Endnotes
Chapter 1
1 For an account of the September 13, 2001, National Security Council (NSC) meetings and several follow-on sessions concerning the debate over Iraq war plans, see Douglas Feith, War and Decision: Inside the Pentagon at the Dawn of the War on Terror (New York: HarperCollins, 2008), 13-15, 47-49.
2 SIGIR interviews with Brigadier General (Ret.) Mark Scheid, former CENTCOM logistics planner; Colonel John Agoglia, former CENTCOM planner; and Colonel (Ret.) Michael Fitzgerald, former CENTCOM J5 Chief of War Plans.
3 SIGIR interview with General (Ret.) Colin Powell, former Secretary of State and Richard Armitage, former Deputy Secretary of State, February 4, 2008; and Karen DeYoung, Soldier: The Life of Colin Powell (New York:
Alfred A. Knopf, 2006), 401-403.
4 Christopher Catherwood, Churchill’s Folly: How Winston Churchill Created Modern Iraq (New York:
Carroll & Graf, 2004), 74.
5 Judith S. Yaphe, “The View from Basra: Southern Iraq’s Reaction the War and Occupation, 1915-1925,” in The Creation of Iraq, 1914-1921, ed. Reeva Spector Simon and Eleanor H. Tejirian (New York: Columbia University Press,2004), 28-30.
6 Phebe Marr, The Modern History of Iraq, 2nd edition, (Boulder, CO: Westview Press, 2003), 12-19.
7 Christopher Catherwood, Churchill’s Folly: How Winston Churchill Created Modern Iraq (New York:
Carroll & Graf, 2004), 19, 44, 74.
8 Christopher Catherwood, Churchill’s Folly: How Winston Churchill Created Modern Iraq, (New York, NY:
Carroll & Graf, 2004), 7, 123, 130, 217, 221.
9 Phebe Marr, The Modern History of Iraq, 2nd edition, (Boulder, CO: Westview Press, 2003), 113-116.
10 Phebe Marr, The Modern History of Iraq, 2nd edition, (Boulder, CO: Westview Press, 2003), 177-178, 207- 208, 217-259.
11 Kuwaiti political structures remained intact after the nation’s leadership fled in 1990.This enabled negotia- tions with the United States before military action restored the Kuwaitis to power, a very different situation than in 2002 and early 2003 when the Iraqi exile leadership was fractious and could not provide a unified front with which to negotiate plans. Nevertheless, the condition of Kuwait’s infrastructure proved worse than an- ticipated, just as would happen in Iraq in 2003. Sewage, water, and electricity plants in Kuwait failed in 1991.
The effort ultimately repaired 10,000 kilometers of electrical lines and restored more than 145 schools, 1,000 public buildings, and hundreds of other facilities. The Army Corps of Engineers alone completed 1,200 task orders with the help of international contractors. Janet A. McDonnell, After Desert Storm: The United States Army and the Rebuilding of Kuwait (Washington, DC: Department of the Army, 1999), 31, 129-131, 176-185.
12 See: United Nations Security Council Resolutions (UNSCRs) 661, 687, 706, 712, 986, and 1051. UNSCR 661 of August 6, 1990, imposed comprehensive economic sanctions on Iraq, exempting food and medicine, and established a committee to oversee implementation of the sanctions; UNSCR 687 of April 3, 1991, set terms for a cease-fire and maintained the terms of the embargo; UNSCR 706 of August 15, 1991, set out a mechanism for an oil-for-food program and authorized an escrow account to be established by the Secretary- General (to fund an oil-for-food program, $1.6 billion was to be raised in six months by the sale of Iraqi oil);
UNSCR 712 of September 19, 1991, confirmed the sum of $1.6 billion to be raised by the sale of Iraqi oil in a six-month period to fund the Oil-for-Food program; UNSCR 986 of April 14, 1995, enabled Iraq to sell oil worth up to $1 billion every 90 days and use the proceeds for humanitarian supplies (it also set terms of reference for the Oil-for-Food program); and UNSCR 1051 of March 27, 1996, established the export/import monitoring system for Iraq.
13 Independent Inquiry Committee, “The Impact of the Oil-for-Food Programme on the Iraqi People,” September 7, 2005, 8, 16.
14 Organization of the Petroleum Exporting Countries, “Annual Statistical Bulletin 2001,” 2001, 3.
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• Endnotes •
15 United Nations Security Council S/1999/356, “Annex II: Report of the Second Panel Established Pursuant to the Note by the President of the Security Council of 30 January 1999 (S/1999/100), Concerning the Current Humanitarian Situation in Iraq,” March 30, 1999; and Independent Inquiry Committee, “The Impact of the Oil-for-Food Programme on the Iraqi People,” September 7, 2005, 10.
16 To make up the additional intake necessary to survive, the very poor relied on wheat flour and bread, the only foodstuff whose prices remained low. Independent Inquiry Committee, “The Impact of the Oil-for-Food Programme on the Iraqi People,” September 7, 2005, 18, 20.
17 UN Secretariat Memorandum S/1996/356, “Memorandum of Understanding between the Secretariat of the United Nations and the Government of Iraq on the Implementation of Security Council Resolution 986 (1995),” May 20, 1996.
18 UN Office of the Iraq Programme: Oil-for-Food, “Background Brief: Food Basket,” February 26, 2003, http://www.un.org/Depts/oip/food-facts.html; and GAO Testimony 04-651T, “United Nations:
Observations on the Oil for Food Program,” April 7, 2004.
19 Independent Inquiry Committee, “Manipulation of the Oil-for-Food Programme by the Iraqi Regime,” October 27, 2005, 1-9; and Iraq Survey Group, “Comprehensive Report of the Special Advisor to the DCI on Iraq’s WMD with Addendums,” September 30, 2004, 8-9, http://www.gpoaccess.gov/duelfer/index.html.
20 For an overview of international aid provided to Iraq in the 1990s, see GAO Report 03-792R, “Rebuilding Iraq,” May 15, 2003.
21 SIGIR interview with William Orme, Director of Communications, UN Development Program, September 8, 2006.
22 Douglas Feith, War and Decision: Inside the Pentagon at the Dawn of the War on Terror (New York:
HarperCollins, 2008), 219.
23 The cell’s members included Major General Victor Renuart, CENTCOM Director of Operations (J3);
Brigadier General John F. Kimmons, CENTCOM Director of Intelligence (J2); Colonel David D. Halverson, Chief of Operations Plans Division, CENTCOM (J3); and Colonel Mark Scheid, Chief of Logistics Plans Division, CENTCOM (J4). SIGIR interview with Brigadier General (Ret.) Mark Scheid, former CENTCOM logistics planner, September 20, 2006.
24 SIGIR interview with Colonel (Ret.) Michael Fitzgerald, former CENTCOM J5 Chief of War Plans, May 30, 2008; SIGIR interview with Brigadier General (Ret.) Mark Scheid, former CENTCOM logistics planner, September 20, 2006; and SIGIR interview with Colonel John Agoglia, former CENTCOM planner, May 22, 2008. Secretary Rumsfeld later stated, “I do not recall, nor do others present in the numerous discussions with General Franks, giving any guidance that could be interpreted as requesting CENTCOM not plan for Phase IV postwar operations, as General Franks will attest. Nor would I have minimized its importance.” Donald Rumsfeld, written comments to SIGIR, November 5, 2008. Michael Fitzgerald, CENTCOM Chief of War Plans, attests that, “We, CENTCOM, were not in charge of designating and developing the government, determining who would be responsible in immediate post-conflict.” Michael Fitzgerald, former CENTCOM J5 Chief of War Plans, May 30, 2008.
25 SIGIR interviews with Brigadier General (Ret.) Mark Scheid, former CENTCOM logistics planner, September 20, 2006; and Colonel John Agoglia, former CENTCOM planner, May 22, 2008. The notation used for campaign phases changes over the years as military doctrine evolves. From 2001 to 2006, the phases were: 1-Deter/Engage; 2-Seize; 3-Decisive Operations; and 4-Transition. Joint Chiefs of Staff Joint Publication
3-0, “Joint Operations,” III-18-III-21, http://www.bits.de/NRANEU/others/jp-doctrine/jp3_0(01).pdf. In 2006, the phases were changed to 0-Shape; 1-Deter; 2-Seize Initiative; 3-Dominate; 4-Stabilize; and 5-Enable Civil Authority. Joint Chiefs of Staff Joint Publication 3-0, “Joint Operations,” IV-26-IV-30, http://www.dtic.
mil/doctrine/jel/new_pubs/jp3_0.pdf. The phases represent general guidance to combatant commanders and may be changed for specific plans. For purposes of this book, Phase IV refers to the establishment of self- sustaining peace, civil control, and the rule of law.
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26 For popular accounts, see Michael R. Gordon and General Bernard E. Trainor, Cobra II: The Inside Story of the Invasion and Occupation of Iraq (New York: Pantheon Books, 2006); Thomas E. Ricks, Fiasco: The American Military Adventure in Iraq (New York: Penguin Group, 2007); Bob Woodward, State of Denial:
Bush at War, Part III (New York: Simon & Schuster, 2006); and Bob Woodward, Plan of Attack (New York:
Simon & Schuster, 2004).
27 Warrick initially discussed this evaluation with State Department officials Steve Beecroft, Alan Limpert, and others from the Iraq desk. ORHA/CPA Historian interview with Thomas S. Warrick, former Senior Advisor to the Assistant Secretary of State for Near Eastern Affairs, November 10, 2004. Dr. Gordon Rudd was the staff historian for both the Office of Reconstruction and Humanitarian Assistance (ORHA) and the Coalition Provisional Authority (CPA). All of Rudd’s interviews will be identified as “ORHA/CPA Historian.” The groups were: Democratic Principles and Procedures; Economy and Infrastructure; Defense Policy and Institutions; Education; Public Health and Humanitarian Needs; Civil Society Capacity Building;
Transitional Justice; Water, Agriculture and Environment; Preserving Iraq’s Cultural Heritage; Public Finance;
Oil and Energy; Local Government; Anti-Corruption Measures; Foreign and National Security; Free Media;
Migration; and Public Outreach. DoS, “Future of Iraq Project,” May 12, 2003, Overview, 4, http://www.gwu.
edu/~nsarchiv/NSAEBB/NSAEBB198/FOI%20Overview.pdf.
28 These meetings, held in the White House situation room, included Deputy Secretary of State Richard Armitage, Under Secretary of State Marc Grossman, Under Secretary of Defense Douglas Feith, Vice Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff General Peter Pace, Chief of Staff to the Vice President I. Lewis “Scooter” Libby, Deputy Director of Central Intelligence John McLaughlin, and Deputy National Security Advisor Steven Hadley. General Wayne Downing—then Zalmay Khalilzad and later Frank Miller—attended as staff representatives from the NSC. The internal NSC calendar referred to the Deputies gatherings as “regional affairs” meetings, obscuring their purpose from the wider NSC staff. ORHA/CPA Historian interview with Douglas Feith, Under Secretary of Defense for Policy, December 17, 2004. For a general description of the “Deputies Lunches,” see Douglas Feith, War and Decision: Inside the Pentagon at the Dawn of the War on Terror (New York: HarperCollins, 2008), 237-298.
29 Douglas Feith, War and Decision: Inside the Pentagon at the Dawn of the War on Terror (New York:
HarperCollins, 2008), 237-298; and SIGIR interview with Douglas Feith, Under Secretary of Defense for Policy, March 21, 2008.
30 ORHA/CPA Historian interview with Douglas Feith, Under Secretary of Defense for Policy, December 17, 2004; and Richard Armitage, “The Future of Iraq,” Department of State policy paper distributed to the Deputies Committee on July 25, 2002, as quoted in Douglas Feith, War and Decision: Inside the Pentagon at the Dawn of the War on Terror (New York: HarperCollins, 2008), 277-78.
31 Donald Rumsfeld, “Beyond Nation Building,” DoD speech, February 14, 2003.
32 For an analysis of the Afghan campaign, see Stephen Biddle, “Afghanistan and the Future of Warfare:
Implications for Army and Defense Policy,” Strategic Studies Institute, November 2002.
33 It was only later that the initial gains in Afghanistan unraveled with the resurgence of the Taliban. David Rohde and David E. Sanger, “How a ‘Good War’ in Afghanistan Went Bad,” New York Times, August 12, 2007;
and Center for the Study of the Presidency, “Afghanistan Study Group Report,” January 30, 2008.
34 Richard Armitage, “The Future of Iraq,” Department of State policy paper distributed to the Deputies Committee on July 25, 2002, as quoted in Douglas Feith, War and Decision: Inside the Pentagon at the Dawn of the War on Terror (New York: HarperCollins, 2008), 277-78.
35 SIGIR interviews with Douglas Feith, former Under Secretary of Defense for Policy, March 21, 2008; SIGIR interview with Colonel (Ret.) Michael Fitzgerald, former CENTCOM (J5) Chief of War Plans, May 30, 2008;
and SIGIR interview with Colonel John Agoglia, former CENTCOM planner, May 22, 2008.
36 Bob Woodward, Plan of Attack (New York: Simon & Schuster, 2004), 154-56; and NSC briefing, “Iraq:
Goals, Objectives, Strategy,” circulated by National Security Advisor Condoleezza Rice, October 29, 2002.
37 Douglas Feith, War and Decision: Inside the Pentagon at the Dawn of the War on Terror (New York:
HarperCollins, 2008), 281-83.
38 ORHA/CPA Historian interview with Colonel John Agoglia, former CENTCOM planner, June 28, 2003.
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• Endnotes •
39 ORHA/CPA Historian interview with Major Thomas Fisher, former CENTCOM planner, August 27, 2003; and ORHA/CPA Historian interview with Major Ray Eiriz, former CENTCOM planner, December 7, 2006.
40 SIGIR interviews with Frank Miller, former Chairman of the Executive Steering Group of the NSC, June 26, 2008; and February 4, 2008; and Douglas Feith, War and Decision: Inside the Pentagon at the Dawn of the War on Terror (New York: HarperCollins, 2008), 276-77.
41 ORHA/CPA Historian interview with Douglas Feith, Under Secretary of Defense for Policy, December 17, 2004.
42 Lieutenant General (Ret.) Jay Garner, multiple interviews with ORHA/CPA Historian and SIGIR; and DoD IG Report 07-INTEL-04, “Report on the Pre-Iraqi War Activities of the Office of the Under Secretary of Defense for Policy,” February 9, 2007. Douglas Feith disputes the assertion that the name of the office was chosen as a deliberate deception and that its products were not widely shared, saying that “The Office of Special Plans was one of the most transparent offices in the United States Government.” Douglas Feith, former Under Secretary of Defense for Policy, written comments to SIGIR, January 7, 2009.
43 SIGIR interview with Frank Miller, former Chairman of the Executive Steering Group of the NSC, August 19, 2008.
44 SIGIR interview with Wendy Chamberlin, former USAID Assistant Administrator, Near East Bureau, May 3, 2006.
45 ORHA/CPA Historian interview with Major Ray Eiriz, former CENTCOM planner, December 7, 2006.
46 SIGIR interview with Jonathan Dworken, former Director for Humanitarian Assistance and Disaster Response for the NSC, October 11, 2006.
47 Colin H. Kahl, “In the Crossfire or the Crosshairs? Norms, Civilian Casualties, and U.S. Conduct in Iraq,” International Security 32, no. 1 (Summer 2007), 16.
48 According to Frank Miller, to whom the Humanitarian Working Group reported, it was not originally charged to do any reconstruction planning. SIGIR interview with Frank Miller, former Chairman of the Executive Steering Group of the NSC, June 26, 2008.
49 SIGIR interview with Wendy Chamberlin, former USAID Assistant Administrator, Near East Bureau, May 3, 2006.
50 SIGIR interview with Jonathan Dworken, former Director for Humanitarian Assistance and Disaster Response for the NSC, October 11, 2006; and SIGIR interview with Frank Miller, former Chairman of the Executive Steering Group of the NSC, June 26, 2008.
51 ORHA/CPA Historian interview with Colonel (Ret.) Joseph J. Collins, former Deputy Assistant Secretary of Defense for Stability Operations, August 29, 2006.
52 SIGIR interview with Jonathan Dworken, former Director for Humanitarian Assistance and Disaster Response for the NSC, October 11, 2006.
53 SIGIR interview with Jonathan Dworken, former Director for Humanitarian Assistance and Disaster Response for the NSC, October 11, 2006.
54 ORHA/CPA Historian interview with Colonel (Ret.) Joseph J. Collins, former Deputy Assistant Secretary of Defense for Stability Operations, August 29, 2006.
55 ORHA/CPA Historian interview with Colonel (Ret.) Joseph J. Collins, former Deputy Assistant Secretary of Defense for Stability Operations, August 29, 2006.
56 SIGIR interview with Jonathan Dworken, former Director for Humanitarian Assistance and Disaster Response for the NSC, October 11, 2006.
57 The “Karzai” comment refers to how Hamid Karzai emerged in Afghanistan as a national leader around whom the nation could generally rally. Karzai, an Afghan exile leader, was named as the country’s president after the overthrow of the Taliban.
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58 ORHA/CPA Historian interview with Colonel (Ret.) Joseph J. Collins, former Deputy Assistant Secretary of Defense for Stability Operations, August 29, 2006.
59 SIGIR and ORHA/CPA Historian interviews with Douglas Feith, Under Secretary of Defense for Policy, December 17, 2004, January 27, 2005, and March 21, 2008; and Douglas Feith, War and Decision: Inside the Pentagon at the Dawn of the War on Terror (New York: HarperCollins, 2008), 315-317, 544-45.
60 SIGIR interview with General George Casey, former Director of the Joint Staff and former Commander of MNF-I, July 30, 2008.
61 This subdivision of Phase IV had long been CENTCOM’s preferred concept of operations, and was taken from OPLAN 1003-98, a standing plan for war in Iraq that had been approved by the Secretary of Defense in 1998. SIGIR interview with Colonel (Ret.) Michael Fitzgerald, former CENTCOM J5 Chief of War Plans, May 30, 2008.
62 SIGIR interview with Colonel (Ret.) Michael Fitzgerald, former CENTCOM J5 Chief of War Plans, May 30, 2008.
63 SIGIR interview with Douglas Feith, former Under Secretary of Defense for Policy, March 21, 2008; and Douglas Feith, War and Decision: Inside the Pentagon at the Dawn of the War on Terror (New York: Harper Collins, 2008), 316-317.
64 ORHA/CPA Historian interview with Douglas Feith, Under Secretary of Defense for Policy, December 17, 2004.
65 The strategy paper was circulated on October 29, 2002. Condoleezza Rice, National Security Advisor, Memorandum to the Vice President, the Secretary of State, the Secretary of Defense, Chief of Staff to the President, Director of Central Intelligence, Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff, “Principals’ Committee Review of Iraq Police Paper,” October 29, 2002, as reproduced in Douglas Feith, War and Decision: Inside the Pentagon at the Dawn of the War on Terror (New York: HarperCollins, 2008), 541-43.
66 SIGIR interview with Douglas Feith, former Under Secretary of Defense for Policy, January 27, 2005.
67 SIGIR interview with Donald Rumsfeld, former Secretary of Defense, December 12, 2008.
68 Assistant Secretary of State William Burns and his deputy, Ryan Crocker, worked to produce a twelve-page, single-spaced analysis of political risks they titled “The Perfect Storm.” Karen DeYoung, Soldier: The Life of Colin Powell (New York: Alfred A. Knopf, 2006), 459; and SIGIR interview with Ambassador Ryan Crocker, United States Ambassador to Iraq, February 24, 2008.
69 SIGIR interview with General (Ret.) Colin Powell, former Secretary of State and Richard Armitage, former Deputy Secretary of State, February 4, 2008; and SIGIR interview with Frank Miller, former Chairman of the Executive Steering Group of the NSC, August 19, 2008.
70 For an overview of the literature, see, for instance: James Dobbins, et al., America’s Role in Nation-Building:
From Germany to Iraq (Santa Monica, CA: RAND, 2003); and Stephen Kinzer, Overthrow: America’s Century of Regime Change from Hawaii to Iraq (New York: Times Books, 2006). For an opposing view, see Justin Logan and Christopher Preble, “Failed States and Flawed Logic: The Case Against a Standing Nation-Building Office,” CATO Institute Policy Analysis, no. 560 (January 11, 2006).
71 Minxin Pei and Sara Kasper, “Lessons from the Past: The American Record on Nation Building,” Carnegie Endowment for International Peace Policy Brief, no. 24 (May 2003), 2, 4.
72 See: Charles Tripp, “Iraq: The Imperial Precedent,” Le Monde Diplomatique, January 13, 2003; and Brent Scowcroft, “Don’t Attack Saddam,” Op-Ed, Wall Street Journal, August 15, 2002.
73 For perspectives on the Germany case study and how historians viewed its relevance to Iraq, see Charles S.
Maier, Seminar, “Comparative Insights: Marshall Plan, Japan, and Iraq,” Seminar at Massachusetts Institute of Technology, Cambridge, MA, March 7, 2005, http://mitworld.mit.edu/video/255/. On the use of historical analogy between Japan and Iraq, see John W. Dower, “A Warning from History: Don’t Expect Democracy in Iraq,” Boston Review, February 2003; John W. Dower, “The Other Japanese Occupation,” The Nation, July 7, 2003; and John W. Dower, “Lessons from Japan about War’s Aftermath,” Op-Ed, New York Times, October 27, 2002. These analyses are drawn from a larger body of scholarship, including: John W. Dower, Embracing Defeat: Japan in the Wake of WWII (New York: W.W. Norton & Company, 2000).
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• Endnotes •
74 National Intelligence Council, “Principal Challenges in Post-Saddam Iraq,” January 2003, as reproduced in:
U.S. Senate Select Committee on Intelligence, “Prewar Intelligence Assessments about Postwar Iraq,” May 25, 2007, 56-94.
75 SIGIR interview with Frank Miller, former Chairman of the Executive Steering Group of the NSC, August 19, 2008.
76 The Institute for National Strategic Studies at the National Defense University in November 2002 hosted a meeting of more than 70 scholars, experts, and practitioners from inside and outside the government to discuss post-intervention reconstruction and political stabilization of Iraq. A 41-page proceeding of the workshop, “Iraq: Looking Beyond Saddam’s Rule,” was circulated across the government, including to the office of Douglas Feith. National Defense University, “Workshop Report: Iraq: Looking Beyond Saddam’s Rule,” National Defense University Institute for National Strategic Studies in collaboration with the Naval Postgraduate School, November 20-21, 2002; Edward P. Djerejian and Frank G. Wisner, co-chairs, Guiding Principles for U.S. Post-Conflict Policy in Iraq (New York: Council on Foreign Relations, 2003); Richard W.
Murphy and C. Richard Nelson, “Winning the Peace: Managing a Successful Transition in Iraq,” The Atlantic Council Policy Paper, January 2003; William D. Nordhaus, “Iraq: The Economic Consequences of War,” The New York Review of Books 49, no. 19, December 5, 2002; and Bob Davis, “Cost of Iraq War May Top $100 Billion,” Wall Street Journal, September 16, 2002. For subsequent news accounts, see Carl Kaysen, Steven E.
Miller, Martin B. Malin, William D. Nordhaus, and John D. Steinbruner, War with Iraq: Costs, Consequences and Alternatives, (Cambridge, MA: American Academy of Arts, 2002); Frederick D. Barton and Bathsheba N. Crocker, “A Wiser Peace: An Action Strategy for Post-Conflict Iraq,” Center for Strategic and International Studies, January 2003; and Anthony Cordesman, “Planning for a Self-Inflicted Wound: U.S. Policy to Reshape a Post-Saddam Iraq,” Center for Strategic and International Studies, December 31, 2002.
77 Conrad C. Crane and W. Andrew Terrill, “Reconstructing Iraq: Insights, Challenges, and Missions for Military Forces in a Post-Conflict Scenario,” U.S. Army War College Strategic Studies Institute, February 1, 2003.
78 Sinan Al-Shabibi, Colonel (Ret.) Scott Feil, Rend Rahim Francke, and Phebe Marr testified before the Senate Foreign Relations Committee on August 1, 2002, as part of a multi-day hearing on Iraq. Their panel focused specifically on post-Saddam Iraq. U.S. Senate Committee on Foreign Relations, “Hearings to Examine Threats, Responses, and Regional Considerations Surrounding Iraq,” July 31 and August 1, 2002. Also see Phebe Marr’s subsequent writings, especially Phebe Marr, “Iraq ‘The Day After’: Internal Dynamics in Post- Saddam Iraq,” Naval War College Review LVI, no. 1 (Winter 2003); P.L. 107-243, Authorization for Use of Military Force against Iraq Resolution of 2002, October 16, 2002; and White House Press Release, “Statement by the President,” October 16, 2003.
79 GPO Access, “Congressional Hearings,” 107th Congress (2001-2002), 108th Congress (2003-2004), http:// www.gpoaccess.gov/chearings/.
80 The project’s first meetings, held April 9 and 10, 2002, under the auspices of the Middle East Institute, a nonpartisan research center in Washington, DC, opened with the discord that was to mark its findings and Iraqi exile politics more generally. Ahmed Chalabi, the prominent Iraqi exile and leader of the Iraqi National Congress, raised concerns about the Middle East Institute’s participation. He viewed the think tank as an un- necessary intermediary between the Iraqi National Congress and the State Department. Acceding to Chalabi’s concerns, the State Department agreed to be the project’s sole sponsor, with meetings resuming in early July.
ORHA/CPA Historian interview with Thomas S. Warrick, former Senior Advisor to the Assistant Secretary of State for Near Eastern Affairs, November 10, 2004. The three groups that did not meet were Refugees and Internally Displaced Persons; Foreign and National Security Policy; and Preserving Iraq’s Cultural Heritage.
DoS, “The Future of Iraq Project,” May 12, 2003, http://www.gwu.edu/~nsarchiv/NSAEBB/NSAEBB198/ index.htm.
81 Four of the groups (Education; Free Media; Transparency and Anti-Corruption Measures; and Civil Society Capacity Building) did not begin meeting until after the start of the new year. DoS, “Future of Iraq Project,” Overview, 7-8, May 12, 2003, http://www.gwu.edu/~nsarchiv/NSAEBB/NSAEBB198/FOI%20 Overview.pdf. For details on updates sent to the Executive Steering Group, see ORHA/CPA Historian inter- view with Thomas S. Warrick, former Senior Advisor to the Assistant Secretary of State for Near Eastern Affairs, November 10, 2004.
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82 ORHA/CPA Historian interview with Thomas S. Warrick, former Senior Advisor to the Assistant Secretary of State for Near Eastern Affairs, November 10, 2004.
83 SIGIR interview with Frank Miller, former Chairman of the Executive Steering Group of the NSC, August 19, 2008.
84 For the edited volumes of the Future of Iraq Project, see DoS, “The Future of Iraq Project,” May 12, 2003, http://www.gwu.edu/~nsarchiv/NSAEBB/NSAEBB198/index.htm.
85 SIGIR interview with Frank Miller, former Chairman of the Executive Steering Group of the NSC, August 19, 2008.
86 SIGIR interview with Ambassador Ryan Crocker, United States Ambassador to Iraq, February 24, 2008.
87 NSC briefing, “Iraq: Goals, Objectives, Strategy,” circulated by National Security Advisor Condoleezza Rice, October 29, 2002; and Douglas Feith, War and Decision: Inside the Pentagon at the Dawn of the War on Terror (New York: HarperCollins, 2008), 541-543.
Essential Services Overview – Prewar Levels in Iraq 88 International Monetary Fund, “Iraq: Statistical Appendix,” August 2007; Energy Information Administration, Department of Energy, “Iraq Country Analysis Brief,” December 2005, as cited in SIGIR, Quarterly Report to the United States Congress, July 2006, 34; Kenneth M. Pollack, The Threatening Storm:
The Case for Invading Iraq (New York: Random House, 2002), 116-117; and Economist Intelligence Unit, “Country Profile: Iraq,” 2005, 34; International Telecommunication Union, “World Telecommunication/ICT Indicators,” no date, A-30m, http://www.itu.int/ITU-D/ict/statistics/at_glance/cellular03.pdf.
89 There were an estimated 500,000 people working in various intelligence, security and police organizations.
With the inclusion of the armed forces and paramilitary units, the estimate for the total Iraqi Security Forces is 1.3 million. Kenneth M. Pollack, The Threatening Storm: The Case for Invading Iraq (New York: Random House, 2002), 116-117.
90 Bechtel National, Inc., “Iraq Infrastructure Reconstruction Program,” Assessment Report submitted to USAID, June 2003; and Paul Wolfowitz, Deputy Secretary of Defense, Testimony before the Senate Foreign Relations Committee, May 22, 2003.
91 International Monetary Fund, “Iraq: Statistical Appendix,” August 2007. Pre-war estimates of electricity pro- duction ranged from 3,250 to 4,500 megawatts per day. The 2003 UN/World Bank estimated production at 4,500 MW. United Nations/World Bank, “Joint Iraq Needs Assessment,” October 2003, 28. The Gulf Region Division later noted, “4,500 MW represents a short-term peak before the war. The full prewar average for 2002 was 4,300MW.” GRD, response to SIGIR vetting for the Quarterly Report to the United States Congress, April 18, 2007. Iraq Transition Assistance Office reports that data from the Ministry of Electricity “suggest that prewar high levels of production... never exceeded 70,000 MWhr [megawatt hours]” which translates into 3,250 MW. ITAO-Electricity response to SIGIR Vetting for the Quarterly Report to the United States Congress, January 13, 2008.
92 DoS Briefing by U.S. Embassy Baghdad, November 30, 2005, as cited in SIGIR, Quarterly Report to the United States Congress, July 2006, 25.
93 Energy Information Administration, Department of Energy, “Country Analysis Brief: Iraq,” December 2005, as cited in SIGIR, Quarterly Report to the United States Congress, July 2006, 34.
Chapter 2
1 USAID, “2002 Congressional Budget Request,” http://www.usaid.gov/pubs/cbj2002/request.html.
2 USAID, “Primer: What We Do and How We Do It,” revised January 2006, http://www.usaid.gov/ about_usaid/PDACG100.pdf. In 2002, only 1,985 of USAID’s workforce were government employees;
more than two-thirds of the workforce of 7,741 was made up of contractors. GAO Testimony 03-117T, “Foreign Assistance: USAID Needs to Improve Its Workforce Planning and Operation Expense Accounting,” September 23, 2003, 1-2.
3 SIGIR interview with Andrew Natsios, former USAID Administrator, April 17, 2006.
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• Endnotes •
4 SIGIR interview with Ross Wherry, former USAID Director of the Office of Iraq Affairs, April 5, 2006; and SIGIR interview with Wendy Chamberlin, former USAID Assistant Administrator, Near East Bureau, May 3, 2006.
5 Chamberlin had just stepped down as Ambassador to Pakistan, and knew White House planners from her long career at the Department of State. SIGIR interviews with Wendy Chamberlin, former USAID Assistant Administrator, Near East Bureau, April 18, 2007 and May 3, 2006.
6 The Asia and Near East Bureau was headed by Chamberlin. USAID Press Release, “Wendy Chamberlin Sworn in as Head of USAID’s Asia and Near East Bureau,” December 2, 2002.
7 Andrew Natsios, former USAID Administrator, email to SIGIR, October 25, 2008.
8 SIGIR interview with Jonathan Dworken, former Director for Humanitarian Assistance and Disaster Response for the NSC, March 29, 2007.
9 SIGIR interviews with Christopher Milligan, USAID Deputy Director of Iraq, February 9, 2006 and March 27, 2007.
10 SIGIR interviews with Wendy Chamberlin, former USAID Assistant Administrator, Near East Bureau, May 3, 2006 and April 18, 2007.
11 SIGIR interview with Andrew Natsios, former USAID Administrator, April 17, 2006.
12 USAID, Vision for Post-Conflict Iraq, February 19, 2003. Although not released to the public until February 2003, a working draft of this document was produced by members of the Humanitarian Working Group in the fall of 2002.
13 SIGIR interview with Andrew Natsios, former USAID Administrator, April 17, 2006.
14 USAID Fact Sheet, “USAID Contingency Plans for Humanitarian Assistance to Iraq,” February 24, 2003.
15 SIGIR interview with Lauren Barbour, former Iraq Team Leader, USAID Office of Transition Initiatives, December 20, 2005; USAID, “Transition Initiatives,” http://www.usaid.gov/our_work/cross- cutting_programs/transition_initiatives/.
16 USAID memorandum, “USAID Consultations on Iraq Contingency Plans,” February 24, 2003, http://pdf.
dec.org/pdf_docs/PDABY342.pdf.
17 SIGIR interview with Jonathan Dworken, former Director for Humanitarian Assistance and Disaster Response for the NSC, March 29, 2007.
18 USAID memorandum, “USAID Consultations on Iraq Contingency Plans,” February 24, 2003, http://pdf.
dec.org/pdf_docs/PDABY342.pdf.
19 SIGIR interview with Jonathan Dworken, former Director for Humanitarian Assistance and Disaster Response for the NSC, March 29, 2007; USAID memorandum, “USAID Consultations on Iraq Contingency Plans,” February 24, 2003, http://pdf.dec.org/pdf_docs/PDABY342.pdf; USAID Press Release, “USAID Announces $200 Million in Emergency Food Assistance to Iraq,” April 2, 2003; and World Food Program Press Release, “WFP Welcomes International Response to Iraq Appeal,” April 4, 2003.
20 SIGIR interview with Jonathan Dworken, former Director for Humanitarian Assistance and Disaster Response for the NSC, March 29, 2007.
21 Interestingly, the group was not directed to meet by the Joint Staff Political-Military Cell, but rather arose more spontaneously from contacts of lower and mid-level staff members on the NSC and at CENTCOM.
ORHA/CPA Historian interview with Major Ray Eiriz, former CENTCOM planner, December 7, 2006.
22 SIGIR and ORHA/CPA Historian interviews with CENTCOM planners Colonel (Ret.) Michael Fitzgerald, Colonel John Agoglia, Major Thomas Fisher, and Major Ray Eiriz.
23 SIGIR interview with Ross Wherry, former USAID Director of the Office of Iraq Affairs, April 5, 2006.
24 SIGIR interview with Christopher Milligan, USAID Deputy Director of Iraq, March 27, 2007.
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25 SIGIR interview with Christopher Milligan, USAID Deputy Director of Iraq, February 9, 2006. Joshua B.
Bolten, OMB Director, Testimony before the Senate Foreign Relations Committee, July 29, 2003; and USAID, “Vision for Post-Conflict Iraq,” February 19, 2003. Shelter and payroll management assistance sectors had been considered but were ultimately dropped.
26 Milligan, a USAID official, had worked in Ecuador, Zimbabwe, and finally Indonesia, where Agency person- nel were evacuated after the Bali bombing. Shortly thereafter, Wendy Chamberlin included him in planning.
27 Jock Covey, Michael J. Dziedic, and Leonard R. Hawley, eds., The Quest for Viable Peace: International Intervention and Strategies for Conflict Transformation (Washington, DC: USIP, 2005).
28 SIGIR interviews with Ross Wherry, former USAID Director of the Office of Iraq Affairs, April 5, 2006;
Christopher Milligan, USAID Deputy Director of Iraq, March 27, 2007; Jonathan Dworken, former Director for Humanitarian Assistance and Disaster Response for the NSC, March 29, 2007; and Wendy Chamberlin, former USAID Assistant Administrator, Near East Bureau, April 18, 2007.
29 Condoleezza Rice, National Security Advisor, Memorandum to the Vice President, the Secretary of State, the Secretary of Defense, Chief of Staff to the President, Director of Central Intelligence, Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff, “Principals’ Committee Review of Iraq Police Paper,” October 29, 2002, as reproduced in Douglas Feith, War and Decision: Inside the Pentagon at the Dawn of the War on Terror (New York:
HarperCollins, 2008), 541-43.
30 USAID, “Vision for Post-Conflict Iraq,” February 19, 2003.
31 See: “Electricity” in USAID, “Vision for Post-Conflict Iraq,” February 19, 2003.
32 See: “Food, Agriculture, and Rural Economy” in USAID, “Vision for Post-Conflict Iraq,” February 19, 2003.
33 See: “Education” and “Electricity” in USAID, “Vision for Post-Conflict Iraq,” February 19, 2003.
34 SIGIR interview with Ross Wherry, former USAID Director of the Office of Iraq Affairs, April 5, 2006.
35 SIGIR interview with Christopher Milligan, USAID Deputy Director of Iraq, February 9, 2006.
36 See: “Transportation” in USAID, “Vision for Post-Conflict Iraq,” February 19, 2003.
37 The CORDS pacification program in rural Vietnam is an interesting precursor to Provisional Reconstruction Teams used in Afghanistan and Iraq. See: R. W. Komer, RAND Report R-967-ARPA, “Bureaucracy Does Its Thing: Institutional Constraints on U.S.-GVN Performance in Vietnam,” August 1972;
Lewis Sorley, A Better War: The Unexamined Victories and Final Tragedy of America’s Last Years in Vietnam (New York: Harcourt Brace & Company, 1999); and Neil Sheehan, A Bright Shining Lie: John Paul Vann and America in Vietnam (New York: Vintage, 1989).
38 SIGIR interview with Christopher Milligan, USAID Deputy Director of Iraq, March 27, 2007.
39 SIGIR interviews with Christopher Milligan, USAID Deputy Director of Iraq, April 14, 2006; and March 27, 2007.
40 SIGIR interview with Frank Miller, former Chairman of the Executive Steering Group of the National Security Council, August 19, 2008.
41 SIGIR interview with Wendy Chamberlin, former USAID Assistant Administrator, Near East Bureau, April 18, 2007. The military also uses this term to denote large depictions of plans, schedules or programs.
42 SIGIR interview with Ross Wherry, former USAID Director of the Office of Iraq Affairs, April 5, 2006; and SIGIR interview with Wendy Chamberlin, former USAID Assistant Administrator, Near East Bureau, April 18, 2007.
43 SIGIR interview with Jonathan Dworken, former Director for Humanitarian Assistance and Disaster Response for the NSC, March 29, 2007; and SIGIR interview with Ross Wherry, former USAID Director of the Office of Iraq Affairs, November 2, 2005.
44 SIGIR interview with Ross Wherry, former USAID Director of the Office of Iraq Affairs, April 5, 2006.
45 GAO Testimony 03-1171T, “Foreign Assistance: USAID Needs to Improve Its Workforce Planning and Operation Expense Accounting,” September 23, 2003, 1-5.
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46 SIGIR interview with Andrew Natsios, former USAID Administrator, April 17, 2006.
47 For current provisions for the FAR, see Acquisition Central, “Federal Acquisition Regulation (FAR),” http://www.acqnet.gov/FAR/.
48 James Q. Wilson, Bureaucracy: What Government Agencies Do and Why They Do It (New York: Basic Books, 1991 reprint edition), 126-127.
49 USAID Acquisition Regulation (AIDAR), Subpart Level 48, CFR 706.302-70, October 18, 2007, http:// www.usaid.gov/policy/ads/300/aidar.pdf. A good overview of contracting procedures can be found in:
Valerie Bailey Grasso, Congressional Research Service Report RL32229, “Iraq: Frequently Asked Questions about Contracting,” updated March 18, 2005; and John R. Luckey, Congressional Research Service Report RS21555, “Iraq Reconstruction: Frequently Asked Questions Concerning the Application of Federal Procurement Statues,” June 23, 2003. For an overview of budget mechanisms for humanitarian assistance, see Rhoda Margesson, Congressional Research Service Report RL33769, “International Crisis and Disasters: U.S.
Humanitarian Assistance, Budget Trends, and Issues for Congress,” updated May 3, 2007; and SIGIR Lessons Learned Forum: Contracting and Procurement, Washington, DC, December 5, 2005.
50 Authority comes from Public Law 87-195 which amended the Foreign Assistance Act (FAA). P.L. 87-195, Foreign Assistance Act of 1961, Section 491, September 4, 1961. The FAA of 1961 releases the agency from some of the more stringent requirements for domestic acquisition. The conditions under which exemptions may be invoked are outlined in an addendum specific to each agency. USAID implements the procurement as- pects of the FAA under AIDAR provision 48 CFR 701.601. AIDAR, Subpart Level 48, CFR 701.601, October 18, 2007, http://www.usaid.gov/policy/ads/300/aidar.pdf.
51 Under a pre-authorization letter, contractors proceed “at risk,” which means that they will only be reim- bursed for expenses later deemed by USAID to have been appropriate given the nature of the pending task.
52 Bruce N. Crandlemire, USAID Assistant Inspector General for Audit, Memorandum to Wendy Chamberlin and Timothy T. Beans, “USAID’s Compliance with Federal Regulations in Awarding the Iraq Education Sector Contract, (AIG/A Memorandum 03-001),” June 6, 2003, http://www.usaid.gov/oig/iraq_doc/memoran- dum_03-001_6-06-03.pdf. Seven exemptions in the FAR allow contracting officers to hold shorter bid periods, use a pre-selected list of bidders, or award a contract outright without competition. (The latter is known as no- bid or sole-source contracting.) Thorough justification must accompany these awards and the FAR prescribes that they be re-competed as soon as practical. The FAR requires a written, certified justification before any exemption to full and open competition is used. The FAR Subpart 6.3 governs the applicability. FAR, Subpart
6.3, “Other Than Full and Open Competition,” June 12, 2008, http://www.arnet.gov/far/current/html/ Subpart%206_3.html#wp1086841. The AIDAR provides regulations for USAID. AIDAR, Subpart Level 48, CFR 706.302-70, October 18, 2007, http://www.usaid.gov/policy/ads/300/aidar.pdf.
53 USAID IG Audit A-000-04-003-P, “Capping Report on the Audit of USAID’s Compliance with Federal Regulations in Awarding the Iraq Phase I Contracts,” May 19, 2004.
54 SIGIR interview with Bruce Spake, Vice President of DAI, November 2, 2006.
55 USAID, “Funding Summary #3, Fiscal Year (FY) 2003,” April 2, 2003.
56 USAID memorandum, “USAID Consultations on Iraq Contingency Plans,” February 24,2003, http://pdf.
dec.org/pdf_docs/PDABY342.pdf.
57 SIGIR interview with Christopher Milligan, USAID Deputy Director of Iraq, March 27, 2007. On January 24, 2003, USAID issued IRG a request for proposal, giving the organization three days to respond. On February 7, 2003, USAID subsequently issued the firm the Agency’s first sole-source contract in the reconstruction ef- fort. USAID Press Release, “USAID Reconstruction Efforts in Iraq,” May 1, 20003. See also: IRG Press Release, “IRG will support USAID in the overall planning, monitoring, coordination, management, and reporting on reconstruction and rehabilitation activities across a variety of sectors including health, agriculture, civil society strengthening, and infrastructure.” IRG, “IRG Selected to Implement Key Post-War Reconstruction,” March 13, 2003. “Only one of the first eight contracts was sole-sourced by USAID, for personnel support, which was awarded to IRG.” USAID Fact Sheet, “Contracting by USAID for Reconstruction of Iraq, Questions and Answers,” May 2, 2003, http://www.usaid.gov/press/factsheets/2003/fs030508.html.
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58 For examples of USAID’s Statements of Work see RTI, USAID contract EDG-C-00-03-00010-00, Section C, April 11, 2003; Abt Associates, USAID contract RAN-C-00-03-00010-00, Section C, April 30, 2003; and CAI, USAID contract EDG-C-00-03-00011-00, Section C, April 11, 2003.
59 SIGIR interview with Wendy Chamberlin, former USAID Assistant Administrator, Near East Bureau, May 3, 2006.
60 SIGIR interview with Ross Wherry, former USAID Director of the Office of Iraq Affairs, April 5, 2006.
61 SIGIR, “Iraq Reconstruction: Lessons in Contracting and Procurement,” July 2006, 29.
62 For final amounts of USAID contracts, several of which were increased multiple times, see USAID, “Assistance for Iraq Contracts and Grant,” http://www.usaid.gov/iraq/contracts/.
63 SIGIR interview with Ross Wherry, former USAID Director of the Office of Iraq Affairs, April 5, 2006.
64 P.L. 108-11, Emergency Wartime Supplemental Appropriations Act for Fiscal Year 2003, and for other purposes,” April 16, 2003; and SIGIR Lessons Learned Forum: Contracting and Procurement, Washington, DC, December 5, 2005, 29-30.
65 SIGIR, “Iraq Reconstruction: Lessons in Contracting and Procurement,” July 2006, 30; and Bruce N.
Crandlemire, USAID Assistant Inspector General for Audit, Memorandum to Gordon West and Timothy T.
Beans, “USAID’s Compliance with Federal Regulations in Awarding the Iraq Infrastructure Reconstruction Program Phase II Contract (AIG/A Memorandum 04-006),” April 20, 2004, http://www.usaid.gov/oig/iraq_ doc/memo04_006.pdf. USAID eventually increased the contract’s ceiling to $1.03 billion in September 2003.
66 USAID Press Release, “USAID Awards Iraq Infrastructure Contract,” April 17, 2003.
67 USAID Bechtel Contract EEE-C-00-03-00018-00, Section C, http://www.usaid.gov/iraq/contracts/pdf/ BechtelSecC.pdf.
68 SIGIR, “Iraq Reconstruction: Lessons in Contracting and Procurement,” July 2006, 30.
69 “There’s a lot of money to pay for this that doesn’t have to be U.S. taxpayer money...the oil revenues of that country could bring between $50 billion and $100 billion over the course of the of the next two or three years... We’re dealing with a country that can really finance its own reconstruction, and relatively soon.” Paul Wolfowitz, Deputy Secretary of Defense, in a hearing before the House Appropriations Committee, March 27, 2003.
70 Iraq contains 115 billion barrels of proven oil reserves, the third largest in the world. Since only 10 percent of the country has been explored, analysts believe that there is much more to be found. Energy Information Administration, Department of Energy, “Country Analysis Briefs: Iraq,” August 2007.
71 Eliot A. Cohen, Director, “Gulf War Air Power Survey,” U.S. Air Force, 1993; and ORHA/CPA Historian interview with Gary Vogler, Senior Advisor to the Ministry of Oil, June 18, 2003.
72 The resolution authorized expanding sales from $2.1 billion to $5.256 billion in a six-month period. UN Press Release SC/6492, “Security Council Authorizes Sale of Iraq Oil to Offset Shortfall in Revenues Resulting from Delay in Oil Sales, Drop in Oil Prices,” March 25, 1998; and United Nations Security Council Resolution 1153, February 20, 1998.
73 Michael H. Mobbs, “Memorandum for the Record: Potential for Competition in Obtaining Contractor Services Required by the Energy Infrastructure Planning Group (EIPG),” November 8, 2002.
74 Members included Mike Mackowski, Senaca Johnston from State, Barbara Glotfelty from DoD Contracting, Matt Armitrano, a consultant, and a CIA representative. SIGIR interview with Gary Vogler, CPA Senior Advisor to Oil, May 10, 2006.
75 Michael H. Mobbs, “Memorandum for the Record: Potential for Competition in Obtaining Contractor Services Required by the Energy Infrastructure Planning Group (EIPG),” November 8, 2002; and SIGIR Lessons Learned Forum: Contracting and Procurement, Washington, DC, December 5, 2005.
76 SIGIR Lessons Learned Forum: Contracting and Procurement, Washington, DC, December 5, 2005.
77 Donald L. Trautner, “A Personal Account and Perspective of the U.S. Army Logistics Civil Augmentation Program (LOGCAP),” 2004 Conference of Army Historians, July 15, 2004.
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78 Donald L. Trautner, “A Personal Account and Perspective of the U.S. Army Logistics Civil Augmentation Program (LOGCAP),” 2004 Conference of Army Historians, July 15, 2004.
79 Lieutenant Colonel Steven T. Mitchell, “Targetable Logistics: Contractors in Zones of Conflict-Backbone or Underbelly?” U.S. Army War College Strategy Research Paper, March 18, 2005, 4.
80 T. Christian Miller, Blood Money: Wasted Billions, Lost Lives, and Corporate Greed in Iraq (New York:
Little, Brown and Company, 2006), 76.
81 For a detailed analysis of contractors in the Iraq theater, see Congressional Budget Office, “Contractors’ Support of U.S. Operations in Iraq,” August 2008.
82 Michael H. Mobbs, “Memorandum for the Record: Potential for Competition in Obtaining Contractor Services Required by the Energy Infrastructure Planning Group (EIPG),” November 8, 2002. In this memoran- dum Mobbs identifies Bechtel and Fluor as among other contractors who have the technical capacity but not an existing connection to CENTCOM. See: SIGIR Lessons Learned Forum: Contracting and Procurement, Washington, DC, December 5, 2005.
83 SIGIR Lessons Learned Forum: Contracting and Procurement, Washington, DC, December 5, 2005.
84 SIGIR Lessons Learned Forum: Contracting and Procurement, Washington, DC, December 5, 2005.
85 John L. Long, Associate General Counsel, Acquisition and Logistics, Memorandum to Barbara Glotfelty, Energy Infrastructure Planning Group, “Legal Position on LOGCAP Scope of Work,” November 8, 2002.
86 SIGIR Lessons Learned Forum: Contracting and Procurement, Washington, DC, December 5, 2005.
87 USACE, “Frequently Asked Questions: Engineer Support to Operation Iraqi Freedom,” USACE Missions—Oil Fire Suppression and Restoration of Production, updated September 5, 2007.
88 “The resulting contingency plan was used as justification for subsequently awarding a sole-source contract to Kellogg Brown & Root for restoring the oil infrastructure, for which nearly $1.4 billion was obligated during fiscal year 2003.” GAO Report 04-605, “Rebuilding Iraq: Fiscal Year 2003 Contract Award Procedures and Management Challenges,” June 2004, 14, 16, 19-20. The contract was replaced by competitively procured contracts in January 2004. KBR was awarded a contract capped at $1.2 billion to repair the oil infrastructure of Southern Iraq. Parsons Iraqi Joint Venture was awarded a contract capped at $800,000 to carry out repairs in Northern Iraq. USACE, “Frequently Asked Questions: Engineer Support to Operation Iraqi Freedom. USACE Missions—Oil Fire Suppression and Restoration of Production,” updated January 20, 2004, http://www.
hq.usace.army.mil/cepa/iraq/faq.htm (accessed April 24, 2006).
89 Although the contingency plan that violated contracting regulations was used as justification for the sole-source contract to Kellogg Brown & Root, GAO found that the award of the contract generally complied with applicable legal standards. GAO Report 04-605, “Rebuilding Iraq: Fiscal Year 2003 Contract Award Procedures and Management Challenges,” June 2004, 19-21.
90 SIGIR Lessons Learned Forum: Contracting and Procurement, Washington, DC, December 5, 2005.
91 ORHA/CPA Historian interview with Brigadier General Robert Crear, Commander of Task Force RIO, June 25, 2003.
92 SIGIR interview with Frank Miller, former Chairman of the Executive Steering Group of the National Security Council, August 19, 2008.
93 For an overall account of Treasury’s activities, see Chapters 7, 8 and 9 in John B. Taylor, Global Financial Warriors: The Untold Story of International Finance in the Post-9/11 World (New York: W.W. Norton & Company, 2007); and U.S. Treasury, “Contingency Plans for Reconstruction of Iraq’s Financial Institutions and Financial Markets,” April 28, 2003.
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94 Iraqi currency printed before 1990 in Switzerland is referred to as the Swiss dinar, which was still used in the Kurdish region at the time of the 2003 invasion even though the Iraqi Central Bank began printing a new currency, known as the Saddam dinar, in 1991. Iraq, as a result, had two systems of currency, one of which—the Saddam dinar—had been subject to inflation, and another—the Swiss dinar—which had not lost nearly as much of its value, even though it had technically ceased to be legal tender. For a description of how the Treasury team approached this problem, see Chapters 7, 8 and 9 in John B. Taylor, Global Financial Warriors: The Untold Story of International Finance in the Post-9/11 World (New York: W.W. Norton & Company, 2007).
95 For supplementary accounts, see USIP and ORHA/CPA Historian interviews with David Nummy, former Senior Advisor to the Ministry of Finance, October 14, 2004, and June 23 and 27, 2003.
96 GAO Testimony 04-579T, “Recovering Iraq’s Assets: Preliminary Observations on U.S. Efforts and Challenges,” March 18, 2004; Roger H. Bezdek, “Using Vested Assets for the Reconstruction of Iraq,” Public Fund Digest 5, no. 2 (2005); and Executive Order 13290, “Confiscating and Vesting Certain Iraqi Property,” March 20, 2003.
97 SIGIR interview with Christopher Milligan, USAID Deputy Director of Iraq, April 14, 2006.
98 SIGIR interview with Frank Miller, former Chairman of the Executive Steering Group of the NSC, June 26, 2008.
99 SIGIR interview with Jonathan Dworken, former Director for Humanitarian Assistance and Disaster Response for the NSC, March 29, 2007.
Chapter 3
1 SIGIR interview with Douglas Feith, former Under Secretary of Defense for Policy, March 21, 2008;
and Douglas Feith, War and Decision: Inside the Pentagon at the Dawn of the War on Terror (New York:
HarperCollins, 2008), 316-317.
2 SIGIR interview with Douglas Feith, former Under Secretary of Defense for Policy, March 21, 2008.
3 SIGIR interview with Colonel John Agoglia, former CENTCOM planner, May 22, 2008.
4 SIGIR interview with Colonel (Ret.) Michael Fitzgerald, former CENTCOM J5 Chief of War Plans, May 30, 2008; SIGIR interview with Colonel John Agoglia, former CENTCOM planner, May 22, 2008; and Michael R. Gordon and General Bernard E. Trainor, Cobra II: The Inside Story of the Invasion and Occupation of Iraq (New York: Pantheon Books, 2006), 140-46.
5 SIGIR interview with Colonel (Ret.) Michael Fitzgerald, former CENTCOM (J5) Chief of War Plans, May 30, 2008; and SIGIR interview with Colonel John Agoglia, former CENTCOM planner, May 22, 2008.
6 Lieutenant Colonel Thomas Fisher, former CENTCOM planner, email to SIGIR, October 20, 2008.
7 ORHA/CPA Historian interview with Major Thomas Fisher, former CENTCOM planner, August 27, 2003.
8 SIGIR interview with General George Casey, former Director of the Joint Staff and former Commander of MNF-I, July 30, 2008. For an early history of JTF-4, see Chapter 4 of Nora Bensahel et. al., After Saddam:
Prewar Planning and the Occupation of Iraq (Santa Monica, CA: RAND Corporation, 2008).
9 SIGIR interview with Douglas Feith, former Under Secretary of Defense for Policy, March 21, 2008;
and Douglas Feith, War and Decision: Inside the Pentagon at the Dawn of the War on Terror (New York:
HarperCollins, 2008), 347.
10 Powell explained his concurrence in the following terms: “People say, ‘Well it should have been State.’ State does not have the personnel, the capacity, or the size to deal with an immediate postwar situation in a foreign country that’s eight thousand miles away from here, so there was never a disagreement about this. It made sense. I point out to people that Douglas MacArthur was not a Foreign Service Officer...neither was Lucius Clay a Foreign Service Officer.” SIGIR interview with Colin Powell, former Secretary of State, February 4, 2008.
11 SIGIR interview with Colin Powell, former Secretary of State, February 4, 2008.
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12 SIGIR interview with Douglas Feith, former Under Secretary of Defense for Policy, March 21, 2008;
and Douglas Feith, War and Decision: Inside the Pentagon at the Dawn of the War on Terror (New York:
HarperCollins, 2008), 347-50. Frank Miller disputes that the discussion of the Defense Department’s takeover of the reconstruction mission was as clear as Feith characterized it. SIGIR interview with Frank Miller, former Chairman of the Executive Steering Group of the NSC, February 4, 2008.
13 National Security Archive, “New State Department Releases on the ‘Future of Iraq’ Project,” September 1, 2006, http://www.gwu.edu/~nsarchiv/NSAEBB/NSAEBB198/index.htm. National Security Presidential Directive 24, “Post-War Iraq Reconstruction,” January 20, 2003, is not publicly available. Information about NSPD 24 was obtained through: DoD IG Audit D-2004-057, “Contracts Awarded for the Coalition Provisional Authority by the Defense Contracting Command-Washington,” March 18, 2004, 1.
14 SIGIR interview with Andrew Natsios, former USAID Administrator, April 17, 2006.
15 SIGIR interview with James Kunder, USAID Acting Deputy Administrator, February 15, 2008.
16 SIGIR interview with Frank Miller, former Chairman of the Executive Steering Group of the NSC, February 4, 2008.
17 ORHA/CPA Historian interview with Major Ray Eiriz, former CENTCOM planner, December 7, 2006.
18 For an overview of how the war plan developed, see Michael R. Gordon and General Bernard E. Trainor, Cobra II: The Inside Story of the Invasion and Occupation of Iraq (New York: Pantheon Books, 2006).
19 SIGIR interview with Colonel (Ret.) Michael Fitzgerald, former CENTCOM (J5) Chief of War Plans, May 30, 2008; and Michael R. Gordon and General Bernard E. Trainor, Cobra II: The Inside Story of the Invasion and Occupation of Iraq (New York: Pantheon Books, 2006), 48-51, 52-54, 66-67.
20 SIGIR interview with Colonel (Ret.) Michael Fitzgerald, former CENTCOM (J5) Chief of War Plans, May 30, 2008.
21 SIGIR interview with Colonel (Ret.) Michael Fitzgerald, former CENTCOM (J5) Chief of War Plans, May 30, 2008.
22 ORHA/CPA Historian interview with Lieutenant General (Ret.) Jay Garner, former Director of ORHA, September 14-15, 2005. For an overview of how force levels evolved, see Michael R. Gordon and General Bernard E. Trainor, Cobra II: The Inside Story of the Invasion and Occupation of Iraq (New York: Pantheon Books, 2006), 95-105.
23 SIGIR interview with Frank Miller, former Chairman of the Executive Steering Group of the NSC, December 12, 2005.
24 SIGIR interview with Colonel (Ret.) Michael Fitzgerald, former CENTCOM J5 Chief of War Plans, May 30, 2008.
25 ORHA/CPA Historian interview with Major Thomas Fisher, former CENTCOM Planner, August 27, 2003.
26 ORHA/CPA Historian interview with Lieutenant General (Ret.) Jay Garner, former Director of ORHA, September 14-15, 2005. An account of Lieutenant General (Ret.) Jay Garner’s involvement in ORHA is to be published in 2009 by Gordon Rudd, the ORHA/CPA Historian.
27 SIGIR interview with Douglas Feith, former Under Secretary of Defense for Policy, March 21, 2008.
28 ORHA/CPA Historian interview with Lieutenant Colonel Jeffrey S. Kojac, NSC military aide, October 19, 2007.
29 DoD News Transcript, “DoD News Briefing-Secretary Rumsfeld and Gen. Myers,” March 20, 2003.
30 SIGIR interview with Wendy Chamberlin, former USAID Assistant Administrator, Near East Bureau, April 18, 2007.
31 ORHA/CPA Historian interview with Lieutenant General (Ret.) Jay Garner, former Director of ORHA, March 30, 2004.
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32 ORHA/CPA Historian interview with Lieutenant General (Ret.) Jay Garner, former Director of ORHA, March 30, 2004. Douglas Feith asserts that his office provided Garner with both written and oral briefings.
Feith also asserts that Garner must have known about the office of Special Plans. Douglas Feith, former Under Secretary of Defense for Policy, written comments to SIGIR, January 7, 2009.
33 ORHA/CPA Historian interview with Lieutenant General (Ret.) Jay Garner, former Director of ORHA, March 30, 2004.
34 ORHA/CPA Historian interview with Lieutenant General (Ret.) Jay Garner, former Director of ORHA, March 30, 2004; and ORHA/CPA Historian interview with Colonel (Ret.) Paul Hughes, former ORHA/CPA Director of Strategic Policy, June 29, 2006.
35 ORHA/CPA Historian interview with Lieutenant General (Ret.) Jay Garner, former Director of ORHA, March 30, 2004; and ORHA, “Contracting Support for ORHA, Office of Reconstruction and Humanitarian Assistance (ORHA) Operational Structure,” March 28, 2003.
36 SIGIR interview with Christopher Milligan, USAID Deputy Director of Iraq, February 9, 2006.
37 ORHA/CPA Historian interview with Lieutenant General (Ret.) Jay Garner, former Director of ORHA, March 30, 2004.
38 ORHA/CPA Historian interview with Lieutenant General (Ret.) Jay Garner, former Director of ORHA, September 14-15, 2005. Douglas Feith recalls contention only over the Civil Affairs pillar Douglas Feith, former Under Secretary of Defense for Policy, written comments to SIGIR, January 8, 2009.
39 Secretary Rumsfeld characterizes this exchange differently. “As I recall, the issue with General Garner was not whether Defense should staff every position at ORHA, but over several individuals whom the White House believed would not be a good fit with ORHA.” Donald Rumsfeld, former Secretary of Defense, written com- ments to SIGIR, November 5, 2008.
40 USAID Assistant Administrator Wendy Chamberlin had called Lucke—formerly AID’s mission director in Jordan, the agency’s second largest mission—out of retirement in October when she learned he spoke some Arabic. SIGIR interview with Wendy Chamberlin, former USAID Assistant Administrator, Near East Bureau, April 18, 2007.
41 ORHA/CPA Historian interview with Lieutenant General (Ret.) Jay Garner, former Director of ORHA, March 30, 2004.
42 Mobbs was not Feith’s first choice. Feith’s first candidate was ineligible to serve. His second, David Kay, was appointed to ORHA, but resigned after two days. Kay would eventually lead the Iraq Survey Group, a task force that searched for weapons of mass destruction at the war’s end. Although Mobbs had served in the U.S. Arms Control and Disarmament Agency in the 1980s, much of his professional experience was as a lawyer special- izing in corporate and commercial matters in Russia and Eastern Europe. Fox News, “Bio: Michael H. Mobbs,” provided by ORHA, April 23, 2003.
43 ORHA/CPA Historian interview with Lieutenant General (Ret.) Jay Garner, former Director of ORHA, September 14-15, 2005.
44 ORHA/CPA Historian interview with Lieutenant General (Ret.) Jay Garner, former Director of ORHA, September 14-15, 2005; and ORHA/CPA Historian interview with Colonel Thomas Baltazar, C3 Operations Officer for ORHA, June 10, 2003.
45 ORHA/CPA Historian interview with Lieutenant General (Ret.) Jay Garner, former Director of ORHA, September 14-15, 2005.
46 ORHA/CPA Historian interview with George F. Ward, former Head of Humanitarian Pillar of ORHA, June 29, 2006.
47 ORHA/CPA Historian interview with Brigadier General Steven Hawkins, former Commander, JTF-4, June 23, 2003.
48 ORHA/CPA Historian interview with Major Thomas Fisher, former CENTCOM Planner, August 27, 2003.
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• Endnotes •
49 ORHA/CPA Historian interview with Brigadier General Steven Hawkins, former Commander, JTF-4, June 23, 2003; and SIGIR interview with Brigadier General Mike Jones, Director of J-5 Middle East Affairs, April 13, 2007.
50 ORHA/CPA Historian interview with Brigadier General Steven Hawkins, former Commander, JTF-4, June 23, 2003.
51 SIGIR interview with Douglas Feith, Under Secretary of Defense for Policy, December 17, 2004.
52 ORHA/CPA Historian interview with Brigadier General Steven Hawkins, former Commander, JTF-4, June 23, 2003.
53 SIGIR interview with Colonel (Ret.) Michael Fitzgerald, former CENTCOM J5 Chief of War Plans, May 30, 2008.
54 SIGIR interview with Colonel (Ret.) Michael Fitzgerald, former CENTCOM J5 Chief of War Plans, May 30, 2008.
55 SIGIR interview with Brigadier General Mike Jones, Director of J-5 Middle East Affairs, April 13, 2007.
Title X of the U.S. Code obliges the Joint Chiefs to provide military advice to the President. A staff larger than that working for the Secretary of Defense backs the Joint Chiefs. These different echelons of planning—the Joint Staff in Washington, combatant commanders in the field, and civilian staff in the Office of the Secretary of Defense—are collaborative, at least in theory. Some analysts note that Rumsfeld’s tenure strained this system of civil-military cooperation. Michael C. Desch, “Bush and the Generals,” Foreign Affairs 86, no. 3 (May/June 2007). Secretary Rumsfeld himself, however, disputes this characterization. “Relationships with the Joint Chiefs during my tenure were professional. As is their statutory obligation, they provided useful and constructive ad- vice to the President and to me.” Donald Rumsfeld, former Secretary of Defense, written comments to SIGIR, November 5, 2008. Rumsfeld notes that Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff Richard Meyers and Richard H.
Kohn wrote a rebuttal to Desch’s article. See: Richard B. Myers and Richard H. Kohn, “The Military’s Place,” Foreign Affairs 86, no. 5 (September/October 2007).
56 ORHA/CPA Historian interview with Brigadier General Steven Hawkins, former Commander, JTF-4, June 23, 2003.
57 ORHA/CPA Historian interviews with Lieutenant General (Ret.) Jay Garner, former Director of ORHA, April 5, 2006, and September 14-15, 2005.
58 ORHA/CPA Historian interview with Lieutenant General (Ret.) Jay Garner, former Director of ORHA, September 14-15, 2005.
59 ORHA/CPA Historian interview with Lieutenant General (Ret.) Jay Garner, former Director of ORHA, September 14-15, 2005.
60 SIGIR interview with Colonel (Ret.) Michael Fitzgerald, former CENTCOM J5 Chief of War Plans, May 30, 2008.
61 SIGIR interview with General (Ret.) Colin Powell, former Secretary of State, February 4, 2008.
62 SIGIR interview with Bob Gersony, former Advisor to the USAID Administrator, January 16, 2007; and ORHA/CPA Historian interview with Lieutenant General (Ret.) Ronald E. Adams, former Deputy Director of ORHA, September 29, 2006.
63 Milligan sent a memorandum to Lieutenant General (Ret.) Garner summarizing progress across eleven sec- tors and highlighting outstanding issues for his action. Christopher Milligan, Reconstruction and Humanitarian Assistance Group, memorandum to Lieutenant General (Ret.) Jay Garner, Director of ORHA, “Status of Reconstruction and Humanitarian Assistance Preparations,” January 26, 2003.
64 SIGIR interview with Thomas Wheelock, former Chief of Party for USAID’s contractor International Resources Group, January 5, 2006.
65 ORHA/CPA Historian interview with Lieutenant General (Ret.) Carl A. Strock, former Commanding General of USACE, October 30, 2006. Bernoulli’s equation is used by engineers to describe the relationship between air pressure and velocity in fluid dynamics.
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66 ORHA/CPA Historian interview with Lieutenant General (Ret.) Jay Garner, former Director of ORHA, March 30, 2004.
2003.
67 ORHA/CPA Historian interview with Colonel Robert D. Costello, Jr., ORHA Chief of Logistics, June 15, 68 Douglas Feith disputes this characterization. Douglas Feith, former Under Secretary of Defense for Policy, written comments to SIGIR, January 7, 2009.
69 Dayton Maxwell, “Deliberate and Development Post-Conflict Planning in Iraq: The Office of Policy, Planning, and Analysis, Coalition Provisional Authority, A USAID Perspective,” unpublished manuscript, July 23, 2004, 9.
70 Leonard Hawley, “Urgent Policy Issues and Capability Needs: U.S. Interim Civilian Transitional Administration (ICTA) in Iraq,” written analysis to Lieutenant General (Ret.) Jay Garner, March 10, 2003.
71 SIGIR interview with Leonard Hawley, former Deputy Assistant Secretary of State for Peacekeeping, February 12, 2008.
72 SIGIR, “Iraq Reconstruction: Lessons in Human Capital Management,” January 2006, 7-9.
73 An inherently governmental activity involves: (1) binding the United States to take or not to take some action by contract, policy, regulation, authorization, order, or otherwise; (2) determining, protecting, and advancing economic, political, territorial, property, or other interests by military or diplomatic action, civil or criminal judicial proceedings, contract management, or otherwise; (3) significantly affecting the life, liberty, or property of private persons; or (4) exerting ultimate control over the acquisition, use, or disposition of United States property (real or personal, tangible or intangible), including establishing policies or proce- dures for the collection, control, or disbursement of appropriated and other federal funds. White House Office of Management and Budget Circular A-76 (Revised), “Performance of Commercial Activities,” May 29, 2003; and FAR, Subpart 7.5, “Inherently Governmental Functions,” http://www.acquisition.gov/far/ current/html/Subpart%207_5.html.
74 SIGIR, “Iraq Reconstruction: Lessons in Human Capital Management,” January 2006, 10.
75 The statutory provision used was Title 5, Section 3161, of the U.S. Code, under 5 CFR 213.3199.
76 ORHA, “Staffing for the Office of Reconstruction and Humanitarian Assistance (ORHA),” Attachment to email from Larry Hanauer, Special Assistant to the Director of ORHA, to Gretchen Anderson, Office of the Under Secretary of Defense (Comptroller), “ORHA Personnel Growth,” April 18, 2003.
77 ORHA/CPA Historian interview with Colonel Thomas Baltazar, C3 Operations Officer for ORHA, June 10, 2003.
78 General Garner dictated notes for the record on February 28, March 3, and March 10, 2003 about the gen- eral status of ORHA preparations and his meetings with Secretary Condoleezza Rice, President Bush, and the United Nations. ORHA/CPA Historian and SIGIR interviews with Lieutenant General (Ret.) Jay Garner.
79 ORHA/CPA Historian interview with Lieutenant General (Ret.) Jay Garner, former Director of ORHA, September 14-15, 2005.
80 ORHA/CPA Historian interview with Lieutenant General (Ret.) Jay Garner, former Director of ORHA, April 5, 2006.
81 A spreadsheet of Rock Drill attendees was maintained by ORHA staff. ORHA, “Rock Drill,” undated.
During military operations undertaken with other countries, officers from the coalition countries typically join the headquarters staff in various capacities.
82 The Political-Military and Near East Affairs bureaus did not dispatch their senior officers handling the Iraq portfolio. ORHA, “Interagency Rehearsal and Planning Conference: Summary and Analysis,” February 21-22, 2003.
83 Dayton Maxwell, “Deliberate and Development Post Conflict Planning in Iraq: The Office of Policy, Planning, and Analysis, Coalition Provisional Authority, A USAID Perspective,” unpublished manuscript, July 23, 2004, 23-24; and ORHA, “Interagency Rehearsal and Planning Conference: Summary and Analysis,” February 21-22, 2003.
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84 ORHA, “Interagency Rehearsal and Planning Conference: Summary and Analysis,” February 21-22, 2003.
85 ORHA, “Interagency Rehearsal and Planning Conference: Summary and Analysis,” February 21-22, 2003.
86 ORHA/CPA Historian interview with George F. Ward, former Head of Humanitarian Pillar of ORHA, June 29, 2006.
87 ORHA, “Interagency Rehearsal and Planning Conference: Summary and Analysis,” February 21-22, 2003.
88 ORHA, “Interagency Rehearsal and Planning Conference: Summary and Analysis,” February 21-22, 2003.
89 SIGIR interview with Ross Wherry, former USAID Director of the Office of Iraq Affairs, April 5, 2006.
90 ORHA/CPA Historian interview with Lieutenant General (Ret.) Jay Garner, former Director of ORHA, March 30, 2004.
91 Lieutenant General (Ret.) Jay Garner, follow-up interview notes to ORHA/CPA Historian, March 10, 2003; and SIGIR and ORHA/CPA Historian interviews with Lieutenant General (Ret.) Jay Garner.
92 ORHA/CPA Historian interview with Lieutenant General (Ret.) Carl A. Strock, former Commanding General of USACE, October 30, 2006.
93 Lieutenant General (Ret.) Jay Garner, follow-up interview notes to ORHA/CPA Historian, March 3, 2003;
and SIGIR and ORHA/CPA Historian interviews with Lieutenant General Garner.
94 SIGIR interview with Frank Miller, former Chairman of the Executive Steering Group of the NSC, December 12, 2005; and Michael R. Gordon and General Bernard E. Trainor, Cobra II: The Inside Story of the Invasion and Occupation of Iraq (Pantheon Books, 2006), 160-63.
95 SIGIR interview with Douglas Feith, former Under Secretary of Defense for Policy, March 21, 2008;
and Douglas Feith, War and Decision: Inside the Pentagon at the Dawn of the War on Terror (New York:
HarperCollins, 2008), 402-11.
96 Lieutenant General (Ret.) Jay Garner, follow-up interview notes to ORHA/CPA Historian, March 10, 2003.
97 SIGIR interview with General (Ret.) Colin Powell, former Secretary of State, February 4, 2008; and ORHA/CPA Historian interview with Lieutenant General (Ret.) Jay Garner, former Director of ORHA, March 30, 2004.
98 ORHA/CPA Historian interview with Lieutenant General (Ret.) Jay Garner, former Director of ORHA, September 14-15, 2005.
99 Douglas Feith asserts that Rumsfeld wanted to institute a “proper analysis and process” to “find the best candidates in the United States, not just the best ones in the U.S. government. See Douglas Feith, War and Decision: Inside the Pentagon at the Dawn of the War on Terror (New York: HarperCollins, 2008), 387.
100 ORHA/CPA Historian interview with Lieutenant General (Ret.) Jay Garner, former Director of ORHA, March 30, 2004.
101 ORHA/CPA Historian interview with Lieutenant General (Ret.) Jay Garner, former Director of ORHA, March 30, 2004.
102 Lieutenant General (Ret.) Jay Garner, follow-up interview notes to ORHA/CPA Historian, March 10, 2003.
Chapter 4
1 SIGIR interview with Colonel (Ret.) Paul Hughes, former ORHA/CPA Director, Strategic Policy Office, May 2, 2007.
2 ORHA/CPA Historian interview with Lieutenant General (Ret.) Jay Garner, former Director of ORHA, September 14-15, 2005.
3 Gordon Rudd, ORHA/CPA Historian, compiled a list of language skills of ORHA personnel. SIGIR conver- sations with Gordon Rudd, ORHA/CPA Historian, Summer 2007.
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4 ORHA/CPA Historian interview with Colonel Robert D. Costello, Jr., ORHA Chief of Logistics, June 15, 2003.
5 SIGIR interview with Colonel (Ret.) Paul Hughes, former ORHA/CPA Director, Strategic Policy Office, May 2, 2007.
6 ORHA/CPA Historian interview with Colonel Robert D. Costello, Jr., ORHA Chief of Logistics, June 15, 2003; and SIGIR and ORHA/CPA Historian interview with Lieutenant General (Ret.) Jay Garner, former Director of ORHA, October 27, 2008.
7 SIGIR interview with Colonel (Ret.) Paul Hughes, former ORHA/CPA Director, Strategic Policy Office, May 2, 2007.
8 SIGIR, “Iraq Reconstruction: Lessons in Contracting and Procurement,” July 2006, 21.
9 ORHA/CPA Historian interview with Lieutenant Colonel Stephen M. Elliott, Contracting Officer for ORHA as part of DCMA’s Contingency Contracting Administration Services Mission, July 12, 2003.
10 Some question remains about the purpose of this funding. Some say it was strictly for the ORHA staff and translators; the ORHA/CPA comptroller says the purpose was more expansive. Gary Minor, “Financing the Fight—From the Front,” Air Force Comptroller (January 2004).
11 The war started on March 20 in Iraq, late evening on March 19 in the United States. The date of the event in local time is used for this report.
12 ORHA/CPA Historian interview with Lieutenant General (Ret.) Ronald E. Adams, Deputy Director of ORHA, September 29, 2006.
13 SIGIR interview with Lieutenant General (Ret.) Jay Garner, former Director of ORHA, April 5, 2006. For a chronology of JTF-4’s dissolution, see Nora Bensahel et al., After Saddam: Prewar Planning and the Occupation of Iraq (Santa Monica, CA: RAND Corporation, 2008), 51-52.
14 Dayton Maxwell, “Deliberate and Development Post Conflict Planning in Iraq: The Office of Policy, Planning, and Analysis, Coalition Provisional Authority, A USAID Perspective,” unpublished manuscript, July 23, 2004, 24.
15 ORHA’s leaders did not give it credence, and it was never formally issued. ORHA/CPA Historian interview with Lieutenant General (Ret.) Ronald E. Adams, Deputy Director of ORHA, September 29, 2006.
16 Dayton Maxwell, “Deliberate and Development Post Conflict Planning in Iraq: The Office of Policy, Planning, and Analysis, Coalition Provisional Authority, A USAID Perspective,” unpublished manuscript, July 23, 2004, 23-24.
17 Lieutenant General (Ret.) Jay Garner, Director of ORHA, memorandum to Secretary of Defense Donald Rumsfeld, passed through Larry Hanauer, Special Assistant to the Director of ORHA, March 21, 2003.
18 OSD, “Policy, Governance & External Relations in Post War Iraq, Ministry Candidates,” March 25, 2003.
19 Colin Powell, Secretary of State, memorandum to Donald Rumsfeld, Secretary of Defense, untitled, March 26, 2003.
20 USAID Press Release, “Food and Non-Food Relief Supplies to Iraq,” April 10, 2003.
21 SIGIR interview with Sloan Mann, USAID/OTI DART team member, August 10, 2007; and USAID, “A Year in Iraq,” May 2004, 4.
22 For background on the Humanitarian Operations Center (HOC) and for an articulation of NGO reticence, see Refugees International, “Humanitarian Coordination for Iraq: A Job for the United Nations,” April 9, 2003.
The article notes that, “Even as they rely on the HOC for access, the view of most aid agencies is that close association with the military forces of a belligerent compromises the impartiality that lies at the core of their mission. The aid agencies provide humanitarian assistance based on need, not politics; the idea of using aid strategically to win “hearts and minds” is anathema to the humanitarian community. Yet while the principles espoused by most aid organizations would seem to dictate distance from the HOC, pragmatism seems to have dictated association.”
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• Endnotes •
23 Dayton Maxwell, “Deliberate and Development Post Conflict Planning in Iraq: The Office of Policy, Planning, and Analysis, Coalition Provisional Authority, A USAID Perspective,” unpublished manuscript, July 23, 2004, 18.
24 USIP interview with Thomas Wheelock, Chief of Party for USAID’s contractor International Resources Group, September 8, 2004.
25 ORHA/CPA Historian interview with Brigadier General Steven Hawkins, former Commander, JTF-4, June 23, 2003.
26 SIGIR interview with Bruce Spake, Vice President of DAI, and Steve Connolly, Task Order Manager, DAI, November 2, 2006.
27 Dayton Maxwell, “Deliberate and Development Post Conflict Planning in Iraq: The Office of Policy, Planning, and Analysis, Coalition Provisional Authority, A USAID Perspective,” unpublished manuscript, July 23, 2004, 40.
28 CENTCOM, “Governorate Support Team (GST) Concept,” briefing slides; and Lieutenant Colonel Thomas Fisher, former CENTCOM planner, email to SIGIR, October 20, 2008.
29 Christopher Milligan, “Bottom Up Governance: For a Democratic Iraq,” briefing slides, April 2, 2003, 11, 14.
30 Jon Wegge and T. Christopher Milligan, “Regime Change and Local Government: A Strategy for a Stable Iraq, with Lessons from Indonesia,” November 2002.
31 SIGIR interview with Christopher Milligan, USAID Deputy Director of Iraq, March 27, 2007, and Christopher Milligan, “Bottom Up Governance: For a Democratic Iraq,” briefing slides, April 2, 2003.
32 ORHA/CPA Historian interview with Lieutenant General (Ret.) Jay Garner, former Director of ORHA, September 14-15, 2005.
33 Larry Hanauer, Special Assistant to the Director of ORHA, email to Gretchen Anderson, Office of the Under Secretary of Defense (Comptroller), “ORHA Personnel Growth,” April 18, 2003.
34 Some of that staff included personnel who provided security but were not assigned specifically to ORHA.
ORHA/CPA Historian interview with Lieutenant Colonel Stephen M. Elliot, Contracting Officer for ORHA as part of DCMA’s Contingency Contracting Administration Services Mission, July 12, 2003; and Director for Operations and Personnel memorandum to Under Secretary of Defense (Comptroller), “Questions from Jaymie Durnan—Why the Huge Increase in [ORHA] Staff?” attachment to email from Larry Hanauer, Special Assistant to the Director of ORHA, to Gretchen Anderson, of the Under Secretary of Defense (Comptroller), “ORHA Personnel Growth,” April 18, 2003.
35 Dov S. Zakheim, Under Secretary of Defense and Comptroller, memorandum to Special Assistant to the Deputy Secretary of Defense, “Response to Your Question on Increased Staffing Level for the Office of Reconstruction and Humanitarian Assistance,” April 14, 2003.
36 Two could write them for up to $5 million; the other could write contracts for up to $1 million. SIGIR, “Iraq Reconstruction: Lessons in Contracting and Procurement,” July 2006, 21; and ORHA/CPA Historian interview with Lieutenant Colonel Stephen M. Elliot, Contracting Officer for ORHA as part of DCMA’s Contingency Contracting Administration Services Mission, July 12, 2003.
37 ORHA/CPA Historian interview with Lieutenant Colonel Stephen M. Elliot, Contracting Officer for ORHA as part of DCMA’s Contingency Contracting Administration Services Mission, July 12, 2003.
38 ABC News, “Project Iraq,” Nightline, April 23, 2003.
39 Dr. Condoleezza Rice, National Security Advisor, “Dr. Condoleezza Rice Discusses Iraq Reconstruction,” White House Press Release, April 4, 2003.
40 Dr. Condoleezza Rice, National Security Advisor, “Dr. Condoleezza Rice Discusses Iraq Reconstruction,” White House Press Release, April 4, 2003.
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Chapter 5
1 Kathleen T. Rhem, “Security Still Most Serious Concern for U.S. Forces in Iraq,” American Forces Press Service, May 15, 2003; and ORHA/CPA Historian interview with Michael Kelly, Australian Army Colonel, June 12, 2004.
2 SIGIR interview with Sinan al-Najaar, former senior manager in an Iraqi ministry, November 30, 2006.
3 The Saddam memorandum was published in Arabic by Al-Hayat (London) on July 12, 2003. For a translated version, see Middle East Media Research Institute, Special Dispatch Series no. 538, “A Top Secret Document Dated January 23, 2003 from Iraqi Intelligence: A Plan for Action in the Event of a Regime Downfall,” July 17, 2003.
4 ORHA/CPA Historian interview with Colonel Glenn Collins, ORHA/CPA Facility Manager, July 17, 2003.
5 SIGIR conversations with Barbara Lewis, former Senior Advisor to the Rafidain Bank, Summer 2007.
6 Robin Raphel, former Senior Advisor to the Ministry of Trade, email to SIGIR, April 11, 2007.
7 The Independent High Electoral Commission, “Fact Sheet: Voter Registration Update in the International Zone,” June 25, 2008.
8 For a description of ordinary life in Iraq in the weeks preceding the invasion, see Anthony Shadid, Night Draws Near: Iraq’s People in the Shadow of America’s War, Part One: Before (New York: Henry Holt, 2005).
9 ORHA/CPA Historian interview with Brigadier General Steven Hawkins, former Commander, JTF-4, June 23, 2004.
10 CNN, “Ground Troops Clash Over Baghdad Airport,” April 4, 2003.
11 For an account of the war plan, see Michael R. Gordon and General Bernard E. Trainor, Cobra II: The Inside Story of the Invasion and Occupation of Iraq (New York: Pantheon Books, 2006).
12 Anthony Shadid, Night Draws Near: Iraq’s People in the Shadow of America’s War (New York: Henry Holt, 2005), 67, 96-97.
13 For a representative account of a clash between coalition and irregular forces, see Michael R. Gordon and General Bernard E. Trainor, Cobra II: The Inside Story of the Invasion and Occupation of Iraq (New York:
Pantheon Books, 2006), 217-221.
14 Colin H. Kahl, “COIN of the Realm: Is There a Future for Counterinsurgency?” Foreign Affairs 86, no.6 (November/December 2007); and Bernard Weinraub and Thom Shanker, “A Nation at War: Under Fire;
Rumsfeld’s Design for War Criticized on the Battlefield,” New York Times, April 1, 2003.
15 SIGIR interview with Lieutenant General (Ret.) Jay Garner, former Director of ORHA, April 1, 2006.
16 USAID, “A Year in Iraq,” May 2004, 4.
17 ORHA/CPA Historian interview with Brigadier General David Blackledge, Commander of the 354th Civil Affairs Brigade, January 2, 2004; ORHA/CPA Historian interview with Mike Gfoeller, former Deputy Director of ORHA Region-South, August 10, 2003; and USAID, “Assistance for Iraq: DART Assessment of Umm Qasr and Relief Efforts,” March 27, 2003.
18 USAID, “Assistance for Iraq: DART Assessment of Umm Qasr and Relief Efforts,” March 27, 2003. A month later, on April 26, another DART team based in Jordan crossed into al-Anbar province to monitor conditions in western Iraq. USAID, “Assistance for Iraq: DART Ar Rutbah Assessment,” April 26, 2003.
19 ORHA/CPA Historian interview with Lieutenant Colonel (Ret.) Schappi Marsh, FEST team member, July 30, 2003.
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• Endnotes •
20 During the invasion’s initial phase, FEST teams helped shut down a hydroelectric dam that would have impacted the operations of the Third Infantry Division if it had failed. The FEST teams also ensured bridges over the Euphrates River could support M-1 tanks waiting to cross. Tele-engineering kits enabled them to relay real-time images to the reach-back center in the United States, where Farsi and Arabic-speaking engineers stood ready to translate diagrams and control panel labels. This capacity to draw on reach-back expertise brought new levels of engineering know-how to the battlefield. Once combat needs were met, the FEST teams moved on to assessing oil, water and electricity infrastructure. Two fully outfitted FEST-Main teams, larger units augmented with more engineers, worked with Task Force Restore Iraqi Oil. As the restoration of power became a major need, FEST teams later assisted Task Force Restore Iraq Electricity. By the end of May, eighteen teams were in country working for ORHA through a USAID-USACE agreement. SIGIR interview with William Fritz, USACE Assistant Deputy G-3 (Operations), Chief, Concepts, Plan and Doctrine Branch, March 1, 2006.
21 The USACE operations center and Infrastructure Assessment Team completed the assessment in the fall of 2002. Estimates for three scenarios were drawn: no damage, middle-range damage, extensive damage. $35 billion was the middle-range scenario. SIGIR interview with William Fritz, USACE Assistant Deputy G-3 (Operations), Chief, Concepts, Plans and Doctrine Branch, March 1, 2006.
22 ORHA/CPA Historian interview with Lieutenant General (Ret.) Jay Garner, former Director of ORHA, April 22, 2004.
23 Only a two-man contingent from the DART team remained in Umm Qasr after March 27, 2003. The rest of the team made follow-up trips from Kuwait on April 2 and April 5, 2003. USAID, “Assistance for Iraq: DART Assessment of Umm Qasr and Relief Efforts,” April 7, 2003.
24 SIGIR interview with Bob Gersony, former Advisor to the USAID Administrator, January 16, 2007.
25 ORHA/CPA Historian interview with Lieutenant General (Ret.) Jay Garner, former Director of ORHA, April 22, 2004.
26 SIGIR interview with Andrew Natsios, former USAID Administrator, April 17, 2006.
27 In a letter to Secretary Rumsfeld on the relationship between DART and ORHA, Secretary Powell wrote, “if operational disagreements arise between DART and ORHA and cannot be resolved...the final resolution of the matter will come to us.” Later that day, Powell wrote another letter regarding the selection of ORHA staff, claiming “these individuals may not be acceptable to you and that you have your own list of candidates to fill these positions. We have frozen these assignments until you and I deal with this.” Colin Powell, Secretary of State, letters to Donald Rumsfeld, Secretary of Defense, March 26, 2003. In response Rumsfeld wrote, “If you agree to this common sense approach, our involvement in subsequent disputes will be kept to a minimum.” Donald Rumsfeld, Secretary of Defense, letter to Colin Powell, Secretary of State, “Disaster Assistance Response Team and the Garner Group,” March 31, 2003.
28 ORHA/CPA Historian interview with Lieutenant General (Ret.) Jay Garner, former Director of ORHA, April 22, 2004.
29 USAID, “Assistance for Iraq: DART Assessment of Umm Qasr and Relief Efforts,” April 4, 2003.
30 ORHA/CPA Historian interview with Mike Gfoeller, former Deputy Director of ORHA Region-South, August 10, 2003.
31 DoD News Transcript, “DoD News Briefing-ASD PA Clarke and Major General McChrystal,” April 10, 2003.
32 ORHA/CPA Historian interview with Lieutenant General (Ret.) Jay Garner, former Director of ORHA, September 14-15, 2005.
33 ORHA/CPA Historian interview with Brigadier General David Blackledge, Commander of the 354th Civil Affairs Brigade, January 2, 2004.
34 For contemporaneous accounts of Garner’s visits to Umm Qasr and developments there, see CNN, “U.S.
Interim Administrator Visits Iraq,” April 12, 2003.
35 DoD News Transcript, “DoD News Briefing-Secretary Rumsfeld and General Myers,” April 7, 2003; and David L. Phillips, Losing Iraq: Inside the Postwar Reconstruction Fiasco (New York: Basic Books, 2005), 8.
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36 Anthony Shadid, Night Draws Near: Iraq’s People in the Shadow of America’s War (New York: Henry Holt, 2005), 378-380.
37 SIGIR interview with Lieutenant General David McKiernan, former Commander of Coalition Forces Land Component Command, December 5, 2006.
38 SIGIR interview with Lieutenant General David McKiernan, former Commander of Coalition Forces Land Component Command, December 5, 2006.
39 Public Broadcasting Service, “Interview with Laith Kubba,” FRONTLINE, September 11, 2003.
40 ORHA/CPA Historian interview with Lieutenant General (Ret.) Carl A. Strock, former Commanding General of USACE, October 30, 2006.
41 The military grid used by NATO militaries is based on the Universal Transverse Mercator coordinate system, not longitude and latitude. SIGIR interview with Dustin Felix, Civil Affairs Officer in the 5th Brigade, 1st Cavalry Division, December 21, 2005.
42 ORHA/CPA Historian interview with Lieutenant General (Ret.) Jay Garner, former Director of ORHA, September 14-15, 2005.
43 SIGIR interview with Colonel John Agoglia, former CENTCOM planner, May 22, 2008; and SIGIR inter- view with Colonel (Ret.) Michael Fitzgerald, former CENTCOM (J5) Chief of War Plans, May 30, 2008.
44 ORHA/CPA Historian interview with Lieutenant General (Ret.) Jay Garner, former Director of ORHA, September 14-15, 2005.
45 ORHA/CPA Historian interview with Lieutenant General (Ret.) Jay Garner, former Director of ORHA, September 14-15, 2005.
46 Lieutenant General Garner recalls that Colonel Colin Boag, a British colonel, informed him of two possible locations to house ORHA: the Rashid Hotel or the Republican Palace. Since the media was already in the hotel, and Garner was concerned about the security risks of a vertical structure, he elected to house ORHA in the pal- ace. SIGIR and ORHA/CPA Historian interview with Lieutenant General (Ret.) Jay Garner, former Director of ORHA, October 27, 2008.
47 ORHA/CPA Historian interview with Lieutenant General (Ret.) Jay Garner, former Director of ORHA, September 14-15, 2005.
48 ORHA/CPA Historian interview with Colonel Glenn Collins, ORHA/CPA Facility Manager, July 17, 2003.
49 Dayton Maxwell, “Deliberate and Development Post Conflict Planning in Iraq: The Office of Policy, Planning, and Analysis, Coalition Provisional Authority, A USAID Perspective,” unpublished manuscript, July 23, 2004, 10-17.
50 Richard Miller, “A Brief History of CPATT,” unpublished manuscript, May 15, 2005, 1. CPATT stands for the Coalition Police Assistance Training Team. Chapter 12 explains the creation of CPATT and other Iraqi security forces, both police and military.
51 ORHA/CPA Historian interview with Timothy Carney, Senior Advisor to the Ministry of Industry and Minerals, June 12, 2003.
52 ORHA/CPA Historian interview with Lieutenant General (Ret.) Jay Garner, former Director of ORHA, September 14-15, 2005.
53 SIGIR interview with Bruce Spake, Vice President of DAI, and Steve Connolly, QRF Coordinator, DAI, November 2, 2006.
54 ORHA/CPA Historian interview with Christopher Spear, Senior Advisor to the Ministry of Labor and Social Affairs, July 15, 2003; and SIGIR interview with James Haveman, former Senior Advisor to the Ministry of Health, and Robert Goodwin, former Chief of Staff, Ministry of Health, December 22, 2005.
55 ORHA/CPA Historian interview with Christopher Spear, Senior Advisor to the Ministry of Labor and Social Affairs, July 15, 2003.
56 SIGIR conversations with Barbara Lewis, former Senior Advisor to the Rafidain Bank, Summer 2007.
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• Endnotes •
57 SIGIR interview with Samir Sumaida’ie, Iraqi Ambassador to the United States, March 11, 2008.
58 ORHA/CPA Historian interview with Major General Donald F. Campbell, Senior Advisor to the Ministry of Justice, July 14, 2003.
59 ORHA/CPA Historian interview with Major Lyn S. Brown, Advisor to the Ministry of Youth and Sport, June 22, 2004.
60 ORHA/CPA Historian interview with Lieutenant General (Ret.) Jay Garner, former Director of ORHA, September 14-15, 2005.
61 ORHA/CPA Historian interview with Gary Vogler, Senior Advisor to the Ministry of Oil, June 18, 2003.
62 USACE, “Iraqi Oil Infrastructure Restoration Strategic Plan: Rough Order of Magnitude,” June 3, 2003; and ORHA/CPA Historian interview with Gary Vogler, Senior Advisor to the Ministry of Oil, June 18, 2003.
63 USACE, “Iraqi Oil Infrastructure Restoration Strategic Plan: Rough Order of Magnitude,” June 3, 2003.
64 ORHA/CPA Historian and SIGIR interviews with Steven Browning, Task Force RIO Advisor, June 21, 2003 and April 26, 2006.
65 Dept. of the Army Memorandum to CJTF-7 C9, “Information Paper: Religious Groups in Iraq,” June 24, 2003, 5.
66 ORHA/CPA Historian interview with Gary Vogler, Senior Advisor to the Ministry of Oil, June 18, 2003.
67 Peter W. Galbraith, National Defense University, Testimony before the Senate Foreign Relations Committee, June 12, 2003. One estimate of looting circulating among CPA officials was $12 billion. L. Paul Bremer, James Dobbins, and David Gompert, “Early Days in Iraq: Decisions of the CPA,” Survival, August 2008, 23, 46.
68 Colonel (Ret.) Gregory Fontenot, Lieutenant Colonel E.J. Degen, and Lieutenant Colonel David Tohn, On Point: The United States Army in Operation Iraqi Freedom (Fort Leavenworth, KS: Center for Army Lessons Learned, 2005).
69 GAO Report 07-444, “Operation Iraqi Freedom: DoD Should Apply Lessons Learned Concerning the Need for Security over Conventional Munitions Storage Sites to Future Operations Planning,” March 2007, 1, 5.
70 USAID, “Iraq – Humanitarian and Reconstruction Assistance,” Fact Sheet #16, Fiscal Year (FY) 2003, April 21, 2003, 3. The 1st Cavalry division turned around en route. Rumsfeld also elected to remove the Third Infantry Division from the theater as soon as the 1st Armored Division, commanded by then-Major General Ricardo Sanchez, arrived—making for a net gain of zero troops. Lieutenant General Ricardo S. Sanchez, Wiser in Battle:
A Soldier’s Story (New York: HarperCollins, 2008); Michael R. Gordon and General Bernard E. Trainor, Cobra II: The Inside Story of the Invasion and Occupation of Iraq (New York: Pantheon, 2006); Thomas E.
Ricks, Fiasco: The American Military Adventure in Iraq (New York: Penguin Group, 2006); and ORHA/CPA Historian interview with Colonel John Agoglia, former CENTCOM planner, September 22, 2006.
71 ORHA/CPA Historian interview with Colonel John Agoglia, former CENTCOM planner, September 22, 2006.
72 SIGIR interview with Lieutenant General (Ret.) Jay Garner, former Director of ORHA, April 1, 2006.
73 P.L. 108-11, Emergency Wartime Supplemental Appropriations Act, 2003, April 16, 2003.
74 General Tommy R. Franks, “Freedom Message to the Iraqi People,” April 16, 2003.
75 SIGIR, “Iraq Reconstruction: Lessons in Contracting and Procurement,” July 2006, 27.
76 For an account of the Nassriya conference and early political events, see Douglas Feith, War and Decision:
Inside the Pentagon at the Dawn of the War on Terror (New York: HarperCollins, 2008), 416-26; and Kenneth Katzman, Congressional Research Services Report RL31339, “Iraq: U.S. Regime Change Efforts and Post- Saddam Governance,” January 7, 2004, 22-23.
77 BBC, “Key Shia Leader Returns to Iraq,” April 16, 2003.
78 SIGIR interview with Lieutenant General (Ret.) Carl Strock, former Commanding General of USACE, May 13, 2008.
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79 Karen DeYoung, Soldier: The Life of Colin Powell (New York: Alfred A. Knopf, 1995), 463.
80 SIGIR and ORHA/CPA Historian interview with Lieutenant General (Ret.) Jay Garner, former Director of ORHA, October 27, 2008.
81 Different iterations of this list exist. See: annotated briefing slide, “ORHA’s Key Tasks (Complete by 15 Jun
03),” undated; and another annotated slide by the same title, also undated.
82 ORHA/CPA Historian interview with Gary Vogler, Senior Advisor to the Ministry of Oil, June 18, 2003.
83 ORHA/CPA Historian interview with Lieutenant Colonel Joseph Morgan, JTF-4 Chief of Public Works, August 12, 2003.
84 Michael Mobbs left ORHA shortly after its arrival in Baghdad. SIGIR conversations with Gordon Rudd, ORHA/CPA Historian, Summer 2007.
85 Lieutenant General Garner notes that Iraqis and the military were cooperative, and that the coordination between Washington and ORHA was most problematic. SIGIR and ORHA/CPA Historian interview with Lieutenant General (Ret.) Jay Garner, former Director of ORHA, October 27, 2008.
86 SIGIR interview with Douglas Feith, former Under Secretary of Defense for Policy, March 21, 2008;
and Douglas Feith, War and Decision: Inside the Pentagon at the Dawn of the War on Terror (New York:
HarperCollins, 2008), 421.
87 General Tommy R. Franks, “Freedom Message to the Iraqi People,” April 16, 2003.
88For Bremer’s own account of his selection, see L. Paul Bremer III, My Year in Iraq, The Struggle to Build a Future of Hope (New York: Simon & Schuster, 2006).
89 Garner notes that he asked Rumsfeld to consider delaying Bremer’s arrival until July 1, 2003, by which time he felt he could prepare for a transition. Rumsfeld disagreed. SIGIR interview with Lieutenant General (Ret.) Jay Garner, former Director of ORHA, April 1, 2006; and SIGIR and ORHA/CPA Historian interview with Lieutenant General (Ret.) Jay Garner, former Director of ORHA, October 27, 2008.
90 SIGIR interview with Ambassador Zalmay Khalilzad, former Presidential Envoy to the Free Iraqis, March 19, 2008.
Essential Services – The Effects of Invasion 91 International Monetary Fund, “Iraq: Statistical Appendix,” August 2007; and DoD, Iraq Status Update, August 28, 2003. Scott Wilson, “Bremer Shifts Focus to New Iraqi Economy; U.S. Occupation Chief Cites Progress on Restoring Order,” Washington Post, May 27, 2003. USAID noted that 95 percent of landlines were down and cell phone service was only provided in Basrah. USAID: Assistance for Iraq, “NGO Pre-Bid Conference,” April 17, 2003. Iraq Coalition Casualty Count; “US Deaths By Month,” updated September 2008; Iraq Coalition Casualty Count, “Iraq Coalition Casualties: Contractors,”, updated July 2008; Ariana Eunjung Cha, “Peril Follows Contractors in Iraq; Tennessee Pair Killed Despite Precautions,” Washington Post, November 14, 2003; Iraq Body Count, “Documented civilian deaths from violence,” updated August 24, 2008; P.L. 108-7, Consolidated Appropriations Resolution for Fiscal Year 2003, February 20, 2003;
and P.L. 108-11, Emergency Wartime Supplemental Appropriations Act for Fiscal Year 2003, and for other purposes,” April 16, 2003.
92 CPA Orders 1 and 2 greatly impacted the security forces as the Army was disbanded and many others loyal to Saddam deserted. The Iraqi Army post-invasion did not exist. The numbers available for the Iraq Security Force only includes the Iraqi Police. CPA Order Number 1, “De-Ba’athification of Iraqi Society,” May 16, 2003; and CPA Order Number 2, “Dissolution of Entities,” May 16, 2003.
93 The exact number of civilian contractor deaths are unknown and only include those which have been reported to the Department of Labor and the Iraq Coalition Casualty Count. This probably underestimates civilian casualties.
94 International Monetary Fund, “Iraq: Statistical Appendix,” August 2007.
95 CPA, “A Free Iraq’s Vision for the Future,” October 23, 2003.
96 DoD, Iraq Status Update, August 28, 2003, 14.
• 383 •
• Endnotes •
Chapter 6
1 CPA, “Biography: Ambassador L. Paul Bremer,” undated; and L. Paul Bremer III, My Year in Iraq, The Struggle to Build a Future of Hope (New York: Simon and Schuster, 2006), 3-5, About the Authors.
2 Peter W. Galbraith, The End of Iraq: How American Incompetence Created a War Without End, (New York:
Simon and Schuster, 2007), 118.
3 L. Paul Bremer III, My Year in Iraq, The Struggle to Build a Future of Hope (New York: Simon and Schuster, 2006), 6.
4 L. Paul Bremer III, My Year in Iraq, The Struggle to Build a Future of Hope (New York: Simon and Schuster, 2006), 11-12.
5 SIGIR interview with General (Ret.) Colin Powell, former Secretary of State, February 4, 2008.
6 Donald Rumsfeld, for Secretary of Defense, written comments to SIGIR, January 7, 2009.
7 White House Press Release, “President Names Envoy to Iraq,” May 6, 2003.
8 Donald Rumsfeld, Secretary of Defense, memorandum to L. Paul Bremer, Presidential Envoy to Iraq, “Designation as Administrator of the Coalition Provisional Authority,” May 13, 2003.
9 L. Paul Bremer III, My Year in Iraq: The Struggle to Build a Future of Hope (New York: Simon & Schuster, 2006), 12.
10 Donald Rumsfeld, Secretary of Defense, memorandum to L. Paul Bremer, Presidential Envoy to Iraq, “Designation as Administrator of the Coalition Provisional Authority,” May 13, 2003.
11 Two international laws—The 1907 Hague Regulation and the Geneva Conventions of 1949—pertain to occupations. Article 42 of the 1907 Hague Regulations states that a “territory is considered occupied when it is actually placed under the authority of the hostile army. The occupation extends only to the territory where such authority has been established and can be exercised.” According to their common Article 2, the four Geneva Conventions of 1949 apply to any territory occupied during international hostilities. They also apply in situa- tions where the occupation of state territory meets with no armed resistance.
12 CPA Regulation Number 1, “The Coalition Provisional Authority,” May 16, 2003.
13 CPA Regulation Number 1, May 16, 2003.
14 Office of the Secretary of Defense, “Iraqi Interim Authority Overview,” April 28, 2003.
15 Office of the Secretary of Defense, “Iraqi Interim Authority Overview,” April 28, 2003.
16 Douglas Feith, Under Secretary of Defense for Policy, Testimony before the House Committee on International Relations, May 15, 2003.
17 L. Paul Bremer, III, former CPA Administrator, written comments to SIGIR, December 19, 2008.
18 L. Paul Bremer, III, former CPA Administrator, written comments to SIGIR, December 19, 2008.
19 Lieutenant General Ricardo S. Sanchez, Wiser in Battle: A Soldier’s Story (New York: HarperCollins, 2008),
168.
20 Major General Sanchez had been nominated for appointment to the grade of Lieutenant General on May 5, 2003. His appointment was for the command of V Corps in Europe. DoD Press Release, “Flag and General Officer Announcements,” May 5, 2003. A Corps headquarters, which would be the basis for CJTF-7, is much smaller and more tactically oriented than an Army headquarters, which was the basis for the Coalition Forces Land Component Command .
21 SIGIR interview with Lieutenant General (Ret.) Ricardo Sanchez, former CJTF-7 Commander, October 26, 2007; and ORHA/CPA Historian interview with L. Paul Bremer III, former CPA Administrator, January 7, 2008.
22 SIGIR interview with Major General William H. McCoy, former Commander of USACE-GRD, June 5, 2008.
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• Chapter 6 •
23 Ali A. Allawi, The Occupation of Iraq: Winning the War, Losing the Peace (New Haven, CT: Yale University Press, 2007), 105.
24 United Nations Security Council Resolution 1483, May 22, 2003; and L. Elaine Halchin, “The Coalition Provisional Authority (CPA): Origin, Characteristics, and Institutional Authorities,” Congressional Research Service Report RL32370, updated September 21, 2006.
25 General Tommy R. Franks, “Freedom Message to the Iraqi People,” April 16, 2003. Two million members:
Sharon Otterman, “IRAQ: De-Ba’athification,” Council on Foreign Relations, April 7, 2005.
26 “Senior Party Members” were Regional Command Members, Branch Members, Section Members, and Group Members. CPA Order Number 1, “De-Ba’athification of Iraqi Society,” May 16, 2003.
27 More junior ranks included Member and Active Member. CPA Order Number 1, May 16, 2003.
28 ORHA/CPA Historian interview with J. Scott Carpenter, Governance Director of the CPA, June 18, 2004.
29 L. Paul Bremer III, My Year in Iraq, The Struggle to Build a Future of Hope (New York: Simon & Schuster, 2006), 40.
30 ORHA/CPA Historian interviews with Lieutenant General (Ret.) Jay Garner, Director of ORHA; Robin Raphel, Coordinator for Civil Administration; David Nummy, Senior Advisor to the Ministry of Finance; Gary Vogler, Senior Advisor to the Ministry of Oil; and Major General David Petraeus, Commander of the 101st Airborne Division .
31 ORHA/CPA Historian interview with Lieutenant General (Ret.) Jay Garner, former Director of ORHA, September 14-15, 2005.
32 SIGIR interview with Nazar Janabi, former Director General, Ministry of Defense, July 2, 2008.
33 SIGIR interview with Frank Miller, former Chairman of the Executive Steering Group of the NSC, February 4, 2008.
34 Lieutenant General Ricardo S. Sanchez, Wiser in Battle: A Soldier’s Story (New York: HarperCollins, 2008),
184.
35 SIGIR interview with Samir Sumaida’ie, Iraqi Ambassador to the United States, March 11, 2008.
36 CPA Order Number 5, “Establishment of the Iraqi De-Ba’athification Council,” May 25, 2003.
37 Lieutenant General Ricardo S. Sanchez, Wiser in Battle: A Soldier’s Story (New York: HarperCollins, 2008),
185.
38 CPA Memorandum Number 7, “Delegation of Authority Under De-Ba’athification Order No. 1,” November 4, 2003.
39 Sharon Otterman, “IRAQ: De-Ba’athification,” Council on Foreign Relations, April 7, 2005.
40 CPA Order Number 2, “Dissolution of Entities,” May 23, 2003.
41 SIGIR interview with Frank Miller, former Chairman of the Executive Steering Group of the NSC, February 4, 2008.
42 SIGIR interview with General (Ret.) Colin Powell, former Secretary of State, February 4, 2008.
43 SIGIR interview with General (Ret.) Colin Powell, former Secretary of State, February 4, 2008.
44 SIGIR interview with L. Paul Bremer III, former CPA Administrator, March 18, 2008.
45 SIGIR interview with Douglas Feith, former Under Secretary of Defense for Policy, March 21, 2008.
46 ORHA/CPA Historian interview with Meghan O’Sullivan, CPA Governance Team Member, December 29, 2003.
47 SIGIR interview with Lieutenant General (Ret.) Ricardo Sanchez, former CJTF-7 Commander, October 26, 2007.
• 385 •
• Endnotes •
48 SIGIR interview with Lieutenant General David McKiernan, former Commander of Coalition Forces Land Component Command, December 5, 2006; SIGIR interview with Lieutenant General (Ret.) Ricardo Sanchez, former CJTF-7 Commander, October 26, 2007; and ORHA/CPA Historian interview with Major General David Petraeus, Commander of the 101st Airborne Division, July 28, 2003.
49 L. Paul Bremer III, My Year in Iraq, The Struggle to Build a Future of Hope (New York: Simon & Schuster, 2006), 55.
50 Lieutenant General Ricardo Sanchez, former CJTF-7 Commander, written comments to SIGIR, October 26, 2008.
51 ORHA/CPA Historian interview with Walter B. Slocombe, Senior Advisor for Defense and Security Affairs, July 18, 2003.
52 Ali A. Allawi, The Occupation of Iraq: Winning the War, Losing the Peace (New Haven, CT: Yale University Press, 2007), 157.
53 Public Broadcasting Service, “Interview with Laith Kubba,” FRONTLINE, September 11, 2003.
54 Kirsten Lundberg, “The Accidental Statesman: General Petraeus and the City of Mosul, Iraq,” Kennedy School of Government Case Program, 2006, 41.
55 ORHA/CPA Historian interview with Major General David Petraeus, Commander of the 101st Airborne Division, July 28, 2003.
Chapter 7
1 P.L. 108-11, Emergency Wartime Supplemental Appropriations Act for Fiscal Year 2003, April 16, 2003.
2 Most contracts were indefinite delivery/indefinite quantity (IDIQ) contracts. U.S. government agencies use IDIQ contracts when exact quantities of supplies and/or services to be obtained through the contract cannot be precisely determined. Task orders are then issued as more detail becomes available. FAR, Subpart 16.5, “Indefinite-Delivery Contracts,” June 12, 2008, http://www.arnet.gov/far/current/html/Subpart%2016_5.
html.
3 This estimate includes cumulative deposits to fund Iraqi government operations and reconstruction pro- grams. CPA-IG, Quarterly Report to the United States Congress, July 2004, 59-60. A smaller portion of these funds, approximately $7 billion, was allocated for relief and reconstruction projects. GAO Report 05-876, “Rebuilding Iraq: Status of Funding and Reconstruction Efforts,” July 2005, 2.
4 The humanitarian and reconstruction sectors established by the legislation were: (1) Water/sanitation infra- structure; (2) feeding and food distribution; (3) supporting relief efforts related to refugees, internally displaced persons, and vulnerable individuals, including assistance for families of innocent Iraqi civilians who suffer losses as a result of military operations; (4) electricity; (5) health care; (6) telecommunications; (7) economic and financial policy; (8) education; (9) transportation; (10) rule of law and governance; (11) humanitarian demin- ing; (12) agriculture. P.L. 108-11, Emergency Wartime Supplemental Appropriations Act for Fiscal Year 2003, April 16, 2003. The Department of Health and Human Services never received any IRRF 1 funding.
5 SIGIR, “Iraq Reconstruction: Lessons in Contracting and Procurement,” July 2006, 32.
6 SIGIR interview with Christopher Milligan, Deputy Director of USAID in Iraq, February 9, 2006; and ORHA/CPA Historian interview with Christopher Milligan, Deputy Director of USAID in Iraq, August 13, 2003.
7 Joshua B. Bolten, Director of the Office of Management and Budget, Testimony before the Senate Foreign Relations Committee, July 29, 2003; and Executive Order 13290, “Confiscating and Vesting Certain Iraqi Property,” March 20, 2003.
8 United Nations Security Council Resolution 1483, May 22, 2003.
9 United Nations Security Council Resolution 1483, May 22, 2003.
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• Chapter 7 •
10 United Nations Security Council Resolution 1483, May 22, 2003; International Advisory and Monitoring Board (IAMB), Press Release, “Establishment of the International Advisory and Monitoring Board,” October 24, 2003; and IAMB, “Minutes of the organizational meeting held at the United Nations Headquarters, New York,” December 5, 2003.
11 United Nations Press Release, “Oil-for-Food Programme: Status of Funds 19 November 2003,” November 19, 2003; DoS Fact Sheet, “UN Security Council Resolution 1483 Lifts Sanctions on Iraq; International Community Pledges Assistance for People of Iraq,” May 22, 2003; and Timothy Carney, “We’re Getting in Our Own Way,” Washington Post, Op-Ed, June 22, 2003.
12 CPA, Program Review Board Minutes, June 7, 2003.
13 ORHA/CPA Historian interview with James D. Warlick, Consular for Oil-for-Food program, June 13, 2004.
14 CPA Regulation Number 2, “The Development Fund for Iraq,” June 10, 2003.
15 CPA Regulation Number 2, June 10, 2003.
16 CPA Regulation Number 3, “Program Review Board,” June 18, 2003.
17 McPherson had taken leave from his job as president of Michigan State University to serve with the CPA. He chaired the PRB for the first two months and then turned over chairmanship to Oliver. Dave Oliver, “Restarting the Economy in Iraq,” November 2003, 9.
18 CPA Regulation Number 3, June 18, 2003.
19 CPA Public Notice, “Managing Financial Resources for Iraq,” June 18, 2003; and KPMG, “Development Fund for Iraq: Report of Factual Findings in Connection with Disbursements: For the Period from 1 January 2004 to 28 June 2004,” October 14, 2004, 2.
20 CPA Regulation Number 3, June 18, 2003.
21 CPA Memorandum Number 4, “Contract and Grant Procedures Applicable to Vested and Seized Iraqi Property and the Development Fund for Iraq: Implementation of Regulation Number 3, Program Review Board,” August 19, 2003.
22 CPA Memorandum Number 4, August 19, 2003.
23 SIGIR Audit 05-004, “Oversight of Funds Provided to Iraqi Ministries through the National Budget Process,” January 30, 2005, 18; KPMG, “Development Fund for Iraq Appendix: Matters Noted Involving Internal Controls and Other Operations Issues During the Audit of the Fund: For the Period to 31 December 2003,” June 2004; and IAMB, Report of the International Advisory and Monitoring Board of the Development Fund for Iraq, “Covering the Period from the Establishment of the DFI on May 22, 2003 until the Dissolution of the CPA on June 28, 2004,” December 14, 2004, 4.
24 Mark S. Martins, “The Commander’s Emergency Response Program,” Joint Force Quarterly 37 (2nd Quarter 2005). Martins was deputy legal counsel to the Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff at the time he wrote this article. A Fragmentary Order (FRAGO) is a change or amendment to a previous operational order.
25 SIGIR, Quarterly Report to the United States Congress, October 2008, 16.
26 Mark S. Martins, “The Commander’s Emergency Response Program,” Joint Force Quarterly 37 (2nd Quarter 2005), 48.
27 SIGIR, “Iraq Reconstruction: Lessons in Contracting and Procurement,” July 2006, 88.
28 SIGIR Lessons Learned Forum: Human Capital Management, Washington, DC, September 20, 2005, 56.
29 ORHA was mentioned in the memorandum, but it had already been subsumed by CPA by this time. The executive agency for ORHA was transferred seamlessly to CPA until ORHA officially dissolved in mid-June.
SIGIR, “Iraq Reconstruction: Lessons in Contracting and Procurement,” July 2006, 24.
• 387 •
• Endnotes •
30 SIGIR refers to HCA as the “HCA office” when speaking of HCA as an organization and “HCA” when refer- ring to the person in charge of the HCA office. The HCA office acted as the contracting organization for the CPA, and later for the CPA’s Project Management Office (PMO) after the PMO was created in the fall of 2003.
When the CPA dissolved, the HCA office continued its contracting support for the Project and Contracting Office (PCO), which took over many of the PMO’s responsibilities. This distinction is noted in SIGIR, “Iraq Reconstruction: Lessons in Human Capital Management,” January 2006, 119.
31 SIGIR, “Iraq Reconstruction: Lessons in Contracting and Procurement,” July 2006, 25-26, 48-51.
32 SIGIR, “Iraq Reconstruction: Lessons in Human Capital Management,” January 2006, 13-14.
33 CPA-IG Audit 04-002, “Management of Personnel Assigned to CPA in Baghdad,” June 25, 2004, 1, 4.
34 SIGIR, “Iraq Reconstruction: Lessons in Human Capital Management,” January 2006, 29; and DoS, com- ments to SIGIR, October 28, 2008.
35 SIGIR Lessons Learned Forum: Human Capital Management, Washington, DC, September 20, 2005; and ORHA/CPA Historian interview with Colonel Dennis J. DeGraff, CPA Director of Personnel, June 25, 2004.
36 SIGIR, “Iraq Reconstruction: Lessons in Human Capital Management,” January 2006, 14.
37 ORHA/CPA Historian interview with Colonel Dennis J. DeGraff, CPA Director of Personnel, June 25, 2004.
38 DoD Personnel Assessment Team, “Report to the Secretary of Defense,” February 11, 2004, 3.
39 CPA-IG Audit 04-002, “Management of Personnel Assigned to CPA in Baghdad,” June 25, 2004, 1, 3.
40 GAO Report 04-902R, “Rebuilding Iraq: Resource, Security, Governance, Essential Services, and Oversight Issues,” June 2004, 37. Other analysis suggests the CPA never had more than 55 percent of its staffing requirement. Terrence K. Kelly, Ellen E. Tunstall, Thomas S. Szayna, and Deanna Weber Prine, Stabilization and Reconstruction Staffing: Developing U.S. Civilian Personnel Capabilities (Santa Monica, CA: RAND Corporation, 2008).
41 SIGIR Lessons Learned Forum: Human Capital Management, Washington, DC, September 20, 2005,
73-74.
42 SIGIR, “Iraq Reconstruction: Lessons in Human Capital Management,” January 2006, 10. According to Colonel DeGraff, the U.S. government relied on the 3161 special hiring authority because most federal agen- cies did not respond to repeated requests for personnel. The Secretary of Defense sent letters to his cabinet-level counterparts asking them to help staff the CPA, but by late fall 2003, few had provided adequate numbers of personnel. In November 2003, the NSC appealed to the federal agencies for assistance, but this plea was simi- larly ineffective. ORHA/CPA Historian interview with Colonel Dennis J. DeGraff, CPA Director of Personnel, June 25, 2004.
43 SIGIR, “Iraq Reconstruction: Lessons in Human Capital Management,” January 2006, 21.
44 GAO Report 04-902R, “Rebuilding Iraq: Resource, Security, Governance, Essential Services, and Oversight Issues,” June 2004, 39. The number of military and civilian staff provided to the CPA by the Defense Department varied from month to month. For example, in March 2004, the Defense Department provided 293 military and 168 civilian personnel, or 461 of the 1,196 on the CPA personnel roster. When the CPA ended, 384 of the CPA’s 1,050 staff were either members of the U.S. military or civilians from the Defense Department.
45 ORHA/CPA Historian interview with Colonel Dennis J. DeGraff, CPA Director of Personnel, June 25, 2004.
46 SIGIR Lessons Learned Forum: Human Capital Management, Washington, DC, September 20, 2005, 132.
47 USIP interview with Rodney Bent, former OMB Director, September 14, 2004.
48 SIGIR, “Iraq Reconstruction: Lessons in Human Capital Management,” January 2006, 22; and Nora Bensahel et al., “After Saddam: Prewar Planning and the Occupation of Iraq,” (Santa Monica, CA: RAND Corporation, 2008), 118, 184.
49 Ali A. Allawi, The Occupation of Iraq: Winning the War, Losing the Peace (New Haven, CT: Yale University Press, 2007), 100.
• 388 •
• Chapter 8 •
50 SIGIR, “Iraq Reconstruction: Lessons in Human Capital Management,” January 2006, 22.
51 GAO Report 04-902R, “Rebuilding Iraq: Resource, Security, Governance, Essential Services, and Oversight Issues,” June 2004, 39.
52 SIGIR, “Iraq Reconstruction: Lessons in Human Capital Management,” January 2006, 22; and DoD IG Audit D-2004-057, “Contracts Awarded for the Coalition Provisional Authority by the Defense Contracting Command-Washington,” March 18, 2004, 10-11, 28-29. The costs of the contract soon rose. For example, one third of the subject-matter experts demanded life insurance, and SAIC requested the use of higher labor rates than originally negotiated “because the subject matter experts required higher compensation.” The value of the contract grew from $7.7 million when it was awarded on March 5, 2003, to $24.8 million by the end of November.
53 DoS, comments to SIGIR, October 28, 2008.
Chapter 8
1 SIGIR conversations with Barbara Lewis, former Senior Advisor to the Rafidain Bank, Summer 2007.
2 John B. Taylor, Under Secretary of the Treasury for International Affairs, Testimony before the Senate Committee on Foreign Relations, June 4, 2003. The Treasury team found that looters, frustrated by their in- ability to break into the vaults, had opened a sewer main and flooded the central bank. ORHA/CPA Historian interview with David Nummy, Senior Advisor to the Ministry of Finance, June 23, 2003.
3 ORHA/CPA Historian interview with David Nummy, Senior Advisor to the Ministry of Finance, June 27, 2003.
4 John B. Taylor, “Billions Over Baghdad,” New York Times, Op-Ed, February 27, 2007.
5 ORHA/CPA Historian interview with David Nummy, Senior Advisor to the Ministry of Finance, June 27, 2003.
6 Joseph A. Christoff, GAO Director of International Affairs and Trade and Davi M. D’Agostino, GAO Director of Financial Markets and Community Investment, Testimony before the House Committee on Financial Services Subcommittee on Oversight and Investigations, March 18, 2004; and ORHA/CPA Historian interview with George B. Wolfe, Deputy General Counsel, U.S. Treasury Department, June 13, 2004.
7 House Committee on Oversight and Government Reform Memorandum, “Cash Transfers to the Coalition Provisional Authority,” February 6, 2007, 6.
8 SIGIR interview with George “Ged” Smith, U.S. Treasury attaché, August 20, 2007.
9 Timothy Carney, We’re Getting in Our Own Way,” Washington Post, Op-Ed, June 22, 2003; and Timothy Carney, Senior Advisor to the Ministry of Industry and Minerals, written comments to SIGIR, November 16, 2008.
10 SIGIR conversations with Barbara Lewis, former Senior Advisor to the Rafidain Bank, Summer 2007.
11 SIGIR conversations with Barbara Lewis, former Senior Advisor to the Rafidain Bank, Summer 2007.
12 John B. Taylor, Under Secretary of the Treasury for International Affairs, Testimony before the Senate Committee on Foreign Relations, June 4, 2003.
13 Dave Oliver, “Restarting the Economy in Iraq,” November 2003, 23.
14 CPA Order Number 30, “Reform of Salaries and Employment Conditions of State Employees,” September 8, 2003.
15 House Committee on Oversight and Government Reform Memorandum, “Cash Transfers to the Coalition Provisional Authority,” February 6, 2007, 6.
16 Henry A. Waxman, Chairman, Statement before the House Committee on Oversight and Government Reform, February 6, 2007; and Robert Kraus email to Joseph Botta, “DFI-Cash00220,” December 12, 2003, as cited in: House Committee on Oversight and Government Reform Memorandum, “Cash Transfers to the Coalition Provisional Authority,” February 6, 2007, 6-7.
• 389 •
• Endnotes •
17 John B. Taylor, Global Financial Warriors: The Untold Story of International Finance in the Post-9/11 World (New York: W.W. Norton, 2007), 200-210; and CPA Press Release, “Iraq Currency Exchange Begins,” October 15, 2003.
18 John B. Taylor, Under Secretary of the Treasury for International Affairs, Testimony before the Senate Committee on Foreign Relations, June 4, 2003.
19 CPA Press Release, “Text of Ambassador Bremer’s Address to the Iraqi People: Budget and Banknotes,” no.
0014, July 7, 2003.
20 CPA Order Number 43, “New Iraqi Dinar Banknotes,” October 14, 2003.
21 CPA, “Iraq Currency Exchange,” http://www.iraqcoalition.org/budget/IraqCurrencyExchange.html.
22 USIP interview with Brigadier General Hugh Tant, former Director of Iraqi Currency Exchange Program, October 22, 2004.
23 John B. Taylor, “Billions Over Baghdad,” New York Times, February 27, 2007; and John B. Taylor, Global Financial Warriors: The Untold Story of International Finance in the Post-9/11 World (New York: W.W.
Norton, 2007), 225-245.
24 George W. Bush, “President Holds Press Conference,” White House Press Release, October 28, 2003.
25 John B. Taylor, Global Financial Warriors: The Untold Story of International Finance in the Post-9/11 World (New York: W.W. Norton, 2007), 243.
26 John B. Taylor, Under Secretary of the Treasury for International Affairs, Testimony before the Senate Committee on Foreign Relations, June 4, 2003.
27 John B. Taylor, “Billions Over Baghdad,” New York Times, February 27, 2007; and John B. Taylor, Global Financial Warriors: The Untold Story of International Finance in the Post-9/11 World (New York: W.W.
Norton, 2007), 250-273.
28 John B. Taylor, Global Financial Warriors: The Untold Story of International Finance in the Post-9/11 World (New York: W.W. Norton, 2007), 250, 260-262.
29 John B. Taylor, Global Financial Warriors: The Untold Story of International Finance in the Post-9/11 World (New York: W.W. Norton, 2007), 263.
30 John B. Taylor, Global Financial Warriors: The Untold Story of International Finance in the Post-9/11 World (New York: W.W. Norton, 2007), 250-273. The Paris Club is an informal group of financial officials from 19 creditor nations that helps debtor countries restructure their debts; the London Club is a similar group of private international creditors. On November 21, 2004, long after the CPA was gone, the London Club members agreed, in the light of “the exceptional situation of the Republic of Iraq and of its limited repayment capacity over the coming year” on “exceptional treatment” that significantly reduced Iraq’s external debt. See Paris Club Press Release, “The Paris Club and the Republic of Iraq Agree on Debt Relief,” November 21, 2004.
31 Dave Oliver, “Restarting the Economy in Iraq,” November 2003, 23.
32 SIGIR interview with George “Ged” Smith, U.S. Treasury Attaché, August 20, 2007; Christopher Foote, William Block, Keith Crane, and Simon Gray, “Economic Policy and Prospects in Iraq,” Journal of Economic Perspectives 18, no. 3 (Summer 2004); and Nora Bensahel et al., After Saddam: Prewar Planning and the Occupation of Iraq (Santa Monica, CA, RAND Corporation, 2008), 195-208.
33 International Monetary Fund, “Iraq: Macroeconomic Assessment,” October, 21, 2003.
34 Peter McPherson, former CPA director of Economic Policy, written comments to SIGIR, January 7, 2009.
35 Zoubida Allaoua, et al., “State Owned Enterprises Reform in Iraq,” World Bank: Reconstructing Iraq Working Paper no. 2, July 26, 2004.
36 Zoubida Allaoua, et al., “State Owned Enterprises Reform in Iraq,” World Bank: Reconstructing Iraq Working Paper no. 2, July 26, 2004.
37 Peter McPherson, former CPA director of Economic Policy, written comments to SIGIR, January 3, 2009.
38 Peter McPherson, former CPA director of Economic Policy, written comments to SIGIR, January 3, 2009.
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• Chapter 9 •
39 Peter McPherson, former CPA director of Economic Policy, written comments to SIGIR, January 3, 2009 and August 19, 2008.
40 The $2 billion in recorded deposits included $1 billion from SOEs and $1billiion from private depositors.
Peter McPherson, former CPA director of Economic Policy, written comments to SIGIR, January 7, 2009.
41 Peter McPherson, former CPA director of Economic Policy, written comments to SIGIR, January 7, 2009.
42 Peter McPherson, former CPA director of Economic Policy, written comments to SIGIR, January 3, 2009.
43 Peter McPherson, former CPA director of Economic Policy, written comments to SIGIR, January 3, 2009.
44 Peter McPherson, former CPA Director of Economic Policy, written comments to SIGIR, August 19, 2008.
45 Peter McPherson, former CPA Director of Economic Policy, written comments to SIGIR, August 19, 2008.
46 The Geneva Conventions require an occupying power to protect the assets of the state, but there is little precedent for determining if state-owned industries are included in this provision of the Conventions.
Christopher Foote, William Block, Keith Crane, and Simon Gray, “Economic Policy and Prospects in Iraq,” Journal of Economic Perspectives 18, no. 3 (Summer 2004).
47 Timothy Carney, Senior Advisor to the Ministry of Industry and Minerals, memorandum to Peter McPherson, CPA Director of Economic Policy, “Fatal Flaws in Budget Policy towards State-Owned Enterprises,” June 15, 2003. Timothy Carney was Ambassador to Sudan (1995–1997) and Haiti (1998–1999) and served with UN peacekeeping missions in Cambodia, Somalia and South Africa. State Department Biography, “Timothy M. Carney, Chargé d’Affaires,” http://haiti.usembassy.gov/timothy_m4._carney.
48 International Monetary Fund, “Iraq: Macroeconomic Assessment,” October 21, 2003, 9.
49 SIGIR interview with Dr. Sami Al-Araji, Deputy Minister of Industry and Minerals, May 2007.
50 John B. Taylor, Under Secretary of the Treasury for International Affairs, Testimony before the Senate Committee on Foreign Relations, June 4, 2003.
51 USAID IG Audit E-266-04-004-P, “Audit of USAID/Iraq’s Economic Reform Program,” September 20, 2004; and SIGIR interview with Gareth Davies, Chief of Party, Bearing Point, May 15, 2007.
52 CPA Order Number 18, “Measures to Ensure the Independence of the Central Bank of Iraq,” July 7, 2003.
53 CPA Order Number 20, “Trade Bank of Iraq,” July 14, 2003 54 Peter McPherson, former CPA director of Economic Policy, written comments to SIGIR, January 3, 2009.
55 CPA Order Number 40, “Bank Law,” September 19, 2003.
56 SIGIR interview with Gareth Davies, Chief of Party, Bearing Point, May 15, 2007.
57 Peter McPherson, former CPA Director of Economic Policy, written comments to SIGIR, August 19, 2008.
58 Christopher Foote, William Block, Keith Crane, and Simon Gray, “Economic Policy and Prospects in Iraq,” Journal of Economic Perspectives 18, no. 3 (Summer 2004).
59 Anne Ellen Henderson, USIP Special Report 138, “The Coalition Provisional Authority’s Experience with Economic Reconstruction in Iraq,” April 2005. Under the Oil-for-Food program, the United Nations assisted the government of Iraq in providing a “food basket” for all Iraqis. An estimated 60 percent of the population depended on the food and supplies provided by the UN. This social safety net cost the Iraqi government about $4.9 billion per year. International Monetary Fund, “Iraq: Macroeconomic Assessment,” October, 21, 2003.
60 Ali A. Allawi, The Occupation of Iraq: Winning the War and Losing the Peace (New Haven, CT: Yale University Press, 2007).
Chapter 9
1 Dave Oliver, “Restarting the Economy in Iraq,” November 2003, 23.
2 Bechtel National, Inc, “Iraq Infrastructure Reconstruction Program,” Assessment Report submitted to USAID, June 2003, 4.4.
• 391 •
• Endnotes •
3 Bechtel National, Inc, “Iraq Infrastructure Reconstruction Program,” Assessment Report submitted to USAID, June 2003, 3.1.
4 Bechtel National, Inc, “Iraq Infrastructure Reconstruction Program,” Assessment Report submitted to USAID, June 2003, 3.1.
5 USACE, “Iraqi Oil Infrastructure Restoration Strategic Plan, Rough Order of Magnitude,” June 3, 2003, ii, 5, 6.
6 USACE, “Iraqi Oil Infrastructure Restoration Strategic Plan, Rough Order of Magnitude,” June 3, 2003, 1.
7 USACE, “Iraqi Oil Infrastructure Restoration Strategic Plan, Rough Order of Magnitude,” June 3, 2003; and Joint Planning Workshop, “Restoration of Iraqi Oil Infrastructure Final Work Plan,” July 24, 2003, http:// www.energyintel.com/resources/workplan.pdf.
8 United Nations/World Bank, “Joint Iraq Needs Assessment,” October 2003.
9 United Nations/World Bank, “Joint Iraq Needs Assessment,” October 2003, v, 55-56.
10 United Nations/World Bank, “Joint Iraq Needs Assessment,” October 2003, 3.
11 United Nations/World Bank, “Joint Iraq Needs Assessment,” October 2003, 56.
12 Frederick Barton, Bathsheba N. Crocker, John J. Hamre, Johanna Mendelson-Forman, and Robert C. Orr, “Iraq’s Post-Conflict Reconstruction: A Field Review and Recommendations,” July 17, 2003, foreword, iii.
13 Frederick Barton, Bathsheba N. Crocker, John J. Hamre, Johanna Mendelson-Forman, and Robert C. Orr, “Iraq’s Post-Conflict Reconstruction: A Field Review and Recommendations,” July 17, 2003, 2, 5-7.
14 The Office of Strategic Planning was later renamed the Office of Policy, Planning, and Analysis. Dayton Maxwell, “Deliberate and Development Post-Conflict Planning in Iraq: The Office of Policy, Planning and Analysis, Coalition Provisional Authority, A USAID Perspective,” unpublished manuscript, July 23, 2004, 5.
15 ORHA/CPA Historian interview with Dayton Maxwell, USAID official assigned to the CPA Office of Policy, Planning, and Analysis, and Lieutenant Colonel Robert B. Polk, ORHA Director of Plans, August 14, 2003.
16 Dayton Maxwell, “Deliberate and Development Post Conflict Planning in Iraq: The Office of Policy, Planning and Analysis, Coalition Provisional Authority, A USAID Perspective,” unpublished manuscript, July 23, 2004, 9-10; and ORHA/CPA Historian interview with Dayton Maxwell, USAID official assigned to the CPA Office of Policy, Planning, and Analysis, and Lieutenant Colonel Robert B. Polk, ORHA Director of Plans, August 14, 2003.
17 CPA, A Vision for Iraq, July 11, 2003.
18 L. Paul Bremer III, CPA Administrator, memorandum to President Bush, “Iraqi Strategy,” July 21, 2003.
19 Dayton Maxwell, “Deliberate and Development Post-Conflict Planning in Iraq: The Office of Policy, Planning and Analysis, Coalition Provisional Authority, A USAID Perspective,” unpublished manuscript, July 23, 2004, 27.
20 Dayton Maxwell, “Deliberate and Development Post Conflict Planning in Iraq: The Office of Policy, Planning and Analysis, Coalition Provisional Authority, A USAID Perspective,” unpublished manuscript, July 23, 2004, 27-28.
21 ORHA/CPA Historian interview with Dayton Maxwell, USAID official assigned to the CPA Office of Policy, Planning, and Analysis, and Lieutenant Colonel Robert B. Polk, ORHA Director of Plans, August 14, 2003.
22 CPA, “Achieving the Vision to Restore Full Sovereignty to the Iraqi People,” October 1, 2003.
23 CPA, “Republic of Iraq Budget Revenues and Expenses: 2003 July-December,” 2003, 3, 5-6.
24 Dave Oliver, “Restarting the Economy in Iraq,” November 2003, 24-25.
25 Dave Oliver, “Restarting the Economy in Iraq,” November 2003, 20, 24-25.
26 Dave Oliver, “Restarting the Economy in Iraq,” November 2003, 20, 30.
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27 SIGIR interview with Rear Adm. (Ret.) David Nash, former Director of the Iraq PMO, January 13, 2006.
28 ORHA/CPA Historian interview with Rear Adm. (Ret) David Nash, Director of the Iraq PMO, July 1, 2004; and Design-Build Institute of America, “Leadership and Staff: David Nash,” http://www.dbia.org/ about/staff/bod/nash.htm.
29 Tom C. Korologos, CPA congressional liaison, memorandum to L. Paul Bremer III, CPA Administrator, “Supplemental Memo Rebuttal,” August 17, 2003.
30 Tom C. Korologos, CPA congressional liaison, memorandum to L. Paul Bremer III, CPA Administrator, “Supplemental Memo Rebuttal,” August 17, 2003.
31 CPA, “Program/Integration Management Plan Recovery, Reconstruction and Redevelopment of Iraq,” August 29, 2003, 1.
32 CPA, “Request to Rehabilitate and Reconstruct Iraq,” September 2003, 2.
33 George W. Bush, “Address of the President to the Nation,” White House Press Release, September 7, 2003.
34 SIGIR interview with Christopher Milligan, USAID Deputy Director of Iraq, February 9, 2006.
35 SIGIR interview with Andrew Natsios, former USAID Administrator, March 17, 2008.
36 SIGIR interview with Andrew Natsios, former USAID Administrator, March 17, 2008.
37 SIGIR interview with Christopher Milligan, USAID Deputy Director of Iraq, February 9, 2006.
38 Lewis Lucke, USAID mission director in Iraq, email to Rear Adm. (Ret.) David Oliver, CPA Director, Management and Budget Office, “RE: Final Draft Info Paper on Execution of the FY04 Supplemental for Iraq Relief Reconstruction Fund2,” October 21, 2003.
39 USAID, “Priorities for USAID under FY04 Supplemental,” October 2003.
40 SIGIR interview with Rear Adm. (Ret.) David Nash, former Director of the Iraq PMO, March 3, 2006;
SIGIR interview with Christopher Milligan, USAID Deputy Director of Iraq, February 9, 2006; and SIGIR interview with Dayton Maxwell, USAID Official assigned to the CPA Office of Policy, Planning and Analysis, November 3, 2005.
41 Representative Nita M. Lowey, Testimony before the House Appropriations Subcommittee on Foreign Operations, Export Financing, and Related Programs, September 24, 2003.
42 Representative David R. Obey, Testimony before the House Appropriations Subcommittee on Foreign Operations, Export Financing and Related Programs, September 30, 2003.
43 Questions from the House and Senate Staffs and Answers attached to an email to Adm. (Ret.) David Oliver, CPA Director, Management and Budget Office, October 4, 2003.
44 Questions from the House and Senate Staffs and Answers attached to an email to Adm. (Ret.) David Oliver, CPA Director, Management and Budget Office, October 4, 2003.
45 Questions from the House and Senate Staffs and Answers attached to an email to Adm. (Ret.) David Oliver, CPA Director, Management and Budget Office, October 4, 2003.
46 CPA Regulation Number 5, “Regarding the Council for International Coordination,” June 18, 2003.
47 ORHA/CPA Historian interview with Peter Andrew Bearpark, CPA Director of Operations, December 18, 2003; and ORHA/CPA Historian interview with Andrew L.J. Goledzinowski, Deputy Chairman, Council for International Coordination, January 1, 2004. Marek Belka became Prime Minister of Poland in June 2004 after serving with the CPA. UN, “Marek Belka, Executive Secretary of the United Nations Economic Commission for Europe,” http://www.un.org/sg/senstaff_details.asp?smgID=3.
48 United Nations, “In Memoriam,” September 4, 2003, http://www.un.org/staff/condolence/inmemoriam.
html.
49 UN Press Release, “Annan to Withdraw UN Staff from Iraq,” March 17, 2003.
50 United Nations Security Council Resolution 1511, October 16, 2003.
• 393 •
• Endnotes •
51 Joseph A. Christoff, GAO Director of International Affairs and Trade, Testimony before the House Committee on Foreign Affairs Subcommittee on International Organizations, Human Rights, and Oversight, May 9, 2007.
52 United Nations Assistance Mission for Iraq, “Trust Fund Facility,” http://www.uniraq.org/donors/irffi.asp.
53 Congress added two important oversight mechanisms to the legislation. Section 2207 of the law required the Office of Management and Budget to produce quarterly reports documenting how the money was being spent. Section 3001 created the Office of the Inspector General of the CPA. It required the Inspector General to produce quarterly reports to the Congress on the “obligations, expenditures, and revenues associated with reconstruction and rehabilitation activities in Iraq.” P.L. 108-106, Emergency Supplemental Appropriations Act for Defense and for the Reconstruction of Iraq and Afghanistan for Fiscal Year 2004, November 6, 2003.
54 P.L. 108-106, Emergency Supplemental Appropriations Act for Defense and for the Reconstruction of Iraq and Afghanistan for Fiscal Year 2004, November 6, 2003.
55 P.L. 108-106, Emergency Supplemental Appropriations Act for Defense and for the Reconstruction of Iraq and Afghanistan for Fiscal Year 2004, November 6, 2003.
Chapter 10
1 OMB, Section 2207 Report, January 2004; and SIGIR Lessons Learned Forum: Program and Project Management, April 12, 2006.
2 SIGIR, “Iraq Reconstruction: Lessons in Program and Project Management,” March 2007, 48-49, 53-54.
3 ORHA/CPA Historian interview with Steve Browning, former Task Force RIO Advisor, July 21, 2007.
4 Dov S. Zakheim, former Under Secretary of Defense and DoD Chief Financial Officer, email to SIGIR, “Re:
An Iraq-related question for SIGIR Lessons Learned,” June 30, 2008.
5 Rear Adm. (Ret.) David Nash, Director of the Iraq PMO, email to Peter Andrew Bearpark, CPA Director of Operations, “Re: Establishing Communications,” September 18, 2003.
6 DoD Cover Brief, “Project from the Coalition Provisional Authority (CPA)—Iraq Project Management Office (PMO),” September 9, 2003; and SIGIR interview with Craig Johnson, Stanley Consultants, spokesman for the “Baker-Stanley” team and former PMO Program Engineer, March 9, 2006.
7 CPA/Department of the Army, letter to Principal Assistant Responsible for Contracting (PARC), September 15, 2003.
8 SIGIR interview with Craig Johnson, Stanley Consultants, spokesman for the “Baker-Stanley” team and former PMO Program Engineer, March 9, 2006; and Craig Johnson, Stanley Consultants, spokesman for the “Baker-Stanley” team and former PMO Program Engineer, written comments to SIGIR, November 4, 2008.
9 SIGIR, “Iraq Reconstruction: Lessons in Program and Project Management,” March 2007, 56; and SIGIR interview with Rear Adm. (Ret.) David Nash, former Director of the Iraq PMO, March 3, 2006.
10 USACE, comments to SIGIR, November 4, 2008. A design-build contractor is responsible for every phase of a project from design to completion, although it may subcontract pieces of a project to other contractors.
SIGIR, “Iraq Reconstruction: Lessons in Program and Project Management,” March 2007, 56.
11 SIGIR, “Iraq Reconstruction: Lessons in Program and Project Management,” March 2007, 53; and ORHA/ CPA Historian interview with Major General Ronald Johnson, Deputy Director of the Iraq PMO, June 27, 2004.
12 SIGIR Lessons Learned Forum: Program and Project Management, Washington, DC, April 12, 2006.
13 SIGIR Lessons Learned Forum: Contracting and Procurement, Washington, DC, December 5, 2005; and SIGIR, “Iraq Reconstruction: Lessons in Program and Project Management,” March 2007, 52-53, 57-59.
14 SIGIR, “Iraq Reconstruction: Lessons in Program and Project Management,” March 2007, 53.
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15 SIGIR, “Iraq Reconstruction: Lessons in Contracting and Procurement,” July 2006, 55; and DoD, “Iraq Reconstruction Pre-Proposal Conference Briefing, Program Management and Design-Build Construction,” January 21, 2004, 10, 27, 32.
16 Dov S. Zakheim, former Under Secretary of Defense and DoD Chief Financial Officer, email to SIGIR, “Re:
An Iraq-related question for SIGIR Lessons Learned,” June 30, 2008.
17 SIGIR interview with Rear Adm. (Ret.) David Nash, former Director of the Iraq PMO, January 13, 2006.
18 SIGIR Lessons Learned Forum: Program and Project Management, Washington, DC, April 12, 2006.
19 SIGIR Lessons Learned Forum: Program and Project Management, Washington, DC, April 12, 2006; and SIGIR Lessons Learned Forum: Contracting and Procurement, Washington, DC, December 5, 2005.
20 PMO/PCO Historian interview with Tina Ballard, Deputy Assistant Secretary of the Army, November 17, 2004.
21 SIGIR, “Iraq Reconstruction: Lessons in Contracting and Procurement,” July 2006, 54-56.
22 PMO/PCO Historian interview with Tina Ballard, Deputy Assistant Secretary of the Army, November 17, 2004.
23 Paul Wolfowitz, “Determination and Findings,” December 5, 2003; and GAO Report 04-605, “Rebuilding Iraq: Fiscal Year 2003 Contract Award Procedures and Management Challenges,” June 2004, 28-46. GAO identified two issues with the memorandum. First, GAO concluded that the memorandum constituted a class determination and finding, which is prohibited by the Federal Acquisition Regulation. Additionally, GAO noted that the waiver to competition requirements was based on a public interest exception, which can only be issued by the Secretary of Defense. GAO noted that while the Deputy Secretary has broad authority to act on behalf of the Secretary of Defense, he did not have authority to do so in this instance.
24 CPA-IG Audit 04-005, “Award of Sector Design-Build Construction Contracts,” July 23, 2004, 6.
25 SIGIR, “Iraq Reconstruction: Lessons in Program and Project Management,” March 2007, 64-65; and PMO/PCO Historian interview with Tina Ballard, Deputy Assistant Secretary of the Army, November 17, 2004.
26 CPA, “Rebuilding Iraq: Prioritized Supplemental Project List,” December 1, 2003; and SIGIR interview with Craig Johnson, Stanley Consultants, spokesman for the “Baker-Stanley” team and former PMO Program Engineer, March 9, 2006.
27 SIGIR interview with Craig Johnson, Stanley Consultants, spokesman for the “Baker-Stanley” team and former PMO Program Engineer, March 9, 2006; and Craig Johnson, Stanley Consultants, spokesman for the “Baker-Stanley” team and former PMO Program Engineer, written comments to SIGIR, November 4, 2008.
28 SIGIR interview with Craig Johnson, Stanley Consultants, spokesman for the “Baker-Stanley” team and former PMO Program Engineer, March 9, 2006.
29 SIGIR interview with James Haveman, former Senior Advisor to the Ministry of Health, December 22, 2005; and SIGIR interview with Craig Johnson, Stanley Consultants, spokesman for the “Baker-Stanley” team and former PMO Program Engineer, March 9, 2006.
30 SIGIR interview with Craig Johnson, Stanley Consultants, spokesman for the “Baker-Stanley” team and former PMO Program Engineer, March 9, 2006.
31 Craig Johnson, Stanley Consultants, spokesman for the “Baker-Stanley” team and former PMO Program Engineer, written comments to SIGIR, November 4, 2008.
32 SIGIR interview with Rear Adm. (Ret.) David Nash, former Director of the Iraq PMO, March 3, 2006.
33 SIGIR Lessons Learned Forum: Program and Project Management, Washington, DC, April 12, 2006.
34 SIGIR interview with Rear Adm. (Ret.) David Nash, former Director of the Iraq PMO, January 13, 2006.
35 SIGIR interview with Andrew Natsios, former USAID Administrator, March 17, 2008.
36 SIGIR interview with Andrew Natsios, former USAID Administrator, April 17, 2006.
37 SIGIR interview with Andrew Natsios, former USAID Administrator, April 17, 2006.
• 395 •
• Endnotes •
38 SIGIR interview with Andrew Natsios, former USAID Administrator, April 17, 2006.
39 OMB, Section 2207 Report, January 2004. The decision to transfer sovereignty earlier than originally envi- sioned by Ambassador Bremer is discussed in detail in subsequent chapters. The CPA—and the U.S. Embassy that replaced it in June 2004—repeatedly re-aligned money in the supplemental to meet changing needs on the ground in Iraq. Part III of this book looks at re-programming in more depth.
40 OMB, Section 2207 Report, January 2004.
41 OMB, Section 2207 Report, January 2004.
42 SIGIR Audit 05-026, “Fact Sheet on the Use of the $50 million Appropriation to Support the Management and Reporting of the Iraq Relief and Reconstruction Fund,” January 27, 2006; and SIGIR interview with Rear Adm. (Ret.) David Nash, former Director of the Iraq PMO, March 3, 2006.
43 CPA, “Program Management Plan,” October 15, 2003, Figure 2 as cited in: SIGIR, “Iraq Reconstruction:
Lessons in Program and Project Management,” March 2007, 60.
44 SIGIR interview with Rear Adm. (Ret.) David Nash, former Director of the Iraq PMO, March 3, 2006.
45 SIGIR Lessons Learned Forum: Program and Project Management, Washington, DC, April 12, 2006.
46 SIGIR, “Iraq Reconstruction: Lessons in Contracting and Procurement,” July 2006, 66; SIGIR interview with James “Spike” Stephenson, USAID Iraq Mission Director, January 19, 2006; and SIGIR interview with Andrew Natsios, former USAID Administrator, April 17, 2006.
47 James Stephenson, Losing the Golden Hour, An Insider’s View of Iraq’s Reconstruction (Washington, DC:
Potomac Books, 2007).
48 SIGIR interview with Rear Adm. (Ret.) David Nash, former Director of the Iraq PMO, January 13, 2006.
49 SIGIR interview with Rear Adm. (Ret.) David Nash, former Director of the Iraq PMO, March 3, 2006.
50 James Stephenson, Losing the Golden Hour, An Insider’s View of Iraq’s Reconstruction (Washington, DC:
Potomac Books, 2007), 33.
51 James Stephenson, Losing the Golden Hour, An Insider’s View of Iraq’s Reconstruction (Washington, DC:
Potomac Books, 2007), 32-35.
52 CPA-IG Audit 04-004, “Task Orders Awarded by the Air Force Center for Environmental Excellence in Support of the Coalition Provisional Authority,” July 28, 2004, 4-5, 7-8.
53 CPA-IG Audit 04-004, “Task Orders Awarded by the Air Force Center for Environmental Excellence in Support of the Coalition Provisional Authority,” July 28, 2004, 4-5.
54 John Daley, U.S. Army Corps of Engineers, written comments to SIGIR, June 26, 2008.
55 SIGIR, “Iraq Reconstruction: Lessons in Contracting and Procurement,” July 2006, 60.
56 OMB, Section 2207 Report, July 2004, Funding Table.
Chapter 11
1 SIGIR interview with Vijay Samaraweera, Senior Policy Advisor for Regional Government, RTI International, August 16, 2007.
2 For Umm Qasr and South-Central, see ORHA/CPA Historian interview with Mike Gfoeller, former Deputy Director of ORHA Region-South, August 10, 2003; Amatzia Baram, “Post-Saddam Iraq: The Shiite Factor,” The Brookings Institution, April 30, 2003; and Ken Pollack, “The Seven Deadly Sins of Failure in Iraq: A Retrospective Analysis of the Reconstruction,” The Brookings Institution, December 1, 2006.
3 Peter W. Brorsen, “Accountability Builds Legitimate Government,” Capacity.org 32 (December 2007);
USAID, “Transcript: Local Governance Update,” June 19, 2003; and USAID, “New Freedom and Opportunities: Founding a New Democracy in Iraq”, November 18, 2003.
4 ORHA/CPA Historian interview with Major Gen. David Petraeus, Commander of the 101st Airborne Division, July 28, 2003.
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5 ORHA/CPA Historian interview with Major General David Petraeus, Commander of the 101st Airborne Division, July 28, 2003.
6 ORHA/CPA Historian interview with J. Scott Carpenter, CPA Director of Governance, June 18, 2004.
7 L. Paul Bremer, III, former CPA Administrator, written comments to SIGIR, December 19, 2008.
8 ORHA/CPA Historian interview with J. Scott Carpenter, CPA Director of Governance, June 18, 2004.
9 SIGIR, “Iraq Reconstruction: Lessons in Contracting and Procurement,” July 2006, 32; and Research Triangle Institute, USAID contract EDG-C00-03-00010-00, Section C, April 11, 2003.
10 SIGIR interview with Dr. Ronald Johnson, Senior Vice President for International Development, RTI International, March 2, 2006.
11 USIP interview with Aaron Williams, Vice President for International Business Development, RTI International, October 1, 2004.
12 USIP interview with Charles “Chuck” Costello, Deputy Chief of Party in the Local Governance Support Project with RTI International, October 14, 2004.
13 USIP interview with Aaron Williams, Vice President for International Business Development, RTI International, October 1, 2004.
14 USIP interview with Aaron Williams, Vice President for International Business Development, RTI International, October 1, 2004.
15 USIP interview with Charles “Chuck” Costello, Deputy Chief of Party in the Local Governance Support Project with RTI International, October 14, 2004.
16 USIP interview with Aaron Williams, Vice President for International Business Development, RTI International, October 1, 2004; SIGIR interview with Dr. Ronald Johnson, Senior Vice President for International Development, RTI International, March 2, 2006; and USIP interview with Charles “Chuck” Costello, Deputy Chief of Party in the Local Governance Support Project with RTI International, October 14, 2004.
17 RTI International, “Lessons Learned Brief: Military-Civilian Cooperation in Postwar Iraq: Experience with Local Governance Reconstruction,” Brief no. 7, May 2005.
18 USAID IG Audit E-267-05-001-P, “Audit of USAID/Iraq’s Community Action Program,” January 31, 2005, 6.
19 USAID IG Audit E-267-05-001-P, “Audit of USAID/Iraq’s Community Action Program,” January 31, 2005, 5, 11-12.
20 SIGIR interview with Steve Connolly, QRF Coordinator for DAI, December 21, 2006.
21 SIGIR Audit 05-004, “Oversight of Funds Provided to Iraqi Ministries through the National Budget Process,” January 30, 2005, 3, 15.
22 United Nations Security Council Resolution 1483, May 22, 2003.
23 ORHA/CPA Historian interview with J. Scott Carpenter, CPA Director of Governance, June 29, 2004.
24 The English translation of the fatwa differs depending on who did the translation. BBC News/Middle East, “Ayatollah Sistani in quotes,” August 27, 2004; Babak Rahimi, USIP Report 187, “Ayatollah Sistani and the Democratization of Post-Ba’athist Iraq,” June 2007; and Rajiv Chandrasekaran, “How Cleric Trumped U.S. Plan for Iraq: Ayatollah’s Call for Vote Forced Occupation Leader to Rewrite Transition Strategy,” Washington Post, November 26, 2003.
25 According to Carpenter, the Council consisted of 25 members so each could select a cabinet minister.
ORHA/CPA Historian interview with J. Scott Carpenter, CPA Director of Governance, June 29, 2004.
26 L. Paul Bremer III, “Iraq’s Path to Sovereignty,” Washington Post, Op-Ed, September 8, 2003.
27 Donald Rumsfeld, former Secretary of Defense, written comments to SIGIR, November 5, 2008.
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• Endnotes •
28 L. Paul Bremer III, “Facts for Feith: CPA History,” National Review, March 19, 2008; and SIGIR interview with L. Paul Bremer III, former CPA Administrator, July 11, 2008.
29 SIGIR interview with Douglas Feith, former Under Secretary of Defense for Policy, March 20, 2008.
30 L. Paul Bremer III, My Year in Iraq: The Struggle to Build a future of Hope (New York: Simon & Schuster, 2006), 167.
31 L. Paul Bremer III, My Year in Iraq: The Struggle to Build a future of Hope (New York: Simon & Schuster, 2006), 187.
32 L. Paul Bremer III, My Year in Iraq: The Struggle to Build a future of Hope (New York: Simon & Schuster, 2006), 188; and David. E. Sanger, “White House to Overhaul Iraq and Afghan Missions,” New York Times, October 6, 2003.
33 Public Broadcasting Service, “Interview: Robert Blackwill,” FRONTLINE, July 25, 2006.
34 SIGIR interview with Richard Armitage, former Deputy Secretary of State, February 4, 2008.
35 Public Broadcasting Service, “Interview: Robert Blackwill,” FRONTLINE, July 25, 2006.
36 SIGIR interview with Frank Miller, former Chairman of the Executive Steering Group of the NSC, February 4, 2008.
37 United Nations Security Council Resolution 1511, October 16, 2003.
38 Iraqi Governing Council and the Coalition Provisional Authority, “The November 15 Agreement: Timeline to a Sovereign, Democratic and Secure Iraq,” November 15, 2003.
39 Iraqi Governing Council and the Coalition Provisional Authority, “The November 15 Agreement: Timeline to a Sovereign, Democratic and Secure Iraq,” November 15, 2003.
40 Iraq’s eighteen major federal units are called governorates or provinces. The terms are used interchangeably, but this book will exclusively use the term “province.” Sharon Otterman, “Iraq: The Changing Plan,” Council on Foreign Relations, December 1, 2003.
41 RTI International, “Lessons Learned Brief: Military-Civilian Cooperation in Postwar Iraq: Experience with Local Governance Reconstruction,” Brief no. 7, May 2005.
42 Mark Etherington, Revolt on the Tigris: The al-Sadr Uprising and the Governing of Iraq (Ithaca, NY: Cornell University Press, 2005), 223-224.
43 USAID IG Audit E-267-06-003-P, “Audit of USAID/Iraq’s Local Governance Activities,” July 10, 2006, 5.
44 Mark Etherington, Revolt on the Tigris: The al-Sadr Uprising and the Governing of Iraq (Ithaca, NY: Cornell University Press, 2005), 133.
45 GAO Report 04-902R, “Rebuilding Iraq: Resource, Security, Governance, Essential Services, and Oversight Issues,” June 2004, 32.
46 SIGIR, “Iraq Reconstruction: Lessons in Program and Project Management,” March 2007, 70, 101.
47 SIGIR, Quarterly Report to the United States Congress, October 2003, 69.
48 CPA Order Number 71, “Local Governmental Powers,” April 6, 2004.
49 CPA, “Republic of Iraq: 2004 Budget,” October 2003. For all of Iraq’s 2003 and 2004 budgets, see http:// www.cpa-iraq.org/budget.
50 USIP interview with Charles “Chuck” Costello, Deputy Chief of Party in the Local Governance Support Project with RTI International, October 14, 2004.
Chapter 12
1 Robert Perito, USIP Special Report 137, “The Coalition Provisional Authority’s Experience with Public Security in Iraq: Lessons Identified,” April 2005, 3; and DoD Briefing, “Rebuilding the Iraqi Military,” January 21, 2003, declassified March 12, 2007, 2.
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• Chapter 12 •
2 Scott Feil, “Building Better Foundations: Security in Postconflict Reconstruction,” The Washington Quarterly 25, no. 4 (Autumn 2002), 97-98.
3 Michael Gordon, “For Training Iraq’s Police, the Main Problem Was Time,” New York Times, October 21, 2004.
4 SIGIR interview with Frank Miller, former Chairman of the Executive Steering Group of the NSC, February 4, 2008.
5 Even if an organized insurgency had not begun, the Iraqi police would probably have had difficulty maintain- ing order. At the eve of the invasion, a web of secret police, paramilitary organizations, and intelligence services were the main providers of public order. However, these groups were guilty of many human rights abuses com- mitted under Saddam, and DoD prewar planning called for their dissolution. In contrast, the Iraqi police service only ventured out of their stations “to round up possible suspects, extract confessions by force, and extort bribes from family members for release of the suspects.” Seth G. Jones, Jeremy M. Wilson, Andrew Rathmell, and K. Jack Riley, Establishing Law and Order after Conflict (Santa Monica, CA: RAND Corporation, 2005),
109-110; and Robert Perito, USIP Special Report 137, “The Coalition Provisional Authority’s Experience with Public Security in Iraq: Lessons Identified,” April 2005, 2-3. DoD Briefing, “Rebuilding the Iraqi Military,” January 21, 2003, declassified March 12, 2007.
6 SIGIR interview with Frank Miller, former Chairman of the Executive Steering Group of the NSC, February 4, 2008. CIA officials denied Frank Miller’s claim that they provided intelligence assessments suggesting Iraq’s police were capable of maintaining order. Michael Gordon, “For Training Iraq’s Police, the Main Problem Was Time,” New York Times, October 21, 2004.
7 SIGIR interview with Gerald Burke, Advisor to the Baghdad police, June 14, 2007.
8 CPA, “Iraqi Police: An Assessment of the Present and Recommendations for the Future,” May 30, 2003, 20, as cited in: House Armed Services Committee Subcommittee on Oversight and Investigations, “Stand Up and Be Counted: The Continuing Challenge of Building the Iraqi Security Forces,” July 2007, 55.
9 Robert Perito, USIP Special Report 137, “The Coalition Provisional Authority’s Experience with Public Security in Iraq: Lessons Identified,” April 2005, 5. Police trainers conduct classroom instruction on human rights, investigations, and rule of law, in addition to firing range and other practice exercises. Police advisors conduct follow-up training and mentorship in the field, where they coach and support new police officers as they apply their new methods and techniques.
10 SIGIR interview with Gerald Burke, Advisor to the Baghdad police, June 14, 2007.
11 Robert Perito, USIP Special Report 137, “The Coalition Provisional Authority’s Experience with Public Security in Iraq: Lessons Identified,” April 2005, 6.
12 White House Press Release, “President Bush, Police Commissioner Kerik Discuss Police Force in Iraq,” October 3, 2003; and SIGIR interview with Major General Paul Eaton, former Commander of CMATT and OSC, May 28, 2008.
13 Lieutenant General Ricardo Sanchez quoted in: Stephanie Gaskell, “Former Iraq Commander: Bernard Kerik Was ‘A Waste of Time’ in Iraq,” New York Daily News, May 5, 2008. See also Lieutenant General Ricardo S. Sanchez, Wiser in Battle: A Soldier’s Story (New York: HarperCollins, 2008), 249-251.
14 Lieutenant General Ricardo S. Sanchez, Wiser in Battle: A Soldier’s Story (New York: HarperCollins, 2008), 191; and Kristopher Joseph, “18th Military Police Brigade helps Iraqis Restore Law and Order,” USAREUR News Release, May 16, 2003.
15 L. Paul Bremer III, My Year in Iraq: The Struggle to Build a Future of Hope (New York: Simon & Schuster, 2006), 19.
16 DoS IG Report ISP-IQO-05-72 and DoD IG Report IE-2005-002, “Interagency Assessment of Iraq Police Training,” July 15, 2005, 19.
17 SIGIR interview with John Meiklejohn, Advisor for police academies and curriculum, June 14, 2007.
• 399 •
• Endnotes •
18 SIGIR interview with John Meiklejohn, Advisor for police academies and curriculum, June 14, 2007; and L. Paul Bremer III, My Year in Iraq: The Struggle to Build a Future of Hope (New York: Simon & Schuster, 2006), 168.
19 SIGIR interview with John Meiklejohn, Advisor for police academies and curriculum, June 14, 2007.
20 DoS IG Report ISP-IQO-05-72 and DoD IG Report IE-2005-002, “Interagency Assessment of Iraq Police Training,” July 15, 2005, 39-40, 55.
21 Initial allocations from the Iraqi budget for the Ministry of Interior totaled $22.9 million, including $2.4 million for operational expenses and $20.5 million for capital expenditures. CPA, “Republic of Iraq Budget Revenues and Expenses: 2003 July-December,” 2003. Capital expenditures were reduced with the revision, to $16.5 million. CPA, “Summary of Changes to Ministry Budgets Arising from 30 Day Review,” July 2003.
22 L. Paul Bremer III, My Year in Iraq: The Struggle to Build a Future of Hope (New York: Simon & Schuster, 2006), 168-170; and GAO Report 04-902R, “Rebuilding Iraq: Resource, Security, Governance, Essential Services, and Oversight Issues,” June 2004, 57.
23 Andrew Rathmell, Olga Oliker, Terrence K. Kelly, David Brannan, and Keith Crane, Developing Iraq’s Security Sector: The Coalition Provisional Authority’s Experience (Santa Monica, CA: RAND Corporation, 2005), 46.
24 CPA Order Number 26, “Creation of the Department of Border Enforcement,” August 24, 2003.
25 U.S. troops deployed as immigration inspectors received a three-hour training module. In the United States, training for immigration duties takes four months, followed by extensive field training, and an immigration officer in the United States would not be considered proficient at reviewing documents for at least three years.
USIP interview with Larry G. Hines, Advisor for customs and border enforcement, October 3, 2004.
26 Robert Perito, USIP Special Report 137, “The Coalition Provisional Authority’s Experience with Public Security in Iraq: Lessons Identified,” April 2005, 9.
27 CPA Order Number 27, “Establishment of the Facilities Protection Service,” September 4, 2003.
28 Sharon Otterman, “Iraq: Security Forces,” Council on Foreign Relations , March 16, 2004; and Walter Slocombe, “Iraq’s Special Challenge: Security Sector Reform ‘Under Fire,’” in Reform and Reconstruction of the Security Sector, ed. Alan Bryden and Heiner Hänggi (Geneva, Switzerland: Geneva Centre for the Democratic Control of Security Forces, 2004), 244.
29 DoD, Measuring Stability and Security in Iraq, June 2007, 36.
30 CPA Order Number 2, “Dissolution of Entities,” May 23, 2003.
31 CPA Order Number 22, “Creation of a New Iraqi Army,” August 7, 2003.
32 Combat Studies Institute interview with Major General Paul Eaton, former Commander of CMATT and OSC, August 3, 2006; and CPA Order Number 22, August 7, 2003.
33 Combat Studies Institute interview with Major General Paul Eaton, former Commander of CMATT and OSC, August 3, 2006.
34 Combat Studies Institute interview with Major General Paul Eaton, former Commander of CMATT and OSC, August 3, 2006.
35 USIP interview with Colonel P.J. Dermer, former CPA governance advisor, August 22, 2004.
36 SIGIR interview with Major General Paul Eaton, former Commander of CMATT and OSC, May 20, 2008.
37 L. Paul Bremer III, My Year in Iraq: The Struggle to Build a Future of Hope (New York: Simon & Schuster, 2006), 150.
38 Combat Studies Institute interview with Major General Paul Eaton, former Commander of CMATT and OSC, August 3, 2006.
39 ORHA/CPA Historian interview with Major General Paul Eaton, former Commander of CMATT and OSC, January 1, 2004.
40 Combat Studies Institute interview with Major General Paul Eaton, former Commander of CMATT and OSC, August 3, 2006.
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41 SIGIR interview with General John Abizaid, former CENTCOM Commander, February 4, 2008.
42 Walter Slocombe, “Iraq’s Special Challenge: Security Sector Reform ‘Under Fire,’” in Reform and Reconstruction of the Security Sector, ed. Alan Bryden and Heiner Hänggi (Geneva, Switzerland: Geneva Centre for the Democratic Control of Security Forces, 2004), 241; and GAO Report 04-902R, “Rebuilding Iraq: Resource, Security, Governance, Essential Services, and Oversight Issues,” June 2004, 57.
43 Lieutenant General Ricardo S. Sanchez, Wiser in Battle: A Soldier’s Story (New York: HarperCollins, 2008), 254; Lieutenant General (Ret.) Ricardo Sanchez, former CJTF-7 Commander, written comments to SIGIR, October 26, 2008; and CPA Order Number 28, “Establishment of the Iraqi Civil Defense Corps,” September 3, 2003.
44 Combat Studies Institute interview with Lieutenant Colonel Blaise Cornell-d’Echert, former CMATT official, October 31, 2006.
45 Lieutenant General Ricardo S. Sanchez, Wiser in Battle: A Soldier’s Story (New York: HarperCollins, 2008), 254-255.
46 Anne Ellen Henderson, USIP Special Report 138, “The Coalition Provisional Authority’s Experience with Economic Reconstruction in Iraq: Lessons Identified,” April 2005, 9.
47 Celeste Ward, USIP Special Report 139, “The Coalition Provisional Authority’s Experience with Governance in Iraq,” May 2005, 6.
48 OMB, Section 2207 Report, January 2004, 18.
49 CPA Office of Policy Planning, “Iraqi Security Sector Reform Action Memo,” November 14, 2003.
50 CPA, “Draft Framework for Iraqi National Security Institution Building,” December 10, 2003.
51 Andrew Rathmell, Olga Oliker, Terrence K. Kelly, David Brannan, and Keith Crane, Developing Iraq’s Security Sector: The Coalition Provisional Authority’s Experience (Santa Monica, CA: RAND Corporation, 2005), 27-28; and USIP interview with Frederick Smith, former Deputy Senior Advisor for National Security Affairs, August 4, 2004.
52 USIP interview with Colonel P.J. Dermer, former CPA governance advisor, August 22, 2004. The reforms made Iraq one of the only Arab countries with a civilian-led defense ministry. Arnold Luethold, “Security Sector Reform: the Arab Middle East,” in Reform and Reconstruction of the Security Sector, ed. Alan Bryden and Heiner Hänggi (Geneva, Switzerland: Geneva Centre for the Democratic Control of Security Forces, 2004), 103.
53 The concern for ethnic balance also extended to the other “power ministries” involved in national security, including the Ministries of Interior, Finance, Foreign Affairs, and Justice. USIP interview with Frederick Smith, former Deputy Senior Advisor for National Security Affairs, August 4, 2004.
54 Andrew Rathmell, Olga Oliker, Terrence K. Kelly, David Brannan, and Keith Crane, Developing Iraq’s Security Sector: The Coalition Provisional Authority’s Experience (Santa Monica, CA: RAND Corporation, 2005), 30.
55 SIGIR interview with Major General Paul Eaton, former Commander of CMATT and OSC, May 28, 2008.
56 Colonel P.J. Dermer, CPA governance advisor, memorandum to Frederick Smith, Deputy Senior Advisor for National Security Affairs, “Thoughts on Choosing the Iraqi Minister of Defense,” December 5, 2003.
57 USIP interview with Frederick Smith, former Deputy Senior Advisor for National Security Affairs, August 4, 2004.
58 ORHA/CPA Historian interview with Steven Casteel, Senior Advisor to the Ministry of Interior, July 3, 2004.
59 SIGIR Audit 07-016, “Interim Review of DynCorp International, LLC, Spending Under Its Contract for the Iraqi Police Training Program,” October 23, 2007.
60 Gerald Burke, Advisor to the Baghdad police, Testimony before the House Armed Services Committee Subcommittee on Oversight and Investigations, April 25, 2007.
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• Endnotes •
61 The relative peace, however, was short-lived. Fewer in number, the 101st Airborne Division’s successors could not prevent Mosul from succumbing to increased violence. Amatzia Baram, USIP Special Report 134, “Who Are the Insurgents? Sunni Arab Rebels in Iraq,” April 2005, 7-9.
62 Public Broadcasting Service, “Interview: General Jack Keane (Ret.),” FRONTLINE, February 8, 2007, and May 1, 2007.
63 OMB, Section 1506 Report, October 2003, 3.
64 SIGIR interview with General (Ret.) Colin Powell, former Secretary of State, February 4, 2008.
65 Former Secretary of Defense Donald Rumsfeld, SIGIR interview, December 12, 2008.
66 L. Paul Bremer III, My Year in Iraq: The Struggle to Build a Future of Hope (New York: Simon & Schuster, 2006), 157.
67 Lieutenant General Ricardo S. Sanchez, Wiser in Battle: A Soldier’s Story (New York: HarperCollins, 2008), 316.
68 SIGIR interview with General John Abizaid, former CENTCOM Commander, February 4, 2008.
69 Robert Perito, USIP Special Report 137, “The Coalition Provisional Authority’s Experience with Public Security in Iraq: Lessons Identified,” April 2005, 11.
70 SIGIR interview with Major General Paul Eaton, former Commander of CMATT and OSC, May 28, 2008.
71 Lieutenant General Ricardo S. Sanchez, Wiser in Battle: A Soldier’s Story (New York: HarperCollins, 2008), 315; and Andrew Rathmell, Olga Oliker, Terrence K. Kelly, David Brannan, and Keith Crane, Developing Iraq’s Security Sector: The Coalition Provisional Authority’s Experience (Santa Monica, CA: RAND Corporation, 2005), 51-52.
72 Operational control was ceded to the military, although the CPA retained administrative control of budgets and policy direction came from CPA advisors. SIGIR interview with Major General Paul Eaton, former Commander of CMATT and OSC, May 28, 2008.
73 Gerald Burke, Advisor to the Baghdad police, Testimony before the House Armed Services Committee, Subcommittee on Oversight and Investigations, April 25, 2007.
74 Lieutenant General Ricardo Sanchez, “Combined Joint Task Force 7 Briefing from Baghdad,” DoD News Transcript, February 26, 2004.
75 Lieutenant General Ricardo Sanchez, “Combined Joint Task Force 7 Briefing from Baghdad,” DoD News Transcript, February 26, 2004; and Sharon Otterman, “Iraq: Security Forces,” Council on Foreign Relations, March 16, 2004.
76 Lieutenant General Ricardo S. Sanchez, Wiser in Battle: A Soldier’s Story (New York: HarperCollins, 2008), 329-331; and GAO Report 04-902R, “Rebuilding Iraq: Resource, Security, Governance, Essential Services, and Oversight Issues,” June 2004, 49, 58.
77 Andrew Rathmell, Olga Oliker, Terrence K. Kelly, David Brannan, and Keith Crane, Developing Iraq’s Security Sector: The Coalition Provisional Authority’s Experience (Santa Monica, CA: RAND Corporation, 2005), 36.
78 GAO Report 04-902R, “Rebuilding Iraq: Resource, Security, Governance, Essential Services, and Oversight Issues,” June 2004, 59.
79 Lawrence Korb, “Five Steps To a More Stable Iraq,” Star-Ledger, April 11, 2004.
80 GAO Report 04-902R, “Rebuilding Iraq: Resource, Security, Governance, Essential Services, and Oversight Issues,” June 2004, 56.
81 CPA Order Number 22, August 7, 2003.
82 SIGIR interview with Major General Paul Eaton, former Commander of CMATT and OSC, May 28, 2008.
83 Lieutenant General Ricardo S. Sanchez, Wiser in Battle: A Soldier’s Story (New York: HarperCollins, 2008), 317.
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84 ORHA/CPA Historian interview with Steven Casteel, Senior Advisor to the Ministry of Interior, July 3, 2004.
85 SIGIR interview with Major General Paul Eaton, former Commander of CMATT and OSC, May 28, 2008.
86 ORHA/CPA Historian interview with David Gompert, Senior Advisor for National Security Affairs, June 13, 2004.
87 SIGIR interview with General John Abizaid, former CENTCOM Commander, February 4, 2008.
88 CPA, A Vision for Iraq, July 11, 2003.
89 DoD, Iraq Status Working Papers, July 13, 2004.
90 DoD, “Transition Update to the Secretary of Defense,” Iraq Interagency Transition Planning Team, June 23, 2004, 5, 11.
91 DoD, Iraq Status Working Papers, July 13, 2004; Anthony Cordesman, Iraqi Security Forces: A Strategy for Success (Westport, CT: Praeger Security International, 2006), 85; and Lieutenant General Ricardo S. Sanchez, Wiser in Battle: A Soldier’s Story (New York: HarperCollins, 2008), 317.
92 Independent Institute for Administration and Civil Security Studies, “Public Opinion in Iraq: First Poll Following Abu Ghraib Revelations,” May 14-23, 2004, http://www.globalpolicy.org/security/issues/iraq/ poll/2004/06iiacss.pdf.
93 Gilbert Burnham, Riyadh Lafta, Shannon Doocy, and Les Roberts, “Mortality after the 2003 Invasion of Iraq: A Cross-Sectional Cluster Sample Survey,” The Lancet 368, no. 9545 (October 21, 2006); and The Brookings Institution, “Iraq Index: Tracking Variables of Reconstruction and Security in Post-Saddam Iraq,” July 23, 2004, 5.
Chapter 13
1 Energy Information Administration, Department of Energy, “Country Analysis Briefs: Iraq,” August 2007, 2.
2 Lawrence Kumins, “Iraq Oil: Reserves, Production, and Potential Revenues,” Congressional Research Service Report RS21626, updated April 13, 2005, 1-2.
3 Energy Information Administration, Department of Energy, “Country Analysis Briefs: Iraq,” August 2007.
4 Norm Kent, ITAO Senior Advisor to the Ministry of Oil, written comments to SIGIR, June 4, 2008.
5 USACE, “Iraqi Oil Infrastructure Restoration Strategic Plan, Rough Order of Magnitude,” June 3, 2003, 1.
6 ORHA/CPA Historian interview with Gary Vogler, Senior Advisor to the Ministry of Oil, June 18, 2003.
7 ORHA/CPA Historian interview with Brigadier General Robert Crear, Commander of Task Force RIO, June 25, 2003.
8 USACE, “Iraqi Oil Infrastructure Restoration Strategic Plan, Rough Order of Magnitude,” June 3, 2003.
9 Energy Information Administration, Department of Energy, “Country Analysis Briefs: Iraq,” August 2007, 14.
10 ORHA/CPA Historian interview with Gary Vogler, Senior Advisor to the Ministry of Oil, June 18, 2003.
11 ORHA/CPA Historian interview with Gary Vogler, Senior Advisor to the Ministry of Oil, June 18, 2003;
and ORHA/CPA Historian interview with Brigadier General Robert Crear, Commander of Task Force RIO, June 25, 2003.
12 GAO Report 04-605, “Rebuilding Iraq: Fiscal Year 2003 Contract Award Procedures and Management Challenges,” June 2004, 19, 36.
13 ORHA/CPA Historian interview with Gary Vogler, Senior Advisor to the Ministry of Oil, June 18, 2003.
14 ORHA/CPA Historian interview with Brigadier General Robert Crear, Commander of Task Force RIO, June 25, 2003.
15 ORHA/CPA Historian interview with Gary Vogler, Senior Advisor to the Oil Ministry, June 18, 2003.
16 ORHA/CPA Historian interview with Gary Vogler, Senior Advisor to the Ministry of Oil, June 18, 2003.
• 403 •
• Endnotes •
17 ORHA/CPA Historian interview with Clark D. Turner, Member of the Energy Infrastructure Planning Group in the Pentagon and Advisor to the Ministry of Oil, June 24, 2003.
18 ORHA/CPA Historian interview with Clark D. Turner, Member of the Energy Infrastructure Planning Group in the Pentagon and Advisor to the Ministry of Oil, June 24, 2003.
19 ORHA/CPA Historian interview with Clark D. Turner, Member of the Energy Infrastructure Planning Group in the Pentagon and Advisor to the Ministry of Oil, June 24, 2003.
20 ORHA/CPA Historian interview with Clark D. Turner, Member of the Energy Infrastructure Planning Group in the Pentagon and Advisor to the Ministry of Oil, June 24, 2003.
21 ORHA/CPA Historian interview with Gary Vogler, Senior Advisor to the Ministry of Oil, June 18, 2003.
22 ORHA/CPA Historian interview with Clark D. Turner, Member of the Energy Infrastructure Planning Group in the Pentagon and Advisor to the Ministry of Oil, June 24, 2003.
23 ORHA/CPA Historian interview with Clark D. Turner, Member of the Energy Infrastructure Planning Group in the Pentagon and Advisor to the Ministry of Oil, June 24, 2003.
24 SIGIR interview with Thamir al-Ghadban, Advisor to the Ministry of Oil, July 7, 2007.
25 ORHA/CPA Historian interview with Clark D. Turner, Member of the Energy Infrastructure Planning Group in the Pentagon and Advisor to the Ministry of Oil, June 24, 2003.
26 USACE, “Iraqi Oil Infrastructure Restoration Strategic Plan, Rough Order of Magnitude,” June 3, 2003, 2.
27 ORHA/CPA Historian interview with Clark D. Turner, Member of the Energy Infrastructure Planning Group in the Pentagon and Advisor to the Ministry of Oil, June 24, 2003.
28 Energy Information Administration, Department of Energy, “Iraq Energy Chronology: 1980-November 2005,” December 2005.
29 ORHA/CPA Historian interview with Gary Vogler, Senior Advisor to the Ministry of Oil, June 18, 2003.
30 ORHA/CPA Historian interview with Gary Vogler, Senior Advisor to the Ministry of Oil, June 18, 2003.
31 GAO Report 07-839, “Defense Contract Management: DOD’s Lack of Adherence to Key Contracting Principles on Iraq Oil Contract Put Government Interests at Risk,” July 2007, 17.
32 GAO Report 07-839, “Defense Contract Management: DOD’s Lack of Adherence to Key Contracting Principles on Iraq Oil Contract Put Government Interests at Risk,” July 2007, 5-7, 17.
33 Joint Planning Workshop, “Restoration of Iraqi Oil Infrastructure Final Work Plan,” July 24, 2003, http:// www.energyintel.com/resources/workplan.pdf.
34 Joint Planning Workshop, “Restoration of Iraqi Oil Infrastructure Final Work Plan,” July 24, 2003, http:// www.energyintel.com/resources/workplan.pdf.
35 Kenneth Katzman, “Iraq: Oil-for-Food Program, International Sanction, and Illicit Trade,” Congressional Research Service Report EL30472, April 16, 2003, Summary.
36 United Nations Security Council Resolution 1483, May 22, 2003.
37 Steve Wright, “Iraqi Oil Exports Increasing,” USACE Engineer Update 27 no.8 (August 2003).
38 Energy Information Administration, Department of Energy, “The Iraq Energy Chronology:
1980-November 2005,” December 2005.
39 ORHA/CPA Historian interview with Gary Vogler, Senior Advisor to the Ministry of Oil, June 18, 2003.
40 International Monetary Fund, “Iraq: Macroeconomic Assessment,” October 21, 2003, 10.
41 The Brookings Institution, “Iraq Index: Tracking Variables of Reconstruction & Security in Post-Saddam Iraq,” June 29, 2006; and United Nations Security Council Resolution 1483, May 22, 2003.
42 Energy Information Administration, Department of Energy, “Iraq Energy Chronology: 1980-November 2005,” December 2005.
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43 Energy Information Administration, Department of Energy, “Iraq Energy Chronology: 1980-November 2005,” December 2005; and ORHA/CPA Historian interview with Gary Vogler, Senior Advisor to the Ministry of Oil, June 18, 2003.
44 CPA, Program Review Board Minutes, July 12, 2003.
45 CPA Contracting Action, Contract DABV01-03-C-0007, awarded to Erinys, August 6, 2003; and Erinys, “The Erinys Iraq Oil Protection Force: Infrastructure Security in a Post-Conflict Environment,” October 2005.
The company’s name is the Greek word for Fury, the mythological personification of vengeance.
46 SIGIR Audit 06-009, “Review of Task Force Shield Programs,” April 28, 2006, 10.
47 SIGIR Audit 06-009, “Review of Task Force Shield Programs,” April 28, 2006, i, 1.
48 SIGIR Audit 06-009, “Review of Task Force Shield Programs,” April 28, 2006, 5-15.
49 Erinys, “The Erinys Iraq Oil Protection Force: Infrastructure Security in a Post-Conflict Environment,” October 2005.
50 Institute for the Analysis of Global Security (IAGS), “Iraq Pipeline Watch,” http://www.iags.org/iraqpipe- linewatch.htm.
51 Erinys, “The Erinys Iraq Oil Protection Force: Infrastructure Security in a Post-Conflict Environment,” October 2005, 23.
52 Erinys, “The Erinys Iraq Oil Protection Force: Infrastructure Security in a Post-Conflict Environment,” October 2005.
53 Institute for the Analysis of Global Security (IAGS), “Iraq Pipeline Watch,” http://www.iags.org/iraqpipe- linewatch.htm.
54 Institute for the Analysis of Global Security (IAGS), “Iraq Pipeline Watch,” http://www.iags.org/iraqpipe- linewatch.htm.
55 ITAO, Monthly Import, Production and Export, response to SIGIR data call for the Quarterly Report to the United States Congress, April 2008; and SIGIR, Quarterly Report to the United States Congress, July 2006, 34.
56 ORHA/CPA Historian interview with J. Michael Stinson, Senior Advisor to the Ministry of Oil, June 12, 2004.
Chapter 14
1 ORHA/CPA Historian interview with Brigadier General Steven Hawkins, former Commander, JTF-4, June 23, 2003.
2 ORHA/CPA Historian interview with Brigadier General Steven Hawkins, former Commander, JTF-4, June 23, 2003.
3 Brigadier General Steven R. Hawkins and Colonel (Ret.) Gordon M. Wells, “Nation-Building in Mesopotamia: U.S. Military Engineers in Iraq,” ARMY 55, no. 2 (February 2005).
4 Brigadier General Steven R. Hawkins and Colonel (Ret.) Gordon M. Wells, “Nation-Building in Mesopotamia: U.S. Military Engineers in Iraq,” ARMY 55, no. 2 (February 2005).
5 Major General Carl Strock, USACE Director of Civil Works, Testimony before the House Committee on Government Reform, March 11, 2004. Strock was one of the original members of ORHA and became Deputy Director for Operations and Infrastructure for the CPA. He later served as Commanding General of the U.S.
Army Corps of Engineers.
6 Brigadier General Steven R. Hawkins and Colonel (Ret.) Gordon M. Wells, “Nation-Building in Mesopotamia: U.S. Military Engineers in Iraq,” ARMY 55, no. 2 (February 2005).
7 Brigadier General Steven R. Hawkins and Colonel (Ret.) Gordon M. Wells, “Nation-Building in Mesopotamia: U.S. Military Engineers in Iraq,” ARMY 55, no. 2 (February 2005).
8 International Monetary Fund, “Iraq: Statistical Appendix,” August 2007.
• 405 •
• Endnotes •
9 Republic of Iraq, Ministry of Electricity, “About the Minister,” Biography of Dr. Kareem Waheed al-Aboudi.
He became Minister of Electricity under Prime Minister Maliki.
10 GAO-04-902R, “Rebuilding Iraq: Resource, Security, Governance, Essential Services, and Oversight Issues,” June 2004, 85.
11 Bechtel National, Inc., “Iraq Infrastructure Reconstruction Program,” Assessment Report submitted to USAID, June 2003.
12 Colonel Mike Moon, USACE, formerly with GRD, email to SIGIR, July 3, 2008.
13 Bechtel National, Inc., “Iraq Infrastructure Reconstruction Program,” Assessment Report submitted to USAID, June 2003.
14 Nameplate capacity is the maximum amount of electricity a facility can generate. Bechtel National, Inc., “Iraq Infrastructure Reconstruction Program,” Assessment Report submitted to USAID, June 2003.One megawatt provides enough power to service an estimated 3,000 homes. USACE-GRD, “Restore Iraqi Electricity,” http:// www.grd.usace.army.mil/news/factsheets/docs/USACE-RIE%20factsheet.pdf.
15 World Bank, “Republic of Iraq: Emergency Electricity Project,” Project Information Document, October 4, 2004.
16 United Nations/World Bank, “Joint Iraq Needs Assessment,” October 2003, 28.
17 World Bank, “Republic of Iraq: Emergency Electricity Project,” Project Information Document, October 4, 2004; and Isam Al Khalisi, “Decentralizing and Restructuring of Iraq’s Electricity Supply System,” Middle East Economic Survey XLVIII, no. 1 (January 3, 2005).
18 Bechtel National, Inc., “Iraq Infrastructure Reconstruction Program,” Assessment Report submitted to USAID, June 2003, 2.4.
19 Bechtel National, Inc., “Iraq Infrastructure Reconstruction Program,” Assessment Report submitted to USAID, June 2003, 2.4-2.9.
20 Bechtel National, Inc., “Iraq Infrastructure Reconstruction Program,” Assessment Report submitted to USAID, June 2003.
21 Major General Carl Strock, USACE Director of Civil Works, Testimony before the House Committee on Government Reform, March 11, 2004.
22 USIP interview with Thomas Wheelock, Chief of Party for USAID’s contractor International Resources Group, September 8, 2004.
23 Bechtel National, Inc., “Bechtel, USAID, and the Iraq Infrastructure Program: Accomplishments and Challenges,” 2, http://www.bechtel.com/assets/files/projects/Accomplishments_and_Challenges.pdf.
24 Major General Carl Strock, USACE Director of Civil Works, Testimony before the House Committee on Government Reform, March 11, 2004; and Bechtel National, Inc., “Iraq Infrastructure Reconstruction Program,” Assessment Report submitted to USAID, June 2003.
25 USIP interview with Thomas Wheelock, Chief of Party for USAID’s contractor International Resources Group, September 8, 2004.
26 Bechtel National, Inc., “Bechtel, USAID, and the Iraq Infrastructure Program: Accomplishments and Challenges,” http://www.bechtel.com/assets/files/projects/Accomplishments_and_Challenges.pdf.
27 Brigadier General Steven R. Hawkins and Colonel (Ret.) Gordon M. Wells, “Nation-Building in Mesopotamia: U.S. Military Engineers in Iraq,” ARMY 55, no. 2 (February 2005).
28 Major General Carl Strock, USACE Director of Civil Works, Testimony before the House Committee on Government Reform, March 11, 2004.
29 Tom Wheelock and Robyn McGuckin, “Iraqi Power Sector: CPA’s Legacy and Lessons,” Middle East Economic Survey XLVIII, no. 29 (July 18, 2005).
30 SIGIR Audit 06-009, “Review of Task Force Shield Programs,” April 28, 2006.
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• Chapter 14 •
31 Tom Ochs, et.al., “Fuels and Power Generation: Lessons Learned and a Path Forward,” February 12, 2007;
Bechtel National, Inc., “Iraq Infrastructure Reconstruction Program,” Assessment Report submitted to USAID, June 2003, 2.4-3.0; and ORHA/CPA historian interview with Gary Vogler, advisor to the Ministry of Oil, June 18, 2003.
32 ORHA/CPA historian interview with Gary Vogler, advisor to the Ministry of Oil, June 18, 2003.
33 Issam Chalabi, “Iraq’s Uncertain Oil and Political Prospects,” Middle East Economic Survey L, no. 48 (November 26, 2007).
34 Tom Ochs, et.al., “Fuels and Power Generation: Lessons Learned and a Path Forward,” February 12, 2007,
13-35; SIGIR interview with Bob Krause, advisor to the Ministry of Electricity, May 20, 2007 35 Colonel Mike Moon, USACE, formerly with GRD, email to SIGIR, July 3, 2008; and Energy Information Administration, Department of Energy, “Country Analysis Brief: Iraq,” August 2007, 6-10.
36 SIGIR interview with Dick Dumford, Program Manager for USAID, May 18, 2007; and SIGIR interview with Stephen Browning, former Deputy Director of Infrastructure, October 3, 2007.
37 SIGIR interview with Dick Dumford, Program Manager for USAID, May 18, 2007; and ORHA/CPA Historian interview with Brigadier General Steven Hawkins, former Commander, JTF-4, June 23, 2003.
38 SIGIR interview with Dick Dumford, Program Manager for USAID, May 18, 2007.
39 CPA, “Republic of Iraq Budget Revenues and Expenses: 2003 July–December,” 2003, 6.
40 CPA, Program Review Board Minutes, August 19, 2003.
41 Bechtel, USAID contract EEE-C-00-03-00018-00, 12, http://www.usaid.gov/iraq/contracts/pdf/Bechtel.
pdf; and SIGIR, “Iraq Reconstruction: Lessons Learned in Contracting and Procurement,” July 2006, 32.
42 Bechtel National, Inc. “Iraq Infrastructure Reconstruction Program, Recommended Implementation Plan,” June 2003, 1-1.
43 Bechtel National, Inc., “Iraq Infrastructure Reconstruction Program,” Assessment Report submitted to USAID, June 2003, 2.4-2.7.
44 Bechtel National, Inc., “Iraq Infrastructure Reconstruction Program,” Assessment Report submitted to USAID, June 2003.
45 DoD News Transcript, “Ambassador Paul Bremer Interview on CBS Face the Nation,” July 20, 2003. On the same day, Bremer also told Fox News, “We are expecting to be back at prewar levels in the next six weeks or so.” Ambassador Bremer, “Ambassador L. Paul Bremer Interview with Fox News Sunday,” DoD News Transcript, July 20, 2003.
46 ORHA/CPA Historian interview with Peter Andrew Bearpark, CPA Director of Operations, December 18, 2003.
47 Browning was the Senior Advisor to the Ministries of Health; Religious Affairs; and Transportation and Communications. MWH Press Release, “Stephen Browning Joins MWH Executive Team,” April 25, 2006; and SIGIR interview with Stephen Browning, former Task Force RIO Advisor, October 3, 2007.
48 SIGIR interview with Stephen Browning, former Deputy Director of Infrastructure, October 3, 2007; and SIGIR interview with Dick Dumford, Program Manager for USAID, May 18, 2007.
49 SIGIR interview with Dick Dumford, Program Manager for USAID, May 18, 2007.
50 SIGIR interview with Stephen Browning, former Deputy Director of Infrastructure, October 3, 2007.
51 Tom Wheelock and Robyn McGuckin, “Iraqi Power Sector: CPA’s Legacy and Lessons,” Middle East Economic Survey, XLVIII, no. 29 (July 18, 2005); SIGIR interview with Stephen Browning, former Deputy Director of Infrastructure, October 3, 2007; and SIGIR interview with Dick Dumford, Program Manager for USAID, May 18, 2007.
52 SIGIR interview with Dick Dumford, Program Manager for USAID, May 18, 2007.
53 SIGIR interview with Dick Dumford, Program Manager for USAID, May 18, 2007.
• 407 •
• Endnotes •
54 SIGIR interview with Stephen Browning, former Deputy Director of Infrastructure, October 3, 2007.
55 L. Paul Bremer III, “Broadcast to the Iraqi People,” August 29, 2003.
56 USAID Fact Sheet, “Upgrading Electricity in Iraq,” August 15, 2003.
57 SIGIR interview with Stephen Browning, former Deputy Director of Infrastructure, October 3, 2007 58 USACE, “Major Effort Restoring Iraq Electricity,” Engineer Update 28, no.2 (February 2004).
59 USACE, “Major Effort Restoring Iraq Electricity,” Engineer Update 28, no.2 (February 2004).
60 OMB, 2207 Report, April 2004, Appendix 3.
61 USACE, “Major Effort Restoring Iraq Electricity,” Engineer Update 28, no. 2 (February 2004).
62 P.L. 108-106, Emergency Supplemental Appropriations Act for Defense and for the Reconstruction of Iraq and Afghanistan for Fiscal Year 2004, November 6, 2003.
63 CPA Electricity Advisory Team, “Meeting Agenda: Project Review for the IIRO – 2004 Supplemental Budget,” email from Robyn McGuckin, November 13, 2003.
64 GAO Report 04-902R, “Rebuilding Iraq: Resource, Security, Governance, Essential Services, and Oversight Issues,” June 28, 2004, 92-93.
65 Jamie Wilson, “Attacks Halt Rebuilding of Iraq,” The Guardian, April 27, 2004.
66 GAO Report 04-902R, “Rebuilding Iraq: Resource, Security, Governance, Essential Services, and Oversight Issues,” June 28, 2004, 91.
67 GAO Report 04-902R, “Rebuilding Iraq: Resource, Security, Governance, Essential Services, and Oversight Issues,” June 28, 2004, 88.
Chapter 15
1 Iraqi Governing Council and the Coalition Provisional Authority, “The November 15 Agreement: Timeline to a Sovereign, Democratic and Secure Iraq,” November 15, 2003.
2 Ali A. Allawi, The Occupation of Iraq: Winning the War, Losing the Peace (New Haven, CT: Yale University Press, 2007), 215.
3 UN News Centre, “Summary of Press Briefing by Lakhdar Brahimi, Special Advisor to the Secretary- General,” March 16, 2004.
4 Ali A. Allawi, The Occupation of Iraq: Winning the War, Losing the Peace (New Haven, CT: Yale University Press, 2007), 228-232.
5 Ali A. Allawi, The Occupation of Iraq: Winning the War, Losing the Peace (New Haven, CT: Yale University Press, 2007), 230-232.
6 George W. Bush, “President Bush Congratulates Iraq for Transitional Administrative Law,” White House Press Release, March 8, 2004; and Iraqi Governing Council, “Law of Administration for the State of Iraq for the Transitional Period,” Articles 55-56, March 8, 2004.
7 Iraqi Governing Council, “Law of Administration for the State of Iraq for the Transitional Period,” Article 7, March 8, 2004.
8 Iraqi Governing Council, “Law of Administration for the State of Iraq for the Transitional Period,” Articles
55-56, March 8, 2004.
9 Iraqi Governing Council, “Law of Administration for the State of Iraq for the Transitional Period,” Article 61, March 8, 2004.
10 CPA Transcripts, “Statements by United Nations Envoy Lakhdar Brahimi, Iraqi President Ghazi al-Yawar, and Iraqi Prime Minister Ayad Allawi, Topic: The New Interim Government for Iraq,” June 1, 2004. Also named was a deputy prime minister for security affairs.
11 GAO Report 05-876, “Rebuilding Iraq: Status of Funding and Reconstruction Efforts,” July 2005, 2.
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12 SIGIR Audit 05-004, “Oversight of Funds Provided to Iraqi Ministries through the National Budget Process,” January 30, 2005, 5; and SIGIR Audit, 04-009, “Coalition Provisional Authority Comptroller Cash Management Controls Over the Development Fund for Iraq,” July 28, 2004, 5.
13 SIGIR Audit 05-004, “Oversight of Funds Provided to Iraqi Ministries through the National Budget Process,” January 30, 2005, 5.
14 SIGIR Lessons Learned Forum: Contracting and Procurement, Washington, DC, December 5, 2005.
15 IAMB, “Report of the International Advisory and Monitoring Board of the Development Fund for Iraq:
Covering the Period from the Establishment of the DFI on May 22, 2003, until the Dissolution of the CPA on June 28, 2004,” 2-3. Almost $6 million in DFI funds was committed by the CPA to pay for the audit.
16 OMB, Section 2207 Report, July 2004, 70.
17 James Stephenson, Losing the Golden Hour: An Insider’s view of Iraq’s Reconstruction (Herndon, VA:
Potomac Books, 2007), 68.
18 CPA, Program Review Board Minutes, May 15, 2004.
19 ORHA/CPA Historian interview with Neil Hawkins, CPA’s Director of Development Coordination and Senior Advisor to the Ministry of Planning, June 21, 2004.
20 James Stephenson, Losing the Golden Hour: An Insider’s view of Iraq’s Reconstruction (Herndon, VA:
Potomac Books, 2007), 69.
21 Rep. Henry Waxman, Ranking Minority Member, Statement before the House Committee on Government Reform, June 21, 2005.
22 National Security Council, Interagency Transition Planning Team, “Operation Plan Sovereign Iraq,” Draft, version 1.3, April 2004.
23 GAO Report 05-737, “Rebuilding Iraq: Actions Needed to Improve Use of Private Security Providers,” July 2005, 13.
24 National Security Council, Interagency Transition Planning Team, “Operation Plan Sovereign Iraq,” Draft, version 1.3, April 2004, K-2 25 National Security Council, Interagency Transition Planning Team, “Operation Plan Sovereign Iraq,” Draft, version 1.3, April 2004.
26 National Security Presidential Directive 36, “United States Government Operations in Iraq,” May 11, 2004.
27 National Security Council, Interagency Transition Planning Team, “Operation Plan Sovereign Iraq,” Draft, version 1.3, April 2004, D-3,4.
28 National Security Council, Interagency Transition Planning Team, “Operation Plan Sovereign Iraq,” Draft, version 1.3, April 2004, A-10 29 GAO Report 05-876, “Rebuilding Iraq: Status of Funding and Reconstruction Efforts,” July 2005, 4.
30 National Security Council, Interagency Transition Planning Team, “Operation Plan Sovereign Iraq,” Draft, version 1.3, April 2004, G-3.
31 United Nations Security Council Resolution 1546, June 8, 2004.
32 United Nations Security Council Resolution 1483, May 22, 2003.
33 A complete listing of the various orders, regulations and memoranda promulgated by CPA can be found at www.cpa-iraq.org.
34 CPA, “An Historic Review of CPA Accomplishments,” June 2004, 71.
35 CPA, “An Historic Review of CPA Accomplishments,” June 2004, 71.
The Marshall Plan and Iraq Reconstruction
• 409 •
• Endnotes •
36 Barry Eichengreen and Marc Uzan, “The Marshall Plan: Economic Effects and Implications for Eastern Europe and the Former USSR,” Economic Policy 7 no. 14, (April 1992); and Greg Behrman, The Most Noble Adventure: The Marshall Plan and the Time When America Helped Save Europe (New York: Free Press, 2007), 4-5.
37 Barry Machado, In Search of a Usable Past: The Marshall Plan and Postwar Reconstruction Today,” (Lexington, VA: George C. Marshall Foundation, 2007), 34; and Greg Behrman, The Most Noble Adventure:
The Marshall Plan and the Time When America Helped Save Europe (New York: Free Press, 2007), 179-180.
38 Greg Behrman, The Most Noble Adventure: The Marshall Plan and the Time When America Helped Save Europe (New York: Free Press, 2007), 165.
39 Barry Machado, In Search of a Usable Past: The Marshall Plan and Postwar Reconstruction Today,” (Lexington, VA: George C. Marshall Foundation, 2007), 8, 15-22, 129.
40 Barry Machado, In Search of a Usable Past: The Marshall Plan and Postwar Reconstruction Today,” (Lexington, VA: George C. Marshall Foundation, 2007), 35-37.
41 SIGIR, “Iraq Reconstruction: Lessons in Human Capital Management,” January 2006, 25-29, 34-37.
42 Barry Machado, In Search of a Usable Past: The Marshall Plan and Postwar Reconstruction Today,” (Lexington, VA: George C. Marshall Foundation, 2007), 117-18.
Essential Services Overview – Transition from CPA to the Embassy 43 International Monetary Fund, “Iraq: Statistical Appendix,” August 2007; ITAO, Monthly Import, Production and Export, response to SIGIR data call for the Quarterly Report to the United States Congress, April 2008; DoD, Iraq Status Report, June 15, 2004, and July 6, 2004; Iraq Coalition Casualty Count, “U.S. Deaths By Month,” updated September 2008; SIGIR, Quarterly Report to the United States Congress, October 2005, 12; Iraq Body Count, “Documented civilian deaths from violence,” updated August 24, 2008; P.L. 108-106, Emergency Supplemental Appropriations Act for Defense and for the Reconstruction of Iraq and Afghanistan for Fiscal Year 2004, November 6, 2003; CPA, “Republic of Iraq Budget Revenues and Expenses: 2003 July–December,” 2003; CPA, “Republic of Iraq: Revisions to 2004 Budget,” March 2004; and GAO Report
05-876, “Rebuilding Iraq: Status of Funding and Reconstruction Efforts,” July 2005, 10.
44 This estimate only includes the number of trained personnel. Although an estimated 74,000 Facilities Protection Service members were listed as part of the security forces, in August 2004 they were deemed unfit as a whole and no longer included in estimates. DoD, Iraq Status Report, June 15, 2004, 29-30; and DoS, Weekly Status Report, August 25, 2004, 24.
45 International Monetary Fund, “Iraq: Statistical Appendix,” August 2007.
46 USAID Press Release, “Upgrading Electricity in Iraq,” August 15, 2003.
47 Joint Staff and CPA, “Iraq Fact Sheet,” October 21, 2003.
48 ITAO, Monthly Import, Production and Export, July 2007 as cited in: SIGIR, Quarterly Report to the United States Congress, July 2007, 81.
Chapter 16
1 Baghdad embassy, “Statement by Ambassador John D. Negroponte at Presentation of Credentials Ceremony,” June 29, 2004; and OMB, Section 2207 Report, July 2004, 14. A career Foreign Service officer, Negroponte had served as ambassador to Honduras, Mexico, and the Philippines before retiring in 1997 to become Executive Vice President for Global Markets of the McGraw-Hill publishing company in New York.
He returned the State Department in 2001 as the United States Permanent Representative to the United Nations before his assignment to Iraq. DoS, “Biography of John Negroponte,” http://www.state.gov/r/pa/ei/ biog/80476.htm.
2 White House Press Release, “President Holds Press Conference,” February 17, 2005.
3 SIGIR Audit 05-029, “Challenges Faced in Carrying Out Iraq Relief and Reconstruction Fund Activities,” January 26, 2006, 4-6.
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4 SIGIR, “Iraq Reconstruction: Lessons in Program and Project Management, March 2007, 10, 82-83; and OMB, Section 2207 Report, July 2004, 14-15.
5 SIGIR interview with William B. Taylor, former Director of IRMO, April 3, 2008.
6 OMB, Section 2207 Report, July 2004, 15.
7 SIGIR, “Iraq Reconstruction: Lessons in Program and Project Management, March 2007, 84-86.
8 SIGIR interview with William B. Taylor, former Director of IRMO, April 3, 2008; and PCO, “PCO Iraq Reconstruction Update,” December 15, 2004.
9 OMB, Section 2207 Report, July 2004, 15; Claude M. Bolton, Jr., Assistant Secretary of the Army for Acquisition, Logistics, and Technology, Testimony before the Senate Committee on Armed Services Subcommittee on Readiness and Management Support on Iraq Reconstruction and Contracting, February 7, 2006; and SIGIR interview with Charles Hess, former Director of PCO, April 24, 2006.
10 DoD News Release, “Casey Takes Over Iraq Commander’s Reins from Sanchez,” July 1, 2004.
11 SIGIR interview with Ambassador John Negroponte, former U.S. Ambassador to Iraq, February 12, 2008.
12 SIGIR interview with Ambassador John Negroponte, former U.S. Ambassador to Iraq, February 12, 2008.
13 SIGIR interview with Gen. George Casey, former Director of the Joint Staff and former MNF-I Commander, July 30, 2008.
14 The ten sectors were: Security and Law Enforcement; Justice, Public Safety Infrastructure, and Civil Society;
Electricity; Oil Infrastructure; Water Resources and Sanitation; Transportation and Telecommunications;
Roads, Bridges, and Construction; Health Care; Education, Refugees, Human Rights, Democracy and Governance; and Private Sector Development. For an overview of the changes, see: OMB, Section 2207 Report, July 2004, 17-20 15 SIGIR interview with Ambassador William B. Taylor, former Director of IRMO, April 3, 2008.
16 CPA-IG, Quarterly Report to the United States Congress, July 2004, 55-56.
17 OMB, Section 2207 Report, July 2004, 20.
18 OMB, Section 2207 Report, January 2004, 19; and Richard Armitage, Deputy Secretary of State, Testimony before the House Appropriations Committee, Foreign Operations Subcommittee, September 24, 2004.
19 SIGIR interview with Ambassador William B. Taylor, former Director of IRMO, April 3, 2008.
20 SIGIR Lessons Learned Forum: Program and Project Management, Washington, DC, April 12, 2006.
21 SIGIR Lessons Learned Forum: Program and Project Management, Washington, DC, April 12, 2006.
22 DoS, Section 2207 Report, October 2004, 2.
23 DoS, Section 2207 Report, October 2004, 2-4.
24 Richard Armitage, Deputy Secretary of State, Testimony before the House Appropriations Committee, Foreign Operations Subcommittee, September 24, 2004.
25 Section 133 of P.L. 108-309 amended P.L. 108-106. P.L. 108-309, Making Continuing Appropriations for the Fiscal Year 2005, September 30, 2004.
26 SIGIR interview with Charles Hess, former Director of PCO, April 24, 2006.
27 Charles Hess, Director of PCO, email to William B. Taylor, Director of IRMO, September 5, 2004.
28 Charles Hess, Director of PCO, email to William B. Taylor, Director of IRMO, September 5, 2004.
29 DoS, Section 2207 Report, January 2005, 8.
30 SIGIR interview with Ambassador William B. Taylor, former Director of IRMO, April 3, 2008.
31 Charles Hess, Director of PCO, memorandum to Claude M. Bolton, Assistant Secretary of the Army for Acquisition, Logistics and Technology, March 2005.
32 DoS, Section 2207 Report, April 2005, 5.
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• Endnotes •
33 GAO Report 05-876, “Rebuilding Iraq: Status of Funding and Reconstruction Efforts,” July 2005, 8; and DoS, Section 2207 Report, April 2005, 6-7; and DoS, Section 2207 Report, April 2005, 6-7.
34 IRMO, “Iraq Reconstruction Program: Framework for Sustainable Operations,” May 18, 2005; and PCO, “Iraq Capacity Development: PCO Management and Interface Plan,” November 22, 2004; and PCO, “Program Management Plan,” Section 10, Capacity Development, October 7, 2004.
35 DoS, Section 2207 Report, April 2005, 7.
36 OMB, Section 2207 Reports, Funding Table, July 2004; DoS, Section 2207 Report, Status of Funds, July 2005; and SIGIR Audit 05-029, “Challenges Faced in Carrying Out Iraq Relief and Reconstruction Fund Activities,” January 26, 2006, 21-23.
37 OMB, Section 2207 Reports, Funding Table, July 2004; DoS, Section 2207 Report, Status of Funds, July 2005; and SIGIR Audit 05-029, “Challenges Faced in Carrying Out Iraq Relief and Reconstruction Fund Activities,” January 26, 2006, 18.
38 SIGIR Audit 05-029, “Challenges Faced in Carrying Out Iraq Relief and Reconstruction Fund Activities,” January 26, 2006, 7.
39 DoS, Section 2207 Report, July 2005, 7.
40 DoS, Section 2207 Report, July 2005, 5, 7.
Chapter 17
1 Brig. Gen. Stephen Seay, Head of Contracting Activity, comments to SIGIR, October 23, 2008.
2 Brig. Gen. Stephen Seay, Head of Contracting Activity, comments to SIGIR, October 23, 2008.
3 SIGIR interview with Brig. Gen. Stephen Seay, Head of Contracting Activity, November 2-3, 2005.
4 USACE, comments to SIGIR, November 4, 2008.
5 SIGIR interview with Brig. Gen. Stephen Seay, Head of Contracting Activity, June 29, 2006.
6 SIGIR interview with Brig. Gen. Stephen Seay, Head of Contracting Activity, November 2-3, 2005.
7 SIGIR interview with Andy Bailey, Vice President of Louis Berger, March 14, 2006.
8 SIGIR, “Iraq Reconstruction: Lessons in Program and Project Management,” March 2007, 85.
9 SIGIR Audit 06-001, “Management of Iraq Relief and Reconstruction Fund Program: The Evolution of the Iraq Reconstruction Management System,” April 24, 2006, 1.
10 SIGIR interview with Brig. Gen. Stephen Seay, Head of Contracting Activity, November 2-3, 2005.
11 SIGIR interview with Brig. Gen. Stephen Seay, Head of Contracting Activity, November 2-3, 2005.
12 SIGIR Audit 06-001, “Management of Iraq Relief and Reconstruction Fund Program: The Evolution of the Iraq Reconstruction Management System,” April 24, 2006, 3.
13 SIGIR Audit 06-001, “Management of Iraq Relief and Reconstruction Fund Program: The Evolution of the Iraq Reconstruction Management System,” April 24, 2006, 17.
14 SIGIR Audit 06-001, “Management of Iraq Relief and Reconstruction Fund Program: The Evolution of the Iraq Reconstruction Management System,” April 24, 2006, 4.
15 The PMO and the succeeding PCO had tried to simplify tracking of design-build contractors’ overhead costs through administrative task orders. These task orders were supposed to capture all the administrative costs separately from the direct costs of the task orders for project construction. Administrative task orders were only issued to five of the design-build firms, though, and “only one of the contractors had adequate account- ing and billing systems to capture administrative costs.” SIGIR Audit 06-028, “Review of Administrative Task Orders for Iraq Reconstruction Contracts,” October 23, 2006, ii.
16 SIGIR Audit 06-028, “Review of Administrative Task Orders for Iraq Reconstruction Contracts,” October 23, 2006, iii.
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• Chapter 18 •
17 The Defense FAR Supplement defines “undefinitized contract action” as “any contract action for which the contract terms, specifications, or price are not agreed upon before performance is begun under the action.” Defense FAR Supplement (DFARS), Subpart 217.7401 (d), revised May 12, 2006.
18 DFARS, Subpart 217.74, “Undefinitized Contract Actions,” revised May 12, 2006.
19 SIGIR Audit 06-019, “Review of the Use of Definitization Requirements for Contracts Supporting Reconstruction in Iraq,” July 28, 2006, 5-6.
20 CFC FRAGO 09-668, “Contracting and Organizational Changes,” 122143Z, November 12, 2004, as cited in: SIGIR, “Iraq Reconstruction: Lessons in Contracting and Procurement,” July 2006, 76.
21 SIGIR, “Iraq Reconstruction: Lessons in Contracting and Procurement,” July 2006, 77.
22 SIGIR, “Iraq Reconstruction: Lessons in Contracting and Procurement,” July 2006, 76-77.
23 SIGIR, “Iraq Reconstruction: Lessons in Program and Project Management,” March 2007, 117.
24 See, for example: Miriam Pemberton and William D. Hartung, eds. Lessons From Iraq: Avoiding the Next War (Boulder, CO: Paradigm, 2008).
25 The DoD estimates that the shift from design-build to direct contracting with Iraqis saved between 20 to 50 percent in the electricity distribution area. GAO Report 07-30R, “Rebuilding Iraq: Status of DOD’s Reconstruction Program,” December 15, 2006, 9; and SIGIR, “Iraq Reconstruction: Lessons in Contracting and Procurement,” July 2006.
26 P.L. 108-375, Ronald W. Reagan National Defense Authorization Act for Fiscal Year 2005, October 28, 2004.
27 Charles Hess, Director of PCO, email to William B. Taylor, Director of IRMO, September, 5, 2004.
28 Charles Hess, Director of PCO, email to William B. Taylor, Director of IRMO, September, 5, 2004.
29 SIGIR, “Iraq Reconstruction: Lessons in Program and Project Management,” March 2007, 106, 108.
30 SIGIR Audit 05-027, “Methodologies for Reporting Cost-to-Complete Estimates”, January 27, 2006, 9.
31 USACE, comments to SIGIR, November 4, 2008.
32 SIGIR, “Iraq Reconstruction: Lessons in Program and Project Management,” March 2007, 84.
33 SIGIR interview with Linda Allen, Senior Consultant for Environment, Municipalities, Public Works, and Water, May 12, 2007.
Chapter 18
1 SIGIR, Quarterly Report to the United States Congress, October 2005, 12. The Defense Base Act provides dis- ability compensation and medical benefits to employees and death benefits to eligible survivors of employees of U.S. government contractors who perform work overseas. For contractors working overseas, the Defense Base Act requires contractors to provide insurance coverage for employees performing work on contracts funded by the U.S. government. The insurance provides lost wages and survivor benefits for death, injury, or other work interruptions, such as kidnapping. If war risk is found, the U.S. government reimburses insurance carriers for their costs and assumes responsibility for future payments. Defense Base Act death and injury claims are filed with the Department of Labor. Department of Labor, “Defense Base Act (DBA) Frequently Asked Questions (FAQ),” May 2005.
2 SIGIR, Quarterly Report to the United States Congress, October 2008, 14.
3 SIGIR Audit 08-020, “Key Recurring Management Issues Identified in Audits of Iraqi Reconstruction Efforts,” July 27, 2008, 4-7.
4 SIGIR Audit 08-020, “Key Recurring Management Issues Identified in Audits of Iraqi Reconstruction Efforts,” July 27, 2008, 6.
5 SIGIR Audit 09-005, “Agencies Need Improved Financial Data Reporting for Private Security Contractors,” October 30, 2008, 1-2; and GAO Report 05-737, “Rebuilding Iraq: Actions Needed to Improve the Use of Private Security Providers,” July 2005, 3.
• 413 •
• Endnotes •
6 GAO Report 05-737, “Rebuilding Iraq: Actions Needed to Improve the Use of Private Security Providers,” July 2005.
7 GAO Report 05-737, “Rebuilding Iraq: Actions Needed to Improve the Use of Private Security Providers,” July 2005, 3, 8. By 2008, SIGIR identified 322 companies who provided security services with contracts totaling more than $6 billion. SIGIR Audit 09-005, “Agencies Need Improved Financial Data Reporting for Private Security Contractors,” October 30, 2008, 3.
8 More than $662 million was obligated to contracts for another 233 companies for tasks that could have included physical security, but the descriptions of work were too general to ensure that the funds did not go for other services. SIGIR Audit 09-005, “Agencies Need Improved Financial Data Reporting for Private Security Contractors,” October 30, 2008, i-ii, 3.
9 SIGIR, “Iraq Reconstruction: Lessons in Contracting and Procurement,” 19, 60.
10 GAO Report 05-876, “Rebuilding Iraq: Status of Funding and Reconstruction Efforts,” July 2005, 14.
11 DoS, Section 2207 Reports, July 2005, 11-12; April 2005, 9-10; and January 2005, 4-5.
12 GAO Report 05-876, “Rebuilding Iraq: Status of Funding and Reconstruction Efforts,” July 2005, 13, 17.
13 DoS, Section 2207 Report, October 2004, I-47; and GAO Report 05-876, “Rebuilding Iraq: Status of Funding and Reconstruction Efforts,” July 2005, 14. The gas-oil separation plants, or GOSPs, separate crude oil from natural gas liquids at well sites. Some of these liquids are processed to produce liquefied petroleum gas, used primarily for cooking and heating in Iraq.
14 DoS, Section 2207 Report, January 2005, I-79.
15 Lawrence Kumins, Congressional Research Service Report RS21626, “Iraq Oil: Reserves, Production, and Potential Revenues,” updated April 13, 2005, 4-5.
16 Ariel Cohen, “Reducing U.S. Dependence on Middle Eastern Oil,” Heritage Foundation backgrounder no.
1926, April 7, 2006, 5-6.
17 DoS, Section 2207 Report, April 2005, I-55; and DoS, Section 2207 Report, January 2005, I-80.
18 DoS, Section 2207 Report, January 2005, I-80.
19 SIGIR, Quarterly Report to the United States Congress, October 2006, 34.
20 DoS, Section 2207 Report, April 2005, I-55.
21 DoS, Section 2207 Report, July 2005, I-57.
22 SIGIR Inspection SA-05-001, “Pipeline River Crossing: Al Fatah, Iraq,” January 27, 2006, 2.
23 SIGIR Inspection SA-05-001, “Pipeline River Crossing: Al Fatah, Iraq,” January 27, 2006, 2.
24 SIGIR Inspection SA-05-001, “Pipeline River Crossing: Al Fatah, Iraq,” January 27, 2006, 4.
25 SIGIR Inspection SA-05-001, “Pipeline River Crossing: Al Fatah, Iraq,” January 27, 2006, 4-5.
26 SIGIR Inspection SA-05-001, “Pipeline River Crossing: Al Fatah, Iraq,” January 27, 2006, 5.
27 SIGIR Inspection SA-05-001, “Pipeline River Crossing: Al Fatah, Iraq,” January 27, 2006, 5-6.
28 SIGIR Inspection SA-05-001, “Pipeline River Crossing: Al Fatah, Iraq,” January 27, 2006, 8.
29 SIGIR Inspection SA-05-001, “Pipeline River Crossing: Al Fatah, Iraq,” January 27, 2006, 8.
30 SIGIR Inspection SA-05-001, “Pipeline River Crossing: Al Fatah, Iraq,” January 27, 2006, i, 8.
31 DoS, Section 2207 Report, April 2005, I-55.
32 DoS, Section 2207 Report, April 2005, I-56.
33 ORHA/CPA historian interview with Michael Stinson, senior advisor to the Minister of Oil 2003- 2004, June 12, 2004.
34 GAO Report 05-876, “Rebuilding Iraq: Status of Funding and Reconstruction Efforts,” July 2005, 19.
35 OMB, Section 2207 Report, April 2004, 45-49.
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36 DoS, Section 2207 Report, July 2005, 48-56.
37 GAO Report 05-876, “Rebuilding Iraq: Status of Funding and Reconstruction Efforts,” July 2005, 20.
38 GAO Report 05-876, “Rebuilding Iraq: Status of Funding and Reconstruction Efforts,” July 2005, 20.
39 Compiled from DoS, Section 2207 Reports, October 2004, January 2005, April 2005, and July 2005; and GAO Report 05-876, “Rebuilding Iraq: Status of Funding and Reconstruction Efforts,” July 2005, 20.
40 American Military Engineers, “Engineering and Construction Efforts to Rebuild Iraq,” August 19, 2004.
41 USAID Audit E-267-05-003-P, “Audit of USAID/Iraq’s Electrical Power Sector Activities,” June 29, 2005, 3.
42 USAID Audit E-267-05-003-P, “Audit of USAID/Iraq’s Electrical Power Sector Activities,” June 29, 2005, 4.
43 USAID Audit E-267-05-003-P, “Audit of USAID/Iraq’s Electrical Power Sector Activities,” June 29, 2005,
8-9.
44 SIGIR interview with Dick Dumford, Program Manager for USAID, May 18, 2007.
45 SIGIR Report PA-07-103, “Doura Power Station Units 5 and 6, Baghdad, Iraq,” July 18, 2007, 7.
46 SIGIR interview with Dick Dumford, Program Manager for USAID, May 18, 2007.
47 SIGIR Inspection PA-07-103, “Doura Power Station Units 5 and 6, Baghdad, Iraq,” July 18, 2007, i.
48 USAID Audit E-267-05-003-P, “Audit of USAID/Iraq’s Electrical Power Sector Activities,” June 29, 2005, 7.
49 USAID Audit E-267-05-003-P, “Audit of USAID/Iraq’s Electrical Power Sector Activities,” June 29, 2005, 7; and SIGIR Audit 05-024, “Management of the Mansuria Electrical Reconstruction Project,” January 23, 2006, 2-4.
50 SIGIR Audit 05-024, “Management of the Mansuria Electrical Reconstruction Project,” January 23, 2006, 3.
51 SIGIR Audit 08-011, “Outcome, Cost, and Oversight of Electricity-Sector Reconstruction Contract with Perini Corporation,” April 29, 2008, iii-iv.
52 SIGIR Audit 08-011, “Outcome, Cost, and Oversight of Electricity-Sector Reconstruction Contract with Perini Corporation,” April 29, 2008, 5, 23.
53 SIGIR Inspection PA-05-008, “Al Seraji Substation, Basrah, Iraq,” March 10, 2006; SIGIR Inspection PA-05-007, “Al Kaffat Substation, Basrah, Iraq,” March 10, 2006; SIGIR Inspection PA-05-006, “Hamdan Substation, Basrah, Iraq,” March 10, 2006; and SIGIR Inspection PA-05-005, “Al Hakamia Substation, Basrah, Iraq,” March 10, 2006.
54 SIGIR Audit 08-011, “Outcome, Cost, and Oversight of Electricity-Sector Reconstruction Contract with Perini Corporation,” April 29, 2008, ii, 1, 3-4. SIGIR auditor Paul Converse provided significant work on this audit before he was killed in Iraq on March 24, 2008.
55 DoS, Section 2207 Report, January 2005, I-65-67.
56 DoS, Section 2207 Report, April 2005, I-43.
57 OMB, Section 2207 Report, January 2004, Funding Table; and DoS, Section 2207 Report, July 2005, Funding Table.
58 DoS, Section 2207 Report, July 2005, I-62-70.
59 USAID Audit E-267-05-004-P, “Audit of USAID/Iraq’s Water and Sanitation Rehabilitation Activities,” June 30, 2005, 17.
60 SIGIR Audit 08-018, “Outcome, Cost, and Oversight of Water Sector Reconstruction Contract with FluorAMEC, LLC,” July 15, 2008; and GAO Report 05-872, “Rebuilding Iraq: U.S. Water and Sanitation Efforts Need Improved Measures for Assessing Impact and Sustained Resources for Maintaining Facilities,” September 2005, 11.
61 GAO Report 05-872, “Rebuilding Iraq: U.S. Water and Sanitation Efforts Need Improved Measures for Assessing Impact and Sustained Resources for Maintaining Facilities,” September 2005, 2, 11.
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• Endnotes •
62 GAO Report 05-872, “Rebuilding Iraq: U.S. Water and Sanitation Efforts Need Improved Measures for Assessing Impact and Sustained Resources for Maintaining Facilities,” September 2005, 21-25.
63 SIGIR Audit 08-018, “Outcome, Cost, and Oversight of Water Sector Reconstruction Contract with FluorAMEC, LLC,” July 15, 2008, ii.
64 SIGIR Audit 08-018, “Outcome, Cost, and Oversight of Water Sector Reconstruction Contract with FluorAMEC, LLC,” July 15, 2008, 5-6.
65 GAO Report 05-872, “Rebuilding Iraq: U.S. Water and Sanitation Efforts Need Improved Measures for Assessing Impact and Sustained Resources for Maintaining Facilities,” September 2005, 28.
66 SIGIR, PA 08-144, PA08-145, PA08-146, PA08-147, PA 08-148, “Fallujah Waste Water Treatment System, Falluja, Iraq,” October 27, 2008, 1-2, 13-14.
67 SIGIR, PA 08-144, PA08-145, PA08-146, PA08-147, PA 08-148, “Fallujah Waste Water Treatment System, Falluja, Iraq,” October 27, 2008, 7.
68 SIGIR, PA 08-144, PA08-145, PA08-146, PA08-147, PA 08-148, “Fallujah Waste Water Treatment System, Falluja, Iraq,” October 27, 2008, 4.
69 The initial completion date was set to three and a half years but the CPA chose to accelerate the date to eighteen months. SIGIR Inspections PA 08-144, PA08-145, PA08-146, PA08-147, PA 08-148, “Fallujah Waste Water Treatment System, Falluja, Iraq,” October 27, 2008, 9.
70 SIGIR Inspections PA 08-144, PA08-145, PA08-146, PA08-147, PA 08-148, “Fallujah Waste Water Treatment System, Falluja, Iraq,” October 27, 2008, 8-9.
71 SIGIR Inspections PA 08-144, PA08-145, PA08-146, PA08-147, PA 08-148, “Fallujah Waste Water Treatment System, Falluja, Iraq,” October 27, 2008, 11, 14.
72 SIGIR Inspections PA 08-144, PA08-145, PA08-146, PA08-147, PA 08-148, “Fallujah Waste Water Treatment System, Falluja, Iraq,” October 27, 2008, 11-12.
73 SIGIR Inspections PA 08-144, PA08-145, PA08-146, PA08-147, PA 08-148, “Fallujah Waste Water Treatment System, Falluja, Iraq,” October 27, 2008, 16.
74 SIGIR Inspections PA 08-144, PA08-145, PA08-146, PA08-147, PA 08-148, “Fallujah Waste Water Treatment System, Falluja, Iraq,” October 27, 2008, i.
75 DoS, Section 2207 Report, April 2005.
76 DoS, Section 2207 Report, July 2005, I-81.
77 SIGIR Audit 06-011, “Management of the Primary Healthcare Centers Construction Projects,” April 29, 2006, i, 1.
78 SIGIR Audit 06-025, “Review of the Medical Equipment Purchased for the Primary Healthcare Centers Associated with Parsons Global Services, Inc.” July 28, 2006.
79 SIGIR Audit 06-011, “Management of the Primary Healthcare Centers Construction Projects,” April 29, 2006, 5.
80 SIGIR Audit 06-011, “Management of the Primary Healthcare Centers Construction Projects,” April 29, 2006, 7.
81 SIGIR Audit 06-011, “Management of the Primary Healthcare Centers Construction Projects,” April 29, 2006, 14.
82 SIGIR Audit 06-011, “Management of the Primary Healthcare Centers Construction Projects,” April 29, 2006, i, 1, 5.
83 SIGIR Inspections PA-06-042, SIGIR PA-06-043, SIGIR PA-06-044, SIGIR PA-06-045, SIGIR PA-06-046, “Primary Health Care Centers Numbered KE-01, KE-02, KE-03, KE-04, and KE-05, Kirkuk, Iraq,” April 25, 2006, i-ii.
84 SIGIR Audit 06-025, “Review of the Medical Equipment Purchased for the Primary Healthcare Centers Associated with Parsons Global Services, Inc.,” July 28, 2006, 34.
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85 SIGIR Audit 06-025, “Review of the Medical Equipment Purchased for the Primary Healthcare Centers Associated with Parsons Global Services, Inc.,” July 28, 2006, ii.
86 SIGIR interview with Jack Holly, Project and Contracting Office logistics, May 2007.
87 SIGIR interview with Jack Holly, Project and Contracting Office logistics, May 2007.
Chapter 19
1 House Armed Services Committee Subcommittee on Oversight and Investigations, “Stand Up and Be Counted: The Continuing Challenge of Building the Iraqi Security Forces,” July 2007, 93-94.
2 Combat Studies Institute interview with Lt. Gen. David Petraeus, former commander of MNSTC-I, December 11, 2006.
3 SIGIR interview with Col. Chris King, former MNSTC-I Deputy J5, June 12, 2008.
4 DoS Report ISP-IQO-05-72 and DoD IG Report IE-2005-002, “Interagency Assessment of Iraq Police Training,” July 15, 2005, 9; and DoS, Section 2207 Report, October 2004, I-1.
5 House Armed Services Committee Subcommittee on Oversight and Investigations, “Stand Up and Be Counted: The Continuing Challenge of Building the Iraqi Security Forces,” July 2007, 94.
6 GAO Report 06-788, “Rebuilding Iraq: More Comprehensive National Strategy Needed to Help Achieve U.S. Goals,” July 2006, 11.
7 OMB, Section 2207 Report, July 2004, 17.
8 P.L. 108-309, Making Continuing Appropriations for the Fiscal Year 2005, and for Other Purposes, September 30, 2004.
9 SIGIR interview with Gen. David Petraeus, Commander of MNF-I, March 2, 2008.
10 Donald. P. Wright and Timothy R. Reese, On Point II: Transition to the New Campaign (Ft. Leavenworth, KS: Combat Studies Institute Press, 2008), 453-454; Combat Studies Institute interview with Col. Peter DeLuca, former J7 (Engineer) for MNSTC-I, June 1, 2006; and SIGIR Audit 08-005, “Differences in Services and Fees for Management and Administration of Iraq Reconstruction Contracts,” January 29, 2008.
11 SIGIR Audit 08-005, “Differences in Services and Fees for Management and Administration of Iraq Reconstruction Contracts,” January 29, 2008; and Combat Studies Institute interview with Col. Peter DeLuca, former J7 (Engineer) for MNSTC-I, June 1, 2006.
12 Donald. P. Wright and Timothy R. Reese, On Point II: Transition to the New Campaign (Ft. Leavenworth, KS: Combat Studies Institute Press, 2008), 453-454.
13 DoS, Section 2207 Report, January 2005, 5-8; and DoS, Section 2207 Report, April 2005, 4-5. SIGIR inspec- tions later revealed improper design practices and poor construction at the Baghdad Police College. SIGIR Inspections PA-06-078.2 and PA-06-079.2, “Baghdad Police College: Baghdad, Iraq,” January 29, 2007.
14 DoS, Section 2207 Report, July 2004, I-12.
15 DoS, Section 2207 Report, October 2004, I-14 16 GAO Report 04-902R, “Rebuilding Iraq: Resource, Security, Governance, Essential Services, and Oversight Issues,” June 2004, 56.
17 Donald. P. Wright and Timothy R. Reese, On Point II: Transition to the New Campaign (Ft. Leavenworth, KS: Combat Studies Institute Press, 2008), 467.
18 Donald. P. Wright and Timothy R. Reese, On Point II: Transition to the New Campaign (Ft. Leavenworth, KS: Combat Studies Institute Press, 2008), 467.
19 DoS, Section 2207 Report, October 2004, I-1-3.
20 GAO Report 04-902R, “Rebuilding Iraq: Resource, Security, Governance, Essential Services, and Oversight Issues,” June 2004, 60; and DoS, Section 2207 Report, October 2004, I-4.
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• Endnotes •
21 Donald. P. Wright and Timothy R. Reese, On Point II: Transition to the New Campaign (Ft. Leavenworth, KS: Combat Studies Institute Press, 2008), 467.
22 DoS, Weekly Status Report, July 27, 2004, 24.
23 Gen. (Ret.) James L. Jones, Chairman, “Report of the Independent Commission on the Security Forces of Iraq,” September 6, 2007, 109.
24 DoD, Measuring Stability and Security in Iraq, October 2005, 39; and MNF-I, “Iraqi Special Police,” July 22, 2006.
25 DoD, Measuring Stability and Security in Iraq, October 2005, 39.
26 DoS, Section 2207 Report, January 2005, I-7.
27 MNF-I, “Iraqi Special Police,” July 22, 2006; and DoS, Section 2207 Report, April 2005, I-2.
28 DoS, Section 2207 Report, April 2005, I-5.
29 DoD, Measuring Stability and Security in Iraq, October 2005, 39.
30 MNF-I, “Iraqi Special Police,” July 22, 2006.
31 DoS, Section 2207 Report, January 2005, I-7.
32 DoS, Section 2207 Report, July 2004, I-2, I-11.
33 DoS, Section 2207 Report, October 2004, 4.
34 DoS, Section 2207 Report, January 2005, I-20.
35 DoS, Section 2207 Report, April 2005, I-11.
36 House Armed Services Committee Subcommittee on Oversight and Investigations, “Stand Up and Be Counted: The Continuing Challenge of Building the Iraqi Security Forces,” July 2007, 93; and DoS, Section 2207 Report, July 2004, I-9.
37 By January 2005, the IIF comprised twelve of the army’s 27 battalions and was integrated as the 1st Division of the IAF. DoS, Section 2207 Report, January 2005, I-3, I-18.
38 House Armed Services Committee Subcommittee on Oversight and Investigations, “Stand Up and Be Counted: The Continuing Challenge of Building the Iraqi Security Forces,” July 2007, 98.
39 DoD, Measuring Stability and Security in Iraq, July 2005, 16.
40 DoS, Section 2207 Report, October 2004, I-2; and House Armed Services Committee Subcommittee on Oversight and Investigations, “Stand Up and Be Counted: The Continuing Challenge of Building the Iraqi Security Forces,” July 2007, 99.
41 GlobalSecurity.org, “Iraqi Intervention Force, New Iraqi Army, 1st Division,” http://www.globalsecurity.
org/military/world/iraq/iif.htm, accessed on April 17, 2008.
42 House Armed Services Committee Subcommittee on Oversight and Investigations, “Stand Up and Be Counted: The Continuing Challenge of Building the Iraqi Security Forces,” July 2007, 99-100.
43 Anthony Cordesman, Iraqi Security Forces: A Strategy for Success (Westport, CT: Praeger Security International, 2006), 172; and DoD, Measuring Stability and Security in Iraq, July 2005, 13.
44 DoS, Section 2207 Report, January 2005, I- 2-3.
45 DoS, Section 2207 Report, April 2005, I-1.
46 Donald. P. Wright and Timothy R. Reese, On Point II: Transition to the New Campaign (Ft. Leavenworth, KS: Combat Studies Institute Press, 2008), 456.
47 Combat Studies Institute interview with Lt. Gen. David Petraeus, former commander of MNSTC-I, December 11, 2006.
48 Donald. P. Wright and Timothy R. Reese, On Point II: Transition to the New Campaign (Ft. Leavenworth, KS: Combat Studies Institute Press, 2008), 461.
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49 House Armed Services Committee Subcommittee on Oversight and Investigations, “Stand Up and Be Counted: The Continuing Challenge of Building the Iraqi Security Forces,” July 2007, 14-15, 130-132. After the transition teams moved under MNC-I control with their Iraqi units, a coordination line was maintained between the advisory teams and MNSTC-I, because MNSTC-I’s mission still included recruiting replacement soldiers and providing the bulk of individual equipment for Iraqi personnel. Combat Studies Institute interview with Lt. Gen. David Petraeus, former commander of MNSTC-I, December 11, 2006.
50 Eric Schmitt, “General Seeking Faster Training of Iraq Soldiers,” New York Times, January 23, 2005; and DoD News Transcript, “Media Availability with Secretary Rumsfeld; General John Abizaid and General George W. Casey, Jr.,” February 11, 2005.
51 Donald. P. Wright and Timothy R. Reese, On Point II: Transition to the New Campaign (Ft. Leavenworth, KS: Combat Studies Institute Press, 2008), 462.
52 Anthony Cordesman, Iraqi Security Forces: A Strategy for Success (Westport, CT: Praeger Security International, 2006), 157.
53 DoD, Weekly Status Report, June 22, 2004, 29.
54 GAO Report 07-308SP, “Securing, Stabilizing, and Rebuilding Iraq: Key Issues for Congressional Oversight,” January 2007, 23, 45. SIGIR found that many of these problems persisted in Defense Department reporting on the Iraqi Security Forces as late as October 2008. SIGIR Audit 08-015, “Interim Analysis of Iraqi Security Force Information Provided by the Department of Defense Report, Measuring Stability and Security in Iraq,” April 25, 2008; and SIGIR Audit 09-002, “Challenges in Obtaining Reliable and Useful Data on Iraqi Security Forces Continue,” October 21, 2008.
55 House Armed Services Committee Subcommittee on Oversight and Investigations, “Stand Up and Be Counted: The Continuing Challenge of Building the Iraqi Security Forces,” July 2007.
56 Joseph A. Christoff, GAO Director, International Affairs and Trade, Testimony before the House Committee on Government Reform Subcommittee on National Security, Emerging Threats, and International Relations, March 14, 2005. “Geographic areas secured by ISF forces” was added as a third indicator of progress by October 2005. This came to be known as the Provincial Iraqi Control (PIC) Process. DoD, Measuring Stability and Security in Iraq, October 2005, 27.
57 GAO Report 07-308SP, “Securing, Stabilizing, and Rebuilding Iraq: Key Issues for Congressional Oversight,” January 2007, 31.
58 DoD, Measuring Stability and Security in Iraq, July 2005, 13.
59 DoD, Measuring Stability and Security in Iraq, October 2005, 30. DoD provided aggregate information on unit readiness to oversight agencies, but did not release unit-level reports, despite repeated requests by GAO.
Questions remained about how TRAs influenced training and equipping policy. GAO Report 07-308SP, “Securing, Stabilizing, and Rebuilding Iraq: Key Issues for Congressional Oversight,” January 2007, 31. TRAs were first used to assess the Iraqi Armed Forces, and a law-enforcement analogue was later developed for the Special Police Forces. The lack of consistent MNC-I presence at local police stations prevented systematic operational assessments of the IPS during this period. DoD, Measuring Stability and Security in Iraq, July 2005,
14-19; and DoD, Measuring Stability and Security in Iraq, October 2005, 29.
60 National Security Presidential Directive 36, “United States Government Operations in Iraq,” May 11, 2004;
and SIGIR interview with Col. John Ferrari, former CJTF-7 strategic planner and OMB program examiner, September 10, 2008.
61 DoS, Section 2207 Report, January 2005, 11.
62 DoD, “FY 2005 Supplemental Request for Operation Iraqi Freedom (OIF), Operation Enduring Freedom (OEF), and Operation Unified Assistance,” February 2005, 78.
63 SIGIR interview with Col. Chris King, former MNSTC-I Deputy J5, July 24, 2008.
64 Office of Management and Budget, “FY 2005 Emergency Supplemental Request,” February 14, 2005, 25- 26, http://www.whitehouse.gov/omb/budget/amendments/supplemental_2_14_05.pdf.
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• Endnotes •
65 P.L. 109-13, Making Emergency Supplemental Appropriations for Defense, the Global War on Terror, and Tsunami Relief, for the Fiscal Year Ending September 20, 2005 and for Other Purposes, May 11, 2005.
66 SIGIR, Quarterly Report to the United States Congress, October 2008, 19. ISFF appropriations include:
P.L. 109-234, Emergency Supplemental Appropriations for Fiscal Year 2006, June 15, 2006; P.L. 109-289, Department of Defense Appropriations Act for Fiscal Year 2007, September 29, 2006; P.L. 110-28, U.S. Troop Readiness, Veterans’ Care, Katrina Recovery, and Iraq Accountability Appropriations Act for Fiscal Year 2007, December 21, 2007; and P.L. 110-161, Consolidated Appropriations Act for Fiscal Year 2008, December 26, 2007.
67 SIGIR, Quarterly Report to the United States Congress, October 2008, 19; and DoS, Section 2207 Report, July 2008, Status of Funds. When CERP and other Economic Support Fund appropriations are included, total U.S. funding for Iraq security totals more than $27 billion as of July 2008. SIGIR, Quarterly Report to the United States Congress, July 2008, 4.
68 DoS, Section 2207 Report, July 2004, 17; and DoS, Section 2207 Report, July 2005, 18.
69 SIGIR interview with Gen. David Petraeus, Commander of MNF-I, March 2, 2008.
70 Combat Studies Institute interview with Lt. Gen. David Petraeus, former commander of MNSTC-I, December 11, 2006.
71 DoS, Section 2207 Report, January 2005, I-4.
72 DoD, Measuring Stability and Security in Iraq, October 2005, 38.
73 House Armed Services Committee Subcommittee on Oversight and Investigations, “Stand Up and Be Counted: The Continuing Challenge of Building the Iraqi Security Forces,” July 2007, 91.
74 SIGIR interview with Gen. David Petraeus, Commander of MNF-I, March 2, 2008; and GAO Report 07- 711, “Stabilizing Iraq: DoD Cannot Ensure that U.S.-Funded Equipment Has Reached Iraqi Security Forces,” July 2007, 9.
75 SIGIR Audit 06-032, “Iraqi Security Forces: Review of Plans to Implement Logistics Capabilities,” October 28, 2006, 7-8.
76 SIGIR Audit 06-033, “Iraqi Security Forces: Weapons Provided by the U.S. Department of Defense Using the Iraq Relief and Reconstruction Fund,” October 28, 2006, 8-10; GAO Report 07-711, “Stabilizing Iraq:
DoD Cannot Ensure that U.S.-Funded Equipment Has Reached Iraqi Security Forces,” July 2007, 11-12; DoD IG Audit D-2008-026, “Management of the Iraq Security Forces Fund in Southwest Asia-Phase III,” November 30, 2007, 9-10; and Claude M. Kicklighter, Department of Defense Inspector General, Testimony before the Senate Appropriations Committee, March 11, 2008. The White House did not certify that a registration and monitoring system for weapons issued to the Iraqi security forces had been established until October 2008.
George W. Bush, President of the United States, letter to Chairmen and Ranking Members of the House and Senate Committees on Armed Services, the House Committee on Foreign Affairs, the Senate Committee on Foreign Relations, and the Senate Committee on Banking, Housing, and Urban Affairs, October 23, 2008.
77 Lt. Gen. David Petraeus, “2006 Combat Studies Institute Military History Symposium Keynote Presentation,” in Kendall Gott, ed., Security Assistance: U.S. and International Historical Perspectives (Ft.
Leavenworth: Combat Studies Institute Press, 2006) 6.
78 DoS, Section 2207 Report, January 2005, I-4, 15.
79 SIGIR interview with Lt. Gen. Martin Dempsey, former commander of MNSTC-I, April 10, 2008; DoD, Measuring Stability and Security in Iraq, October 2005, 27; and SIGIR interview with Gen. David Petraeus, Commander of MNF-I, March 2, 2008.
80 IAF recruits signed a national service contract that required them to serve anywhere they were assigned, although there was no legal penalty for dropping out of the military. DoD, Measuring Stability and Security in Iraq, July 2005, 17.
81 DoS Report ISP-IQO-05-72 and DoD IG Report IE-2005-002, “Interagency Assessment of Iraq Police Training,” July 15, 2005, 23.
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82 Andrew Rathmell, “Fixing Iraq’s Internal Security Forces: Why Is Reform of the Ministry of Interior So Hard?,” CSIS, November 2007, 10.
83 Iraqi Governing Council, “Law of Administration for the State of Iraq for the Transitional Period,” March 8, 2004; and CPA Order Number 91, “Regulation of Armed Forces and Militias Within Iraq,” June 2, 2004.
84 DoD, Measuring Stability and Security in Iraq, July 2005, 23.
85 Lt. Gen. David Petraeus, “Advance Policy Questions for Lieutenant General David H. Petraeus, Nominee to be General and Commander, Multi-National Forces-Iraq,” January 23, 2007, 14,.
86 Andrew Rathmell, “Fixing Iraq’s Internal Security Forces: Why Is Reform of the Ministry of Interior So Hard?,” CSIS, November 2007, 11.
87 House Armed Services Committee Subcommittee on Oversight and Investigations, “Stand Up and Be Counted: The Continuing Challenge of Building the Iraqi Security Forces,” July 2007, 86.
88 House Armed Services Committee Subcommittee on Oversight and Investigations, “Stand Up and Be Counted: The Continuing Challenge of Building the Iraqi Security Forces,” July 2007, 71; and Andrew Rathmell, “Fixing Iraq’s Internal Security Forces: Why Is Reform of the Ministry of Interior So Hard?,” CSIS, November 2007, 10-11.
89 Joseph A. Christoff, GAO Director, International Affairs and Trade, Testimony before the House Armed Services Committee Subcommittee on Oversight and Investigations, March 13, 2007, 11-12.
90 DoS, Section 2207 Report, July 2005, I-1.
91 SIGIR interview with Lt. Gen. Martin Dempsey, former commander of MNSTC-I, April 10, 2008.
92 Kenneth Katzman, Congressional Research Service Report RL31339, “Iraq: U.S. Regime Change Efforts and Post-Saddam Governance,” July 5, 2005, 32.
93 The Brookings Institution, “Iraq Index: Tracking Variables of Reconstruction and Security in Post-Saddam Iraq,” July 11, 2005.
94 DoS, Bureau of Democracy, Human Rights, and Labor, “Country Reports on Human Rights Practices–2005: Iraq,” March 8, 2006.
95 James D. Fearon, “Iraq’s Civil War,” Foreign Affairs 86, no. 2 (March/April 2007).
Chapter 20
1 OMB, Section 2207 Report, January 2004, 45.
2 OMB, Section 2207 Report, January 2004, 102.
3 DoS, Section 2207 Report, July 2005, I-31-43.
4 OMB, Section 2207 Report, January 2004, 45-47.
5 DoS, Section 2207 Report, October 2004, 7, I-30.
6 DoS, Section 2207 Report, July 2005, I-31-43.
7 GAO Report 05-932R, “Rebuilding Iraq: U.S. Assistance for the January 2005 Elections,” September 7, 2005, 2, 5.
8 CPA Order Number 92, “The Independent Electoral Commission of Iraq,” May 31, 2004.
9 CPA Order Number 96, “The Electoral Law,” June 15, 2004.
10 United Nations, “Iraq Electoral Fact Sheet, May 17, 2007. For a history of UN involvement, see: United Nations Security Council Report S-2005-585, “Report of the Secretary-General Pursuant to Paragraph 30 of Resolution 1546 (2004),” September 7, 2005.
11 GAO Report 05-932R, “Rebuilding Iraq: U.S. Assistance for the January 2005 Elections,” September 7, 2005, 5-6.
12 DoS, Bureau of Public Affairs, “Iraqi Elections: January 30, 2005,” January 25, 2005.
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• Endnotes •
13 Council on Foreign Relations, “Iraq Timeline 2004,” December 31, 2004.
14 Council on Foreign Relations, “Iraq Timeline 2004,” December 31, 2004.
15 Jonathan Morrow, USIP Special Report 155, “Iraq’s Constitutional Process II: An Opportunity Lost,” November 2005.
16 Larry Diamond, “Not Perfect, but ‘Reasonably Credible,’” Op-Ed, Wall Street Journal, October 25, 2004.
17 Kenneth Katzman, Congressional Research Service Report RS21968, “Iraq: Government Formation and Performance,” updated May 2, 2007, 2; and Council on Foreign Relations, “Iraq Timeline 2005,” October 13, 2005.
18 George W. Bush, “President Congratulates Iraqis on Election,” White House Press Release, January 30, 2005.
19 GAO Report 05-932R, “Rebuilding Iraq: U.S. Assistance for the January 2005 Elections,” September 7, 2005, 3.
20 Jonathan Morrow, USIP Special Report 155, “Iraq’s Constitutional Process II: An Opportunity Lost,” November 2005.
21 Council on Foreign Relations, “Iraq Timeline 2005,” October 13, 2005.
22 Council on Foreign Relations, “Iraq Timeline 2005,” October 13, 2005.
23 Ali A. Allawi, The Occupation of Iraq: Winning the War, Losing the Peace (New Haven, CT: Yale University Press, 2007), 404.
24 Jonathan Morrow, USIP Special Report 155, “Iraq’s Constitutional Process II: An Opportunity Lost,” November 2005, 9.
25 Jonathan Morrow, USIP Special Report 155, “Iraq’s Constitutional Process II: An Opportunity Lost,” USIP Special Report 155, November 2005; and Lionel Beehner and Sharon Otterman, “Iraq: Drafting the Constitution,” Council on Foreign Relations, August 23, 2005.
26 Jonathan Morrow, USIP Special Report 155, “Iraq’s Constitutional Process II, An Opportunity Lost,” USIP Special Report, November 2005, 11.
27 DoS-OIG Report No. ISP-IQO-06-01, “Inspection of Rule-of-Law Programs, Embassy Baghdad,” October 2005, 7.
28 DoS-OIG Report No. ISP-IQO-06-01, “Inspection of Rule-of-Law Programs, Embassy Baghdad,” October 2005, 15.
29 DoS-OIG Report No. ISP-IQO-06-01, “Inspection of Rule-of-Law Programs, Embassy Baghdad,” October 2005, 8.
30 SIGIR, “Iraq Reconstruction: Lessons in Contracting and Procurement,” July 2006; and SIGIR Audit 08- 019, “Outcome, Cost, and Oversight of the Security and Justice Contract with Parsons Delaware, Inc.,” July 28, 2008, 3.
31 CPA Ministry of Justice, “Prisons and Detention Centers in Iraq: An Assessment and Recommendations for Prisons in a Free Society,” June 15, 2003, 5.
32 ORHA/CPA Historian interview with Maj. Gen. Donald F. Campbell, Senior Advisor to the Ministry of Justice, July 14, 2003.
33 CPA Ministry of Justice, “Prisons and Detention Centers in Iraq: An Assessment and Recommendations for Prisons in a Free Society,” June 15, 2003, 6.
34 ORHA/CPA Historian interview with Maj. Gen. Donald F. Campbell, Senior Advisor to the Ministry of Justice, August 13, 2003.
35 SIGIR Audit 08-019, “Outcome, Cost, and Oversight of the Security and Justice Contract with Parsons Delaware, Inc.”, July 28, 2008, 3.
36 SIGIR Audit 08-019, “Outcome, Cost, and Oversight of the Security and Justice Contract with Parsons Delaware, Inc.”, July 28, 2008, 8-24.
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37 SIGIR Audit 08-019, “Outcome, Cost, and Oversight of the Security and Justice Contract with Parsons Delaware, Inc.” July 28, 2008, 17.
38 SIGIR PA-08-138, “Khan Bani Sa’ad Correctional Facility, Khan Bani Sa’ad, Iraq,” July 25, 2008, 1.
39 SIGIR Audit 08-019, “Outcome, Cost, and Oversight of the Security and Justice Contract with Parsons Delaware, Inc.,” July 28, 2008.
40 SIGIR PA-08-138, “Khan Bani Sa’ad Correctional Facility, Khan Bani Sa’ad, Iraq,” July 25, 2008, ii, 3-4, 5-8.
41 SIGIR PA-08-138, “Khan Bani Sa’ad Correctional Facility, Khan Bani Sa’ad, Iraq,” July 25, 2008, 22.
42 Senator Bryon L. Dorgan, Chairman, Statement before the Senate Democratic Policy Committee, September 22, 2008, 2.
43 ORHA/CPA Historian interview with Maj. Gen. Donald F. Campbell, Senior Advisor to the Ministry of Justice, July 14, 2003; and Robert Perito, USIP Report 104, “Establishing the Rule of Law in Iraq,” April 2003.
44 CPA Order Number 2, “Dissolution of Entities,” May 23, 2003.
45 GAO Report 04-902R, “Rebuilding Iraq: Resources, Security, Governance, Essential Services, and Oversight Issues,” June 28, 2004, 80.
46 Sermid Al-Sarraf, Board of Directors, Iraqi Jurists’ Association, Testimony before the Senate Committees on Foreign Relations and Judiciary, June 25, 2003.
47 CPA Order Number 13, “The Central Criminal Court of Iraq,” March 22, 2004.
48 CPA Order Number 15, “Establishment of the Judicial Review Committee,” June 23, 2003.
49 United Nations, “The Present Situation of Human Rights in Iraq,” June 9, 2004, 34.
50 Judge Daniel L. Rubini, Senior Advisor to the Ministry of Justice, memorandum to Ambassador Richard Jones, Deputy Administrator, November 29, 2003.
51 GAO Report 04-902R, “Rebuilding Iraq: Resources, Security, Governance, Essential Services, and Oversight Issues,” June 28, 2004, 82.
52 Agence France Presse (AFP), “Governor Calls Strike in Najaf after Judge Killed,” November 6, 2003.
53 Luke Harding, “Judge Shot Dead in Northern Iraq,” The Guardian, December 24, 2003.
54 GAO Report 04-902R, “Rebuilding Iraq: Resources, Security, Governance, Essential Services, and Oversight Issues,” June 28, 2004, 82-83.
55 Cheryl W. Gray and Daniel Kaufmann, “Corruption and Development,” Finance and Development 35 no. 1 (March 1998), 9.
56 Stuart Bowen, Special Inspector General for Iraq Reconstruction, Testimony before the House Committee on Foreign Affairs’ Subcommittees on International Relations, Human Rights, and Oversight, and on the Middle East and South Asia, March 27, 2007.
57 Danny L. Athanasaw and Christopher M. Griffith, “Iraq Inspectors General: A Work in Progress,” unpub- lished, 2008, 5. (The authors served with the U.S. Department of State in Embassy Baghdad’s anticorruption office, where their portfolio including advising Iraq’s Inspectors General.) 58 SIGIR Audit 07-007, “Status of U.S. Government Anticorruption Efforts in Iraq”, July 24, 2007, 1.
59 David M. Walker, GAO Comptroller General, Testimony before the House Committee on Government Reform, Subcommittee on National Security, Emerging Threats, and International Relations, July 11, 2006.
60 “The oil is being smuggled from Sunni militias and in Basra through the Shi’ite militia and. . . they use this to purchase weapons. . . .These monies will target the killing of Iraqis and Americans.” Judge Radhi Hamza al- Radhi, former Commissioner, Iraqi Commission on Public Integrity, Testimony before the Senate Committee on Appropriations, March 11, 2008.
61 SIGIR, Quarterly Report to the United States Congress, July 2006, 5.
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• Endnotes •
62 USIP interview with Charles Grinnell, Senior Advisor to the Commission on Public Integrity, October 22, 2004; and Stuart Bowen, Special Inspector General for Iraq Reconstruction, Statement before the House Committee on Foreign Affairs Subcommittees on International Relations, Human Rights, and Oversight and The Middle East and South Asia, March 27, 2007.
63 CPA Order 55, “Delegation of Authority Regarding the Iraq Commission on Public Integrity,” January 28, 2004; and CPA Order 57, “Iraqi Inspectors General,” February 5, 2004.
64 The money was for “personnel costs and to ramp up its information collection, administration, and com- munity outreach responsibilities.” OMB, Section 2207 Report, April 2004, 29-30.
65 SIGIR interview with Charles B. Johnson, CPA Trainer and proponent of building the IG system, October 9, 2007; and USIP interview with Charles Grinnell, Senior Advisor to the Commission on Public Integrity, October 22, 2004.
66 Danny L. Athanasaw and Christopher M. Griffith, “Iraq Inspectors General: A Work in Progress,” unpub- lished, 2008.
67 CPA Order 55, “Delegation of Authority Regarding the Iraq Commission on Public Integrity,” January 28, 2004.
68 Radhi, a Shi’a, had refused to join the Ba’ath Party. USIP interview with Charles Grinnell, Senior Advisor to the Commission on Public Integrity, October 22, 2004.
69 CPA Order 55, “Delegation of Authority Regarding the Iraq Commission on Public Integrity,” January 28, 2004; DoS and the Broadcasting Board of Governors-OIG Report ISP-IQO-06-50, “Survey of Anticorruption Programs: Embassy Baghdad, Iraq,” August 2006, 21; and SIGIR Audit 06-021, “Joint Survey of the U.S.
Embassy—Iraq’s Anticorruption Program,” July 28, 2006, 17.
70 Charles B. Johnson and Major Shawn Turner, “Report on Iraqi Anticorruption Systems,” October 25, 2007,
27.
71 Judge Radhi Hamza al-Radhi, Commissioner, Iraqi Commission on Public Integrity, Testimony before the House Committee on Oversight and Government Reform, October 4, 2007.
72 DoS, Bureau of Democracy, Human Rights, and Labor, “Country Reports on Human Rights Practices – 2005: Iraq,” March 8, 2006.
73 Judge Radhi Hamza al-Radhi, Commissioner, Iraqi Commission on Public Integrity, Testimony before the House Committee on Oversight and Government Reform, October 4, 2007.
74 CPA Memorandum Number 3 (Revised), “Criminal Procedures,” June 27, 2004; Stuart Bowen, Special Inspector General for Iraq Reconstruction, Testimony before the House Committee on the Judiciary Subcommittee on Crime, Terrorism, and Homeland Security, June 19, 2007; and SIGIR, Quarterly Report to the United States Congress, April 2007, 101.
75 SIGIR, Quarterly Report to the United States Congress, April 2007, 101.
76Judge Radhi Hamza al-Radhi, Commissioner, Iraqi Commission on Public Integrity, Testimony before Senate Committee on Appropriations, March 12, 2007. He added, “There was pressure put on the judiciary not to prosecute cases on behalf of individuals. Many of Iraq’s judges live in fear of torture and assassination of themselves and their family members if they adjudicate cases of senior government officials.” Currency converted at XE Universal Currency Converter, http://www.xe.com/ucc/convert.cgi, accessed July 2008.
77 Judge Radhi Hamza al-Radhi, Commissioner, Iraqi Commission on Public Integrity, Testimony before the House Committee on Oversight and Government Reform, October 4, 2007.
78 CPA Order 57, “Iraqi Inspectors General,” February 5, 2004.
79 Appointment of an Inspector General is subject to confirmation by Iraq’s national legislature, the Council of Representatives. CPA Order 57, “Iraqi Inspectors General,” February 5, 2004.
80 For a complete list of IG duties see: CPA Order 57, “Iraqi Inspectors General,” Section 5, February 5, 2004.
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81 CPA Order 57, Section 6(1) details the IGs’ powers. CPA Order 57, “Iraqi Inspectors General,” February 5, 2004. Subpoena power is better understood as “request” power. Oftentimes, the individual suffers no legal consequences for failing to provide the documents or show up for interviews.
82 Danny L. Athanasaw and Christopher M. Griffith, “Iraq Inspectors General: A Work in Progress,” unpub- lished, 2008.
83 Danny L. Athanasaw and Christopher M. Griffith, “Iraq Inspectors General: A Work in Progress,” unpub- lished, 2008, 1.
84 CPA Order Number 57, “Iraqi Inspectors General,” February 10, 2004.
85 SIGIR interview with Charles B. Johnson, CPA Trainer and proponent of building the IG system, October 9, 2007. Johnson later said that the decision to overturn the vote was done literally at the last minute, in an email at 2300 hours to the CPA Treasury Advisor.
86 DoD OIG, “DoD OIG Provides Assistance to Iraqi IGs,” http://www.dodig.osd.mil/gwot_iraq/ support_iraq_ig.htm.
87 CPA Order Number 77, “Board of Supreme Audit,” April 25, 2004.
88 Stuart Bowen, Special Inspector General for Iraq Reconstruction, Testimony before the House Committee on Oversight and Government Reform, October 4, 2007.
89 Danny L. Athanasaw and Christopher M. Griffith, “Iraq Inspectors General: A Work in Progress,” unpub- lished, 2008, 3.
90 USIP interview with Charles Grinnell, Senior Advisor to the Commission on Public Integrity, October 22, 2004.
91 UN, “Iraq: Situation Report,” June 28-July 4, 2004.
92 SIGIR, Quarterly Report to the United States Congress, October 2006, 114-115.
93 DoS and the Broadcasting Board of Governors-OIG Report ISP-IQO-06-50, “Survey of Anticorruption Programs: Embassy Baghdad, Iraq,” August 2006, 9-10.
94 DoS and the Broadcasting Board of Governors-OIG Report ISP-IQO-06-50, “Survey of Anticorruption Programs: Embassy Baghdad, Iraq,” August 2006, 17.
95 SIGIR Audit 08-023, “Anticorruption Efforts in Iraq: U.S. and Iraq Take Actions but Much Remains to Be Done,” July 29, 2008, 1-2; SIGIR Audit 08-008, “U.S. Anticorruption Efforts in Iraq: Sustained Management Commitment is a Key to Success,” January 24, 2008, 2-3; SIGIR Audit 07-007, “Status of U.S. Government Anticorruption Efforts in Iraq,” July 24, 2007; and SIGIR Audit 06-021, “Joint Survey of the U.S. Embassy- Iraq’s Anticorruption Program, July 28, 2006.
Chapter 21
1 SIGIR Interview with Robert Stein, Federal Penitentiary, Petersburg, VA, June 13, 2007; and SIGIR, Quarterly Report to the United States Congress, July 31, 2006, Appendix J-1.
2 SIGIR interviews with Brian Flynn, Assistant Inspector General for Inspections; Kevin O’Connor, SIGIR Auditor; and Special Agent Erick Vail, SIGIR Investigator, May 2007. Brian Flynn was the Assistant Inspector General for Audit from 2004-2005.
3 SIGIR interview with Robert Stein, former DoD contractor, Federal Penitentiary, Petersburg, VA, June 13, 2007.
4 Department of Justice, “U.S. Contractor Sentenced in Case Involving Bribery, Fraud, and Money Laundering Scheme in al-Hillah, Iraq,” February 16, 2007.
5 James Glantz, “Wide Plot Seen in Guilty Plea in Iraq Project,” New York Times, February 2, 2006.
6 SIGIR interviews with Brian Flynn, Assistant Inspector General for Inspections; Kevin O’Connor, SIGIR Auditor; and Special Agent Erick Vail, SIGIR Investigator, May 2007.
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• Endnotes •
7 SIGIR interviews with Brian Flynn, Assistant Inspector General for Inspections; Kevin O’Connor, SIGIR Auditor; and Special Agent Erick Vail, SIGIR Investigator, May 2007.
8 SIGIR interviews with Brian Flynn, Assistant Inspector General for Inspections; Kevin O’Connor, SIGIR Auditor; and Special Agent Erick Vail, SIGIR Investigator, May 2007.
9 SIGIR Audit 05-006, “Control of Cash Provided to South-Central Iraq,” April 30, 2005, 6.
10 SIGIR interviews with Brian Flynn, Assistant Inspector General for Inspections; Kevin O’Connor, SIGIR Auditor; and Special Agent Erick Vail, SIGIR Investigator, May 2007.
11 SIGIR interview with Robert Stein, former DoD contractor, Federal Penitentiary, Petersburg, VA, June 13, 2007.
12 SIGIR Audit 05-016, “Management of the Contracts and Grants Used to Construct and Operate the Babylon Police Academy,” October 26, 2005, 8-10.
13 SIGIR Audit 05-016, “Management of the Contracts and Grants Used to Construct and Operate the Babylon Police Academy,” October 26, 2005.
14 SIGIR Audit 05-020, “Management of Contracts, Grants, and Micro-Purchases Used to Rehabilitate the Kerbala Library,” October 26, 2005, 2-3.
15 SIGIR Audit 05-020, “Management of Contracts, Grants, and Micro-Purchases Used to Rehabilitate the Kerbala Library,” October 26, 2005, 10-12, 18, 34, Appendix I.
16 SIGIR Audit 05-006, “Control of Cash Provided to South-Central Iraq,” April 30, 2005, 4.
17 Department of Justice Press Release, “U.S. Contractor Sentence in Case Involving Bribery, Fraud, and Money Laundering Scheme in Al-Hillah, Iraq,” February 16, 2007.
18 Department of Justice Press Release, “Army Lieutenant Colonel Pleds Guilty to Participating in Wire Fraud Scheme Arising out of Al-Hillah, Iraq,” July 28, 2008; SIGIR Audit 05-006, “Control of Cash Provided to South-Central Iraq,” April 30, 2005, 11; Department of Justice Press Release, “U.S. Contractor Sentence in Case Involving Bribery, Fraud, and Money Laundering Scheme in Al-Hillah, Iraq,” February 16, 2007; and SIGIR, Quarterly Report to the United States Congress, July 2006, Appendix J.
19 Department of Justice Press Release, “U.S. Army Colonel and Lt. Colonel Convicted of Conspiracy for Role in Fraud Scheme in Al-hillah, Iraq,” November 7, 2008.
20 Department of Justice Press Release, “U.S. Army Major Pleads Guilty to Bribery Scheme Related to Department of Defense Contracts in Kuwait,” August 13, 2008.
21 Department of Justice Press Release, “U.S. Army Major Pleads Guilty to Bribery Scheme Related to Department of Defense Contracts in Kuwait,” August 13, 2008.
Essential Services Overview - Transition from Negroponte to Khalilzad 22 International Monetary Fund, “Iraq: Statistical Appendix,” August 2007; ITAO, Monthly Import, Production and Export, response to SIGIR data call for the Quarterly Report to the United States Congress, April 2008. DoD, Measuring Stability and Security in Iraq, July 2005, 12; DoS, Iraq Weekly Status Report, June 8, 2005; Iraq Coalition Casualty Count, updated September 2008; SIGIR, Quarterly Report to the United States Congress, October 2005, 12; Iraq Body Count, “Documented civilian deaths from violence,” updated August 24, 2008; P.L. 108-287, Department of Defense Appropriations Act for Fiscal Year 2005, August 5, 2003; P.L. 109-13, Making Emergency Supplemental Appropriations for Defense, the Global War on Terror, and Tsunami Relief, for the Fiscal Year Ending September 20, 2005 and for Other Purposes, May 11, 2005;
Presidency of the Iraqi Interim National Assembly: The State General Budget for 2005; and SIGIR, Quarterly Report to the United States Congress, July 2005, F-3.
23 DoS, Section 2207 Report, July 2005, 10-11; October 2005, 12; and International Monetary Fund, “Iraq:
Statistical Appendix,” August 2007.
24 GAO Report 05-876, “Rebuilding Iraq: Status of Funding and Reconstruction Efforts,” July 2005, 14-17.
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Chapter 22
1 In 2005, the U.S. government did not keep official statistics on civilian deaths; these civilian numbers are estimates by the nongovernmental organization Iraq Body Count. See Iraq Body Count, “A Dossier of Civilian Casualties 2003-2005,” July 2005. Coalition and contractor death figures come from Hannah Fischer, Congressional Research Service Report RL32492, “American War and Military Operations Casualties: Lists and Statistics,” July 13, 2005, 16; and SIGIR, Quarterly Report to the United States Congress, July 2005, 4.
2 SIGIR interview with Ambassador Zalmay Khalilzad, former U.S. Ambassador to Iraq, March 19, 2008.
3 Zalmay Khalilzad, “Afghanistan’s Milestone,” Op-Ed, Washington Post, January 6, 2004.
4 Eric Schmitt, “General Seeking Faster Training of Iraq Soldiers,” New York Times, January 23, 2005.
5 P.L. 109-13, Making Emergency Supplemental Appropriations for Defense, the Global War on Terror, and Tsunami Relief, for the Fiscal Year Ending September 20, 2005 and for Other Purposes, May 11, 2005. By July 2008, ISFF would grow to $17.9 billion. SIGIR, Quarterly Report to the United States Congress, July 2008, 4.
6 SIGIR interview with Philip Zelikow, former Counselor, U.S. State Department, June 26, 2008. See also:
Robin Wright and Glen Kessler, “Rice Sends Team to Assess Iraq Transition,” Washington Post, February 15, 2005; and Bob Woodward, State of Denial: Bush at War, Part III (New York: Simon & Schuster, 2006),
387-89.
7 SIGIR conversations with Philip Zelikow, former Counselor, U.S. State Department, August and September 2008; and SIGIR interview with Celeste Ward, Deputy Assistant Secretary of Defense for Stability Operations Capabilities, September 9, 2008.
8 SIGIR interview with Philip Zelikow, former Counselor, U.S. State Department, June 26, 2008; and Bob Woodward, State of Denial: Bush at War, Part III (New York: Simon & Schuster, 2006), 387-89, 396-97,
412-15.
9 Khalilzad’s transition staff cite four milestone documents that articulate his strategy: a 35-slide briefing deliv- ered to the NSC; the written testimony Khalilzad submitted for his Senate confirmation hearing; an op-ed he wrote in The Wall Street Journal; and, after the draft Iraqi constitution was written, a speech delivered at CSIS.
SIGIR interview with Marin Strmecki, Senior Advisor to Ambassador Khalilzad, January 21, 2008. See Zalmay Khalilzad, U.S. Ambassador to Iraq, Statement before the Senate Committee on Foreign Relations, June 7, 2005; Zalmay Khalilzad, “The Battle of Baghdad: Rampant Insecurity—And a Detailed Plan to Combat It,” Op-Ed, Wall Street Journal, August 23, 2006; and Zalmay Khalilzad, “Iraq: A Status Report,” CSIS Statesmen’s Forum, July 11, 2006.
10 Zalmay Khalilzad, U.S. Ambassador to Iraq, Statement before the Senate Committee on Foreign Relations, June 7, 2005.
11 Krepinevich briefed Khalilzad in Washington, D.C. Krepinevich’s subsequent article in Foreign Affairs was derived from these briefings. Andrew F. Krepinevich, Jr., “How to Win Iraq,” Foreign Affairs (September/ October 2005). Some military officials also refer to this as the “ink-spot” strategy.
12 Public Broadcasting Service, “Interview with Philip Zelikow,” FRONTLINE, February 6, 2007.
13 SIGIR interview with Ambassador Zalmay Khalilzad, former U.S. Ambassador to Iraq, March 19, 2008.
14 SIGIR interview with David Satterfield, former Deputy Chief of Mission, April 14, 2008.
15 SIGIR interview with Ambassador Zalmay Khalilzad, former U.S. Ambassador to Iraq, March 19, 2008.
16 U.S. Appropriated Funds ($29.1 billion): P.L. 108-11 ($3.34 billion), P.L. 108-106 ($19.48 billion), P.L.
108-287 ($0.14 billion), P.L. 109-13 ($6.136). SIGIR, Quarterly Report to the United States Congress, October 2008, 17-18.
17 SIGIR, Quarterly Report to the United States Congress, July 2005, Appendix F; and SIGIR, Quarterly Report to the United States Congress, October 2008, 17-18.
18 SIGIR, Quarterly Report to the United States Congress, July 2005, Introduction, 29-30.
19 SIGIR, Quarterly Report to the United States Congress, July 2005, 23.
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• Endnotes •
20 The Office of Management and Budget (OMB) reallocated the $18.44 billion of IRRF 2 funds as follows:
DoD, $12.98 billion (70.4%); USAID, $3.10 billion (16.8%) DoS, $1.20 billion (6.5%); Treasury $390 million
(2.12%); USIP, $10 million (.05%). SIGIR, Quarterly Report to the United States Congress, July 2005, 24-25.
21 For a summary of reconstruction metrics, see SIGIR, Quarterly Report to the United States Congress, July 2005, 29-35.
22 Oil production was 16 percent below the Ministry of Oil target of 2.5 million barrels per day. SIGIR, Quarterly Report to the United States Congress, July 2005, 30.
23 SIGIR, Quarterly Reports to the United States Congress, July 2005, 33, and October 2005, 19-20.
24 For background on progress in the water sector and details about the reprogramming, see GAO Report 05- 872, “Rebuilding Iraq: U.S. Water and Sanitation Efforts Need Improved Measures for Assessing Impact and Sustained Resources for Maintaining Facilities,” September 2005.
25 SIGIR, Quarterly Report to the United States Congress, October 2005, 3-5.
26 ABC News Poll, “Iraq—Where Things Stand,” December 12, 2005.
27 SIGIR, Quarterly Report to the United States Congress, July 2005, 3.
28 SIGIR, Quarterly Report to the United States Congress, April 2005, 3; SIGIR, Quarterly Report to the United States Congress, July 2005, 107; SIGIR Audit 05-021, “Management of Iraq Relief and Reconstruction Fund Programs: Cost-to-Complete Estimate Reporting,” October 24, 2005, i; and SIGIR Audit 07-003, “Cost-to- Complete Reporting for Iraq Reconstruction Projects,” July 26, 2007, 3.
29 For more detail on contracting and program management, see SIGIR, “Iraq Reconstruction: Lessons in Contracting and Procurement,” July 2006; and SIGIR, “Iraq Reconstruction: Lessons in Program and Project Management,” March 2007.
30 Ambassador Zalmay Khalilzad, vetting comments to SIGIR, October 27, 2008.
31 SIGIR interview with Lieutenant General Peter Chiarelli, former Commander of MNC-I, February 19, 2008.
32 Ambassador Zalmay Khalilzad, comments to SIGIR, October 27, 2008.
33 SIGIR Audit 09-005, “Agencies Need Improved Financial Data Reporting for Private Security Contractors,” October 30, 2009, 3; SIGIR Audit 06-044, “Fact Sheet on Major U.S. Contractors’ Security Costs Related to Iraq Relief and Reconstruction Fund Contracting Activities,” January 30, 2007, 2; and DoS, Section 2207 Report, January 2006, 8. The January 2006 Section 2207 Report also listed water, health care, and roads/ bridges/construction projects that were canceled because funds were shifted to security. In addition to reduc- ing funds available for construction projects, rising security costs made it more challenging to estimate the costs to complete projects. PCO management advised SIGIR that, as of March 31, 2005, the estimated cost for project security had risen from the original program baseline of $1.2 billion to more than $2 billion. SIGIR believes that actual costs (e.g., delays caused by security problems, higher force levels than expected) may be much higher. SIGIR Audit 05-011, “Cost-to-Complete Estimates and Financial Reporting for the Management of the Iraq Relief and Reconstruction Fund,” July 26, 2005, 4; and GAO Testimony 06-179T, “Rebuilding Iraq: Enhancing Security, Measuring Program Results, and Maintaining Infrastructure Are Necessary to Make Significant and Sustainable Progress,” October 18, 2005.
34 SIGIR Audit 09-005, “Agencies Need Improved Financial Data Reporting for Private Security Contractors,” October 30, 2009, 6.
35 SIGIR interview with Major General William H. McCoy, former Commander, USACE-GRD, June 5, 2008;
and SIGIR interview with Lieutenant Colonel Otto Busher, Baghdad PRT member, June 25, 2006.
36 SIGIR interview with Ruth-Ann Ijames, Senior Advisor to JCC-I, June 25, 2006.
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37 SIGIR interviews conducted in Amman, Jordan, with anonymous Iraqi business owners in June 2006;
and multiple interviews in the spring of 2006 with Browning Rockwell, U.S.-Iraqi business consultant. See also: SIGIR interview with Ruth-Ann Ijames, Senior Advisor to JCC-I, June 25, 2006. The PCO developed a web-based management tool, the Subcontracting Excellence Program Database, to monitor the progress of subcontracted work. Ylli Bajraktari, “Economic Empowerment of Women in Iraq: The New Way Forward,” USIP Briefing, May 2006; SIGIR, “Iraq Reconstruction: Lessons in Program and Project Management,” March 2007, 96; and SIGIR Audit 07-009, “Review of Bechtel’s Spending under Its Phase 2 Iraq Reconstruction Contract,” July 24, 2007, 23-26.
38 SIGIR interviews with several anonymous Iraqi firms headquartered in Amman, Jordan in June and July 2006.
39 SIGIR interview with Daniel Speckhard, former IRMO Director and former Deputy Chief of Mission, April 29, 2008.
40 SIGIR interview with Philip Zelikow, former Counselor, U.S. State Department, June 26, 2008; and Bob Woodward, State of Denial: Bush at War, Part III, (New York: Simon & Schuster, 2006), 387-89.
41 The term “reconstruction gap” denotes the differences between what was expected to be built and what was actually built. It was first discussed in SIGIR, Quarterly Report to the United States Congress, October 2005, 3.
42 SIGIR, Quarterly Report to the United States Congress, October 2005, 3.
43 SIGIR interview with Ambassador Zalmay Khalilzad, former U.S. Ambassador to Iraq, March 19, 2008.
44 SIGIR interview with Ambassador Zalmay Khalilzad, former U.S. Ambassador to Iraq, March 19, 2008.
45 In addition to the Negroponte-Casey campaign plan, Ambassador Negroponte and General Casey published a second joint mission statement on February 7, 2005, titled “A Plan for the Year Ahead: Transition to Self-Reliance.” This, along with a Secretary of State cable “U.S. Government Position on Political/Security Principles and Priorities for Iraq Reconstruction,” Cable 061748Z APR 05, SECSTATE 6360, established the strategic direction of U.S. reconstruction policy in early 2005. SIGIR interview with Marin Strmecki, Senior Advisor to Ambassador Khalilzad, January 21, 2008.
46 SIGIR conversations with Dana Eyre, former USAID consultant, Summer 2006; and Terrence K. Kelly, former JSPA director, August 13, 2007.
47 SIGIR conversations with Dana Eyre, former USAID consultant, Summer 2006; and Terrence K. Kelly, former JSPA director, August 13, 2007.
48 SIGIR interview with Marin Strmecki, Senior Advisor to Ambassador Khalilzad, January 21, 2008.
49 SIGIR interview with Marin Strmecki, Senior Advisor to Ambassador Khalilzad, January 21, 2008.
50 This observation was forcefully made by the strategic review performed by Ambassador Negroponte and General Casey in July 2004, and its follow-on analysis by General Luck and members of the Joint Forces Command in August 2004. Leonard R. Hawley, “An Analysis of the DCS for Political and Economic Effects,” August 2004; and Henry W. Stratman, “Orchestrating Instruments of Power for Nationbuilding,” Joint Forces Quarterly 41 (2nd quarter 2006), 33-34.
51 When the strategic communications portfolio was added to PME in 2005, the incumbent became the Deputy Chief of Staff for Strategic Effects. Henry W. Stratman, “Orchestrating Instruments of Power for Nationbuilding,” Joint Forces Quarterly 41 (2nd quarter 2006), 35.
52 Ambassador Zalmay Khalilzad, comments to SIGIR, October 27, 2007.
53 Although the Joint Strategic Planning and Assessment office was approved in late 2005, it was not fully operational until mid-2006. For details of its formation, see SIGIR interview with Terrence K. Kelly, former JSPA director, August 13, 2007.
54 SIGIR interview with Daniel Speckhard, former IRMO Director and former Deputy Chief of Mission, April 29, 2008.
55 SIGIR, Quarterly Report to the United States Congress, January 2008, 35-38.
56 SIGIR Interview with John Bowersox, former Senior Advisor for Health, November 1, 2006.
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• Endnotes •
57 For a description of democracy building programs, see USAID Fact Sheet, “Democracy and Governance:
Advancing Freedom Around the World,” July 24, 2008.
58 Major General Peter W. Chiarelli and Major Patrick R. Michaelis, “Winning the Peace: The Requirement for Full-Spectrum Operations,” Military Review (July-August 2005), 4-17.
59 USAID, “Assistance for Iraq: USAID/Military Cooperation,” updated June 21, 2006; and James “Spike” Stevenson, “Military-Civilian Cooperation: A Field Perspective,” Foreign Service Journal (March 2006), 55-62.
60 James Stephenson, Losing the Golden Hour: An Insider’s View of Iraq’s Reconstruction (Washington, DC:
Potomac Books, Inc., 2007), 102.
61 SIGIR interview with Marin Strmecki, Senior Advisor to Ambassador Khalilzad, January 21, 2008.
62 SIGIR interview with Andrew Rathmell, former Director of CPA Office of Planning and Analysis and consultant to Joint Strategic Planning and Assessments, June 26, 2006.
63 SIGIR interview with Marin Strmecki, Senior Advisor to Ambassador Khalilzad, January 21, 2008.
64 SIGIR interview with Colonel Kenneth Cox, Engineer Brigade Commander, June 24, 2006.
65 SIGIR interview with Andrew Rathmell, former Director of CPA Office of Planning and Analysis and consultant to Joint Strategic Planning and Assessments, June 26, 2006.
66 SIGIR interview with Calvin Crane, Regional PAO Coordinator, August 12, 2007; and SIGIR, Quarterly Report to the United States Congress, October 2005, 7. For background and commentary on PRDCs, see Center for Army Lessons Learned, “Provincial Reconstruction Teams in Iraq Handbook,” version 1.5, October 2006, 38; MNF-I, Operation Iraqi Freedom Press Conference, “Provincial Reconstruction,” October 2, 2006;
MNF-I, Operation Iraqi Freedom Press Briefing, October 9, 2006; and Robert Perito, USIP Report 185, “Provincial Reconstruction Teams in Iraq,” March 2007, 8.
67 Plans were also drawn up to create Provincial Support Teams composed of the U.S. Embassy, PCO, and USAID staff, but only three deployed and a later assessment of their performance found them an insufficient vehicle. Inadequacies of the Provincial Support Teams are discussed in Unclassified Baghdad 4045, “Action Plan to Build Capacity and Sustainability within Iraq’s Provincial Governments,” from embassy Baghdad to SECSTATE, 010330Z October 2005. SIGIR interview with Celeste Ward, political aide to Lieutenant General Peter Chiarelli, and Colonel Kenneth Cox, Engineer Brigade Commander, June 24, 2006.
68 DoS, Section 2207 Report, July 2005, 2-3.
69 USACE-GRD, Susan M. Fournier, “Provinces Succeed in Selecting Projects,” February 24, 2006.
70 Michael J. McNerney, “Stabilization and Reconstruction in Afghanistan: Are PRTs a Model or a Muddle?” Parameters (Winter 2005-2006), 37. For further background on the PRT history and operating concept, see Robert Perito, “Hearts and Minds Model?” Armed Forces Journal (December 2005); and Robert Perito, USIP Special Report 152, “U.S. Experience with Provincial Reconstruction Teams in Afghanistan: Lessons Identified,” October 2005.
71 SIGIR conversations with Philip Zelikow, former Counselor, U.S. State Department, August and September 2008; and SIGIR interview with Celeste Ward, Deputy Assistant Secretary of Defense for Stability Operations Capabilities, September 9, 2008. With the changing military footprint and eventual transition to Iraqi control, Khalilzad did not want to embed teams in brigades that would soon be withdrawn or repositioned. Ambassador Zalmay Khalilzad, vetting comments to SIGIR, October 27, 2008.
72 Robert Perito, USIP Special Report 185, “Provincial Reconstruction Teams in Iraq,” March 2007, 4; and Condoleezza Rice, Secretary of State, Testimony before the Senate Committee on Foreign Relations, October 19, 2005.
73 Unclassified Baghdad 4045, “Action Plan to Build Capacity and Sustainability within Iraq’s Provincial Governments,” From embassy Baghdad to SECSTATE, 010330Z October 2005.
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74 The CORDS (Civil Operations and Revolutionary Development Support) pacification program in rural Vietnam was an interesting precursor to Provisional Reconstruction Teams used in Afghanistan and Iraq. R.
W. Komer, RAND Report R-967-ARPA, “Bureaucracy Does Its Thing: Institutional Constraints on U.S.-GVN Performance in Vietnam,” August 1972; Lewis Sorley, A Better War: The Unexamined Victories and Final Tragedy of America’s Last Years in Vietnam (New York: Harcourt Brace & Company, 1999); Neil Sheehan, A Bright Shining Lie: John Paul Vann and America in Vietnam (New York: Vintage, 1989); and David Passage, “Speaking Out: Caution: Iraq is Not Vietnam,” Foreign Service Journal (November 2007).
75 SIGIR interview with Calvin Crane, Regional PAO Coordinator, August 12, 2007; and Condoleezza Rice, “Remarks at the Inauguration of the Provincial Reconstruction Team,” November 11, 2005.
76 SIGIR Audit 06-034, “Status of the Provincial Reconstruction Team Program in Iraq,” October 29, 2006,
8-11; and SIGIR conversations with Philip Zelikow, former Counselor, U.S. State Department, August and September 2008.
77 Ginger Cruz, Deputy Inspector General for Iraq Reconstruction, Testimony before the House Armed Services Committee, September 5, 2007; and SIGIR Audit 06-034, “Status of the Provincial Reconstruction Team Program in Iraq,” October 29, 2006, 9.
78 Joe Saloom, IRMO Director, memorandum to David M. Satterfield, Chargé d’Affaires ad interim, “P.R.T.
Support Issues,” July 6, 2006.
79 Some PRTs did retain PSD support, but plans for all PRTs to be supported were dropped. DoS Cable, “Estimated Costs for DS PRT Security Recommendations,” Ref. Baghdad 2236; Randall Bennett, Regional Security Officer, “PRT PSD Teams discussion between RSO Bennett and Lieutenant General Chiarelli on 07/25/2006,” August 10, 2006; and DoS, “DoS Financial Plan to Support PRT Excel,” undated.
80 Unclassified Baghdad 4045, “Action Plan to Build Capacity and Sustainability within Iraq’s Provincial Governments,” From embassy Baghdad to SECSTATE, 010330Z October 2005; and SIGIR Audit 06-034, “Status of the Provincial Reconstruction Team Program in Iraq,” October 29, 2006, 8.
81 SIGIR Audit 06-034, “Status of the Provincial Reconstruction Team Program in Iraq,” October 29, 2006, 8.
82 SIGIR site visit to Mosul PRT and follow-up correspondence, Forward Operating Base Marez, June 22, 2006.
83 SIGIR interview with Andrew Rathmell, former Director of CPA Office of Planning and Analysis and consultant to Joint Strategic Planning and Assessments, June 26, 2006.
84 SIGIR interview with Rear Admiral Scott R. Van Buskirk, Director, Office of National Unity, Strategic Effects, June 20, 2006.
85 Ginger Cruz, Deputy Inspector General for Iraq Reconstruction, Testimony before the House Armed Services Committee, September 5, 2007; and SIGIR Audit 07-015, “Review of the Effectiveness of Provincial Reconstruction Teams in Iraq,” October 18, 2007. See also: Supplemental Agreement to the Memorandum of Agreement between Commander, Multi-National Force-Iraq, and Chief of Mission, U.S. Mission Iraq Regarding Security Responsibility on PRT Security Responsibilities and Requirements, November 9, 2006;
and Memorandum of Agreement between the Deputy Secretary of State and the Deputy Secretary of Defense Regarding PRT Support, February 22, 2007.
86 SIGIR Audit 06-034, “Status of the Provincial Reconstruction Team Program in Iraq,” October 29, 2006, 15.
87 Ginger Cruz, Deputy Inspector General for Iraq Reconstruction, Testimony before the House Armed Services Committee, September 5, 2007.
88 SIGIR Audit 06-034, “States of the Provincial Reconstruction Team Program in Iraq,” October 29, 2006, 5.
89 Bonn Agreement, “Agreement on Provisional Arrangements in Afghanistan Pending the Re-Establishment of Permanent Government Institutions,” December 5, 2001.
90 Kenneth Katzman, Congressional Research Service Report RL31339, “Iraq: Post-Saddam Governance and Security,” updated November 7, 2006.
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• Endnotes •
91 CIA, “The World Factbook - Afghanistan,” January 2008; and CIA, “The World Factbook - Iraq,” January 2008.
92 James Kunder, USAID Asst Administrator, Near East Bureau, Testimony before the House Committee on International Relations, March 9, 2006.
93 Decree of the President of the Islamic Transitional State of Afghanistan on the Afghan National Army, December 1, 2002 as cited in: United Nations Assistance Mission in Afghanistan, “Rebuilding Afghanistan:
Peace and Stability,” December 2, 2002, Annex 1, http://www.unama-afg.org/docs/_nonUN%20Docs/_ Internation-Conferences&Forums/Bonn-Talks/decree%20on%20army.pdf.
94 Combat Studies Institute interview with Major General Paul Eaton, former Commander of CMATT and OSC, August 3, 2006; and CPA Order Number 22, August 7, 2003.
95 SIGIR interview with General Paul Eaton, former CMATT Commander, May 20, 2008.
96 Robert Perito, USIP Senior Program Officer, Testimony before the House Armed Services Subcommittee on Oversight and Investigations, October 18, 2007.
97 SIGIR, Quarterly Report to the United States Congress, October 2008, 16; SIGAR, Quarterly Report to the United States Congress, October 2008, 1.
98 MNC-I, “Money as a Weapons System (MAAWS): MNC-I Smart Book For Resource Managers,” MNC-I C8, October 1, 2005, 2.
99 USAID, “Transition Strategy: 2006-2008,” PowerPoint Briefing, September 2005; and USAID, “Strategy and Impact of Iraq Transition Initiative: OTI in Iraq (2003-2006), Final Evaluation,” September 30, 2006, 15.
100 The list of strategic cities infrequently changed, based on periodic assessments coordinated by the NSC and MNF-I. One list is located at: USAID, “Annex 1- Strategic Cities in Iraq,” http://www.usaid.gov/iraq/con- tracts/pdf/Annex1-StrategicCitiesinIraq.pdf.
101 Clear-Hold-Build is slightly different than the oil-spot strategy, in that it advocates a broader emphasis on creating safe havens simultaneously across all areas of operation by emphasizing civilian security, rather than selecting only some regions for intervention. Public Broadcasting Service, “Interview with Philip Zelikow,” FRONTLINE, February 6, 2007.
102 Condoleezza Rice, Secretary of State, Testimony before the Senate Foreign Relations Committee, October 19, 2005; DoD News Transcript, “News Briefing with Secretary of Defense Donald Rumsfeld and General Peter Pace,” November 29, 2005; and Public Broadcasting Service, “Interview with Philip Zelikow,” FRONTLINE, February 6, 2007.
103 DoD News Transcript, “News Briefing with Secretary of Defense Donald Rumsfeld and General Peter Pace,” November 29, 2005.
104 George W. Bush, “President Commemorates Veterans Day, Discusses War on Terror,” November 11, 2005.
105 NSC, “National Strategy for Victory in Iraq,” November 30, 2005.
106 Public Broadcasting Service, “Interview with Philip Zelikow,” FRONTLINE, February 6, 2007; SIGIR interview with Philip Zelikow, former Counselor, U.S. State Department, June 26, 2008; and SIGIR interview with Celeste Ward, political aide to Lieutenant General Peter Chiarelli, and Colonel Kenneth Cox, Engineer Brigade Commander, June 24, 2006.
107 For an elaboration of the conflict transformation approach, see Jock Covey, Michael J. Dziedzic, and Leonard R. Hawley, eds., The Quest for Viable Peace: International Intervention and Strategies for Conflict Transformation (Washington, DC: USIP, 2005).
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• Chapter 23 •
Chapter 23
1 SIGIR interview with Lieutenant Colonel Otto Busher, Baghdad PRT member, June 25, 2006.
2 Sgt. Samson Barini, “Minutes from Meeting with the Water Sector at the Amanat,” Baghdad PRT Infrastructure Report, June 25, 2006. Members of SIGIR’s lessons learned team observed this meeting. See, also: Baghdad Water Authority, “Minutes of Meeting—The Coordination with USAID,” June 11, 2006.
3 SIGIR interview with Lieutenant Colonel Otto Busher, Baghdad PRT member, June 25, 2006.
4 Dan Bisbee, Baghdad PRT, “Baghdad Governance,” 3rd ed., April 2007, 10. This manual was written as a primer to city politics for reconstruction personnel working in Baghdad, and is widely circulated among officials and contractors.
5 Dan Bisbee, Baghdad PRT, “Baghdad Governance,” 3rd ed., April 2007, 11-12; and James Glanz, “Baghdad Mayor is Ousted by a Shiite Group and Replaced,” New York Times, August 10, 2005.
6 Sgt. Samson Barini, “Minutes from Meeting with the Water Sector at the Amanat,” Baghdad PRT Infrastructure Report, June 25, 2006; and SIGIR interview with Lieutenant Colonel Otto Busher, Baghdad PRT member, June 25, 2006. A SIGIR inspection found similar problems at the Nassriya water treatment plant, where the local distribution system would not be able to withstand increased water pressure and would thus lead to major leakages when the water treatment became operational. SIGIR Inspection PA-07-116, “Nassriya Water Treatment Plant, Nassriya, Iraq,” April 28, 2008, 28-29.
7 Sgt. Samson Barini, “Minutes from Meeting with the Water Sector at the Amanat,” Baghdad PRT Infrastructure Report, June 25, 2006; and SIGIR interview with Lieutenant Colonel Otto Busher, Baghdad PRT member, June 25, 2006.
8 SIGIR interviews with Lieutenant Colonel Otto Busher, Baghdad PRT member, June 19-28, 2006. See also:
Dan Bisbee, Baghdad PRT, “Baghdad Governance,” 3rd ed., April 2007, 12; and SIGIR interview with Joseph Gregoire, Baghdad PRT leader, June 20, 2006.
9 Sgt. Samson Barini, “Minutes from Meeting with the Water Sector at the Amanat,” Baghdad PRT Infrastructure Report, June 25, 2006; and SIGIR interview with Lieutenant Colonel Otto Busher, Baghdad PRT team member, June 25, 2006.
10 SIGIR interview with Sgt. Timmy R. Rostro, Convoy Commander Red 2, Unit 43029, June 25, 2006, and subsequent correspondence, July 4, 2006.
11 SIGIR interviews with Lieutenant Colonel Otto Busher, Baghdad PRT member, June 19-28, 2006.
12 “Groundhog Day” is a term that some military personnel use to describe “another day in Iraq.” SIGIR inter- view with Lieutenant Colonel Otto Busher, Baghdad PRT member, June 25, 2006.
13 USIP interview with Colonel P.J. Dermer, former CPA governance advisor, August 22, 2004.
14 SIGIR interview with Vijay Samaraweera, Senior Policy Advisor for Regional Government, RTI International, August 16, 2007.
15 This was made explicit in articles 55 and 56 of the Transitional Administrative Law (TAL) and CPA Order Number 71. In theory, these writs empowering local government moved Iraq further toward a decentral- ized federal republic in which the central government would nominate governors, whose appointment and tenure would be subject to the approval of provincial councils. The councils and the governor would manage ministerial outposts in each province headed by the directors general, thereby putting the resources of national ministries under the direction of local elected officials. Iraqi Governing Council, “Law of Administration for the State of Iraq for the Transitional Period,” Articles 55-56, March 8, 2004; and CPA Order Number 71, “Local Governmental Powers,” April 6, 2004. SIGIR interview with Vijay Samaraweera, Senior Policy Advisor for Regional Government, RTI International, August 16, 2007.
16 For a discussion of the debate over federalism, see Eric Herring and Glen Rangwala, Iraq in Fragments: The Occupation and its Legacy (Ithaca, NY: Cornell University Press, 2006); and Ali A. Allawi, The Occupation of Iraq: Winning the War, Losing the Peace (New Haven, CT: Yale University Press, 2007).
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• Endnotes •
17 ORHA/CPA Historian interview with J. Scott Carpenter, CPA Director of Governance, June 29, 2004. For an analysis of how Iraqi factions took control of Iraqi ministries, see Eric Herring and Glen Rangwala, Iraq in Fragments: The Occupation and Its Legacy (Ithaca, NY: Cornell University Press, 2006).
18 SIGIR interview with Ali A. Allawi, former Iraqi Minister of Trade and Minister of Defense, September 13, 2007. For an account of nepotism and political capture, see Ali A. Allawi, The Occupation of Iraq: Winning the War, Losing the Peace (New Haven, CT: Yale University Press, 2007).
19 Eric Herring and Glen Rangwala, Iraq in Fragments: The Occupation and its Legacy (Ithaca, NY: Cornell University Press, 2006), chapters 1-3.
20 Eric Herring and Glen Rangwala, Iraq in Fragments: The Occupation and its Legacy (Ithaca, NY: Cornell University Press, 2006), 118, 125.
21 Dan Bisbee, Baghdad PRT, “Baghdad Governance,” 3rd ed., April 2007, 10.
22 James A. Baker III and Lee H. Hamilton, co-chairs, “The Iraq Study Group Report,” December 6, 2006, 20.
23 USAID, “Local Governance Program,” Final Report, June 2005, 12.
24 Dan Bisbee, Baghdad PRT, “Baghdad Governance,” 3rd ed., April 2007, 10.
25 USAID, “Local Governance Program,” Final Report, June 2005, 9.
26 SIGIR interview with Vijay Samaraweera, Senior Policy Advisor for Regional Government, RTI International, August 16, 2007.
27 Dan Bisbee, Baghdad PRT, “Baghdad Governance,” 3rd ed., April 2007.
28 For a detailed history and analysis of Iraq’s constitutional negotiations, see Noah Feldman and Roman Martinez, “The International Migration of Constitutional Norms in the New World Order: Constitutional Politics and Text in the New Iraq: An Experiment in Islamic Democracy,” Fordham Law Review 75, no. 2 (November 2006), 883-920.
29 Iraqi Governing Council, “Law of Administration for the State of Iraq for the Transitional Period,” Articles
55-56, March 8, 2004.
30 Noah Feldman and Roman Martinez, “The International Migration of Constitutional Norms in the New World Order: Constitutional Politics and Text in the New Iraq: An Experiment in Islamic Democracy,” Fordham Law Review 75, no. 2 (November 2006), 900-901.
31 United Nations Security Council Report S-2005-585, “Report of the Secretary-General Pursuant to Paragraph 30 of Resolution 1546 (2004),” September 7, 2005.
32 Dan Bisbee, Baghdad PRT, “Baghdad Governance,” 3rd ed., April 2007, 34.
33 SIGIR, Quarterly Report to the United States Congress, April 2008, 145-46.
34 SIGIR, Quarterly Report to the United States Congress, October 2008, 6.
35 SIGIR interview with John Jones, Diyala PRT member, August 9, 2007.
36 Mat Bouldin, Diyala PRT member, email to SIGIR, August 17, 2007.
37 SIGIR interview with John Jones, Diyala PRT member, August 9, 2007.
38 SIGIR interview with Robert Tillery, former National Coordination Team Chief of Staff, January 11, 2008.
39 Mat Bouldin, Diyala PRT member, email to SIGIR, August 17, 2007.
40 SIGIR site visit to the Northern Governors Conference, Baghdad, August 2007.
41 Not until 2008 was the original CPA Order Number 71, outlining the authorities of local governments, replaced with a formal Provincial Powers Law. The Provincial Powers Law was approved on March 19, 2008.
Reuters, “Iraq Presidency Passes Provincial Powers Law,” March 19, 2008.
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• Chapter 24 •
42 For background on the Local Governance Program II, see USAID, “Iraq Strengthening Local and Provincial Governance Program: Annual Report, October 1, 2005-September 30, 2006,” December 2006; and USAID, “Assistance for Iraq: “Contracts and Grants,” http://www.usaid.gov/iraq/contracts, and USAID, “Iraq Local Governance Program (LGP): 2007 Annual Report,” October 1, 2006-December 31, 2007,” January 15, 2008.
43 SIGIR interview with Todd Helmeke, RTI regional team leader in Hilla, August 25, 2007.
44 USAID, “Iraq Local Governance Program II (LGP II),” undated, http://www.usaid.gov/iraq/contracts/ pdf/AI4-IraqlocalGovernanceProgram_LGPII_FactSheet.pdf.
45 USAID Audit E-267-07-007-P, “Audit of USAID/Iraq’s Local Governance Activities,” July 31, 2007, 1, 5.
46 SIGIR Audit 09-003, “Cost, Outcome, and Oversight of Local Government Program Contract with Research Triangle Institute,” October 21, 2008.
47 SIGIR interview with Vijay Samaraweera, Senior Policy Advisor for Regional Government, RTI International, August 16, 2007.
Chapter 24
1 USAID contracted with Bechtel in 2003 (IRRF 1) and again in 2004 (IRRF 2) to rebuild vast parts of Iraq’s electrical infrastructure. The Doura power plant’s number 5 and number 6 generators were the objects of two Bechtel job orders under the IRRF 1 and IRRF 2 contracts. The first, amounting to $90.8 million, called for the rehabilitation of the two generators. The second, amounting to an additional $80 million, called for the establishment of operations and maintenance training for personnel at the Ministry of Electricity. Work on the generators was scheduled for completion on April 30, 2004. Actual completion was delayed by almost two years, to April 2006. SIGIR Inspection PA 07-103, “Doura Power Stations 5 and 6, Baghdad, Iraq,” July 18, 2007, 3-4.
2 SIGIR Inspection PA 07-103, “Doura Power Stations 5 and 6, Baghdad, Iraq,” July 18, 2007, i-ii, 7-10.
3 For instance, the pressure on working-level engineers was so extreme that not only were maintenance periods shortened due to demand, but improper procedures were used after blackouts to restart sensitive components.
SIGIR interview with Al Herman, Senior Consultant for Electricity, February 28, 2008.
4 Stuart Bowen, Special Inspector General for Iraq Reconstruction, Testimony before the House Committee on Appropriations Subcommittee on Foreign Operations, Export Financing, and Related Programs, September 7, 2005; and SIGIR, Quarterly Report to the United States Congress, January 2006, 4-5. For ex- amples of SIGIR sustainment inspections see SIGIR Inspection PA 07-116, “Nassriya Water Treatment Plant, Nassriya, Iraq,” April 28, 2008; and SIGIR Inspection PA 08-137, “Kirkuk to Baiji Pipeline Exclusion Zone – Phase 3, Kirkuk, Iraq,” July 24, 2008; and SIGIR Inspections PA 06-082, PA 06-083, PA 06-084, PA 06-085, PA
06-086, “Electrical Substation Sustainment, Basrah, Iraq,” January 10, 2007.
5 SIGIR defines sustainment “as the ability of the Iraqi government to support IRRF-funded projects and facilities for an extended period of time after U.S. financial, managerial, and technical assistance is terminated.” SIGIR Audit 05-022, “Managing Sustainment for Iraq Relief and Reconstruction Fund Programs,” October 24, 2005, i. SIGIR defines capacity development as “an activity or multiple activities that lead to the transfer of knowledge, skills, and abilities across a range of functions over a period of time.” SIGIR Audit 06-045, “Status of Ministerial Capacity Development in Iraq,” January 30, 2007, 3.
6 One Iraqi employed by the Coalition recalled experiences working for the former regime in which Ba’athist enforcers would identify missing inventory from state factories, and then mete out punishment by shooting em- ployees at random. SIGIR interview with Babil PRT Iraqi employee, August 2008. Individual ministries during the Hussein era also maintained their own prison networks, designed to incarcerate suspected employees and enforce a culture of fear. SIGIR interview with Andrew Natsios, former USAID Administrator, April 17, 2006.
7 For a history of Saddamist management practices, see Kanan Makiya, Republic of Fear: The Politics of Modern Iraq (Berkeley: University of California Press, 1998); and Phebe Marr, The Modern History of Iraq, 2nd edition (Boulder, CO: Westview Press, 2003).
8 Bearing Point, USAID contract RAN-C-00-03-00043-00, July 18, 2003, http://www.usaid.gov/iraq/con- tracts/pdf/BearingPoint.pdf.
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• Endnotes •
9 SIGIR Audit 08-007, “Efforts to Implement a Financial-Management Information System in Iraq,” January 25, 2008.
10 GAO Report 04-902R, “Rebuilding Iraq: Resource, Security, Governance, Essential Services, and Oversight Issues,” June 2004, 14.
11 Bechtel, USAID contract EEE-C-00-03-00018-00, April 17, 2003, 14, http://www.usaid.gov/iraq/con- tracts/pdf/Bechtel.pdf.
12 SIGIR interview with Robert MacLeod, USAID Chief Technical Officer, January 20, 2006.
13 For example, a critical deterioration of the port equipment at Umm Qasr took place between the summer months of 2003, when the port was rehabilitated, and December 2003. Visits by USAID officials revealed that work on maintaining the equipment had been stalled by local managers who were waiting for Baghdad to initi- ate repairs. SIGIR interview with Robert MacLeod, USAID Chief Technical Officer, January 20, 2006.
14 Bechtel, USAID contract SPU-C-00-04-00001-00, January 5, 2004, http://www.usaid.gov/iraq/contracts/ pdf/Bechtel_II.pdf.
15 SIGIR, “Iraq Reconstruction: Lessons in Program and Project Management,” March 2007, 54-55.
16 James Stephenson, former USAID Mission Director, email to SIGIR, August 2, 2006.
17 SIGIR interview with Robert MacLeod, USAID Chief Technical Officer, January 20, 2006; and James Stephenson, former USAID Mission Director, email to SIGIR, August 2, 2006.
18 James Stephenson, former USAID Mission Director, email to SIGIR, August 2, 2006.
19 SIGIR interview with Andrew Natsios, former USAID Administrator, March 17, 2008.
20 SIGIR interview with Thomas Wheelock, former Chief of Party for USAID’s contractor International Resource Group, January 5, 2006.
21 SIGIR interview with Christopher Milligan, USAID Deputy Director of Iraq, February 9, 2006.
22 For example, SIGIR found that, three years after their graduation from Bechtel University, a handful of engineers were leading infrastructure reconstruction programs in Baghdad under the auspices of USAID’s second Local Governance Program. SIGIR interviews with members from RTI Baghdad and RTI Green Zone compounds, August and September 2007.
23 SIGIR interview with Thomas Wheelock, former Chief of Party for USAID’s contractor International Resources Group, January 5, 2006.
24 SIGIR interview with Bruce Parmelee, Community Action Plan program officer, March 2, 2007. For a more recent example, see SIGIR Inspection PA 07-116, “Nassriya Water Treatment Plant, Nassriya, Iraq,” April 28, 2008.
25 SIGIR Audit 05-022, “Managing Sustainment for Iraq Relief and Reconstruction Fund Programs,” October 24, 2005.
26 IRMO, “Iraq Reconstruction Program Framework for Sustainable Operations,” May 18, 2005, 4.
27 For a discussion of the capacity problems associated with frequent ministry personnel turnover during this period, see SIGIR Audit 06-045, “Status of Ministerial Capacity Development in Iraq,” January 30, 2007, 1.
28 Nationwide electricity production in June of 2004, for example, was recorded at approximately 3,900 megawatts, slightly less than Iraq’s pre-war generation of 4,400 megawatts, and far below the CPA’s goal of 6,000 megawatts by summer. Daily crude export, meanwhile, was at 1.2 million barrels per day, almost half of its pre-war peak. Other services were also underperforming. The Brookings Institution, “Iraq Index: Tracking Variables of Reconstruction and Security in Post-Saddam Iraq,” June 21, 2004, 20-21.
29 SIGIR interview with David Satterfield, former Deputy Chief of Mission, April 14, 2008.
30 PCO, “Iraq Capacity Development: PCO Management and Interface Plan,” November 22, 2004, 3; and SIGIR, “Iraq Reconstruction: Lessons in Program and Project Management,” March 2007, 119-120.
31 SIGIR interview with Sheryl Lewis, PCO Capacity Development officer, December 1, 2007; and SIGIR Inspection PA 07-116, “Nassriya Water Treatment Plant, Nassriya Iraq,” April 28, 2008.
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• Chapter 24 •
32 Most of these tracking data are now held in PCO-GRD capacity development and subcontractor databases.
Each database reports on twelve contract deliverables relevant to capacity development, as well as on various general requirements and award fee criteria. See PCO briefing, “Capacity Development and Sustainability Program,” March 2007.
33 Department of the Army, PCO/USACE-GRD, “A Report on Iraq Reconstruction,” January 2004 - September 2006, 16.
34 PCO briefing, “2005 Capacity Development and Sustainment,” PCO Training Center Map, 2005.
35 SIGIR interview with Sheryl Lewis, PCO Capacity Development officer, December 1, 2007.
36 IRMO, “Iraq Reconstruction Program Framework for Sustainable Operations,” May 18, 2005.
37 SIGIR, Quarterly Report to the United States Congress, October 2005, 16-20.
38 GAO Report 08-117, “Stabilizing and Rebuilding Iraq: U.S. Ministry Capacity Development Efforts Need an Overall Integrated Strategy to Guide Efforts and Manage Risk,” October 2007, 14.
39 GAO Report 08-117, “Stabilizing and Rebuilding Iraq: U.S. Ministry Capacity Development Efforts Need an Overall Integrated Strategy to Guide Efforts and Manage Risk,” October 2007, 6-7, 14-15.
40 SIGIR interview with Daniel Speckhard, former IRMO Director and Deputy Chief of Mission, April 29, 2008.
41 SIGIR interview with Sheryl Lewis, PCO Capacity Development officer, December 1, 2007.
42 SIGIR interview with Daniel Speckhard, former IRMO Director and Deputy Chief of Mission, April 29, 2008.
43 SIGIR interview with Robert Tillery, former National Coordination Team Chief of Staff, January 11, 2008.
44 SIGIR interview with Robert Tillery, former National Coordination Team Chief of Staff, January 11, 2008.
45 GAO Report 08-117, “Stabilizing and Rebuilding Iraq: U.S. Ministry Capacity Development Efforts Need an Overall Integrated Strategy to Guide Efforts and Manage Risk,” October 2007, 8-9.
46 Only the ministry of electricity, which had a long history of working simultaneously with different compo- nents of the U.S. mission, successfully integrated the Ministerial Assistance Team concept. SIGIR interview with Robert Tillery, former National Coordination Team Chief of Staff, January 11, 2008.
47 SIGIR Audit 06-045, “Status of Ministerial Capacity Development in Iraq,” January 30, 2007, 10-11; and SIGIR interview with Robert Tillery, former National Coordination Team Chief of Staff, January 11, 2008.
48 A SIGIR audit found that, in its first four months of operation, the task force was primarily occupied with cataloging the various capacity-development activities throughout the reconstruction program. It also found that individual relationships with ministries tended to define capacity-development efforts, rather than an overall strategy. SIGIR Audit 06-045, “Status of Ministerial Capacity Development in Iraq,” January 30, 2007, 12; SIGIR interview with Robert Tillery, former National Coordination Team Chief of Staff, January 11, 2008;
and SIGIR interview with Sheryl Lewis, PCO Capacity Development officer, December 1, 2007.
49 USAID, “Tatweer Project: Developing National Capacity in Public Management,” Quarterly Progress Report No.1 (August-October 2006), November 30, 2006, ii, 1.
50 USAID, “Tatweer Project: Developing National Capacity in Public Management,” Quarterly Progress Report No. 2 (November-December 2006), January 30, 2007, 7.
51 GAO Report 08-117, “Stabilizing and Rebuilding Iraq: U.S. Ministry Capacity Development Efforts Need an Overall Integrated Strategy to Guide Efforts and Manage Risk,” October 2007, 19; and SIGIR Audit 06-045, “Status of Ministerial Capacity Development in Iraq,” January 30, 2007, 2.
52 SIGIR conversations with Rick Olson, former Office of Provincial Affairs official, Spring 2008.
53 SIGIR interview with Joseph Saloom, former IRMO Director, April 21, 2008.
54 Rick Olson, former Office of Provincial Affairs official, email to SIGIR, November 19, 2008.
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• Endnotes •
55 IRMO’s Presidential charter, National Security Presidential Directive 36, originally defined the office as a temporary organization without an explicit expiration date. National Security Presidential Directive 36, “United States Government Operations in Iraq,” May 11, 2004.
56 SIGIR interview with Joseph Saloom, former IRMO Director, April 21, 2008.
57 The U.S. Embassy formally dropped this effort in July 2007. GAO Report 08-117, “Stabilizing and Rebuilding Iraq: U.S. Ministry Capacity Development Efforts Need an Overall Integrated Strategy to Guide Efforts and Manage Risk,” October 2007, 16. For a discussion of the difficulty associated with performing ca- pacity building as ministries constantly changed hands, see SIGIR Audit 06-045, “Status of Ministerial Capacity Development in Iraq,” January 30, 2007, 1.
58 GAO Report 08-117, “Stabilizing and Rebuilding Iraq: U.S. Ministry Capacity Development Efforts Need an Overall Integrated Strategy to Guide Efforts and Manage Risk,” October 2007, 19.
59 SIGIR interview with Jeremiah S. Pam, former Treasury attaché, September 9, 2008.
60 SIGIR interview with Daniel Speckhard, former IRMO Director and Deputy Chief of Mission, April 29, 2008.
61 SIGIR interview with Joseph Saloom, former IRMO Director, December 2, 2007; and Jeremiah S. Pam, former Treasury attaché, September 9, 2008. For further background on Iraq’s financial reconstruction, see Jeremiah S. Pam, USIP Special Report 216, “The Treasury Approach to State-Building and Institution- Strengthening Assistance: Experience in Iraq and Broader Implications, October, 2008.
62 Ambassador Zalmay Khalilzad, vetting comments to SIGIR, October 27, 2008.
63 SIGIR interviews with Joseph Saloom, former IRMO Director, December 2, 2007; and Jeremiah S. Pam, former Treasury attaché, September 9, 2008.
64 SIGIR interview with Muhannad Esheiker, Ministry of Planning fusion cell member, August 25, 2007.
65 Conflicting budget execution data exist. SIGIR January 2008 Quarterly Report cites a White House report putting this number at 24 percent, a Treasury Department report showing 15 percent, and a GAO report show- ing 4.4 percent. SIGIR, Quarterly Report to the United States Congress, January 2008, 124.
66 SIGIR, Quarterly Report to the United States Congress, April 2008, 142-144.
67 SIGIR interview with Jeremiah S. Pam, former Treasury attaché, September 9, 2008.
68 SIGIR interview with Henry Clarke, former director, Office of Provincial Affairs, August 17, 2007; and Mat Bouldin, Diyala PRT member, August 9, 2007.
69 That many of the advisors had no prior background in development may also be a factor. GAO Report 08- 117, “Stabilizing and Rebuilding Iraq: U.S. Ministry Capacity Development Efforts Need an Overall Integrated Strategy to Guide Efforts and Manage Risk,” October 2007, 19.
70 SIGIR interview with David Satterfield, former Deputy Chief of Mission, April 14, 2008.
71 SIGIR Audit 06-006, “Multi-National Security Transition Command-Iraq: Management of the Transfer of IRRF-funded Assets to the Iraqi Government,” April 29, 2006; SIGIR Audit 06-007, “U.S. Agency for International Development: Management of the Transfer of Iraq Relief and Reconstruction Fund Projects to the Iraqi Government,” April 29, 2006; and SIGIR Audit 06-017, “Transition of Iraq Relief and Reconstruction Fund Projects to the Iraqi Government,” July 28, 2006. Follow-on audits include SIGIR Audit 07-004, “Transferring Iraq Relief and Reconstruction Fund Capital Projects to the Government of Iraq,” July 25, 2007;
and SIGIR Audit 08-017, “Transferring Reconstruction Projects to the Government of Iraq: Some Progress Made but Further Improvements Needed to Avoid Waste,” April 28, 2008.
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72 SIGIR Audit 06-006, “Multi-National Security Transition Command-Iraq: Management of the Transfer of IRRF-funded Assets to the Iraqi Government,” April 29, 2006; SIGIR Audit 06-007, “U.S. Agency for International Development: Management of the Transfer of Iraq Relief and Reconstruction Fund Projects to the Iraqi Government,” April 29, 2006; and SIGIR Audit 06-017, “Transition of Iraq Relief and Reconstruction Fund Projects to the Iraqi Government,” July 28, 2006. Follow-on audits include SIGIR Audit 07-004, “Transferring Iraq Relief and Reconstruction Fund Capital Projects to the Government of Iraq,” July 25, 2007;
and SIGIR Audit 08-017, “Transferring Reconstruction Projects to the Government of Iraq: Some Progress Made but Further Improvements Needed to Avoid Waste,” April 28, 2008.
73 SIGIR Audit 06-017, “Transition of Iraq Relief and Reconstruction Fund Projects to the I
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Hard Lessons: The Iraq Reconstruction Experience (SIGIR, 2009) — endnotes
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