurred in the Persian Gulf War, civilian crews may refuse to enter the war zone. In short, the psychological effects of these weapons could prove just as disruptive as their physical effects. Though Iraq did not use CBW in the Persian Gulf War, many believe that Saddam Hussein’s restraint in this regard would be not repeated. This view was based on the assumption that, given that the U.S. objective would now be the destruction of his regime rather than the more limited objectives in the Persian Gulf War, Hussein would have “nothing to lose” by their employment. As events turned out, there has been no use of CB weapons, and no confirmed CBW munitions have been discovered. Given that operational planning called for suspected CBW sites to be among the first objectives to be seized or neutralized, the apparent failure to find any of these weapons, though certainly heartening to combat commanders, has led to questions about the Administration’s assertions of Iraq’s CBW capabilities. Secretary Rumsfeld noted that intelligence reports indicated a greater probability of encountering these weapons as allied forces move closer to Baghdad.16 However, now that coalition forces are within Baghdad, that possibility is being discounted. CENTCOM spokesmen have suggested that more extensive searches for these weapons will take place after offensive operations have stabilized.17 Though perhaps better prepared than any other military to deal with CB warfare, U.S. forces have not actually encountered the use of CB weapons since World War I. U.S. commanders have had to ensure adequate supplies of protective and decontamination equipment for an invasion force, and may again be confronted with the possibly problematic issue of vaccinations and prophylactic pharmaceuticals that has led to the “Gulf War illnesses” controversy. Indicative of this latter problem, even though production of anthrax vaccine has been restored, DOD has still not re- instated its service-wide vaccination policy. This concern may be compounded with the smallpox vaccine. In October 2002, the General Accounting Office reiterated its 15 Iraq’s Weapons of Mass Destruction: A Net Assessment. Center for International and Strategic Studies. September 2002. Iraq’s Weapons of Mass Destruction Programs. Central Intelligence Agency. October 2002. 16 DOD Press Conference, March 25, 2003. 17 CENTCOM Press Briefing , March 25, 2002 CRS-10 concerns over “serious problems” in the adequacy of the armed forces CBW training, availability of specialist personnel, and defensive equipment inventories 18 With regard to GAO’s concerns over CBW suit defects, DOD spokesmen have noted that troops deployed to the Persian Gulf have all been issued the newly-designed Joint Service Lightweight Integrated Suit Technology (JSLIT), which does not have the manufacturing defects detected in some of the older Battle Dress Overgarment.19 The Bush Administration’s announced policy of possible nuclear retaliation if WMD are used against U.S. forces may serve as a deterrent, as more veiled references to nuclear force were felt to forestall their use in 1991.20 On the other hand, the U.S. emphasis upon ousting Hussein could induce a “nothing to lose” attitude conducive to using CB weapons. Post-War Requirements With the onset of widespread looting and some breakdown of public services (electricity, water) in the cities, coalition forces are confronted with the challenges of restoring public order and infrastructure even before combat operations have ceased. Though U.S. forces have come under some criticism for not having done more to prevent looting, the transition from combat to police roles is a difficult one, particularly when an important objective is winning popular support. Harsh reactions risk alienation of the population, yet inaction reduces confidence in the ability of coalition forces to maintain order. The situation is further complicated by continuing small-scale attacks on coalition troops in relatively secure areas. Increased patrols, the return of many Iraqi policemen to duty, and the emergence of civilian “watch groups” are assisting what appears to be a natural abatement of looting. In addition to looting, coalition forces will also have to ensure that factional violence and retribution against former government supporters do not derail stabilization efforts. With combat operations still on-going in some areas, and U.S. forces spread relatively thin throughout Iraq, it is clear that the addition of additional troops, (e.g. the 4th Infantry moving in from Kuwait) could improve the pace and breadth of stabilization operations. In testimony before the House Armed Services Committee on September 18, 2002 Defense Secretary Rumsfeld declined to speculate upon what might be the military requirements for the United States in post-war Iraq, assuming Saddam Hussein’s ouster. On February 25, testifying before the Senate Armed Services Committee, Army Chief of Staff. General Eric Shinseki expressed the opinion that up to “several hundred thousand” troops could be required to maintain an occupation of Iraq. This estimate was almost immediately dismissed by DOD’s civilian 18 General Accounting Office. Chemical and Biological Defense: Observations on DOD's Risk Assessment of Defense Capabilities GAO-03-137T, October 1, 2002 19 “U.S. Troops’ Chemical Suits Do Not Leak, Army Insists”, Washington Post, March 4, 2003. Department of Defense Press Briefing, March 3, 2003. 20 National Strategy to Combat Weapons of Mass Destruction, December 2002. p. 5 [http://www.whitehouse.gov/news/releases/2002/12/WMDStrategy.pdf] CRS-11 leadership.21 This controversy reflects the great difficulty in predicting what the political and military situation would be in a post-war Iraq, and how long a U.S. military presence would be required before an acceptable and stable Iraqi government could be established. The reaction of the Iraq population is the key element, and will depend upon a variety of factors, such as the nature and extent of war damage and casualties, the demands of ethnic and religious minorities, and the speed with which a credible government can be established. Though a short-term post-war occupation may be a possibility, given that so far the Iraqi population has not demonstrated an acceptance of coalition forces, it is possible that a continued deployment of substantial military ground force will be necessary for several years. For comparison, in the relatively benign environment and considerably smaller areas of Bosnia and Kosovo, NATO currently maintains a deployment of about 60,000 troops. It is possible, however, that some nations unwilling to participate in military action against Iraq may be willing to contribute to a post-war stabilization force, thus alleviating some of the burden on U.S. forces. Given the current international political climate regarding U.S. military operations against Iraq, it is difficult to estimate the possible extent of such assistance. Other U.S. Military Resource Requirements Aside from the deployments in the Balkans where the United States has about 12,000 troops, operations continue in Afghanistan where U.S. troops number about 7,000. DOD has not released information on the current deployment situation for U.S. Air Force units: however many air assets could possibly respond to operational requirements for either Iraq or Afghanistan from their current bases, if aerial re- fueling is possible. While the Department of Defense can meet the overall manpower requirements of an Iraqi invasion, an issue of particular concern is whether sufficient “low density-high demand” assets are available. These include assets such as aerial re-fueling tankers, the EA-6B aircraft used to engage air defense radars, the AWACS and JSTARS reconnaissance/air control aircraft, unmanned aerial vehicles, Combat- Air-Search and rescue (CSAR), and all special operations forces (SOF). Demands on special operations forces have been particularly high over the last year. Most notably in Afghanistan, but there have also been training/advisory missions in the Philippines, Georgia (Gruzia), and Yemen as part of a world-wide antiterrorism campaign, in addition to anti-drug operations in Columbia. And, Secretary Rumsfeld indicated that he intends to increase further the SOF commitment to the war on terrorism .22 It is in this context, that some have suggested that the invasion of Iraq is detracting from the resources available to continue efforts to pursue the world-wide war on terrorism, which they view as currently a greater threat to U.S. security than Iraq.23 21 Secretary Rumsfeld, Defense Press Briefing, February 28, 2003. 22 See CRS Report RS21048, U.S. Special Operations Forces (SOF): Background and Issues for Congress. 23 Fulgham, David. “War Preparations Reveal Problems”, Aviation Week and Space Technology, December 9, 2002. p. 29 CRS-12 North Korea’s decision in December 2002 to resume its nuclear weapons program has raised tensions in that region, and brought attention to the question whether the United States would and/or could take military action there, in addition to a campaign in Iraq. Secretary Rumsfeld has asserted that U.S. military resources are sufficient to fight in two theaters simultaneously, though some observers have strongly disagreed, citing shortages of strategic air/sealift and active duty personnel.24 At a minimum, the situation on the Korean Peninsula may mean that Pacific Command forces that may have otherwise deployed to the Persian Gulf will have to remain in the Pacific region. Meanwhile, the Bush Administration has stressed it is seeking a diplomatic rather than military resolution to the North Korean situation. Costs25 Predicting the cost of military operations is a task that DOD did not undertake prior to the peace-keeping deployments to the Balkans, and it remains a highly conjectural exercise. Methodologies tend to be relatively crude and based upon historical experience, i.e. “the last war”. Though initially Secretary Rumsfeld expressed his opinion that “it is unknowable what a war or conflict like that would cost”, in early 2003 he estimated a cost of under $50 billion. Other DOD officials anticipated an $80-85 billion cost, assuming a 6-month follow-on occupation.26 On March 25, 2003 The Administration submitted a $74.7 billion FY2003 supplemental appropriations request, of which $62.6 billion was for Department of Defense expenses related to the war in Iraq through September 2003. Specifically, this request includes funds for preparatory costs incurred, costs associated with military operations, replenishing munitions, and funds to support other nations. The Administration stated that this supplemental request was “built on the key assumption that U.S. military action in Iraq will be swift and decisive.”27 Both the House and Senate have approved the legislative conference report to H.R. 1559 (H.Rept. 108-76), which provides $62.37 billion. Michael O’Hanlon of the Brookings Institution, pegged a 250,000-strong invasion at between $40-$50 billion with a follow-up occupation costing $10-$20 billion a year. Former White House economic advisor Lawrence Lindsay estimated the high limit on the cost to be 1-2% of GNP, or about $100-$200 billion. Mitch Daniels, Director of the Office of Management and Budget subsequently discounted this estimate as “very, very high”, and stated that the costs would be between$50-$60 billion, though no specific supporting figures were provided for the estimate.28 In 24 Scarborough, Rowan. “U.S. Ability to Fight Two Wars Doubted”, Washington Times, December 25, 2002. p. 1. 25 For greater detail on cost estimates, see CRS Report RL31715, Iraq War: Background Issues and Overview. Updated periodically. 26 “War Could Cost More Than $40 billion”, Knight-Ridder Wire Service, September 18, 2002; “Iraq War Costs Could Soar, Pentagon Says”, Los Angeles Times, February 26, 2003. 27 Office of Management and Budget, Press Release No. 2003-6, March 25, 2002. 28 Bumiller, Elisabeth. “Budget Director Lowers Estimate of Cost of War”, New York (continued...) CRS-13 its most recent cost estimate, the Congressional Budget Office put deployment costs at about $14 billion, with combat operations costing $10 billion for the first month and $8 billion a month thereafter. CBO cited the cost of returning combat forces to home bases at $9 billion, and the costs of continued occupation of Iraq to run between $1-4 billion.29 The American Academy of Arts and Sciences has published a much more wide- ranging report which covers the possibility of an extended occupation, in addition to potential long-term economic consequences and concludes that potential costs could range from $99 billion to $1.2 trillion.30 For comparison, the cost to the United States of the Persian Gulf War in 1990-91 was approximately $60 billion, and almost all of this cost was offset by international financial contributions. 28 (...continued) Times, December 31, 2002. p. 1 29 Congressional Budget Office. An Analysis of the President’s Budgetary Proposals for Fiscal Year 2004: An Interim Report. March 2003 30 War with Iraq: Costs, Consequences, and Alternatives. American Academy of Arts and Sciences. Dec. 2002. [http://www.amacad.org/publications/monographs/Iraq_Press.pdf]