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Mr Chris fox, Fresident or hero Forto Mr Paul Keragilan, Chief Constable, ACPO International Atfairs i Copy: Mr D L Clarke, Chief Constable MOP [for information) subject: Bart on second Vat to Trag by Chief Constable Kerashan -
1. Introduction
I first visited iraq In May [13/5-20/5] and submitted my report to the Foreign
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2003. A copy of that report land and Home Secretaries on 23 May appendices] is attached at Appendix 'N' for ease of reference.
The Iraq Directorate [Security Sector Reform] FCO requested that 1 undertake
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a second wisht to Irag and address the following points:
Terms and conditions of UK pollce officers in traq Additional ereas where UK could add value Information on polleing structures Chief Offler arrangements in Baghdad, Basra and the other Governorates within CPA [South] Viability of training plans and facilities in Basra Issues that can be done better or differently, e.g, role of contractors?
Process of Iradi ownership of policing especially in CPA [South], but also more widely in Iraq General assessinent re stall position in CPA (Baghdad]
to several recipients. En some cases I have merely highlighted issues which require attention at ministertal or senior officlal level. My visil owing to it:
duratton means that my Findings are necessarily based on a snapshot approach.
The vlews expressed in the report are my own and I take full responsibilty for
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them. I have sought to reflect the views of my interviewees but have exertised my own judgement and on occasion I was faced with contradiclory views.
2. Context
My visit programme changed repeatedly in the days before my departure
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and, indeed, even more once I was in Iraq. My scheduled meetings with Ambassador Bremmer and Sir Jeremy Greenstock were both cancelled as they had been recalled for soparate consultatlons with their respeclive governments.
My Basra programme was totally disrupted by a security 'lockdown' toinciding
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with my arrival at Basra International Airport [BIA] on 13/11/03. The threal of a Vehicle Borne Improvised Explosive Device [VBIED] resuited in all movement by road being prohibited and at one stage even movement within Iwas able to meet with both Ti Go and Sir iny Synot dies my extender stay at 0 A
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The absence of the ambassadors and the socurity 'scare' at BlA both perfectly Illustrate the atmosphere and reality of Iraq during my vistt. The future plans of the Coalition Powers CPl for Irag were in a state of flux and the seniol threat was the dominant thenie of both discussrons and CP uperational 2
decorte sarger wier tacr day that posses Sadly, the "bad luck' factor has klcked in with a vengeance. The CA
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Headquerters was mortared on my first day in iraq, and the Italian Carabinleri sustained multiple fatalities as a result of a BIED attack during my second day. Shortly after my departure the US Army lost seventeen soldlers when two helicopters crashed, the result it is bellewed of enemy fire.
Security is a major fector in all CPA and Coalition Powers - Security Forces [CP-SF] discussions. The so-called 'Green Zone' In Baghdad resembles a massive building site with concrete walls and obstacles being erected everywhere.
I have no doubt those attacks on the CP and other manlfestations of
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International Involvement will continue, and will probably Increase in tempo. 1 submit that the threat to the CP encompasses a wide range of potentlal attackers. There are undoubtedly former regime elements [FRE] but opinions differ amongst coalition officials as to whether they are seeking to restore a Ba'athist regime or merely to Impose a heavy price on the CP for removing them from power. There Is also the threat posed Independently, or in a loose coalition of mutual self Interest with FRE, by what I will designate as foreign radical islamist [FRI]. In addition to these two groups, 1 would submit that attacks may also be mounted by unemployed and alienated youth with universal aocess to frearms. To say nothing of traditional lubal based disputes and potentially activity assocated with political groupings seeking influence in the new Iraq. Each group poses a specific threat ranging from serious to marginal, but they all require a response from the CP-SF.
Infiltration and other classic CRy techniques may work agalnst organised groupings but are irrelovant when the threat comes from local youths demonstrating their masculinily to each other.
:
The security situation is not good and will become worse, but the answer to
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many aspects of the problem is an effectlve lagi security Infrastructure. 1 was provided with a helicopter tour of Baghdad and it confimed my view that large parts of that cily will never and should never see CP-SF patrol activily.
Huge areas are composed of high-density housing and foreign security forces would merely become targets with no accompanying secutity benefit being gleaned from patral activity, You will only 'police' "Sadr City' for example, with indigenous forces, preferably police officers.
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A pool or z0u orficers has been created at the request or the foreign Secretary with a vlew to sustalning a deployment of 100 officers in support of Tradi operations. Plans are well advanced to support the Jordanian - 1ra4 Police Training Centre with up to 70/75 'tratners' drawn from the pool. Some 24 officers from the pool are undertaking frearms tralning, with a view to being deployed to a training facility at Basra.
The deployment to Jordan has been formally requested by the Foreign
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Secretary, endorsed by the Home Secretary, and is in hand. The deployment to Basra has not yet been formally requested and is subject lo an approprlata security assessment. I will return to this issue later.
4. Assessment
I will speclfically address the issues raised by the Trag Directorate but feel an
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overview is essential. The pace of change in irad polley Is quickening and the outcome of the consultations undertaken by Ambassador Bremmer and Sir Jeremy Greenstock are now Filtering in to the public arena. It appears that the new timetable to which the CP are working is as follows:
Formal restoratlon of Iraqi sovereignty by June 2004 - Power being transferred to a 'provisional' Tragi government. However the EP and specifically the CP-SF would remaln In Irag on a basts to be declded with the provisional government. Full elections in 2005 to establish a government with democratle legitimacy, It appears that elections will not take place until a In the context of UK pollce assistance it Is important thal a clear timetable is
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established, which Is compatible with the strategic plan. Do we have a date for the wilhdrawal of UK police support or, whatever the constitutional arrangements do we envisage a long-term police assistance mission? 1 deliberately use the term police assistance mission, as it suggests a move
Iragi Chief of Pollce for Baghdad. The recent arrival of additional officers [meinly drawn from the MDP] has eased the situation but security restrictions and the limited availability of Close Protection Teams [CPT] and vehicles, limits their ability to contribute.
The Joint Co-ordinating Centre [JCC) was not operating during my visit and I
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was advised that the original concept had not been properly resourced or thought through. The MOP officers originally earmarked for tie JCC were being employed on general support dutles with the DCC. However, work continues to revive the JCC concept.
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The ACE In CPA [South] seeks to provide guidance to local IPS commanders and to support CPA (South] generally. The major project is the establishment of a police training centre. Currently, a team of Danish officers have developed, and are dellvering, three management type courses based on their work wilh the 'Palestinian Police", However, I antielpate problems with the continued dellvery of this progremme glver the recent emphasis on basic training as decreed by the Commander of CITFT and disseminated by FRAGO [Fragmentary Order] 1018.
Overall my impression was that the UK pollce assistance effort was under-
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resourced and lacked a clear vision as to the way ahead. They had ideas but were uncertaln as to their chain of command - CPA, CPA [South], Iraq Directorate or United Nations Department? I could set out the current position in greater depth but feel the correct approach is to focus on options for the future and also to highlight the factors which require addressing in connection i was somewhat surprised to learn that Ambassador Bremmer as CP
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between CPA and CJTF7.
5, Future Pollce Assistance Optlons
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I consulted with the Head of the Mol [Mr Steve Castecl] and he sketched out the development plan he ls seeking to implement. Field Training Co- ordinators [FTC] will support Iraql recrults trained in Jordan and at domestic training centres. These personnel will be suppled by 'Dyncorps" and the aim is to create a unit of 1,500 FTCs, Iraqi recruits will be subject to 1 years probation before they are confirmed in the Iraqi Police Service. He did not envisage UK officers being deployed on the streets of trag as FTCS. He saw the UK supporting the training centre[s] effort and suggested that over time UK personnel might dellver some areas of specialist training.
It should be noted that with the exception of the Basra tralning centre,
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military persontet are dellvering all police training in Iraq. This emphasis on training was also reflected by several interviewees in Baghdad.
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I detected the lack of a clear vision and was also concerned that we appeared to be creating a hybrid US City department/UK police service. I see the need for a service with the ability to routinely demonstrale the capability to utilise within the clear democratic and human rights culture which european units of this type demonstrate. It should be noted that of the FIEP grouplng [France, Italy, Spain and Partugall and their potential latest member Romanla, all bor France are present in Iraq.
Baghdad Police Training Centre [aka the Baghdad Police Academy). He may Baghdad Tralning Centre should be developed In line with CPA directives and i do not envisage it becoming a distinctly uk sponsored project.
[d] The future of the JCC is unclear and the question of UK support should await updated proposals from DCC Brand.
[PA [Sauth]
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[al The current staffing level of three is Insufficent to deliver anything meaningful. Therefore, I recommend that we should increase our support to [Pa [South].
[b) Basra Training Centre - deploy 24 officers as trainers as provisionally be they internatlonal police planned. They together with other personnel, officers, RMP or other military assets would deliver transitional training to existing officers of the 1P5.
[c) MaIntan a senior UK officer post within CPA [South]. ACC White is seeking to retum to the UK by 14 January 2004.
[d] Prowide the senior officer with a small support staff. It was suggested that sentor CID and SB officers would be particularly helpful. I recommend no action on the SB appointment until CPA promulgates a clear picture as to what internal Iragi security structures will be. I can see some merit in providing an officer with CID experience, but in the absence of a brief on the restored Iraq OS, I am reluctant to endorse such an Imprecise suggestion at this stage.
(el There are four governates with the remit of CPA [South] and I recommend that we appoint an advisor [Chief Superintendentl to each of Lhe governate's Chiefs of Police. I envisage the advlsors mentoring the IPS personnel and showing them how a professional senior officer performs. In addition, I feel there would be merit in the advisors "talent spotting' the future leaders of the IP5, with a view to the Uk providing a 'senior command course' for such personnel, at some stage in the future. Identification of the future leaders will require diplomatic skills and diplomatic guidance. I am concerned thal at present nepotism and political sponsorship might determine who we had to train an a senior command course. I would prefer that we monitor and select good officers but equally l recognise the goal is to provide a
should not be overlooked.
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If HMG agrees that we should proceed as recommended it, is imperative that appropriate security measures are implemented. Each governate advisor would require a dedicated CPT with appropriate transport. The advisors and thelr CPT support would work in local Police Headquarters, but live with other members of the governate support teams in secure CP facilitles, Clull servants already operate in the governates and I feel that the risk to UK police officers woutd be acceptable and reasonable given the security measures specified.
In relation to the Basra Training Centre, opinions differ as to whether or not
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Uk trainers should reside at the centre or commute daily from other ePA accommodation. The Danish offleers currently commute. It has also been suggested that the UK officers could alternate their living accommodation between the centre and the CPA (South) Headquarters. I recognise that all concerned are anxious to protect the officers concerned. My advlce Is that they should work and reside at the training centre. Routine transportation constitutes a real risk and the advantages of residing at the BTC wilh access to co-located military units appears to provide lhe best option.
8. Commitment of the UK Police Service The creation of the pool of officers for service in connection with iraq
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highlighted problems with our current service structure and the approach adopted by Indiudual forces. 27 E+ 6 ACPOS] forces nominated officers, whilst 16 forces declined to do so. I recognise that some chief officers feel Iraq does not feature on their own list of priorities and/or they believe, that notwithstanding officers' own decisions to volunteer, they have a duty lo protect officers from themselves, I reiterate that 1 recognise my colleagues sincerity, However, the resull or this disparate response to the Foregn Secretary's request Is that the burden effectively shifts to the willing and they are faced with losing operational personnel and potentially with managing the would at fatal need the for ces which indicated support ere airing in te face of adverse media coverege of the securily situation In Iraq.
111011491-
An Indicative target for forces In relation to participation in all overseas ÷ 8.3 missions should also be set.
ii
The issue of attracting suitable volunteers for overseas missions, particularly
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senlor officers, was thrown in to stark relief during my visit to Iraq, working In Iraq is challenging and we should aim to utllse that challenge as a developmental tool for officers with real command potential, 1 am dellghted to note that Mr Stephen Rimmer [HO] and a Foreign Office counterpart have convened a meeting to discuss this particular issue. It would be helpful if overseas missions could form pert of the Home Secretary's agenda to strengthen police leadership. However, I would highlight that at present all officers regardless of rank require police authorty permission overseas. The Home Office may wish to consider changing the legislation, or in the short term seeking an APA endorsement for overseas missions.
9. The UK/PSNI Dimension
The FCO decided that the iraq pool would be drawn solely from Home Office
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and Scottish Executive forces. The FCO consulled with ACPOS direct, as opposed to incorporating them with consent within the man ACPO trawi exercise. PSNi were not targeted, as I believe the FCO were cognisant that the Policing Board of Northern Ireland had publicly indicated that their priority was domestle policing and that they were withdrawing from their commitment to Kosovo, The ACC deployed in Basra was selected on the basts of an ACPO recruiting
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exercise, which treated all forces equally. Mowever, it appears that media coverage in Northern treland led to an unsolicited offer of support from the and also to discussions between ministers Chlef Constable [NED/FCO/MOD/HO].
The Chief Constable PSNI has offered to supply 6-10 offiters of Chief
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Inspector/Superintendent rank for service in Traq. I received this offer by telephone and formally advised the FCO [raq Directorate) of il at a meeting on 29/10.03. Subsequently, & heve had sight of correspondence From Jane Kennedy [Mg5 NO] to the Foreign Secretary dated 5/11/03. Her letter indicates that there is an appelite within the N10 and PSNI to fully contrinute
than familiarlty with military tactics in Ni, I am not aware of any spoclal skills alone, Police advisors will not be engaged In possessed by that force executive policing and will act solely as trainers and advisors. All UK police personnel deployed to Iraq will be armed for ther own protection.
The deployment of personnel from the PSMI, outside the mainstream
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arrangements, could potentlally be misrepresented as suggesting lhey are more sulted to risking their lives abroad. I feel that would be morally and professionally wrong. However, if SNI personnel applied for advertised vacances and were selected, that would be in keeping with AÇPO's commitment to equal opportunities.
It should be noted that 1 met former members of the RUG/PSNi in Iraq and
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they were employed on contracts by CRo and other security companies. The FCO may wish to consider the use of contract staff, either directly employed or via a commerclal undertaking, in relation to varlous aspects of the police assistance programme in Irag. However, it would be my hope that the service encouraged by the home departments would be in a position to provide serving career officers.
1D, Specific Points Ralsed by the Itaq Directorate I have provided specific answers lo all the points raised by the Iraq
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Directorate at Appendia N2.
11. General Observations
I have documented observations which did not fall within the above headings at Appendix N3. However, I would like to address one Issue in the main body of the report. It has been suggested that the deployment of UK 'tramers' to the Basra Training Gentre has been unduly dalayed. This is not my nderstanding of the situalion and I trust that officials within the Ira irectorale (55Rl wil be given due credil for oroceedina in a orofessional an amely manner. The question of deployment Is subject to an up to date risk assessment and that is linked to approprate logslical and securily
I beleve we snout Increase the number on cmeers bebloyee 0n 8ye4e 92 identlied within the report. However, clear guidance to the service from HMG Is required, as the risks to personnel are obvious, Equally, Iraq merely lustrates some wider dilemmas facing the service and I hope the Home Office will feel able to address those career management issues. & frai submitted an RCDS paper on the subject of police missions abroad In 1997, 1 for a government sponsored re- suggest that the time has now come assessment of how the Uk provides such support, with a view to improving our approach for the future.
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I will separately provide feedback to Chier Constables on the performance of individual members depoved in Irag and lase with the Irao Direccorate In relatlon to recognition of their service.
This report has been "rushed' as I am aware of a desire by the Trag
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Directorate to have sight of It prior to drafting papers for meetings this week.
Paul Kernaghan
Chief Constable
ACPO International Affairs Portfolio 18 November 2003 11
Simllar considerations may also apply in relation to Jordan, however, 1 am aware that alternative provisions may be Incorporated within the JIPTC protocol/Mou.
Acconumedation In Baghdad is at a premium and the recent closure of a hotel, owing to the security situation, has merely execerbated the pressure on accommodation at the CPA Headquarters Palace, However, at present more than 130 officials [of botl genders] are sleeping in one farge room. Air conditioning is now provided and given the overall security threat it might be considered acceptable accommodation.
I was advised that no
However, two related Issues are Impacting on morale.
coherent or publlshed accommodation policy exlsts. Some newly arrived officials are allocated superior accommodation without any obvious linkage to duration of postings. The pollce offlcers feel waiting lime for superior accommodation linked to the anticipated duration of postings should be the factors which determine allocation, in all cases, other than those of senior officials. I was also advised that some newcomers have contrects which specify the accommodation to be allocated l.e.
single roamns.
The lack of a clear polley means that such matters take on real Importance and are a source of dissatisfaction. The police officers are making the best of things but the FCg may wish to make representations to CPA (Baghdad] and elso reter their pwn procedures in relation to terms offered to different groups of UK personnel being posted to Baghdad.
Additignal areas where UK police could add value 1 address this Issue In the main body of the report.
Information on policing structures 1 remain unclear as to the overall CPA, Irag 'model' and whether or not a single tier national service is being crealed. There was some discussion in relation to local and structure of the IPS.
Viabillty.of training plans and facilities In Basra i am unable to comment on the Basra TC, as I was unable to visit it owing to the security regime in operation. I think it is important that CPA Mol and CJTF7 are both working to the one common plan.
Issues that can be done better or differently. eg. role of contracter:
of using contractors for the provision of police assistance I address the issue elsewhere. However, I was conscious of some general concern related to contractors with CPA operations. The qualily of service provided by contractors appeared to vary widely and poor service was delvered by both US and UK contractors - the view was clearly expressed that giving a contract to a UK company might look good and make us all feel patriotic but if they failed to deliver, the staff in the fleld were the ones to suffer. One UK governate official In CPA [Southl claimed not to have had a hot neal it was clalmed at in several months owing to poor performance by contractors.
senior level that ail contracts are awarded by officials back in the US and the UK and that personnel on the ground have limited input. The need for probity and audit trails was accepted but I detected a genuine feeling that the views of personnel with experience on the ground was not being fully recognised in Washington and London.
Process of Iragi ownership of policing especially in CPA [5outh].
I was unable to meet any IP5 personnel in CPA [South]. I am aware that at least one senior officer has been assassinated and I detected some factionalism during my visit o the Gaghdad Academy, However, I recognise that policing does not operate in a vacuum and progress on local polite ownership must be related to straregic politica developments. I deal with the development of Future leaders within the main body of
Baghdad.
rerers
Vehites - It was suggested to me In Baghdad, that Uk personnel are under resourced In terms of vehictes In comparison with other countries and agencies.
Close Profection Teams - Personnel in Baghdad cannot leave the CPA Headquarters Palace without protection and there are only 4 CRG teams available. This capability will elther have to be increased or, In respect of police personnel, new security rules — - agreed.
Iraq Civil Defense Corps [CDC] - police advisors saw this body as a pool of lulure police and army recruits, whilst military commanders saw it very clearly as an army recruitment pool. 1 tend to agree with the milltary commanders. in any event it is important that a medium term strategy for this body is agreed and that it is compatible with the long term iraqi security infrastructure which will Incorporate both the IPS and the New iragi Army [NIA].
JIPTC (Security? - It appears that personnel posted to the JIPTC at present lack a source of updated security assessments. I suggest the irag Directorate should ensure [via Rin Shadforth] that personnel in Jordan are provided with a weekly updated security assessment.
JIPTC [Transport) • Concern was expressed that transport arrangements for Iraqi recruits to and from Jordan was not shaping up In an appropriate manner. Concern te airlift capabllity, CPA Staffing - It was claimed that the staffing of the CPA compares unfavourably with the resources allocated to East Timor. If this is an urban myth it should be dispelled rapldly, if not, it suggests one or both countries are inappropriately resourced.
Baghded/Basra Communication - I noted thal six months on there is still a feeling in CPA (5outh) that they are not fully in the loop with CP& [Headquarters]. This may not be true but It Is a widely held perception.
Briefing - Several personnel highlighted that in their view there was a lock of proper briefing for personnel being deployed and that there is no authoritative audit trail for policy proposals and deliverables. Bernard Kerik endorsed information supplied by a junior FCO official that an international police farce of 6.500 officers would ba deployed to Ireq. However, In practice we are now sull planning for the deployment