Report kernaghan to blunkett straw and pres of acpo report on second visit to iraq by cc kernaghan 11-14 nov 03

Mr Chris Fox, President of ACPO From: Mr Paul Kernaghan, Chief Constable, ACPO International Affairs Portiolia i Copy: Mr D L Clarke, Chief Constable MDP [for information) Subject: Report on Second Visit to Iraq by Chief Constable Kernaghan - 11/17/03 - 14/11/03 1, Introduction I first visited Iraq In May [13/5-20/5] and submitted my report to the Foreign 1.1 and Home Secretaries on 23 May 2003. A copy of that report [and appendices is attached at Appendix 'N1' for ease of reference. The Iraq Directorate [Security Sector Reform] FCO requested that 1 undertake 1.2 a second visit to Iraq and address the following points: : Terms and conditions of UK pollce officers in iraq Additional areas where UK could add value Information on polling structures Chief Officer arrangements in Baghdad, Basra and the other Governorates within CPA [South] Viability of training plans and facilities in Basra Issues that can be done better or differently, e.g, role of contractors? Process of Iraqi ownership of policing especially in CPA [South], but also more widely in [rag General assessment re staff position in CPA (Baghdad] DECLASSIFIED 221U14 1811011 19ma1er6 100099 require attention at ministertal or senior officlal level. My visit owing to its duration means that my findings are necessarily based on a snapshot approach. 1.5 The vlews expressed in the report are my own and l take full responsiblity for I have sought to reflect the views of my interviewees but have exercised my own judgement and on occasion I was faced with contradictory 2. Context My visit programme changed repeatedly in the days before my departure and, indeed, even more once I was in Iraq. My scheduled meetings with Ambassador Bremmer and Sir Jeremy Greenstock were both cancelled as they had been recalled for separate consultations with their respeclive governments. My Basra programme was totally disrupted by a security 'lockdown' coinciding with my arrival at Basra International Airport [BIA] on 13/11/03. The threat of a Vehicle Borne Improvised Explosive Device [VBIED) resufted in all GOC and Sir Hilary Synnott during my extended stay at BIA. 2.3 The absence of the ambassadors and the security 'scare' at BIA both perfectly Ellustrate the atmosphere and reality of Iraq during my visit. The future plans of the Coalition Powers [CP) for Irag were in a state of flux and the seniol officials remaining, acknowledged that meetings in Washington Tend London] might well totally change existing plans. They were therefore somewhere reluctant to be definitive as to the CP's strategle plan. Equally, the security threat was the dominant theme of both discussions and CPA operational actlvity. DECLASSIFIED become larger with each day that passes* 2.5 Sadly, the 'bad luck' factor has kIcked in with a vengeance. The CPA Headquarters was mortared on my first day in iraq, and the Italian Carabinleri sustained multiple fatalities as a result of a BIED attack during my second day. Shortly after my departure the US Army lost seventeen soldlers when two helicopters crashed, the result it is belleved of enemy fire. Security is a major factor in all CPA and Coalition Powers - Security Forces [CP-$F] discussions. The so-called 'Green Zone' In Baghdad resembles a massive building site with concrete walls and obstacles being erected everywhere. I have no doubt those attacks on the CP and other manifestations of 2.6 International Involvement will continue, and will probably Increase in tempo. 1 submit that the threat to the CP encompasses a wide range of potentlal attackers. There are undoubtedly former regime elements [FRE] but opinions differ amongst coalition officials as to whether they are seeking to restore a Ba'athist regime or merely to Impose a heavy price on the CP for removing them from power. There Is also the threat posed Independently, or in a loose coalition of mutual self Interest with FRE, by what I will designate as foreign radical islamists [FRI]. In addition to these two groups, 1 would submit that attacks may also be mounted by unemployed and alienated youth with universal access to firearms. To say nothing of traditional tribal based disputes and potentially activity assoclated with political groupings seeking ! influence in the new Iraq. Each group poses a specific threat ranging from serious to marginal, but they all require a response from the CP-SF. Infiltration and other classic CRV techniques may work agalnst organised groupings but are irclovant when the threat comes from local youths demonstrating their masculinily to each other. The security situation is not good and will become worse, but the answer to 2.7 large parts of that cily will never and should never see CP-SF patrol activily. Huge areas are composed of high-density housing and foreign security forces would merely become targets with no accompanying security benefit being gleaned from patral activity. You will only 'police' Sadr City' for example, with indigenous forces, preferably police officers. 3 DECLASSIFIED Secretary with a vlew to sustalning a deployment of 100 officers in support of Traqi operations. Plans are well advanced to support the Jordanian - Iraq Police Training Centre with up to 70/75 'tralners' drawn from the pool. Some 24 officers from the pool are undertaking firearms tralning, with a view to being deployed to a training facility at Basra. 3.3 The deployment to Jordan has been formally requested by the Foreign Secretary, endorsed by the Home Secretary, and is in hand. The deployment to Basra has not yet been formally requested and is subject to an approprate security assessment. I will return to this issue later. 4. Assessment 4.1 I will specifically address the issues raised by the Iraq Directorate but feel an overview is essential. The pace of change in iraq pollcy Is quickening and the outcome of the consultatons undertaken by Ambassador Bremmer and Sir Jeremy Greenstock are now filtering in to the public arena. It appears that the new timetable to which the CP are working is as follows: Formal restoratlon of Iraqi sovereignty by June 2004 - Power being transferred to a 'provisional' Iragi government. However the CP and specifically the CP-SF would remaln In Iraq on a basis to be decided with the provisional government. Full elections in 2005 to establish a government with democratic legitimacy, It appears that elections will not take place until a government structure and securlty climate have been created to facilitate a genuine exercise In democracy. The provisional government will be selected by means of consultation with 'community groups'. In the context of UK police assistance it Is imoortant thal a clear timetable is 4.2 established, which Is compatible with the strategic plan. Do we have a date for the wilhdrawal of UK police support or, whatever the constitutional arrangements do we envisage a long-term police assistance mission? 1 deliberately use the term police assistance mission, as it suggests a move from a short-term crisis response to a more thought through medium term assistance package. The miltary have experience in providing traing assistance support and it may be that Iraq marks the dawn of a similar DECLASSIFIED and in addition co his mol briet was alse seeking to provide mentoring to the Iraqi Chief of Pollce for Baghdad. The recent arrival of additional officers (mainly drawn from the MDP] has eased the situation but security restrictions and the limited availability of Close Protection Teams [CPT] and vehicles, limits their ability to contribute. 4.5 The Joint Co-ordinating Centre OCC) was not operating during my visit and I was advised that the original concept had not been properly resourced or thought through. The MDP officers originally earmarked for the JCC were being employed on general support dutles with the DCC. However, work continues to revive the JCC concept. The ACC In CPA [South] seeks to provide guidance to local IPS commanders and to support CPA (South] generally. The major project is the establishment of a police training centre. Currently, a team of Danish officers have developed, and are dellvering, three management type courses based on their work wilh the 'Palestinian Police', However, I anticlpate problems with the continued dellvery of this progremme glven the recent emphasis on basic training as decreed by the Commander of CJTF7 and disseminated by FRAGO [Fragmentary Order] 1016. Overall my impression was that the UK pollce assistance effort was under- 4.7 resourced and lacked a clear vision as to the way ahead. They had ideas but ! were uncertaln as to their chain of command - CPA, CPA [South], Iraq Directorate or United Nations Department? I could set out the current position in greater depth but feel the correct approach is to focus on aptions for the future and also to highlight the factors which require addressing In connection with the aptions proposed. 4.8 i was somewhat surprised to learn that Ambassador Bremmer as CP Administrator did not have political control over the military but that the Commander CJTF7 had his own reporting line via CentCom back to Washington. On the one hand a matter of high polly and national style, but I belleve that on occasions there Is an Information and co-ordination gap between CPA and CJTF7. DECLASSIFIED 5. Future Pollce Assistance Options 5.1 I consulted with the Head of the Mol [Mr Steve Casteel] and he sketched out the development plan he Is seeking to implement. Field Training Co- ordinators [FTC] will support Iraql recrults trained in Jordan and at domestic training centres. These personnel will be supplied by 'Dyncorps' and the aim is to create a unit of 1,500 FTCs. Iraqi recruits will be subject to 1 years probation before they are confirmed in the Iraqi Police Service. He did not envisage UK officers being deployed on the streets of trag as FTCs. He saw the UK supporting the training centre[s] effort and suggested that over time UK personnel might dellver some areas of specialist training. 5.2 It should be noted that with the exception of the Basra tralning centre, military personnet are dellvering all police training in Iraq. This emphasls on training was also reflected by several interviewees in Baghdad. 5.3 I detected the lack of a clear vision and was also concerned that we appeared to be creating a hybrid US City department/UK police service. I see the need for a service with the ability to routinely demonstrale the capability to utilise Force, somewhere higher on the 'continuum of force' than is the norm in the USA and the uK. I am aware that Police Support Units [PSUs] are being trained but none of my hosts briefed me on this development and T fear it is not being properly Integrated into a national plan. Currently this PSU training 1s being provided by CP milltary and gendarmerie type Formations. I endorse the use of gendarmerie type units and feel the IP5 needs such a capability within the clear democratic and human rights culture which european units of this type demonstrate. It should be noted that of the FIEP grouping [France, Italy, Spain and Partugal] and their potential latest member Romanla, all bar France are present in Iraq. DECLASSIFIED Baghdad Police Training Centre [aka the Baghdad Police Academy]. He may baghdad tralning Centre should be develaged in line with CPA directives and i do not envisage it becoming a distinctly uk sponsored project. [d] The future of the JCC is unclear and the question of UK support should await updated proposals from DCC Brand. CPA [Sauthl [al The current staffing level of three is Insufficent to deliver anything meaningful. Therefore, I recommend that we should increase aur support to [PA [South]. [b) Basra Training Centre - deploy 24 officers as trainers as provisionally existing officers of the 1P5, [c) Maintan a senior UK officer post within CPA [South]. ACC White is seeking to retum to the UK by 14 January 2004. [d] Provide the senior officer with a small support staff. It was suggested that sentor CID and SB officers would be particularly helpful. I recommend no action on the SB appointment until CPA promulgates a clear piclure as to what internal Iraqi securlty structures will be. I can see some merit in providing an officer with CID experience, but in the absence of a brief on the restored Iraq OS, I am reluctant to endorse such an Imprecise suggestion at this stage. fel There are four governates within the remit of CPA [South] and I recommend that we appoint an advisor [Chief Superintendent) to each of the governate's Chiefs of Police. I envisage the advisors mentoring the IPS personnel and showing them how a professional senior officer performs. in addition, I feel there would be merit in he advisors 'talent spotting' the future leaders of the IP5, with a view to the Uk providing a 'senior command course' For such personnel, at some stage in the future. Identification of the future leaders will require diplomatic skills and diplomatic guidance. I am concerned thal at present nepotism and political sponsorship might determine who we had to train an a senior command course. I would prefer that we monitor and select good officers but equally 1 recognise the goal is to provide a 7 DECLASSIFIED 7.2 If HMG agrees that we should proceed as recommended it is imperative that appropriate security measures are implemented. Each governate advisor would require a dedicated CPT with appropriate transport. The advisors and their CPT support would work in local Police Headquarters, but live with other members of the governate support teams in secure CP facilitles. Clvil servants already operate in the governates and I feel that the risk to UK police officers woutd be acceptable and reasonable given the security measures specified. 7.3 In relation to the Basra Training Centre, opinions differ as to whether or not UK trainers should reside at the centre or commute daily from other CPA accommodation. The Danish officers currently commute. It has also been suggested that the UK officers could alternate their living accommodation between the centre and the CPA (South) Headquarters. I recognise that all concerned are anxlous to protect the officers concerned. My advice Is that they should work and reside at the training centre. Routine transportation constitutes a real risk and the advantages of residing at the BTC with access to co-located military units appears to provide he best option. 8. Commitment of the UK Police Service #.1 The creation of the pool of officers for service in connection with iraq highlighted problems with our current service structure and the approach adopted by Individual forces. 27 E+ 6 ACPOS] forces nominated officers, whilst 16 forces declined to do so. I recognise that some chief officers feel Irag does not feature on their own list of priorities and/or they believe, that Secretary's request Is that the burden effectively shifts to the willing and they are fated with losing operational personnel and potentially with managing the impact of fatalities. Whereas the unwilling see no downside to their stance. It should also be noted that forces which indicated support are waivering in the Face of adverse media coverage of the seturily situation In trag. DECLASSIFIED manner. An Indicative target for forces In relation to participation in all overseas : 8.3 missions should also be set. 8.4 The issue of attracting suitable volunteers for overseas missions, particularly senlor officers, was thrown in to stark relief during my visit to Iraq. working In Iraq is challenging and we should aim to utilise that challenge as a developmental tool for officers with real command potential, 1 am dellghted to note that Mr Stephen Rimmer [HO] and a Foreign Office counterpart have convened a meeting to discuss this particular issue. It would be helpful if overseas missions could form part of the Home Secretary's agenda to strengthen police leadership. However, I would highlight that at present all serve officers regardless of rank require police authority permission lo overseas. The Home Office may wish to consider changing the legislation, or I in the short term seeking an APA endorsement for overseas missions. 9. The UK/PSNI Dimension The FCO decided that the Traql pool would be drawn solely from Home Office 9.1 and Scottish Executive forces. The FCO consulted with ACPOS direct, as opposed to incorporating them with consent within the main ACPO trawi exercise. PSNi were not targeted, as I believe the FCO were cognisant that Lhe Policing Board of Northern Ireland had publicly indicated that their priority was domestic policing and that they were withdrawing from their commitment to Kosovo. The ACC deployed in Basra was selected on the basts of an ACPO recruiting 9.2 treated all forces equally. However, it appears that media exercise, which coverage in Northern Ireland led to an unsolicited offer of support from the Constable PSNI and also to discussions between ministers Chlef [NIO/FCO/MOD/HO]. The Chief Constable PSNI has offered to supply 6-1D offiters of Chief 9.3 Inspertor/Superintendent rank for service in Iraq. I received this offer by telephone and formally advised the FCO [Iraq Directorate] of it at a meeting on 29/10.03. Subsequently, i have had sight of correspondence from Jane Kennedy [Mo5 N1O] to the Foreign Secretary dated 6/11/03. Her letter indicates that there is an appetite within the NIO and PSNi to fully contrinute DECLASSIFIED han tammanty win mintery cactes in Ni, l am not aware of any speclal skills possessed by that force alone. Police advisors will not be engaged In executive policing and will act solely as trainers and advisors. All UK police personnel deployed to Iraq will be armed for their own protection. The deployment of mainstream 9.6 personnel from the PSNI, outside the arrangements, could potentlally be misrepresented as suggesting lhey are more sulted to risking their lives abroad. I feel that would be morally and professionally wrong. However, if PSNI personnel applied for advertised vacancles and were selected, that would be in keeping with ACPO's commitment to equal opportunities. 9.7 It should be noted that i met former members of the RUC/PSNi in Iraq and they were employed on contracts by CRG and other security companies. The FCO may wish to consider the use of contract staff, either directly employed or via a commerclal undertaking, in relation to various aspects of the police assistance programme in Iraq. However, it would be my hope that the service encouraged by the home departments would be in a position to provide serving career officers. 1D, Specific Points Raised by the Iraq Directorate 10.1 1 have provided specific answers to all the points raised by the Iraq Directorate at Appendix N2. 11. General Observations I have documented observations which did not fall within the above headings at Appendix N3. However, l would like to address one Issue in the main body of the report. It has been suggested that the deployment of Uk 'trainers' to the Basra Training Centre has been unduly delayed. This is not my understanding of the situalion and I trust that officials within the Irag Directorale (SSR] wil be given due credit for proceeding in a professional and timely manner. The question of deployment Is subject to an un to date risk assessment and that is linked to appropriate lodistical and security DECLASSIFIED I believe we should increase the number of officers deployed on specific tasks identified within the report. However, clear guidance to the service from HMG Is required, as the risks to personnel are obvious. Equally, Iraq merely Illustrates some wider dilemmas facing the service and I hope the Home Office will feel able to address those career management issues. & first submitted an RCDS paper on the subject of police missions abroad In 1997. 1 suggest that the time has now come for a government sponsored assessment of how the UK provides such support, with a view to improving our approach for the future. : I will separately provide feedback to Chief Constables on the performance of individual members deployed in Iraq and Hase with the Iraq Directorate in relation to recognition of their service. This report has been 'rushed' as I am aware of a desire by the Trag Directorate to have sight of It prior to drafting papers for meetings this week. Paul Kernaghan Chief Constable ACPO International Affairs Portfolio 18 November 2003 11 DECLASSIFIED Similar considerations may also apply in relation to Jordan, however, 1 am aware that alternative provisions may be Incorporated within the JIPTC protocol/MoU. Acconumodation In Baghdad is at a premium and the recent closure af a hotel, owing to the security situation, has merely exacerbated the pressure on accommodation at the CPA Headquarters Palace. However, at present more than 130 officials [of both genders] are sleeping in one farge room. Air conditioning is now provided and given the overall security threat it might be considered acceptable accommodation. I was advised that no However, two related Issues are Impacting on morale. coherent or published accommodation policy exists. Some newly arrived officials are allocated superior accommodation without any obvious linkage to duration of postings. The police officers feel waiting lime for superior accommodation linked to the anticlpated duration of postings should be the factors which determine allocation, in all cases, other than those of senior officials. I was also advised that some have contracts which specify the accommodation to be allocated le. The lack of a clear polley means that such matters take on real single rooms. Importance and are a source of dissatisfaction. The police officers are making the best of things but the FCO may wish to make representations to CPA (Baghdad] and elso review their own procedures in relation to terms offered to different groups of UK personnel being posted to Baghdad. Additignal areas where UK police could add value 1 address this Issue In the main body of the report. Information on policing structures 1 remain unclear as to the overall CPA Iraq 'model' and whether or not a single tier national service is being created. There was some discussion in relation to local and federal forces/responsibilltles. I recognise that the police structure may be afferted by constitutional arrangements. I resterale my view that a hybrid US/Uk service may not be appropriate and I still have nol seen a single policy document setting out the structure of the IPS. DECLASSIFIED Viabillty.of training plans and facilities In Basra i am unable to comment on the Basra TC, as I was unable to visit it owing to the security regime in operation. I think it is important that CPA Mol and CJTF7 are both working to the one common pian. Issues that can be done better or differently. g.g. role of contrasters? of using contractors for the provision of police assistance I address the issue elsewhere. However, I was conscious of some general concern reiated to contractors with CPA operations. The qualily of service provided by contractors appeared to vary widely and poor service was delivered by both US and UK contractors - the view was clearly expressed that giving a contract to a UK company might look good and make us all feel patriotic but if they failed to deliver, the staff in the fleld were the ones to suffer. One UK governate official In CPA [South] claimed not to have had a hot meal It was clalmed at in several months owing to poor performance by contractors. senior level that ail contracts are awarded by officials back in the US and the UK and that personnel on the ground have limited input. The need for probity and audit trails was accepted but I detected a genuine feeling that the views of personnel with experience on the ground was not being fully recognised in Washington and London. Process of Iragi ownership of palicing especially in CPA [South]. I was unable to meet any IPS personnel in CPA [South]. I am aware that at least one senior officer has been assassinated and I detected some factionalism during ny visit to the Saghdad Academy, However, I recognise that policing does not operate in a vacuum and prooress on local police ownership must be related to strategic political developments. I deal with the development of future leaders within the main body of the report. DECLASSIFIED Bagidad, DECLASSIFIED o concrenl umanal dogyle byatem min dlog crordger noorme redon 60ro.ta refersf Vehicles - It was suggested to me In Baghdad, that UK personnel are under resourced In terms of vehictes in comparison with other countries and agencies. Close Profection Teams - Personnel in Baghded cannot leave the CPA Headquarters Palace without protection and there are only 4 CRG teams available. This capability will elther have to be increased or, In respect of police personnel, new security rules agreed. Iraqi Civil Defense Corps [1CDC] - police advisors saw this body as a pool of fulure police and army recruits, whilst military commanders saw it very clearly as an army recruitment pool. 1 tend to agree with the milltary commanders. In any event it is strategy for this body is agreed and that it is important that a medium term compatible with the long term iraqi security infrastructure which will Incorporate both the IPS and the Nev Iraqi Army [NIA]. JIPTG (Security] - It appears that personnel posted to the JIPTC at present lack a source of updated securlty assessments. I suggest the iraq Directorate should ensure [via Rin Shadforth] that personnel in Jordan are provided with a weekly ; updated security assessment. JIPTC [Transport) - Concern was expressed that transport arrangements for Iraqi recruits to and from Jordan was not shaping up In an appropriate manner. Concern Te airlift capabllity. CPA Stafing - It was claimed that the staffing of the CPA compares unfavourably with the resources allocated to East Tinor. If this is an urban myth it should be dispelled rapldly, if not, it suggests one or both countries are inappropriately resourced. Baghded/Basra Communication - I noted thal six months on there is still a feeling in CPA (5auth) that they are not fully in the loop with CPA [Headquarters]. This may not be true but It Is a widely held perception. Briefing - Several personnel highlighted that in their view there was a lack of praper briefing for personnet being deployed and that there is no authoritative audit trail for policy proposals and deliverables. Sernard Kerik endorsed information supplied by a junior FCO official that an international police farce of 6,500 officers would be deployed to Ireq. However, in practice we are now still planning for the deployment DECLASSIFIED DECLASSIFIED