07-F-2106 DOC 18 Redacted

.• I , ·"' OFFICE 01' TliE DU'UTT SECAETAflV 01" 0UENSE THE MIUTAftY ASSISTANT L--\.l. TI , i)' 0 ,A-;r I'-~.!) J rt£. <- I, A-- Tc, AN&W"dl.., rtt4L t~) ~f:.~1"\o,-.JS I ~d f QtJEJJ I~ Tl+I~ l)oCu,,v..~J. ~ ~ ~~ ~ .I:.. ~ - lJ 7o Df2- Lu..r-..c IZ> A-1\lSw!T2. ~ ~~.,_.c_. fROU WASHFAX SIT~ 38 . . CMONI 9. 1 6" 02 IO : 54/ST. l O : $4/11"0. )(6) P 2 ___ __,, Yes, Let's Go Into Iraq - With an Army oflnspcctors By RolfEkeus SW1day, September JS, 2002; Page BOJ For seven years, a United Nations team of inspectors undcrm.y direction uncovered biological, chemical and nudear weapons programs in hag by scourin1 financial records, tracking down imporled equipment, searching laboratories and bases, and accounting for every one of the more: th2A 900 Scuds the Soviet Union had prol'ided to Baghdad. The Iraqi government did its best to conceal mQSt cf this d.angcroua i:nf:rutnicturc. Our experience from those yc:an proves beyond.doubt that Iraq baa the ambi1ion and ability to acquire weapons of mas, destruction. But it llso sbo~ that i.ntanational weapons inspectors, if propedy becked up byintematioul fon:;c, cu \lllca.rth Saddam Hwxin'a weapons programs. Jf we believe that lraq would be much less of a threat wilhout such weapons, tbe obvious thing is to focus on gcttine :rid of the weapons. Doini that through an inspection team is not only the most effective way, but would cost Jess in lives IIIJd dcst:ruction than an invasion. The question is wbcthcr weapons ~ons can provide credible assurance to All intcinational community anxious to disann Iraq. On that, there is considerable debate and disagreement. But many people underestimate the sophistication of inspec:tions and tho experts who devoted themselves to this challenge. Take Iraq's bioloaical weapons program, often cited as evidence of Baghdad's ability to deceive weapons inspectors. In his speech to U\C U.N. Oc:ucral Assembly on Thursday. President Bush attributed the sue<:cssful uncovering of the biowcapons ptograrn to the fortuitous defection of a seruor Jraqi ~ official in 1995. In this cue, the pl"e$idart does DDt appear to have been well briefed. In fact. in April 1995, four months before the Iraqi official defected, U .N. jnspecton disclosed lo the Secwity C~cil tba .Iraq bad a major bfol?jiCal weapons program, including ll 3iz.able production facili~ later ,cports in June and Julf,'~ l.Dspection team, known as the U.N. Special Commission on Iraq, orlJNSCOM, added details about Iraq's research into weapons that could spread anthrax. botulism, aflatoxin and su gangrene. The defection of the Iraqi weapons official, a son-in-law of Saddam Hussein, in August provided .:some additional coiuirmation and prompted the Iraqi regime to anake some more •amission$, but the inspectors learned few new details..;t'.)l".,,.- The discovery oflraq's bioweapons program wa.s the work of smart inspectors, not a godsend. One example of the many disc;ovme:11 shows the delcctivc wdrk involved. By c"amining J~crs of acdit i:1$ued by Iraq's c.cDtral bam, UNSCOM found a Western company that had exported a spny drying system to haq. The piece of equipment is common in agricuftutc. But when we interviewed them, puzzled company officials said tbat the Iraqi importer WZllltcd to use it to mill particles so miall they would s1ay suspended in the atmosphere. That set off alann bells, because the only reason to do that would be to make sure that particles could be inhaled. There is no civilian reason to do that with this piece of agricultural equipment. To fmd other corroborating evidence, UNSCOM searched nonnally innoc:Mt institutiOOll such as hospitals, university labs, health centers and wterinary centers, and slowly a picture ancraed of a major weapons program. UNSCOM profited. from breakthroughs in gmetic: analysis to discover traces of biological weap<mS in sampJos obtained earlier at suspect facilities. If, in 1he face oflraq's total denial and non-<:00peration, the inspectors could find that kind of carefully concealed ac1ivity, that should give us reason to trust a renewed U.N. inspection system. UNSCOM had other successes as weU. Jn 1995, we found out about missile guidance systems Iraq had 51r1uggled in from Russia the ume year, even as inspections were going on. With inspectors in hot pursuit, Iraqi officials tried to avoid detection by throwing the equipment ~A~~~ A,,.J1ArJll1. IFfs-~rt.t-~ . ~~i~~~~~/4~~1,~~~ ,;_i:;a., .i~t;:-4.. re ~ ?11 /);JI.. u~ ~ , ,:tf4.47'~ &f htr Btt1 ~ ~" ~~ .s ~·n.. ?-;, - - - -- ' -- -- • FROM WASHFAX BlT! 3B . . (MON) 9- 16' 02 IO: 55/ST. t O: 54/M'O. fb)(6) : 1 p 3 F~O~ WASffTAX SJTE 3B )(6) CMON t 9. 16' 02 10 : 55/S'T, 10 ; 5 4/110 p 4 into the Tigris River, but UNSCOM divers were able to fish it out. This case was proof that Iraq not only concealed, but tried to reconstitute prohibited weapons prosra,ns. Using documentation of Soviet Scud missiJes delivered to Iraq in 1he 1980s, incJuding xrial numbers of and data about individual missiles, engines, warheads, fueJ pwnps and &Uldancc sptems, and taking advantase of Russian and former East German cxpcrts with detailed knowledge o1 Scuds, inspec10Js were able to account for more tbaD 900 missiles. The destruction of those miss:iJes that still remained after the two earlier Gulf wars was lhcn certified by UNSCOMμ.,-,.; The U.N. inspectora also found that lraq was more advanced in its pursuit of nuclear weapons than it had admitted or than was widely believed. l:raq bad obwned practically the entire design of o nuclear explosion device, and appeared to have mastered most other technical upccts of the production ofDuclear weapons. Jt had not mana~ed to acquire enough fissile material for a nuclear device, though. To remedy this. lraq had embarked on expen,ive efforts to enrich uranium. 1nis capacity was also dismantled by iupecton,t'-"'i'W' In similar fam.ion, UNSCOM aJso found ,ad destroyed stoc:kpile.s of ehcmi'-AI weopoo.,, such as mustard gas and the nerve agents satin md VX. The jnspcctors also demolished tarac quantities of chemical weapons munitions, including roclcts and bombs. ln all these endeavors. UNSCOM benefited from intelligence support, including imaaery provided by 02 planes which flew regulady over Jnq. For a while, notwithstanding obstacles, the inspec.tion 1caimc worked. Thea, in 1991, Hussein started systematically blocking inspectors from cntc:rina certain sites that wae under suspicion. The pennane.nt five members of the U.N. Sc<:wity Council were divided about how to react, the inspectors withdrew, and U.S. al)d British planes were sent to bomb Iraq in Operation Desert Fox. In the four years since, there have been no U.N. inq>ectors in Iraq. Thanb 10 the work of U~~on, not much Wat left of lraq's once miwivc weapons programs wben inspections halt~e question now ia how much Baghdad baa managed u, - acquire since then. Beause of Hussein's clandestine teclmiq_ues, little can be proven. Assessments can be made oo wbal is possible and what ia pn,bable. A strone caM. can be made that Iraq, with access to considerable financial resources fi-om oil aales since 1998. is makina cxtenSive efforts to rebuild its capabilities in weapons of mass destructlon. Given his proven redclessncss and boundless ambitio1is, Hussein is again posing a threat to the peace and prosperity of the Gulf region and beyond. With his U. N. speech, PrcsidClll Bush has opened the door for the U .N. to send m inspectors again. Iftbe U.N. oow said it warued to send in inspectors, Bush would be bard- pressed to say no to an or~on be sought to spur to Ktion. But the door might not be open lone. The United Nations should take this opportunity to create a system of co~ive or armed inspu1ions in order to guarantee access to suspected weapons ,ites, as pcoposcd by Jessica T. Mathews and others from the Carnegie Endowment for Intem.atiolllll PeaQC. How should a U.N. inspection regime be reconstituted to prevent Iraq &om blocking inspeclors and sowing discord among the five permanent members of the Security Council? The answer lies in a radical strenpeoing of the inspection system, based on the existing and largely untested U.N. Monitoriog, Verification and Inspection Commission (UNMOVIC). The inspectors should be backed up by an inq,ection implementation fon:c positioned in neishboring countries and possibly in some parts of lraq. Such a multina1ional force, preferably under an American cpmmander, should be mandated by the Security Council. G)>f#,Y,t,~;firJA.L rz..t-A-~ ,~r?J ~ 1/.l<.f~fi'A ~~ """- AJ-J,. ,_J 1:J-J dwlt 5cttO} 1-,d-/Lu,{-.~;/:! :~~~4')";, ~~,~? /b>!f 4X-~ P!-r-''j-q 1$ 2· ~~,.rA<~ ~~r=-~;;,~; /1,u~ Jil.f&M,~.:A.1/4•,,e;._K~. ' ::) - - - - -- - ---- -- -- - -- ---- - - p s I I i .· i ' i I - - - ---- f~OM WASHFAX, SITE iB (JIO)tl 9. u· 02 IO : 55,-eT. IO: 541'"0 )(6) p 6 Any obstruction by Iraq should be met with immediate reaction. The bead of the inspection team, the excc11tivc ch11.inmm of UNMOVlC, should be given the exclusive authority to call upon the military bac.lrup fo,ces for support if inspeciClrs arc blocked. No prior approval by the Security CoWlCil ahould be required. The force commander would be responsible: for military operations in each situation. The ioal of such an arranaement would be to deter Iraq from a policy of obstruction and force it to give up its notorious efforts at intimidation. President Bush is right to be concerned about lnq. There are strong RaSO.ns to believe that Hussein has designs on Che Persian Gulf's oil resources and that he seeks unchallenged leadership of the Arab world. Tbc only way H1Wci11 c1111 fulfill bis ambitions is to bock them up with intimidation of his ncighbou. For that, weapons of mMS destruction arc: the prccmincot tools. President Bwh is aJso right to be worried about what we don't know about Iraq's weapons. The status quo caanot be an option. All the more reason to tum to inspectors to eliminate these tools. If we live io fear of not knowing what ltaq possesses. Ibis is the only altcmativc to an inva.sion of lrllQ, whlcb would cany high risks for innOCCJlt Iraqi civiliam, American and other international forces and the stability of 1he .eaion. But the United Nations must cmw-c high quality inspections, strengthening their presence aod guanu:ttecing access by providina inspectors with robust military back.up so they can carry out their mission in NI.J. Rolf Ekeus, chairman of the Stockholm International Poacc: Research lnsti~ and fonncr Swedish ambassador to the United States, llerved as executive dio.i.rnwi of the United Nations Special Co.rnmission (UNSCOM) on Iraq from 1991 to 1997. 3