Command and Control (C2) Cell Advisory Support Team (AST) Issues

CMATT Command and Control (C2) Cell Advisory Support Team (AST) Issues COALITION MILITARY ASSISTANCE TRAINING TEAM I R A Q J1 Issues CMATT Chain of Command Unclear if the chain of command for the Iraqi Army (DIV/BGE/BN) is the same for the ASTs Evaluations (OER/NCOER) of AST Members Recommendations: Set blanket policy for all to follow Services rate their own people COALITION MILITARY ASSISTANCE TRAINING TEAM I R A Q J1 Issues (cont) AST Working relationship with higher HQs: Where does the BN AST team get their direction/guidance? From BGE, C2 Cell, DIV, J-3, OSC, CMATT, CMATT FWD??? Recommendation: Advisor Support Teams work autonomously from BGE and DIV. The C2 Cell validates their training mission and verifies they have met all basic METL requirements to ensure their Iraqi soldiers are ready for MSC mission. ASTs receive guidance from their next higher. The next higher will validate and verify METL requirements have been met. Hybrid. Initially receive guidance from C2 Cell until next higher is fully functional and then transfer responsibility. COALITION MILITARY ASSISTANCE TRAINING TEAM I R A Q J1 Issues (cont) Information Flow. Currently if an AST needs information they pick up a phone and call someone they know in the J1 shop and bypass the command and control chain (C2 Cell). What this causes is a lack of information sharing across all ASTs and puts undue burden on the J1 shop, causing them to have to answer multiple inquiries instead of one point (C2 Cell LNO). Recommendation: Have the J1 direct all questions to the C2 Cell. If a question is answered, pass this information to all ASTs, not just one. Rationale: Every team will work from the same sheet of music and the J1 shop won’t be burdened by multiple request for the same information. COALITION MILITARY ASSISTANCE TRAINING TEAM I R A Q Pay Peshmerga stipend is a procedure already being used by many IAF soldiers. 1st BDE and 3d battalion have not received information about this although rosters were turned in over five weeks ago to CMATT Recommendation Have pay representative address this issue for all ASTs COALITION MILITARY ASSISTANCE TRAINING TEAM I R A Q J-1 Issues (cont) Critical Fills There are too many holes in the structure of the IA. The AST’s need a more responsive method of filling billets that have been vacated or never filled. Interpreters The number of IT’s allotted continue to be an issue that must be addressed. This will directly affect the mission. Recommendation J1 devise a plan for filling billets and provide that guidance to the AST’s via the C2 Cell. Request re-evaluation of IT requirements for AST’s and numbers adjusted as required. COALITION MILITARY ASSISTANCE TRAINING TEAM I R A Q J-1 Issues (cont) Interpreters: Quality is generally good Shortages among AST and other training teams Need additional skills to translate to ALL IA soldiers Deployable Interpreters Recommendations: Vet the interpreters with background checks before hiring. Continued recruitment of quality Interpreters is required Interpreters who speak Kurdish and Arabic if possible Deployable interpreters cleared to move with unit as mission changes COALITION MILITARY ASSISTANCE TRAINING TEAM I R A Q J-1 Issues (cont) Leave Policies are not fully defined Sometimes changed when the unit reports to a new location after being told leave would be granted Emergency leave for family member illness or death Payroll Time required away from training and missions can be lengthy Inaccurate rosters may cause shortages in pay Incorrect pay for rank Banking system not fully capable, some soldiers must report to a specific bank for pay which requires additional leave time COALITION MILITARY ASSISTANCE TRAINING TEAM I R A Q J-1 Issues (cont) J-3 Issues Program of Instruction (POI) Not available for AST to use to enforce/re-enforce training received Soldier, NCO, and Officer Recommendation: Provide to C2 for distribution to all ASTs - all POI’s. Rationale: C2 has communications with all AST’s and will provide exact info without variations. COALITION MILITARY ASSISTANCE TRAINING TEAM I R A Q J-3 Issues (cont) Incoming AST not getting current intelligence about mission: Little information to CONUS on mission Information provided upon arrival was limited in scope Recommendations: Package put together by the J3 explaining the mission and plan for use of ASTs sent to all Teams/Out Processing Stations, prior to their departure. ALL Teams be given C2 Cell as POC C2 LNO to provide movement info to Incoming Teams COALITION MILITARY ASSISTANCE TRAINING TEAM I R A Q Iraqi Soldiers Safety on Leave 1st BGE is requesting weapons cards for their officers to carry side arms with them when they go on leave. Recommendations J3 address and if approved issue out weapons cards for the officers in a trail evaluation. If disapproved, provide justification why not. COALITION MILITARY ASSISTANCE TRAINING TEAM I R A Q J-3 Issues (cont) Mission ‘Handoff’ There is no established procedures for handing off Iraqi units to MSC for missions. Recommendation There should be clear and defined validation methods to ensure the IA is prepared to conduct the missions proposed by the MSC. Should not be personality driven. The handoff should be procedural and conducted by the AST C2 cell. COALITION MILITARY ASSISTANCE TRAINING TEAM I R A Q J-3 Issues (cont) POI’s Advisor Support Team (AST) does not know the level of training of its Iraqi supported unit when link-up for training begins. Recommendation To better assist the supported unit, advisors should be aware of the training curriculum provided to the unit while in basic training and officer or NCO professional schools. C2 brief school curriculums when AST’s arrive at TMTB. COALITION MILITARY ASSISTANCE TRAINING TEAM I R A Q J-3 Issues (cont) Casualty Procedures There is no defined casualty procedure in case of WIA’s. Because the CMATT FWD elements lack hard phone lines or DNVT, they can not contact medical units and vice-versa. Recommendation C2 develop communications cards for all AST members with numbers to the J-3, J-1 and the Battle Commander’s desk (manned 24 hours) to carry with them in case of emergency. Hospital numbers published at all CMATT FWD and J3 shop. COALITION MILITARY ASSISTANCE TRAINING TEAM I R A Q J-3 Issues (cont) Accountability Accurate IA rosters are not available. Rosters submitted to CPA location change at times and are returned with different names. Payroll issues created with differences in rosters Unauthorized Absences (UA) not tracked sufficiently Casualty Procedures need improved Recommendations: Utilize rosters confirmed at the Battalion level. UA MUST be submitted to C2 by ALL AST’s for tracking WIA/KIA, other injuries/Death of soldier, Notification of Next of Kin MUST have the IA Chain of Command involved. NO Coalition force present other than to mentor the Leadership from afar. COALITION MILITARY ASSISTANCE TRAINING TEAM I R A Q J-3 Issues (cont) Training: TMTB has limited training assets and space Range design supports limited use of AK47 and Pistol only. Training areas for FTX and other battle drills are not available Recommendation: Alternate training sites need to be established Current events prohibit easy utilization of other training locations, as well as major range changes Begin planning for additional training areas to be used as current events allow COALITION MILITARY ASSISTANCE TRAINING TEAM I R A Q J-3 Issues (cont) J-4 Issues DODAACs under a common UIC from CPA-CMATT J4 : The ASTs need guidance on funding to purchase incidental items. What will be their limit, and a list of items authorized or unauthorized for purchase. We also need to have the account numbers available to teams already in the field and those inbound (part of their indoc inbrief they receive at Taji). Recommendation: C4 produce required items and provide guidance for ASTs. COALITION MILITARY ASSISTANCE TRAINING TEAM I R A Q Blank Ammunition Training Each of the AST’s are requesting blank ammunition for training their Iraqi Army. blank firing adapters for weapons, smoke grenades and artillery simulators to affect more realistic training. 7.62 tracers are a must. Recommendation J4 address this and give a response as soon as possible. J-4 Issues (cont) COALITION MILITARY ASSISTANCE TRAINING TEAM I R A Q Life Support systems CMATT AST soldiers not consistent with other Coalition soldiers Funding is linked with IA Approving authorities may not be familiar with mission of CMATT (MWR, communications, vehicles required to move CMATT soldiers between locations for mess, PX, Fitness facility is located up to 4 miles away) Base Support Unit (BSU) is not currently functional and responsive. Taji Coalition forces planning generally does not include CMATT personnel Recommendations: Support systems be designed similar to other Coalition forces Vehicle and other assets be issued to allow CMATT soldiers to utilize mess facilities at distant locations. CMATT FWD mentor’s BSU. COALITION MILITARY ASSISTANCE TRAINING TEAM I R A Q J-4 Issues (cont) Repair/Replacement Instructions Broken equipment such as: NVG’s Vehicles Lost gear: Uniforms, field gear (e-tool, harness, etc) Recommendation J-4 provide guidance CMATT FWD / CIF given specific guidance on support and given the tools to accomplish. COALITION MILITARY ASSISTANCE TRAINING TEAM I R A Q J-4 Issues (cont) Equipment Issue (CMATT FWD) Accountability of all Unit assets must be established. All Sensitive Items Weapons Vehicles Radios Night Observation Devices Maintenance Procedures (and records) need to be developed and utilized by the Unit Leadership Recommendation: Focused mentoring on IA BN staff to account for and establish standard maintenance. COALITION MILITARY ASSISTANCE TRAINING TEAM I R A Q J-4 Issues (cont) J-6 Issues Communications and Computer Equipment: The C2 Cell submitted a requirements document to the J-6 to support ASTs. This requirements document is not being adhered to and causes a lack of equality in communications capabilities between the ASTs. Recommendation: C2 Cell has responsibility of issuing command and control equipment. If the gear is coming to Taji, the C2 Cell will work with the J-6 personnel in issuing out equipment as ASTs come through Taji. If equipment is being sent from the J-6 shop to other locations, the requirements are verified by the C2 Cell LNO. Rationale: This ensures that teams receive the required equipment to complete their mission and it remains equitable across the board. COALITION MILITARY ASSISTANCE TRAINING TEAM I R A Q J-6 Issues (cont) COALITION MILITARY ASSISTANCE TRAINING TEAM I R A Q Tactical Communications Equipment: The AST’s are out in the field with their Iraqi counterparts without means to contact Coalition forces in case of emergencies. Recommendation: MSC provide tactical communications for the ASTs. Rationale: This ensures that teams will have direct communication with the coalition forces and have immediate assistance when required. Generator supplied power for post and facilities. Fuel is intermittent and unscheduled Maintenance performed by BSU is unannounced and appears unscheduled Duration of maintenance is not consistent; one day takes 30 minutes, another it takes 3 hours Discussions with BSU to plan for outages is not successful Maintenance does not allow for switching between generators to maintain critical Lines of communications with un-interrupted service Email, used as the primary communications with higher elements across a system designed to support one workstation, now supports 10 workstations. Bandwidth not appropriate for support. Cell phones not capable in remote locations due to infrastructure Teams do not have local communications to stay in touch for Force Protection as well as assist coordination of training events. Unable to communicate with CMATT C2, CMATT FWD, QRF, each other Electronic reports are dictated by CPA location with no means to generate the reports locally. Must be hand written and then entered into an available computer for email to C2 for consolidation and reporting. Computers have been requested since end of January 04. Currently C2 issued 7 for all AST and C2 Cell. Support for Communications typically unavailable. Computer support is non-existent other than local expertise. Software not loaded nor available through normal support channels. Satellite phones requested not available for issue to the AST who may be operating in remote locations and require phone as primary means of communications to C2 Cell or CPA location. Information to ASTs at beginning is unclear on chain of command and how the C2 Cell functions. CMATT FWD (Base operations) and C2 Cell has conflicts with who is responsible for the AST members. Support to CMATT FWD must occur for Force Protection and normal duties. Requests for support should flow through C2 Cell. AST Reporting, Information on who reports to who not clear initially and difficult to correct. ALL ASTs report to C2 Cell for data collection, analysis, consolidation and forwarding to CMATT C3 and higher. Return RFI should be through C2 Cell. RFI for information and support moving through the wrong channels and not being sent to C2 Cell AST is not a command element. AST is configured as a training element to mentor the IA Leadership. C2 LNO at CPA location has been reassigned to another position without notification to the C2 Commander This has eliminated the responsiveness needed for C2 RFI in support of ASTs C2 must use other sources for information and support at the CPA location. Other support at CPA location is also tasked with other responsibilities and duties which may take more immediate precedence over C2 support requirements. Cultural Attitudes Cultures not used to working closely together. Potential tension which can easily evolve into actions, fights, ‘riots’ that need to be quelled quickly and dealt with under Military Law. Communications within Battalions is difficult due to the cross culture nature. Language is different so soldiers are unable to effectively train at times or communicate with other soldiers not of the same background. Translators utilized by the ASTs and the schools (MP) may not be bilingual with Kurdish and Arabic. Need for multiple Translators with the proper skills to conduct training/mentoring. Between ASTs and MSC is a primary difference in the focus of training. The ASTs mentor IA Leaders to support training the developed METL. The MSC focus is to execute more specific missions which may not be directly driven by the METL. Base security for example. Taking charge of the unit does not train the IA Leaders. Taking charge of the unit should ONLY occur when needed when danger to US and Coalition Forces or equipment may occur IF the IA Leadership does not. C2 team strength has decreased with reallocation of staff to other functions at the CPA location. No support directed to computer systems to support communications outside Taji. Internal expertise used in addition to other C2 functions. Need to retain personnel at CMATT Taji to support computer communications systems. Minimum duration 90 days. Need better computer support for computer products. Firewall, MS Office software, Operating system software, Anti-Virus software and all other Software with activation codes. Currently have to reload every 30 times a software package is installed (MS Word, Excel, Powerpoint) and using personal software soldiers have brought which are evaluation versions. Initially IA was informed and recruited to become the New Iraqi Army responsible for Traffic Control Points, Gate guards, border patrol. When given a mission to defend a city they feel as they are ‘fighting their brother Arabs’ which is unacceptable. Tendency is for the IA soldier to “lay down their arms and walk away from the fight”. Mission Brief may play an important role in minimizing this. Fight is with the terrorists who endanger all Arabs. Future recruits need to be informed of potential roles which may include being positioned to quell local terrorist cells. OPSEC plays a role as to how much information the IA Soldier is given. Who decides what can be shared for assigned missions? Mission Brief: Conduct movement to take defensive positions, and assist with cordon searches and patrols at another location. Mission Brief: Conduct movement to take defensive positions, conduct cordon searches and patrols to find and minimize/eliminate local terror activities. Leave appears inconsistent to the IA Soldier. Complete training move to new duty location where leave was indicated and then revoked at the new station. No method to track leave and pass information from station to station with relocating of IA soldiers. Payroll is currently a slow and cumbersome task. Paper process is required and lack of translators to convert documents and generate accurate rosters. Advisor Support Teams identified in CONUS and prep for movement to AOR. No POCs are given and information is found with much difficulty and not directed to C2 Cell to coordinate. Equipment issues is limited upon entry to AOR. Moving as Individuals and not units coordination of equipment is by trial and error by the team upon arrival and not consistent. As teams are identified with team leaders, information is now being forwarded. With dedicated staff at CPA location coordination of AST’s can be accomplished. Will need assistance from other CPA elements (C1) to provide information on personnel issues, DEROS, Awards, Finance for example. Taji Military Training Base is split between IA and Coalition forces. CMATT Soldiers live and work on the IA side of the post and have no built in assets, i.e. mess, MWR, fitness, PX. Vehicles are limited for transport to mess. MWR requests for weights and other fitness related equipment have been denied. Current CMATT population is over 100 soldiers who must be transported to the Coalition side for meals, fitness and MWR facilities. BSU is not fully functional and a CMATT FWD responsibility. Establishing billets and other life support functions not very responsive to work requests for IA or CMATT-Taji personnel. i.e. Electrical shocks in showers. CPA Order #23 and others are used and under continued revision as situations are identified that are not covered. Updates are not quickly distributed Information not centralized for distribution to all teams through C2. Requests and responses are allowed at the CPA location from single AST’s and is not distributed to all. Re-Creating the wheel every time. Continuing issue with quality of issued equipment and uniforms. Shortages are common with inventories received after needed or barely in time for issue. Soldiers move to and through other posts receive other equipment and uniform issues due to availability of inventories at the local level. AST’s need to send information to the C2 Cell to coordinate all teams with standard procedures being developed. C2 Cell may require changes to maintain accepted standards approved by higher HQ’s. Accountability continues to be an issue. IA Leadership has different emphasis and direct control to the AST. AST MUST mentor the IA Leadership to take control and account for personnel, equipment and other unit assets. Casualty procedures to include non-combat related incidents needs the IA Leadership to resolve. AST members were directly involved with one incident and the focus (blame) of the family member was directed to the Coalition member. This particular incident, was not combat related. Soldier died in billets as the result of an electrical malfunction. Soldier notification of family member injury or death needs to be developed with procedures for ‘emergency leave’.