GUIDANCE FOR THE OPERATION OF CMATT ADVISORY SUPPORT TEAMS AND LESSONS LEARNED TO DATE

GUIDANCE FOR THE OPERATION OF CMATT ADVISORY SUPPORT TEAMS AND LESSONS LEARNED TO DATE General As members of the CMATT Advisory Support Teams (AST), you have been selected to be an advisor, mentor and trainers for the Iraqi Armed Forces (IAF). You are not commanders. Your role is to assist members of the Iraqi Armed Forces grow into a professional and credible force for good in the country and the region. This document provides guidance on how you are to perform this role. It is not proscriptive. It is to be applied or modified as circumstances and your judgment dictates. The document also provides a synopsis of lessons learned to date to assist you in preparing the IAF for operations. Mission Advisor Support Teams are to provide military training and leadership advice to their assigned IAF units and HQs. This is in order to support the execution of the post war campaign plan that seeks to train Iraqi units from the company level down to “fully trained” status – based upon their demonstrated proficiency – as documented in a formal rated evaluation for each of their designated battle tasks. Chain of Command ASTs are at all times under command of the Commanding General Office for Security Cooperation (OSC). This command has been delegated to the Commanding General CMATT. When IAF units have met initial training requirements they and their accompanying AST will be placed under OPCON of MND-I Major Subordinate Commands (MSCs) or Divisions throughout the country. Internally, the AST chain of command will follow conventional hierarchical lines. Divisional AST leaders will command Brigade ASTs who in turn will command those at Battalion level. Inherent in this relationship is the authority to task organize AST members at all levels as the situation demands and ensure the adherence of superior HQ directives orders and guidance. The AST Chain of Command is diagrammatically depicted below. (Insert hierarchical diagram Bn- Bde-Div-AST C2 Cell CMATT plus POCs) Where higher echelons above battalion or brigade have not yet been formed, units and/or brigades are to provide reports direct to the AST Command and Control Cell (AST C2 Cell). AST Reporting ASTs at all levels are to submit weekly reports (not daily as is the current practice) in accordance with the format at Annex A (insert Annex to document) Battalions are to submit reports through Brigade ASTs. These will be consolidated at Brigade level before on forwarding to Divisional ASTs. Divisions will again consolidate the reports and forward them to the AST Command and Control Cell (C2 Cell) located at Taji and commanded by LTC Don Bennett. The C2 Cell is to provide a consolidated AST report to the CMATT POCs (COL Pat Ferral and LT Pat Burrus). AST C2 Cell Responsibilities The AST C2 Cell is to analyze and consolidate all weekly AST reports. Apart from forwarding these reports to CMATT, the C2 Cell is to: Establish and maintain a lessons learned data base Advise COS CMATT on the development of an IAF units status report Advise COS CMATT on the development of an IAF unit certification process Relationship with Iraqi Leadership The Iraqi leadership at all levels is to be actively encouraged to grasp and exercise their leadership role and responsibilities. AST members are not defacto leaders or commanders. AST members should only take command in situations where Iraqi leadership has patently failed or will endanger life. Iraqis leaders are to be treated with respect as a colleague or superior. Your role is to advise, mentor and guide – not patronize or marginalize. Relationship with CMATT Base Commanders CMATT Base commanders are tasked with the efficient and effective operation of IAF bases. In time they will turn over their responsibilities to Iraqi garrison commanders and their staffs. Base commanders are under command CMATT – not AST irrespective of their levels. Base commanders are placed in Direct Support of the senior AST leader in the location for the conduct of training. This is to be interpreted as applying the main effort of base personnel and infrastructure in support of the AST training mission. As ASTs transition to the conduct of operations with the IAF, base commanders are to be placed under OPCON of the senior base AST leader to ensure a timely and directed response from base personnel to the conduct of operations. Bases are only capable of sustaining operational IAF forces 65 road km from base locations. Thereafter, supported coalition MSCs are responsible for the sustainment of supporting IAF units. Conduct of Training and Operations During training ASTs are to again advise and mentor Iraqi leader cadres in the conduct of their own training. Where ever possible, Iraqi instructors are to be used for the delivery of trainings. AST members should only deliver formal instruction when available Iraqi officers or NCOs are clearly incapable of doing so. Even then, Iraqi personnel should understudy AST members and contribute to training delivery as much as is possible. Once initial training is completed, IAF units will pass to OPCON of MNC-I for the conduct of operations. The AST training and mentoring task does not however stop here. Supported Coalition MSCs will provide guidance on the operational tasks they require of IAF units. ASTs at all levels are to actively advise MSCs on what tasks the IAF units are capable of and their level of training achievement. IAF units should not be taken to undertake missions clearly beyond their capability. For all allotted missions, mission rehearsal training should be instituted in an environment as benign as possible. Practice before conducting live missions. While IAF units should not be tasked beyond their capabilities, ASTs are to encourage IAF commanders to push hard in raising collective proficiency across all company battalion METLs. Latitude and initiative should be encouraged in all IAF units to progress rapidly through squad, and company level tasks. Prudent force protection measures and constraints are the only factor which should override this aim. LESSONS LEARNED Valuable lessons have already been extracted from our limited experiences with IAF units on operations. As can be expected, under strong resolute leadership, Iraqi soldiers have performed well. Individual acts of real courage have been observed. When poorly led, Iraqi troops reacted less favorably. Like any green troops they are liable to forget their training if surprised or their leadership collapses. These then are some of the major challenges of the ASTs. Orders Trained professional troops can be expected to undertake short notice deployments steadily anticipating that formal orders will be issued in the new locations. Iraqi troops are not at this level of proficiency. As far as OPSEC permits, IAF units must be briefed in as much detail as possible on the reasons for a move and their likely tasking once they arrive. They need to be assured that full orders will be issued prior to commencing an operation, that their mission is well within their training proficiency and that administrative support arrangements are in place at the new location. Most importantly, they need to be reassured that they are not expected to launch large scale attacks against their own people in built up areas. But they will be required to support such operations. Where time permits, all missions should be rehearsed before hand. The Iraqi leadership has had significant training in the delivery of orders. They expect that orders will be issued as in doctrinal format and sequence. If this is not done or significantly abbreviated, rumors take over amongst the troops and poorer leaders weakening the resolve of the unit. Full and timely orders are therefore essential. ASTs need to impress this fact on support coalition units. Missions and tasks must be within the capability of the IAF unit and formal orders either verbal or written, issued. The importance of the warning order including as much task specific information as possible needs to be emphasized. Communications Supported coalition units must understand that ASTs require dedicated tactical communications and vehicles from them. ASTs must be mobile in tactical vehicles and have secure tactical communications with the coalition units HQ. Effective coordination and control is virtually impossible without it. Movement IAF units do not have military specification vehicles and often coalition forces will not be able to provide them. As such we must make best use of what we do have. Road convoys must be carefully planned. Prime considerations are timings, route selection and force protection measures. Iraqi command advice is essential for timings and route selection. They often have better knowledge of routes and hazards than coalition forces. Movement through built up areas in peak traffic times should also be avoided. Where possible supported coalition units should be requested to provide an adequate number of tactical vehicles with crew served weapons to provide protection. Convoy columns should not be too long. Packets of no more than 15-20 vehicles should march separately each with its own escorts. Where this is not possible, the AST should advise on the best make shift measures possible using issued vehicles and weapons. Conclusion A lesson learned data base is being constructed by the AST C2 Cell. All ASTs are to contribute on a continuing basis to this data base as experience is gained. Sharing experiences and lessons will improve our effectiveness more rapidly and lower losses. We must disseminate and use what we learn!