14 April 04

14 April 04 From: Major David E. Lane II, Senior Advisor to the 2nd Battalion Iraqi Army To: AST Conference Committee Subj: LESSONS LEARNED/ AFTER ACTION COMMENTS Prior to arrival in-country there was absolutely no information provided to the AST’s concerning their mission. During the initial processing phase for OCONUS duty, the AST’s questions and concerns were neither answered nor addressed. There was little contact with the CMATT organization and no information was provided prior to departure CONUS. Done, see website – Major Lewis C2 Cell Upon arrival in Iraq, the CMATT C3 (OSC J3) element provided all the guidance they had, which was very limited in scope. The first three BN ASTs have essentially been blazing trails as the situation develops. As a result of the ASTs initial and sole introduction to J3, all requests for information have been submitted through them. To add to the confusion the C2 cell and CMATT Forward element (Tadji) had no defined mission or “chain of command”. Subsequently, the information flow has been transmitted via three separate chains in order to get resolution on any single issue. After making several trips to the CPA Palace, the ASTs have made the necessary contacts to establish what role each J-shop plays in the information flow process. It has taken two months to accomplish this Mission Essential Task; the requisite information has been there the entire time, it has never been passed. Done – Major Lewis C2 Cell The ASTs’ support assets necessary for mission accomplishment have been minimal and in many cases non-existent. There are no dedicated computer/printer/projector assets for the ASTs. There are no dedicated communication assets for the ASTs i.e. SAT Phones, DNVT/DSN lines, .mil accounts for official email and no secure means of communications via radio or email. There are no dedicated transportation assets. There are no dedicated office supplies. There are no funds available to the ASTs to affect a change in any of these areas. The results are obvious. In one situation specific to 2nd Bn, the lack of communication assets precluded the AST’s ability to de-conflict information changes that occurred without proper authorization prior to and subsequent to the ambush enroute to the assigned AO. Done – Major Lewis C2 Cell The Base Support Unit (BSU) is non-functional. This has led to an enormous cascade of problems which have degraded the IA’s ability to accomplish the mission. For example, pay problems throughout the Battalions, food shortages and unsatisfactory/unsanitary food preparation techniques (numerous cases of food poisoning), an inability to order necessary gear (no replacement uniforms/boots/TA-50), repair items are lacking, facility and vehicle maintenance are lacking, and the list continues. Everyone within the OSC organization including the ASTs has lost some credibility due to this situation. It is still unresolved. Working, unrealistic expectations – Major Lewis C2 Cell There was little guidance provided to ASTs concerning their roles as advisors, no job description. There was no standardization of procedures across Battalions, every new situation generated a reaction because no plan or procedure was in place. Information was sought only when an incident occurred which forced a response. There was little guidance on where information was located and what information was available, all of which was provided after the ASTs were engaged with their Battalions. See website – Major Lewis C2 Cell Respectfully Submitted, D.E. Lane II MAJ USMCR