Minute driver to pso Cds supporting paper for cos strategic think tank on iraq 18 june

Further to Reference, this note and the Enclosures will prepare attendees for the meeting. The enclosed paper is part of ongoing work developed by a cross Whitehall group that has met on a regular basis to exchange ideas and information, and undertake UK contingency thinking. The purpose of this work has been to develop UK thinking in advance of any detailed consultations with the US. The legend/paper has been constructed so that it supports the ideas captured within the enclosed slide; hence COS need to refer to the slide whilst reading the legend/paper. At the meeting next Tue DCDS(C) will open with a short overview. Brig Jim Dutton (SPG Leader) will follow covering the subject matter to draw out the major issues to inform the subsequent discussion. Questions on the attached paper should be addressed to the SPG point of contact, (DOMA AD(ME)) on Ext (Original signed} MA1/DCDS(C) Enclosures: 1. Powerpoint Slide - A Concept? 2. Legend. SECRET UK/US EI EMINATION DECLASSIFIED 12 OPTIONS MEANST EFFECTS ENABLERS 9 10/ ENDS & WAYS RAT UKUS EYES - NO FURTHER DISSEMI CREATE A CONCEPT? CONDITIONS REGIME WMD CURRENT POL/DIP INTEL HUMANITARLAN INE 0 OPS MIETARY LECAL -ECONOMIG CURRENT SITUATION Regime options. PRINCIPLES Principles. 7 CREATE CONDITIONS Conditions. ENABLERS Military enablers. 9 ENDS/WAYS/MEANS WMD 10 Regime Change 11 ILLUSTRATIVE APPROACHES - MILITARY STRANDS 12 Version 12 Jun manteralice of lidd as a viable naton stale, disavowing the use of WMd but capable of defending its borders and contributing to the counter balance of Iran!' US is determined to achieve a more representative, non-tyrannical, government. KEY POINT The Endstate cannot be achieved while the current Iraqi regime remains in power. Consequently, regime change is a necessary step and there is no point in pursuing any strategy that does not achieve this. [see Box 3] MILITARY/STRATEGIC IMPLICATIONS • Force Size. Once it is obvious that the US is committed to regime change, she will have to prevail, so need to plan for worst case and to be prepared to execute it if required. • Tempo. Need to be able to escalate rapidly, which will require strategic agility. • Post Conflict. Need to acknowledge that there will be a post conflict phase with an associated commitment, manpower and finance bill. Depending on how the regime change is achieved, and the form of the replacement, there is a spectrum of commitment where the worst case is a long period with a large • Intelligence. A much more detailed level of intelligence is required. This has implications for the tasking of collection assets and the timing of any action: • WMD. If regime survival were at stake, Saddam would almost certainly use WMD, so there would be no deterrent equation as in 1991. Early neutralisation and, if that fails, preparedness to fight in an NBC environment, is required. Adapted from US CENTCOM OPLAN 1003. Version 12 Jun SECRET UK/US EE NOOSTHERE SEMINATION Key Judgements. • Regime change is a necessary step to achieve the endstate. • Establishing and maintaining support from the International Community, and regional support from neighbours, will be the Coalition Version 12 Jun LAL ARGININ 3 of 21 RET UK/US EYES NO FURTHER DISSEMINATION Regime will Shatter due to its minority appeal 2. Critical Institutions of Power. • Saddam himself. US assess Saddam to be the CoG. He is focus of the State and completely closed to normal diplomatic persuasion. Although inherently unpredictable, he remains more predictable whilst he is unsure of the precise intentions of the Coalition • Special Security Organisation (SSO). Around 2,000 strong, this at the top of the tree, headed by Qusai, Saddam's second son. It controls the rest. • SRG. Around 8,000 strong, based in Baghdad. Best equipped - T72 BMP 1/2, 253. Responsible for WMD concealment. • RGFC. 75,000 men, the principal warfighting organisation. Leads on Internal Security, defence of the regime and would lead offensive action. • Regular Army. 400,000 men. There has been no additions or improvement to weapon systems since 1991. 3. Opposition Groups. • Sunni. - Not organised. • Kurds. KDP and PUK not united. Militarily weak. 2/3 of Iraqi army stands on border' Turkish sensitivity Shia. Clan groups with little co-ordination and unable to mobilise any support in the Sunni heartland. The Iranian backed groups (SCIRl, Badr Corps and Dawa Party) are more capable, but depend upon Iranian support. • INC. ineffectual. There is little evidence of co-operation between the opposition groups. The Shias, Kurds and INC gave their best effort in the insurgency of 1991 and 1994/95 and were slaughtered. Kurds and Shias will require significant inducements to rise, especially if political hopes/aspirations seem unlikely to be fulfilled. They will also need to be confident that the US is resolute and that the US force posture is credible. Version 12 Jun PARAI 4 of 24 SECRET UK/US SUNG FURTHER DId • Saddam and his wider security and • International Presence coupled with governing regime a bridging process leading eventually to a broad based coalition • The entire Ba'thist regime • Federated state WAYS A number of graduated military tasks fall out: - Undermine regime/induce climate of collapse/foster internal dissent - Encourage Kurdish/Shia insurgency (money/protection/training/equipment/planning) - Coerce/persuade potentially dissident Sunni officers to plot against Saddam. Re-enforcement of NFZs. Selected surgical targeting of regime infrastructure Wider air campaign: - Ground forces to destroy Sunni hegemony (US aim) and control/influence the outcomes: - Support to new regime, supported (and ideally led) by neighbouring countries. Key Judgements Removal and replacement options cannot be directly correlated. • Possibilities for a replacement regime are very difficult to assess. At the very least, we must be clear on what we do not want. • It will be difficult to apply force with sufficient precision to ensure a predetermined outcome. So, need reserves and ground forces with the agility to respond to developing events. Version 12 Jun 5 of 24 EM AGAINIC SECRET UK/U DISSEMINATION ST NO BURTHEL Iraq situation? (Assess both in regional terms and the effect on international opinion.) END The end required is that there is no longer a threat to the region or the wider World from Iraqi WMD. WAYS Change regime to one that renounces WMD, or • . Completely destroy WMD capability and remove will to regenerate the capability, which implies regime change MEANS • Pre-Conflict • Need to task intelligence collection means to provide greater detail on level and location of WMD facilities, command and control means and means of delivery. . Pursue unfettered UNMOVIC inspection regime, wresting initiative from Saddam. • Conflict. • Maximum effort to destroy WMD and/or reduce the effect of WMD weapons use. • Provide protection and be prepared to fight in CB environment. • Post Conflict. • Secure any remaining threat; audit Iraqi capability for public verification. In slower time, destroy weapons and scientific infrastructure. . ence. Version 12 Jun Monitor successor regime i ne 6 of 24 DISSEMINATION SECRET UK/US EYER-NOFURTHER Version 12 Jun SECRET UK BEGINE ATE SEMANION IRAQ TURKEY IRAN SAUDI CHINA FRANCE ISRAEL; KURDS AFGHANISTAN RUSSIA PRIORITY ONE COUNTRIES • Iran. May take the opportunity to disrupt Coalition SLOCs and/or seize land in the border region. So, we need to be prepared to: • Protect SLOCs. action. • Deter land seizure by political : . Turkey/Kurds. Support from Kurdish opposition groups will be a key factor in overthrowing Saddam. At the same time, Turkey, a critical ally in the Coalition, is adamantly opposed to further Kurdish autonomy. This will call for a delicate political balance that will require the following military support: • Enhanced military aid to Turkey. Establishment of effective millitary links to Kurdish guerrilla groups. . Kuwait. Kuwait is a critical ally for basing purposes. The Coalition must be prepared to provide: • Support to sustain regime. Version 12 Jun CA MONIE SECRET UK/ EGE N9 EURTHER PISSEMINATION • Jordan. Jordan is a particularly key Western ally, so we need to plan to: • Provide support to the Hashemite regime. • Ensure provision of oil to Jordan, if the Iraqi flow is halted Syria. We will need to prevent Syria drifting into covert active support for Saddam • Remain engaged with Syria to ensure overflight access for Med based assets is not denied • Prevent Saddam using Syria • Afghanistan. It is unlikely that the Coalition (even the USA) could sustain use of key enabling capabilities (C4/ ISR/ SF) in Afghanistan at the same time as taking action against Iraq. This raises wider (than Afghanistan) problems of concurrency, especially for UK. So we will need to • Examine forces levels and possibly reduce elsewhere. • Israel. Saddam may choose to provoke Israel into military action in order to garner Arab support against the Coalition. The Coalition needs to be prepared to: Enhance the Israeli defensive (particularly air) shield. Pre-empt Israeli reactions by early committal of other coalition forces. Be prepared to use ground forces to dominate western region of lraq to prevent WMD capable missile systems being deployed to areas in range of Israel. Key Judgement Minimise footprint and duration of operation, commensurate with assets to manage unintended consequences. Version 12 Jun SECRET UK/US LUN FUHERE SSEMINATION . Iraq has a sound agricultural base ("fertile crescent") • Educated and able technical, industrial, and managerial population exists • Although ethnic suppression has occurred there is limited regional inter- ethnic mixing as compared to Afghanistan and Balkans • International intervention is not in tandem with ongoing, and in the case of Afghanistan prolonged, civil war. Likely Military Tasks • Immediate (0 - 6 months) • Provide external and internal security, law and order to prevent any potential for inter-ethnic violence, or opportunity for organised crime • Detention and processing of key regime figures (Nuremberg model?) • Confine and disarm elements of armed forces likely to rebel (Special Republican Guard, Republican Guard) • Confine and monitor remaining elements of Iraqi Armed Forces • Secure and account for WMD capability (materiel and intellectual) • Enable humanitarian relief • Assist in restoration of key infra-structure elements • Secure oilfields and oil distribution/ refining infrastructure Negotiate and secure alternative lines of communication (LoC) through Syria/ Turkey/ Jordan • Scope of tasks likely to demand large numbers of ground troops, comprehensive C2 and air mobility (circa 200,000+) • Medium Term (6 months - 2+ years) • Continue to provide both external and internal security, law and order to prevent any potential for inter-ethnic violence, or opportunity for organised crime, but commence transfer of requirement to new Iraqi security structures Detention and processing of key regime figures Version 12 Jun A A02TIEN ECRET UKUS NES- MOJUIT BIDSSEMINATION • Support SSR through training and presence on ground to effect gradual resumption of full responsibility for internal and external security by new regime. : Detention of key regime figures Exercises to underpin international security guarantees: Key Judgement • In the worst case, we need to be prepared for a substantial long-term commitment. Version 12 Jun SECRET UKUS EYES ENDURANHE intentions and consequently avoids handing us a casus belli. Therefore he is unlikely to take any significant military action. Possible actions include: • Accelerate WMD development and weaponisation. • NFZ actions to 'wrong foot' the Coalition. • Admit inspectors, then obstruct/expel them. • Stop oil production. • Handover power (whilst actually retaining it in a 'behind the scenes' role). Phase 2 This phase begins when Saddam is convinced that the Coalition is determined to overthrow his regime. His reaction will be unpredictable, ranging from benign/conciliatory, in the hope influencing international public opinion to undermine Coalition action, to military aggression at the other end of the scale. Possible actions include: • Pre-emptive attack (maybe on Israel or a spoiling operation on potential APODs and SPODs) - possibly WMD. • Mining SPODs or approaches. • Pre-emptive attack on Kuwait. • Asymmetric: • Terrorism. • Dispersal of Army and/or Air Force to 'neutral' Arab country. Phase 3 This is the conflict phase. Saddam now goes into full regime (and personal) survival mode, with no holds barred. Possible actions include: • IADS mobilisation. • Conventional fixed defensive lines. Mobilise population; create 'nation in arms.' • Hold urban areas, forcing us to use siege/urban warfare. Asymmetric: Version 12 Jun 91 126124150 SECRET UK/U DIESE NOSE DISSEMINATION support would be very hard to maintain, as would support from the Region. The plan that the Coalition eventually adopts will need to minimize the possibility of addam going for this option, which supports the idea of a surprise attack Most Dangerous COA A WMD attack on Israel would be the most dangerous COA for the Coalition to deal with. Any plan must include guarantees to Israel that her security will be guarded / Key Judgement Saddam's best chance is to fracture the will of the Coalition in Phase 2, so speed and agility are needed once the decision to act has been taken. Version 12 Jun A ARIFIN 13 of 24 SECRET UK/ ISSEMINATION DEE 10220 • Surprise. The aim is to maximise strategic uncertainty in Saddam's mind: OTHER PRINCIPLES. • Deception. Critical, to keep Saddam off balance. • Morale. There are indications that the 'average Iraqi conscript will not fight to the death for Saddam. We need to encourage this by 10 and inducements • Offensive Action. Once committed, there can be no turning back until the regime is overthrown and WMD is under control. • Security. This is particularly important for surrounding countries; especially Israel and those that will facilitate the Coalition build up • Concentration of Force. The Coalition will need to identify key areas and fault lines, so that force can be concentrated to shatter cohesion. * Co-operation. Especially with regional allies. Sustainability. Post Conflict commitment. This needs to be planned and agreed before we embark on military action. Version 12 Jun 1002 TED • Russia • China MIL • (UK) Review force levels and key capabilities worldwide.* • Review NFZ posture; re-enforce zones rigorously. • Promote uncertainty in Saddam's mind to keep him guessing and on edge: • Exploit regime fault lines by 10 and • Wide use of lO to destabilise Saddam's supporters. • Use of UNMOVIC. Other UN moves. • Military/strategic deception. eg reschedule exercises. • Create military coalition, particularly to provide adequate LOCS, overflight rights, APOD, SPOD, bases and Assembly Areas. ME • Kuwait - total support. Turkey - total support. Egypt - total support. Saudi flank. Bahrain. . Qatar. Oman. • Jordan. Version 12 Jun 15 of 24 SECRET UK/US EYES- NO FURTHER DISSEMINATION • Precursor action to neutralise WMD. • Necessary military actions to prevent• interference. Key Judgement • Aim is to keep Saddam off balance whilst carrying out the necessary preparatory activities prior to the main action. Version 12 Jun CRET UKUS EVES NO FURT DISSEMINATION • Strategic intelligence demand will be high: • retasking of UK national strategic intelligence gathering assets (SIGA) • UK capabilities: PR9, Nimrod R, SF, HUMINT, maritime SIGINT platforms • Prepare. (UK) • with 3 months warning of offensive operations the UK could deploy a Medium Scale Joint Force to the Gulf (10 major warships including a carrier, an armoured Brigade, about 60 fast jets and associated support including transport aircraft). Cost of generating forces to the required level of readiness, including essential UORs, would be some £500M - £800M. • 6 months preparation time would allow us to deploy a Large Scale land warfighting force (Div(-)|2 square armoured brigades, OSG, and a rear ops brigade], combined with medium scale maritime and air forces comparable to those available for the 3-month option. Cost of generating forces to the required level of readiness, including essential UORs, would be some £800M - £1.1Bn. . with 9 months warning the recommended force package would remain as for six months, but inherent risks would be significantly reduced; the large scale land for package in particular becomes more credible, capable and sustainable. Cost of generating the required level of readiness would be of the order of £900M - £1.2Bn. • Project. (UK) • 21days is minimum for sea transit times from UK South Coast ports to Bahrain or other Guif destinations (36 days if via Cape of Good Hope). • Large Scale deployment using only UK military sealift and airlift resources would take approximately 500 days. • Using additional commercial charter timescale can be reduced to around 81 day. • Assume unimpeded movement through Suez, simplified 7 day Dipclear • Figures do not include a margin for sustainment, which would need to begin shortly after any force arrives in theatre, or recovery. Air estimates are based on a marked reduction in current usage of AT for up to 3 months before any air deployment is started in order to enable Version 12 Jun 17 of 24, SECRET UK/US EMINATION NO FUN THER Prolonged post conflict deployment will provide significant burden on defence resources Operate. Force packages will be determined by COA Version 12 Jun AMPIRE 18 of 24 SECRET UK/US'EMES - NO FURTHERE OSEMINATION ATION rand/or precision SSEM and/or precision air MEANS Identify WMD C2 chain - means. comms and commanders. Re-establish UNMOVIC inspection regime (may Identify location of delivery facilities. Identify location of production research scientists involved. Establish international (UN?) require military protection). Identify and locate key Destroy delivery means by verification system. strikes. air strikes. Destroy production facilities communications links. Destroy WMD by. Establish monitoring system capability. to prevent resurgence of 1. 10. - 11. 12. VE TVUITIC ES - NO FURTHER 7 TO 11 2,3,4,5,6 1,2,3,4,5,6 2 TO 11,12 SECRE JK/US E SECRET UK DECLASSIFIED MAHON WAYS CONFLICT PRE- CONFLICT CONFLICT POST- ENDS REMOVE FROM WMD THREAT Version 12 Jun SSE MEANS Identify potentially Persuade them to lead dissident Army officers. move against Saddam - Remove Saddam and his Destroy key regime immediate team. 10 campaign to exploit Conduct strategic coup de air strikes and/or air strikes and/or Re-enforce NFZs. regime weakness and fault campaign to weaken infrastructure by surgical Conduct wider air air force. lines. power contres.- regime: and neutralise tragi main seizure of key regime attack to neutralise Army 8. - Destroy (ADS by surgical 10. 11. Conduct conventional 120 of 24 1-6 1-10 POSS JK/US EYES NO' FURTHERD SECRÉ SECRET UKUS DE VERIS SIFIED MA TON WAYS SUNNI STRONGMAN INTERNATIONAL PRESENCE WITH OTATE BRIDGING PROCESS FEDERATED ENDS CHANGE REGIME Version 12 Jun conduct i campaign to exploit regime weaknesses and fault lines. • increase intelligence collection (technical and human) to improve the granularity of the inteiligence on WMD-related installations, individuals, means of delivery and command and control. Create a climate of uncertainty. Deceive Saddam by building up and building down force levels in Kuwait and the Gulf. Conduct short notice exercises. • Prepare to support new (post conflict) regime, politically, militarily and economically. Note: • Requirement is to minimise the Coalition military footprint, to be more acceptable in the Region. • Aim is to keep Saddam off balance, whilst we improve our intelligence • for possible future operations. • There is a possibility that Saddam may over react, thus giving a casus belli. However: • These measures are unlikely to cause the downfall of Saddam by themselves. • The Coalition will have little control of the outcomes ie What happens to WMD? How will Iran react? Judgement. These measures are required, whichever course of action is eventually adopted. Although not impossible, it is unlikely that Saddam can be unseated by this means alone. It also leaves WMD uncontrolled, so will not satisfy the endstate. Very low military risk. Version 12 Jun DEC SECRET UK/US EYES - NO FURTHER DISSEMINATION • Actions: • Destroy IADS by precision air strikes : • Destroy WMD delivery means by precision air strikes : • Destroy CB production facilities by precision air strikes • Remove or isolate key individuals in the WMD C2 system. • Destroy WMD communications system. • Provide air support and leadership advice for dissident (Kurdish and Shia) uprising. Pros: • Minimises exposure of Coalition Forces. • Neutralises WMD (especially CB) threat. Cons: • Assumes precise targeting information, which may be an unrealistic assumption. • Gives inadequate control over the successor regime. • Successor regime needs to be identified in advance and ready to move quickly. • Insufficient evidence of US resolve may fail to trigger uprising. Judgement. Unsure at this point if it will ever be possible to have adequate granularity of targeting detail. Even if it is, Coalition will have little control over successor regime. Low military risk for low return. Version 12 Jun A MACIFIED SECRET UK/US I YES - NO FURTHER DISSEMINATION Seize key regime power centres (mainly in Baghdad): • Seize NBC weapons, sites and command and control nodes. Neutralise Special Republican Guard. Pros: • Plays to US military strengths. • Abbreviates 'build up' Surprise. • Sets conditions to achieve endstate most quickly. Cons: • High risk if we misjudge Iraqi cohesion and resolve. Success could never be guaranteed, so need to be prepared to move rapidly to Option C • Increased likelihood of significant Allied casualties. • Narrows military coalition. Judgement. Militarily, a high risk strategy. Politically attractive Needs strategic surprise - deceive as to time frame/readiness, yet must signal resolve sufficient to corrode Iraqi cohesion. High military risk for high return. Version 12 Jun ACTED SECRET UKUS D DISSEMINATION Pros: Presents Iraq with inevitability of military defeat. . Least risk of significant Allied casualties. . Facilitates more ambitious endstate. Cons: • Maximum strain on Coalition and offensive to 'Arab Street'. . High risk for other Arab regimes. Vulnerable LOC. Presents target array for WMD. Time consuming/predictable - risks handing initiative to Saddam. Judgement. The safer military option. Medium military risk for high return. Version 12 Jun DISSEMINATION