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@ Ill APJIII IP I ftll -------------·-------···· ---------------------···· Dealing with - Iraqi WMD: The Inspection Option 12/19/0l ll:20 AM 1 ll!!!IR•'1111•FSPPL 81,t,1~ .... ..... , ......... Dl!CL eN. II Now 1,11 &li&RI !iiidOI O:UO . Outline ---------------------···· ----------------------··· • Goal. • Strategy. · • Background. • Key Lessons from UNSCOM. • Current Status of UN Inspection Regime. • Action Plan. • Timeline. 12/19/01 ll:20AM . 2 tCS!l& iii list di!!! _ ew,t,ad ftoHr lluHlprla aoureca IH!eL OH.11 ti•"' acu1 . c ...... , .. _____ _ li1Alf4111171Rll · The Strategic Goal -- Eliminate the Iraqi WMD Threat --------------------···· --------------------···· • WMD is the core of the danger that Saddam poses. • Eliminating it may ultimately require military action. • However, we may first want to try to put in place an inspection regime that · . - is based on the Gulf War ceasefire and UNSC Resolution 687, · ~ but incorporates the lessons of the UN Special Commission (UNSCOM) . . • Later, we could assess whether (a) the new regime ensures elimination of the WMD threat, or (b) further action, including . military action, is required. Ultimate question: Are we satisfied that Iraqi WMD threat · has been· eliminated? · 12/19/01 11:20 AM 3 111•1• 11111 IPl!lt Dlilvad,.anMtlltlaM••'"'• D&CL ON· 19 Nov 20~1 ··· ····--•· -------- . liiiAill'.lilPIAll ·· Strategy --------------------···· --------------------···· • Develop an inspection regime derived·from the key· lessons learned from UNSCOM: " - Even intrusive inspections over several years missed . . significant parts of Iraqi_ program and failed to detect an ongoing buildup. · - Unilateral intelligence capability is required to complement inspections. - Counterintelligence capability is required to deal with Iraqi . attempts to penetrate and deceive inspection teams. - Ability to enforce inspection regime required. • No inspection regime that fails to incorporate these lessons is even worth proposing. 12/19/01 11;20 AM 9111il'11JIP 111 llarl\ecl fauna Multl-,1• wwwcw DIGL 8N. 11 Now ff11 I I - --- ---- ~ &&29571:t:OEOPII History ---------------------···· ------------------- ~ Iraq initiated deception on declarations as soon as UNSCR 687 , ·-···· created UNSCOM. - Began seven year campaign of interference with inspectors. ~ Denied access, removed material from sites. b)(l) • Iraq successfully pressured the UN. - Dictated timing, access, scope of inspections. - Demanded vote on inspection team composition. - Rejected USG nationals in October 1997. - Rejected random/no-notice inspections August 1998. - Halted UNSCOM activity in October 1998. Despite its formal powers, and some on-the-ground accomplishments, UNSCOMregime eventually failed. 12/19/01 11:20 AM 323!.•flifllfiAtk 5 DliflWwd ftdh Multlpla IWIWW DIEQ. ON. "Ne, aau ---- - - - - ---- ......... IIIFIIN Key Lessons from UNSCOM ---------------------···· ---------------------···· • UNSCOM proved inadequate to uncover and dismantle Iraqi programs. - Despite hundreds of highly intrusive inspections, UNSCOM missed significant parts of Iraqi program and failed to detect · an ongoing buildup. • The defection of Hussein Kamel in August 1995, not UNSCOM inspections, forced the Iraqis to disclose · weaponization of Botulinin and anthrax . . • A credible inspection system would require (at a minimum) a · return to enforcement of existing UNSC mandates and the Gulf War ceasefire agreement. - But even the most intrusive inspection regime can only hinder Iraqi WMD/missile development, not eliminate it. Even highly intrusive inspections are of limited vafue in the absence of sufficient intelligence-and the international community has no effective response to Saddam's defiance. Sanctions are not sufficiently coercive and not sustainable. 12119/01 11:20 AM liiPETfli:SiiAU 6 Bealwad 11011, Mlllllplw aettr•a DiCL. ON· 11 N,., aD41 -· I - - - - -- - '--------- ----- ····•··· .,, . ..... 9ifi•• ,nlllf?RM Current Status of UN Inspecti.on Regime --------------------···· --------------------···· ~ • UNSC RES 1284 (17 Dec 99) created UN Monitoring, Verification and Inspection Commission (UNMOVIC) • UNMOVIC is weaker than UNSCOM.~ . .. ·. - Lacks staff expertise to baseline/evaluate Iraqi compliance. - Knowledgeable inspectors have left. • .•. and is structured to reduce USG influence: - Chairman and staff chosen based on Iraqi "sensitivities." - No U.S. national in top leadership . . · • USG unwilling to share intelligence with untrustworthy . organization. Therefore, we assess that Saddam could accept UNMOVIC .. and· sti/1 build WMD/missi/es without detection. · 12/19/01 11:20 AM 7 De«itce«f tr.om Ntsllph enelllCM . 9l!81:: 8N. 11 Noc 1111 -- - - - ····----------------------- IIIPll?i!IJ IJ!JPJII Iraqi Reaction to UNMOVIC -------------------···· -------------------···· • Saddam has up to now rejected any inspections as a · matter of "principle." - However, he could do a sudden about-face, just as he did with respect to "oil-for-food." • Worst outcome for US would be international · pressure to accept UNMOVIC as meeting the disarmament requirements of the Gulf War ceasefire. U.S. could demand immediate Iraqi answer to a new U.S.-proposed inspection regime, to preempt Iraqi attempt to negotiate on basis ofUNMOVIC. · 12/19/0111:20 AM 8 '9!!8RIWIHIF9fllts Oedved frnm Ht:'tlpte 8MIIIN• QECL QI· 19 NCII' 101t\ &&SES t!l:C! 1ml Plan of Action -----------------------···· ----------------------···· Demarche • Conditions: - Team led by an American. - - Access to anywhere in Iraq to anyone (including information and data) in timeframe determined by the inspectors. - Authority to Impound equipment or shut down facilities . . - Interference With teams prohibited. - No delays. - Unrestricted overflight rights for fixed and rotary~wing aircraft, including UAVs. - Team has authority to demand use of a designated Iraqi military facility as a base (e.g. H-3 airfield In western Iraq). • Short timeline for acceptance of inspection regime. - Collection plan should be in place prior to demarche. Iraq to be informed that lack of cooperation will subject it to military action. 12/19/0\ l l:20 AM · 111,-li!JH&FQAII 9 === :.,:;- liORFTllll&flnll Plan of Action (cont.) ----------------------···· ----------------------···· Immediate Inspection (no later than one month from Iraqi acceptance) • Deploys from Bahrain, targets high-value sites. • Staffed by mix of people now in/out of USG. - may include some Inspectors from selected other nations. • U.S. will recruit Iraqis inside and outside of Iraq. · - offer rewards/sponsorship/relocation. • List of specialties/capabilities will parallel UNSCOM. - with the addition of physical security experts and counterintelligence capabilities. · • Authority to task intelligence and call on CENTCOM-provided support. • MIiitary extraction plan for team is ess· ential. Longer-term Inspection Presence · • Teams based in North, South and Central Iraq. ·· 12/19/0l ll:20AM 10 91!i1Ai.UJCU. dlt:C Bwalwid la.a Multiplwsocwwa Dli;LGN111Neu IH1 111 I !IMll&8•rt SECDEF CABINET APPROVES ENDORSEMENT PLAN DTRA INSPECTORATE HQ ESTABLISHED. PLANS b1 MISSION 12/19/01 11;20 AM · Timeline -------···· -------···· US ASSE~ES WHETHER IRAQI WMD ELIMINATED t FIRSTU.S. INSPECI'ORS ---. ARRIVE D+3 t IRAQ ACCEPTS POTUS IRAQI ULTIMATUM RESPONSE TO IRAQIS REQUIRED D (NO LATER THAN D+l) IRAQ INTERFERES WITH INSPECTION KEY ALLIES BRIEFED* . IRAQ REJECTS, FAILS TO RESPOND, or ACCEPTS UNMOVIC ONLY 11 l USG INITIATES MILITARY ACOON 91!01<2 I HICO: Ci l!tls BMYl~fl-..lMllple--.www miela ON1 48 Hau a11