Fiscal Year 2004 Supplemental Request for Reconstruction of Iraq and Afghanistan

S. HRG. 108–373 FISCAL YEAR 2004 SUPPLEMENTAL REQUEST FOR RECONSTRUCTION OF IRAQ AND AFGHANISTAN HEARINGS BEFORE THE COMMITTEE ON APPROPRIATIONS UNITED STATES SENATE ONE HUNDRED EIGHTH CONGRESS FIRST SESSION SPECIAL HEARINGS SEPTEMBER 22, 2003—WASHINGTON, DC SEPTEMBER 24, 2003—WASHINGTON, DC SEPTEMBER 25, 2003—WASHINGTON, DC Printed for the use of the Committee on Appropriations ( Available via the World Wide Web: http://www.access.gpo.gov/congress/senate U.S. GOVERNMENT PRINTING OFFICE WASHINGTON : 90–309 PDF 2004 For sale by the Superintendent of Documents, U.S. Government Printing Office Internet: bookstore.gpo.gov Phone: toll free (866) 512–1800; DC area (202) 512–1800 Fax: (202) 512–2250 Mail: Stop SSOP, Washington, DC 20402–0001 COMMITTEE ON APPROPRIATIONS THAD COCHRAN, Mississippi ARLEN SPECTER, Pennsylvania PETE V. DOMENICI, New Mexico CHRISTOPHER S. BOND, Missouri MITCH MCCONNELL, Kentucky CONRAD BURNS, Montana RICHARD C. SHELBY, Alabama JUDD GREGG, New Hampshire ROBERT F. BENNETT, Utah BEN NIGHTHORSE CAMPBELL, Colorado LARRY CRAIG, Idaho KAY BAILEY HUTCHISON, Texas MIKE DEWINE, Ohio SAM BROWNBACK, Kansas TED STEVENS, Alaska, Chairman ROBERT C. BYRD, West Virginia DANIEL K. INOUYE, Hawaii ERNEST F. HOLLINGS, South Carolina PATRICK J. LEAHY, Vermont TOM HARKIN, Iowa BARBARA A. MIKULSKI, Maryland HARRY REID, Nevada HERB KOHL, Wisconsin PATTY MURRAY, Washington BYRON L. DORGAN, North Dakota DIANNE FEINSTEIN, California RICHARD J. DURBIN, Illinois TIM JOHNSON, South Dakota MARY L. LANDRIEU, Louisiana JAMES W. MORHARD, Staff Director LISA SUTHERLAND, Deputy Staff Director TERRENCE E. SAUVAIN, Minority Staff Director (II) C O N T E N T S MONDAY, SEPTEMBER 22, 2003 Page Opening Statement of Chairman Ted Stevens ...................................................... 1 Statement of Hon. L. Paul Bremer, U.S. Administrator in Iraq ......................... 1 Prepared Statement of ..................................................................................... 7 Coalition Provisional Authority Request to Rehabilitate and Reconstruct Iraq ........................................................................................................................ 12 Supplemental Request ............................................................................................. 15 Iraqi Reconstruction ................................................................................................ 20 The Plan ................................................................................................................... 21 Coalition Forces ....................................................................................................... 23 Contracts .................................................................................................................. 25 Telecommunications ................................................................................................ 27 Essential Services .................................................................................................... 28 International Community ....................................................................................... 28 Oil Reserves ............................................................................................................. 34 Reconstruction Funding .......................................................................................... 34 Healthcare for Children .......................................................................................... 37 Military Money ........................................................................................................ 40 Oil Assets ................................................................................................................. 41 Terrorists .................................................................................................................. 46 The Plan ................................................................................................................... 48 Prepared Statement of Senator Mitch McConnell ................................................ 52 Oil Revenues ............................................................................................................ 53 Iraqi Oil .................................................................................................................... 56 WEDNESDAY, SEPTEMBER 24, 2003 Opening Statement of Chairman Ted Stevens ...................................................... 75 Statement of Hon. Donald H. Rumsfeld, Secretary, Department of Defense ..... 75 General Richard Myers, Chairman, Joint Chiefs of Staff .................................... 75 General John P. Abizaid, Commander, CENTCOM ............................................. 75 Dr. Dov Zakheim, Under Secretary of Defense (Comptroller) ............................. 75 Fiscal Year 2004 Supplemental Request ............................................................... 76 Importance of Funding for Recovery ...................................................................... 76 Progress in Afghanistan .......................................................................................... 77 Progress in Iraq ....................................................................................................... 77 Foreign Contributions ............................................................................................. 78 Affordability ............................................................................................................. 79 Prepared Statement of Donald H. Rumsfeld ......................................................... 80 Prepared Statement of General John F. Abizaid .................................................. 84 War on Terrorism .................................................................................................... 84 Iraq ........................................................................................................................... 85 Afghanistan .............................................................................................................. 86 Mandate From American People ............................................................................ 90 Oversight of Political Initiatives ............................................................................. 91 Status of International Support ............................................................................. 92 Other Components of the Request ......................................................................... 93 Coast Guard Funding .............................................................................................. 93 Participation of Reserve Components .................................................................... 94 National Guard/Reserve Troops Supplemental Funds ......................................... 94 Assessments of Guard/Reserve/Iraq Forces ........................................................... 94 Fortitude of Iraqi People ......................................................................................... 95 Funding for Foreign Divisions ................................................................................ 95 (III) IV Page Coalition Support ..................................................................................................... 96 Force Levels ............................................................................................................. 96 International Forces ................................................................................................ 97 Obligation of Coalition Support Funding ............................................................... 98 Loans as an Alternative .......................................................................................... 98 U.N. Involvement ..................................................................................................... 99 Political Failure in Iraq? ......................................................................................... 102 Stay the Course and Win the War ......................................................................... 103 Improvements in Iraq .............................................................................................. 104 Difficulty of the Task in Iraq .................................................................................. 104 Winning the War on Terrorism .............................................................................. 105 TRICARE for Reservists ......................................................................................... 107 Responses to Senator Leahy ................................................................................... 108 Recruitment and Retention ..................................................................................... 110 Reenlistment ............................................................................................................ 111 Military Construction Funding ............................................................................... 113 Entire Supplemental for the War? ......................................................................... 113 Responsibility for Recovery in Iraq ........................................................................ 115 Progress in Iraq ....................................................................................................... 116 Funding for Equipment ........................................................................................... 118 Supplemental Funding ............................................................................................ 118 Countries of Origin of Terrorists in Iraq ............................................................... 118 Iraqi/Foreign Fighter and Terrorists Against the Coalition ................................ 119 Skepticism About Iraq ............................................................................................. 119 Finding Weapons of Mass Destruction .................................................................. 121 Importance of the United Nations .......................................................................... 121 Being Candid About Iraq ........................................................................................ 124 Importance of Infrastructure to Security ............................................................... 124 Protecting Vulnerable Populations ......................................................................... 125 Combining Political and Economic Progress ......................................................... 126 New Measurements or Metrics ............................................................................... 129 Military Construction Supplemental Funding ...................................................... 130 Consultations With Congress ................................................................................. 131 Unsecured Iraqi Munitions Sites ............................................................................ 132 Separating Two Parts of Fiscal Year 2004 Supplemental .................................... 133 Payments on Iraqi Debt .......................................................................................... 133 When CPA Funds Will Run Out ............................................................................ 135 Special Military Pay ................................................................................................ 138 No-bid Contract for Halliburton ............................................................................. 139 Projected Oil Revenues ............................................................................................ 142 Prepared Statement of Senator Harry Reid .......................................................... 143 Dissent About Whether Iraq can be Democratized ............................................... 146 Uniform and Equipment Shortages ....................................................................... 147 Equipping the Forces Breastplates ........................................................................ 147 Iraqi Liberation Act ................................................................................................. 151 Urgency of the Supplemental ................................................................................. 151 Publically Present Iraq Recovery Plan .................................................................. 152 Screening Iraqi’s for Security Duties ..................................................................... 154 Communicating With the American People .......................................................... 155 Safety for Troops ...................................................................................................... 156 Telecommunications ................................................................................................ 157 Impact of Disapproval of $20 Billion Request ....................................................... 158 Increased Use of Embedded Reporters .................................................................. 159 Involvement of Small Businesses ........................................................................... 159 Prevent Decline in Reserve Components ............................................................... 162 Combat Service Support .......................................................................................... 162 Rebalancing the Force ............................................................................................. 163 Limits on Deployments ........................................................................................... 164 Paying for the War in Iraq ..................................................................................... 165 Affordability ............................................................................................................. 165 Other Contributions ................................................................................................ 166 Costs of September 11 Attacks ............................................................................... 167 Restrictions on the $20 Billion for CPA ................................................................. 168 Restructuring Iraq’s Debt ....................................................................................... 168 Terrorist Safe Havens ............................................................................................. 169 Winning the Battle of Ideas .................................................................................... 169 Projections for Reservists ........................................................................................ 170 V Page Evaluating the U.S. Global Footprint .................................................................... 172 Military Construction Request and Air Bases ....................................................... 172 Funding for 23 Sites ................................................................................................ 174 Controlling Iraq’s Borders ....................................................................................... 176 Police and Site Protection ....................................................................................... 177 Alternative to $20 Billion Request ......................................................................... 178 Security Situation .................................................................................................... 178 Additional Committee Questions ............................................................................ 178 Questions Submitted to Donald H. Rumsfeld ....................................................... 179 Questions Submitted by Senator Harry Reid ........................................................ 179 THURSDAY, SEPTEMBER 25, 2003 DEPARTMENT OF DEFENSE Statement of Hon. Dov Zakheim, Ph.D., Under Secretary of Defense—Comp- troller .................................................................................................................... 183 General Peter Pace, Vice Chairman, Joint Chiefs of Staff ................................... 183 Peter Rodman, Assistant Secretary of Defense for International Security Af- fairs ....................................................................................................................... 183 Statement of Chairman Ted Stevens ..................................................................... 183 Statement of Senator Robert C. Byrd .................................................................... 184 Statement of Senator Robert F. Bennett ............................................................... 186 Summary Statement of Dov Zakheim .................................................................... 187 Middle East Border Issues ...................................................................................... 196 Percentage of U.S. Troops—Reserves/National Guard ......................................... 196 Afghan Security ....................................................................................................... 198 Funding Afghan Troop Training ............................................................................ 198 Drawdown of Troops ................................................................................................ 200 Troop Training Afghanistan Versus Iraq .............................................................. 201 Troop Morale ............................................................................................................ 202 Afghan Reconstruction ............................................................................................ 202 Afghan Central Government ................................................................................... 204 Afghan Growth of the Central Government .......................................................... 204 Terrorist Movement ................................................................................................. 205 Force Protection Procedures ................................................................................... 205 Rapid Fielding Initiative (RFI) ............................................................................... 207 Increase of Forces .................................................................................................... 208 Activation of Forces ................................................................................................. 210 Afghan Supplemental Reconstruction .................................................................... 211 Iraqi Post War Timeline Reconstruction ............................................................... 212 Terrorism Worldwide ............................................................................................... 214 Equipment Replacement ......................................................................................... 217 Remote Caches of Military Supplies ...................................................................... 219 Improve Infrastructure—Highways ....................................................................... 219 Drawdown of U.S. Troops ....................................................................................... 221 Additional Committee Question ............................................................................. 223 Question Submitted by Senator Robert C. Byrd ................................................... 224 FISCAL YEAR 2004 SUPPLEMENTAL REQUEST FOR RECONSTRUCTION OF IRAQ AND AF- GHANISTAN MONDAY, SEPTEMBER 22, 2003 U.S. SENATE, COMMITTEE ON APPROPRIATIONS, Washington, DC. The committee met at 2:30 p.m., in room SH–216, Hart Senate Office Building, Hon. Ted Stevens (chairman) presiding. Present: Senators Stevens, Domenici, Burns, Bennett, Craig, Hutchison, DeWine, Brownback, Byrd, Inouye, Leahy, Harkin, Reid, Murray, and Dorgan. OPENING STATEMENT OF CHAIRMAN TED STEVENS Chairman STEVENS. Mr. Ambassador, I notice you have your statement ready, and we have other Senators on the way. I’m going to call on you to make your statement first, and then the Senators can make their statements or ask questions after you’ve finished. STATEMENT OF HON. L. PAUL BREMER, U.S. ADMINISTRATOR IN IRAQ Ambassador BREMER. Thank you, Mr. Chairman, Members of the Committee, and thank you for this opportunity to discuss the Presi- dent’s supplemental request. Mr. Chairman, before I begin, I would like to pay tribute to the men and women of our armed services. Leading a coalition, our armed forces delivered a military victory without precedent. In roughly 3 weeks, they liberated a country larger than Germany and Italy combined, and they did it with forces smaller than the Army of the Potomac. They did all this while absorbing and inflict- ing minimal casualties. The Iraqis understood that we tried to spare the innocent. After the first days of the war, only those citi- zens of Baghdad living close to obvious targets feared our bombing. Mr. Chairman, I know you and all Americans hate waking up to hear a newscast that begins, ‘‘Last night, another American soldier was killed in Iraq.’’ Well, my day starts 8 days earlier than yours, and I’m among the first to know of those deaths—— Chairman STEVENS. Eight hours earlier? Ambassador BREMER. Yes. No one regrets those deaths more than I do. But these deaths, painful as they are, are not senseless. They are part of the price we pay for civilization, for a world that refuses to tolerate terrorism and genocide and weapons of mass destruction.(1) 2 Those who ambush Coalition forces, like those responsible for this morning’s suicide bombing in Baghdad, and those who am- bushed Governing Council member Aquila al-Hashimi on Saturday, are trying to thwart constitutional and democratic government in Iraq. They are trying to create an environment of insecurity. Mr. Chairman, they are in a losing battle with history. President Bush’s vision, in contrast, provides for an Iraq made secure through the efforts of the Iraqis. In addition to a more se- cure environment, the President’s plan provides for an Iraqi econ- omy based on sound economic principles, bolstered by a modern, re- liable infrastructure. And, finally, the President’s plan provides for a democratic and sovereign Iraq at the earliest reasonable date. If we fail to recreate Iraq with a sovereign democracy sustained by a solid economy we will have provided the terrorists with an in- credible advantage in their war against us. Terrorists love state sponsors, countries that provide them with cash, arms, refuge, a protected place to rest and plan future operations. Saddam’s Iraq was one of those countries. If terrorists cannot find a congenial state sponsor, they thrive in chaotic environments with little or no effective government. When militias, warlords, and communities war with each other, terrorists are right at home. Think back on the Lebanon we knew in the 1980s. Either outcome, or some combination of both, is possible in Iraq if we do not follow up on our military victory with the wherewithal to win the peace. The opposite is also true. Creating a sovereign, democratic, constitutional, and prosperous Iraq deals a blow to ter- rorists. It gives the lie to those who describe us as the enemies of Islam, enemies of the Arabs, or enemies of the poor. That is why the President’s $87 billion request has to be seen as an important element in the global war on terrorism. Mr. Chairman, our national experience teaches us how to consoli- date a military victory. We didn’t have that experience 85 years ago when we emerged victorious from the first world war. Many had opposed that war, wished to shake the Old-World dust off their boots and solve the problems here at home. We have spent and lent a lot of money. The victors celebrated their victory, mourned their dead, and demanded the money they were owed. Mr. Chairman, we know the results of that policy. Extremism, bred in a swamp of despair, bankruptcy, and unpayable debts, gave the world fascism in Italy and Nazism in Germany. The result was another world war. After that conflict, we showed that we had learned that military victory must be followed by a program to se- cure the peace. In 1948, our ‘‘greatest generation’’ recognized that military victory was hollow if democracy was not reinforced against tyranny and terrorism. Democracy could not flourish unless Eu- rope’s devastated economies were rebuilt. That generation re- sponded with the boldest, most generous, most productive act of statesmanship in the past century, the Marshall Plan. Winston Churchill called it ‘‘the most un-sordid act in history.’’ The Marshall Plan, enacted with overwhelming bipartisan sup- port, set war-torn Europe on the path to freedom and prosperity which Europeans enjoy today. After 1,000 years as a cockpit of war, Europe became the cradle of peace in just two generations. 3 The $20.3 billion in grants to Iraq the President seeks as part of this $87 billion supplemental bespeak grandeur of vision equal to the one which created the free world at the end of the Second World War. Iraqis living in freedom with dignity will set an exam- ple in this troubled region which so often spawns terrorism. A sta- ble, peaceful, economically productive Iraq will serve America’s in- terest by making America safer. There are a few things I’d like to point out about this $87 billion request. No one part of this supplemental is dispensable, and no part is more important than the others. This is a carefully consid- ered request. This request is urgent, Mr. Chairman. The urgency of military operations is self-evident. The funds for nonmilitary ac- tion in Iraq are equally urgent. Most Iraqis welcomed us as lib- erators, and we glowed with pleasure at that welcome. Now the re- ality of foreign troops on the streets is starting to chafe. Some Iraqis are beginning to regard us as occupiers and not liberators. Some of this is inevitable, but faster progress on reconstruction will help. Unless this supplemental passes quickly, Iraqis face an indefinite period with blackouts 8 hours daily. The link to the safety of our troops is indirect, but very real. The people who ambush our troops are small in number and don’t do so because they have undepend- able electrical supplies. However, the population’s view of us is di- rectly linked to their cooperation in hunting down those who attack us. Earlier progress gives us an edge against the terrorists. We need to emulate the military practice of using overwhelming force in the beginning. Incrementalism and escalation are poor military practice, and they are a poor model for economic assist- ance. This money will be spent with prudent transparency. Every con- tract of the $20 billion for Iraq will be competitively bid. That the money be granted and not loaned, Mr. Chairman, is essential. Ini- tially offering assistance as loans seems attractive; but, once again, we must examine the facts and the historical record. Iraq today has almost $200 billion in debt and reparations hang- ing over it as a result of Saddam’s economic incompetence and ag- gressive wars. Iraq is in no position to service its existing debt, let alone take on more. Mountains of unpayable debt contributed heav- ily to the instability that paved Hitler’s path to power. The giants of the post-war generation recognize this, and the Marshall Plan assistance was overwhelming in the form of grant aid. Turning to the specifics of the supplemental request, the Presi- dent’s first priority is security, security provided by Iraqis and to Iraqis. That security extends to our forces and changes Iraq from a logistics and planning base for terrorists into a bulwark against them. The President’s supplemental seeks $5.1 billion for three pil- lars of security. The first pillar is public safety. If Congress agrees to the Presi- dent’s request, we will spend just over $2 billion for police and po- lice training, border enforcement, fire and civil defense, public-safe- ty training, and a communications network to draw all of these to- gether. Already, Mr. Chairman, 40,000 police are on duty through- out Iraq, and our plan will double this number in the next 18 months. 4 National defense forces are the second pillar of this security. The President seeks another $2 billion for a new three-division Iraqi army and a civil defense corps. The first battalion of the new Iraqi army will graduate on schedule October 4. By next summer, Iraq will have 27 battalions trained. The third pillar is a justice system to rein in the criminal gangs, revenge-seekers, and others who prey on Iraqis every day and make them fear that they will never know the quiet enjoyment that so many of us take for granted. To fund this justice system, the President requests approximately $1 billion for technical assist- ance to investigate crimes against humanity, to provide security for witnesses, judges, and prosecutors, and to construct prisons suffi- cient to house an additional 16,000 inmates. This security assistance to Iraq benefits the United States in four ways. First, Iraqis will be effective. As talented and courageous as the Coalition forces are, they can never replace an Iraqi policeman who knows his beat, knows his people, their customs, rhythms, and language. Iraqis want Iraqis providing their security, and so do we. Second, as these Iraqi security forces assume their duties, they replace Coalition forces in the roles that generate frustration, fric- tion, and resentment, things like conducting searches, manning checkpoints, guarding installations. Third, this frees up Coalition forces for the mobile, sophisticated offensive operations against former regime loyalists and terrorists, for which they are best suited. And, finally, these new Iraqi forces reduce the overall security demands on Coalition forces and speed the day when we can bring our troops home. Now, security is the first and indispensable element of the Presi- dent’s plan for Iraq. It is not, however, by itself, sufficient to ensure success, because a security system resting only on arms is a secu- rity system that will fail. Recreating Iraq as a nation at peace with itself and with the world, an Iraq that terrorists will flee rather than flock to, requires more than people with guns. A good security system cannot persist on the knife-edge of economic collapse. When Saddam scurried away from Coalition forces, he left behind an economy ruined not by our attacks, but by decades of neglect, theft, and mismanage- ment. Imagine the effect on the economy of operating without a budget for a quarter century. Saddam, who came to power in 1979, Mr. Chairman, never prepared a national budget. Ill-conceived and clumsily executed policies left Iraq with an oil industry starved nearly to death by under-investment, thousands of miles of irriga- tion canals so weed-clogged as to be almost useless, and an elec- trical system that can, at best, meet only two-thirds of demand. Reflect, Mr. Chairman, if you will, on that last item. As millions of households, including my own, this past week discovered, it is almost impossible to live in the modern world without dependable electricity. Think of what we would be asking of Iraq were we to suggest they fashion a new economy, a new democracy, while lit- erally in the dark 8 hours a day. The Iraqis must refashion their economy. Saddam left them a So- viet-style command economy. That poor model was further hobbled 5 by cronyism, theft, and pharaonic self-indulgence by Saddam and his intimates. The good news is that important changes have already begun. The Iraqi Minister of Finance yesterday announced a set of mar- ket-oriented policies that is among the world’s boldest. These poli- cies include a new Central Bank law which grants the Iraqi Cen- tral Bank full legal independence, makes price stability the para- mount policy objective, gives the Central Bank full control over monetary and exchange-rate policy, and broad authority to super- vise Iraqi banks. This is rare enough anywhere in the world, and unique in that region. The Iraqi Government Council proposed—and on Thursday, Mr. Chairman, I had the great joy to sign into law—a program opening Iraq to foreign investment. Foreign firms may now own wholly- owned companies or buy 100 percent of Iraqi businesses. Under this law, foreign firms receive national treatment and have an un- restricted right to remit profits or capital. Iraq’s new tax system is admirably straightforward, the highest marginal tax rate, as announced by the Minister of Finance yester- day, on personal and corporate income tax is, get this, 15 percent— one-five percent. Tariff policy is equally simple. There is a 2-year reconstruction tariff of 5 percent on all but a few imports. Foreign banks are free to enter Iraq and will receive equal treatment with Iraqi banks. On October 15, Iraq will get a new dinar, new cur- rency, which will float against the world’s currencies. Iraq’s pro-growth policies should bring real, sustained growth and protect against something we’ve all seen and regretted in the past, economic assistance funds disappearing into a morass of pov- erty. Mr. Chairman, the Iraqi Government has put into place the legal procedures for encouraging a vibrant private sector, but those poli- cies will come to nothing if Iraq must try to establish itself on an insufficient and unreliable electrical grid or in a security environ- ment that puts a stick on the spokes of the wheel of commerce. Iraq, in short, cannot realize its potential to return quickly to the world stage as a responsible player without the services essential to modern society. We have made significant progress restoring these essential serv- ices. The widely predicted humanitarian crisis did not occur. There was no major flow of refugees. All of Iraq’s 240 hospitals and 90 percent of its health clinics are open today. There is adequate food, and there is no evidence of epidemic. We have cleared thousands of miles of irrigation canals so that farmers in these areas have more water than they’ve had for a generation. Electrical service will reach pre-war levels within 1 month. But the remaining de- mands are vast, and that is why the President is requesting almost $15 billion for infrastructure programs in Iraq. Here are some of the main areas in which the President plans to use the supplemental to bring essential services to the Iraqi peo- ple: $5.7 billion for the electrical system; $2.1 billion for the oil in- frastructure; $3.7 billion for potable water, sewer systems, and re- lated public works; $3.7 billion for water resources, transportation, telecommunications, housing and construction, health, and private- sector development. 6 Mr. Chairman, on another front, there is already good news. The democratization of Iraq on which so much global attention is fo- cused is further advanced than many people realize. Encouraging a quick political transformation, we have laid out a clear seven-step process leading to sovereignty. Three of the seven necessary steps have already been completed. First, an Iraqi Governing Council, the most broadly representa- tive governing body in Iraq’s history, took office in July. In August, the Governing Council took the second step by naming a pre- paratory committee to determine the mechanisms for writing Iraq’s new constitution. Earlier this month, the Governing Council ap- pointed ministers to run the day-to-day affairs of Iraq. The fourth step will be writing a constitution, which sets the framework for all that follows. This will occur after the Iraqi Gov- erning Council decides how to act on the recommendations of the preparatory committee. This constitution, Mr. Chairman, will be written by Iraqis and for Iraqis. The fifth step, the constitution will be ratified by the popular vote of the entire adult population. This will give Iraq its first pop- ularly approved constitution. Next, after the constitution is ratified, elections for a new govern- ment will be held. The seventh and final step comes after elections, when we trans- fer sovereignty from the Coalition authority to the new govern- ment. And, Mr. Chairman, I mentioned that the Governing Council had appointed ministers, and it’s my great pleasure to note for you and the members here the presence of two of the ministers of the new Iraqi Government. I would like to introduce the Minister of Public Works and Municipalities, Nesreen Berwari, and the Minister of Electricity, which is the power industry, Mr. Ayham Sameraei. They are here in Washington this week for meetings and discus- sions, and I consider it an honor that they would take the time to come up here and hear my opening statement. They are indicative of the quality of people in this new cabinet. Mr. Chairman, the cab- inet has 25 members, 17 of whom have Ph.D.s, which must make it one of the best-educated governments anywhere in the world, an extremely able group of people. Mr. Chairman, that’s our seven-step plan. Some suggest that we should move soon to give full sovereignty to an Iraqi Government. I firmly believe that such haste would be a mistake. Iraq has spent a quarter century under a dictatorship as absolute and abusive as that of Nazi Germany. As a result, political distortions and inequi- ties permeate the fabric of political life. No appointed government, not even one as honest and dedicated as the Iraq Governing Coun- cil, can have the legitimacy necessary today to take on the difficult issues Iraqis face as they write their constitution and elect a gov- ernment. The only path to full Iraqi sovereignty is through a writ- ten constitution ratified and followed by free democratic elections. Shortcutting the process, in my view, would be dangerous. Mr. Chairman, Members of the Committee, as you examine the President’s plan, I’m sure you will see that it is an integrated and thoughtful whole. Every part depends on every other part. As the Congress knows, sweeping political reforms cannot be separated 7 from sweeping economic reforms. It is equally obvious that a popu- lation beleaguered by the threat of terrorism and endless insufficiencies in water, electricity, and telephones finds it hard to concentrate on the virtues of the new constitution and market-ori- ented policies. The need to protect the Coalition and populace alike against terrorist and common criminals is obvious and indispen- sable. This entire program requires the help of Congress. The United States must take the lead in restoring Iraq as a friend and demo- cratic model. There is a donor’s conference in Madrid in late Octo- ber. The United States must set the example for other countries of goodwill. Other nations who do not wish to see Iraq become a ter- ror-supporting tyranny or a landscape of factions should join us. We set an example and work with other donors to avoid the near- anarchy in which terrorists would feel right at home. When we launched military operations against Iraq, we assumed a great responsibility that extends beyond defeating Saddam’s mili- tary. We cannot simply pat the Iraqis on the back, tell them they are lucky to be rid of Saddam, and ask them to go find their place in a global market to compete without the tools of competition. To do so would invite economic collapse followed by political extre- mism and a return to terrorism. If after coming this far we turn our backs and let Iraq lapse into factional chaos, some new tyranny and terrorism, we will have committed a grave error. Not only will we have left the long suffering Iraqi people to a future of danger and deprivation, we will have sown the dragon’s teeth, which will sprout more terrorists and eventually cost more American lives. You may think I exaggerate. I ask you to look at what happened in Afghanistan, another country which, after being debilitated by decades of war and mismanagement, become easy prey for the Taliban and al Qaeda. The reconstruction of Iraq may seem distant from American con- cerns today. Eight time zones and two continents separate the East Coast of the United States from Iraq. The West Coast is effectively half a world away. Two years ago, on September 11, terrorists brought their threat home to us. From a faraway corner of the world they showed us that we must fight terrorism globally. Iraqis only seem far away. Today Iraq is a focal point in our global war on terrorism. Failure there would strengthen the terrorists morally and materially. Success tells, not just the Iraqis, but the world, that there is hope, that the future is not defined by tyranny on one side and ter- rorism on the other. PREPARED STATEMENT Mr. Chairman, Members of the Committee, we respectfully ask you to honor the President’s supplemental request, which responds to urgent requirements. The administration and I look forward to working with you to achieve the vision of a sovereign, stable, pros- perous, and democratic Iraq at peace with us and with the world. Mr. Chairman, I’d be happy to take your questions. [The statement follows:] 8 PREPARED STATEMENT OF AMBASSADOR L. PAUL BREMER Mr. Chairman and members of the Committee, thank you for this opportunity to discuss the President’s supplemental request. Before I begin, I want to pay tribute to the men and women of our armed services. Leading a coalition, our armed forces delivered a military victory without precedent. In roughly three weeks they liberated a country larger than Germany and Italy combined. And they did so with forces smaller than the Army of the Potomac. They did all this while absorbing and inflicting minimal casualties. Iraqis under- stood that we tried to spare the innocent. After the first days of the war, only those citizens of Baghdad living close to obvious targets feared our bombing. Mr. Chairman, I know that you and all Americans hate waking up to hear a newscast that begins, ‘‘Last night another American soldier was killed in Iraq . . .’’ My day starts eight hours ahead of yours. I am among the first to know of those deaths and no one regrets them more than I do. But these deaths, painful as they are, are not senseless. They are part of the price we pay for civilization, for a world that refuses to tolerate terrorism and genocide and weapons of mass destruction. Those who ambush Coalition forces, like those responsible for this morning’s sui- cide bombing in Baghdad and those who ambushed Governing Council member Aquila al-Hashimi on Saturday, are trying to thwart constitutional and democratic government in Iraq. They are trying to create an environment of insecurity. They are in a losing battle with history. President Bush’s vision, in contrast, provides for an Iraq made secure through the efforts of Iraqis. In addition to a more secure environment, the President’s plan pro- vides for an Iraqi economy based on sound economic principles bolstered by a mod- ern, reliable infrastructure. And finally, the President’s plan provides for a demo- cratic and sovereign Iraq at the earliest reasonable date. If we fail to recreate Iraq with a sovereign democracy sustained by a solid econ- omy we will have provided the terrorists with an incredible advantage in their war against us. Terrorists love state sponsors, countries that provide them with cash, arms, ref- uge, a protected place to rest and plan future operations. Saddam’s Iraq was one of those countries. If terrorists cannot find a congenial state sponsor, they thrive in chaotic environ- ments with little or no effective government. When militias, warlords and commu- nities war with each other, terrorists are right at home. Think of Lebanon in the 1980’s. Either outcome, or some combination of both, is possible in Iraq if we do not fol- low up on our military victory with the wherewithal to win the peace. The opposite is also true. Creating a sovereign, democratic, constitutional and prosperous Iraq deals a blow to terrorists. It gives the lie to those who describe us as enemies of Islam, enemies of the Arabs and enemies of the poor. That is why the President’s $87 billion request has to be seen as an important element in the global war on terrorism. Our national experience teaches us how to consolidate a military victory. We did not have that experience 85 years ago when we emerged victorious from World War I. Many had opposed the war, wished to shake the old world dust off their boots and solve problems at home. We had spent and lent a lot of money. The victors celebrated their victory, mourned their dead and demanded the money they were owed. We know the results of that policy. Extremism, bred in a swamp of despair, bank- ruptcy and unpayable debts, gave the world Fascism in Italy and Nazism in Ger- many. The result was another World War. After that conflict we showed we had learned that military victory must be followed by a program to secure the peace. In 1948 our greatest generation recognized that military victory was hollow if democracy was not reinforced against tyranny and terrorism. Democracy could not flourish un- less Europe’s devastated economies were rebuilt. That generation responded with the boldest, most generous and most productive act of statesmanship in the past century—the Marshall Plan. Winston Churchill called it ‘‘the most unsordid act in history.’’ The Marshall Plan, enacted with overwhelming bipartisan support, set war-torn Europe on the path to the freedom and prosperity which Europeans enjoy today. After a thousand years as a cockpit of war Europe became a cradle of peace in just two generations. The $20.3 billion in grants to Iraq the President seeks as part of this $87 billion supplemental bespeak grandeur of vision equal to the one which created the free 9 world at the end of World War II. Iraqis living in freedom with dignity will set an example in this troubled region which so often spawns terrorists. A stable peaceful economically productive Iraq will serve American interests by making America safer. There are some things I would like to point out about this $87 billion request: —No one part of the supplemental is dispensable and no part is more important than the others. This is a carefully considered request. —This is urgent. The urgency of military operations is self-evident. The funds for non-military action in Iraq are equally urgent. Most Iraqis welcomed us as lib- erators and we glowed with the pleasure of that welcome. Now the reality of foreign troops on the streets is starting to chafe. Some Iraqis are beginning to regard us as occupiers and not as liberators. Some of this is inevitable, but fast- er progress on reconstruction will help. Unless this supplemental passes quickly, Iraqis face an indefinite period with blackouts eight hours daily. The link to the safety of our troops is indirect, but real. The people who ambush our troops are small in number and do not do so because they have undependable electric supplies. However, the population’s view of us is directly linked to their cooperation in hunting down those who at- tack us. Earlier progress gives us an edge against the terrorists. —We need to emulate the military practice of using overwhelming force in the be- ginning. Incrementalism and escalation are poor military practice and they are a poor model for economic assistance. —This money will be spent with prudent transparency. Every contract of the $20 billion for Iraq will be competitively bid. —That the money be granted and not loaned is essential. Initially, offering assist- ance as loans seems attractive. But once again we must examine the facts and the historical record. Iraq has almost $200 billion in debt and reparations hang- ing over it as a result of Saddam’s economic incompetence and aggressive wars. Iraq is in no position to service its existing debt, let alone to take on more. Mountains of unpayable debt contributed heavily to the instability that paved Hitler’s path to power. The giants of the post-World War II generation recog- nized this and Marshall Plan assistance was overwhelmingly grant aid. The President’s first priority is security, security provided by Iraqis to and for Iraqis. That security extends to our forces and changes Iraq from a logistics and planning base for terrorists into a bulwark against them. The President’s supplemental seeks $5.1 billion for three pillars of security. The first pillar is public safety. If the Congress agrees to the President’s request, we will spend just over $2 billion for police and police training, border enforcement, fire and civil defense, public safety training and a communications network to link it all together. Already 40,000 police are on duty. Our plan will double this number in the next 18 months. National defense forces are the second pillar. The President seeks another $2 bil- lion for a new, three-division Iraqi Army and a Civil Defense Corps. The first bat- talion of the New Iraqi Army will graduate on schedule October 4. By next summer Iraq will have 27 battalions trained. The third pillar is a justice system to rein in the criminal gangs, revenge seekers and others who prey on Iraqis every day and make them fear that they will never know the quiet enjoyment that so many of us take for granted. To fund this justice system, the President requests approximately $1 billion for technical assistance to investigate crimes against humanity, security for witnesses, judges and prosecutors and the construction of prisons sufficient to house 16,000 ad- ditional inmates. This security assistance to Iraq benefits the United States in four ways. First, Iraqis will be more effective. As talented and courageous as the Coalition forces are, they can never replace an Iraqi policeman who knows his beat, who knows his people, their customs, rhythms and language. Iraqis want Iraqis pro- viding their security and so do we. Second, as these Iraqi security forces assume their duties, they replace Coalition troops in the roles that generate frustration, friction and resentment-conducting searches, manning check points, guarding installations. Third, this frees up Coalition forces for the mobile, sophisticated offensive oper- ations against former regime loyalists and terrorists for which they are best suited. Finally, these new Iraqi forces reduce the overall security demands on Coalition forces and speed the day when we can bring troops home. Security is the first and indispensable element of the President’s plan. It is not, by itself, sufficient to assure success because a security system resting only on arms is a security system that will fail. Recreating Iraq as a nation at peace with itself 10 and with the world, an Iraq that terrorists will flee rather than flock to, requires more than people with guns. A good security system cannot persist on the knife edge of economic collapse. When Saddam scurried away from Coalition forces he left behind an economy ruined not by our attacks but by decades of neglect, theft and mismanagement. Imagine the effect on the economy of operating without a budget for a quarter- century. Saddam, who came to power in 1979, never prepared a national budget. Ill-conceived and clumsily executed policies left Iraq with: —an oil industry starved nearly to death by underinvestment, —thousands of miles of irrigation canals so weed-clogged as to be almost useless, and —an electrical system that can at best meet only two-thirds of demand. Reflect, if you will, on that last item. As millions of American households (includ- ing the Bremer household) have learned in recent days, it is almost impossible to live in the modern world without dependable electricity. Think of what we would be asking of Iraqis were we to suggest they fashion a new economy, a new democ- racy, while literally in the dark eight hours per day. The Iraqis must refashion their economy. Saddam left them a Soviet-style com- mand economy. That poor model was further hobbled by cronyism, theft and pharonic selfindulgence by Saddam and his intimates. Important changes have already begun. The Iraqi Minister of Finance on Sunday announced a set of market-oriented poli- cies that is among the world’s boldest. Those policies include: —A new Central Bank law which grants the Iraqi Central Bank full legal inde- pendence, makes price stability the paramount policy objective, gives the Cen- tral Bank full control over monetary and exchange rate policy, and broad au- thority to supervise Iraqi banks. This is rare anywhere in the world and unique in the region. —The Iraqi Government Council proposed and on Thursday I signed into law Thursday a program opening Iraq to foreign investment. Foreign firms may open wholly owned companies or buy 100 percent of Iraqi businesses. Under this law foreign firms receive national treatment and have an unrestricted right to remit profits and capital. —Iraq’s new tax system is admirably straightforward. The highest marginal tax rate on personal and corporate income is 15 percent. —Tariff policy is equally simple. There is a two-year ‘‘reconstruction tariff’’ of five percent on all but a few imports. —Foreign banks are free to enter Iraq and will receive equal treatment with Iraqi banks. —On October 15, Iraq will get a new Dinar, which will float against the world’s currencies. Iraq’s pro-growth policies should bring real, sustained growth and protect against something we have all seen and regretted—economic assistance funds disappearing into a morass of poverty. The Iraqi Government has put in place the legal procedures for encouraging a vi- brant private sector. But those policies will come to nothing if Iraq must try to rees- tablish itself on an insufficient and unreliable electric grid or in a security environ- ment that puts a stick in the spokes of the wheels of commerce. Iraq cannot realize its potential to return quickly to the world stage as a respon- sible player without the services essential to a modern society. We have made significant progress restoring these essential services. The widely predicted humanitarian crisis did not occur. There was no major flow of refugees. All of Iraq’s 240 hospitals and 90 percent of its health clinics are open. There is ade- quate food and there is no evidence of epidemic. We have cleared thousands of miles of irrigation canals so that farmers in these areas have more water than they have had for a generation. Electrical service will reach pre-war levels within a month. However, the remaining demands are vast, which is why the President is request- ing almost $15 billion for infrastructure programs in Iraq. Here are some of the main areas in which the President plans to use the supple- mental to bring essential services: —$5.7 billion for the electrical system, —$2.1 billion for the oil infrastructure, —$3.7 billion for potable water, sewer service and related public works, —$3.7 billion for water resources, transportation and telecommunications, housing and construction, health, and private sector development. On another front there is already good news. The democratization of Iraq, on which so much global attention is focused, is further advanced than many realize. 11 Encouraging a quick political transformation, we have laid out a clear, seven-step process leading to sovereignty. Three of the seven necessary steps have been com- pleted: —1. An Iraqi Governing Council, the most broadly representative governing body in Iraq’s history, was appointed in July. —2. In August the Governing Council named a Preparatory Committee to deter- mine the mechanism for writing Iraq’s new, permanent constitution. —3. Earlier this month the Governing Council appointed ministers to run the day- to-day affairs of Iraq. —4. The fourth step is writing a constitution, which sets the framework for all that follows. This will occur after the Iraqi Governing Council decides how to act on the recommendations of the Preparatory Committee. The constitution will be written by Iraqis. —5. The constitution will be ratified by popular vote of the entire adult popu- lation. This will give Iraq its first popularly approved constitution. —6. After the constitution is ratified, elections for a new government will be held. —7. The final step will come after elections, when we transfer sovereignty from the Coalition to the new government. Some suggest we should move soon to give full sovereignty to an Iraqi govern- ment. I firmly believe that such haste would be a mistake. Iraq has spent a quarter century under a dictatorship as absolute and abusive as that of Nazi Germany. As a result, political distortions and inequities permeate the fabric of political life. No appointed government, even one as honest and dedicated as the Iraqi Gov- erning Council, can have the legitimacy necessary to take on the difficult issues Iraqis face as they write their constitution and elect a government. The only path to full Iraqi sovereignty is through a written constitution, ratified and followed by free, democratic elections. Shortcutting the process would be dan- gerous. As you examine the President’s plan I am sure you will see that it is an inte- grated and thoughtful whole. Every part depends on every other part. As the Con- gress knows, sweeping political reforms cannot be separated from sweeping eco- nomic reforms. It is equally obvious that a population beleaguered by the threat of terrorism and endless insufficiencies in water, electricity, and telephones finds it hard to con- centrate on the virtues of a new constitution and market-oriented economic policies. The need to protect the Coalition and the populace alike against terrorists and common criminals is obvious and indispensable. All of this requires the help of Congress. The United States must take the lead in restoring Iraq as a friend and democratic model. There is a donor conference in Madrid in late October. We must set the ex- ample for other nations of goodwill. Other nations who do not wish to see Iraq be- come a terror-supporting tyranny or a landscape of factions. We set an example and work with other donors to avoid the near anarchy in which terrorists will feel right at home. When we launched military operations against Iraq we assumed a great responsi- bility that extends beyond defeating Saddam’s military. We cannot simply pat the Iraqis on the back, tell them they are lucky to be rid of Saddam and then ask them to go find their place in a global market—to compete without the tools for competition. To do so would invite economic collapse followed by political extremism and a re- turn to terrorism. If, after coming this far, we turn our backs and let Iraq lapse into factional chaos, some new tyranny and terrorism, we will have committed a grave error. Not only will we have left the long-suffering Iraqi people to a future of danger and deprivation, we will have sown the dragon’s teeth which will sprout more ter- rorists and eventually cost more American lives. You may think I exaggerate. I ask you to look at what happened in Afghanistan, another country which, after it was debilitated by decades of war and mismanage- ment became easy prey for the Taliban and al Qaida. The reconstruction of Iraq may seem distant from American concerns today. Eight time zones and two continents separate the East Coast of the United States from Iraq. The West Coast is effectively half a world away. Two years ago on September 11, terrorists brought their threat home to us. From a farway corner of the world, they showed us that we must fight terrorism globally. Iraqis only seem far away. Today Iraq is a focal point in our global war on ter- rorism. Failure there would strengthen the terrorists morally and materially. Success tells not just Iraqis, but the world that there is hope, that the future is not defined by tyranny on one side and terrorism on the other. 12 Mr. Chairman and members of the committee we respectfully ask you to honor the President’s supplemental request, which responds to urgent requirements. The administration and I look forward to working with you to achieve the vision of a sovereign, stable, prosperous and democratic Iraq at peace with us and with the world. Mr. Chairman, I welcome your questions. COALITION PROVISIONAL AUTHORITY REQUEST TO REHABILITATE AND RECONSTRUCT IRAQ SECURITY Objective Ensure a secure environment for people and property that enables citizens to par- ticipate fully in political and economic life. Create conditions and provide means for Iraqis to assume responsibility for their own security. Request—$5.136 billion. Accomplishments Security remains top priority. Major focus of CPA security efforts has been to in- crease Iraqi participation and responsibility for a safe and secure Iraq. Security situation is complex: —80 percent of Iraq is permissive environment-people returning to normal pace of life. —Remaining 20 percent are less permissive, with entrenched Saddam loyalists, international terrorists and general lawlessness hindering recovery efforts. 60,000 Iraqis now under arms assisting in security: —46,000 Iraqi police nationwide. —8,700 facility protection officers augmenting the Iraqi police at 243 locations. —4,000 border and customs police helping to enforce immigration and customs laws along the borders and stem the tide of foreign fighters entering Iraq. —Civil Defense Corps is in the process of being developed. Beginning to train New Iraqi Army; first battalion graduates in October. In September, the Iraqi Ministry of Justice established an independent judiciary. Plan for Requested Funds Public Safety Projects ($2.141 billion) Reinforcement and training of police forces: —Recruiting police officers, continuing operations and maintenance ($150 million). —New police training force of 1,500 focusing on democratic principles ($800 mil- lion). —Recruiting and training of 5,200 traffic officers ($50 million). Establishment of a Department of Border Enforcement ($150 million): —13,600 new personnel. —Rehabilitation of infrastructure. Facilities protection, mine removal, fire service, and public safety facility and equipment repairs ($500 million). Establish Facility Protection, Services ($67 million). Conduct Public Safety Training to increase professional standards ($274 million). Develop a National Security Communications Network ($150 million). National Security Forces Projects ($2.076 billion) Establishment of New Iraqi Army (NIA) ($2 billion): —Full manning by September, 2004. —Training 9 brigades, including 1 armored brigade and army aviation. —Small coast guard. —Military academies and military training facilities. Establishment of Iraqi Civil Defense Corps (CDC) ($76 million): —Military support corps for the 18 Iraqi governates. —One battalion for each governate. Justice and Civil Society Development Projects ($919 million) Technical assistance for investigations of crimes against humanity ($100 million). —Establish a working system of criminal investigations and trials. Security for judges and prosecutors, renovate and harden courthouses ($200 mil- lion). Witness Protection Program ($100 million). Other technical investigative methods ($10 million). Prison system rehabilitation: —Prison system technical assistance ($10 million). 13 —Reconstruction and modernization of 26 detention facilities ($99 million). —2 new 4,000 bed facilities ($400 million). ESSENTIAL SERVICES AND INFRASTRUCTURE Objective Restore essential services to acceptable standards and to begin to create a civil society which participates in improving social and physical infrastructure. Provide foundation from which Iraqis can rebuild Iraq. Request—$14.868 billion. Accomplishments Under difficult conditions, there has been no food or health crisis: —Sufficient food stockpiles and distribution system; total distribution since the beginning of operations has exceeded 1.8 million MT. —All hospitals and primary care clinics are open, have power 24 hours a day, and are being supplied with adequate medical supplies for the first time in many years. —All schools and universities are open. Working together Coalition and Iraqi engineers have restored electric power pro- duction to prewar average levels—improved from virtually nothing following major combat operations to 3,200 MW in July and 3,734 MW in August. Water and sanitation—By July, much of Iraq at pre-war conditions; CPA has shifted focus to specific rehabilitation projects; Baghdad had first ever city-wide gar- bage clean up in August. Restoration of the oil industry is helping to rehabilitate the economy: —Iraqi/CPA oil management team is highly respected internationally. —Crude oil production is averaging about 1.7mi1 barrels per day which is 160 percent higher than June average and 70 percent of prewar output. —Oil exports are averaging 860k barrels per day which represents approximately $21 million and is 165 percent higher than July average and 45 percent of pre- war level. —Sabotage remains an issue. Plan for Requested Funds Electrical Projects ($5.675 billion) Electricity generation ($2.9 billion): —Rehabilitate existing power stations and spare parts. —New gas turbine generation. —New thermal power stations. Repair, expansion, and rehabilitation of transmission ($1.55 billion): —Repair, expansion of 400 KV and 132 KV lines. —Rehabilitation and construction of substations. Rehabilitation and replacement of network infrastructure over several years ($1 billion): —33 KV and 11 KV substation and network rehabilitation and development. Development of an automated monitoring and control system ($150 million). Institutional strengthening ($25 million). Security of stations and transmission lines ($50 million). Oil Projects ($2.1 billion) Investment in oil infrastructure ($1.2 billion): —Rapid repair caused by sabotage and looting. —Convert to topping plants to reduce importation of refined petroleum. —Establishment of transport redundancy due to sabotage. —Development of oil infrastructure and personnel security. —Increased efficiency of water plant for the Ramayllah reservoir. —Other repairs to rehabilitate upstream and downstream sectors. Importation of refined petroleum products to overcome shortfalls due to sabotage and looting ($900 million). Public Works Projects ($3.710 billion) Raising potable water access to 90 percent from 60 percent: —Costs are estimated at $500/km for 15,000 km of water main line ($2.83 billion). —Includes efforts to reduce water loss ($30 million). Increasing sewerage service from 6 percent to 15 percent ($697 million). Improving solid waste management ($153 million). 14 Water Resources Projects ($875 million) Replace pumping station standby generators, pumps, electrical control devices ($150 million). Rehabilitation of irrigation and drainage systems ($130 million). 10 major irrigation projects, reducing salinity loads to Tigris and Euphrates ($130 million). Dam repair, rehabilitation, and new construction ($125 million). Umm Qasr to Basra water pipeline and treatment plant ($200 million). Environmental restoration of Euphrates, Hawizeh Marsh, and Basra Channel Regulators to benefit millions of people ($140 million). Transportation and Communications Projects ($835 million) Airspace and airport opening in Baghdad and Basra, and 120 smaller airports ($165 million): —Repair infrastructure, purchase avionic equipment, training to meet ICAO standards. Umm Qasr Port rehabilitation ($45 million). Railroad rehabilitation and restoration ($303 million). Restoration of Iraqi Telecom and Postal Corporation ($124 million). Iraqi Communications systems, including Iraqi media ($109 million). Iraqi communications operations ($89 million). Housing and Construction Projects ($470 million) Housing ($100 million): —Construction of 3,500 new housing units including 7 housing communities. —Pilot program for Ministry of Housing and Construction, 1 million housing units needed. Public buildings ($130 million): —1,325 basic repairs and 140 refurbishment projects. —6 major reconstruction projects at $7 million each. Roads and bridges ($240 million): —2 percent of need for total road and bridge repair. —Repair to Expressway 1. Health Projects ($850 million) Major new children’s hospital ($150 million): —41 percent of total population is under age 14. —Demographics point to baby boom within next ten years. Hospital refurbishment ($393 million): —Reduce infant and childhood deaths by 50 percent. —Refurbish 1,200 primary care clinics and 5 regional maternal/pediatric referral centers. —Construction cost in Iraq is one-tenth that of U.S. Equipment replacement ($300 million): —Early studies estimate that 50 percent of all equipment needs replacement. —Equipment and training of technicians. Partner with American health care organizations, intern. donors, and schools ($7 million). Private Sector Development Projects ($353 million) An American-Iraqi Enterprise Fund ($200 million): —Promote private sector of Iraq. —Independent fund would invest in private enterprises, and disseminate Western business know-how. Expand network of Employment Centers ($8 million). On-the-job training ($35 million). Market-oriented specialized training ($110 million). GOVERNANCE Objective Enable the transition to a legitimate constitutional government. Help Iraqis on the path to a democratic society and full sovereignty. Request—$300 million. Accomplishments Iraqi Governing Council, comprised of 25 men and women representing Iraq’s reli- gious and ethnic diversity, was established on July 13th and has had several accom- plishments: —Welcomed by UN Security Council as step toward a sovereign, democratic Iraq. 15 —Appointed constitutional preparatory committee. —Appointed 25 member Cabinet, responsible for the day to day management of Iraqi government ministries. —Iraqi Foreign Minister has been seated by the League of Arab States in early September. —Growing international recognition that GC is the political voice of Iraq. —GC prepared to open embassies in U.S., U.K. and 5 Arab nations. 90 percent of the Iraqi people live under local representative governing councils. Iraq has 3 pillars required for achieving a democratic society: free press and speech, freedom of religion and an independent judiciary. Plan for Requested Funds Refugees, Human Rights, and Civic Society ($300 million) Migration and Refugee Assistance ($105 million). Local Governance & Municipalities ($90 million). Property Claims Tribunal ($30 million). Update antiquated banking system ($30 million). Catch up business training ($20 million). Human Rights ($15 million). Civic Programs ($10 million). Chairman STEVENS. Thank you very much for your statement, Mr. Ambassador, and we thank you for bringing the Iraqi citizens with you. Perhaps we’ll have a chance to visit with them later. This supplemental will be the subject of hearings more than any supplemental I’m aware of. We’ve gone back and checked the his- tory. In the past we’ve had supplemental requests for Operations Desert Shield and Storm. We had only one hearing. That was true for Bosnia and Kosovo, too. The House and the Senate will conduct, I’m told, seven hearings regarding this supplemental, where ad- ministration officials will appear before the Congress. Ambassador Bremer, I am informed that you will appear at six of those hear- ings. You’re going to have a busy week. Ambassador BREMER. Yes, sir. Chairman STEVENS. I believe the supplemental is necessary to protect the lives of our people who are there now in Iraq. That in- cludes our troops, as well as Americans who will be working there. We need to help rebuild their infrastructure, as you have said, and get the Iraqi people back to work. Mr. Ambassador, from my point of view, you will have my full support for this important task, and your colleagues in the Coalition Provisional Authority, known as CPA. Liberation of the Iraqi people from the oppressive rule of Saddam Hussein is no small feat, nor is the task of helping the Iraqi people craft a nation rooted in freedom, free markets, and the rule of law. With our help, America’s help and leadership, the Iraqi people should become a stable nation with a promising future. SUPPLEMENTAL REQUEST Last week, as you said, the administration sent us an $87 billion supplemental request, of which $71 billion is for Iraqi-related pro- grams. Of that amount, $20.3 billion is for activities under your ju- risdiction. That includes $5.1 billion for security-related programs, including costs necessary to stand up a new Iraqi army, $5.7 billion for the electricity repair and reconstruction, and $2.1 billion for re- pair of oil infrastructure and oil products. You expanded that in your statement. The nexus between support for our troops and on- going reconstruction efforts in Iraq, for me, is undeniable. The 16 sooner a new Iraqi Government is formed and effectively functions, the quicker our solders, sailors, and all Americans can come home. Throughout this week, staff on the Defense and Foreign Oper- ations Subcommittees of this committee, will continue to meet with relevant administration officials, including members of your CPA, to better understand the details and assumptions of your supple- mental request. I look forward to your further comments through this hearing today. We are going to have a policy, if there’s no objection, of recog- nizing each Member, one from each side of the aisle, as we go down the line, for not to exceed 8 minutes the first time around, and then we will continue along as long as we can continue the hearing. Senator Byrd? Senator BYRD. May I ask you a question, without its being taken from my time? Chairman STEVENS. Yes, sir. Senator BYRD. When you say 8 minutes, does that include our opening statements as well as our questions? Chairman STEVENS. Yes, sir. Eight minutes, which each member can use as they wish as we go through the first round, and then we’ll go through another round as long as we can. Senator BYRD. Well, Mr. Chairman, it’ll take me more than 8 minutes for my statement. Could the chairman and the ranking member have some time for a statement—at least those two mem- bers, to begin with, without its being taken out of the time which we need for questions? Chairman STEVENS. Senator, I think—they tell me I used 4 min- utes, so I’ll let you have the rest of my statement, my time. Senator BYRD. Well, now, Mr. Chairman, you say you’ll ‘‘let me have.’’ I’m here on behalf, as you are, of millions of Americans. This is a very serious matter that we are going to be studying. It seems to me that our time is going to be extremely limited if we proceed as I envision it under the chairman’s proposal. Chairman STEVENS. Senator, the—— Senator BYRD. I’m not trying to be argumentative. I have a state- ment which will require at least 8 minutes. I’ll try to move through it. But if I’m only to be allowed 8 minutes, then I’ll use the full 8 minutes on my statement without getting to the questions which I have. Chairman STEVENS. Senator, there are 29 members of this com- mittee. If we give each one of them 8 minutes, it will be almost 3 hours, a little over 3 hours, before we get back to me. Senator BYRD. I understand. Now, how many sessions are we going to have in this committee? Chairman STEVENS. We’re going to have this hearing today. We’re going to have another hearing on Wednesday, and maybe one on Thursday. We were considering having an additional meeting on the Afghanistan portion of this, but there are several portions of this supplemental. The Defense one, it’s the largest one, it will be the subject of the Wednesday hearing, and hopefully we can go to other aspects. I’ve not discussed with members of the committee what other aspects might—we’re thinking perhaps of having one portion of our hearing cover the question that’s been raised by Am- bassador Bremer, and that’s the question of the contracts for recon- 17 struction, which, as he indicated, will be subject to competition. I think that’s a matter that should be explored. But we’re going to have as much time as we possibly can. As I said, Ambassador Bremer is scheduled six separate hear- ings. And, as I understand, he is also returning to Iraq the last part of the week with the House Appropriations Committee. So we’ve got a lot to do in a short period of time. But, Senator, I’m not trying to be arbitrary, either, but I do be- lieve—I’ve told every member of the committee will be here today, and each one of them is entitled some time. So in order to be enti- tled to some time, we have to limit all of us, at least as we go through the rounds. But, Senator, I agree we will not take this time out of your statement. I’ll be glad to recognize you, and I hope you’ll make your statement as short as you can, and I certainly will allot you the balance of my time. Senator BYRD. Well, Mr. Chairman, does the time used by the witnesses come out of the 8 minutes when we get to our questions? Chairman STEVENS. Yes, it does, sir. Senator BYRD. You see, that’s not the way we ought to do things. And I’m not blaming you for that. That’s the way we’re doing things around here anymore. But it used to be that we opened a line of questions, and we were permitted to pursue that line for much more time than we now are allowed to do. And I’m not fault- ing you for that. We have the same situation in the Armed Services Committee. Chairman STEVENS. Senator, I remember, when I first came here, new Senators were seen and not heard. We didn’t get a chance to ask questions until the senior members had exhausted their questions. That policy changed about midway through my 35 years, and I think we’re conducting this hearing in a manner that you conducted yours, sir, when you were chairman. Senator BYRD. Well, I don’t remember having any hearings on a matter of this kind. And we had 5 days of hearings when I con- ducted this—when I was chairman of this committee last—I believe it was at the beginning of last year. We had 5 days of hearings. You participated in those hearings. I’m simply saying that we’re going to need more time than it appears is going to be provided. Chairman STEVENS. The Senator is correct, we did have hearings on the subject of the new Department of Homeland Security. It was a brand new issue, and I did sit through all those hearings with you. There’s no question about it. This is on the question of a supplemental appropriations bill, which the President and Ambassador Bremer have said is abso- lutely necessary that we get this matter settled as quickly as pos- sible. And there are other committees involved, both in the Senate and the House. So all I can do is be as fair as I can, Senator. Senator BYRD. Well, Mr. Chairman, you are always fair. There’s no question about that. But this is a different matter from any that I have dealt with in quite awhile, and it takes more time. It really requires more time than it appears is going to be given. You and I can talk about this, to some extent, after the hearing. But I hope that we’ll have more days of hearings, because it’s obvious that, 18 with an $87 billion request, that’s $1,000 for each Iraqi, man, woman, boy, and girl. That’s a lot of money. And I hear my friends on the other side of the aisle saying, ‘‘This is your money,’’ to the people, you see, when we have these tax cuts, ‘‘It’s your money.’’ Well, here again, it’s your money. And I’m just arguing that we really need more time, and I hope you’ll think about it. So I’ll begin then. Chairman STEVENS. Yes, sir. Senator BYRD. Mr. Chairman, I thank Chairman Stevens for con- vening these hearings, and I thank Ambassador Bremer for his tes- timony today. Ambassador Bremer, you have a tough job. You’ve been handed an extremely difficult job under critical and dangerous cir- cumstances. And I’ve been following you in the press as best I could. I think that you’re doing the best you can do with what you have, and you have a terrible situation on your hands. It means life and death every day for you and our soldiers. And so the questions I ask are not going to be intended to be personal or unfriendly. But the chairman talks about his 35 years here. I’ve been in this Congress—this is my 51st year. And the people who are most af- fected can’t be here today to ask questions. Our children, our grandchildren, they can’t be here to ask questions. The American people out there, the voters, cannot be here today to ask questions. That’s our responsibility. We passed a supplemental earlier this year. We didn’t have ex- tensive hearings on that supplemental. We passed a bill providing for $40 billion within 3 days after September 11, with no questions asked. Now, this is a lot of money. I understand the need to expedite the action, but this does not shield us from the responsibility to ask questions. This administration, in my view, has not wanted to ask questions, not wanted to answer questions. This is a request in which I think we have to ask the questions. I hope you’ll accept my questions in the spirit in which I ask them. I don’t mean to be contentious or combative, but the ques- tions need to be asked. I recognize your problems as best I can, as ‘‘looking through a glass, darkly.’’ And I appreciate your coming here. The President’s request for an addition $87 billion for the mili- tary and for the reconstruction of Iraq is eye-popping—e-y-e, eye- popping. This request comes at a time when the American people are expressing serious reservations about the President’s go-it- alone occupation of Iraq. The American people are asking questions about the reconstruction plan. They are questioning the wisdom of a policy that has our soldiers serving as sitting ducks in an Iraqi shooting gallery. The committee has before it the President’s request for $87 bil- lion for Iraq. The request arrived late Wednesday without detailed justification or explanation. That’s not your problem. That’s not your fault. That explanation arrived over the weekend, and we are gathered here today, with the committee vote on the supplemental expected as early as September 30. 19 Is that what you’re proposing, Mr. Chairman, a markup by Sep- tember 30? Chairman STEVENS. I would hope to have it passed before the re- cess, yes, sir. Senator BYRD. I hope that we will not be in such a rush. This is a complicated, controversial, and incredibly costly request that has enormous long-range funding and policy implications. It is not something that this committee should rubberstamp. We ought to examine this request line by line and see if the high-minded rhet- oric coming out of the White House matches its proposal. I believe that 2 days or 3 days, or whatever the chairman has said, are not sufficient, and I hope that the committee will take more time to consider this request. We need expert witnesses, and we need independent analyses to advise us on these matters. In his $87 billion request, the President asks future generations of Americans to pay for his war in Iraq. By refusing to pay for this war today and, instead, exacerbating the largest deficit in the Na- tion’s history, President Bush is forcing those young Americans, who are now in kindergarten, to pick up the tab for his war in Iraq. If the President’s $87 billion request is approved, the deficit for fiscal year 2004 could reach $535 billion. That assumes spending the $164 billion Social Security surplus in the streets of Baghdad. Such a deficit totals nearly $2,400 for every person in this country, almost $10,000 for every family of four. Just a few short years ago, we had eliminated annual deficits and were on a glide-path to wiping out the debt by 2008. But that financial security has been destroyed in this administration’s fiscal shock-and-awe campaign. The President’s unsubstantiated justification for his war in Iraq has left the Nation questioning the White House’s current efforts. The administration was wrong, it seems, on its claims of an Iraqi broad-scale advanced weapons-of-mass-destruction capability. And it’s not your fault. The administration was wrong on its claims that American soldiers would be welcomed with open arms, as lib- erators. And the administration remains wrong in its refusal to share authority and responsibility for the restoration of Iraq with the rest of the world. We obviously cannot accomplish this task alone. I think that’s be- coming more and more clear every day. And yet that is exactly what we continue to attempt. It is no wonder that the country is losing confidence and patience in the President’s Iraqi program. Many of us on this panel have seen what a loss of public con- fidence and trust can do to a war effort, to a government, and, in- deed, to the fabric of the Nation. I saw it in Vietnam. Have we not learned the lessons of our own past? Despite the best hopes for an Iraqi democracy, we have begun to realize the worst fears of occupation. Hit-and-run murders of Amer- ican soldiers, guerrilla tactics, sabotage. We have forged a cauldron of contempt for America that may poison the efforts of peace throughout the Middle East and, indeed, the world. Winning the war has proved, by comparison, a far easier task than winning the peace. We had the weapons to win the war. But we have not shown the wisdom to win the peace. 20 What has become tragically clear is that the United States has no strong plan for reconstruction, and no clear concept for main- taining order. America is stumbling through the dark, hoping, by luck, to find the lighted path to peace and stability in Iraq. The Bush administration’s single-minded focus on Iraq has ig- nored, in large respect, the terrorist threat that produced the at- tack of September 11, 2001. The leader of that attack on our shores has not been found. Eyes have been trained solely on Iraq while we remain vulnerable here at home. Many of us on this committee have tried to better protect the American people from future ter- rorist attack. But time after time, the administration has actively opposed efforts to boost homeland security funds. In this request, however, the Bush administration seems very willing to back Iraqi homeland security dollars. The administration fought against a $200 million boost for America’s police officers, firefighters, and paramedics. But Iraqi first-responders would get $290 million through this supplemental. Last Wednesday, I, along with Representatives David Obey and Martin Sabo, offered an amendment to the Homeland Security Ap- propriations Conference Report that would have provided $125 mil- lion to hire 1,300 customs inspectors on America’s borders. That amendment was rejected as too expensive. Yet on the exact same day, the President sent Congress this emergency request for $150 million for 5,350 border inspections personnel, including 2,500 cus- toms inspectors, in Iraq. The cost of the President’s war in Iraq grows by the day. And even when the supplemental requests stop and our soldiers do fi- nally come home, the American people will continue to pay for this war for years to come. In essence, America faces two wars at once, the war brought against us with the attacks of September 11, 2001—that’s one war—and the war that we brought to Iraq on March 19, 2003. The Iraqi war was the wrong war for the wrong reasons against the wrong enemy. It is a tragedy of American foreign policy that the sympathy which most of the world had for the United States after 9/11 has been squandered by the Bush administration’s head- long pursuit of an unnecessary preemptive war against a sovereign country, a country which posed no imminent and direct threat to our national security. I don’t blame you for that. IRAQI RECONSTRUCTION Ambassador Bremer, you are the President’s point man for Iraqi reconstruction. You have been placed in an almost untenable posi- tion by flawed policy and a nondescript plan that some have called ‘‘Compassionate Colonialism.’’ I believe that the best approach for this administration is to garner more dollars, more men, and more expertise from the United Nations. It is painfully obvious that de- spite the best efforts of Ambassador Bremer and those in charge of the American occupation of Iraq, we cannot continue on this path alone. We ought to seek help before we completely alienate the international community and give Iraq a future of chaos in- stead of stability. Five months ago, Congress provided more than $70 billion in funds for military and reconstruction activities in Iraq and Afghan- 21 istan. Now we learn that the administration needs far more money for Iraq, far sooner than it either anticipated or admitted. When it came to the President’s last supplemental bill for Iraq, Congress could not get straight answers from the administration on the ex- pected costs or the expected duration of the Iraq operation. We can- not afford to settle for evasions this time around. Again, Mr. Chairman, I thank you for calling these hearings, and I look forward to the testimony from the witnesses. Chairman STEVENS. Thank you very much, Senator. Senator Domenici? Senator DOMENICI. Thank you very much, Mr. Chairman. First of all, the last I remember, the vote in the United States Senate for this war was 77 Senators aye, and 23 no. I would think that we could at least say that the Congress of the United States declared this war, and it’s not the President’s war, it’s our war. Now, I have so many things that I disagree with the distin- guished Senator from West Virginia on, but I am going to—in fact, I might say I disagree with his entire statement, and let me leave it at that. I think it has things in it that aren’t true, it has accusa- tions in it that are invalid. But I had another reason for coming today, and I will not let the distinguished Senator Byrd distract me from what I wanted to establish here today with you. First, let me say, your statement is a superb statement. As a matter of fact, the more I think about it, the more I perceive it to be a brilliant analysis of the current situation. Secondly, I believe it sets forth in great detail what you are going to use the money for. And, thirdly, I am pleased that you choose to mention a plan, the Marshall Plan. And I come here today because I want to ask you—and this is all asked in terms of trying to be positive, trying to be helpful, and trying to answer what my constituents want to know about Iraq. They’re not so interested in many of Senator Byrd’s attacks, but they would like to know if we have a plan. And I have to answer that more often than anything else, ‘‘Does the ad- ministration have a plan?’’ Now, Mr. Ambassador, today in your statement you mentioned a great American achievement called the Marshall Plan. I read about it, only because of this. I am thoroughly amazed. I thought it must have been something huge, and it must have lasted forever. It was $13 billion and lasted 4 years, and it is thought to be the recon- struction—that’s somewhere around 150 today, Mr. Leader—and it is seen as the instrument for the revitalization of 21 countries who are our friends. Now, you talked today about specifics, but I want to ask you, do you have a definite plan, with a timetable, with guideposts, for the rehabilitation of Iraq’s economy, infrastructure, and the turning over to the country, with its full political strength? Do you have one that can be viewed by the American people, can be presented as a plan to the Congress, to the public, so that we will know what it is and how you are going to implement it? Can I stop there and ask you to please answer that question? THE PLAN Ambassador BREMER. Thank you, Senator. We do have a plan. The plan addresses four major areas—restoring security, restoring 22 essential services, giving Iraq a vibrant private economy, and transforming Iraq’s political structure to provide for a sovereign democratic Iraq. Each of those four areas is then enlightened by a series of par- ticular steps. And, to answer your question, there are timelines and metrics on every single one of those steps. The plan, which I released—the latest version was released here to Congress on July 23—the plan runs now to, I think, some 98 pages and has some 300 or 400 individual tasks, each of which has a metric to measure over the next year to see how we’re doing. It’s a very comprehensive plan. Senator DOMENICI. Mr. Ambassador, is that plan a plan which is going to be followed and which—is it transparent? Can we see it? Can it be viewed and understood? Ambassador BREMER. Yes. The answer is yes to all those ques- tions, Senator. I think I have a copy of it with me here, and I’d be happy to provide copies again to the committee. It is an unclassi- fied plan. It’s available to anybody. It’s available to anybody, on our Web site, and can be read and studied by people and used however they wish. I will say this, that in the kind of circumstances we’re in, which is obviously a rather fluid, complicated situation, we have to be flexible about the plan. We have—my motto is strategic clarity and tactical flexibility. We’ve got to be clear what we want to get in all four of those areas. We’ve got to be clear about the end state we want, and we have to be flexible how we get there. But that plan drives our work every day in Baghdad. Senator DOMENICI. I’m not looking for a plan that cannot be changed. Ambassador BREMER. Clearly. Senator DOMENICI. I mean, obviously—— Ambassador BREMER. This is the plan, Senator. It’s here. Senator DOMENICI. That’s it? Ambassador BREMER. Yup. Senator DOMENICI. I wonder if there’s some way that you might, when you leave here, ask some of your experts to reduce that plan to some simple propositions that can be presented to a committee like ours, where you say that’s four parts, here’s the part on the political, and here’s the start, and here’s how it goes; here’s the part on economic. Could you do that, do you think? Ambassador BREMER. That’s an excellent idea, Senator. We’ll do that. Senator DOMENICI. I think you should have it ready the next time you testify, and it should be put up there where people can ask you questions from it. That’s too cumbersome and too difficult for us. Now, it has been said that we intend to do this seeking help from no one. Is that true? Ambassador BREMER. No, sir. This is already a rather broad international effort. Sixty-one countries have already pledged to the reconstruction of Iraq. The troops of 30 nations are already on the ground fighting alongside our soldiers. And I have, on my staff, representatives from 25 other nations. It’s already an international operation. 23 Senator DOMENICI. Aren’t we about to, or have we just completed a mechanism for an international bank that will handle the inter- national banking transactions of Iraq? And did not somebody named Peter McPherson leave Michigan State University—or Michigan, and some to help you with that? Ambassador BREMER. Yes. Mr. McPherson’s been my top eco- nomic advisor the last 4 months. He’s just finished his tour. He was instrumental in putting together the proposal for a trade bank to finance imports into Iraq, that you just mentioned. Senator DOMENICI. And what would be the purpose of a trade bank? Ambassador BREMER. The purpose of that bank is to provide fi- nance for Iraqis who wish to import materials—it could be a Gen- eral Electric or a Siemens engine of some kind—for which they need trade credit. Senator DOMENICI. Now, most countries, immediately after a war, have trouble with banking. This country already has a bank- ing system, does it not? Ambassador BREMER. After a sort. It has two state-owned banks, which ran rather on Soviet style and, therefore, were not really banks as much as mechanisms to push money to favored people in the economy. We do have them reopened now. Most of their branches are open, so we do begin to get some activity. But, as I said in my statement, a more important element is that the Min- ister of Finance announced yesterday that we’re going to allow international banks to come in and compete, and that will give us a real modern banking system. Senator DOMENICI. But are you not going to have a central bank- ing system with—— Ambassador BREMER. Yes, sir. Senator DOMENICI [continuing]. Central monetary system? Ambassador BREMER. Yes, sir. We established the Central Bank as the first independent central bank in Iraq’s history, in July. Senator DOMENICI. And that exists already. Ambassador BREMER. That exists, yes, sir. That’s up—— Senator DOMENICI. What is it—— Ambassador BREMER [continuing]. Up and running. Senator DOMENICI [continuing]. Modeled after? Ambassador BREMER. It’s really modeled more or less after the Federal Reserve here. Senator DOMENICI. My time is up, I’m sorry. Mr. Chairman, my time is up. Chairman STEVENS. Thank you very much, Senator. Senator Inouye? Senator INOUYE. Thank you very much. Thank you very much, Mr. Ambassador, for your statement. COALITION FORCES Listening to your statement, sir, you mentioned the words ‘‘Coali- tion forces’’ seven times. How many troops are in the Coalition forces? Ambassador BREMER. I think as of today it’s about 16,000. Senator INOUYE. Of that number, the United States is how many? 24 Ambassador BREMER. Oh, I’m sorry, I thought you were talking about the non-American. The total number is about 160,000, of which all but 16,000 are American. I may be off by a couple of thousand, because the numbers change from day to day and I’ve been away from Baghdad for 2 days. Senator INOUYE. And there are 31 non-American countries there. Ambassador BREMER. That’s right. Senator INOUYE. That includes the British? Ambassador BREMER. That’s right. Senator INOUYE. With how many? Ambassador BREMER. The British have about 8,000, I think, Sen- ator. Senator INOUYE. And the next-largest group? Ambassador BREMER. Next-largest group would probably be the Poles, who are heading a multinational division based south of Baghdad. They have, I think, a reinforced brigade, probably 3,000 to 4,000. Senator INOUYE. All right. What about the others, the small ones? They must be small ones. Ambassador BREMER. Well, the numbers depend. There is a Spanish-led brigade as part of the Polish division, which has bat- talion-level troops from countries like El Salvador, Honduras, and Nicaragua, but they’re—I mean, I could submit, for the record, or I could have the Pentagon submit for the record, the full list, Sen- ator. I just don’t have it at the top of my head. Senator INOUYE. I would like to see that, because I’ve never seen this. Ambassador BREMER. Okay. [The information follows:] [CLERK’S NOTE.—The information is classified and is being held in the committee files.] Senator INOUYE. When one speaks of the ‘‘Coalition forces,’’ you get an impression of huge armies there. But I would gather from this that there are some countries that have provided, what, 100 troops? Ambassador BREMER. Well, there would be some with a company level, that’s right. Senator INOUYE. Now, you spoke of 60-plus countries that have provided aid for reconstruction? Ambassador BREMER. Yes, sir. Senator INOUYE. What is the total amount that you’re antici- pating from all sources? Ambassador BREMER. It’s a bit hard to tell right now. Those 61 countries, according to our information, have pledged just under $1.5 billion. As I mentioned in my statement, we are working with the World Bank and the United Nations for a donor’s conference in Madrid at the end of next month, and I think that will be the point at which we hopefully will see some substantial contributions by other countries and by international financial institutions. Senator INOUYE. We will be providing, in this bill, roughly $20 billion for reconstruction? Ambassador BREMER. Yes, sir. Senator INOUYE. In this $87 billion, do we anticipate assistance from other countries? 25 Ambassador BREMER. Yes. Senator INOUYE. Or is this all American? Ambassador BREMER. Well, the $87 billion, of course, is all Amer- ican. The World Bank has just about completed an assessment of the needs of the Iraqi economy. They judge that the Iraqi economy needs something between $60 and $70 billion in the next 4 to 5 years. Our $20 billion is part of that needed $60 to $70 billion. Senator INOUYE. So the heavy load, at this moment, in personnel and money is borne by the United States. Ambassador BREMER. That’s correct. Senator INOUYE. Now, I gather, from reading the press, that much work has been done. As you’ve pointed out, schools are open, hospitals are open, the water is running, we have electricity for 16 hours a day, et cetera, and oil seems to be pumping. Who has done that work? Ambassador BREMER. Well, that work has been done by Iraqis, often financed—almost always financed by the Coalition Provi- sional Authority using, in some cases, appropriated funds that the Congress appropriated earlier this year, and, in other cases—in fact, now the majority of the funds come from Iraqi sources—Iraqi oil revenues, frozen assets, and so forth. CONTRACTS Senator INOUYE. Do we have—this is a question that is asked of me quite often—do we have major American corporations involved in the reconstruction? Ambassador BREMER. Yes. We’ve had a number of contracts. I think the total now is 92 contracts have been let. And under U.S. law, the contract, the prime contractor, in those cases must be an American corporation. Senator INOUYE. How much are the contracts worth? Ambassador BREMER. I would have to get back to you, but they’re certainly worth $2.4 billion, because that’s the amount that was appropriated. And then there will be other contracts that we have let using Iraqi funds that will have gone to American compa- nies, also. But I would have to get back to you with a precise num- ber, Senator. It’s certainly at least $2.4 billion. [The information follows:] Contracts awarded to American companies are worth $3.319 billion (including U.S. appropriated and Iraqi funds). Of these, Bechtel’s contract is worth $1.03 bil- lion and Halliburton’s KBR oil contract is worth $1.418 billion. Senator INOUYE. How are the contractors selected? Ambassador BREMER. Contractors are selected on an open and fair bidding process consistent with U.S. law. Senator INOUYE. Were we prepared for the terrorism and guerilla activities that are now occurring? Did we anticipate that when the President announced that the fight was over? Ambassador BREMER. I think we anticipated that there would be resistance by remnants of the former regime. The degree to which we are now threatened by terrorists, I think, has been an unwel- come surprise to some of us. You will recall that at the beginning of the war we attacked an Ansar al-Islam base in the north of Iraq. We killed quite a few of the terrorists, but a number of them es- caped into Iran. Those terrorists have since infiltrated back into 26 Iraq, and now there are scores of them in Iraq, many of them in Baghdad, who pose a threat that I think is important to both the Coalition and to the Iraqi people, as we’ve seen in the terrorist at- tacks, including the one today. Senator INOUYE. Would this be unfair to say, that we should have learned something in Afghanistan, that there the war never ends? Ambassador BREMER. Well, I’m not enough familiar with the pre- cise circumstances in Afghanistan to make a comparison, Senator, but I think it is clear that we’ve got to now continue the process we’ve started of imposing a sense of security in Iraq, and that the key to that, as I’ve suggested, is to get Iraqis more involved in it. And I think we’ll find more success as we get Iraqis more involved in it. Senator INOUYE. Some of my colleagues have been discussing the possibility of dividing this $87 billion in two parts, military and re- construction. What would be the effect or the impact if this Con- gress passed the military portion, the $50-plus billion, and left the remaining $20-plus billion for debate, awaiting the President’s presentation of his case before the United Nations? Ambassador BREMER. Well, Senator, as I suggested in my open- ing remarks, I think this $87 billion is an integral part. We cannot secure security in Iraq in the long run, we cannot find a path to withdraw our troops there, unless we can provide Iraq and Iraqis with the essential economic infrastructure, which will give them a sense of security and let them move forward. And as was noted, $5 billion of the $20 billion is directly related to security—to the new Iraqi army, to the police, to the justice system. Those are insepa- rable, it seems to me, from the security of our forces and from pro- viding security there. So I think it would be—of course, the Senate should have what- ever debate it needs to have on the supplemental, but I think it would be a mistake to separate parts of these out. This is ex- tremely urgent. We need to get this $20 billion going quickly. Senator INOUYE. I notice my time is up. I thank you, Mr. Ambas- sador. Chairman STEVENS. Thank you very much, Senator. Senator Bennett? Senator BENNETT. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. Ambassador Bremer, thank you for your appearance here and for the clarify of your statement. Reference has been made to the Marshall Plan. I think that’s an appropriate reference, and I would make this comment in response to earlier comments that were made in the committee. At the end of the Second World War, our national debt stood at 150 percent of the Gross Domestic Product (GDP). In other words, the national debt was half again larger than the total amount of goods and serv- ices produced in the United States. Today, the national debt owed to the public is 38 percent of GDP. We are not endangering our children and our grandchildren fi- nancially with an $87 billion supplemental. I know $87 billion sounds huge, compared to $15 billion or $13 billion for the Mar- shall Plan, but I also remember when you could buy a decent lunch for 35 cents, and you can’t do that today. 27 So in constant dollars, measured as a percentage of GDP, the point I would make is that this is not a terrifying amount of money that you have asked for. Second, I would point out that the Marshall Plan began in 1948. The war ended in 1945. We cannot afford to wait 3 years to deal with the economic and infrastructure reconstruction of Iraq, as was done in Europe. So I applaud you on the speed with which you have moved to get this job done, much more rapidly than was done in a previous circumstance. Senator Burns had to leave. He handed me a note as he left and asked me to raise this issue on his behalf, which I am happy to do. TELECOMMUNICATIONS Senator Burns, as you know, is very much concerned with tele- communications issues in the Senate Commerce Committee, and he believes strongly that the ability to communicate will be a corner- stone of the reconstruction. He has been trying to find a name of someone on your staff with whom he can communicate on this issue. And, on his behalf, I would ask you to provide that name to Senator Burns. He points out there’s $322 million for telecom and postal corpora- tion internal communication. He would like more information about how that $322 million would be used and, again, a name of some- one on your staff with whom we could talk. Could you respond to that? Ambassador BREMER. Yes, I will get him a name this afternoon. [The information follows:] The point of contact for telecommunications is the Senior Advisor to the Ministry of Communication in Baghdad is Mr. Gary Sudnick and at the Pentagon is Mr. Linton Wells. Senator BENNETT. Do you agree that telecommunications and postal service is an essential part of this? Ambassador BREMER. Absolutely. Iraq needs its economy brought quickly into the 21st century. And we are working already to re- store the telecommunications system that existed before—the fiberoptics system—and we’re trying to get a mobile cellular system up. But it’s quite clear that if Iraq is going to have a modern busi- ness, and we hope it will, a vibrant sector, and we hope it will, we are going to have to spend several hundred million dollars on put- ting together a modern telecommunications system. It’s a vital part, as you note, of this proposal. Senator BENNETT. I applaud the four statements that you are— or the four areas that you are concentrating on, and I agree with the priority—security first and then essential services, working to get the economy under control, and then ultimately the political structure that will preserve these things. One of the statements that have been made—one of the accusa- tions that has been made with respect to this is that we are doing things in Iraq that need to be done in the United States, and why are we spending money to build schools and pave roads and do all of these wonderful things in Iraq when we need more schools and roads, et cetera, in the United States? As I look through your presentation, there is none of that. You are not talking about building schools or providing anything that 28 might be considered above the very basic survival kinds of levels. We have just gone through the experience with the hurricane and 4 million people out of power, and we are focusing, in this com- mittee, I’m sure, as emergency monies come through, and the speed with which we get back to a certain baseline. As I read your plan, you are talking about establishing a baseline. You are not talking about constructing anything on top of that that might be something that the Iraqis themselves could construct. Do I have it correct? Is my examination here—— ESSENTIAL SERVICES Ambassador BREMER. Yes, Senator. The main thrust of what we’re trying to do here is get the fundamental preconditions, the economic and essential service preconditions, that will allow Iraq to create a vibrant private sector which can then pay for itself. And I should say that if one looks forward in the budgeting process, our estimate is that by 2005, Iraq’s oil revenues should be more than sufficient to pay for the Iraqi Government and provide an extra amount that can be used for capital investment in other areas, ei- ther more electricity or more schools. It’s also the case that we think the donors conference will probably focus on some of the things you just mentioned—education, healthcare, and so forth. So we have tried to focus on the essential services. Senator BENNETT. But we are not trying to do anything in Iraq other than provide simply the absolute baseline, plain-vanilla kinds of security and services that are necessary, and then we—— Ambassador BREMER. That’s right. Senator BENNETT [continuing]. Look to the Iraqis to build beyond that. INTERNATIONAL COMMUNITY Ambassador BREMER. The Iraqis and the international commu- nity. Senator BENNETT. And the international community. I held a hearing, as chairman of the Joint Economic Committee, on this issue of the cost of reconstruction of Iraq, and in that hear- ing discovered something that I had not known before. Iraq has fer- tile soil, and Iraq has water. And prior to Saddam Hussein’s in- credible mismanagement, Iraq was a net exporter of food in the re- gion. I had not realized that. Ambassador BREMER. Right. Senator BENNETT. I’m concerned that a single-product economy is a shaky economy. As you look down the road, are you looking at things that can be done? And does your plan help provide a baseline for things that can be done by the Iraqis to build an econ- omy based on something other than total reliance on oil? Specifi- cally, agriculture. To have a net exporter of food in that region would be a very significant thing. Ambassador BREMER. Yes, Senator, it’s a good point. Many peo- ple, when they think about Iraq’s wealth, think only about the oil. But the fact is, it has great water and very fertile soil when the water is put together with the soil. It was, after all, the ‘‘fertile crescent,’’ and it was an exporter of agriculture, and there’s no rea- son why it can’t be. We’re spending something like $900 million 29 on—particularly on the irrigation, which is the main problem, so that we can put that agriculture back on its feet as an export-earn- er and as a new source of revenue. I think there are other sources of revenue, which are obvious. They are taxation and, in the end, tourism. But the focus here is on agriculture, about $900 million. Senator BENNETT. Thank you very much. One quick final comment, Mr. Chairman. I remember, in this Congress, when we approved an action in Haiti, went in to, as it now turns out, replace a brutal dictator, much beloved of American conservatives, with a brutal dictator much beloved of American lib- erals. We turned the reconstruction responsibility over to the United Nations, and left. And the people of Haiti are now worse off eco- nomically and politically than before we went in. We do not want another Haiti in Iraq. Chairman STEVENS. Senator Leahy? Senator LEAHY. Well, thank you, Mr. Chairman, and I also wel- come the Ambassador. After the President, he probably has the most difficult job these days in the Federal Government, and he’s doing it under very dangerous and difficult conditions. I want to thank you, Ambassador, for your office and the Office of Management and Budget (OMB) for the detailed materials you sent up with the supplemental request. You’ve mentioned your July 23 plan. I’d ask you to send a copy of that to the Congress so that we can see what it is, too, please. I’ll assume that’s a yes. [The information follows:] The July 23 edition of the Strategic Plan was re-submitted to Congress. Senator LEAHY. And you may want to double-check your answer to Senator Inouye’s question about the first $2.4 billion being in open and competitive bids. I’m not sure that’s accurate. But if you—— Ambassador BREMER. I’m sorry, no, I can correct—there was one bid that was not open—that is correct—before the war. That is cor- rect. But I was answering—— Senator LEAHY. For how much—— Ambassador BREMER [continuing]. I thought, the question on the future of the $20 billion. Senator LEAHY. I’ll let you look at the—— Ambassador BREMER. Yeah, I’ll—— Senator LEAHY [continuing]. Question and—— Ambassador BREMER. I understand. Senator LEAHY [continuing]. Clarify it, if you wish. I do appreciate you telling me your answers to the letters I sent you—— Ambassador BREMER. Yeah. Senator LEAHY [continuing]. Several months ago. You mentioned you didn’t have a fax machine. I sent them to your office here in Washington. And I assume that every few months that they do find some way to correspond with you or at least with all the people we’re sending back and forth over there. 30 Now, I don’t know, the way this bill is written, whether I want to vote for or against the supplemental, but I want to take this time to make this point. The President has gotten us into a costly and dangerous situa- tion in Iraq. We’re at a crucial juncture. American lives, our re- sources, and our credibility are on the line. I think the next 12 months are going to have consequences for decades to come, long after all of us are out of whatever offices we’re holding now. Since the fall of Baghdad, practically everything the White House and the Pentagon predicted about Iraq has turned out to be wrong. You wouldn’t know it when you listen to some of the officials here in Washington who made overly optimistic assessments—or when people raise questions about whether they’re wrong, instead of an answer, we’re told that we’re not true patriots. The patriotism is questioned even of people who have served with distinction in our military. We get a different picture from those who are in Iraq in the field. Vice President Cheney said Saddam Hussein had reconstituted nuclear weapons. No weapons of that nature or any weapons of mass destruction have yet been found. Last week, even though we were told by some in the administration there’s a link between Saddam Hussein and 9/11, President Bush conceded there was none. The Vice President said our troops would be treated as lib- erators. I’m sure that most Iraqis are grateful that we removed Saddam Hussein. I’m grateful that he’s gone. But it’s clear the Iraqi people increasingly don’t want us there. A New York Times article last week, entitled, ‘‘Iraqi’s Bitterness is Called Bigger Threat Than Terror,’’ described this problem. Now, you may disagree with this, but it’s hard to overlook such warnings when our soldiers, who have performed so bravely, so ad- mirably, are ambushed and killed. There seems to be increasing ju- bilation in the streets, and not just by remnants of Saddam’s re- gime. And there is the issue of cost. Five months ago, we passed a war- time supplemental, I believe, Mr. Chairman, Senator Byrd, which provided $2.5 billion for the reconstruction of Iraq. And we were told that’s all the U.S. taxpayers would be asked for. Well, that was a gross miscalculation. Then former OMB Director Daniels said the total cost could be between $50 and $60 billion. The Deputy De- fense Secretary said, ‘‘We’re dealing with a country that can fi- nance its own reconstruction.’’ He said the oil revenues of that country would bring between $50 and $100 billion over the course of the next 2 to 3 years. Well, those were wildly off the mark. I agree with Senator Byrd. When Americans saw the $87 billion price tag it gave Americans sticker-shock-and-awe. It’s had the same effect up here. With this supplemental we’ll spend more than $100 billion in the first year to rebuild Iraq. And it’s clear we’re going to be back for a lot more. We don’t have this money in the bank. It is red ink. We are headed for a trillion dollar deficit that our children and grand- children will pay off. I think of what this spending magnitude would bring to our national priorities—our schools, our healthcare, our ability to fix Medicare or Social Security. 31 Now, one of the reasons many of us disagreed with the adminis- tration’s decision to attack Iraq without the support of the United Nations, is that it would be harder to rebuild Iraq on our own. As one Senator, I feel it would have been better if the administration had not alienated our allies through arrogance, or snubbed Mexico and Canada, among others, only to find ourselves needing their support today. I haven’t heard anything about how this supplemental is going to deal with the security situation in Iraq or bring our soldiers home. We are told the security problems will be solved by rebuild- ing the Iraqi army. That’s going to take time, as we’ve seen in Af- ghanistan, another country where we’re doing nation-building, where crime and violence today are on the rise. And I worry that our soldiers and relief workers will continue to die, attempts to re- build will continue to be thwarted by saboteurs, and the Iraqi peo- ple’s support will erode. It’s a long road for the Iraqi Governing Council to a viable democracy. And even if that is possible, guess who’s going to be there until the job is done? We are. Our soldiers, our aid workers, well-qualified and motivated diplomats, like your- self, and, of course, our money. I want to know how much it’s going to cost, when the Iraqis can take over. I don’t think we can drift along, spending more than $1 billion a week with no plan, no timetable, every week another four or five Americans killed and wounded, and the growing resentment of the Iraqi people. I think it’s time to bend the same old go-it- alone strategy that has squandered the goodwill and support of the international community. I think we’ve got to get the international community behind us. Ambassador Bremer, I hope you don’t take these criticisms per- sonally. You inherited a policy without a strategy. We want you to succeed. Now, we were told the $2.5 billion the President wanted for the Iraq Relief and Reconstruction Fund was all you’d need. That was back in April. Five months later, you’re asking for another $20 bil- lion just for 2004. Do you believe you’re going to need another $25 to $50 billion, or are we really going to see foreign donations? Be- cause the amount of donations—we’ve talked about 30 countries. Some of them have got forces in there the size of some of the rural police forces in Vermont. I appreciate their support, but you can’t really count that. I know we’re going to get a request for more for- eign aid than they donate. So are you going to be back here next year asking for another $25 or $50 billion? Ambassador BREMER. Well, Senator, the amount we’re asking for here represents what we think is urgently needed now for imme- diate needs, and we don’t anticipate coming back for another sup- plemental of this magnitude. That’s all I can say at the moment. I think we’ve found the reason that the $2.4 billion initially was not sufficient was we found the infrastructure in the country was in a lot worse shape than we thought. And that’s the problem we’ve got. We’ve got to redo that infrastructure. It’s expensive. Senator LEAHY. Mr. Chairman, I’ll submit my other questions. I thank you. Chairman STEVENS. Thank you. Senator Brownback? 32 Senator BROWNBACK. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. Thank you, Ambassador Bremer, for being here today. I appre- ciate your testimony. I thought your statement was quite good and eloquent and very captivating on the current situation. It really de- scribes something quite different than we read in the press, it seems like, on a daily basis, where most of the news seems to be pretty negative. I think it’s important to go back and look at this situation and some of the history of how we, as a body, got here, because, as Sen- ator Domenici pointed out, I think there were 77 Senators, or somewhere around that, voted for the Iraqi war conflict. In the House, the vote was 296 to grant the administration the authority to go to war and move forward, versus 133 against. Strong, bipar- tisan, nearly 300 votes in the House, out of the 435, were there. So, I mean, strong bipartisan support. And if you go back prior to September 11, it probably wouldn’t have been there. But after September 11, we changed. And that same week of September 11, we appropriated nearly $40 billion for reconstruction and war efforts and gave the President and the ad- ministration the authority to go to war in Afghanistan, with about an hour’s debate, so moved was the country that we needed to do something about the terrorism threat. And then when that moved forward, and after that, there’s a continuing threat in the war on terrorism that we’re experiencing in the world today. The adminis- tration comes forward with a proposal on dealing with Iraq. Now, I’ve been dealing with the issue of Iraq and the Iraqi oppo- sition for some time. I’ve been on the Foreign Relations Committee since I’ve been in the U.S. Senate, in 1996. I’ve worked with Dr. Chalabi, that you work with now, for some period of time. We’ve had him up for a number of hearings—Iraqi opposition—and talk- ing about the horrific situation that the Iraqi people were experi- encing and also the three different areas of Iraq. In the North, it was basically governing itself separate from Saddam. In the South, Saddam was pillaging the countryside and draining the wetlands areas that I hope we’re working on getting restored. And they came forward and put forward for us a bill, the Iraqi Liberation Act, that passed the Congress, was signed into law by President Clinton, and it called for regime change in Iraq, signed by President Clinton. This was passed probably in 1998, I’m thinking somewhere through that period of time. Allocated $100 million, which I wish we had spent it at that period of time in working and building up the oppo- sition. The whole point that I’m putting forward here is that Saddam has been a problem for a long period of time, and any allegations or assertions that we’re coming up—that the Bush administration came up with new claims about Saddam Hussein, I was getting the same intelligence reports under President Clinton as I was under President Bush about the Iraqi threat, the nature of the threat. And these were not—you can’t know in intelligence reports for cer- tain, because you’re gathering information. Unless you’ve got some- body in the room, you’re not certain what is taking place, but the best estimates. And we did know that he had used chemical weap- ons against his own people and against the Iranians. We knew that. And we knew he had terrorists operating on his soil. And so 33 you had that mixture of terrorists and the ability to constitute weapons of mass destruction. And then we were in dependency— in dependency on Saddam Hussein that he wouldn’t mix the two and use them against us. So when the vote comes up for the Congress, most of us said, ‘‘I’m not willing to depend on Saddam Hussein that he’s not going to use—find some way to get chemical weapons, give a pickup truck full of them to terrorists, and find them here on our soil, as we did on September 11.’’ We moved forward on Iraq. The war moved, I think, much more quickly than most people thought it would, surprisingly so, and we were very happy about that. But now we’re at a point in time, do you go ahead and move forward and conclude and deal with the sit- uation that we’re in, or do you pull out, like we did the prior time, in Afghanistan, in the 1980s? And I think everybody has concluded you can’t pull out at this point in time. You have to work in recon- structing and building Iraq back up. I do get two pointed questions often from my constituents on this, and they’re this. Number one is, we hate the loss of any life, particularly an American life. And are there any other things that we can do to protect these American lives? Or how can we move forward with protection of those American lives? That’s the thing that just strikes at the very nerve of Americans, is that issue. And then the second one that I’d like for you to address is, a number of people question—Iraq has the second largest reserves of oil in the world. Can’t they pay for this in the reconstruction effort? And you’ve addressed a portion of that, that by 2005 they’ll be able to pay for their government and some capital investment. Project me on out a little bit further on that point, if you would. Ambassador BREMER. Thank you, Senator. Just before I answer your questions, two points. We have about $100 million in this supplemental request to begin the reconstitu- tion of the marshlands that Saddam Hussein drained. And you mentioned the chemical attack. Secretary of State and I, a week ago today, visited the site of the chemical attack in 1988, in Halebjeh, up in the north. And it was a very moving thing to see this village where more than 5,000 people were killed by Saddam’s chemical attack in 1988. I met a man there who was the only member of a 24-member family who survived the chemical at- tacks. It’s quite a moving thing. On the question about protecting lives, there basically are three things we’re doing to try to deal better with security. Number one, we’re trying to improve our collection of intelligence against the people who are attacking us, whether they’re former regime loyal- ists or terrorists. We have a fusion cell that we’ve established in Baghdad under my direction, which is trying to focus our intel- ligence more closely. Secondly, we are in the process of reconfiguring our forces to make them more mobile and lighter so that they can move around and respond more quickly to threats. And, thirdly, as I mentioned in my statement, and as is very prominent in the President’s re- quest, we need to get Iraqi forces more involved in their own secu- rity. That’s why you have $2 billion in here to speed up the train- ing of an Iraqi professional police, and $2 billion to train an Iraq 34 army. And contrary to one of the earlier comments, with the Presi- dent’s supplemental, we will be able to train a full three divisions by next summer, of the Iraqi army. That’s a significant force for Iraq. OIL RESERVES On the question of the oil reserves, the problem is this. The oil infrastructure was severely run down over the last 20 years, partly because of sanctions over the last decade. Iraq has a theoretical production capability of about three billion barrels a day. We hope to get back to that level by the middle of next year, roughly, some- time in the late summer next year. Once Iraq reaches that level— that’s its maximum production level—it should be able, assuming a price of about $18 a barrel, to generate in the neighborhood of $20 billion a year in oil revenues. To get substantially beyond that level means increasing their production, which means exploiting new fields, and that will involve a substantial investment, presum- ably from outside Iraq, into the development of new fields so their resources can be brought forward. But even with just getting back to three million barrels a day, by the year 2005 they should be producing a surplus on their cash budget, which will allow the Iraqis to begin to pay for some of the less urgent things that we’ve got to pay for over the next 12 to 18 months. Senator BROWNBACK. Thank you. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. Chairman STEVENS. Senator Dorgan? Senator DORGAN. Mr. Chairman, thank you very much. Ambassador Bremer, thanks for being here. There’s no doubt that the money that you are requesting is need- ed, and let me describe my reaction this way. First of all, with re- spect to the military funding that you are requesting, I think that the Congress will move quickly. I don’t think we will withhold one dollar that’s needed to support the troops, who we have asked to fight for this country. And so I believe that is going to be appro- priated fully by this Congress. RECONSTRUCTION FUNDING I want to go through with you, however, the issue of reconstruc- tion funding. The campaign that was initiated in Iraq, called ‘‘shock and awe,’’ exclusively and specifically did not target infra- structure. We didn’t target their electric grid, we didn’t target the dams and the basic infrastructure of Iraq. My colleague from Kan- sas made the point that Iraq has the second-largest oil reserves in the world, next to the Saudis. You made the point that by next summer Iraq will be able to produce three million barrels per day. And at that level of production, with about 80 percent available for export, the way I calculate it, using reasonably conservative prices, the Iraq oil fields will produce about $16 billion a year of net rev- enue. That’s $160 billion in 10 years, or $320 billion in 20 years. When I take a look at what you want to do in Iraq, with respect to reconstruction—basic investment in water, sewer, irrigation, de- veloping marshlands, improving power plants, developing commu- nications plans, including WiFi, housing projects, 3,500 new hous- 35 ing units in seven communities, and so on. This occurs to me not a reconstruction based on damage done by the war, but reconstruc- tion that you believe is necessary for the long-term welfare and eco- nomic health of the country of Iraq. The question, for me, is, why would we not use the Iraq oil rev- enue to collateralize loans from the International Monetary Fund (IMF) or the World Bank to pay for the reconstruction of Iraq? $320 billion over the next 20 years, seems to me collateralizing loans from the International Monetary Fund, which I read this weekend, just provided $13 billion to Argentina, why is it that you have chosen to say that rather than moving in that direction, the American people should provide $20-plus billion in grants for re- construction? Could you identify or at least address that piece? Because I think that no doubt the reconstruction is necessary, no doubt it is urgent, but there is also another way to pay for this, and I don’t under- stand why you have chosen grants from the American taxpayers— and, incidently, told us in your testimony, that the new tax rate in the country of Iraq will have a top rate, and you beamed, appar- ently, when you said 15 percent—so we will have taxpayers in this country paying a much higher tax rate on income taxes than you have, or the council has, created in Iraq, and then use the money to invest in exactly the sort of things we’re debating about in this country—water, communications, transportation infrastructure. Might you address that, Mr. Ambassador? Ambassador BREMER. Yes, thank you, Senator. We, of course, considered the question of whether this supple- mental should be done in the form of loans of some kind, which is effectively what you’re mentioning, and as I said in my testimony, and I feel quite strongly about it, I believe it would be a mistake to lay any more debt onto the backs of the Iraqis. They are under a burden, an extraordinary burden, of about roughly $100 to $120 billion of debt entered into by Saddam’s regime over the last 20 years or so, and another $90 to $100 billion in claimed reparations from countries because of Saddam’s wars. That means that Iraq has something like $200 billion in debt outstanding. There is no way the Iraq Government is going to be able to pay that. Even if you took all of the excess amounts projected—and I answered ear- lier, in answer to Senator Brownback’s questions—the math is roughly as follows. Starting in 2005, the cost of running the Iraqi Government, with no major capital investments, is about $15 bil- lion a year. The revenues, as you rightly point out, we think they will come to roughly $20 billion a year by then, because they will have some tax revenues, they will have some tariff revenues in ad- dition to the oil revenues. So you have revenues of roughly $20 bil- lion, and expenses of roughly $15 billion. You could—— Senator DORGAN. Well—— Ambassador BREMER. You could imagine roughly $5 billion a year, in other words, available for capital. If the debt is assumed to be $200 billion, and if you assume, just for sake of math, an average interest rate of 6 percent a year, the debt service alone on that debt would come to $12 billion a year just—— Senator DORGAN. But—— 36 Ambassador BREMER [continuing]. Just for the debt that they have now. Therefore, it has been our view that we need to help carry them across the bridge of 2004, which is the year when they are going to not be generating enough excess income to pay any extra capital for themselves. Senator DORGAN. Mr. Ambassador, I, frankly, don’t understand that. You say that the country of Iraq has accrued a debt of $200 billion, roughly. Did you, then, developing a new government in Iraq, inherit the responsibility for the debt created by Saddam Hussein? It’s a rather peculiar thing to inherit, it seems to me, number one. Number two, it seems to me the first obligation would be to begin seeking debt forgiveness. And I’d like to ask who is the largest holder of that debt? Ambassador BREMER. Of course, we do inherit the debt. That’s international law until something is done about that debt by a sov- ereign government, which will come into being after the elections. Senator DORGAN. And who is the largest holder of that debt? Ambassador BREMER. The largest holders—and there is some im- precision as to exact amounts—are France, Russia, Germany, and Japan. Senator DORGAN. And we can talk about risk-free encumbrances at some point later. I have rather limited time. But I do want to make the point, if you’re saying that you and the administration decided to seek grants for reconstruction in Iraq rather than collateralize their oil production—and I think we have a disagree- ment of about $5 billion a year, and we’ll go over that later, as well, in this calculation—but if you’re saying you made that deci- sion because of overhanging debt, it seems to me that if one works hard at debt forgiveness—and certainly one should. Saddam Hus- sein is gone. Ambassador BREMER. Yes. Senator DORGAN. Good riddance. Whatever debt burden the Iraqi people now have around their neck, it seems to me, ought to be for- given. And especially those countries who did business with the country of Iraq during a time when there was an embargo. There ought not be any obligation for you or anybody else in the Gov- erning Council to accept that debt. I understand international law, but—— Look, I really think—as this committee begins to strategize and think through what we do here, I think, first and foremost, we pro- vide the money for the troops. It’s essential. We do it quickly. Sec- ond, we think through a policy, a cogent policy, on behalf of this country. What should we do with respect to the reconstruction in Iraq? Not whether we do it, because we must, but who pays for it. Should that be the burden of the American people? And I don’t— frankly, I don’t think so, especially when you’re dealing with a country that has the second-largest oil reserves in the world. And I do want to make one additional point, and I’ll pursue this at a later time. There was a newspaper story, a rather lengthy story, in the Washington Post about 2 days ago that gave me great pause. Ambassador Bremer, you talked about the opposition in Iraq being guerrillas and insurgents and the Fedayeen and so on. This was a story that I read, and I put the paper down and thought a 37 lot about it. It was about a family holding a picture of their son— wasn’t part of Saddam’s operation, wasn’t part of the Fedayeen, wasn’t part of anything. He was just a guy that became incensed and angry and part of the local group in his town, and decided to go out and kill some Americans. And I don’t know whether that’s happening over there in large degree or not. I mean, you described the insurgent movement as guerrillas associated with Saddam’s old regime, but some of what we’re reading, Mr. Ambassador, suggests that it is more than that. And if it is more than that, we really need to address that, as well, in a very significant—— Ambassador BREMER. Well, let me—I know your—our time is up here, but let me just answer that question, Senator. I saw the story, and there are, no doubt, isolated cases of people meeting that definition. This fellow went out and, fortunately, he was killed and did not kill any of our soldiers, so it had a happy ending, as far as I’m concerned. There are, no doubt, isolated cases like that. But by far the ma- jority—and we know this from our intelligence, we know it from the people we catch, we know it from the people we kill—the people who are attacking and killing our solders, our men and women, are Fedayeen Saddam, former regime loyalists, Ba’athists, members of the former intelligence community. That is a fact. Now, I don’t say there aren’t people like that story, but they are not what is driving the situation. Senator DORGAN. Well, Mr. Ambassador, that is helpful. And might I ask, as you’re here this week, if we could exchange some information about oil revenues, potential oil revenues, expenses, so that I can at least pursue the issue of whether we ought not collateralize the oil capability of that country—to invest only in that country, by the way. Chairman STEVENS. Senator DeWine? Senator DEWINE. Mr. Ambassador, thank you very much. This is a ton of money, but I don’t think there is any doubt that it is nec- essary, and I don’t think there’s any doubt this Congress will ap- prove it. I thank you for your testimony. I thank you also for your service. We appreciate it very much. You have outlined a plan, which, as you have testified, puts a great deal of emphasis on security and infrastructure, as is it the beginning of the prosperity and return of Iraq. And I think that is certainly understandable. I would like to talk about something that I think also is important to Iraq, and that is the confidence of the people that things are improving. And that’s one area, and that is the healthcare for children. HEALTHCARE FOR CHILDREN Saddam Hussein’s government spent virtually nothing on healthcare and nothing on—virtually on the health of its children. It ignored the children, with devastating results. The under-five mortality rate, we are told, has more than doubled in the last dec- ade, with one in eight children now dying before their fifth birth- day. Of those deaths, 70 percent are due to preventable illnesses such as common things such as diarrhea or respiratory infections. 38 We have seen presented to us, you have presented to us, the Coa- lition’s Provisional Authority plans to rehabilitate the healthcare system, which does include a new children’s hospital, which I ap- plaud that. My question to you is whether or not, in this plan, there is sufficient money that’s been allocated to meet the health needs of children in a timely manner. In other words, will we—is there enough in there for this, and are we going to see some results based on this plan? Because I do think it is important—you know, people need to see some results. It’s important from a humani- tarian point of view. What’s happened to these kids is just abso- lutely atrocious in a country that should have been able to provide for their children. And I think if we want to let people see some results and some changes—which is what they want to see, people need to see some changes—that the healthcare of their own kids is a pretty good place for them to be able to see it. Ambassador BREMER. Well, I agree, Senator. We do have some- thing like $850 million in here for health. I’ll just give you two numbers that are worth thinking about. In the last 6 months of 2002, Saddam Hussein spent $13 million on healthcare for the entire country, a country of 27 million people. In the budget which I approved for these 6 months, the comparable 6 months of 2003, we’re spending $211 million. It is a 3,500 percent increase in healthcare, and we’re going to continue—we have, in the budget for 2004, a comparable run rate on healthcare. I have visited a lot of the hospitals in Iraq, and you will never find more dedicated doctors and nurses anywhere in the world, but the infrastructure is appallingly rundown. You have children in in- cubators that are 20 or 25 years old that have not been main- tained. You have children in wards where there is no air condi- tioning, and the outside temperature is 127 degrees. You have hos- pitals where there are no generators, so that the operating rooms and the oxygen tents cannot operate when the power goes down. We are placing a great emphasis on healthcare. We agree with you, it’s important. It has to move quickly. The children’s hospital will take longer, because—— Senator DEWINE. Right. Ambassador BREMER [continuing]. We have to build it. Senator DEWINE. It’s an infrastructure issue, sure. Ambassador BREMER. But there are actions in this program to move quickly, in this area and in others, to show that life is im- proving. Senator DEWINE. What else—take a moment—I’m going take some of my time for you to explain to me, how do you start mov- ing—I mean, what everyone has told me is there are doctors there. They have good doctors in Iraq. Ambassador BREMER. Yes. Senator DEWINE. And this is not the problem. But how do you begin to improve the infant mortality rate or the terrible rate that we see under the age of five, when you’re losing kids to very, very common—what to us in our country is very common, very prevent- able diseases that should not be occurring in a country like Iraq. Ambassador BREMER. One of the most important elements here is the $400 million we’re asking for hospital refurbishment. I mean, there are lots of hospitals. There are 240 hospitals. There actually 39 are more beds than they need. The problem is the infrastructure. So if you look at how that’s going to be spent, it’s going to move quickly on things like immunization, trying to get nutrition coun- seling going. Again, in visiting hospitals, particularly in the Shia South, which was crushed by Saddam, now nutrition is an ex- tremely—particularly of the mothers—is an extremely important problem. And we need to get quickly at that, and we can get quick- ly at that with many of the proposals here to rehabilitate some 200 of the 240 hospitals. We’re going to try to get maternal and paternal referral centers and care centers up to do counseling, for mothers, in particular, to know better how to take care of their children. But there is a whole series of things here, Senator, that we think can be done quickly. Senator DEWINE. Is the security situation good enough to be able to put some of those programs in place? Because this is—— Ambassador BREMER. Yes. Senator DEWINE. It must not be just refurbishing and updating the hospitals. I mean, to get out and deal with nutrition issues and education issues, you obviously have to get beyond the hospital. Ambassador BREMER. That’s right. But it’s an important point, Senator, which you bring out, and that is Iraq is not a country in chaos. Most of the country is at peace. The North is quiet. The South is quiet. We have problems in the Baghdad area and particu- larly in the area just north of Baghdad. But the area I was talking about, in the South, where I have visited often, and I visited a number of hospitals there, people are moving around, they’re going about their business in a perfectly normal way. There’s no reason why we can’t carry the kind of healthcare message out into villages that we need to do. Senator DEWINE. Is there a healthcare—is there a health struc- ture there now to do that, or do you have to create one? Ambassador BREMER. No, there is. There is a Ministry of Health, a very dedicated group of people. And the Ministry of Health has offices in each of the 18 provinces, that we can use. Now, the civil service is not as creative as you might hope, be- cause they’ve lived for 35 years under one-man rule, so people don’t take enough initiative. But as we start to work with them, we find them enjoying their freedom and starting to think creatively. Senator DEWINE. So you’ll be using the current—— Ambassador BREMER. Yeah. Senator DEWINE [continuing]. Health structure. Ambassador BREMER. We will use the current health structure. Senator DEWINE. Is that a governmental health structure? Ambassador BREMER. Yes, it is. It’s the Ministry of Health. Senator DEWINE. All right. Well, this is something that I obvi- ously have a great deal of interest in, and I would like to follow this up with you, if I could. Ambassador BREMER. Sure. Senator DEWINE. Thank you very much. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. Chairman STEVENS. Ambassador Bremer, I’m back to my time now. 40 MILITARY MONEY I do want you to know that, as chairman of this committee, I haven’t had one single Senator tell me that he or she will oppose the military money in this bill. And I was pleased to hear Senator Dorgan make the comment he did. Our hearing here today is about the $20.3 billion that’s in the structure for moving the Iraqi Government and people towards a point where they could be self-sufficient. A very important distinc- tion. But the military money is absolutely necessary to assure that you can get on with the job. The other money is necessary so that you can help us get those men and women back here. I do have a few questions of my own. Do you believe, with this money, that you can be successful in aiding the Iraqis in creating a self-sustaining police security force that can handle the problem of these terrorists that are still at loose in their society? Ambassador BREMER. Yes, I do, Senator. I think if you cast your eyes forward to a day when Iraq has a sovereign government, the key question will be, do they have a competent, honest, police force? It’s the same question that any country has to ask itself. It’s the police who, in the end, are responsible for law and order. And they will. With this supplemental, we will create a police force of 75,000 to 80,000 trained police in the next 18 months. The second question is, will they be able to defend themselves so that they can stay at peace with their neighbors? And the answer is, with this supplemental we will produce a new army, with 27 battalions, in about 1 year. That should give them enough, at least for now, while there are still Coalition forces on the ground, to be assured of staying in a secure environment. So I believe that this money, spent now, is, indeed, not separable from the rest of the money. It is all part of the question of security for Iraq and for the American success so that we can bring our sol- diers home once Iraq is stable, secure, and democratic. Chairman STEVENS. Now, your CPA is going to have a lot to do. Do you have sufficient personnel now in your CPA organizations to oversee not only the reconstruction efforts, but these security ef- forts? Ambassador BREMER. I believe we need a few more people, but we have largely got the people we need in the CPA structure now. We are going to—I am establishing a special office, a project man- agement office, that will oversee the large-scale projects that are in the supplemental, the large-scale construction projects—electricity, hospitals, water projects—because these tend to cut across various ministries in Iraq, and they are not accustomed to working to- gether because of the very rigid structure Saddam kept them under. So we’re going to have a project management office, which will work with standard Pentagon accounting and contracting proce- dures to be sure that we are consistent with American law and can move contracts quickly. Chairman STEVENS. Now, those contracts, under our law, are let primarily—I think, exclusively—to American business, aren’t they? Ambassador BREMER. That’s correct. The prime contractor, by law, must be American. 41 Chairman STEVENS. The CPA—have you put out a statement of goals or objectives for the CPA, itself? Ambassador BREMER. Well, our goals and objectives are essen- tially what’s in our plan. This is what my people work towards, which is our plan. That’s our goals and objectives. OIL ASSETS Chairman STEVENS. Okay. What about these oil assets now that have been mentioned? I believe when I called you once over there, you told me that every time you get the pipeline repaired, the power plant goes down, or a power plant goes down. And by the time you repair the power plant, the pipeline goes down. And the money that’s coming in now from the oil assets is primarily dedi- cated to the ongoing war to get the infrastructure reestablished. What’s the situation over there now? I think that was several weeks ago we had that conversation. Ambassador BREMER. Yes, sir, it was. Well, we do still find acts of political sabotage against both the pipelines and against the power structure, but we are gradually getting better. Yesterday, we produced 1.9 million barrels of oil, which is the record since liberation. Yesterday, we produced about 3,700 megawatts of power, which is getting towards our goal of 4,400 megawatts of power. But there will be bad days ahead. The saboteurs know that this is a very fragile infrastructure, both the oil and the electricity in- frastructures, and they know how to attack it where it hurts, and they have done that in the past, and I have no doubt they will do it again. We are trying to rebuild the police—the electricity police, and the oil police—to make it more difficult for them to attack the infra- structure, and we’re making progress. And we will get back to our goal of pre-war power generation within the month, and we will get back to the goal of three million barrels a day within 1 year. But there will be ups and downs. I wouldn’t want to mislead you. Chairman STEVENS. Alaskans know a little bit about the oil busi- ness; not as much as we’d like to, but enough. My friends tell me that if they had anything to do with that series of oil fields you’ve got, they’d rebuild it from scratch, because what you inherited probably is harder to keep going than to build it all new. What really is the situation over there with regard to the status of the assets that are necessary to increase their production? Ambassador BREMER. Well, Senator, I’m not an expert on the oil industry. The fields have been managed, according to our oil ex- perts, reasonably well. But the fact of the matter is that if Iraq is really going to have a bright economic future, they’re going to have to probably double their production rate, and that is going to re- quire new fields coming on-stream. I mentioned earlier, in answer to a question, I think, from Senator Brownback, that is going to take a lot more investment in the future. The Iraqis are known in the oil industry—— Chairman STEVENS. None of this money is for that stage yet, though, is it? Ambassador BREMER. No. No, because—no. That will be some- thing the sovereign government will have to decide, what they’re— 42 because it will raise immediately the question of whether they’re going to allow foreign investment in the oil field. Chairman STEVENS. I see the yellow—let me ask one other thing. Is your CPA going to have anything to do with the donor con- ference in Madrid? Ambassador BREMER. Yes, sir. Chairman STEVENS. Will you have a role in it? Ambassador BREMER. Yes, sir, I will. But, more importantly—— Chairman STEVENS. Should we be optimistic? Ambassador BREMER. Yeah, I think so. I think the international community will realize they have an interest in our success in Iraq, in Iraq not becoming a hotbed for terror, in Iraq being a stabilizing force in the Middle East. And I think the donors will make, we hope, a substantial contribution. Chairman STEVENS. What role will this $20.3 billion play in try- ing to get those people to the table? Ambassador BREMER. Oh, I think it’s very important, Mr. Chair- man, because it shows that the American people understand their obligation now to win the peace, just as we won the peace in Eu- rope after the Second World War. It will show leadership, and that’s what they need to see from us. Chairman STEVENS. Thank you. Senator Byrd? Senator BYRD. You had a plan there. May we have a copy of the plan? Ambassador BREMER. Yes, sir, of course. Senator BYRD. Have we seen this plan before? Ambassador BREMER. Yes, you have. This plan was presented to every Member of Congress on July 23, sir. Senator BYRD. Have we seen that? Ambassador BREMER. I’d be happy to submit it again. Senator BYRD. I don’t recall—— Ambassador BREMER. I’d be happy to submit it again. Senator BYRD. I’d like to have it. I’d like to have that plan, for the first time. Senator LEAHY. I’ve been watching very carefully. I haven’t seen one. Ambassador BREMER. Well, I don’t know where 535 copies of it went on July 23. Maybe they were faxed to Baghdad. Senator LEAHY. Maybe it was just the Republican side. Ambassador BREMER. No, it was sent to everybody on the Hill, sir. Senator BYRD. When was it sent? Ambassador BREMER. July 23. Senator BYRD. I’ll be glad to have a copy. Ambassador BREMER. I’ll be happy to present it to you, sir. [The information follows:] The July 23 edition of the Strategic Plan was re-submitted to Congress. Senator BYRD. I hope you’ll present it today. Ambassador BREMER. Sure. Senator BYRD. Where does the administration plan to find the additional $38 to $55 billion that is estimated to be needed for re- building Iraq? 43 Ambassador BREMER. If one looks at the World Bank Needs As- sessment, Senator, from which the numbers are derived, basically they’re looking at a longer period than we are looking at. They are looking at a 4- to 5-year period. And we are trying to address the urgent needs over the next 12 to 18 months. We are hoping that the international community will come forward at the donor’s con- ference once we set the example. We are hoping that the inter- national financial institutions, like the World Bank and the IMF, will make substantial contributions. And we are hoping, as I have said earlier, that by 2005 the Iraqi Government and the Iraqi peo- ple, themselves, will be able to contribute substantially to closing that gap. Our goal is to try to close the gap of the urgent and es- sential things in the next 12 to 18 months. Senator BYRD. In addition to U.S. taxpayer funds and oil reve- nues, the administration plans on paying for the rebuilding effort by using seized Iraqi bank accounts and the millions of dollars in cash that were discovered in Iraq during the war. How much money has been seized or discovered to date? Ambassador BREMER. $900 million. Senator BYRD. How are those funds being used? Ambassador BREMER. Those funds have been entirely spent, and they are now exhausted. They’ve been spent on paying the Iraqi Government salaries. Salaries for the Iraqi Government. Senator BYRD. Are you keeping detailed records on the receipts and outlays of seized or discovered funds so that Congress may ex- amine or audit the use of those funds? Ambassador BREMER. We have detailed records of those funds, sir. Senator BYRD. When you say ‘‘we,’’ whom are you talking about? Ambassador BREMER. The CPA. Senator BYRD. The CPA? Ambassador BREMER. Yeah. Senator BYRD. Has detailed records? Ambassador BREMER. Yes, sir. Senator BYRD. On the receipts and the outlays. Ambassador BREMER. Yes, sir. Senator BYRD. Could you tell this committee today what the total amount is for the receipts and outlays of seized or discovered funds? Ambassador BREMER. Well, the seized assets are in the neighbor- hood of $900 million. That has been spent. The frozen assets, which were the assets that the President froze here at the outset of hos- tilities, totaled $1.7 billion. Of that, all but $63 million has been expended, also on the Iraqi salaries, on paying for the new cur- rency, a variety of things. That is essentially exhausted. Those are the two funds I think you asked about. Those two are essentially now exhausted, with the exception of $63 million. Senator BYRD. Do you have records that can be audited by Con- gress? Ambassador BREMER. We have records of all of the receipts and expenses. Senator BYRD. Now, you spoke earlier of the salaries—— Ambassador BREMER. Yes, sir. Senator BYRD [continuing]. That are being paid. 44 Ambassador BREMER. Yes. Senator BYRD. How much are you—I don’t mean this to be you, personally, of course—how much are you paying to, let’s say, the police? What are the salaries for the policemen? Ambassador BREMER. The salaries for a starting policeman now are $60 a month, which is 10 times what they got under Saddam, and we hope we’re getting better policemen. Senator BYRD. What are you paying the people that are going into the army? Ambassador BREMER. They’re getting about—I think the privates get about $110 a month. I may be off by $10, but it’s in that neigh- borhood. Senator BYRD. You spoke of the number of men that other coun- tries among the 30 are contributing. How many of those, of the 30, would you say contribute as many as 1,000 men? Ambassador BREMER. Senator, I’d have to get you the answer to that. I just don’t have all those numbers in my head, and it is more on the side of the military side of the house than on my side, but we can—— Senator BYRD. Yes. Ambassador BREMER [continuing]. Certainly get you those fig- ures. Senator BYRD. That’s probably a better question for Mr. Rums- feld. Ambassador BREMER. Yes, sir. Senator BYRD. Thank you. The coalition force composition is classified and will be submitted for record through a secure information channel. Senator BYRD. The President plans to spend over $20 billion in this bill on reconstruction in Iraq, but he is asking Congress to let him reallocate that entire $20 billion after we approve it. This means he can tell us one thing today, but do something completely different in Iraq tomorrow. Do you expect to adhere closely to the spending plans outlined in this request? Ambassador BREMER. Yes, sir. Senator BYRD. If so, why do we need to authorize the reallocation of the entire $20 billion? Ambassador BREMER. Well, Senator, I am not an expert on these legislative matters, but I do work in a rather fluid environment, where we have plans, and we try to follow them, and we do our best, and I believe that we will spend this $20 billion as we have suggested we will spend it, but I can’t exclude that as events move forward, there might have to be some adjustments in that plan. Senator BYRD. But do you anticipate that the President will dele- gate any of his proposed reallocation authority to you so that you can have the extra flexibility to divert from the administration’s spending plans? Ambassador BREMER. Well, Senator, that’s a good question, and I don’t have an answer to it for you today. Senator BYRD. Well, that’s a good question, and we need an an- swer. If the chairman decides to ask you to return to this com- mittee, when do you think you might be able to do that? This is the chairman’s responsibility, but I would like to know, on behalf of my side of the committee. 45 Ambassador BREMER. Well, I’m in the chairman’s hands, Sen- ator. And I can get you an answer to that once I discuss it with other officials in the administration. I just don’t know the answer. Senator BYRD. Yeah, well, I’m very concerned about this realloca- tion of authority. I believe strongly in the Constitution and in the power of the purse as being vested here. I don’t believe that we should give too much authority to the executive branch—to the President or to you, with all due respect, or to anybody else—to re- allocate monies that we appropriate. That is your monies—your monies, the people who are watching through those electronic lenses. It’s their money. And so, I am anticipating that you would expect the President to delegate some of this proposed reallocation authority to you. Is it fair to say, Ambassador Bremer, that for many of the spend- ing decisions being made on the ground in Iraq, you have complete and final authority over those decisions? Ambassador BREMER. No. I have an international staff. I have Iraqi ministers, who have actually been instrumental in drawing up the plans for the supplemental, because they are people who un- derstand the needs on the part of the Iraqis. And I have a program review board, which makes recommendations, which has represent- atives from other Coalition countries, as well as the United States, which actually makes the recommendations to me. Senator BYRD. Can you supply, for the record, the number of countries out of the 30 that provide at least 1,000 personnel, and can you supply the names of those countries? Ambassador BREMER. Yes, sir. [The information follows:] The coalition force composition is classified and will be submitted for record through a secure information channel. Senator BYRD. Would you say that 20 out of the 30—none of the 20 out of the 30—provide at least 1,000 persons? Ambassador BREMER. I’ll get you that answer, sir. Senator BYRD. Yes, all right. Perhaps the Secretary will be in a better position to provide that. Ambassador BREMER. Yes. Senator BYRD. Is my time up? Chairman STEVENS. Yes, sir. Senator Domenici is in the rear. He’ll be coming back in a minute. I was letting you go until he comes back. Senator BYRD. Very well. With respect to U.S. payments for oil infrastructure, the Presi- dent is requesting $2.1 billion for the cost of repairing Iraq’s oil in- frastructure. Should oil receipts be used for that purpose? Ambassador BREMER. Well, Senator, I think the problem is that we don’t—the oil receipts are simply not there. There are not going to be any excess oil receipts before 2005. So it simply is not an op- tion. Chairman STEVENS. Would the Senator yield for just a moment? Senator BYRD. Yes. Chairman STEVENS. Senator Byrd, Senator Domenici was called to our leader’s office for a conference of chairmen pending bills coming up this week, and he will not be returning, soon, not before 46 the votes. May I yield time now to Senator Brownback? He is wait- ing, sir. Senator BYRD. Can I follow on that just one brief moment? Chairman STEVENS. Yes, sir. Senator BYRD. In Secretary Rumsfeld’s testimony before the Sen- ate Appropriations Committee on March 27 of this year, he said, quote, ‘‘I do not believe that the United States has the responsi- bility for reconstruction. We want to participate in reconstruction. Other countries will want to participate in reconstruction. And the funds can come from frozen assets, oil revenues, and the Oil for Food Program.’’ Clearly, the Secretary misjudged the extent to which these other sources would produce revenue. Now, do you believe that the United States has the responsibility for reconstruction? Now, I’m using Secretary Rumsfeld’s statement as the background, in which he said he didn’t think it did, didn’t think the United States had that responsibility. Ambassador BREMER. I think that, as my testimony, my pre- pared statement, suggested, I believe that we have a responsibility to ourselves, to our service men and women, and to the American people, to win this war against terrorism where it’s being fought, which today is in Iraq. And I believe that we will be able to speed the day when we win that war and bring home our troops, by pro- viding the Iraqis with the wherewithal to win that fight. And that means approving the President’s supplemental request. Chairman STEVENS. Senator, I must interrupt now and let Sen- ator Brownback, who’s been waiting for time, to come in. Senator BYRD. Okay. Chairman STEVENS. I’m in. Senator BYRD. Will we have another round? Chairman STEVENS. Yes, sir. Senator Brownback? Senator BROWNBACK. Thank you very much, Mr. Chairman, ap- preciate that. And, Ambassador Bremer, thank you for hanging in there with us on a—going through more questioning rounds. You mentioned earlier that a number of hostile forces that we’re facing are leftover Saddam loyalists—— Ambassador BREMER. Yes, sir. TERRORISTS Senator BROWNBACK [continuing]. And then terrorists that are coming in. Do we know basically where these terrorists are coming in from, what border they’re coming across, and what countries they’re coming from? Ambassador BREMER. Yes. We think they’re coming mostly from Syria and, to some extent, from Iran. And they are from a variety of countries, judging from the ones we’ve captured or killed. They carry Syrian, Saudi, Yemeni, Sudanese passports or travel docu- ments. Senator BROWNBACK. Is there any dominance of those, that it’s most Syrians that are coming or most Saudis or Yemenis? Ambassador BREMER. We have, in detention, several hundred third-country nationals as detainees, who are people who have been fighting the Coalition. They may not all be terrorists in the sense 47 of being trained terrorists. The majority of those 278 detainees are Syrians. Senator BROWNBACK. What’s the next largest group? Ambassador BREMER. The next largest group, I think, are Jor- danians. I have it. I’ll check while you’re asking your next question. Senator BROWNBACK. Yeah, if you could, because I find this an interesting point of where these terrorists are coming in from and where they’re coming from in attacking our troops. If you could. Ambassador BREMER. Yeah, the total is 278, of which 123 are from Syria. The next largest is actually Iran, 62, and Jordan, 38. Senator BROWNBACK. How many from Saudi Arabia? Ambassador BREMER. One. Senator BROWNBACK. What’s the—— Ambassador BREMER. Mind you, these are not necessarily terror- ists. Senator BROWNBACK. Yeah, these are detainees. Ambassador BREMER. Simply detainees, some of whom may be terrorist, some of whom may have been simply fighting alongside Saddam’s army. You’ll recall that, at the outset of hostilities, a number of countries said they were sending volunteers to fight alongside Saddam. So some of these—I don’t know when these were detained. Some of these may have been detained, actually, during the war. Senator BROWNBACK. But these are hostile combatants when they were detained? Ambassador BREMER. That’s right. Senator BROWNBACK. In hostile actions? What are the—what’s the Syrian Government and the Iranian Government doing to help us or to, in the contrary, to hinder us in this by letting people flow in? Ambassador BREMER. Well, we’ve had discussions with the Syr- ian Government. We believe there are—it’s pretty well established that there are rat lines for people coming in across the Syrian/Iraqi border. Some of them are terrorists, some of them are foreign fight- ers, some of them are simply smugglers. We do not think the Syr- ians have done enough to control their border. The same can be said of the Iranian border. We are asking, in this supplemental, among other things, for funds to try to reestablish some control, effective control, over Iraq’s borders through standing up of border police and a border patrol. And that’s an important element, obviously, in creating a secure environment inside of Iraq. It’s one of the reasons, another reason, why this money needs to be approved quickly. Senator BROWNBACK. What about the Iranian Government? What are they doing to either help or to hinder us in this effort? Ambassador BREMER. Well, Senator, it’s a difficult question to answer, because it’s sometimes hard to tell who speaks for the Ira- nian Government. But my impression is that elements of the Ira- nian Government are causing mischief in Iraq interfering in affairs through their intelligence services and through the revolutionary guards. This is not helpful. Senator BROWNBACK. It seems to me that the two countries that benefit the most from us having difficulty in Iraq today are either the Syrians, in some reassertion of a Ba’athist-type regime or area 48 of control for the Ba’athists, or the Iranians, with a theocracy-style government coming into place in Iraq. Are we seeing that commu- nicated by those governments in allowing these—you called them ‘‘rat lines’’ to be established and people coming in? Ambassador BREMER. Well, we have, as you know, diplomatic re- lations with the government in Damascus, so we are able at least to talk to them in a rather direct way. The same is not true in Tehran. The good news on the Iranian question, Senator, is that as I go around and talk to Shia and other Iraqis—Sunnis, Kurds—Iraqis do not want their neighbors to interfere in their affairs, and they do not welcome Iran’s interference. And, indeed, there was a poll recently that showed less than a third of the people in the entire country believe in any kind of a theocratic government coming from the constitution and the elections. So I think the Iranian interference is not falling on fertile soil, and I’d hope that will continue to be the case. Senator BROWNBACK. I want to ask one other line of questions. A gentleman in Kansas lost his—husband and wife in Kansas lost their son in the battle. Jacob Butler is a Kansan from Wellsville, Kansas. And his dad would like to go over to Iraq sometime soon, as part of the healing process, to see the area where the battle was that his son was involved with. Number one, are you seeing some requests like this come through? And are you able to assist and to work with some of these family members? Or is that something that just doesn’t—you aren’t available to do to date? Ambassador BREMER. Well, we haven’t seen it yet. And I think as the security situation gets better, we probably will see more peo- ple who want to do that. We just haven’t seen it yet. Senator BROWNBACK. Okay. Well, we will be making a request of your office, because his dad has made a direct request of me, and I told him, when I contacted the family members after the loss of their son, and said, ‘‘Is there anything I can do to help?’’ And this was the one thing that he had asked of me, is he wants to go to the site of the battle where his son was involved in. And I told him we will, at the appropriate time, try to help out as much—— Ambassador BREMER. Yeah. Senator BROWNBACK [continuing]. As we can in that process. And I think you probably will be seeing a few more of those. Thank you for your direct answers. I really appreciate those. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. Chairman STEVENS. Senator Leahy, do you have further ques- tions? Senator LEAHY. I do, Mr. Chairman. Ambassador Bremer, I find so many things I agree with in your comments. I mean, obviously, having overthrown the Iraqi Govern- ment, we can’t just walk away. But I worry that, to some extent, we’ve done that in Afghanistan, and we may pay a high price for it. THE PLAN The Iraqis need a chance to rebuild their country. I have not seen your plan, and I haven’t found anybody on this side of the aisle, at least, that have. I’m not—I don’t doubt your word that it 49 was sent out, and maybe it’s in—like the proverbial check, it’s in the mail and someday I’ll see it. But does the plan ask for more than just more money and more of the same? Ambassador BREMER. Yeah. The plan was written, Senator, as I mentioned, in a—it was, sort of, under constant revision from the time I got there in May, and it continues to be under revision. It was not established as a document to request for money; it is es- tablished as a document to show the way forward in the four crit- ical areas. Senator LEAHY. Well, I think what we see here today—and I think there’s a feeling of all Senators, both sides of the aisle, that we’re going to be asked for more and more money. Each time we’ve been told, ‘‘This is the final amount,’’ within months it’s anted up considerably more. I remember the almost arrogant disregard of the former OMB Director, Mr. Daniels, when anybody even dared question that we’d be spending more than $20 billion or so here. Of course, now we’re talking about $87 billion. I also think we need to start mending our fences around the world so that we might get other countries to join us. I think back to the terrible tragedy in Beirut when our marines were killed in a truck bombing in a country where suicide bombers are endemic. It turned out, subsequently, that the White House had not allowed them to put the normal tank traps, even though we had intelligence that said that they might get hit that way. It turned out the White House had not allowed them, the sentries, to be properly armed, even though they had asked to be. And it turned out the White House had ignored warnings when they put them all in the same place. But within a few days after that, we invaded Grenada, and the world’s attention turned to that and proved that the U.S. military was able to take on the dozen or so, couple of dozen, Cubans in Grenada and free it for good, and they even had heads of state come to Washington to say that this was the greatest thing that ever happened. But even that was dimin- ished when we found out later some of those heads of state were given cash by the U.S. Government prior to coming here. My question is this. Are any of these countries that are providing support either been promised money up front or been promised re- imbursement for whatever they did subsequently? Ambassador BREMER. Senator, I really am reluctant to answer, not because I think the answer won’t please you, but because I don’t know the answer. These are really questions, I think, con- cerning the force disposition there, that belong more appropriately with the military side of the Pentagon. And I understand the com- mittee will have the Secretary and General Abizaid up on Wednes- day—— Senator LEAHY. But you’re not aware—and maybe they’d be the ones to ask. But you’re not aware of any country that was either given money or material prior to offering to support us in Iraq or promised money or material for their help? Ambassador BREMER. I’m not aware. Senator LEAHY. Thank you. I don’t think anybody doubted, whether they supported the war or opposed the war, that we would ultimately be victorious. After 50 all, we have the best armed forces in the world. That was never in doubt. I still go back to the question about Afghanistan, which is not your portfolio, but I’m afraid that the administration and maybe the Congress is losing sight of Afghanistan, where we knew al Qaeda was. We also know that al Qaeda was very, very heavily en- trenched—and still is—in Saudi Arabia, our close friends, and pro- tected by some in the Saudi Government, even today. And in Paki- stan, our other close ally, al Qaeda there. And some in the Paki- stani Government turn a blind eye. I worry that all the burden suddenly gets put on you to stop ter- rorism, when maybe we ought to look at some of our very, very, very close friends, like the Saudis. And I don’t think that this—and not just this administration, but past administrations, have ever done that. Now, you say that by next summer the Iraqi national army will be a significant fighting force. Will they be able to defend Iraq from threats posed by Iran? Iran has more than half a million troops, hundreds of aircraft. They have a budding nuclear capability. Would Iraq, by itself, next summer—if threatened by Iran, would they be able to defend themselves, or would they need the United States? Ambassador BREMER. Well, I think the question of how long for- eign forces will be needed in Iraq is one that eventually a sovereign Iraqi Government, like every government in the world, is going to have to make its own determination on whether they would, at that point, ask for a SOFA agreement for American or other forces is really a question for a sovereign government. On the face of it, the answer is no, the Iraqi army will only have about 35,000 mem- bers by next summer. And, as you point out, the Iranians have a much larger armed forces and probably more capable, and this army will not have, for example, combat air force. It will not have an offensive capability, will not have heavy equipment—— Senator LEAHY. Okay, let me ask a question about elections. The extremists, former Ba’athists, are some of the best organized ele- ments in Iraq. The Iraqi Governing Council has varying degrees of popular support. Are we going to hold elections if it looks like the extremists are going to win? Ambassador BREMER. One of the reasons why I emphasized, in my opening statement, the importance of following a steady path to elections, Senator, is because I think there is always a risk of early elections. And my view is that those elections—and it is the view of the President and our Government—those elections should only take place after the Iraqis have been through the discipline of writing a constitution, so that there is a framework, a political framework, for subsequent political action. And I think while it is perhaps frustrating to the Iraqis to have to wait that long, I think our experience shows the importance of getting a constitution and getting it right. It, after all, took us the better part of 12 years to figure this out, and we might as well learn from that lesson. Senator LEAHY. We didn’t have computers. No, many here would agree with you, Ambassador Bremer. And I thank you, Mr. Chairman, for the extra time. Chairman STEVENS. Thank you. 51 Let me state that I’ve been informed there will be two votes at 5:30 p.m., and also state that at 10 a.m. Wednesday, in the Russell Caucus Room, Room 325, Secretary Rumsfeld and Generals Myer and Abizaid will be there to answer questions and make state- ments concerning the military portions of this. Senator LEAHY. Russell Caucus, Mr.—— Chairman STEVENS. Rumsfeld with be—— Senator LEAHY. The Russell Caucus? Chairman STEVENS. The Russell Caucus Room, yes. Senator LEAHY. Great. Chairman STEVENS. Senator DeWine? Senator DEWINE. Mr. Chairman, I just have one additional ques- tion. Chairman STEVENS. Yes? Senator DEWINE. Mr. Ambassador, there have been some pub- lished op-ed pieces and some articles by individuals who have been involved in the reconstruction. And they were expressing their frus- tration about their inability to operate in Iraq. And it was—if I can, sort of, paraphrase the articles, they were saying that it was a tough environment—understandably, I guess—it’s a very tough environment to work in. You know, they would have to get permis- sion from the military to move around. You know, just very, very, very difficult. These articles that I read were a couple of months old. Has that changed any in the last couple of months? Is that still a problem? Or how do you perceive the—maybe if you can just take a minute or two and tell us how is the environment to work in there today? Ambassador BREMER. Well, thank you, Senator. It is a lot better than it was a couple of months ago. The security situation, as I said earlier, in response to another question, is, by and large, good in most of the country, with the exception of the area north of Baghdad and, obviously, parts of Baghdad. Senator DEWINE. Sure. Ambassador BREMER. But even in Baghdad, things are getting better. I had a petition presented to me last week by a group of restauranteurs who said, ‘‘Business is so good now that we’d like you to extend the curfew from 11 o’clock to midnight or later, be- cause we want to have more business. The people are out, they’re enjoying themselves, and they want to stay later for dinner.’’ This is a good sign, because it means the people are, in fact, moving around with more confidence in Baghdad. But I would not hide from you the fact that it is a difficult envi- ronment. There are, after all, significant dangers. There are terror- ists. There are quite a number of al Qaeda terrorists in the coun- try, picking up on the point Senator Leahy just made. And it’s a tough environment. But it is considerably better than it was a cou- ple of months ago. Senator DEWINE. All right. Thank you. Again, I thank you for your service. Mr. Chairman, thank you very much. Chairman STEVENS. Yes. I would place in the record, without objection, the statement of Senator Mitch McConnell regarding this bill. [The statement follows:] 52 PREPARED STATEMENT OF SENATOR MITCH MCCONNELL Ambassador Bremer, thank you for appearing before the Committee today. It is my hope and expectation that the President’s supplemental appropriations request we received last week can be considered and returned to the White House in a time- ly manner so that we can move forward with our important humanitarian, security and reconstruction work in Iraq. You are tasked with one of the most important missions in the world today. The success of your efforts—namely, to help the Iraqi people establish a representative and functioning government—is directly linked to stability in the region and contin- ued progress in America’s global war on terrorism. You must succeed, because failure is not an option. But you alone do not have an obligation to succeed. Congress must not fail to provide you with the tools and resources necessary to help the Iraqis build for themselves a stable economy and functioning democratic government. You have my full support, including for the President’s $20.3 billion request for the reconstruction of Iraq. Not surprisingly, some are trying to stack the deck against you. Remnants of Sad- dam Hussein’s toppled regime and foreign jihadis on a daily basis seek to sabotage and undermine any progress in Iraq. Just this weekend, terrorists tried to assas- sinate Akila Hashemi, one of only three women on the new Iraqi Governing Council, and only this morning another car bomb exploded by the U.N. headquarters. The $5.1 billion for security programs requested by the President, including sup- port for the establishment of a New Iraqi Army, is clearly in the security interests of both Iraq and the United States; so too is the $3.7 billion for public works and $470 million for infrastructure projects. In Iraq, both the devil and terrorists are eager to find work for idle hands. Here at home, there are some who view the request for the reconstruction of Iraq as fodder for political campaigns. This is as reckless as it is irresponsible. Quick to cast themselves as patriots, these individuals profess unwavering support for Amer- ican troops in Iraq—and then disparage the costs of rebuilding that country. The fact is you can’t have it both ways. One hundred percent support for our troops in Iraq means support for their mili- tary needs ($51 billion, or 72 percent of the total cost requested for Iraq in the sup- plemental) and support for short term reconstruction costs ($20.3 billion, or 28 per- cent). America can bring its soldiers home only after a functioning Iraqi government— with effective security forces—is in place. The longer that takes, the longer our troops will remain in-country. Let me close by recommending we keep our eyes on the prize. Winston Churchill once counseled that in quarreling ‘‘between the past and present, we shall find that we have lost the future.’’ The President deserves our continued support as he tire- lessly works to protect and defend the security of America. Chairman STEVENS. Senator Murray? Senator MURRAY. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. And thank you, Ambassador, for being here today. And I apologize for being late. I will keep my questions short, Mr. Chairman. I just flew in. And I have to say that many of my constituents at home in Washington State had a little bit of sticker shock over $87 billion. It’s a lot of money at a time when our economy here is struggling, and I heard that comment over and over to me in the past week since we heard that figure. I’m sure you’ve heard it, as well. And I think part of it is that no one was expecting the price tag to be that high, and now you’ve come forward, and I think we’re all try- ing to work our way through it to see what it is. I think a general sense, in my State, at least, that we understand that Iraq needs to rebuild their economy and their infrastructure and their govern- ment, but what our responsibility is, getting other countries to help, is critically important. 53 OIL REVENUES But one of the things that I heard over and over again was, weren’t the oil revenues from Iraq supposed to finance much of this reconstruction? And what happened? I know there’s a story behind that. I’d like to hear a little bit about that from you, what hap- pened. But also, specifically, I’ve seen your proposal, that you have $1.2 billion to invest in the infrastructure in your testimony, is that in- vestment alone enough to get the Iraqi oil revenues to cover any reconstruction costs beyond what you have presented to us in this proposal, or are we going to be seeing that that’s not enough and we’re going to have to look again at future proposals? Ambassador BREMER. Thank you, Senator. The problem with the oil revenues is basically twofold. Number one, that the previous regime, as was the case throughout the econ- omy, did not invest in infrastructure. The oil industry, as I said in my testimony, was basically starved of investment for a period of almost 20 years. The Iraqi oil engineers, who are very competent, labored heroically and were able to get production at various times up to the maximum, which is about three million barrels a day. And our objective is to try to get the industry back to that level. But with the damage that was done by under-investment in in- frastructure and with the repeated damage that is done now by po- litical sabotage, and if you add into that the looting that took place in the immediate post-war period, we are in a situation where it is going to take this $1.2 billion to assure that the Iraqis get back to that three million barrels a day that they had, pre-war. And what that means, in terms of revenues, is that next year they will still not generate a surplus in revenues. It will cost them as much to run the government as they can get from revenues. In 2005, assuming we can get the oil production to three million barrels a day, they should be generating excess cash for capital in- vestments on the order of $4 to $5 billion a year. Senator MURRAY. You do believe that the $1.2 billion is enough to get that reconstruction—— Ambassador BREMER. Yes. Senator MURRAY [continuing]. To where we are seeing that? Ambassador BREMER. Yes. In fact, in general, the answer to your question about, you know, ‘‘Are we coming back for more,’’ is that what we’ve done here is put together the amount that believe rep- resents what’s urgently needed now to get the—to address Iraq’s immediate needs, and we don’t anticipate coming back with an- other major supplemental like this this year. This—— Senator MURRAY. This year? Ambassador BREMER [continuing]. This is our best—now, well, we hope that in other years, we—any needs for Iraq are handled in a more normal way through the regular budgetary process. But I answered, I think, a question from another Senator before, Sen- ator, you know, this is the best estimate that I can give you on what is needed. I do not believe we will need major additional amounts of money. 54 Senator MURRAY. And do you think the oil production that we’ll be able to generate is enough revenue to eliminate our continuing investment post-2005? Ambassador BREMER. Certainly on anything like this scale, yes. Senator MURRAY. Okay. Let me ask you a more specific questions about Um Qasr. I know that rehabilitation of that port was essen- tial to getting food and other supplies into Iraq shortly after—— Ambassador BREMER. Done by the Stevedores Association of Se- attle. Senator MURRAY. Correct. And I know that there has been a lot of problems with sabotage and looting. I note in here that you have $45 million for the rehab of the port there. And I’m—do you think that’s enough to cover the costs, now that we’ve seen some of what the infrastructure there is like and some of the costs of security that weren’t anticipated? Ambassador BREMER. Yes. Although the fact that I think it’s enough is less important than that my experts think it’s enough. The people we worked with in the Ministry of Transportation, and our own experts, believe that this should be enough to put the port, which is a very important port—it is our only port—— Senator MURRAY. Right. Ambassador BREMER [continuing]. So it’s very important, par- ticularly for the import of food products, and now for the import of fuel oils that we’re importing. Senator MURRAY. And it is open and operational—— Ambassador BREMER. Yes it is. Senator MURRAY [continuing]. At this point? Ambassador BREMER. It’s been open since June 16. Senator MURRAY. Okay. And is the $45 million enough to cover security for the people running the port? Ambassador BREMER. Yes. The security—of course, the security part of this supplemental comes more in the front part of it, where we talk about the roughly $5 billion for an Iraqi police force, for the facilities protective service, which is more likely to take on fixed-site security on places like ports. It’s more likely to come through a different part of the supplemental, but we believe the amount that’s in here for security should be enough. Senator MURRAY. Okay. Because I was noting that railroad rehab was $303 million. That’s a lot more than $45 million for the port. Is that—am I—— Ambassador BREMER. Well, it’s—— Senator MURRAY [continuing]. Just looking at that—— Ambassador BREMER [continuing]. An extremely—it’s the region’s largest rail system. It’s a very extensive rail system—again, dras- tically under-invested in over the years, with an outmoded rail— the actual physical rails are not adequate and need to be replaced. It’s a very big capital project. Senator MURRAY. All right. Thank you very much, Ambassador. Ambassador BREMER. Yes. Chairman STEVENS. Thank you. Senator Domenici? Senator DOMENICI. Thank you very much, Mr. Chairman. 55 Mr. Ambassador, I’m sorry that I wasn’t here for all the rest of all the testimony, but I was here for a part of it, and I’m very pleased to return for a couple of questions. First, about 10 days ago, 12 days ago, I got on the telephone and called five Senators. Don’t ask me why. I just decided five names. I trusted them, and I’m pretty good friends. And I asked them if they’d like to work on thinking about, talking about, learning about reconstruction of Iraq. Most interesting, everyone said yes. None of them are on the Foreign Relations Committee, but four are on Ap- propriations, this Committee. We have since had a number of meetings. We met with Condoleezza Rice. We met with the Secretary of Defense. What we’re really trying to find out is everything we can about what is the reconstruction contract, the reconstruction agreement, for Iraq. And a lot of good ideas have come out. And I want to share one with you. And I really believe you ought to seriously consider it. First, if you make the plan, if you put it on four stools—and I think that’s what I heard you say—and you abbreviate them where they’re on placards instead of in a packet, I would submit to you that the American people ought to hear you regularly explain the plan, versus what you’ve accomplished. It’s simple, but it would be a press conference which you would pledge as part of making sure that the public has full understanding and that it is totally visible to the public of America. And so you hold a press conference, and you say, ‘‘The plan was. And it is 1 month since the last meeting. And here’s what we have done,’’ or, ‘‘Here’s what we have had to change.’’ Ambassador BREMER. Right. Senator DOMENICI. Now, I really believe, Ambassador Bremer, that you should do that, and you should do it in a way that is fac- tual, forthright, the whole goal being to make this whole recon- struction totally transparent to the American people who are inter- ested. Do you have a thought on that? Ambassador BREMER. No, I think that’s a very good suggestion, Senator. I already made a note earlier, your idea of getting a sim- plified explanation—— Senator DOMENICI. Right. Ambassador BREMER [continuing]. Of the plan, and we’ll follow that up. Senator DOMENICI. Now, the Senator—new Senator from Ten- nessee, former Governor and Secretary, he’s the one in our meet- ings that came up with, ‘‘Why don’t we tell America about it?’’ And I’m passing that on to you. Okay? Ambassador BREMER. Thank you. Senator DOMENICI. Now, there are some who continue to act as if the American people are against the war in Iraq. Some are trying to make sure they turn out against the war by suggesting they should be against the war. I submit it’s your responsibility and the President’s, if you want to win, to make sure the American people understand, from you all, that we’re winning this. Now, by that I mean that you tell them in detail that the plan is being implemented and we are suc- ceeding. Because I believe there is still a very large percentage of 56 Americans who think we should have gone into this war, who sup- port it, but who are fragile because they don’t understand the plan. That’s why I think that plan of yours is good for you and for a bunch of people who are helping you, but it isn’t very much good for the American people, because they’re not going to read it, and that press crowd’s not going to read it, and that TV outfit’s not going to report it. So I would hope that you would make it so. My last observation is, the American people would be thrilled if you could come close, at some point, to telling them that we don’t need any more capital after this $20 billion. Now, why do I say that? I say that because it’s obvious to me that, contrary to those who are attacking you and the President and the plan, that you’re trying to make this a reconstruction plan that has borrowing capac- ity, that goes out into the donors market to see what you can get others to give and purchase and loan. And I submit to you that all of that sounds like you’re trying to make this $20 billion leverage so that you can get this done. Am I right? Ambassador BREMER. Yes, that’s right. I think I said, in response to an earlier point, that I think it’s very important in the runup to the donors conference that it is clear that the American people are stepping up and doing our part, and it’s important for us to have that $20 billion on the table. IRAQI OIL Senator DOMENICI. Now, I want to talk about oil, but very quick- ly. I thought it too easy that you could just look at Iraqi oil as a great big asset and that you could say, ‘‘Eventually, Iraq should have a valuable flow of money that should help defray some of these expenses.’’ Now, I want to submit to you that I understand everything is going to be privatized and internationalized except oil, and I understand that. Almost every country that has oil, ex- cept us, has done that. In Mexico, they call it their ‘‘patrimony.’’ Ambassador BREMER. Yeah. Senator DOMENICI. In Spanish, ‘‘el patrimonio,’’ which really means the fatherland is equated with their oil. Well, I submit, nonetheless, that even though it’s heavily in debt, Iraq, and it’ll be awhile before you get oil, that you clearly ought to start talking early about the possibility that in a few years some portion of that oil revenue might come back to either pay donors or pay America back. Now, I’m not suggesting that we tell the Iraqis we don’t want them to grow and prosper, but I just think, as a financier, what would be wrong with a pledge of $1 a barrel or $2 a barrel, starting 5 years from now? No, it probably wouldn’t have an impact at all, but it would be a lot of money, and it would surely add credence to a donors conference, in terms of how people might want to bid to do things in Iraq. I offer the concept of oil as an asset in the outer years as some- thing that I really think you should consider early with the Iraqis so they wouldn’t think that you come along with it later and want to take something away. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. Thank you very much, Mr. Ambassador. Ambassador BREMER. Thank you. 57 Chairman STEVENS. Thank you, Senator. Senator Harkin? Senator HARKIN. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. Mr. Ambassador. Again, I want to add my name to Senator Byrd’s request for the plan. We’ve asked around, and no one’s—I haven’t seen it, and I’ve asked my staff for it on July 23, and no one can seem to find it. So hopefully it’ll surface sometime soon and we’ll see that. Chairman STEVENS. Well, Senator, it came to my office, and I’ve sent to get it and get the letter that it was transmitted. I under- stand it was transmitted to all Members of Congress. Ambassador BREMER. Right. Chairman STEVENS. It’s just a book, but he’s got a copy of it right there. Senator HARKIN. Well, I just asked my staff, and they’ve asked around, and no one seems to have seen it. So I don’t know where it is, but maybe it’s around here someplace, one of those things that came and just was chucked or something like that. But I’d like to see it. Mr. Ambassador, the $21 billion that we’re looking at for public works, water, housing, health, and other things, on a per-capita basis in Iraq that’s more than we’re spending here at home on some of those things. And I’ve been told that that’s about half the GDP of Iraq. That would translate into about $5 trillion of that kind of spending here in the United States in 1 year. That’s awe- some. Chairman STEVENS. What figure—— Senator HARKIN. That’s awesome. Half of the GDP of Iraq. Chairman STEVENS. What figure did you use, Senator? Senator HARKIN. I don’t know if that’s true or not. Someone told me it was. $40 billion. Chairman STEVENS. We’re dealing with $20.3 billion, Ambas- sador Bremer is testifying concerning $20.3 billion. Senator HARKIN. That’s right. I don’t know. What’s the GDP of Iraq right now? Ambassador BREMER. Well, $40 billion is as good a guess as any. Senator HARKIN. Well, that’s what I’m saying. Ambassador BREMER. We just don’t have—we don’t know. Senator HARKIN. Well, okay. Ambassador BREMER. But call it $40 billion. Senator HARKIN. Okay. So this is half the GDP. I’m just saying, if you were spending that much on reconstruction in the United States, half the GDP, it would be $5 trillion in 1 year in the United States. So that’s awesome. The other thing that came to my mind is, is the amount you’re asking here consistent with other nation-building efforts in the past, on a per-capita basis—Kosovo, Bosnia, East Timor, among others? How does this compare, on a per-capita basis, to those other countries? I don’t expect you to know that answer, but I think it’s something that we ought to find out, in terms of what the per-capita basis is. Now, again, I’d also like to know how the $20 billion will be spent. I think Senator Byrd’s touched on that. What process will you use? Federal Acquisition Regulation (FAR) rules or some other approach? Who signs the checks? Will they all be competitive bids? 58 In your statement, you said they would be competitive bids. But competitive bids by whom? By other countries? German companies? And France, French companies? Iraqi companies? Who can com- petitively bid for these contracts? Is it open to anyone, globally? Ambassador BREMER. Let me answer both of those questions, if I can. On a per-capita basis, there is a study by the RAND think-tank that looked at the general question of spending and made the point that successful transitions tend to be characterized by large amounts spent early. And to answer your question, because it just happens to stick in my mind, the per-capita spending in Kosovo was about the same as what we’re planning to spend here. It’s about $800 per capita. On the process for bidding, it will be done under our American regulations; and appropriated funds, by law, will have to go—the prime contractor will have to be an American firm. Senator HARKIN. Will have to be an American firm. Ambassador BREMER. That’s the law. Senator HARKIN. But they could subcontract—— Ambassador BREMER. That’s right. Senator HARKIN [continuing]. To anybody else they want. Ambassador BREMER. That’s right. Senator HARKIN. And will you know that before the contract is approved, who they’re—— Ambassador BREMER. No. Senator HARKIN [continuing]. Subcontracting to? Ambassador BREMER. Normally not, but the guidance that—the contractors we have now follow, my guidance is to place as much of the subcontract as possible in the hands of Iraqi companies so that we create jobs. Senator HARKIN. There’s an article this morning, ran in the New York Times—I don’t know if it was brought up earlier; I apologize if it was, I was on a plane just coming back, but reading the New York Times in the plane coming here—said that the Iraqi leaders are going to come here to Congress next week. And I’ll just read you this paragraph. It said, ‘‘In interviews, the Iraqi leaders said they plan to tell Congress about how the staff of L. Paul Bremer III, the American occupation administrator, sends its laundry to Kuwait, how it costs $20,000 a day to feed the Americans at the Al Rashid Hotel in Baghdad, how American contractors charge large premiums for working in Iraq, and how across the board the overhead from supporting and protecting the large American and British presence here is less efficient than granting direct aid to Iraqi ministries that operate at a fraction of the cost.’’ It says they’re coming here. It said that, ‘‘In a 6,000 mile end- run around American and British occupation authorities, leaders from the Iraqi Governing Council say they will go to Congress this week to argue that American taxpayers could save billions of dol- lars by granting sovereignty more rapidly to the Council and doing this.’’ Do you have any comment about that, Ambassador Bremer? Ambassador BREMER. Well, let me make a few. First of all, we don’t send out laundry to Kuwait. But we did—— Senator HARKIN. You did. 59 Ambassador BREMER [continuing]. We did when we first got there. We had no electricity. We had no running water. And so, for the first 6 weeks, the only place anybody could get any laundry was in Kuwait. We don’t do that anymore, because the hotel is open. We spend $17,500 a day on food. We serve 3,000 meals. It works out to about $5 a meal, which, incidently, is $3 less than it costs for a meal, ready to eat (MRE). On the question of overhead, there is no doubt it is more expen- sive to have Americans than Iraqis, but the fact is we are needed there for all the reasons that have been laid out in the supple- mental. And we are convinced that this $20 billion can be spent in accordance with our regulations, can be spent quickly, and can help give the Iraqis the necessary economic infrastructure so that they can have a viable economy, and that, in turn, will provide for a se- cure environment, which allows us to withdraw our troops. Senator HARKIN. The rest of the article went on to say that, ‘‘In the spirit of demonstrating such savings, the Governing Council this month cancelled the $5,000-a-day contract that Ambassador Bremer had arranged to feed the 25-member body, and its staff found a cheaper supplier.’’ That’s $200 a day for the 25-member Council. Ambassador BREMER. Yeah, that, unfortunately, is factually in- correct. The Governing Council arranged that themselves. They were charged on a per-capita basis. And instead of feeding 25 peo- ple a day, they were feeding about 100 a day, because they were having their staff and bodyguards eat there. They’re on their own budget now, Senator, and it’s up to them to figure out how much they’re going to pay for meals. It’s not my responsibility. Senator HARKIN. So when they say that the Governing Council cancelled the $5,000-a-day contract that you signed—— Ambassador BREMER. That’s incorrect. Senator HARKIN. That’s incorrect. That you had arranged, that’s incorrect. Ambassador BREMER. That’s incorrect. They have—— Senator HARKIN. Well, I just—— Ambassador BREMER. They have, I understand it, decided that they were spending a bit too much on food, which I entirely agree with. They were. Senator HARKIN. Well, I’m glad we cleared that up, because obvi- ously this is misinformation that’s getting out, right? Ambassador BREMER. Shocking. Senator HARKIN. Shocking, isn’t it? Shocking. Shocking. The other thing I wanted to clear up was that on the amount that you’re asking for here, in April we were told that the $2.5 bil- lion the President wanted for the Iraq Relief and Reconstruction Fund was all you would need from American taxpayers. Five months later, you’re asking for another $20 billion, just for this year. Am I right to believe that you will need more like $75 billion, and that the balance of the $55 billion will be paid for with Iraqi oil exports and donations from other countries? Is that what we’re looking at? 60 Ambassador BREMER. Well, the $60 to $75 billion—probably more like $60 to $65 billion—overall need is the assessment of the World Bank of what is needed in the Iraqi economy over the next 4 to 5 years. It involves things like water and power and schools and healthcare and all of the basics. What we have done is said, what is the most urgent and essen- tial stuff that we need for our strategy and for our plan? And we decided it is security and basic infrastructure. And then we asked ourselves, and what needs to be done now, in the next 12 to 18 months? And that’s how we arrived at the plan that you have be- fore you for the supplemental. That’s the $20 billion. The rest of the money will come over a period of years. We hope it will come from the donors conference, which we are going to attend, that the World Bank is calling, in Madrid on October 23. We hope that by the year 2005, Iraqi oil revenues will be more than sufficient to pay for the running costs of the government, and they will have prob- ably $4 to $5 billion a year in excess revenues spun off by the oil revenue that they can then invest. And that’s how you will fill in this gap. Senator HARKIN. Mr. Ambassador—— Chairman STEVENS. The time’s expired. Senator Bennett’s time will be the last before the votes. The votes will start in 2 minutes. There are two votes that start at 5:30 p.m. We’ll return here after that time, Ambassador Bremer, if you continue to be available. Ambassador BREMER. Sure. Chairman STEVENS. Senator Bennett? Senator BENNETT. Thank you very much, Mr. Chairman. A wild question, off-the-wall, but do you have any idea what the GDP of Japan was at the end of the Second World War? Ambassador BREMER. No, I don’t. Senator BENNETT. Neither do I. Ambassador BREMER. I’m sorry. Senator BENNETT. I don’t know what percentage of our—what our contribution to Japan would have been, measured as a percent- age of Japanese GDP. Ambassador BREMER. Don’t know. Senator BENNETT. But I think it would probably have been more than 50 percent of the GDP at that point, because Japan was abso- lutely prostrate. I used to own a business in Japan. I remember driving through the streets of Tokyo and said to the manager of the business there as I looked at the various buildings, some of which were traditional architecture, and some of which were new—I said to her, ‘‘How many of these buildings survived the war? How many of them are pre-war?’’ And she said, ‘‘None.’’ I said, ‘‘None?’’ She said, ‘‘There were only two buildings in Tokyo at the end of the war—the Imperial Palace and the Daiichi Insurance Building,’’ which was built out of solid concrete, seven stories—three stories above ground and four stories below. I may have those numbers wrong. She said, ‘‘MacArthur took that as his headquarters.’’ I don’t think we measure reconstruction money as a percentage of GDP of a country that has been destroyed. Chairman STEVENS. Will the Senator yield just for a moment there? 61 Senator BENNETT. Sure. Chairman STEVENS. I think this President’s the first President that’s asked for money in advance for a military operation such as this. The money for Kosovo, for Bosnia, even for Tokyo, for occupa- tion in Europe, came out of the operation and maintenance ac- counts of the Department of Defense. The President was asked, the last time we had this bill up, why we didn’t budget in advance, and so this time he gave us the budget in advance for the military costs of this operation needed now for the future supplemental for 2004. And I commend him for doing it. It was really—past Presidents have taken the money out of money we appropriated to the Department of Defense under the Food and Forage Act, and spent the money for the occupation forces, and Congress replaced it in the Defense budget. This is the first time we’ve had a stand-up amount—it’s an enormous amount—in advance for the costs of an operation like this, a mili- tary operation, to support what you’re doing in terms of your pro- gram for reconstruction. Thank you. Senator BENNETT. If I can go back to the hearing that I held in the Joint Economic Committee, I remember being struck by the testimony of the final witness that we had. And, by coincidence— or happenstance, rather—it happened to be the witness that the Democratic members of the committee had called. The Republicans called some of the witnesses, the Democrats called some of the wit- nesses. And she said to us, ‘‘I wish to make four points about Iraq.’’ I’m not sure I have them in the right order. She said, ‘‘Number one, Iraq will be very, very difficult. Number two, Iraq will be very, very expensive. Number three, Iraq will take a very long time. And, number four, in the end Iraq will be very much worth it.’’ And I think that’s the point you’re trying to make. It will be ex- pensive, it will take time, but, in the end, it will be very much worth it. We have a poll in front of us. I’m mistrustful of polls, but it’s the only public-opinion poll that’s been taken in Iraq done by the Zogby organization in connection with the American Enterprise Institute. Seventy percent of the Iraqis said they expect their lives to be bet- ter in the next 5 years. And 32 percent, or roughly half of that, said they expect their lives to be very much better, which shows a great sense of optimism among the Iraqis, which is not what you hear from the American press. Now, what is your perception of how much of Iraq is in an opti- mistic mood and how much is in a funk, let us say, or a great con- cern? I understand that it changes geographically. Can you give us a sense of where in the country there is a sense of support and ex- citement and optimism about the future, gratitude for the Ameri- cans for being there, and what portions of the country are they say- ing, kind of, they wish they’d get us out? Because we keep hearing, from the American press, as if there is only one position in Iraq, and it’s they hate us. And now I think a country that size, clearly there’s going to be divisions, just as there are divisions in this country. Can you give us your sense, from the ground, as to who is optimistic, who is not, who feels good about our being there and 62 who does not, how many on each side, and where are they geo- graphically? Ambassador BREMER. Well, Senator, thank you for that com- ment. I’ve seen the poll, also, and, as you say, one doesn’t know about polls. But certainly my, sort of, empirical experience traveling around, and I do travel a lot, suggests that something like 70 or 75 percent of the people in the country are optimistic—I’m very op- timistic about Iraq’s future—that a similar percent of people are delighted, even more delighted, with liberation. And I think the ex- ception tends to be in those areas where we are being regularly at- tacked. About 80 to 85 percent of the attacks against American forces are from a very small area, north of Baghdad, between Baghdad and Tikrit. And there are historical reasons for that, and that’s the thing we have to keep working on. But if you go any- where in the north—from Mosul, north—if you go anywhere from Baghdad, south, you will, first of all, find a country that is basi- cally going about its business. Kids are going to school, kids are playing soccer on the soccer fields, people are driving their cars, they’re going out to restaurants. And this is the story that you don’t hear as much as one should in the American press. Senator BENNETT. Give us a sense of how long you think it will take in those—well, no, let me go another place, because my time is going. There are some who say that we cannot ever expect Iraq to func- tion, because it’s an artificial country created by Winston Churchill, et cetera, when the British drew the lines, and they drew them in arbitrary ways, and so on. As you move around the country, do you get a sense that there is an Iraqi identity that would override the Sunni, the Shia, the Kurd, and the other subdivisions of those divi- sions that we hear about, and that, in fact, Iraq has a national identity that can be tapped to create a viable country? Ambassador BREMER. I think so. I find the Iraqis very proud of their history and of their country, and they do have a great history that goes back 6,000 years, after all. And I find that it does cross the lines. This is not to minimize the problems. There are ethnic and sectarian tensions in Iraq that have to be dealt with, and it’s one of the reasons we have to insist on following a careful process as we move on the political front. We cannot rush it, because to rush it is to court real trouble, as I said in my opening statement. But I think the Iraqis do have a sense of identity. In some de- gree, it’s defined as an identity which is contrast to several of their neighbors. They spent 1,200 years under the Persians, so they have a view towards Iran. They spent 400 years under the Turks, so they have a particular view towards the Turks. So they have man- aged to pull together something of a national identity, which takes pride in going all the way back basically to the Mesopotamian pe- riod 3,000 years before Christ. It is, nonetheless, going to be a chal- lenge to get across all of these lines and put together a government that is unified, but it is our main job. Senator BENNETT. Just very quickly, with my time gone, how long have you been at this? Ambassador BREMER. Since May. Senator BENNETT. MacArthur took 7 years in Japan. 63 Ambassador BREMER. I hope you’re not going to tell me I’m going to take 7 years, Senator. Senator BENNETT. No. The Marshall Plan, as I said earlier, came after 3 years—— Ambassador BREMER. That’s right. Senator BENNETT [continuing]. Of occupation in Germany, et cetera. I think, by historic standards, you are proceeding at breath- taking speed. And I’m sorry the New York Times is impatient, but I am not. I agree with the witness, Iraq will be very expensive, Iraq will be very difficult, Iraq will take a very long time, but, in the long run, Iraq will be worth it, and we will reap a dividend from what you are doing in Iraq just as Americans have reaped an enormous dividend for what was done in Germany and Japan at the end of the Second World War. Economically, we have been paid 1,000 times over for the money and effort that we put into creating those economies on a stable basis and those islands of political stability in areas that had been historically explosive. If we can duplicate that in Iraq, and I think you’re on a very fast track towards doing it, our children and our grandchildren will thank us enormously for leaving them that her- itage of stability and strength. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. Chairman STEVENS. Thank you very much, Senator. We’re 8 minutes into the first vote, gentlemen. I’d suggest we’ll come back after the second vote. Senator BYRD. What time would you say we would come back? Chairman STEVENS. I’d say that would be 5:15 p.m., 5:20 p.m.— or 6:15 p.m. or 6:20 p.m., pardon me. 6:15 p.m.. I’m seeing the clock wrong. 6:15 p.m., sir. Senator BYRD. 6:15 p.m., okay. Chairman STEVENS. Yes, sir. Gentlemen, if we may, we’ll resume the hearing. Ambassador Bremer, I know you said that your home was dark. Mine is dark. I would hope that I get home before it’s not too dark. But I know Senator Byrd has some additional questions. One of the Senators said to me, Mr. Ambassador, as we went to those votes, why did I believe that this Defense money, that amount of Defense money, was needed? The Defense money was the biggest, largest part of this request. And I told him I remem- bered too well being overseas in China on World War II. I think one of the desires of any American when he’s overseas, particularly in uniform in wartime is to come home. I think that what you’re doing is essential, in seeing to it that that wish of our people that are over there can be fulfilled. So I do hope we can get early action by the Congress on this request, and I do hope that you’re success- ful in achieving the Coalition vision that’s outlined in your working document of July 21. Senator Byrd, do you have questions? Senator BYRD. Well, Mr. Chairman, I’ve got a few questions, yes. Do we plan to have any further hearings with Ambassador Bremer? Chairman STEVENS. Ambassador Bremer will not be asked to come back. I have seen his schedule. He’s before the Armed Serv- 64 ices Committee, and he’s scheduled to be before the Senate Foreign Relations Committee, the House Appropriations Committee, both Foreign Operations and Defense Subcommittee—they’re not having theirs at full committee, as we decided to do—he’ll be before the Senate Armed Services Committee and also before the House Armed Services Committee and/or the House Intelligence Com- mittee in the time that he has left before he returns to Iraq. We do have scheduled, as I indicated, Secretary Rumsfeld, 10 a.m. on Wednesday morning with Generals Myer and Abizaid. And we are trying to establish a connection with the commander in Af- ghanistan to see if we could have a televised appearance of the General before us this week. And we are also exploring the other issues that might be brought up. But we have told—Ambassador Bremer has told us the balance of his week here is filled now with other committees that he’s been requested to appear before. Senator BYRD. Well, Mr. Chairman, how about next week? Chairman STEVENS. Senator, I hope to go to markup 1 week from tomorrow. Senator BYRD. Well, I’ll tell you, Mr. Chairman, I think you’ve been very kind to have these hearings, and I personally appreciate them, but I don’t think we’ve had enough hearings. I don’t think we will have had enough hearings. It may be an imposition on Am- bassador Bremer to come back, but he’s asking for $20 billion here. I think that if he expects to get $20 billion, he ought to make him- self available. That’s the way I feel about it. And we have a supplemental here, and we’re talking about devel- oping a democracy in Iraq, and we’re talking about how we’re going to build an army there, and how we’re going to build a police force. This is the first supplemental in which we’ve really asked ques- tions about the situation in Iraq. The American people have never had any debate with respect to what we have to do, as has been outlined here, with respect to reconstruction in Iraq. When we went into Iraq, the American people weren’t told that we were going to reconstruct Iraq, or that we were going to try to build a democracy there. They weren’t told that. And now here we are with a bill, and we’re going to ram this bill through. Ambassador Bremer is the administration’s key man. He’s the point man for reconstruction in Iraq. It seems to me that the Amer- ican people are entitled to know more about this reconstruction ef- fort and what the plans are, and so are the Members of Congress. I hope that you won’t think I’m being personal, Senator Stevens. I’m dumbfounded by the size of this request and also by the short- ness, the brevity, of time which is going to be spent by this com- mittee on this request. Once we latch onto this reconstruction effort and say that we’re going to establish a democracy in Iraq, we’re going to be there for quite a long time, in all likelihood. I think the American people are entitled to hear a debate and to have ques- tions answered with regard to this reconstruction effort. We’ve got a lot of reconstructing to do here in our own country, and yet we’re putting Iraq ahead of that. Now, much has been said about this plan. I’m telling you, this is the plan, and this day is the first day that I ever heard of such a plan. This afternoon is the first time that I’ve seen this so-called plan. That’s not your fault, Ambassador Bremer, that we didn’t see 65 it. Here we are, this is on a Monday. Everybody who’s familiar with the operations of the Senate and the way we do things around here anymore knows that some Senators are not here on Mondays. So, we have set up one of the most important hearings that we’ll have this year with one of the most important witnesses that we’ll hear, and yet we’ve had the hearing on Monday. I thank you, Mr. Chairman, I thank you, Mr. Ambassador, for re- adjusting the hearings to the point that we could begin them in the afternoon. That was necessary, because I had two doctor’s appoint- ments set up for my wife, and it’s pretty hard to arrange doctor’s appointments. I have a duty to my wife, and I’m going to stand by that duty, and you’ve allowed me to do that. But still, we are disadvantaging the American people when it comes to handling their money by ramming this huge bill through with only one day of hearings. Now, let’s take a look at this plan. I’m looking on page—I’m not too familiar with this plan—I’m looking on—it says ‘‘Security 1’’ at the bottom of the page. The heading on the page is as follows, ‘‘Achieve a Secure and Stable Environment and Transition Respon- sibility for Maintaining it to Iraqi Security Forces.’’ One, ‘‘Defeat Internal Armed Threats by October 3.’’ That’s the way I read it. The plan was to defeat internal armed threats by October 3. Is that correct, Mr. Ambassador? Ambassador BREMER. Well, that’s one of the dates. That’s a con- tinuing obligation. If you continue out to the right there, Senator, you’ll see that that particular obligation carries all the way through to the far right-hand column. And where it says ‘‘Continue,’’ that means continue the effort to defeat internal threats and gradually transfer responsibility—— Senator BYRD. No, no, no. That says ‘‘Continue Transfer Respon- sibility.’’ Ambassador BREMER. No, there’s a period after the word ‘‘Con- tinue,’’ sir. Senator BYRD. ‘‘Continue.’’ Ambassador BREMER. Continue—— Senator BYRD. ‘‘Transfer Responsibility.’’ Ambassador BREMER. Yeah. Senator BYRD. Yeah. Continue what? Ambassador BREMER. Continue to defeat internal armed threats. That obligation carries all the way through to the right-hand col- umn. In my view, that obligation will continue for at least the next 6 to 9 months. And as we do that, as this top line says, we’re going to start transferring responsibility. Presuming we get the supple- mental from Congress, we will accelerate the transfer of responsi- bility to Iraqi police, Iraqi border police, the facilities protective service, and the Iraqi army. Senator BYRD. Well, this certainly needs some fleshing out. That’s all the more reason why we ought to have more hearings. This says, as I read it, ‘‘Defeat Internal Armed Threat.’’ And they’re going on. In some ways, they seem to be increasing in num- ber. It doesn’t say that we’re—the American people haven’t been told that we were going to be in there another 8 to 10, 12 months, or 12 or 14 or 16. We’re going to rebuild an army? We’re going to build an Iraqi army? The American people have never been told 66 this, and yet we are going to appropriate money to do it. And once we start down that road, we’re committed. With respect to the reconstruction process, how much money have other countries contributed, as of now, to the reconstruction efforts? Ambassador BREMER. Senator—— Senator BYRD. In March, Secretary Rumsfeld testified that he thought that over 60 countries would contribute to the reconstruc- tion effort. The President is asking Congress to appropriate $20 bil- lion. To date, how much have we received in donations from the 60 countries for reconstruction efforts? Ambassador BREMER. Senator, 61 countries have pledged $1.46 billion. Senator BYRD. Pledged. But how much have we received? Ambassador BREMER. Well, I don’t know what the—the receipt number, I’m not sure, but that’s pledged and given. Senator BYRD. Well, surely you know how much we’ve received. Ambassador BREMER. Well, I’d have to go through each country, Senator, to know which has been delivered. It’s like our appropria- tions process. In many countries, they have to appropriate the funds after they pledge them, and then the funds actually have to flow. Senator BYRD. Well—— Ambassador BREMER. There’s a gap in time. But we have about a billion and a half from 61 other countries, to answer your ques- tion. Senator BYRD. Sixty-one countries have pledged about $1.5 bil- lion? Ambassador BREMER. That’s right. Senator BYRD. Now, with respect to the contributions in per- sonnel, I’ve heard this said time and time again, to the effect that there are 30 countries involved here, and it makes it sound like there may be 30 countries contributing what we’re contributing. But when one takes a careful look at it, one will find that probably as many as 20 of these countries don’t appropriate more than 1,000 men each, and possibly 20 of them contribute 100, 200, 300, or cer- tainly less than 1,000. So why don’t we just make it clear to the American people that of these 30 countries—there are about 4 or 5 that contribute—Britain, I believe you said 8,000 or 10,000, something like that; then Poland, how many, 2,500? Ambassador BREMER. I think Poland has a reinforced brigade. But, again, Senator, I really think that you’ll get more accurate in- formation from your witnesses Wednesday on these figures. This is really more something that General Abizaid can answer with much more precision than I can. Senator BYRD. Well, I’ll hope that I can be there Wednesday and ask questions. Now, with respect to Iraqi’s new army, the New York Times of yesterday, Sunday, September 21, has this headline, front page, above the fold, ‘‘Iraqi’s New Army Gets Slow Start. Effort to Train Force is Small and Plagued with Delays.’’ I suppose you’re familiar with this. Ambassador BREMER. Yes, I saw the story. 67 Senator BYRD. The story. It says, ‘‘Within a few minutes, under the watchful eye of private trainers paid by the United States, a platoon of recruits overruns the enemy position. This is a mock at- tack, complete with whistles and so on. Like the rest of their bat- talion, these young men are only weeks from becoming full-fledged soldiers. When they are ready, their new army will have 735 men.’’ That doesn’t sound like a very big army, does it? Ambassador BREMER. Senator, that story refers to the first bat- talion of the new Iraqi army, which I mentioned in my opening statement will graduate not late, as that article’s headline sug- gests, but on time on October 4. Senator BYRD. It says, ‘‘Whether the Americans simply under- estimated Iraqi resistance or whether the United States wanted Iraq to depend on America for security, as some Iraqis contend, the delay has fueled the Iraqi’s distrust of Washington’s intentions and placed a heavy burden on American troops.’’ It goes on. I see a line that jumps out at me. It says, ‘‘These troops will not be available until next summer.’’ And then I excerpt another paragraph, ‘‘The occupying forces want to train an additional 35,000 Iraqi police officers in Hungary over the next 2 years. None are now being trained, though training is expected to begin this fall. Even if the plan to have former Iraqi officers recruit a new army works, the only new troops in the next 10 months will come from the training at the base here, which is expected to produce about 6,700 by next September.’’ Well, Mr. Ambassador, we’re going to be a long time in building an army at this rate. We’re going to be a long time in building an adequate, efficient, well-trained police force at this pace. So I think we’re being given—with all due respect, Mr. Chair- man, I think we’re being given a kind of a snow job by the adminis- tration. The American people haven’t been told. They weren’t told when we went into Iraq. Chairman STEVENS. Senator, I’ve got to tell you, I’ve got a family at home. We’re here to have you ask questions of Ambassador Bremer. If you want to ask him questions, do it. I’m not here to debate with you, and I’m not here for you to read me the New York Times. I read it yesterday. Now, I have to go home, sir. Do you have any more questions for Ambassador Bremer? Senator BYRD. Well, you’re not going to rush this Senator. Chairman STEVENS. Well, I’m—— Senator BYRD. I’ll tell you this. We’re going—— Chairman STEVENS [continuing]. With all due respect—— Senator BYRD [continuing]. We’re going to have a debate on this. We’re not being treated fairly. Here this is a Monday. Some Sen- ators aren’t here on Mondays. I’m sorry about that. I’m here. Sen- ator Stevens is here, and a few other Senators. But normally the Senate is not in session on Mondays, and yet we’re hearing one of the key witnesses in this whole thing. We’re talking about an $87 billion Defense bill, $20 billion of which is going to be under the direction of the witness who is testi- fying now. I said at the beginning, I think that he’s doing a good job with what he has. But we have a responsibility. Senator, I can’t 68 help when you have to go home. I have to go home, too. I have re- sponsibilities at home, but I also have responsibilities here. Now, if you can tell me, Mr. Chairman, that we will be back and that Ambassador Bremer will be back, I’ll be very happy to close here in another 5 minutes. Chairman STEVENS. Senator, we’re going to close here at 7:15 p.m. We’re going to close this hearing at 7:15 p.m. Senator BYRD. 7:15 p.m. Chairman STEVENS. Yes, sir. Senator BYRD. Well, in other words, these empty chairs here rep- resent Senators who could not be here, and those Senators are not going to have an opportunity to hear Ambassador Bremer, or to ask him questions. Is that right? Chairman STEVENS. Every Member of the Senate—this Appro- priations Committee that I could find on the floor to ask did any- one else have any questions, not one did, from your side or from mine. Senator BYRD. That doesn’t prove anything. These Senators have a responsibility to hear Ambassador Bremer and a right to hear him. They represent millions of people, collectively. And I think that, if we’re going to make a considered judgment on spending this much money in a reconstruction effort which has never been debated in the Senate and concerning which the American people have never been informed about, we’re not fulfilling our obligation to the American people and to these Senators. Now, they’re not here, and perhaps they were told. I don’t know. But, in any event, who else is going to appear before this committee and tell us about reconstruction? May I ask that question? What other witnesses are going to be before this committee and answer questions about the reconstruction effort? Is this the short and the long of it, as Shake- speare said? Chairman STEVENS. Ambassador Bremer is the witness in sup- port of this portion of the supplemental. Senator BYRD. Well, I’m requesting, Mr. Chairman, that we have Ambassador Bremer come back on another date so that these Sen- ators who have not been here today will have an opportunity, an- other opportunity, to hear him and to go over his answers in to- day’s hearing and to study the plan. This so-called plan was sprung on us, as far as I’m concerned. I’m not making any accusations, but in my conversations with other Senators on my side of the aisle, they never knew about this plan until today. Now, as the ranking member, I’m making that request, that we have Ambassador Bremer come back. Chairman STEVENS. I’m sorry, sir, we’ve examined Ambassador Bremer’s schedule. As I’ve told you, he’s scheduled to return to Iraq with the House Armed Services Committee, as I understand it, at the end of the week, and he will not be back. Senator BYRD. Well, Mr. Chairman, if I were chairman, I wouldn’t treat you like that—you, as the ranking member. If you asked for another hearing, I would arrange for you to have another hearing. The administration wants $20 billion over which it will have oversight. The Congress has a responsibility to oversee this money. 69 Chairman STEVENS. Senator, three committees in this Senate are having hearings, besides this one. Some of these Members are on those committees. Three committees in the House are having hear- ings. This is going to be thoroughly explored by at least six commit- tees. We are exploring this $20 billion now. We’re going to explore the Defense matter on Wednesday. And we may go into another issue on Thursday with regard to Afghanistan. I have before me the hearings history on supplementals. There has never been more than one meeting on a supplemental before this committee. Senator BYRD. No. Chairman STEVENS. Never once—— Senator BYRD. I don’t know whether that’s true or not. Chairman STEVENS [continuing]. Before. Well that’s the record. Senator BYRD. I’m not challenging what you’re saying. Chairman STEVENS. I didn’t make it up. That’s the record. Senator BYRD. What difference does that make? This is the first time that we’ve heard anything, the first witnesses that we’ve heard, about any reconstruction effort in Iraq, and this so-called plan has just came to light today, as far as I’m concerned. I think some of it is laughable. It’s absolutely impossible to make a judg- ment based on a short examination of this plan, which came into my possession just 2 or 3 hours ago. And I’m asking you, as chairman, to work out a plan whereby Ambassador Bremer can come back. The American people are enti- tled to this. That’s not asking very much. It’s only asking what is right. Chairman STEVENS. Senator, I’m sure the Ambassador will re- spond to any questions you want to submit for the record, and the record will be open until next Tuesday. Senator BYRD. Well, submitting questions for the record, Mr. Chairman—I’ve been around here a long time; I know what that means. You can’t ask the Ambassador any follow-up questions about his responses. There are no follow-on questions. He can sub- mit answers for the record. That’s not like having the Ambassador here. He wants $20 billion. I’m not trying to provoke you, Mr. Chairman. I just am asking for what I think we should have. We should have another hearing. Look at the empty chairs. Chairman STEVENS. Senator, as a member of the Armed Services Committee, he’ll be before the Armed Services Committee. Senator BYRD. I understand that. I’ve been attending the Armed Services Committee as well as I can. But I’m sorry that the chair- man is apparently just going to flatly turn me down on this re- quest. Well, let me say, Mr. Chairman, that I don’t mean to be discour- teous, but if you’re not going to have another hearing with Ambas- sador Bremer, I don’t know why you would not want to do that. Ambassador Bremer, could you appear again before this com- mittee, in the interest of this $20 billion bill? Ambassador BREMER. The chairman has already addressed that question, sir. Senator BYRD. Well, I’m asking you if you could appear, if the chairman were to ask you to come back? 70 Ambassador BREMER. I don’t have time, sir. I have—I’m com- pletely booked, and I have to get back to Baghdad to my duties at the end of the week. Senator BYRD. You don’t have time, and yet you want $20 bil- lion? You don’t have time to make yourself available? Is that what you’re saying? Ambassador BREMER. Senator, I’m prepared to stay here as long as you want tonight and answer any questions you’ve got, and I’m prepared to answer any questions you submit for the record we don’t get to tonight. Senator BYRD. Well, are you prepared to come back if—— Ambassador BREMER. Sir, I do not have the time, but I’m pre- pared to stay here as long as the chairman wants to keep in ses- sion. Senator BYRD. Well, look at the empty chairs. I’m sure that the American people are represented by more than one Senator, the Senator from West Virginia. I take it that we’re not going to get you back and that you’re going to take the position that you will just stay here as long to- night as I might want to stay. Where’s the audience? You’re asking for $20 billion. Well, Mr. Chairman, let me say this. I don’t think that I’ve ever been treated with such discourtesy as I have on this occasion. I’m surprised, Mr. Chairman, that you would treat your old friend like that. I say most respectfully to you, that if the tables were turned, I would immediately do that for you and your colleagues rep- resenting a large minority here. You’re going to close the committee at 7:15 p.m.? Chairman STEVENS. Senator, I have the greatest respect for you, and I’ve tried to show it in this hearing today. I think the record will show that you’ve used half the time today. The rest of the members had 8 minutes apiece. Senator BYRD. What difference does—— Chairman STEVENS. I have done my best to meet—I agreed to hold the hearings that you requested. I agreed to get Ambassador Bremer here, and he came, as requested. I have agreed to get Sec- retary Rumsfeld here, and he will come on Wednesday, as re- quested. We’re trying to work out a hearing, a televised hearing, about Afghanistan. I think I’ve gone much further than any chair- man in my history has gone to meet the request for hearings on a supplemental. Most supplementals don’t have any hearings at all. Senator BYRD. That doesn’t make any difference what most supplementals do. Chairman STEVENS. I understand that. This is an exception, and we’ve made an exception, sir. Senator BYRD. But I’m not going—— Chairman STEVENS. If I have offended you, I apologize. I’ve not intended to offend you, but I’ve intended to try to work this hearing in with my family responsibilities and other things that I must do. Senator BYRD. Senator, you haven’t offended me. And what dif- ference does that make? That’s of no interest in the long run of his- tory. I’m just trying to do my duty. I don’t believe that adequate explanation has been made for this $20 billion on the part of Am- bassador Bremer. He has been very good to make himself available 71 this afternoon. But I can see the handwriting on the wall. There’s not going to be any further hearing in this committee on this re- quest insofar as Ambassador Bremer is concerned. And let me, then, close out my part, since you’re going to close it at 7:15 p.m. I was one of the 23 who voted against giving the President the power, which the Constitution doesn’t give him, the power to de- clare war. I was against giving him that power then, and I’m against it now. I think that it was the wrong decision on the part of the Senate to do what it did, and I think that Members will come to regret it, and many already have. I don’t think that this $20 billion, insofar as Ambassador Bremer, has been justified. I don’t think the American people had an understanding when we went into this war that we were going to create a democracy there, that we were going to spend billions of dollars for reconstruction. The American people weren’t told about that. Now, I see two wars here, the war in Afghanistan, which began with the terrorist attack on the Twin Towers on September 11, 2001. This country was attacked, and I am for doing whatever needs to be done in that regard. In the war in Iraq, we attacked a sovereign country by the order of the Commander in Chief. That country did not attack this country. That country did not represent an imminent threat to this country. But we deliberately attacked that country in furtherance of the doctrine of preemption. I don’t subscribe to that doctrine. And so, we are in two wars. One I fully support. The other I have grave questions about. And that’s why I’ve referred to it as ‘‘Mr. Bush’s war.’’ He, as Commander in Chief, declared war, in essence, on Iraq, and Con- gress made a decision, which I did not share; namely, it shifted to the President the responsibilities for our making the declaration. And so, one can see why I think, and great numbers of the Amer- ican people think, that we are in a war which we should not have fought. I feel a responsibility to the American people and to the people of West Virginia to do what I can to have Congress examine the request for $20 billion. That’s the taxpayers’ money. And that’s not the end of it. We gave the United Nations the back of our hand when it came to going into Iraq. We should have taken a little longer there. The inspectors were on the ground. They were going wherever they wanted to go. They were making progress. They were destroying caches of weapons. I think we could have avoided this war by con- tinuing with those inspectors, and by taking more time. Hans Blix said that it would take months, not years, to do the job there. We should have done that. I say, to the credit of the President, that he was instrumental in forcing the Iraqis to open their doors, so to speak, to the inspec- tions. The inspections were going forward. But the President was apparently bent up going to war in Iraq. I recall Karl Rove, the President’s political guru, who addressed the Republican Committee Members in January of last year, I be- lieve it was, in California, saying, in essence, that we should make this war on terrorism our strategic centerpiece, or words to that ef- fect, for the political campaign. Now, I haven’t forgotten that, and 72 that makes me dubious of the correctness or incorrectness of what we did, of our attacking another country that didn’t present an im- minent threat to us and had not attacked us. It was something that I think we already knew, many of the American people. I cer- tainly knew it. But that is a kind of background. And so one cannot help but be somewhat suspicious of the motives of the administra- tion in pushing us into that war. So having said that, that will probably explain why I say that there are two wars. I’ve explained why. Two wars. And the second one, I have designated that, in my own public statements and in my own mind, as ‘‘Mr. Bush’s war.’’ He took us to war. There was no good reason to go. And here we are now, we’re going down an- other long road, and that is that we’re going to reconstruct Iraq. And, here again, we haven’t asked the United Nations to help us. I understand that the President will go tomorrow, and I hope he will ask the United Nations to help. I can understand the reluc- tance on the part of some of the other countries to join with us in that. They weren’t with us on the takeoff, and we didn’t want them with us, we didn’t wait, and now they won’t be with us on the land- ing. But I say all that, Mr. Chairman, to explain why I, personally, feel that we’re doing the wrong thing by our country in taking the actions that we’ve taken, and Congress stepping aside and giving to the Commander in Chief the authority that he doesn’t have, the authority to declare war, and our stepping aside, relegating our- selves to the sidelines. And now we find that we’re going to be taken down another long road. I thank you, Ambassador Bremer, for what you’re doing. I think that you, personally, are trying hard. I think that you’re loyal to those who have placed this responsibility in your hands. I think that you’ve done the best you could. I don’t envy your task. It’s a tough one. Much of what I have said certainly is not directed at you. I probably wouldn’t have said it here tonight had it not been for the fact that, apparently, as the head of the Democratic Mem- bers here, I’m going to be denied on the basis, on my side, of a fur- ther opportunity to ask questions. This is an extraordinary time that we’re in, I must say, and I am very sorry that this committee is not going to have another oppor- tunity to ask questions of the key man in Iraq. I think it’s bad. I, personally, thank you for what you’re doing, and I certainly thank our troops for what they are doing. I think that we ought to do whatever we can even if it means our eating a little crow, I think we ought to be willing to eat some crow—to get the United Nations with us and give them a share in the control of the civilian side, and not be so bent over in opposition and in reluctance to share some of this with our erstwhile friends and allies. Mr. Chairman, I thank you for having this hearing. I thank you for having it in the afternoon so as to accommodate me, as I asked you to do. I have no more to say at this point. Chairman STEVENS. Well, Mr. Chairman, Ambassador Bremer, I was sitting here thinking about a conversation I had once with a Secretary of Navy who was called by President Roosevelt to his of- fice and told that he wanted to give Britain some of our naval equipment. He said he thought we ought to develop a program 73 where we could loan them or lease them these pieces of equipment. The Secretary told me that he had gone back to his Department, and he asked his general counsel if the President had the authority to do this, and the counsel said no, he didn’t have authority to do that. So the Secretary said he went back to the President and said he was sorry, he couldn’t do what the President asked him to do because he didn’t have authority to do it. And President Roosevelt, according to this gentlemen who told me the story, and he was the one that was there supposedly, said to him, ‘‘Well, I want you to go back to your Department and go through your legal department, and the first lawyer that agrees with me, he’s your new general counsel.’’ I say that, Senator, because in my lifetime and yours we’ve seen Presidents act in a lot of ways. I remember when Harry Truman went to Korea, and I remember when Lyndon Johnson went really deeply into Vietnam. And this President came to us for authority. He got the authority from Congress—77 to 23 in our Senate, al- most two thirds in the House, voted to give the President this ex- traordinary authority to go to war, because he thought it was right, just as President Roosevelt thought was right to go into lend-lease, just as Harry Truman thought it was right to go into Korea, and just as Lyndon Johnson thought it was right to go into Vietnam. Now, you have your vision, and I have mine. Mine is that, Mr. Ambassador, I hope you go back there and do everything you have to do to assist this government to come to where the world wants it to be, to a stable government and to bring those young men and women home. I hope it happens during my watch. But if it doesn’t happen during my watch, as long as I’m here I’ll support you in what you’re doing and do everything I can to get you the money, the taxpayers’ money, to do what we have to do. Basically, this money, over $60 billion of it, is for Defense, to pro- tect and give our people the ability to defend themselves and to de- fend the people we’ve chosen to defend, those who wanted freedom in Iraq. So I respect you, Senator, I respect your right to ask questions and to have a hearing, but I think my job is to respond to the President’s request, an emergency request. This is an emergency bill. I don’t know that we’ve ever had a hearing on an emergency bill before. We’re going to have three hearings, at least, on this one. And that was at your request, Senator. So I have deep respect for you. I’ve got to say, Ambassador, God be with you, and I hope you do well in the other hearings, and I look forward to hearing what you and—again, you have my phone number, sir. I don’t give it to many people, Senator, but I gave it to Ambassador Bremer. You call me if I can ever help you do the job, this incredible job—I think that’s one thing, Senator Byrd and I both agree on—you have the most incredible job in the world right now. It’s a tough one, and I wish you well. Senator BYRD. Mr. Chairman, may I say one thing in closing? Chairman STEVENS. Yes, sir. Senator BYRD. Mr. Chairman, to me, the Constitution is far above any President of the United States. And I’m standing by what I think. I’m standing by the Constitution. This country in- 74 vaded another country without provocation, and I think that has to be taken into consideration. American lives are being taken, and American treasures are being taken to fight a war under a new doctrine, the preemptive strike doctrine. I think if that matter were to be put before the American people, they’d vote it down over- whelmingly. The doctrine of preemption, that’s what we’re doing. And never, no matter what President there may be, Republican or Democrat, would I put that President ahead of the Constitution and ahead of this institution. I have to say that I don’t think we’re doing the right thing tonight. Thank you very much. COMMITTEE RECESS Chairman STEVENS. Well, thank you, Senator. I always wanted to be a marine. From the Halls of Montezuma to the Shores of Tripoli, neither one of those actions was authorized by Congress. Do your best, Mr. Ambassador. Ambassador BREMER. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. [Whereupon, at 7:14 p.m., Monday, September 22, the committee was recessed, to reconvene subject to the call of the Chair.] FISCAL YEAR 2004 SUPPLEMENTAL REQUEST FOR RECONSTRUCTION OF IRAQ AND AF- GHANISTAN WEDNESDAY, SEPTEMBER 24, 2003 U.S. SENATE, COMMITTEE ON APPROPRIATIONS, Washington, DC. The committee met at 10:05 a.m., in room SD–106, Dirksen Sen- ate Office Building, Hon. Ted Stevens (chairman) presiding. Present: Senators Stevens, Cochran, Specter, Domenici, Bond, Burns, Shelby, Bennett, Campbell, Craig, Hutchison, Brownback, Byrd, Inouye, Hollings, Leahy, Harkin, Mikulski, Reid, Kohl, Mur- ray, Dorgan, Feinstein, Durbin, and Johnson. OPENING STATEMENT OF CHAIRMAN TED STEVENS Chairman STEVENS. Good morning, Mr. Secretary, General Myers, General Abizaid, and I note that Dr. Zakheim is with us. Thank you for coming. We’re here to discuss the administration’s request for the fiscal year 2004 supplemental, and it would be my wish that we’d hear from the Secretary first, and then proceed with our questions or statements. Mr. Secretary? STATEMENT OF HON. DONALD H. RUMSFELD, SECRETARY, DEPART- MENT OF DEFENSE ACCOMPANIED BY: GENERAL RICHARD MYERS, CHAIRMAN, JOINT CHIEFS OF STAFF GENERAL JOHN P. ABIZAID, COMMANDER, CENTCOM DR. DOV ZAKHEIM, UNDER SECRETARY OF DEFENSE (COMP- TROLLER) Secretary RUMSFELD. Mr. Chairman, thank you, and members of the committee. We’ve been requested to have our statements sub- mitted for the record, and that only I make a brief opening state- ment, which I will do. Chairman STEVENS. I’m pleased you’ve complied with that re- quest. All of your statements will appear in the record as though read. Secretary RUMSFELD. Earlier this month, the American people marked the anniversary of September 11, and thanks to the cour- age of the men and women in uniform, two brutal regimes have been removed from power, two nations have been rescued from tyr- anny. And thanks to those who fight the battles, thousands of ter-(75) 76 rorists have been captured or killed, including nearly two-thirds of known senior al-Qaeda operatives, and most of those responsible for the September 11 attacks. With the support of some 90 nations, a number of planned at- tacks have been stopped, terrorist assets seized. But perhaps the greatest blessing is the fine men and women who wear the uni- form. Each volunteered for service, and, in the course of the war, many have given their lives. Still others have suffered serious wounds. As many of you, we visit them in Bethesda, Walter Reed, and other hospitals around the country. Our hearts go out to their families and to all those who have been injured or killed in this war, both United States and Coalition, alike. We’re grateful also for the brave soldiers and the fine civilian staffs from the Coalition countries that now serve in Iraq, Afghanistan, and elsewhere in the global war on terror. Together, we’ve accomplished a great deal, but a good deal re- mains. Notwithstanding the successes, dangers persist. Many ter- rorists are behind bars, but those that remain at large are plan- ning future attacks. FISCAL YEAR 2004 SUPPLEMENTAL REQUEST As a sign of his conviction, the President has proposed, re- quested, $87 billion in emergency funds to fight the war on terror. The vast majority of the funds that the President has requested will go the troops who are risking their lives in this struggle. Of the $87 billion, $66 billion is to support ongoing military oper- ations, money for military pay, fuel, transportation, maintenance, weapons, equipment, lifesaving body armor, ammunition, and other military needs. He requested $51 billion for military operations in Iraq, $11 billion for military operations in Afghanistan, the Horn of Africa, and other Operation Enduring Freedom missions; $2.2 billion for defending the U.S. homeland; $1.4 billion to support Co- alition partners, many of whom are stepping forward with troops willing to risk their lives in this effort, but whose governments lack the resources to support those deployments. So $66 billion, or 75 percent of the request, is for the troops. They need it, and they will need it soon. The remaining $21 billion is to help Afghanistan and Iraq secure their nations for freedom so that they can get on a path to stability, self-government, and self-reliance. For the Afghanistan request, it’s for $300 million for roads, schools, clinics, $400 million to train and support the Afghan Na- tional Army and highway patrol, border patrol, and national police, $120 million to train demobilized militia and help them find jobs, and support other private-sector initiatives, and nearly $300 mil- lion to support the rule of law, elections, and other critical support for the Afghan National Government. This support is in addition to the $1.8 billion previously appropriated and the $5 billion that has been pledged thus far by the international community. IMPORTANCE OF FUNDING FOR RECOVERY Since Ambassador Bremer was here before this committee on Monday, I will not address the request for the $20 billion for the Coalition Provisional Authority (CPA) in Iraq, except to say that a 77 major portion is to help the Iraqis assume responsibility for the se- curity of their country, including the training of Iraqi police, border guards, facility-protection services, a new Iraqi army, and a new Iraqi civil defense corps, and for the Iraqi justice system. The funds for the Department of Defense and the $20 billion for the Coalition Provisional Authority are linked inextricably. Both are needed. All of the CPA request investments are critical for the efforts that General Abizaid and General Sanchez and their troops are engaged in. Helping Iraqis provide for their own security is critical. The in- vestments the President is requesting are, in a very real sense, a critical element of the Coalition’s exit strategy. The sooner Iraq can defend its own people, the sooner the United States and the Coali- tion forces can turn over the security responsibility to the Iraqis. But reaching our goal requires some investments now to restore critical infrastructure and basic services necessary to jumpstart the economy. Iraq cannot make those improvements today without as- sistance from the United States and the international community. But the purpose of this assistance is to help the Iraqis get on a path where they can rebuild their own country. The President has requested a $20 billion investment in the fu- ture of Iraq. To put that in context, the Marshall Plan, after World War II, cost roughly $90 billion in today’s dollars. Those invest- ments helped transform a region that had been a source of violent war and instability for centuries and turn it into a place of peace, prosperity, and mutually beneficial trade. PROGRESS IN AFGHANISTAN I recently returned from Iraq and Afghanistan, as did Secretary Powell, and I know a number of you have been there very recently, as well. I am convinced that progress is being achieved in both countries. Afghanistan is on the road to a more stable democratic self-government. After 2 years of training, the Afghan National Army has recently been fighting side by side with Coalition forces in our most recent anti-terrorist campaigns, Operations Mountain Viper and Warrior Sweep. The central government is working to extend authority to these provinces. Together with the Afghan au- thorities, the Coalition deployed what we called Provincial Recon- struction Teams, or PRTs, to four provinces, with four more on the way. Afghanistan faces challenges, to be sure, but the progress has been measurable. The terrorist training camps are gone, al-Qaeda is on the run, the Afghan people are liberated, and the country is on a path to democracy. PROGRESS IN IRAQ In Iraq, the Coalition forces also face difficulties and dangers, let there be no doubt, including the threat from regime remnants, criminals, and foreign fighters who have come into the country to oppose the Coalition forces. What’s remarkable is that despite the significant dangers they face, the Coalition civil and military staff in Iraq has, in less than 5 months, racked up a series of achieve- ments in both security and civil reconstruction that may very well be without precedent. 78 Consider a few of their accomplishments. In less than 5 months, virtually all major Iraqi hospitals and universities have been re- opened. Hundreds of secondary schools—until a few months ago, those schools were used often as weapon caches for the Ba’ath Party—they have been rebuilt and they were ready for the start of the fall semester. Fifty-six thousand Iraqis have been armed and trained in just a few months, and they are contributing to the secu- rity and defense of their country. Another 14,000 are currently— have been recruited and are currently in training, for a total of 70,000. Today, a new Iraqi army is being trained, and more than 40,000 Iraqi police are conducting joint patrols with Coalition forces. By contrast, it took 14 months to establish a police force in postwar Germany, and 10 years to begin training a new German army. As security improves, so does commerce, and some 5,000 Iraqi small businesses opened since liberation on May 1. The inde- pendent Central Bank of Iraq was established and a new currency announced in just 2 months, accomplishments that took 3 years in postwar Germany. The Iraqi Governing Council has appointed an Iraqi Cabinet of Ministers, something that took 14 months in Ger- many. And all of this is in less than 5 months. In all major cities and most towns and villages, Iraqi municipal councils have been formed, something that took 8 months in Ger- many. To date, the Coalition has completed some 8,000 civil-affairs projects, with many more underway. All of this has taken place in less than 5 months. The speed and breadth of what Ambassador Bremer, General Abizaid, General Sanchez, and the Coalition military and civilian teams has accomplished is impressive. It may, in fact, be without parallel, whether compared to postwar Japan, postwar Germany, or postwar Bosnia or Kosovo. FOREIGN CONTRIBUTIONS I keep hearing that the United States should not go it alone. Well, the United States is not going it alone. There are, at this mo- ment, some 17 nations represented in Ambassador Bremer’s Coali- tion Provisional Authority. They are participating in that author- ity. Moreover, there are currently 32 countries with troops in Iraq today. They include Albania, Azerbaijan, Bulgaria, the Czech Re- public, Denmark, Dominican Republic, El Salvador, Estonia, Geor- gia, Honduras, Hungary, Italy, Kazakhstan, Korea, Latvia, Lith- uania, Macedonia, Moldova, Mongolia, The Netherlands, New Zea- land, Nicaragua, Norway, the Philippines, Poland, Romania, Slo- vakia, Spain, Thailand, Ukraine, and the United Kingdom. Por- tugal is, at this moment, preparing to deploy forces in Iraq, as well. Of the 19 North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO) nations, 11 have already committed troops to Iraq. We’re currently in dis- cussions with 14 other countries. Now, do they equal our forces, or do their financial contributions equal ours? No, they don’t. But do they represent a significant mili- tary commitment, and do they represent a significant political com- mitment of those nations? Yes, they do. And we are, and we should be, deeply grateful for their contributions, for their political cour- 79 age, as well as for their friendship. A great many of the forces of those countries, I should add, are also volunteers, as are all of ours. In Afghanistan, NATO has just taken over command of the Inter- national Security Assistance Force (ISAF), the Alliance’s first mis- sion outside of Europe in its entire history. I met with the new German Commander of ISAF forces in Kabul. What they are doing is important for Afghanistan and for the NATO Alliance, as well. So between Iraq and Afghanistan, there are now 49 countries with forces on the ground, with many others making important contributions in other ways. So this business that America is going it alone, it seems to me, is not factual at all. AFFORDABILITY Let me conclude by recalling why we’re spending this money, why we are proposing it, why the President is requesting it. The Wall Street Journal recently tallied the cost to our country and the economy after the September 11 attacks: $7.8 billion in lost income for the families of more than 3,000 victims; $21 billion sent to New York City for direct-damage costs; $4 billion for the victims fund; $18 billion to clean up the World Trade Center site; $700 mil- lion to repair the Pentagon; $6.4 billion in reduced or lost wages or salaries for workers in New York industries; $1.3 million net job loss nationwide; $50 billion in costs to the insurance industry; $11 billion in lost business to the airline industry; the bankruptcy of two airlines, even after a $15 billion Federal bailout; $38 billion in costs for new border security, protection against biological threats and emergency preparedness; $1.3 billion in costs to State govern- ments for homeland security; $33 billion in spending by the private sector for new protective services. So even assuming some overlap, which there undoubtedly is, the 9/11 attack very likely cost the American people hundreds of bil- lions of dollars. And that’s not counting the price paid in lives and the immense suffering of their families and their loved ones. I believe our Nation can afford whatever it needs to defend our people, to defend our way of life, and to defend our vital interests. At the height of the cold war in the Eisenhower and Kennedy years, we spent roughly 10 percent of Gross Domestic Product (GDP) on defense. The last time I was Secretary of Defense, in the 1970s, we spent something in the neighborhood of 5 percent. Today, we spend a little over 3 percent. It’s a great deal of money, let there be no doubt, but it’s a modest fraction of our Nation’s wealth. To defend freedom in the 21st century, we need to root out ter- rorists. We need to take the battle to the terrorists. And we need to help the now-free people in Iraq and Afghanistan rebuild from the rubble of tyranny and claim their places as responsible mem- bers of the community of nations. A British author wrote, quote, ‘‘If a nation values anything more than freedom, it will lose its free- dom. And the irony is that if it is comfort or money that it values more, it will lose that, too.’’ Is $87 billion a great deal of money? Answer is yes. Can our country afford it? The answer is also yes. We believe it is necessary for the security of our country and the stability of the world, and that the price of sending terrorists a message that we’re not willing 80 to spend what it takes to do or what it takes, that we value comfort or money more than freedom, would be far greater. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. [The statements follow:] PREPARED STATEMENT OF DONALD H. RUMSFELD Mr. Chairman, thank you for this opportunity to testify on the President’s emer- gency supplemental request. Earlier this month, the American people marked the anniversary of the Sep- tember 11th attacks—and took stock of all that had been accomplished in the two years since this war on terror was visited upon us two years ago. Thanks to the courage of our men and women in uniform, two brutal regimes have been removed from power, two nations rescued from tyranny. Thanks to those who fight the battles, seen and unseen, in the war on terror, thousands of terrorists have been captured or killed—including nearly two-thirds of known senior al-Qaeda operatives, and most of those responsible for the 9/11 attacks. With the support of dozens of nations, a number of planned attacks have been stopped, terrorist assets seized, and thousands of lives saved. We have much to be grateful for. But perhaps our greatest blessing is the fine men and women who wear our nation’s uniform. Each of them volunteered for serv- ice—and in the course of this war, many have given their lives. They are heroes— they will not be forgotten. Still others have suffered serious wounds. I’ve visited with many of them, at Bethesda and Walter Reed, and Brooke Army Medical Cen- ter—to thank them for their service and sacrifice. Our hearts go out to the families of all those who have been injured and killed in this war—U.S. and Coalition forces alike. And we are grateful also for the brave soldiers and fine civilian staffs from Coalition countries now serving in Iraq and Af- ghanistan. Together, we have accomplished a great deal. But much work still remains. Not- withstanding our successes, dangers persist. Many terrorists are behind bars—but those that remain at large are planning future attacks. Standing between our people and the gathering dangers is the courage of our men and women in uniform—and the determination of our country to see this war through. As a sign of his conviction that we must prosecute this war, and defeat those who threaten us, the President has requested $87 billion in emergency funds to fight the war on terror. The vast majority of the funds the President has requested will go to the troops who are risking their lives in this struggle. Of the $87 billion in the President’s re- quest, $66 billion is to support ongoing military operations—money for military pay, fuel, transportation, maintenance, weapons, equipment, life-saving body armor, am- munition and other critical military needs. The President has requested: —$51 billion for military operations in Iraq, —$11 billion for military operations in Afghanistan, the Horn of Africa and other missions related to Operation Enduring Freedom, —$2.2 billion for defending the U.S. homeland, and —$1.4 billion to support coalition partners, many of whom are stepping forward with troops willing to risk their lives in this effort—but whose governments lack the resources to support those deployments. So $66 billion—or 75 percent of this request—is for troops. They need it—and they need it soon. The remaining $21 billion is to help the people of Afghanistan and Iraq secure their nations for freedom—so that they can get on a path to stability, self-govern- ment and self-reliance. For Afghanistan, the President will reallocate nearly $400 million in funds from existing accounts, and has requested an additional $800 million to accelerate recon- struction efforts now underway. This includes: —$300 million for roads, schools, clinics; —$400 million to train and support the Afghan National Army and the national police, border patrol and highway patrol; —$120 million to train demobilized militia and help them find jobs, and to sup- port other private sector initiatives; and —Nearly $300 million to support rule of law, elections and other critical support for the Afghan government. 81 This support is in addition to the $1.8 billion previously appropriated, and the $5 billion that has been pledged thus far by the international community. As discussed by Ambassador Bremer before this Committee on Monday, the Presi- dent has also requested $20 billion for the U.S. contribution to support the Coalition Provisional Authority in Iraq—including $15 billion to speed repairs to Iraqi’s starved and dilapidated infrastructure, and $5 billion to help Iraqis assume increas- ing responsibility for the security of their country—including training of Iraqi police, border guards, facilities protection services, a new Iraqi Army and a new Iraqi Civil Defense Corps, and for the Iraqi justice system. The $20 billion the President has requested does not cover all of Iraq’s needs, which are vastly greater than this— nor is it intended to. We expect that the international community to step up with additional contribu- tions as well. Already, some 60 nations have made pledges or contributions of $1.5 billion—and there are discussions with others, who have expressed an interest in contributing as well. A free and stable Iraq is in the world’s interest. The hope and intention is that over the coming years the bulk of the funds for Iraq’s reconstruction will come from the Iraqis themselves—from oil revenues, recov- ered assets, international trade, and foreign direct investment. The funds the Presi- dent has requested are designed to help Iraqis so they can generate the income, and security, necessary to rebuild their own country. Our goal is to help the Iraqi people get on a path to self-reliance. The investments proposed are intended to help them do that. Today, Iraq is not yet producing enough income to pay for essential services. The $15 billion the President has requested to pay for urgent repairs to Iraq’s infrastruc- ture will, along with international contributions and Iraqi funds, help Iraqis begin generating the income necessary to eventually pay their own way. Take oil, for example. Ambassador Bremer testified that Iraq will earn about $2.5 billion in oil revenue in 2003—a substantial sum considering the dilapidated condi- tions of its oil infrastructure. With improvements to that infrastructure, Ambas- sador Bremer estimates that Iraq’s oil revenue should grow to about $12 billion next year, and should reach roughly $20 billion by 2005. Investments are needed in water, sewage, power and other essential services that were allowed to degenerate over three decades—starved of investment as Saddam Hussein built his palaces and weapons. These are critical not only to the lives of Iraqis, but also to Iraq’s ability to attract foreign investors. Iraq’s interim leaders are already taking steps to make Iraq hospitable to trade and foreign investment. Last weekend, Iraq’s finance minister announced sweeping reforms of Iraq’s tax and foreign investment laws. The Iraqi economy will be open to foreign capital and investment, with 100 percent foreign ownership permitted in all sectors except natural resources. Tariffs on imports will be 5 percent across the board, except for necessities like food, medicine and clothing—which will be tariff- free. It is safe to say that, with the implementation of these provisions, Iraq will have some of the most enlightened—and inviting—tax and investment laws in the free world. But to attract foreign investment, Iraq must have more than just attractive tax and investment laws; it must also have a reasonable security environment. This is why the President has requested $5 billion to train Iraqis to help defend their country. This includes $2 billion for public safety, including the training of an additional 40,000 police in the next 18 months; $2 billion to train a new three-divi- sion Iraqi Army and an Iraqi Civil Defense Corps; and almost $1 billion for the Iraqi justice system. All of these investments are critical to the efforts of General Abizaid, General Sanchez and their troops’ efforts. Helping Iraqis provide for their own secu- rity is critical. The investments the President is requesting are, in a real sense, a critical element of the Coalition’s exit strategy. The sooner Iraq can generate income and defend its own people, the sooner U.S. and Coalition forces can come home. As foreign investment begins to flow, Iraq’s leaders can invest in reconstruction and other efforts to bolster the economy and create growth and prosperity—so that the Iraqi people can achieve self-reliance. That is the goal. But reaching that goal requires investments now to restore crit- ical infrastructure and basic services necessary to jump-start their economy. Iraq cannot make those improvements today without assistance from the U.S. and the international community. But the purpose of this assistance is to help Iraqis get on a path where they can rebuild their own country—so that they do not become per- manent wards of the international community. This is why the President has requested that the $20 billion be granted, and not loaned. Iraq is a nation with considerable potential—water, oil, vast wheat and bar- 82 ley fields, biblical sites and great potential for tourism, and an educated population. But it also owes almost $200 billion in debts and reparations. Iraq is in no position to pay its current debt service, let alone take on more addi- tional debt. If we want to encourage Iraqi self-reliance, so that Iraqis can fund their reconstruction and so that American troops can come home, it would not be helpful to saddle Iraq with more debt it could not reasonably be expected to repay. What the President has requested is a $20 billion investment in the future of Iraq. To put that in context, the Marshall plan after World War II cost roughly $90 billion in today’s dollars. Those investments helped transform a region that been a source of violent war and instability for centuries, and turn it into a place of peace, prosperity and mutually beneficial trade. Today, in Iraq and Afghanistan, we have a similar opportunity to help nations that were sources of terror and war get on a path to becoming sources of freedom and moderation in a turbulent region. If we have the vision to do so, the people of the world will reap the benefits of that investment for generations to come. Still, $87 billion is a lot of money. And the American taxpayers deserve to know that it is being spent wisely. So let me say several things: I recently returned from Iraq and Afghanistan, as did Secretary Powell. He will tell you, as I will, that progress is being achieved in both countries. Afghanistan is on the road to stability, democracy and self-government. After two years of training, the Afghan National Army has been fighting side-by-side with Co- alition forces in our most recent anti-terrorist campaigns—Operations Mountain Viper and Warrior Sweep. The central government is working to extend authority to the provinces. Together with Afghan authorities, the Coalition has deployed Provincial Reconstruction Teams (or PRTs) to four provinces, with four more on the way. Afghanistan faces challenges to be sure, but the progress has been measurable. The terrorist training camps are gone. Al-Qaeda is on the run. The Afghan people are liberated and the country is on the path to democracy. In Iraq the Coalition forces also face real difficulties and danger—including the threat from regime remnants, and foreign fighters who are coming into the country to oppose the Coalition. What is remarkable is that, despite the significant dangers they face, the Coalition civil and military staff in Iraq has—in less than five months—racked up a series of achievements, in both security and civil reconstruc- tion, that may be without precedent. Consider a few of their accomplishments: —In less than five months, virtually all major Iraqi hospitals and universities have been re-opened, and hundreds of secondary schools—until a few months ago most often used as weapons caches—have been rebuilt and were ready for the start of the fall semester. —70,000 Iraqis have been armed and trained in just a few months, and are con- tributing to the security and defense of their country. Today, a new Iraqi Army is being trained and more than 40,000 Iraqi police are conducting joint patrols with Coalition forces. By contrast, it took 14 months to establish a police force in post-war Germany—and 10 years to begin training a new German Army. —As security improves, so does commerce. Some 5,000 Iraqi small businesses opened since liberation on May 1st. The independent Iraqi Central Bank was established and a new currency announced in just two months—accomplish- ments that took three years in post-war Germany. —The Iraqi Governing Council has appointed an Iraqi cabinet of ministers—some- thing that took 14 months in Germany. —In all major cities and most towns and villages, Iraqi municipal councils have been formed—something that took 8 months in Germany. —To date, the Coalition has completed some 8,000 civil affairs projects—with many more underway. All this, and more, has taken place in less than five months. The speed and breadth of what Ambassador Bremer, General Tom Franks, General John Abizaid, General Rick Sanchez, and the Coalition military and civilian teams have accom- plished is impressive—it may be without historical parallel, whether compared to post-war Japan, Germany, Bosnia, or Kosovo. These successes would not be possible without many months of preparation—plan- ning that began before Operation Iraqi Freedom was launched. And they would not be possible without substantial international support and cooperation. I keep hearing that the United States should not ‘‘go it alone.’’ Well, the United States is not going it alone. There are, at this moment, some 25 nations in the Coa- lition Provisional Authority—it is a genuinely international operation. Moreover, there are currently 32 countries with troops in Iraq today. 83 These include: Albania, Azerbaijan, Bulgaria, the Czech Republic, Denmark, the Dominican Republic, El Salvador, Estonia, Georgia, Honduras, Hungary, Italy, Kazakhstan, Korea, Latvia, Lithuania, Macedonia. Moldova, Mongolia, the Nether- lands, New Zealand, Nicaragua, Norway, the Philippines, Poland, Romania, Slo- vakia, Spain, Thailand, Ukraine, and the UK. Portugal is at this moment preparing to deploy forces to Iraq. Of the 19 NATO nations, 11 have already committed troops to Iraq. We are currently in discussions with 14 other countries that have expressed possible interest in sending forces. Do they equal our forces or financial contributions? No they do not. But do they represent a significant military commitment and a political commitment for those nations? Yes, they do. And we are, as we should be, deeply grateful for their con- tributions, their political courage, and their friendship. The international forces in Iraq are extraordinary. Earlier this month, I met many of them when I visited the Polish Multinational Division in Babylon, which had just taken over from the Marines in the South-Central sector of Iraq. That division alone includes troops from 17 nations, with four more nations providing civil support— for a total of 21 countries. Many were from nations that had only recently recovered their own freedom and independence—and were proud to be helping the Iraqi people recover theirs. It was an honor to meet them, and see their enthusiasm and their commitment. In Afghanistan, NATO has just taken over command of ISAF—the Alliance’s first mission outside of Europe in its history. I met with the new German commander of ISAF forces in Kabul. What they are doing is important for Afghanistan, and for the NATO alliance. Between Iraq and Afghanistan, there are 49 countries with forces on the ground— with many others making important contributions in other ways. So this business that America is ‘‘going it alone’’ is not factual, plain and simple—it is false. Finally, let me conclude by recalling why we are spending that money. The Wall Street Journal recently tallied the costs to our country and economy, of the September 11th attacks. They include: —$7.8 billion in lost income for the families of the more than 3,000 victims— money that would have gone to pay for braces and summer camps, schools and colleges. —$21 billion sent to New York City for direct damage costs. —$4 billion for the victims fund. —$18 billion to clean up the World Trade Center site. —$700 million to repair the Pentagon. —As much as $6.4 billion in reduced or lost wages and salaries for workers in New York industries. —1.3 million net jobs lost nationwide. —$150 billion in reduced GDP. —$50 billion in costs to the insurance industry. —$11 billion in lost business to the airline industry. —The bankruptcy of two airlines, even after a $15 billion federal bailout. —$38 billion in costs for new border security, protection against biological threats, and emergency preparedness. —$1.3 billion in costs to state governments for homeland security, and —$33 billion in spending by the private sector for new protective services. Even assuming for some overlap, the 9/11 attack alone cost the American people literally hundreds of billions of dollars—and that is not counting the enormous price paid in lives, and the immense suffering of their families and loved ones—men and women from all walks of life, of all races and religions, and from most countries of the world. If September 11th cost more than three thousand lives and hundreds of billions of dollars, it makes $87 billion pale by comparison. Our nation can afford whatever it needs to defend our people, our way of life and our vital interests. At the height of the Cold War, in the Eisenhower and Kennedy years, we spent roughly 10 percent of GDP. The last time I was Secretary of De- fense, in the 1970s, we spent roughly 5 percent of GDP on defense. Today, we spend a little over 3 percent—a great deal of money, to be sure, but a modest fraction of our nation’s wealth. Our job is to work to prevent another attack like the one we experienced on Sep- tember 11th—before it happens. There is only one way to do so—by taking the bat- tle to the terrorists, and those who give them support and sanctuary. As President Bush told the United Nations yesterday, ‘‘events during the past two years have set before us the clearest of divides: between those who seek order, and those who spread chaos . . . between those who honor the rights of man, and those 84 who deliberately take the lives of men and women and children without mercy or shame. Between these alternatives there is no neutral ground . . . Because a coali- tion of nations acted . . . Iraq is free . . . [and] people are safer because an unsta- ble aggressor has been removed from power.’’ To defend freedom in the 21st century, we need to root out the terrorists. We need to make clear to the world’s terrorist states that defying 17 U.N. resolutions, filing false declarations with the United Nations, refusing to cooperate with U.N. inspec- tors, and refusing to disarm and prove to the world you have done so, has con- sequences. We need to help the now free people in Iraq and Afghanistan rebuild from the rubble of tyranny, and claim their places as responsible members of the community of nations. A British author once declared: ‘‘If a nation values anything more than freedom, it will lose its freedom; and the irony is that if it is comfort or money that it values more, it will lose that too.’’ Is $87 billion a great deal of money? Yes. But can we afford it? Without question. Because it is necessary for the security of our nation and the stability of the world— and because the price of sending terrorist a message that we are not willing to spend what it takes or do what it takes—that we value comfort or money more than freedom—would be far greater. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. PREPARED STATEMENT OF GENERAL JOHN F. ABIZAID It is an honor to report to this committee on the situation and our actions in the CENTCOM Area of Responsibility. As you know, our command is focused on three main priorities: defeating transnational terrorism and creating safe and secure envi- ronments in Iraq and Afghanistan. CENTCOM operates within the geographic and ideological heart of the Global War on Terror. It is a war without borders that spans all twenty-five countries in the region. There is no doubt that The War on Terror is connected to our efforts in Afghanistan and Iraq. Success in Afghanistan and Iraq will result in stable States that do not harbor terrorists and provide a visible alter- native to the terrorist vision of hatred and conflict. The over 195,000 U.S. soldiers, sailors, airmen, and Marines now serving in the CENTCOM Area of Responsibility are engaged in a wide range of activities, each of them critical to maintaining our national security. These include counter-insur- gency, counter-terrorist, stability, and civil-affairs operations. Over twenty ships and 200 aircraft are sustaining our land forces and providing a potent deterrent to our adversaries. Our servicemen and women are also occupied with training exercises designed to increase our ability to operate with regional partners as well as enhance their military effectiveness. I visit our troops and their commanders frequently and they remain confident that we are winning the war on terrorism and winning the peace in Iraq and Afghanistan. They are also realistic and understand that success will not come without cost or without the cooperation of local populations. Those of you who have visited the region understand the great strides our servicemen and women have made toward accomplishing our objectives. We all recognize, however, that there are no easy answers to the problems we face in the region. At CENTCOM we also know that, while we are the military centerpiece of our national security efforts in the region, none of the problems with which we are engaged will succumb to military force alone. Integrating our efforts with those of other agencies and en- suring that our operations advance our political objectives are essential to our suc- cess. WAR ON TERRORISM We have had good effect against terrorists throughout the Central Command Area of Responsibility. Our success has not been due to military actions alone. The United States Government, in cooperation with our regional partners, has killed and captured terrorists and attacked their infrastructure. CENTCOM is proud to have played a role in an effort marked by unprecedented cooperation between various agencies, regional partners, and members of the largest international coalition in history. Despite remarkable victories, the fight against terrorism is far from over. The en- emy’s ideological base, financial networks and information networks remain strong. Indeed, the demographic and economic conditions that breed terrorists may be wors- ening and those conditions are heightening the ideological fervor associated with radical Islamist extremism. It is clear that we must continually reassess our efforts and improve our effectiveness. 85 We at Central Command, partnered as we are with many Islamic nations, recog- nize that the War on Terrorism is not a war against Islam; it is a war against the enemies of Islam. It is not a war against religion; it is a war against irreligious mur- derers. Securing all of our futures depends mainly on collective action and inter- national cooperation. Each of the three main Combined Joint Task Forces in our Area of Responsibility has an important role to play in the greater regional effort against terrorists. Through these task forces and Component Commands, we synergize theater cooperation efforts with other nations and build indigenous capa- bilities to combat terrorism and control borders. Central Command, our regional partners, and the seventy-one members of the Operation Enduring Freedom Coali- tion will remain on the offensive until terrorists no longer pose a threat. IRAQ In Iraq, our forces are working alongside the Coalition Provisional Authority to provide military capacity in our interagency and international efforts toward build- ing a unified and stable country. The CPA’s endstate for Iraq calls for a democratic and sovereign nation, underpinned by new and protected freedoms and a growing market economy, and made secure through the efforts of Iraqis—able to defend itself, but posing no threat to its neighbors or the international community.1 Coalition servicemen and women, alongside many Iraqi partners, are fighting our enemies and making progress toward a return of Iraq to the Iraqi people. While Iraqi police capacity still remains below requirements, joint Coalition and Iraqi po- lice operations are bringing to justice criminal gangs that have been preying on the Iraqi people. Neighborhood watch programs are springing up throughout towns and villages. Although large reconstruction projects will require considerable time and resources, military commanders are working with local townspeople to prioritize small reconstruction projects; thousands of these have been completed. Town and city councils are in place throughout the country. The first battalion of the New Iraqi Army will graduate on 4 October and the second battalion begins training the next day; these soldiers are proud to be part of the New Iraq. The first two thou- sand men and women of the Iraqi Civil Defense Corps are assuming security re- sponsibilities alongside Coalition soldiers. All this and more has been achieved in just over four months, despite the utter collapse of virtually every Iraqi institution. Our achievements, however, have not come without sacrifice and there is more fighting ahead. Iraq has tremendous potential, but the Coalition and our Iraqi partners must de- feat our enemies and overcome considerable obstacles before the future of Iraq is secure. While all but a very few Iraqis recognize the promise of freedoms they are enjoying for the first time—freedom to express their personal views, freedom to practice their religion, freedom from fear, freedom to determine their own destiny— there are those who would deny the Iraqi people the peace and prosperity they so richly deserve. We continue to experience attacks on Coalition forces, our Iraqi part- ners, and infrastructure punctuated by larger high-visibility attacks to discredit the Coalition, disrupt reconstruction, and cause unrest. While former regime loyalists remain the focus of our operations, extremists, foreign fighters and terrorist groups are emerging as a major threat to Iraqis, the Coalition, and the international com- munity. Criminal activity continues to frustrate reconstruction efforts and is the major source of instability in some regions. While our enemies are too weak to chal- lenge us militarily, they believe that we do not possess the will to persevere in Iraq. They are wrong. We are taking the fight to the enemy in Iraq. Attacks against our forces are local- ized in the Sunni areas and the city of Baghdad. Over seventy-five percent of violent incidents and sabotage have occurred in only four of the eighteen provinces. The preponderance of the country, including Baghdad, has achieved a very high degree of security and stability. Iraqis are providing intelligence that permits us to kill or capture the enemy and preempt attacks. We are focusing our efforts in five areas: improving intelligence, developing Iraqi security forces, internationalizing our security effort, protecting the infrastructure, and helping to communicate our aims, plans, and successes to the Iraqi people. We have also repositioned forces to concentrate our efforts in problem areas and estab- lish a higher degree of control over Iraq’s borders. In areas in which we achieve sta- bility, we will disengage our forces and turn over security responsibilities to Iraqis 1 This more closely follows Amb. Bremer’s testimony yesterday. It reads: ‘‘President Bush’s vi- sion, in contrast, provides for an Iraq made secure through the efforts of Iraqis. In addition to a more secure environment, the President’s plan provides for an Iraqi economy based on sound economic principles bolstered by a modern, reliable infrastructure. And finally, the President’s plan provides for a democratic and sovereign Iraq at the earliest reasonable date.’’ 86 while maintaining the capability to anticipate and respond rapidly to any changes in the situation. Later, as the New Iraq expands its security capacity, we intend to move our forces to less visible locations from which we can react to external threats and prepare to relinquish national defense responsibilities to the New Iraqi Army. Violence, of course, is not the only obstacle to progress in Iraq. As you know, we must maintain the consent of the Iraqi people. Popular disaffection sets conditions for instability. Disaffection stems from many sources including high expectations, high unemployment, a lack of essential services, suspicion of Coalition motivations for liberating Iraq, residual fear of the Baath Party, and the sudden end to the former regime’s patronage system. Our efforts to rebuild Iraq are connected to the security situation because general disaffection among the populace provides avail- able manpower to those who are inciting (and paying for) attacks against Iraqis, the infrastructure and Coalition forces. We recognize that economic development, political development, and security are interdependent. COMBINED JOINT TASK FORCE-7 and CENTCOM are sup- porting fully the Coalition Provisional Authority’s efforts in all areas. In addition to securing critical infrastructure alongside our Iraqi partners, two U.S. Army task forces, Task Force Restore Iraqi Oil and Task Force Restore Iraqi Electricity are ac- celerating progress in restoring Iraq’s failed oil economy—the financial engine to move Iraq forward—and providing the key enabler for all economic functions and public needs—electricity. Brigade commanders have partnered with Iraqis to com- plete over eight thousand reconstruction projects. Also, our commanders and civil affairs personnel worked with Iraqis to establish local and provincial councils as a foundation for regional and national governance. Over the past four months, we have improved our understanding of the situation and identified what more needs to be done. We know what is working well and what areas require additional attention and resources. CENTCOM, COMBINED JOINT TASK FORCE-7, CPA, and our Coalition partners are working together in accord- ance with our plans. We must remember, however, that the situation in Iraq is com- plex and dynamic; we are certain to encounter unforeseen difficulties and opportuni- ties and we must remember that the future course of events depends not only on what we plan to do, but on enemy reactions and initiatives that are difficult to pre- dict. We are resolved to reassess continually the situation, refine our plans, be pre- pared for contingencies, and refocus our efforts whenever necessary. Our commanders and troops are optimistic and feel that we now have before us an opportunity to gain tremendous momentum. In the short term, we believe that if we and our partners commit resources to accomplish three things—restore basic services (especially power), build Iraqi security capacity, and improve our ability to communicate our plans and successes to the Iraqi people—we will accelerate progress in the next months. AFGHANISTAN The next year in Afghanistan, with the constitutional Loya Jirga in December and elections scheduled for June 2004, will prove critical to achieving peace and stability there. We have achieved much in Afghanistan, but there is much work that we, the Coalition, and the Afghans have yet to accomplish. As in Iraq, there is no purely military solution to the problems we face there. We must simultaneously defeat our enemies, support the effort to establish representative government and set condi- tions for economic growth and long-term stability. The enemy adjusted after the devastating losses inflicted on them since the initi- ation of Operation Enduring Freedom (OEF). Al Qaeda, Gulbiddin Hekmatyar’s Hizb-e-Islami (HIG) and Taliban forces are conducting low-level guerrilla and ter- rorist attacks. Their attacks aim to obstruct reconstruction efforts and incite chaos. Al Qaeda and HIG terrorist activity pose the greatest threat in the Northeast while Taliban remnants have shown signs of reorganization and continue anti-Coalition/ anti-Afghan operations in the Southeast. We continue to seek out and defeat Taliban and Al Qaeda forces. Cooperation with the Pakistanis will disrupt further the enemy’s ability to reorganize and con- duct operations. The formation of the Afghan National Army (ANA) continues to be a success story as units demonstrate their professionalism and gain operational ex- perience. Our conventional force in Afghanistan is small in comparison to the force in Iraq, but it is very effective due to its ability to conduct joint and combined oper- ations. During a recent mission, COMBINED JOINT TASK FORCE-180 successfully brought together U.S. conventional, Special Operations Forces, air, Afghan National Army and Afghan Militia Forces against a long-known Taliban operational base. Because political and economic initiatives will prove most important in maintain- ing stability in Afghanistan, we must ensure that our operations support those ini- 87 tiatives. The expansion of Provincial Reconstruction Teams from four to eight and the possibility that NATO might expand its security efforts beyond Kabul are par- ticularly promising. The most important person in Central Command is the young soldier, Marine, sailor, or airman performing his or her mission on the frontline of freedom in the middle of the night. It goes without saying that our successes will continue to de- pend on the bright, talented, and courageous serv […اقتُطع العرض هنا — النص الكامل في ملف التنزيل]