Iraq's Transition--the Way Ahead [Part I]

S. HRG. 108–645 IRAQ’S TRANSITION—THE WAY AHEAD [PART I] HEARING BEFORE THE COMMITTEE ON FOREIGN RELATIONS UNITED STATES SENATE ONE HUNDRED EIGHTH CONGRESS SECOND SESSION MAY 18, 2004 Printed for the use of the Committee on Foreign Relations ( Available via the World Wide Web: http://www.access.gpo.gov/congress/senate U.S. GOVERNMENT PRINTING OFFICE WASHINGTON : 96–371 PDF 2005 For sale by the Superintendent of Documents, U.S. Government Printing Office Internet: bookstore.gpo.gov Phone: toll free (866) 512–1800; DC area (202) 512–1800 Fax: (202) 512–2250 Mail: Stop SSOP, Washington, DC 20402–0001 VerDate 11-MAY-2000 14:54 Jan 04, 2005 Jkt 000000 PO 00000 Frm 00001 Fmt 5011 Sfmt 5011 96371 SFORELA1 PsN: SFORELA1 COMMITTEE ON FOREIGN RELATIONS CHUCK HAGEL, Nebraska LINCOLN CHAFEE, Rhode Island GEORGE ALLEN, Virginia SAM BROWNBACK, Kansas MICHAEL B. ENZI, Wyoming GEORGE V. VOINOVICH, Ohio LAMAR ALEXANDER, Tennessee NORM COLEMAN, Minnesota JOHN E. SUNUNU, New Hampshire RICHARD G. LUGAR, Indiana, Chairman JOSEPH R. BIDEN, JR., Delaware PAUL S. SARBANES, Maryland CHRISTOPHER J. DODD, Connecticut JOHN F. KERRY, Massachusetts RUSSELL D. FEINGOLD, Wisconsin BARBARA BOXER, California BILL NELSON, Florida JOHN D. ROCKEFELLER IV, West Virginia JON S. CORZINE, New Jersey KENNETH A. MYERS, JR., Staff Director ANTONY J. BLINKEN, Democratic Staff Director (II) VerDate 11-MAY-2000 14:54 Jan 04, 2005 Jkt 000000 PO 00000 Frm 00002 Fmt 5904 Sfmt 5904 96371 SFORELA1 PsN: SFORELA1 C O N T E N T S Page Armitage, Hon. Richard L., Deputy Secretary of State, U.S. Department of State, Washington, DC ........................................................................................ 11 Prepared statement .......................................................................................... 13 Responses to additional questions for the record from Senator Lugar ........ 80 Responses to additional questions for the record from Senator Biden ........ 92 Responses to additional questions for the record from Senator Feingold .... 104 Biden, Hon. Joseph R., Jr., U.S. Senator from Delaware, opening statement ... 30 Feingold, Hon. Russell D., U.S. Senator from Wisconsin, prepared statement .. 20 Lugar, Hon. Richard G., U.S. Senator from Indiana, opening statement ........... 1 Wolfowitz, Hon. Paul, Deputy Secretary of Defense, U.S. Department of De- fense; accompanied by: Lt. Gen. Walter L. Sharp, Director, Strategic Plans and Policy, Joint Chiefs of Staff, U.S. Department of Defense, The Pen- tagon, Washington, DC ........................................................................................ 4 Prepared statement of Deputy Secretary Wolfowitz ...................................... 5 Responses to additional questions for the record from Senator Lugar ........ 86 Responses to additional questions for the record from Senator Biden ........ 96 (III) VerDate 11-MAY-2000 14:54 Jan 04, 2005 Jkt 000000 PO 00000 Frm 00003 Fmt 5904 Sfmt 5904 96371 SFORELA1 PsN: SFORELA1 VerDate 11-MAY-2000 14:54 Jan 04, 2005 Jkt 000000 PO 00000 Frm 00004 Fmt 5904 Sfmt 5904 96371 SFORELA1 PsN: SFORELA1 IRAQ’S TRANSITION—THE WAY AHEAD [PART I] TUESDAY, MAY 18, 2004 U.S. SENATE, COMMITTEE ON FOREIGN RELATIONS, Washington, DC. The committee met, pursuant to notice, at 9:30 a.m. in room SD– 106, Dirksen Senate Office Building, Hon. Richard G. Lugar (chair- man of the committee), presiding. Present: Senators Lugar, Hagel, Chafee, Allen, Brownback, Voinovich, Alexander, Coleman, Sununu, Biden, Sarbanes, Dodd, Feingold, Boxer, Bill Nelson, and Corzine. OPENING STATEMENT OF SENATOR RICHARD G. LUGAR, CHAIRMAN The CHAIRMAN. This hearing of the Senate Foreign Relations Committee is called to order. Today, the Committee on Foreign Re- lations meets to continue our ongoing oversight of American policy toward Iraq. The Coalition intends to hand over sovereignty to an Iraqi government 6 weeks from tomorrow. We’re pleased to welcome Richard Armitage, Deputy Secretary of State; Paul Wolfowitz, Deputy Secretary of Defense; and Lieuten- ant General Walter Sharp, Director of Strategic Plans and Policy for the Joint Chiefs of Staff. We look forward to a wide-ranging dis- cussion that further clarifies United States plans for the Iraqi tran- sition. This is the nineteenth hearing on Iraq the Foreign Relations Committee has held since January 2003, and the fifth in this past month. Tomorrow we will hold another hearing on Iraq that will feature several expert witnesses from outside our government. Within the substantial bounds of Congress’s oversight capacity, we are attempting to illuminate United States plans, actions, and op- tions with regard to Iraq, both for the benefit of the American peo- ple and to inform our own policymaking role. I am convinced that the confidence and commitment dem- onstrated by the pronouncement of a flexible but detailed plan for Iraq is necessary for our success. With lives being lost and billions of dollars being spent in Iraq, the American people must be con- fident that we have carefully thought through an Iraq policy that will optimize our prospects for success. Moreover, a detailed plan is necessary to prove to our allies and to Iraqis that we have a strategy and that we are committed to making it work. If we can- not provide this clarity, we will risk the loss of support of the American people, the loss of potential contributions from our allies, and the disillusionment of Iraqis. (1) VerDate 11-MAY-2000 14:54 Jan 04, 2005 Jkt 000000 PO 00000 Frm 00005 Fmt 6633 Sfmt 6633 96371 SFORELA1 PsN: SFORELA1 2 As the June 30 transfer of sovereignty draws closer, violent at- tacks on Coalition forces have increased, and power struggles be- tween Iraqi factions have intensified. The lack of security has ham- pered political and economic development in key parts of Iraq. Many non-governmental aid organizations have pulled out of Iraq. Adding to the difficulties, the appalling revelations of our prisoner abuse in Iraq have repulsed Americans and hurt our reputation in the international community. In dealing with this scandal, we need to establish absolute accountability and stay true to our values without reducing our efforts to overcome terrorism. At this critical junction, the committee and the American people need to hear directly from the administration. Are U.S. plans for building Iraq shifting to address the new realities on the ground? And have sufficient resources been identified to carry through with our plans? The Senate confirmed Ambassador John Negroponte, to be Am- bassador to Iraq, on an expedited basis to ensure that he and his team would be in place quickly. We are interested in knowing how the State Department plans to staff, house, and secure what will be one of the largest embassies in the world. Under Secretary Marc Grossman has testified that the embassy could cost more than a billion dollars, but these funds were not included in fiscal year 2005 budget request. The administration recently requested an ad- ditional $25 billion in contingency funds for Iraq and Afghanistan, but this amount does not apparently include any funding for the new embassy. Our diplomatic forces, as well as our military forces, must have what they need to succeed. I am especially interested in details surrounding the use of the $18.4 billion provided for Iraq by the emergency supplemental signed last November 6, 2003. In this bill, Congress gave broad au- thority to the President to control these funds through the Office of Management and Budget. The OMB report submitted last month showed that only $2.3 billion of the $18.4 billion has been obligated by March 24, 2004. Given the urgency of reconstruction efforts in Iraq and the role that they play in a successful outcome for the United States, it is perplexing that only about 12 percent of the money has been obligated. Committee inquiries indicate that recon- struction projects have been slowed by a long bureaucratic con- tracting process overseen by the OMB and the Department of De- fense. In addition, the OMB report lacks specificity. In many cases, the report fails to identify the agency responsible for carrying out reconstruction projects. Our committee needs to be reassured that Congress’s intent is being fulfilled and that there is no unnecessary delay in reconstruction efforts. In Iraq, we are perceived more as an occupation force by some than as a friend helping to nurture a new nation. Delays in recon- struction undercut United States credibility and increase sus- picions among Iraqis who are impatient for improvements. Without tangible progress in reconstruction, Iraqis will perceive little ben- efit in the U.S. military presence. Achieving a transfer of sov- ereignty on June 30, 2004, was always going to stretch our capa- bilities. But since we are firmly committed to that date, we should be attempting to accelerate stabilization and reconstruction in every possible way. VerDate 11-MAY-2000 14:54 Jan 04, 2005 Jkt 000000 PO 00000 Frm 00006 Fmt 6633 Sfmt 6633 96371 SFORELA1 PsN: SFORELA1 3 We are hopeful that Ambassador Lakhdar Brahimi will be suc- cessful in his work to construct an Interim Iraqi Government. The Iraqis themselves must reach internal political consensus and bal- ance among competing Sunni, Shia, and Kurdish factions and their thoughts. Once the new government is named, the transition to sovereignty should begin immediately. If possible, in my judgment, we should establish the United States Embassy before the June 30 transfer, and bring Ambassador Negroponte in early. Ambassador Bremer has provided extraordinary service, but, at this stage, he will begin to take on lame-duck status. Under Secretary Grossman testified, on April 22, about the im- portance of engaging an Interim Iraqi Government as soon as it is selected. We cannot simply turn on the lights in the embassy on June 30 and expect everything to go well. We must be rehearsing, with Iraqi authorities and our Coalition partners, how decision- making and administrative power will be distributed and exercised. It is critical, therefore, that Ambassador Negroponte and his team be put in place at the earliest possible moment. We also should be accelerating negotiations to complete a United Nations Security Council resolution to give international legitimacy to the new Iraqi government and to define new security arrangements. In addition, the United Nations and the new interim government should con- sider accelerating the elections scheduled for January 2005 and De- cember 2005 for the Transitional and Permanent Iraqi govern- ments. We are especially appreciative to have our witnesses with us today. Now, let me just say, as a point of personal privilege and, likewise, history, that about 19 years ago, in 1985, when I was a newly anointed Chairman of the Foreign Relations Committee, on the first occasion, Paul Wolfowitz and Rich Armitage came before the committee on that occasion to talk about the Philippines. Their testimony was farsighted and courageous. In a chapter in a book that I wrote about the situation, I stated my admiration for their testimony, for whatever it’s worth, because it was remarkably pre- scient with regard to events that occurred throughout 1985 and the elections in February 1986 and subsequently. My admiration for these two gentlemen has remained unabated ever since. I appre- ciate especially your coming today at this important time for our committee, and for our colleagues, and for the American people who will witness this hearing. Senator Biden has been delayed by train difficulties, pure and simple. He will be here, and when he arrives, I will call upon him, of course, for his opening statement and comment. And, at some stage, we will have, the committee knows, a rollcall vote at ap- proximately 11:15. We will try to continue the hearing throughout that time. I will slip over to the floor and vote as rapidly as pos- sible, and call upon one of my colleagues to chair the meeting so we may continue with our deliberations. We thank the witnesses for coming. We look forward to hearing from them, first of all, in the order in which they are listed in our agenda, which would be Secretary Wolfowitz, then Secretary Armitage. Secretary Wolfowitz, we’re delighted that you are here and we would be pleased to hear your testimony. VerDate 11-MAY-2000 14:54 Jan 04, 2005 Jkt 000000 PO 00000 Frm 00007 Fmt 6633 Sfmt 6633 96371 SFORELA1 PsN: SFORELA1 4 STATEMENT OF HON. PAUL WOLFOWITZ, DEPUTY SECRETARY OF DEFENSE, U.S. DEPARTMENT OF DEFENSE; ACCOM- PANIED BY: LT. GEN. WALTER L. SHARP, DIRECTOR, STRA- TEGIC PLANS AND POLICY, JOINT CHIEFS OF STAFF, U.S. DE- PARTMENT OF DEFENSE, THE PENTAGON Mr. WOLFOWITZ. Mr. Chairman, I’m delighted to have the oppor- tunity to come here to talk about the very important questions that you’ve outlined in your opening statement. I want to thank you for the kind words that you just spoke about the role that Rich Armitage and I played some 20 years ago, not quite 20 years ago, but you were unduly modest, because you yourself played a more important role and with considerable courage, both in taking on an assignment that nobody else wanted to do, and then carrying it for- ward in the face of a great deal of pressure. And I think our coun- try and the Philippine people have a lot to thank you for that great leadership. Mr. Chairman, I have a somewhat long statement, which you can read and I would like to put in the record. I would just like to put it aside and make a few brief comments about the overall situation in Iraq. The CHAIRMAN. Your statement will appear in the record in full, and, likewise, that of Secretary Armitage. Mr. WOLFOWITZ. Mr. Chairman, members of the committee, the great men and women who wear the uniform of the United States have already accomplished amazing things in Iraq. They have re- moved a regime that was a threat to the United States and to the entire Middle East, a regime that sponsored terrorism and then de- veloped and used weapons of mass destruction. In the process, they have also liberated a nation of 25 million talented people, most of them Muslims, from the grip of one of the most cruel and sadistic tyrants in modern history. But their work is not done. The enemy that was defeated in major combat a year ago continues to sow death and destruction in the effort to prevent the emergence of a new Iraq. They and their terrorist allies from inside and outside Iraq understand that real defeat for them will come when Iraqis achieve the ability to govern themselves in freedom and to provide for the security of their own country. That is why the enemy real- izes that the next year or year and a half will be so critical, be- cause that is the time it will take to stand up Iraqi security forces that are fully trained, equipped, and organized, and to elect a rep- resentative Iraqi government after 40 years of tyranny and abuse. Already more than 775 American military have died in this noble cause, and many more have suffered grievous wounds. Brave civil- ians have been killed, as well. More than a hundred of our Coali- tion partners have given their lives for this cause. And by our own count, which is probably far from complete, 350 Iraqi policemen, civil defense fighters, and other security forces have given their lives for the cause of a new Iraq in the last year, and that doesn’t count the thousands of Iraqis who have died fighting that evil re- gime for the last several decades, nor does it count the many brave Iraqi civilians who have stepped up to lead Iraq into the future and who were gunned down and murdered for that reason alone. Just this week, a second members of the Iraqi Governing Council, Izzedine Salim, was brutally assassinated, the second member of VerDate 11-MAY-2000 14:54 Jan 04, 2005 Jkt 000000 PO 00000 Frm 00008 Fmt 6633 Sfmt 6633 96371 SFORELA1 PsN: SFORELA1 5 the Iraqi Governing Council, along with that brave woman, Akila al-Hashimi, to give their lives for the cause of Iraqi freedom. We owe it to these noble Americans, to the Iraqi and Coalition part- ners, and, indeed, to ourselves and to the world, to finish the work that they have so nobly advanced. Today’s hearing, like many other hearings in this distinguished body, will be listened to by the entire world. In recent weeks, we have been sending many messages to the world about our shock and horror at the abuse of Iraqi prisoners, messages of regret and remorse, messages of outrage and horror, messages of American commitment to correct our mistakes, to find the truth, and to pun- ish the guilty. It is entirely proper that we should do so. Most of all, we are sending the message that in democracies abuses are not tolerated or covered up, but revealed and punished. That is a very important message for the Iraqi people and a lesson, as well, as they seek to build a government that would be the first of this kind in the Arab world. But it is even more important that the Iraqi people hear an addi- tional message from this great body and from the American people, the message that we will win in Iraq, and that we are determined to win, and that we understand that winning means giving their country back to them, but also sticking with them until they have a reasonable chance to establish a government that represents them and creates security forces that can protect them. Mr. Chairman, the enemies of a free Iraq are tough and deter- mined killers and terrorists, but they have nothing positive to offer the Iraqi people—only fear and death and destruction. Our weapon is not fear, but hope. But it is a hope that is shared by millions of Iraqis. In the coming months, they and we will be the targets of the killers who hope to block the progress to Iraqi self-govern- ment and Iraqi self-defense. They need to know that we will stand with them as they stand up for a free Iraq. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. [The prepared statement of Mr. Wolfowitz follows:] PREPARED STATEMENT OF HON. PAUL WOLFOWITZ INTRODUCTION Mr. Chairman and Members of the Committee: I thank you for the opportunity to come and brief you today on the Defense De- partment’s role in the upcoming transition to Iraqi sovereignty. I am heartened by the numerous statements from members of this Committee recognizing the impor- tance of Operation Iraqi Freedom and the ongoing reconstruction mission in Iraq to our nation’s security. Such statements send a strong message of America’s resolve to those who oppose our efforts to help the Iraqi people rehabilitate their nation after 35 years of unimaginable tyranny under Saddam Hussein. I would also like to thank the members of this Committee for their continued sup- port to the men and women of our Armed Forces. Our prayers are with all our peo- ple currently serving in Iraq and Afghanistan. Whether members of Active Duty, Reserve, or National Guard units, these heroes embody the best ideals of our na- tion—serving so that others may be free—and we thank them all for the sacrifices they make. I would also like to pay tribute to the hard work and sacrifices of all the civilians and Foreign Service officers in the Coalition Provisional Authority and various NGOs. Their tireless efforts and heroism have been vital to our mission in Iraq, and they have been as fine a group of ambassadors for this nation as we have ever sent abroad. Finally, we also owe a sincere debt of gratitude as well to the roughly 25,000 men and women from our Coalition partners, who are serving the cause of freedom in VerDate 11-MAY-2000 14:54 Jan 04, 2005 Jkt 000000 PO 00000 Frm 00009 Fmt 6633 Sfmt 6621 96371 SFORELA1 PsN: SFORELA1 6 Iraq. This coalition is neither ‘‘illegitimate’’ nor ‘‘window dressing.’’ Thirty-four of our closest friends have troops that are bravely fighting alongside us in Iraq, spear- headed by the two multinational divisions led by the British and the Poles. British, Italians, Bulgarians, Thais, Poles, Danes, Estonians, Ukrainians, and Spanish have been killed while trying to advance freedom and democracy in Iraq. Just recently, one of our smallest allies, El Salvador, has been singled out for the valor of its troops in countering the recent violence in Iraq. Most significantly, the largest part- ner of this Coalition is the Iraqis themselves, tens of thousands of whom are already fighting for a new Iraq. The number of Iraqi Security Forces may exaggerate their capability at this time, but not their determination to rebuild their country, as more than 300 Iraqi Security Forces have been killed in action, and close to 700 wounded. The horrible abuses at Abu Ghraib prison have been, as Secretary Rumsfeld char- acterized it, a body blow for all of us. These actions are a betrayal of what thou- sands of Americans have risked their lives to achieve in Iraq. But these actions do not represent America, nor do they represent American values. We will uncover the truth. We will punish the guilty. And we will act to prevent such abuses from recur- ring in the future. The Iraqi people will see that a free democratic system functions and operates transparently. Americans are human and we make mistakes, but when we do, we work to correct them. And it was not a mistake to free the Iraqi people and the world from one of the most abusive dictators in history. THE COALITION’S STRATEGY TO ACHIEVE VICTORY IN IRAQ: CAPACITY BUILDING We need to continue to move forward on all fronts implementing the coalition’s strategy to set conditions that will ensure a free Iraq that is stable and at peace with its neighbors. Our strategy involves three interdependent lines of operations to build indigenous Iraqi capacity and transition responsibilities from the Coalition to Iraq rapidly, but not hastily. While the lessons to be learned from the violent events of the past few weeks affect the way we pursue these three lines of operation, these are still the three key elements that will bring success in Iraq. The first element involves building capable Iraqi security forces to achieve sta- bility. Accordingly, we have redoubled our efforts to recruit, train, equip and, most importantly, mentor Iraqi security forces—Police, Iraqi Civil Defense Corps, Army, Border Police, and the Facilities Protection Service. Over the next few months our aim is to be able to certify the ability of these forces, as they become ready to as- sume greater responsibilities from coalition forces. Also, through technical assist- ance and mentoring by U.S. prosecutors, we are helping to build the capacity of the Iraqi criminal justice sector. The second element involves nurturing Iraq’s capacity for representative self-gov- ernment, with the aim of creating a government that can assume sovereignty on be- half of the Iraqi people. June 30 is not a magical date on which the Coalition Provi- sional Authority (CPA) will suddenly transition all of its responsibilities to a new Iraq government. It is actually just one step, albeit a very important one, in a proc- ess. Free Iraqis have been gradually assuming responsibility for governmental func- tions for quite some time. Eleven Iraqi ministries already report to the Governing Council rather than the CPA. Iraq now has a functioning judiciary to provide equal justice for all. At the local and provincial levels, elected assemblies are up and run- ning. When the Interim Government assumes sovereign authority on June 30, its most important task will be to prepare the way for elections to establish the Transi- tional Government in January of 2005. That government in turn facilitate the draft- ing of a permanent Iraqi Constitution which will pave the way for the election of a fully constitutional government at the end of 2005. The third element of the strategy involves the reconstruction of Iraq’s infrastruc- ture and the restoration of essential services that are providing better lives for Iraqis and putting people back to work. Iraq has tremendous potential. Iraq has well-educated and industrious people. It has fertile land and water resources and it has abundant natural resources. Our strategy aims to put Iraq on course to real- izing that potential and to setting conditions for Iraqis to prosper in the future. IRAQ’S PROGRESS SINCE LIBERATION The recent violence in Iraq is aimed at obstructing the progress that is being made toward building a new Iraq and to create chaos that will permit the return of the old tyranny or the imposition of a new one. Despite this assault, after 35 years of living through the nightmare of Saddam’s cruelty and misrule, Iraq is slow- ly beginning to realize its long-suppressed potential. Given its talented people, fer- tile land, and natural resources, Iraq should have been a wealthy nation. Yet Iraq’s economy was moribund due to state control, rampant corruption, and Saddam’s misallocation of resources. Money earmarked for life-saving medicines was used to VerDate 11-MAY-2000 14:54 Jan 04, 2005 Jkt 000000 PO 00000 Frm 00010 Fmt 6633 Sfmt 6621 96371 SFORELA1 PsN: SFORELA1 7 buy means to end life. Money available to maintain Iraq’s infrastructure instead maintained Saddam’s palaces. Schools that should have been centers of learning be- came command centers and ammunition bunkers. Today, the Iraqi economy is on the path to recovery and prosperity. Unemploy- ment has fallen by nearly one-half over the past year. Inflation is a quarter of what it was before the war. Iraqi marketplaces are filled with consumer goods for the first time in decades. All of this is occurring despite ongoing security concerns, and be- fore the full effect of the $18.4 billion in reconstruction grants and more than $15 billion in international aid is felt. Iraqi essential services have also seen significant improvement in the past year. Electricity generation has surpassed prewar levels and is more evenly distributed. Iraqi schools are no longer propaganda factories for Saddam’s cult of personality and Ba’ath party fascism. Health care spending in Iraq is 30 times greater than its pre- war levels. Iraqis are also experiencing unprecedented political freedoms as well. The Transi- tional Administrative Law, the document that will govern Iraq’s transition period beginning June 30 and which was signed by all members of the Iraqi Governing Council, is the most liberal basic governance document in the Arab world, with as- surances that include: • Freedom of Religion; • Freedom of Expression; • Freedom of the Press; and • Freedom of Assembly. The TAL calls for equal rights for all citizens of Iraq regardless of ethnicity, de- nomination, or sex. Over ninety percent of Iraqi towns and provinces have local councils. More than half of the Iraqi population is active in community affairs, and one in five belongs to a non-governmental organization. SECURITY IN IRAQ Although these achievements are far from trivial, they take place against the background of continuing violence. The past month has been as costly to us as any since the liberation of Iraq a year ago. We are facing a pivotal moment in the battle for Iraq’s future, making sober reflection on where we stand and where we are head- ing in Iraq critical. This reflection begins with recognizing who the enemy is in Iraq. Among the groups in Fallujah the U.S. Marines have been fighting are the murderers and tor- turers of the Fedayeen Saddam and Mukhabarat who melted away without engag- ing our forces a year ago. Reports indicate that Iraqi officers of the so-called ‘‘Special Operations and Antiterrorism Branch,’’—a truly Orwellian designation—also known as M–14, are responsible for planning roadway improvised explosive devices and some of the larger car bombs that have killed Iraqis, Americans, and other for- eigners. Their campaign of terror and intimidation springs not from frustration with the Coalition’s occupation of Iraq, but from their desire to dominate and brutalize their fellow Iraqis. Captured documents reveal that these members of Saddam’s se- cret service were making plans for urban guerrilla warfare even before the fall of Baghdad, and took steps such as preparing explosives-laden vests for suicide attacks before the war. In order to destroy the last vestiges of Saddam’s tyranny, it was always necessary that we defeat these forces. They are joined by domestic and for- eign terrorists, including the notorious Abu Musab al-Zarqawi, who moved to Iraq after the fall of Afghanistan and who claims credit for personally beheading Nich- olas Berg and is responsible for conducting many of the worst terrorist bombings in Iraq, and he is connected to a number of plots in Europe and possibly elsewhere. In the Shi’a community, Muqtada al Sadr’s power grab has not succeeded. A Feb- ruary poll by Oxford Research International showed that only one percent of Iraqis name al Sadr as the national leader they trust most. This number seems to be de- clining as the Shi’a clerical establishment influences their community against him. U.S. and Iraqi forces have launched numerous attacks against Sadr’s gang of thugs in the past week, further limiting his efforts to intimidate his way into power. LESSONS LEARNED AND CHALLENGES AHEAD It is well known that no pre-war prediction will unfold perfectly, and that there will be setbacks that require adjustments in both objectives and courses of action. In war, plans are at best the basis for future changes. This Coalition has repeatedly demonstrated that it can be flexible when necessary. Examples of this flexibility in- clude: VerDate 11-MAY-2000 14:54 Jan 04, 2005 Jkt 000000 PO 00000 Frm 00011 Fmt 6633 Sfmt 6621 96371 SFORELA1 PsN: SFORELA1 8 • Creating a new type of indigenous force (the Iraqi Civil Defense Corps) to fill the gap left by the Iraqi police service, many of whose members turned out not to be as well trained as we had supposed. • Requesting a large amount of supplemental funds when the requirements for Iraqi reconstruction became clear. • Responding to Iraqi demands for an earlier resumption of sovereignty by devel- oping the idea of a transitional government that could take power before a per- manent constitution is ratified. • Dropping the ‘‘caucus plan’’ for selecting the transitional government, when it turned out to be unpopular with Iraqis, and substituting a two-step process in- volving an interim government that can take power before legislative elections. • Revising the mechanisms for implementing the de-Ba’athification policy to ad- dress complaints that the appeals process was not working as intended, and to respond to the Sunni minority’s fears of marginalization. Similarly, events of the past month have taught us several lessons that have in- fluenced our policy decisions. We are focusing intently on the Iraqi Security Forces, whose performance during the recent spike in combat activity has been mixed. Ap- proximately half of the security forces stood their ground, and in Fallujah some ICDC units fought bravely and well. Iraqi commandos from the Iraqi Counter Ter- rorist Force were instrumental in expelling Sadr’s militia from the Mukhaiyam Mosque in Karbala. However, other units, however, did not face the enemy or avoid- ed contact altogether, and a small proportion cooperated with the enemy. Our disappointment with the security forces has to be tempered with realism. Overall, they were not capable by themselves of deterring or withstanding the re- cent attacks, and that fact should not surprise us. We have been fielding Iraqi secu- rity forces as fast as we could, but we never expected Iraqi security forces to take over responsibility for Iraq’s security on June 30th, much less April 5th. Our plan was—and is—for Iraqi forces to develop strength, capability, and experience under the security umbrella of the Coalition, while the Coalition retained overall security responsibilities. Recent events provide lessons we can apply to increase the impact of what we are doing. The first lesson is the need for stronger leaders in the security forces. We will build on the leaders whose units fought and we will replace those whose units did not. We will integrate Iraqi officers with Coalition forces and we will embed Coali- tion officers with the Iraqi security forces. This arrangement provides liaison, which produces mutual confidence, and it also helps us develop Iraqi leadership. Similarly, we need police liaisons and specialized trainers to get down to police stations around the country to provide confidence and set the example. Second, the Iraqi security forces need more and better equipment. We had not planned for them to be fully equipped at this point, but some police and ICDC units were outgunned in recent action, so we are reexamining the equipment require- ments. We have also incurred some delays in equipping the Iraqi security forces. Part of the delay has been caused by challenges in the contracting process, and we hope those problems have been fixed. We need to make up for lost time, but any delay is unacceptable. Third, it is clear that the members of the security forces, most of whom are Iraqi patriots, need an Iraqi rallying point. They need to understand they operate under an Iraqi chain of command, and that at the top of that chain of command is a law- fully constituted Iraqi government. The chain of command is being put in place now. A defense minister has been named, along with a commander in chief of the armed forces and a chief of staff. A new interior minister has also taken office. We need to fill in the rest of the chain, but Iraqis in the security forces can see today that there are Iraqis at the top. The greatest factor in the mixed performance of the security forces was an intan- gible: fear. The enemies of a democratic future for Iraq have so terrorized the cities of central Iraq that many members of the security forces doubt that they or their families can be protected from the retribution that may follow their participation in operations alongside the Coalition. Until Iraqis are convinced that Saddam’s regime has been permanently and irreversibly removed, and until a long and ghastly part of their history is put to rest and overcome, that fear will remain. Convincing them of this truth—that Saddam and the Saddamists are finished—will continue to re- quire investments of our time and our resources and our precious men and women in uniform, to continue to build trust among the Iraqi people. That is why it is so important in this time of stress to show that our commitment to their freedom is rock-solid. VerDate 11-MAY-2000 14:54 Jan 04, 2005 Jkt 000000 PO 00000 Frm 00012 Fmt 6633 Sfmt 6621 96371 SFORELA1 PsN: SFORELA1 9 POLITICAL PROGRESS AND THE WAY AHEAD The timing of the current violence was not entirely unexpected. President Bush warned that we could expect increased violence in the months leading up to the transition to Iraqi sovereignty. We knew that the enemies of democracy in Iraq would do everything they could to disrupt the transition to sovereignty. This expec- tation was confirmed when we intercepted a letter from Abu Musab Zarqawi to his Al Qaeda colleagues in Afghanistan. In this letter, Zarqawi recognized that the fast- approaching turnover of sovereignty would further weaken his cause, saying: With the spread of the [Iraqi] army and the police, our future is becoming frightening. The problem is you end up having an army and police con- nected by lineage, blood and appearance to the people of the region. How can we kill their cousins and sons and under what pretext, after the Ameri- cans start withdrawing? This is the democracy . . . we will have no pre- text. Zarqawi’s letter strongly suggests that we are seeing an upsurge in violence pre- cisely because the terrorists and extremists in Iraq believe we are winning and that their time to derail democracy in Iraq is running out. The same political situation that is driving such attacks also is a source of optimism for the Iraqi people and their Coalition partners. The reason the enemy believes its time is running out is because Iraqis, as re- flected in the Transitional Administrative Law, have established a clear way for- ward for drafting and ratifying a permanent constitution for Iraq and the election of a government in accordance with its terms. This political transition is scheduled to evolve over three phases: • Phase I (June 30, 2004)—Iraqi Interim Government • Phase II (January 2005)—Iraqi Transitional Government • Phase III (January 2006)—Iraqi Government under Permanent Constitution According to the timeline laid out in the TAL, the Iraqi Interim Government will take power on June 30. This Interim Government is being selected based on inten- sive consultations among Iraqis, led by Ambassador Brahimi, the UN Secretary General’s Special Advisor on Iraq. Under this plan, the UN will appoint an Iraqi executive consisting of: • A President; • Two Deputy Presidents; • A Prime Minister; and • A Ministerial Cabinet. In accordance with the TAL, the interim Government will assume full sovereignty on June 30th, And in July a national conference will be convened to select a ‘‘con- sultative’’ council. Ambassador Brahimi currently is in Iraq where he is consulting closely with Iraqis and U.S. officials to produce a list of names by the end of May. We believe the ideas put forth by Mr. Brahimi are promising and we look forward to more details from the UN. U.S. officials remain in close contact with Mr. Brahimi, members of the Iraqi Governing Council and other Iraqis as these proce- dures are finalized. This Administration has made a major effort from the start to involve the United Nations in the reconstruction of Iraq. The Coalition’s ongoing efforts in Iraq have been endorsed by three Security Council Resolutions: UN Security Council Resolu- tion 1483—passed May 22, 2003—supports the formation of the CPA and an Iraqi Interim Administration. UNSCR 1500—passed August 14, 2003—welcomed the es- tablishment of the Governing Council. UNSCR 1511—passed October 16, 2003—au- thorizes a multinational force under U.S. command. All three of these resolutions were unanimously endorsed by the UN Security Council. The Administration has worked closely with the United Nations Secretary Gen- eral throughout the past year. Before his tragic murder by terrorists, UN envoy Ser- gio Viera de Mello was instrumental in establishing the Iraqi Governing Council. Since the tragic bombing of the UN Headquarters in Baghdad last August—which Zarqawi boasts was his doing and which was clearly aimed at driving out the UN— security for the UN has been a major challenge. However, the UN representative for Security Coordination’s Office has been in Baghdad since mid-January. A UN Election Assistance Team headed by Carina Perelli continues to work with the Iraqi people to help them create the legal and institutional structures for direct national elections by the end of January 2005. And as noted, we have welcomed the pro- VerDate 11-MAY-2000 14:54 Jan 04, 2005 Jkt 000000 PO 00000 Frm 00013 Fmt 6633 Sfmt 6621 96371 SFORELA1 PsN: SFORELA1 10 posals of the new UN envoy, Lakhdar Brahimi, regarding the creation of the Iraqi Interim Government. The Interim Government will serve until the Transitional National Assembly, or TNA, is elected in either December 2004 or January 2005. The TNA will then elect a three-person Presidency Council consisting of a President and two Deputies, who will appoint by unanimous vote the Prime Minister and, on the Prime Minister’s recommendation, a Council of Ministers. The Prime Minister and Council of Min- isters must obtain a vote of confidence from the TNA before taking office. Together, the TNA, the Presidency Council and the Council of Ministers will comprise the Iraqi Transitional Government. In addition to being the legislature, the TNA will also draft a permanent constitu- tion for Iraq, which will be submitted for popular ratification by October 15, 2005. Elections under this new constitution are to be held by December 15, 2005, and the newly elected government, operating under the permanent constitution, will take of- fice by December 31, 2005. Now, I cannot sit here today and predict the exact form of the permanent govern- ment. Iraqis will decide the exact provisions of their permanent Iraqi constitution, and who will emerge as the leaders of the new Iraq. After 35 years of totalitarian dictatorship, it is a complicated task to build new political institutions and it cannot happen overnight. Since the liberation of Iraq a year ago, Iraqis have conducted themselves extraor- dinarily well for a nation so long exposed to Saddam Hussein’s unique level of sa- dism. In a remarkably short period of time, Iraqi leaders have overcome many dif- ferences to demonstrate the arts of political compromise and their commitment to the goal of a new Iraq. Americans of all people should understand that democracy does not guarantee specific outcomes, it opens ideas up for debate. One need only look back at our own Constitutional Convention to be reminded that with any attempt to establish rule for the people by the people, there is always a great deal of uncertainty and con- troversy, even after the ink has dried. We should not expect Iraqis to achieve imme- diately what we and the British, for example, have labored to accomplish over the course of centuries. But even an imperfect Iraqi democracy will be an enormous im- provement for a country that has suffered so much over the past 35 years. An early end to the occupation is essential to our political strategy to defeat the terrorists. A sovereign Iraqi government will be better able to marginalize its ex- tremist opponents politically while Coalition forces defeat them militarily. As the letter from Zarqawi demonstrates, such a transformation is the worst possible sce- nario for those who oppose the emergence of democracy in Iraq. They fear it, and that’s why they are trying so hard to derail it. Moving ahead is important to inspire Iraqi confidence that the transition is mov- ing forward and that their country will not be occupied indefinitely. The transfer of sovereignty will also help to create the national rallying point for the Iraqi Secu- rity Forces I alluded to earlier. But it is important also to make clear that we be- lieve that there will continue to be an urgent need for coalition forces to remain in Iraq after June 30, as there will still be serious threats to security in Iraq. But, on July 1, Iraq will be governed by an Iraqi government. This is in accordance with the expressed wishes of the Iraqi people. We will have a legal basis for continued MNF operations in Iraq. The TAL provi- sions relevant to security arrangements provide the appropriate framework for im- plementing our security strategy in Iraq after this transition. Article 59(B) of the TAL states that Iraqi armed forces will be ‘‘a principal partner in the multinational force operating in Iraq under unified command pursuant to’’ UNSCR 1511. Article 59(C) states that the elected Iraqi Transitional Government ‘‘shall have the author- ity to conclude binding international agreements regarding the activities of the mul- tinational force,’’ and that ‘‘nothing in this Law shall affect rights and obligations . . . under UNSCR 1511 . . . which will govern the multinational force’s activities pending entry into force of those agreements.’’ And perhaps most importantly, Article 26(C) ensures that CPA orders and regulations ‘‘shall remain in force until rescinded or amended by legislation duly enacted and having the force of law.’’ While it is important not to view the accomplishments in Iraq through rose-col- ored glasses, it is also harmful to give way to excessive pessimism. The American people need to know what their forces are accomplishing in Iraq, how the efforts of our servicemen and women are transforming the lives of 25 million Iraqis for the better, and transforming a region that has for too long accommodated despotism to the detriment of its freedom starved populations. And both our friends and our en- emies in Iraq need to know that we have the will and resolve to accomplish our ob- jectives. VerDate 11-MAY-2000 14:54 Jan 04, 2005 Jkt 000000 PO 00000 Frm 00014 Fmt 6633 Sfmt 6621 96371 SFORELA1 PsN: SFORELA1 11 They also need to know that the Defense and State Departments share the same objectives in Iraq. Today as we face the challenge of executing the transition from the Coalition Provisional Authority to a sovereign Iraqi government 45 days from now, we must also plan for U.S. representation in Iraq to be conducted by a U.S. Embassy. Fortunately, planning for this transition has been well underway within the Defense and State Departments for some time. LTG (USA, Ret.) Mick Kicklighter and Ambassador Frank Ricciardone lead Transition Teams for the two Departments, and they have worked hand in glove with the CPA and Defense and Army staffs since early January to make the transition a success. They have formed an Interagency Transition Planning Team (ITPT) and provide the State and Defense leadership for drafting an Operations Plan for the transition. Experts from 16 sub- ject matter sectors (such as Security, Human Resources and Personnel, Facilities, Finance, Medical and Health Services, etc.) from State and Defense coordinate close- ly to draft the highly detailed, time-phased plan. The ITPT as a whole meets almost daily, with sector leads meeting with their teams more often as required. General Kicklighter and Ambassador Ricciardone meet several times each week to ensure that planning and implementation of the plan are on track. CONCLUSION When the President declared the end of major combat operations last year, he noted that ‘‘We have difficult work to do in Iraq. . . . The transition from dictator- ship to democracy will take time.’’ This prediction has turned out to be correct, al- though the specific nature of some of the challenges we have encountered could not have been foreseen a year ago. But it is important to remember how large the stakes are and that fortitude and steadfastness are essential for success. Iraqis seem to understand this and are less prone to pessimism in the face of set- backs than we are half a world away. Despite all the violence and uncertainty caused by the enemies of a free Iraq, Iraqis sense dramatic improvement in their everyday lives and anticipate much more. Iraqis recognize the challenges they face and embrace them as a revolutionary op- portunity to build a free nation and to better their lives. Recently, Nesreen Berwari, the woman serving as the Iraqi Minister of Municipalities and Public Works said: ‘‘On April 9, 2003, Iraqis were offered the opportunity to begin to dream their fu- ture. Before April 9, 2003, we were not allowed to dream. We could not imagine life with the kinds of positive challenges we face today.’’ Minister Berwari’s optimism persists even though she recently survived a second assassination attempt on her life which killed her bodyguard. There is an old Chinese saying, ‘‘May you live in interesting times.’’ This saying is intended as a curse not a blessing. There are some days when it is tempting to view events in Iraq this way. But overall, I think we are in fact blessed with the opportunity and the capability to help the Iraqi people to realize their goal of a stable and representative govern- ment. And with this Committee’s help, we will begin to make this a reality with the transition to Iraqi sovereignty next month. Recently in Houston, seven Iraqi businessmen were fitted for artificial hands. Saddam had ordered their hands am- putated, to make them scapegoats for Iraq’s economic failure. As one of those busi- nessmen said, ‘‘The age of tyrants is over, the age of good remains. God willing. Good is coming in Iraq.’’ The CHAIRMAN. Well, thank you very much, Secretary Wolfowitz. Secretary Armitage. STATEMENT OF HON. RICHARD L. ARMITAGE, DEPUTY SECRETARY OF STATE, U.S. DEPARTMENT OF STATE Mr. ARMITAGE. Thank you, Mr. Chairman and members. I’ll try to respond, rather than going through my opening statement, which you’ve kindly submitted for the record, to the individual items you brought up, Mr. Chairman, and I’ll do it very briefly. I want to echo Paul’s comments about your kind comments re- garding us. It’s been a pleasure to serve with you and in front of you many times, through the Philippines and other different for- eign policy activities. And we’re proud again to be here today. You mentioned that you want to see things move to autonomy as rapidly as possible. Eleven of the Iraqi ministries right now are au- VerDate 11-MAY-2000 14:54 Jan 04, 2005 Jkt 000000 PO 00000 Frm 00015 Fmt 6633 Sfmt 6602 96371 SFORELA1 PsN: SFORELA1 12 tonomous, and two more this week will become autonomous. And that means their ministers make all the decisions, prepare the budgets, are responsible for all of the programs, et cetera. And the CPA folks who have been in those ministries revert to the position of senior advisor, and we will attrit these away when the ministers themselves tell us that they feel that they no longer need senior advisors. That’s a story, I think, that has been untold—13 of the 25 ministries this week are autonomous. You talked about John Negroponte. Thank you very much, and your other Senate colleagues, for being so rapid in conducting a hearing, and confirming the nomination. Now, I understand the desire to have John out in Iraq as soon as possible, but let me explain our reason. We want to make sure that there’s a clean break between Ambassador Bremer and Am- bassador Negroponte. Ambassador Negroponte is not Mr. Bremer’s successor. He is the first U.S. Ambassador to a sovereign Iraq, and we’re trying to make that point dramatically. We also want John’s expertise as we move forward to another U.N. Security Council Resolution, which I will get to. But we’ve tried to meet you half- way, sir. We chose, as the DCM, our ambassador to Albania, who is a decorated Vietnam combat officer. We chose him for that rea- son, as well as his overall leadership skills, because we wanted to send him out early. And he’s there now. He’s arranging the embas- sies. He’s putting together the different political shops, governance shops, et cetera, right now. We thought it was very helpful to have someone who, frankly, spoke the same language as our military col- leagues and one who has walked the walk, as well as talking the talk. Jim Jeffrey is there now. He is getting the job done for us. You mentioned funding. We’re going to need about $483 million for the fourth quarter of the fiscal year, and that is from July until September. Right now, I can lay my hands on $477 million. The $6 million that I don’t quite have, I plan to get by charging other agencies for their billeting, et cetera, with the State Department. We have these cross-servicing agreements, so that’s not a par- ticular problem. We do estimate, as Marc Grossman told you, that it will be a little over a billion dollars to run an embassy for fiscal year 2005, and this money, I’m pleased to say, will be coming for- ward, requesting, at the beginning of the year in a supplemental, an administration-wide supplemental, a State and foreign oper- ations supplemental. I do want to be clear, however, the President has very kindly re- quested, and DOD has acceded, to continue to supply to the U.S. Embassy what we call the LOGCAP, the Logistics Civilian Aug- mentation Program, and security. And this, over a year, amounts to about $800 million. So when I finally come forward to you with a supplemental, then it will be, I think, somewhat less than a bil- lion dollars to operate the embassy. We’ve got three properties that are in the process of renovation. They will be completed by the 15th of June. One is a residence, which will serve as a chancery. It’s inside the Green Zone. The pal- ace, which Ambassador Bremer is in now, will be an annex. And Ambassador Negroponte will move into the residence which Am- bassador Bremer now occupies. VerDate 11-MAY-2000 14:54 Jan 04, 2005 Jkt 000000 PO 00000 Frm 00016 Fmt 6633 Sfmt 6602 96371 SFORELA1 PsN: SFORELA1 13 A little bit about the UNSC. We desire to move ahead as rapidly as possible, and we’ve had informal consultations in New York and, most recently, with the G–8 foreign ministers here in Washington on Friday. There’s not a piece of paper that we have put forward. We have gleaned and garnered all the ideas of those who are most interested. We do want to await the outcome of the Brahimi con- sultations. Then we would have an actual government which we would want to support in that resolution. But we want to accomplish several other things, as well. We want to make it very clear that occupation is over. Sovereignty is Iraqis’. The assets gained from the sale of oil belong to Iraqis now. Those type things. We also want to talk about the security arrangements moving forward. We do feel, under Security Council Resolution 1511 and other associated memoranda, we have sufficient basis to continue to operate in Iraq. However, we would want, and many of our part- ners are desirous of having, a further U.N. Security Council Reso- lution which makes this fact well known. So I’ve tried to respond to several of your items. One, if I may, about funding. I said, I’ve got about $477 million; $196 million of that will come from the OMB fourth-quarter apportionment, $97 million of it comes from 2003 and 2004 moneys which have already been appropriated, and the $184 million remaining would be out of the so-called ‘‘one-percent funds,’’ which, following the law, the Iraq reconstruction and redevelopment fund, up to 1 percent of the money was allowed to be used for administrative costs. So I think we’ve got a pretty good handle on that, and I hope you will agree with me by the end of the hearing. So I’ll stop there, sir, and look forward to questions. [The prepared statement of Mr. Armitage follows:] PREPARED STATEMENT OF HON. RICHARD L. ARMITAGE Mr. Chairman, Senator Biden, Members of the Committee, it is always an honor to engage with you in a dialogue about the foreign policy challenges and opportuni- ties facing our nation. The transition to sovereignty and democracy in Iraq is the pivotal opportunity and challenge for our nation at the moment, so I especially ap- preciate the chance to discuss this subject with you today. In 44 days, the Department of State takes the lead in managing and representing U.S. interests to a sovereign Iraqi government. At this point, you have confirmed Ambassador Negroponte, who is well prepared for this work. We have selected a very capable Deputy Chief of Mission in Jim Jeffrey, our current Ambassador to Al- bania, who already has moved to Baghdad to smooth the transition. Nearly all of the 140 State Department staff positions have been filled, and a number of Coalition Provisional Authority (CPA) staff will stay on for a period to ensure continuity of operations. We already have a number of the 155 Locally Employed Staff the State Department will hire here in Washington for training. Combined with personnel from other U.S. Government agencies, the U.S. Mission will total up to 1,000 perma- nent American staff, as well as a total of approximately 500 Locally Employed Staff. Our temporary chancery will be ready by July 1st, and we have chosen a site for a permanent embassy. Of course, the Department of Defense (DOD) will also continue to support a size- able force in Iraq after June 30th. An Interagency Transition Planning Team, head- ed by Ambassador Frank Ricciardone and General Mick Kicklighter, is working out how our two agencies will work together, including how our roles, missions, re- sources, responsibilities, and authorities will complement and support each other. With the ongoing primacy of security concerns, this will obviously continue to be an important issue, and a top priority for Ambassador Negroponte and Lieutenant Gen- eral Sanchez. Indeed, the security of our mission itself is a top priority in our transi- tion planning; we already have 32 Diplomatic Security staff in Iraq defining and im- VerDate 11-MAY-2000 14:54 Jan 04, 2005 Jkt 000000 PO 00000 Frm 00017 Fmt 6633 Sfmt 6621 96371 SFORELA1 PsN: SFORELA1 14 plementing measures to protect our staff. A total of 48 Diplomatic Security agents will serve in the mission as of July 1st. As for funding the U.S. Mission, we are working with CPA and DOD to project start-up and fourth quarter operating costs, as well as to develop FY 2005 require- ments. For FY 2004, the costs to stand up and operate the U.S. mission are around $480 million. We believe these costs are covered by the funding available from CPA’s fourth quarter operating budget, the one percent transfer of Iraq Relief and Reconstruction Funds (IRRF) available under the law, and the funding directly ap- propriated to the Department of State from FY 2003 and FY 2004 supplemental ap- propriations. Our rough estimate of FY 2005 operating costs for the new mission amount to approximately $1 billion, exclusive of capital facility costs for a new em- bassy compound. Of this total, State Department costs for personnel and adminis- trative support, IT, provincial teams, and to maintain a strategic communications capability total about $112 million. The largest cost components are logistics and security contracts that are being managed by DOD. It is our expectation that DOD will continue to cover logistics and security costs until Ambassador Negroponte and his team have time to assess the actual needs and provide an estimate we can in- clude in a 2005 supplemental request. We plan to meet the remaining FY 2005 re- quirements through funds requested by the Department in the FY 2005 budget, as well as potential cost allocations to other agencies, potential carryover from FY 2004, and the IRRF for any appropriate reconstruction expenses. Overall, this transition presents both opportunities and challenges, as I noted. We have the opportunity to help secure our long-term interests in seeing a stable, peaceful, and economically vital region. At the same time, we have the challenge of helping a country emerge from decades of tyranny, divide and rule tactics, propa- ganda, and opprobrium. Of course, the revelations about the terrible treatment of detainees in Iraq have complicated our challenges and our opportunities. The diplomats of the Department of State are accustomed to telling the world about the strengths of our country, and that is usually an easy task—our strengths are manifestly obvious. It is in times of trouble, however, that the world sees the strength of our system actually tested. With all eyes transfixed on the images of American soldiers abusing Iraqi prisoners at Abu Ghraib, it is one of those times. Americans are human beings; we are not above injustice and sin. But because we are American, we can also say that we are not above the law—no one is above the law. We will hold every person who bears responsibility for the human rights viola- tions in Iraq accountable. As President Bush has said, we will compensate those who suffered. In his meetings with Iraqis, Ambassador Bremer has expressed deep remorse and the resolve to address these violations. And while accountability for in- dividual soldiers is necessary, that alone is insufficient. As General Abizaid has noted, we are also correcting the system that accommodated such abuses in the first place. The Department of State is also taking measures to deal with the damage these violations have brought to our country, particularly to our efforts in Iraq. We are engaging in an open dialogue with other nations and with the news media, with a focus on the Islamic world. I want to underscore, however, that our outreach goes beyond a frank discussion of Abu Ghraib. There are hundreds of thousands of Amer- icans around the world who are engaged every day in positive and productive ac- tions to strengthen human rights, democracy, and open economies, to give aid to people in need of help, as well as to protect the security of this country. I believe we all have a responsibility, as official representatives of this govern- ment, to provide a balanced picture. Personally, in the course of the past week alone, I have tried to do so in interviews with a roundtable of Arabic print media, Al-Ikhbariya TV, and Lebanon’s an-Nahar newspaper. In the past few days, Sec- retary Powell has talked to al-Arabiya and the World Economic Forum in Jordan. As for gaining the good opinion of Iraqis and the international community about our efforts in Iraq, Ambassador Bremer and his team, along with Ambassador Blackwill, are meeting with government officials, civil leaders, clerics, tribal leaders and many others from across Iraqi society to talk about American policy and intentions and to seek input. Ultimately, however, our overall strategy for success in Iraq will be the most per- suasive proof of our good intentions. That strategy is entirely sound, even in light of shifting events on the ground: we must succeed in helping Iraq to become a stable and successful independent state with a democratic, representative government and the seeds of a strong economy. That will require progress on the political, economic, and security fronts, so allow me to turn now to the ‘‘way ahead.’’ The United States and coalition countries have spent the last year preparing Iraq to assume sovereignty by building up the political system, from the ground up and the top down. First, we have provided the training, advice, equipment, and facilities VerDate 11-MAY-2000 14:54 Jan 04, 2005 Jkt 000000 PO 00000 Frm 00018 Fmt 6633 Sfmt 6621 96371 SFORELA1 PsN: SFORELA1 15 to help construct local, regional, and national governing structures. Indeed, as of our last count, there are 18 governorate councils, 90 district councils, 194 city councils, and 445 neighborhood councils. At the national level, there are 11 Ministries al- ready under direct Iraqi control; and more will be transferred in the coming weeks leading up to June 30. We will, however, continue to provide some 155 liaison offi- cers to these Ministries after the transition. We also supported Iraqis as they draft- ed and adopted clearly defined principles and targets for the national government in the Transitional Administrative Law (TAL), which will be in effect as of July 1st and will stay in effect until a constitutionally-based, elected government takes office. The Interim Iraqi Government is taking shape. At the invitation of the Iraqi Gov- erning Council and with full U.S. support, the United Nations has played a leading role in advising and assisting Iraqis in forming this interim government and pre- paring for elections. Ambassador Lakhdar Brahimi, who successfully helped steer the Bonn process and political transition in Afghanistan, is continuing his broad consultations with Iraqi leaders across the country. We welcome his proposal to es- tablish by early June an interim government led by a Prime Minister, along with a President, and two Deputy Presidents. A Council of Ministers would report to the Prime Minister. An Advisory Body, selected in July by a National Conference, would serve alongside the Executive, but with no legislative authority. We have full con- fidence in Ambassador Brahimi, and not just because of his demonstrated com- petency in this area. We also have confidence because we are working in cooperation for the same ends. The Iraqi Interim Government (IIG) will have full sovereignty, but as spelled out in the TAL, it will serve for a limited term. The main focus of this interim govern- ment will be to take the country to an elected government in early 2005. The IIG will also take charge of the daily administration of the country, including the secu- rity and safety of the Iraqi people and continued progress in the economic recovery. As for the economy, the Coalition Provisional Authority reports important progress. Electric power production has exceeded pre-war levels, and more to the point, is now being distributed more widely and equitably across the country. Under the previous regime, much of the distribution had been concentrated on the Bagh- dad and Tikrit areas. Less than half of the population had access to potable water before the war; now two-thirds has access. Wheat production in the fertile Central- South region is up by 60 percent. Oil production has surpassed prewar levels. More than 5 million children are back in school, many of them vaccinated for the first time. The port and airport are fully functional for the first time in years and the Central Bank is fully operational. Of particular significance in a country where un- employment and underemployment together may be as high as 50 percent, the CPA has helped create nearly half a million jobs. The foundation for a healthy economy is in place and our efforts will continue. The Secretary of State, through the Chief of Mission, will assume ultimate authority for all of the projects and contracts as of 1 July. As we saw yesterday with the assassination of Iraqi Governing Council President Izzedin Saleem, security will continue to be the seminal challenge for a sovereign Iraqi government. For that reason, the TAL spells out an Iraqi desire to keep the Multi-National Force (MNF) in place, with an Iraqi security force at its core. Both the TAL and UN Security Council Resolution 1511 provide the legal framework for that ongoing presence. In addition, the TAL gives the elected transitional govern- ment the authority to conclude additional, binding international agreements rel- evant to the MNF. We have already begun consultations on a new UN Security Council resolution, as well, but want to be careful not to get ahead of the political process within Iraq. We will continue to recruit and train Iraqi forces to eventually take responsibility for security, and all security assistance will continue to be under DOD authority after June 30th with the policy guidance of the Chief of Mission. I would like to express our high level of confidence in Major General David Petraeus, who will be leading the effort to train and equip the Iraqi military. He has already dem- onstrated, in his command of the 101st Airborne, a high degree of success and skill in this environment, and we look forward to working with him. In addition, Ambassador Bremer, Ambassador Blackwill and their colleagues, as well as Mr. Brahimi, are also consulting widely with Iraqis on security issues, a pat- tern that Ambassador Negroponte and the coalition military commanders in theater will strengthen and deepen. Indeed, dialogue and cooperation with Iraqi leaders about the situations in Fallujah and Najaf has been essential in moving toward res- olution in both places. In both situations, a sovereign Iraqi government would stand to inherit the same security challenges with which we are now confronted. Antip- athy to the occupation may have generated some popular sympathy, but I believe VerDate 11-MAY-2000 14:54 Jan 04, 2005 Jkt 000000 PO 00000 Frm 00019 Fmt 6633 Sfmt 6621 96371 SFORELA1 PsN: SFORELA1 16 most Iraqi citizens recognize that these lawless, violent groups do not represent their interests. The antipathy is understandable. Iraqis are a proud people who have endured a great deal of hardship. They have wanted their freedom for many years, and now they want their sovereignty. The sacrifice of brave Iraqis, such as Izzedin Saleem, is testament to the will of so many Iraqis to secure a better future. So while I recog- nize that there are still details to be worked out over the course of six short weeks, I believe our ability to see progress in our overall strategy for Iraq hinges on sov- ereignty. I am confident that on July 1st Ambassador Negroponte will take the reins of a large Embassy, with a highly experienced Deputy Chief of Mission and an eager country team. There will be more than 100,000 U.S. forces in the country, working alongside the forces of at least 32 other nations, including Iraq. When the Ambas- sador calls on the Iraqi leadership, he will meet with the Prime Minister and Presi- dent of a sovereign nation. There will be much to accomplish, of course. The country will still be immersed in all the confusion of a dramatic transition: elections will need to be held; a con- stitution will need to be drafted; and economic reconstruction will need to continue. The U.S. commitment to a strategy of success also will continue unabated, and we will continue to define success as a democratic and prosperous Iraq, at peace within itself and with its neighbors. I appreciate the support this Committee already has given the Department of State in reaching for that success, and I look forward to discussing our strategy with you today. The CHAIRMAN. Thank you very much, Secretary Armitage. We’ll try to have a 10-minute question round at this point. We have good attendance. I will proceed with questions. I appreciate your response to some of the questions that I had raised in the opening statement. I’m going to ask that you respond, both of you, to questions that will be submitted for the record. We have gotten into a detailed list of questions regarding the $18.4 bil- lion. These are too voluminous for a 10-minute question-and-an- swer period, but it is important that you have an opportunity to detail what is being done with the $18.4 billion, or what will be done, and what problems have occurred in terms of our bidding, contracting, and so forth. Ambassador Brahimi will soon name Iraqi leaders. What is our plan, or what should be our plan, for Mr. Jeffrey if he is onboard in Baghdad, or for General Abizaid, General Sanchez, to visit with these people? My thought, as I’ve expressed in other hearings, is that it would be very helpful to have some rehearsal offstage before the curtain opens on the 1st of July, specifically about these issues of putting an Iraqi face on both governance and security, and what that means. What I suspect it may mean, in terms of many Iraqis, is that they will want to take more responsibility, and we may wish that that was the case. Clearly, in Fallujah, we have had a step forward that was very substantial in terms of both the vetting of the general and the troops. Mr. Bremer has pointed out that this should not serve as a model of how things may go elsewhere, but it certainly is interesting as an instructive, pragmatic example cur- rently in the security area. As for governance, it’s never been quite clear what sovereignty meant. And, really, as you pointed out, Sec- retary Armitage, 11 of the 25 ministries, as I understand it, are presently passed over and are moving, but, Mr. Bremer points out, we probably won’t get to the end of the 25 list before June 30. Can either of you describe, in the security area or in the governance area, how these new leaders are coming together, so that there is at least, if not a smooth transition, some modus vivendi for people VerDate 11-MAY-2000 14:54 Jan 04, 2005 Jkt 000000 PO 00000 Frm 00020 Fmt 6633 Sfmt 6602 96371 SFORELA1 PsN: SFORELA1 17 to talk, as opposed to a public row as to who does what and push- back by the Iraqis? Would you have a go at this to begin with? Mr. ARMITAGE. I’d be glad to, Mr. Chairman. First of all, what Ambassador Brahimi is doing is finally coming up with a list that will be winnowed down to 30 names, and his suggestion is for a President, two Vice Presidents, Prime Minister, and 26 Ministries, because it will include the Ministry of Defense, as well. He is also going around the country—he was in Irbil 2 days ago, with the late Izzedine Salim, as a matter of fact—talking with Iraqis about var- ious lists of names, and winnowing them down. We’ve seen some of them. We haven’t seen them all. I don’t think it does any good to talk about them publicly, because what matters is not so much what I think or Paul thinks; it’s what Iraqis think about those names. Once they are named, and we hope to have that done by the end of the month of May, perhaps the first week of June—and then the TAL annex, which we have spoken about in the past, the pen is held by Mr. Pachachi, and he and his colleagues will write the TAL annex, which will document the responsibilities of the Iraqi Interim Government. I don’t expect that document to be extraordinarily voluminous, because this is not an elected government. Mr. Brahimi and Aya- tollah al-Sistani and others have spoken about the need to run the day-to-day business of government, and not to be involved in long- term negotiations between the long-term agreements internation- ally, et cetera. So I would say that we have a month or so, roughly, to work with the Iraqi Interim Government, to make it very clear what sovereignty means. And it’s not limited. They are sovereign. This will be encompassed or spoken to in the U.N. Security Council resolution. The CHAIRMAN. Secretary Wolfowitz. Mr. WOLFOWITZ. I don’t have a lot to add to that. I agree with all of it. We view moving forward in security areas definitely as something that’s going to be a partnership. So as soon as we know who our counterparts are, I think the kind of dialog that you de- scribe is something that should take place, and hopefully before the actual date that the government takes over. You correctly said Iraqis look forward to taking more responsi- bility. I think you suggested that we look forward to them taking more responsibility. That’s part of this whole process. One of the limitations, of course, is that this will not be an elect- ed government. There will be an elected government at the end of this year, and I think Iraqis probably want this government to take more responsibility, but not too much. To be helpful, Mr. Chairman, we have an easel chart that lists some of the specific powers and responsibilities that would flow to this interim government, according, at least, to the Transition Ad- ministrative Law, and I think it bears out what Rich Armitage said, they are very extensive administrative responsibilities. But the most important task they have is to help organize and run elec- tions for an elected Transitional Government at the end of this year. [The chart referred to follows:] VerDate 11-MAY-2000 14:54 Jan 04, 2005 Jkt 000000 PO 00000 Frm 00021 Fmt 6633 Sfmt 6602 96371 SFORELA1 PsN: SFORELA1 18 The CHAIRMAN. On the point of elections, there would be some virtue, I would think, in having elections for somebody even prior to December. By that, I mean, a constitutional assembly. It might be persons with some regional powers. But it appears to me, at this point, that the legitimizing of Iraqi leadership through people vot- ing for it—we have some votes on the board here—may be very im- portant, despite the formality that we’ve been talking about, in De- cember and January and then the following December and what have you, so that, in fact, there is a sense of sharing. If there are insurgents, if there are terrorists who don’t like this situation, they’re going to be shooting at Iraqis as well as Americans. There are going to be some Iraqi people up front with the supporting cast of Americans and the security and the governance situations, as opposed to the other way around. And it seems to me, without knowing precisely who the new leaders are going to be, what kind of responsibilities they have contemplated, how we could use the U.N. food rolls that the press may be more rough and ready than the fastidious work that we would like to see later on. Have either of you thought about that? And what comment do you have? Mr. ARMITAGE. Mr. Chairman, the U.N. Representative for Elec- toral Processes, Carina Perelli, has been in Iraq since April, and she has been trying to set the atmosphere for these elections. The first task that she has undertaken is, again, garnering nominations from Iraqis themselves for the post of what we call Federal Elec- tion Commissioner, they would call Iraqi Election Commissioners, seven of them. And there will eventually be seven. She’s winnowing down those names. They will be chosen by an international group VerDate 11-MAY-2000 14:54 Jan 04, 2005 Jkt 000000 PO 00000 Frm 00022 Fmt 6633 Sfmt 6602 96371 SFORELA1 PsN: SFORELA1 19 of experts in electoral law. There will also be three Directors Gen- eral, for a total of ten people. This is the first step in getting to where you want to be and where we all want to be in late Decem- ber, early January 2004/2005. She has noted, as you have noted, that there’s something con- tradictory about the ballot and the bullet, but she’s also noted that in the spirit that she sees among the Iraqi people, that when they see that they actually are going to have a buy-in and—that means a vote, a say—that their desire for this becomes much greater than the ability of enemies to defeat them. And she has noted past U.N. experiences in Timor and other places where elections took place in an atmosphere of some violence. There are many municipal elections and neighborhood council elections which are being held with stunning regularity, and I’ve got the number in this book, and I can’t memorize the whole book—I think it’s about 60,000 Iraqis hold some sort of elected po- sition, some sort of position or another, not just in the Kurdish area, where you’d expect it, but throughout Iraq. And it’s not a po- sition that comes without some danger, because some of them have been assassinated, because they look like they might be leaders who could stand on a larger stage. So some of what you suggest is ongoing. The CHAIRMAN. Let me intrude before my time is up. To what extent will the Transitional Administrative Law that has been pro- mulgated by the Governing Council now—that suggests 25 percent participation by Iraqi women, as a minimum, the freedom-of-speech and the freedom-of-religion clauses, as well as other things that are very important, we hope, to Iraqis, and very important to us— what’s going to happen to that? Is this the law as we proceed? Mr. ARMITAGE. The so-called TAL, the Transitional Administra- tive Law, will be the law of the land, and it embodies a stunning array of rights never before held by the Iraqis, and it will last and cannot be amended except by a Transitional Government, which would be in place with the election of a 275-person National As- sembly in January. They have the ability to amend laws. Now, I’m not going to say that it’s perfect and I can guarantee you that wom- en’s rights and religious rights will be respected as we’d want them. But we’ve faced this in Afghanistan, we’ve faced it earlier this year, and we prevailed. And I believe we prevailed not because of the wisdom and the strength of our arguments, but because Iraqis hold their religion very dear, but they also hold the idea of secular government to be something very worthy. So I have some optimism we’ll prevail. Mr. WOLFOWITZ. Mr. Chairman, if I might emphasize a point you made at the end of your question, that this is a key part of winning the military battle, as well. And, in fact, page 7 of my statement, I got this quote from that notorious letter from that notorious ter- rorist, Mr. Zarqawi, where he says, ‘‘The problem is, you end up having an army and police connected to the people. How can we kill their cousins and sons after the Americans start withdrawing? This is the democracy. We will have no pretext.’’ And then else- where he refers to that as ‘‘suffocation.’’ It’s winning for us, it’s los- ing for them. VerDate 11-MAY-2000 14:54 Jan 04, 2005 Jkt 000000 PO 00000 Frm 00023 Fmt 6633 Sfmt 6602 96371 SFORELA1 PsN: SFORELA1 20 And, if I might add, too, the point Secretary Armitage made about elections, it was a very interesting report recently in the Guardian of London, that in some, I believe it was, 15 local elec- tions in southern Iraq, in most of those the Islamists lost the elec- tion, and I think that tells you something, also, about what Rich said, that these are very religious people, but that doesn’t mean they want a religious tyranny imposed on them. The CHAIRMAN. Good point. Senator Feingold. [The prepared statement of Senator Feingold follows:] PREPARED STATEMENT OF SENATOR RUSSELL D. FEINGOLD First I want to thank the chairman and the ranking member for holding this im- portant hearing, and to thank our witnesses for being here today. It is vitally important that this committee seek out and insist on answers from the administration about just where the path of current U.S. policy is leading us in Iraq, about what additional commitments of American resources will be made to this endeavor, and about whether we have a viable political strategy in Iraq and a plan for increasing burden-sharing. I want to hear about all of these issues today. I want to hear about the implications of the sarin-filled artillery shell found over the weekend, and the murder of the President of the Iraqi Governing Council yester- day. I want to hear about where we stand in getting a transitional government in place in time for next month’s transition. Most importantly, I want to hear about how U.S. policy in Iraq is affecting our capacity to protect our national security and pursue our national interests overall. So in many senses I eagerly await the testi- mony of our witnesses. But there are a few things I don’t want to hear today. I don’t want to hear that attacks on our troops and terrible instability in Iraq are actually somehow positive indicators that we are on the right track. And I don’t want to hear that reasonable estimates of the scope and scale of the U.S. commitment in terms of troops, timelines, and taxpayer dollars are utterly unknowable. We have heard all of that before, and the American people—especially the brave men and women in uniform who are making great sacrifices on the ground—deserve so much better than obfus- cation or misguided, wishful thinking. The stakes are terribly high, the current indi- cators are deeply troubling. Getting our policy right must start with honesty about what is wrong. We cannot afford to wait another day. Senator FEINGOLD. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. Let me first thank all of you, and especially Secretary Armitage and Secretary Wolfowitz, for being before us today. It has always been important for you to appear before this committee as often as possible, but let me suggest that I hope this is the beginning of a pattern. The American people, as you know, are extremely irate and concerned about what is happening in Iraq, and I think I can honestly say it goes all the way across the political spectrum. There has never been a time when we need your answers and your guid- ance more, and I am hoping this is the beginning of a very regular opportunity to have contact with you and ask these kinds of ques- tions. Secretary Wolfowitz, I want to ask you again how long we can reasonably anticipate needing a substantial U.S. troop presence in Iraq. I know that you can’t give me an exact timeframe. We’ve been through this before. But since our forces are on the ground training Iraqi security forces and, therefore, we are in an excellent position to judge their capacities and to estimate how long it will be before they can provide for their own security, I would think you would be able to give me at least a reasonable estimate. We’ve seen that slap-dash efforts to train and deploy Iraqi security forces can lead to dangerous failures and instability. So I guess what I want to VerDate 11-MAY-2000 14:54 Jan 04, 2005 Jkt 000000 PO 00000 Frm 00024 Fmt 6633 Sfmt 6602 96371 SFORELA1 PsN: SFORELA1 21 know is, how long will it take to properly train Iraqis such that they’ll be able to provide for their own country’s security? And for how long will security be primarily the responsibility of U.S. forces? Mr. WOLFOWITZ. Senator, you know, because you’ve said it in your question, the course of war is simply not something one can determine. We can say, I think, with reasonable confidence, that we have a plan underway to train and equip and organize very substantial Iraqi security forces by the end of this year. We finally have the various obstacles to funding, I think, unblocked. I hope that’s true. There have been some critical delays that have done harm. We have unity of command for doing this, all the five Iraqi security forces will be—training and equipping and organizing of them—will be the responsibility of a single lieutenant general, who happens to be the general who commanded for a year up in Mosul in Northern Iraq, with Iraqi security forces. In fact, it performed impressively in the fighting in the last month. So I think we’re on a course to substantial Iraqi security forces by the end of this year. But I can’t tell you how strong the enemy will be. I can’t tell you— predict exactly how things will go. But our goal is to put responsi- bility in their hands as quickly as we can, and not too rapidly to create problems. Senator FEINGOLD. So if I were to look at a memo where you’re planning your goals, and the goal was stated that by the end of this year the United States will no longer be primarily responsible for the security, is that a realistic goal? Mr. WOLFOWITZ. Senator, that’s more than what I just said. What I said is, there will be substantial capable Iraqi security forces by the end of this year, we believe. That’s our plan. How much they will still need help from the United States, I can’t pre- dict. We want it to be as little as possible. And I’ll give you, sort of, real examples. In some of the fighting in recent weeks, Iraqi se- curity forces have performed well, have been able to do things like going into mosques to seize weapons supplies. That’s something that we would always prefer be done by Iraqis and not by Ameri- cans. In the fighting I referred to up in Mosul, where the enemy attacked the government house, the Governor, who, by the way, is a Sunni Arab, stayed there through the night, through the fighting. The police initially left, because they were outgunned. The Iraqi Civil Defense Corps stayed and fought, fought off the enemy. The police came back. Through all of it, they were in touch with Gen- eral Ham, who commanded the American forces there. And I’m quite sure that the knowledge that General Ham was there to back them up if needed probably emboldened them and gave them cour- age. And that’s the kind of arrangement we need to have. We’re in this to win, as I think you agree, and winning means having the Iraqis take as much responsibility as they possibly can, but also not putting them too far, so far out in front that they fail. Senator FEINGOLD. Thank you, Mr. Secretary. Let me ask a question about the transition. Let me start with Secretary Armitage. When the CPA ceases to exist, what authority will take over the implementation of the $20 billion reconstruction program that has been financed by the U.S. taxpayer? Who’s going to be in charge of that? And I’d like to also hear Secretary Wolfowitz’s feelings on it. VerDate 11-MAY-2000 14:54 Jan 04, 2005 Jkt 000000 PO 00000 Frm 00025 Fmt 6633 Sfmt 6602 96371 SFORELA1 PsN: SFORELA1 22 Mr. ARMITAGE. All appropriated U.S. moneys, sir, the Chief of Mission, John Negroponte, will have the responsibility for it. For Iraqi money, which will be theirs, and they’ll have responsibility, and they can contract with whomever they like. Senator FEINGOLD. So the Ambassador will be in charge of the entire $20 billion? Mr. ARMITAGE. Correct. Senator FEINGOLD. Secretary Wolfowitz, do you concur with that? Mr. WOLFOWITZ. I do. I’d point out that Iraqi funds are very sub- stantial. Senator FEINGOLD. So the State Department will now have au- thority over the reconstruction funds. That’s correct, isn’t it? Mr. ARMITAGE. That’s correct. Senator FEINGOLD. Secretary Armitage, when do we expect to see a new Security Council Resolution on Iraq, and what will be, in your view, the substance of the resolution? Mr. ARMITAGE. We and our friends on the Security Council are desirous of moving forward shortly after we find the shape and the names of a new Iraqi government. We think it would be very im- portant to have as one of the elements of the U.N. Security Council Resolution support for that Iraqi Interim Government [IIG]. Other elements which may very well find themselves in this will be end of occupation, make a declaration of sovereignty for Iraq, make it clear that Iraqi assets, particularly oil assets, belong to Iraqis and would be managed by them, discuss security, though we don’t feel we need more, if you’ll allow me to use the term, ‘‘international cover,’’ and we think it’s a very good thing and it’ll be very helpful for many of the other Security Council Members to have a specific reference to security arrangements in Iraq during the time of the Interim Iraqi Government. Those are some of the things. There might be other elements. Everyone’s got different ideas. But I’m pleased to say in the consultations informally in New York, and more recently that Secretary Powell had with the G–8, there was a pretty good comity of views. So I find everybody’s within a certain box, and I think we’ll be able to do this pretty well. Senator FEINGOLD. Thank you, Mr. Secretary. Followup to Secretary Wolfowitz, there are reports that Iraq, our troop strength in Iraq, will remain at about 135,000 troops until the end of 2005. Is that report inaccurate? Mr. WOLFOWITZ. We don’t know what it’ll be. We’ve had changes, as you know, month by month, we have several different plans to be able to deal with the different levels that might be required. Our current level is higher than we had planned for at this time this year. I have no idea what it’ll—— Senator FEINGOLD. So it could well be accurate, then. Mr. WOLFOWITZ. It could be. It could be more, it could be less, Senator. Senator FEINGOLD. Thank you. Secretary Armitage, I’ve served, as you know, on this committee and on the Subcommittee on African Affairs for almost 12 years. One name that keeps coming up and is very familiar is the name of Victor Bout, because he appears at the center of illicit arms traf- ficking that has fueled devastating conflicts in Angola, Sierra Leone, Liberia, and elsewhere. Is Victor Bout, or any firm associate VerDate 11-MAY-2000 14:54 Jan 04, 2005 Jkt 000000 PO 00000 Frm 00026 Fmt 6633 Sfmt 6602 96371 SFORELA1 PsN: SFORELA1 23 with Victor Bout, providing air freight services for Coalition forces in Iraq, as the Financial Times alleged in an article published yes- terday? Has the United States opposed, including Bout on an asset freeze list being compiled by the United Nations, which targets in- dividual who were involved with the criminal regime of former Li- berian President Charles Taylor? And if so, why? Mr. ARMITAGE. As you, I have seen the name Victor Bout. I be- lieve he’s a Ukrainian arms merchant, merchant of death. I cer- tainly hope what you suggest is not true. And as far as I’m con- cerned, he ought to be on any asset freeze list and anything else you can do to him. Senator FEINGOLD. So would you followup with me on any aware- ness of that, that might be available from the State Department? Mr. ARMITAGE. Of course. Senator FEINGOLD. Mr. Secretary Wolfowitz, do you know any- thing about the question I just asked with regard to Mr. Bout? Has he been involved with providing air freight services for Coalition forces in Iraq? Mr. WOLFOWITZ. I don’t know more than what you and Secretary Armitage know, but I share your concern about it, and I will work with Secretary Armitage to look into it and try to fix the problem if there is one. [The following information was subsequently provided:] UNITED STATES DEPARTMENT OF STATE, Washington, DC 20520, June 2, 2004. The Honorable RUSS FEINGOLD, Committee on Foreign Relations, United States Senate. DEAR SENATOR FEINGOLD: Deputy Secretary Armitage has asked that I respond to your question of May 18 regarding the U.S. position on including Victor Bout on a UN asset freeze. We sup- port the designation of Bout for the asset freeze in accordance with UN Security Council Resolution 1532, as well as his designation under any other applicable sanc- tions measures. Resolution 1532 was adopted unanimously on March 12 to prevent former Libe- rian President Charles Taylor, his immediate family members, senior officials of the former Taylor regime and Taylor’s close allies or associates from using misappro- priated funds and property to interfere in the restoration of peace and stability of Liberia. Bout was a major supplier of arms to former Liberian President Taylor and, as noted by a recent UN experts’ report, it would be possible to reactivate quickly the former weapon supply networks, a step which would have ‘‘grave implications for peace in Liberia.’’ We believe that designating Bout as subject to the assets freeze will impair Taylor’s potential access to arms, and assist in the restoration of peace in Liberia. With regard to your question on whether Viktor Bout or any enterprise associated with Viktor Bout is providing air freight services for coalition forces in Iraq, we are researching Department of State procurement records to look at any air freight serv- ices we have contracted in this regard. Preliminary results of this research into Iraq freight contracts are negative, but we have not yet completed this effort and are sending a cable to overseas posts to be certain we have complete information. We will update you when we have completed our investigation of State records. We can- not speak for DOD/CPA, which handle the larger portion of contracting for Iraq. In connection with our data search, however, we would like to inform you that we did identify two cases in which a freight forwarder under contract to the Depart- ment subcontracted without our prior knowledge, for freight service to destinations outside of and unconnected to Iraq, with air charter services believed to be con- nected with Viktor Bout. In view of this, we will send instructions to posts and Des- patch Agencies overseas to ensure that contracts with freight forwarders preclude VerDate 11-MAY-2000 14:54 Jan 04, 2005 Jkt 000000 PO 00000 Frm 00027 Fmt 6633 Sfmt 6621 96371 SFORELA1 PsN: SFORELA1 24 any use of entities connected to Bout. Should you require further information, we would be happy to arrange for a classified briefing. I hope this information is helpful to you. Sincerely, PAUL V. KELLY, ASSISTANT SECRETARY, Legislative Affairs. Senator FEINGOLD. Thank you. Mr. Wolfowitz, in the lead-up to the war in Iraq, I repeatedly raised questions which I felt were never satisfactorily answered about what exactly the plan was for dealing with weapons of mass destruction in Iraq. And given the number of troops we had on the ground when Baghdad fell, and the wide-scale looting that ensued, I have remained uncertain that a viable plan for securing this ma- terial ever existed. Lately, concerns about WMD in Iraq have fallen out of favor in the administration’s remarks about Iraq, because, at least as far as we could tell, we’ve not found what was adver- tised. But yesterday, as you know, we learned that an artillery round containing sarin gas was employed as an IED near Baghdad International Airport. I’m wondering what this means to you, in terms of what we did and what plans we had for securing any weapons of mass destruction as we entered Iraq and entered Bagh- dad. Mr. WOLFOWITZ. Well, in fact, as I think—I know we’ve briefed the Armed Services Committee in detail, and we had very exten- sive plans that transformed into what was called the Iraq Survey Group to find the weapons of mass destruction, to locate them, to make sure, to the best of our ability, they didn’t leak out elsewhere. And when David Kay stepped down, one of the reasons why we felt it was very important to continue the work of the Iraq Survey Group is not only to find out what may have happened to those things, but also to secure them if they’re around. And I would note, also, according to Stuart Cohen, at least, who was the national in- telligence officer who prepared the NIE, that some 2,000 Iraqi offi- cers were deliberately looting files and hard drives and so forth during the fall of Baghdad. So there was some pretty active work on their side, apparently, at trying to destroy at least records. I don’t know any more than what you’ve read in the newspapers about this device that has been discovered. It is obviously some- thing that we’re very concerned about, and we’re going to try to find out about it as much as we can. Senator FEINGOLD. Mr. Chairman, I’m sure my time’s up. Let me just conclude by saying a number of us started, in late July and early August of 2002, to raise these very questions, to ask what was the plan with regard to a possible negative reaction from the Iraqi people, and also, specifically, what was the plan with regard to securing any weapons of mass destruction. I, frankly, feel we were never given real answers to that, and I have a feeling it’s be- cause there wasn’t a serious plan. And I think, at this point, we’re paying a serious price for it. But I do thank the witnesses for their answers. And, Secretary if you’d like to respond—— Mr. WOLFOWITZ. Senator, there was a serious plan I’d be happy to give you for the record, the full table of organization and the VerDate 11-MAY-2000 14:54 Jan 04, 2005 Jkt 000000 PO 00000 Frm 00028 Fmt 6633 Sfmt 6602 96371 SFORELA1 PsN: SFORELA1 25 number of people that were planned to do it. A lot of thought went into it. It may not have been perfect, but there was a lot of work done on it. Senator FEINGOLD. Well, I wish that we had been told about these plans, because whenever we made an effort to ask about it, we were just told to trust you, and we didn’t get the assurance that we needed. But I would like to receive those materials. [The following information was subsequently provided:] The material provided was classified. [Deleted] Senator FEINGOLD. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. The CHAIRMAN. Thank you very much, Senator Feingold. Senator Hagel. Senator HAGEL. Mr. Chairman, thank you. Gentlemen, welcome. Secretary Armitage, going back to the question Senator Feingold asked regarding a new U.N. resolution, how necessary is a new U.N. resolution as we move toward June 30? Mr. ARMITAGE. It’s very desirable. It’s not exactly necessary, ex- cept in political terms. I think politically this will find great favor with our major Security Council partners, both the P5 and the elected ten, and I think it makes a rather dramatic point to the Iraqi people, sir. Senator HAGEL. Well, politically speaking, as we all know, that’s the essence of the effort here. If we lose the Iraqi people, we’ve lost. Mr. ARMITAGE. Exactly. Senator HAGEL. So I would hope that there is serious work being done now on working with our allies on getting a new U.N. resolu- tion. You can assure this committee that’s being done. Mr. ARMITAGE. I’ll assure the committee, I’ll assure you person- ally it is being done, and it’s being done almost on a daily basis. Senator HAGEL. Thank you. What additional resources could we expect from our partners, those not now participating in the effort in Iraq, if, in fact, we were able to get a new U.N. resolution? Resources, meaning troops, meaning money, meaning training. Are we anticipating that? Mr. ARMITAGE. Let me parse it, if I may, Senator. We would be desirous of getting greater NATO involvement, although 17 of the 26 NATO countries are on the ground with us in Iraq. There aren’t large numbers of ground forces in NATO. Only the French have large ground forces. I think it’s very unlikely that they may be in- volved. One possible involvement for them on the ground might be if the U.N. Security Council resolution there’s a call to provide forces to protect the U.N. as they go about their business of elections, et cetera, and that might be something that might find some favor. We would be desirous of engaging NATO in greater talks, par- ticularly about providing headquarters, perhaps where the Polish division has been, something of that nature. But I think, in candor, it’s a little premature. A new U.N. Security Council resolution could possibly encourage some of the South Asian nations to step up a little more, and that would certainly be a target of opportunity. Senator HAGEL. What about Middle Eastern countries? VerDate 11-MAY-2000 14:54 Jan 04, 2005 Jkt 000000 PO 00000 Frm 00029 Fmt 6633 Sfmt 6602 96371 SFORELA1 PsN: SFORELA1 26 Mr. ARMITAGE. I think it’s unlikely. We’ve had discussions re- cently with King Abdullah, and I went around to the gulf, who didn’t specifically ask for forces, but there’s a lot of neuralgia that exists in Iraq evolving around the neighbors, and I think it might be a little premature. Senator HAGEL. Thank you. Mr. WOLFOWITZ. Senator, I might add that we’ve been asking NATO for help, actually going back to December 2002—I did when I was in Brussels—and specifically said even those countries that may not support the war could contribute afterwards to reconstruc- tion. But as Secretary Armitage said, their capacity has, unfortu- nately, declined substantially over the last 10 years, and even in Afghanistan, where NATO has an important role and has made a lot of commitments, they’re having some trouble meeting some of their commitments, even in Afghanistan. Senator HAGEL. Thank you. Let me take that point, Mr. Sec- retary, and ask about the reports, which I understand are accurate, that we will be moving 3,600 American troops from Korea into a brigade, the second division, into Iraq. Was that planned? Mr. WOLFOWITZ. It was—let me put it this way, we have been discussing for some time with our Asian colleagues, with the Con- gress, the whole restructuring of the U.S. global footprint. We have already made some adjustments to our posture in Korea, in both directions. We’ve moved troops off of the DMZ, where, frankly, they were performing nothing except a kind of useless and, indeed, I would say, counterproductive trip-wire function. We are investing a great deal in increasing our capability to reinforce Korea, to the tune of, I believe the number is—well, it’s over $10 billion of var- ious force improvements. But it was concluded, over a year ago, that it was long overdue to reduce the strain on our Army that comes from having these continuous 1-year unaccompanied tours in Korea. So we had planned on some reductions. We need a brigade, an extra brigade, in Iraq, and, in fact, the brigade in Korea is ideally suited for that. Senator HAGEL. My understanding is that this will mean that, for this brigade moving to Iraq from Korea, it’s an additional 12- month commitment in addition to the unaccompanied 12-month commitment they have just finished. Is that right? Mr. WOLFOWITZ. Do you know, General Sharp? General SHARP. It will be a 12-month commitment, sir. As you know, we rotate troops into Korea on a continuous basis, so about half of them will have been in Korea already 6 months. So some of the tours will be very short, they will be 12 months; others will go up to a maximum of 23 months. Senator HAGEL. Thank you. So this was discussed with the Congress, the possibility of mov- ing a combat brigade from Korea into Iraq. Is that what you just said, Mr. Secretary? Mr. WOLFOWITZ. With the leadership of the committees, yes. Senator HAGEL. So Senator Warner and Senator Levin were con- sulted on this, and they knew about it. Mr. WOLFOWITZ. Either they or their staffs were, yes. Senator HAGEL. They or their staffs knew about it? VerDate 11-MAY-2000 14:54 Jan 04, 2005 Jkt 000000 PO 00000 Frm 00030 Fmt 6633 Sfmt 6602 96371 SFORELA1 PsN: SFORELA1 27 Mr. WOLFOWITZ. I have been told that, yes, sir. And I consulted with several Senators. Senator HAGEL. Thank you. Mr. Wolfowitz, how will prisoners, detainees, be handled after the transition of government in Iraq? Mr. ARMITAGE. May I, Senator? Senator HAGEL. Secretary Armitage. Mr. ARMITAGE. Right now, two classes. There are prisoners of war, and there are criminals. Criminals are handled right now by Iraqis. The management of the military prisons is that the U.S. military is working with the Ministry of Justice and, after the turn- over, it is my understanding that we want, as rapidly as possible, to put those into the hands of Iraqis. Senator HAGEL. As rapidly as possible. Do we have any idea what that means? Mr. ARMITAGE. I don’t have that, sir. Senator HAGEL. Does anybody? Mr. WOLFOWITZ. I don’t. Senator HAGEL. It’s a fairly significant issue, as we all know. There’s been a little attention brought to this issue the last few weeks, and I would have thought that this government would put some time into this, especially what we’ve just been through the last 2 weeks. Can someone get back to the committee with some plan? Mr. WOLFOWITZ. We absolutely will. We agree with you on the importance of it, Senator. [The following information was subsequently provided:] UNITED STATES DEPARTMENT OF STATE, Washington, DC 20520, June 18, 2004. The Honorable CHUCK HAGEL, Committee on Foreign Relations, United States Senate. DEAR SENATOR HAGEL: I would like to follow up on an exchange between you and Deputy Secretary Armitage at the May 18 SFRC hearing on Iraq. You asked for more information on how detainees will be handled after the June 30 transition. There are several categories of detainees currently under Coalition control, the most important of which are High-Value Detainees (HVD’s) and security internees. HVD’s number less than 100 and are comprised primarily of former regime officials, including Saddam Hussein. A small number of foreign fighters have also been cap- tured. Security internees are individuals detained by coalition forces in the course of counter-insurgency operations. There are currently several thousand security in- ternees; they comprise the majority of detainees in Iraq. The Multinational Force (MNF-I) will have sufficient legal authority under inter- national law to detain suspected insurgents after the June 30 transition. However, we believe that, as a matter of principle, the incarceration of Iraqis on Iraqi soil is a matter for which Iraqi government authorities should assume responsibility. Therefore, as Mr. Armitage told you in the hearing, we are working to develop a process for the orderly transfer of authority over detainees to the Iraqi government. Both the CPA and Major General Miller are working hard in Iraq to build Iraq’s capability to manage detainees, including training guard forces and putting in place judicial mechanisms to ensure internees are subject to due process. For Saddam and other senior Iraqi implicated in atrocities against the Iraqi people, we are working with the JIG to identify a suitable holding facility or, if necessary, construct one. Our approach to working through these complexities is based on three principles. First, we need to respect Iraq’s sovereignty and the inherent responsibility for its citizens. Second, those who have committed crimes against the Iraqi people or the VerDate 11-MAY-2000 14:54 Jan 04, 2005 Jkt 000000 PO 00000 Frm 00031 Fmt 6633 Sfmt 6621 96371 SFORELA1 PsN: SFORELA1 28 Coalition should face justice in an Iraqi-led process. Third, the continuing safety and security of the Iraqi people and the MNF forces is paramount. We are engaging PM Allawi and his government to develop a coordination mecha- nism between the MNF and the Iraqi government officials on transferring detainee operations to Iraq based on the three principles listed above. I hope you find this information useful. More details will take shape as we discuss transitional arrangements in the coming weeks with the newly appointed govern- ment. We will gladly keep you and your staff apprised. Sincerely, PAUL V. KELLY, ASSISTANT SECRETARY, Legislative Affairs. Senator HAGEL. Thank you. Secretary Wolfowitz, Secretary Armitage, you know, about the latest Washington Post stories regarding polls. Now, I don’t sub- scribe completely to polls, but just for everyone’s quick review here, last week the Washington Post reported, on a recent poll conducted by the CPA, 80 percent of Iraqis lack confidence in the CPA, 82 percent disapprove of the United States and allied militaries in Iraq; furthermore, 45 percent of those polled in Baghdad, 67 per- cent polled in Basra, said they backed Muqtada al-Sadr. This was before the prison abuse issue. Then there was a subsequent poll taken, as well. How concerned are you with these numbers? Do you believe these numbers? Secretary Wolfowitz. Mr. WOLFOWITZ. I think we are concerned about them. And, in fact, the reason why we have wanted to move toward Iraqi self-gov- ernment is so that the Iraqis feel that its their people who are run- ning their country, it’s their security forces that are dealing with their country. As you say, it’s hard to know the reliability of polling data, and especially in a country where people are, to put it mildly, not used to telling the truth to anyone, although it is striking how some of these polls do seem to show important things. One of them is a poll that I’ve seen that shows very rapidly declining approval of our forces, but pretty steady confidence in Iraqi security forces. I think it says that we’re on the right track in moving as rapidly as we can to Iraqi self-government and Iraqi self-defense. We don’t have an infinite amount of time, though. Senator HAGEL. Thank you. Secretary Armitage. Mr. ARMITAGE. As with Paul, I’m very concerned about it. I would note, though, usually if you look at the question a little more closely, it’s, ‘‘We’d like you out of here, but not now.’’ Our forces, who are operating around Najaf anaconda-like, closed in a bit on Muqtada al-Sadr, have found the people coming out thanking them for these activities. So we’re very concerned, but I think it’s a more complicated picture than that poll would represent. Senator HAGEL. Let me ask you both this. Do you believe a rising sense of nationalism in Iraq, if that’s happening, is a result mainly of a target of the United States or an anti-American sense as much as anything else that may be occurring? Mr. ARMITAGE. My understanding of Iraq historically is they’ve always had a good sense of themselves and their place in the re- gion, in the world, and at one time as the center for science and VerDate 11-MAY-2000 14:54 Jan 04, 2005 Jkt 000000 PO 00000 Frm 00032 Fmt 6633 Sfmt 6602 96371 SFORELA1 PsN: SFORELA1 29 alphabets and things of that nature. So I don’t think it’s a direct result of this. Senator HAGEL. Just the anti-Americanism. Mr. ARMITAGE. The reputation of the Arab—— Senator HAGEL. You don’t think is an anti-Americanism. Mr. ARMITAGE. No, I don’t. I think it’s the reputation in the Arab world has historically been a very scrappy, tough people. Senator HAGEL. Thank you. Secretary Wolfowitz. Mr. WOLFOWITZ. I would agree with that. And I think over- whelming numbers of them are nonetheless, whatever their feel- ings about our staying in Iraq, grateful that we helped them to re- move a terrible dictator. Senator HAGEL. Let me ask a question about sovereignty which you have both noted. A couple of pieces. One, what will be the role of the Department of Defense, come July 1? And the second part of that is, what, in fact—and I see your charts here—but what, in fact, is the power of this new government yet to be determined, un- defined—we don’t know who they are—as to security? I see, in the Washington Post this morning, a good friend of the Defense De- partment, Ahmed Chalabi, who is an Iraqi Governing Council member, says the Iraqi government must have exclusive and com- plete control over the army and all security services of Iraq, come July 1. So if you would both handle each of those parts. Secretary Armitage. Mr. ARMITAGE. Yes, Senator, thank you. Iraqi forces will work for an Iraqi general, who will work for the Ministry of Defense. They will work in partnership with Coalition forces, under the unity-of-command theory, for a U.S. general. The real question that you’re asking is: Can they opt out of an oper- ation if they don’t want to, or something of that nature? And the answer has to be yes. But, if I may, this is not very unusual to us. If you can think back to a fellow you all know, by the name of Wes Clark, who in Kosovo, when told the Russians were heading for the Kosovo Air- port, told his British counterpart who worked for him to go stop them. The British said, ‘‘No, I think I’ll check with headquarters for guidance on that issue,’’ and he didn’t do it. So there will be a lot of management, sort of, alliance/coalition/partnership manage- ment as we go forward, but they are sovereign, and they’ll be in charge of their forces. Senator HAGEL. Thank you. Secretary Wolfowitz. Mr. WOLFOWITZ. I agree exactly with what Rich just said. Senator HAGEL. OK, well, that makes it easy, thank you. Mr. Chairman, thank you. The CHAIRMAN. Thank you very much, Senator Hagel. We welcome now the distinguished ranking member of the com- mittee, and we’re grateful he has surmounted the obstacles pre- sented to him this morning. Senator BIDEN. This is a hearing on funding for Amtrak, isn’t it? All the trains out of New York, Mr. Chairman, today, were ex- ceedingly late, and I do apologize, because it is a very important VerDate 11-MAY-2000 14:54 Jan 04, 2005 Jkt 000000 PO 00000 Frm 00033 Fmt 6633 Sfmt 6602 96371 SFORELA1 PsN: SFORELA1 30 hearing, and I appreciate you calling it and our witnesses being here. May I have permission to make my opening statement and then to save my questions until the next round so I do not use my time for a statement at this point? The CHAIRMAN. Please proceed. Senator BIDEN. And I apologize, gentlemen, for not hearing your statements. You, as well, general. OPENING STATEMENT OF SENATOR JOSEPH R. BIDEN, JR., RANKING MEMBER Senator BIDEN. From my point of view, notwithstanding the meeting last week with the President, which I truly appreciated, I don’t think things are going all that well in Iraq, notwithstanding that our people have performed miracles opening schools and hos- pitals and restoring some oil production and setting up local coun- cils. But these successes, I think, have been dwarfed by two tow- ering deficits that the administration created—a security deficit and a legitimacy deficit. And the result, I think we’re losing sup- port, as Senator Hagel suggested, although I’m not associating him with my remarks—I don’t want to get him in trouble. But we’re los- ing the support of the Iraqi people. When I get a round of questioning, have an opportunity, I’d like to know what our strategy is to erase those deficits, the deficits in security and legitimacy, because I think both are needed to be erased in order to build a successful plan. Success, in my judgment, and this is what I told the President, would be a stable Iraq—secure within its borders, with a represent- ative government that doesn’t threaten its neighbors or threaten us. I’m convinced that we can defeat the insurgent forces. But while military superiority is essential, I don’t think, quite frankly— and I don’t think you all do either—it’s enough. We also need an effective political strategy. And based on a very brief briefing I got from my staff on your opening statements, although I’m sure they were necessarily truncated, my chief concern is, first, whether we have one, and my second concern is, we appear to have lost the Iraqi people. As Senator Hagel said, 82 percent of the Iraqi people oppose our presence, although some pockets may very much want us to stay. They’re in a conundrum, as the President said in a different con- text. He can understand why they’d chafe at occupation. They know they have to have these forces in order to prevent a civil war from occurring, but they don’t like the forces being there. And only 23 percent support the Iraqi Governing Council. At the same time, as Senator Hagel pointed out, al-Sadr gets alarmingly high marks at least in two major cities. And I would suggest these numbers would be worse if this poll had been taken after the debacle at the prison. So my question is, how do we reverse this downward dynamic? I think we have to go back to first principles. The first is, and I’m sure we agree, we can’t want freedom for the Iraqi people more than the Iraqi people want it, and that’s what the silent majority in Iraq seeks, I believe—freedom. I believe the polls all show, as well, that they neither want an Iranian-style theocracy, nor do they VerDate 11-MAY-2000 14:54 Jan 04, 2005 Jkt 000000 PO 00000 Frm 00034 Fmt 6633 Sfmt 6602 96371 SFORELA1 PsN: SFORELA1 31 want another strongman. But after being brutalized for three dec- ades, they’ve learned to keep their heads down, that middle, that 65 to 80 percent of the people, if it’s that high. It seems to me we have to create the conditions that encourage them to raise their heads. The Iraqi people must have more security in their daily lives, and they must believe that there is a legitimate plan to re- turn sovereignty to them, and that it makes sense. Second, it seems to me we have to square the circle between the need for significant international support for years to come, both political, economic, and security, and their growing frustration with U.S. occupation, or any occupation, for that matter. And I think that requires investing our European and Arab allies more heavily in Iraq today and working with them to prepare Iraqis to take back their country tomorrow. As it stands, the Iraqis are going to wake up on July 1, after the so-called transfer—and I’m not belittling that—of some form of some sovereignty to a group of people whom they don’t know. There’s going to be no single national figure. There’s going to be no George Washington, there’s no Madison, there’s no Benjamin Franklin as part of this. And so they’re going to wake up, and the bulk of the Iraqi people are not going to know the bulk of the people in this new government, although I believe it will be viewed regionally as more legitimate. They’re going to see 140,000 troops, Americans, with American patches on their shoul- ders still patrolling the streets, and a new super-Ambassador, who they’re going to suspect, I think, is going to be the one pulling the strings in a cast, as I said, of unelected and relatively unknown po- litical figures. That’s not in any way to denigrate the capacity or the integrity of those who will be chosen. And it seems to me we have to change that dynamic. And in order to do that, the President has to articulate a single over- arching goal that everybody can understand. And I think this pre- sents a significant opportunity for the President to state a goal that everyone can rally around, and a rationale. And the goal should be that our job, and the international community’s job, is to hold suc- cessful elections in November of 2005. We want a civil election and not a civil war in December 2005. And I believe these elections should be the rallying point within Iraq—and, quite frankly, out- side of Iraq—to build security and legitimacy. I think it’s a ration- ale for European leaders who know they have a great stake in suc- cess or failure in Iraq to be able to justify to their people why they’re there, with an implied end date to it. Not a literal end date, an implied end date. I believe it provides a rationale as well for Arab leaders to join in the effort. I also believe that it provides a rationale for the Interim Iraqi Government to be able to speak to interlocutors to actually cooperate with this new military force, this old military force hopefully with a new face. Because I asked the President in our meeting, I said, Mr. Presi- dent, we’re all just plain old politicians. Imagine if you’re about to be appointed to an interim government, and you want to be a per- manent, or at least an elected, official running that country 13 months from now, or 16 months now, and 82 percent of the people say, I hate the outfit that you’re dealing with. What are you going to do? I’m just a plain old politician, Mr. Secretary. You ain’t gonna VerDate 11-MAY-2000 14:54 Jan 04, 2005 Jkt 000000 PO 00000 Frm 00035 Fmt 6633 Sfmt 6602 96371 SFORELA1 PsN: SFORELA1 32 talk to ’em. You’re not going to be seen as cooperating with them. It will guarantee your defeat. Now, this is the only thing I probably do know more than all you guys, just plain old politics. And so we’ve got to provide them a ra- tionale. Why are they going to be cooperating with, no matter what the face is, a U.S.-led and dominant U.S. presence. And I think this election process as a rationale for our staying cannot be repeated enough, in my view. I also think it would be a strategy that the American people could understand, and could understand that there’s an end date. Not a definite date, not a date to say, we’re out of here by such and such, but there is a strategy that is able to be articulated that the American people are smart—and they can understand. We had a hearing here last summer after the report done by John Hamre, the former controller of the Defense Department, on the closing window of opportunity in Iraq, meaning the Iraqi people. The three of us said basically, ‘‘The window of opportunity in America is clos- ing.’’ In America, it’s closing. And, fellows, we’re all about the same generation. Once the folks decide this ain’t gonna work, I don’t care how brilliant any of us are, I don’t care how wonderful any plan we have is, it ain’t gonna work without the informed consent of the American people. So I think the President has an opportunity, and only the Presi- dent can lead in this regard. And I would respectfully suggest the first order of business should be to form a contact group who would give those whose help we’re seeking a seat at the table on the polit- ical decision. And this includes the major powers in Europe, it in- cludes the Security Council—not as a security council—and it in- cludes our Arab allies, who have a great deal to lose, and the in- coming Iraqi government. And I respectfully suggest that the Presi- dent publicly call a summit of those folks. Get on the plane, go to Europe, pick a venue, meet—he could meet with the G–8 a little bit—meet, meet, find out what the deal is, how we get them in- volved. Second, the enormous logistical security requirements for elec- tions are going to require a surge of security forces. It required that in Bosnia, it required that in Kosovo, it even, in a sense, requires that in Afghanistan. And we’re not quite doing it the same way, but it required it. And the President should seek, I believe, agree- ment for NATO to take over multinational security forces under U.S. command. I know, fellows. You know. We go back a long way, Mr. Secretary, about 30 years—you a staffer, and me essentially a staffer, a 29-year-old United States Senator is equivalent to being a staffer, only staffers knew more in those days. And notice I said ‘‘those days.’’ But the point is, we know there’s never been a single serious plan NATO has initiated that we haven’t carried over to Brussels. Never. Never. So as that old song goes, ‘‘What’s the plan, Stan?’’ We ought to show up. Now, I have met with a lot of your former colleagues. I’ve met with a total now of seven four-stars, and I meet with them regu- larly in conferences. Every single one of them, reflecting various points of view in the military, believe if the President says, ‘‘This is the deal I want,’’ sits down, hammers it out at the NAC—author- VerDate 11-MAY-2000 14:54 Jan 04, 2005 Jkt 000000 PO 00000 Frm 00036 Fmt 6633 Sfmt 6602 96371 SFORELA1 PsN: SFORELA1 33 izes you to hammer it out at the NAC—we can get a NATO-led mission. It’s only going to be 3,000 to 7,000 forces over the next several months, but a NATO-led mission. That’s an important, symbolic, and substantive change, in my view. So I believe that the President should ensure this new U.N. reso- lution you all talked about authorizes a NATO-led security force, supports the Brahimi plan for a caretaker government and elec- tions, endorses a senior rep to be Iraq’s primary international ref- eree in what are going to be serious disputes between July 1 and the end of January 2005, when these elections are supposed to be held. Were this to occur, I believe we might find participation with countries such as Pakistan, Morocco, India—maybe even India, al- though I don’t know now, in light of recent election results. And, once named, the incoming government should be invited to participate in drafting this resolution, in my humble opinion. Iraqis should see its members, not new ambassadors. And I have great re- spect—don’t anybody in the press translate this as a knock on Am- bassador Negroponte; it’s not—but I don’t want to see Negroponte’s face, I don’t want to see General Kimmitt, who’s a great Amer- ican—I don’t want to see their faces ever again on Iraqi television. Let’s see Iraqis’ faces speaking the language without an accent on television. And I think we have to spare no effort to help the Iraqis field an effective security force. I notice you said, Mr. Secretary Wolfowitz, that the Iraqi forces are gaining some confidence. Even though it’s water under the bridge, I don’t know why we don’t have a massive effort to train Iraqis using the officers that were originally made by the French and the Germans and others. We’re already doing it in Jordan— American-trained Arab forces training the Iraqis, because I think you’re right, this is an essential, overwhelming need. And I think we have to spare, as I said, no effort to help the Iraqis field this force. And we should be inviting European and American-trained Arab officers to participate in that training, beyond what we’ve done. And the last thing, Mr. Chairman, and I will end, the President, I think, also has to make a gesture as dramatic and consequential as the symbolic damage done when, in fact, the prison scandal broke. Mr. Chairman, I know you’ve heard me say this before but I believe the President should go to both these Secretaries and say, find me the remaining 100 or 200 most qualified men and women we have in the government that have any background in quasi- military-police work. Go vet every one of the 8,000 prisoners, re- lease every damn one that’s not a security risk, if there’s a doubt. Be seen to be releasing them. Sit down with the interim govern- ment, ask them what plan—for permission, because we want to ask their permission, to bulldoze down that damn prison, bulldoze it to the ground. That will cause us big problems, finding room for 2,000 people somewhere. And ask them what they want to do with this symbol of tyranny. Do they want a new institution of their choice on that spot? The biggest school? A university? A hospital? What do they want? I think our gestures have to be as grand as the dam- age done. And I think we should state clearly that we’re willing to bring American forces home once Iraqis—and you have—can han- dle their own security and there’s a legitimate government. VerDate 11-MAY-2000 14:54 Jan 04, 2005 Jkt 000000 PO 00000 Frm 00037 Fmt 6633 Sfmt 6602 96371 SFORELA1 PsN: SFORELA1 34 So, folks, despite the fact I am very, very concerned about the state of affairs, I still think, quote, ‘‘this is winnable.’’ But I do think it is not ‘‘staying the course.’’ It is ‘‘changing the course’’ in order to be able to stay to be successful. I apologize to my colleagues for not being here in time to make that at the beginning, and I’ll hold my questions until the end. I thank you, appreciate you listening. The CHAIRMAN. Thank you, Senator Biden. Senator Chafee. Senator CHAFEE. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. Welcome, gentle- men. Despite some of the progress we are making there and some of the positive signs, some of the generals on the ground have ex- pressed great concern. And, in particular, an Army general who was posted in western Iraq, when asked whether he believes the United States is losing there, he said, ‘‘I think strategically we are.’’ And an Army colonel who was based in Baghdad, said, ‘‘Unless we ensure that we have coherency in our policy, we will lose strate- gically.’’ And he went on to say, ‘‘We don’t understand the war we’re in.’’ And then a senior general went on to say, ‘‘I do not believe we had a clearly defined war strategy, end state, and exit strategy be- fore we commenced our invasion,’’ and that, he said, ‘‘It is doubtful we can go on much longer like this. The American people may not stand for it, and they should not.’’ So maybe somewhere in between what you’re portraying and what they’re portraying is the truth, but, nonetheless, there’s cause for alarm, which I certainly hear from my constituents back in Rhode Island. But what I’d like to ask is that—just yesterday, King Abdullah of Jordan was asked the question, ‘‘Do you see a link between the war in Iraq and the Palestinian/Israeli peace process?’’ And he an- swered, ‘‘They sort of feed off each other.’’ The core issue in the hearts of everybody in the Middle East is the Israeli/Palestinian one. The core issue. They feed off one anther. They are related. And what I’d like to go back to is what the President said on February 28, 2003 in a speech before the American Enterprise In- stitute, where he said, ‘‘Success in Iraq could also begin a new stage for Middle Eastern peace and set in motion progress toward a truly democratic Palestinian state.’’ And he went on to say, ‘‘America will seize every opportunity in pursuit of peace, and the end of the present regime in Iraq would create such an oppor- tunity.’’ He said it: the end of the present regime in Iraq would cre- ate this opportunity. And then, Secretary Wolfowitz, I’ll also say, I gave you a shot in May 2003, right after the end of the war, when things were going very, very well, and I asked at a hearing, from the transcript, ‘‘It seems to me that we have thrown a rock into the pool that is the Middle East. And, just for the sake of my question, if all goes well in restoring order in Iraq, what is our strategic vision of the ripples now going out from that rock we have thrown into the pool? What is the strategic vision in the Middle East now?’’ And you answered, ‘‘A clean piece of canvas.’’ You said, ‘‘I would say several things. I VerDate 11-MAY-2000 14:54 Jan 04, 2005 Jkt 000000 PO 00000 Frm 00038 Fmt 6633 Sfmt 6602 96371 SFORELA1 PsN: SFORELA1 35 think some of them hopefully will happen even perhaps before some of the other results are achieved inside Iraq. I think one of the ripples is a positive impact on the Arab/Israeli peace process, and clearly we need it. We need to move that process forward. I think we have credibility, enormous credibility, not that we did not have it before. We have it more than we did before.’’ Those are you words from May 2003, when things were going well. So my question is, why the paralysis—if this is so important, by your own words—why the paralysis on this important issue? As King Abdullah said, ‘‘the core issue.’’ Mr. WOLFOWITZ. Let me ask Rich—— Senator CHAFEE. I’ll ask Secretary Wolfowitz, since I quoted him, if I could. Mr. WOLFOWITZ. OK, but I’m going to turn to my colleague in the State Department on this issue of what you call paralysis. But I would say this. I think that, in fact, part of our problem, as we said, as those quotes make clear, I think success in Iraq will have these effects. We are not—we’re not at success, to put it mildly, and we need to get there. I agree very strongly with what both the chairman and Senator Biden said on that point. I think, if you go back to last year, when there was a bit of eu- phoria, I believe, in the sense that we really were getting success, I know I heard from Arab democrats that there was some sense of exhilaration in the Arab world about the prospects of change. And I don’t claim to be expert enough to say it’s cause and effect, but I think we—in the meeting in Sharm el Sheikh, we saw some signs of Egyptians and the Saudis stepping up to responsibilities to sup- port the peace process. And, again, I can’t say it’s cause and effect, but I don’t think it’s helped the peace process that the enemy in Iraq has proved as resilient as it has. And, let’s be clear, that enemy includes Saddam Hussein, who was out there funding attacks on Coalition forces right up until he was captured in December. It includes No. 6 on the black list, Izzat Ibrahim al-Duri, who is still at large and still funding attacks on American and Coalition forces with money that he’s salted in banks in neighboring countries. It includes the former killers, as I men- tioned in my opening statement, from the so-called—the M–14 branch of the Iraqi intelligence, the so-called anti-terrorism branch. George Orwell would have used that phrase. Anti-terrorism meant that they specialized in killings, hijackings, assassinations, and bombings. Those people are still out there, they’re still killing peo- ple, killing Iraqis, killing Americans. Their goal is to prevent ex- actly that process that, I agree with Senator Biden, we need to move forward. If I could just—— Senator CHAFEE. If you could, I’m talking about the paralysis. And there have been so many opportunities. After Akaba, in June, there was the long 7-week cease-fire. Abu Mazen came here to the Foreign Relations Committee and begged—and he met with the President—begged us to help him on the settlements, the wall, the prisoners held without charges, ‘‘Please empower me with my peo- ple.’’ He went back empty-handed. These are the missed opportuni- ties. When the Geneva Accords came, in October of last year, there was a cold shoulder given to those. I believe this is what’s hurting VerDate 11-MAY-2000 14:54 Jan 04, 2005 Jkt 000000 PO 00000 Frm 00039 Fmt 6633 Sfmt 6602 96371 SFORELA1 PsN: SFORELA1 36 us in Iraq, not taking the opportunities—even as the President said, taking the opportunities that are presented to us, and ener- gizing our adversaries in Iraq. Mr. ARMITAGE. Senator, may I? There are others who would say that what happened to Abu Mazen was that we held him too close, and that’s burned him. And he became—— Senator CHAFEE. He wouldn’t say that. He wouldn’t say that. Mr. ARMITAGE. Several of those who served with him when he was Prime Minister would say that, and gave us advice to be some- what cautious. You’re right, we have a 7-week window with the cease-fire. The difficulty with the cease-fire is the Palestinian Au- thority can have a cease-fire, but if they won’t control Hamas, then it’s for naught. And they’re not controlling Hamas. They’re not even trying to. We thought we were on the verge of something, and it’s very frustrating, almost ‘‘Perils of Pauline,’’ the Middle East saga of a search for peace with the Sharon plan for disengagement from Gaza, where 80 percent of the people of Israel, by opinion polls, ap- pear to be for it. But Likkud was not for it, and, hence, he was un- successful. We thought it was rather noteworthy for the first time since 1967 to have 21 Gaza settlements and four West Bank settle- ments turned over to the Palestinians. We weren’t quite bullish on this, and now we’re disappointed. But Mr. Sharon is making the re- finements and modifications to his plan. He will eventually show them to us. We have not seen it, to my knowledge yet. Secretary Powell met at the Dead Sea with Abu Allah and Dr. Rice met with Abu Allah in Berlin. So there’s—it’s kind of like a duck on the water; it doesn’t appear to be moving very much, but underneath there’s a lot of churning going on. And we’re doing a lot of it, some of the Palestinians are doing it, and certainly our Israeli allies are doing it. Senator CHAFEE. I’d just like to go further and say there’s a lot of churning going on, but, in the meantime, the days are slipping by, the months are slipping by, the tide is turning. If you believe what King Abdullah says, he’s geographically located, as he said, ‘‘in between Iraq and a hard place,’’ and he says this is ‘‘the core issue.’’ And I think my constituents just see paralysis on this issue. And maybe if you can level with us, is it an election issue that, a certain base that you’ve got to be careful of? What’s the truth? Mr. ARMITAGE. Well, the affection of the President for Israel and for that democracy has nothing to do with elections. It has to do with his view that Israel as one of the great democracies in the world, perhaps the most pure democracy. However, it was our President who was the only one who spoke up about a vision of two states living side by side. He’s held that vision for 2 years now, he’s not shying away from it, and, hence, he has encouraged Secretary Powell to meet with Abu Allah, and Dr. Rice to meet with him, as well. It’s frustrating for us, as well as for you and your constituents, but it’s most frustrating for the Palestinians who are having their houses bulldozed and for those 11 or 12 IDF soldiers who were killed last week. Senator CHAFEE. Well, I’ll conclude just by saying every visitor that I get said only the Americans can push this forward. I hear VerDate 11-MAY-2000 14:54 Jan 04, 2005 Jkt 000000 PO 00000 Frm 00040 Fmt 6633 Sfmt 6602 96371 SFORELA1 PsN: SFORELA1 37 it every time. Only the Americans. And sadly, we’re not exercising that power. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. The CHAIRMAN. Thank you very much, Senator Chafee. Senator Boxer. Senator BOXER. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. Gentlemen, I know how hard you are working, and I know that the burdens that you bear are very heavy, but I have to say I was very disappointed in your opening statements, to be honest with you. Listening to you, one would never know what is happening in America, how people are so distraught over this. And I think if you looked at the faces of my colleagues, I’ve never seen us quite look this way. It’s not partisanship. And I didn’t get, as Senator Biden pointed out, where are you changing course? I don’t hear it. And if there’s one thing I want to say, it is to agree with my ranking member here, that this is the moment to do it, if ever there was a moment. Now, the essence of our country has taken an enormous hit in the world, to the point where American business people, Mr. Secre- taries, are telling me and telling us that they’ve never seen such a negative view of America in many, many, many years. As they put it, one put it, one very successful businessman, the American brand is being pummeled. Now, some of it, I believe, is due to a go-it-alone policy that’s been perceived as arrogant, and I won’t go through it all, but we’ve seen it over and over. And then there’s the prison scandal, which has really seared the soul of America. Now, some of the things that we saw, we have seen even worse by the terrorists, but our strength is that we’re not like them, and they repel us because they have no respect for human rights. But all of us who have seen the original photos and then moving pic- tures, frankly, of torture—I need to ask you, Secretary Wolfowitz, in Newsday yesterday, Pentagon officials adamantly deny charges. In a New Yorker magazine article, the Defense Secretary Rumsfeld and other key officials had approved a plan to expand from Afghan- istan to Iraq, a secret interrogation program that included rough treatment and sexual humiliation. Do you stand by that? Do you deny? Mr. WOLFOWITZ. Senator Boxer, we’re trying to find out what, if any, possible truth led to that story. I’m aware of nothing that would substantiate that. Senator BOXER. So you don’t deny it. You’re saying you’re still looking into it? Mr. WOLFOWITZ. No, we stand by our denials. When something comes out like that, and people claim that they have sources inside that reveal something, you have to try to find out. Senator BOXER. OK. Do you agree with Pentagon officials who basically said that those charges are wrong, that there was never a plan that was approved to expand from Afghanistan to Iraq a se- cret interrogation program that included rough treatment and sex- ual humiliation? Mr. WOLFOWITZ. To the best of our knowledge, yes, Senator. Senator BOXER. OK. Mr. Wolfowitz, you spoke eloquently about your desire to help the good people of Iraq. We were all stunned by those pictures of VerDate 11-MAY-2000 14:54 Jan 04, 2005 Jkt 000000 PO 00000 Frm 00041 Fmt 6633 Sfmt 6602 96371 SFORELA1 PsN: SFORELA1 38 Abu Ghraib. And one of those pictures—I’ll never forget any of them, but one of them that is haunting me is that of a beautiful Iraqi woman who is staring into the camera with dead eyes, and then, in the next shot, she is lifting her blouse, and she is exposing her nudity to the camera with the same dead eyes. Have you seen this photo, Mr. Wolfowitz? Mr. WOLFOWITZ. No, I haven’t, Senator. I’ve seen some of the photos. Let me explain. Secretary Rumsfeld, when this thing began, put together a considerable task force to dig into the facts to find out what had happened to make sure that we get to the bot- tom of this. And I would underscore that the Army had already— the reason—— Senator BOXER. Sir, if I might, I don’t have time. Mr. WOLFOWITZ. Can I just—— Senator BOXER. I only have 5 minutes left, and I would—I under- stand that you’re looking into it, but I want to find out what you personally know. So if I might just continue to—— Mr. WOLFOWITZ. I know enough—— Senator BOXER. Mr. Chairman—— Mr. WOLFOWITZ [continuing]. To be horrified at what has hap- pened. I have not spent the 2-hours that Secretary Rumsfeld did looking at all the photos. I will look at the one you mentioned. Senator BOXER. Thank you. Given the Islamic rules for modest dress, even the removal of a head scarf is a major violation of faith for many Iraqi women. So the abuse that was inflicted upon these female Iraqi prisoners is not only physical abuse, but it is mental abuse. According to a recent article written by Tracy Wilkinson, a Polk Award-winning journalist for the Los Angeles Times, quote, ‘‘One woman told her attorney she was forced to disrobe in front of male prison guards. After much coaxing, another woman described how she was raped by U.S. soldiers. Then she fainted,’’ unquote. Secretary Wolfowitz, have you looked into this particular claim that Iraqi women were actually raped by our soldiers? Mr. WOLFOWITZ. Senator Boxer, we’re looking into all of this. And the behavior you’ve described is absolutely appalling, to treat any woman that way, Muslim or otherwise, and I share your horror at it. I very strongly do. It’s absolutely contrary to everything we’re trying to accomplish in Iraq. Senator BOXER. Well, I know you don’t have the answers, but I would appreciate, in writing, if you could let us know how many Iraqi women have been raped in U.S. prisons. [The following information was subsequently provided:] Senator, we can not confirm that any women in Iraq that have been raped while in DOD custody. There have been multiple visits with the women in DOD custody by the Iraqi Governing Council and the ICRC and no allegations of rape have sur- faced. There is, however, a finding in the Taguba investigation indicating that a male MP guard had sex with a female detainee. That finding was based upon a statement of a witness who did not see the actual event and did not know the iden- tity of the woman. However, if the event is proven, given the position of authority of a guard over a detainee, a charge of rape could be sustained. The guard is cur- rently facing court-martial on a variety of charges. Additionally, the Taguba report states there was also a single photograph uncov- ered by CID where a female detainee is shown exposing her breast. The facts and circumstances surrounding that event are not known at this time. VerDate 11-MAY-2000 14:54 Jan 04, 2005 Jkt 000000 PO 00000 Frm 00042 Fmt 6633 Sfmt 6621 96371 SFORELA1 PsN: SFORELA1 39 Finally, we are aware of one incident in which a female detainee was assaulted (kissed) by male interrogator, working in concert with two other male interrogators. The detainee reported the incident to a female guard and an investigation ensued. The military personnel involved were disciplined. Senator BOXER. And we know that many of them are disowned, then, by their families. And Secretary Rumsfeld is on the record saying restitution would be provided for the victims. And could you tell us how far along we’re getting in this plan and if we’re looking particularly at these women, who, as I say, are, many of them, dis- owned by their families? Mr. WOLFOWITZ. I know that we are looking into how to do res- titution the best possible way. There are legal issues involved, too, with respect to whether or not it might affect the trials of people that these people may have to testify against. I consider it very im- portant to make restitution and do it as quickly as we possibly can and as generously as we possibly can. Senator BOXER. Secretary Wolfowitz, because I’m the only woman on this committee, sometimes I will put forth a lot of these issues. And it has come to my attention, and the attention of the women Senators, that there have been reports of 129 credible cases of sexual assault against our women military by our military in Iraq, Kuwait, Afghanistan, and Bahrain. And the rules today say that a woman who is a victim of rape in our military, she’s allowed to use the military hospital, but she has to pay for an abortion if she chooses to end this pregnancy of violence. And I am asking you if you would consider supporting Senator Snowe and my bill that would say if a woman in our military is sacrificing her life and she is raped, that she can—she is not forced to pay for this abortion, that the military will, in fact, pay for it. Mr. WOLFOWITZ. I would certainly consider that, Senator. Senator BOXER. Thank you. Secretary Wolfowitz, in March 2003, you said the oil revenues of Iraq could bring between $50 and $100 billion over the course of the next couple of years, and you went on to say, ‘‘We’re dealing with a country that can really finance its own reconstruction, and relatively soon.’’ Do you still feel that way? Mr. WOLFOWITZ. If I might say, first, Senator, that was in the context of a hearing on the House side that—some days after the war had already begun, and I introduced those comments by em- phasizing no one can predict what the cost of the reconstruction in Iraq will be. At that moment, we fully anticipated—anticipated is too strong a word—we were very fearful that, among other things, the oil fields of Iraq might be completely destroyed, so the bill could have been much, much greater even than it’s turned out to be, and that caveat is frequently omitted. Let me note that, in the last year alone, Iraq has contributed some $21 billion in Iraqi assets to the running of the country and to the reconstruction of the country. Oil revenues are currently above target, partly because production has come back faster, also because of higher oil prices. I will get you the exact numbers for the record but I don’t think, in the end, those numbers will turn out to be too far off the mark. [The following information was subsequently provided:] VerDate 11-MAY-2000 14:54 Jan 04, 2005 Jkt 000000 PO 00000 Frm 00043 Fmt 6633 Sfmt 6602 96371 SFORELA1 PsN: SFORELA1 40 From its inception in May 2003 to 28 June 2004, the total cash inflow for the De- velopment Fund for Iraq was $20.7 billion. The largest portion of this fund, $11.3 billion, has been drawn from Iraq’s oil exports. The remaining $9.4 billion comes from repatriated Iraqi assets, Oil for Food money, and other Iraqi sources. $14.1 billion of this has already been spent by Iraqis towards the reconstruction of their country. Senator BOXER. So you don’t think we need to put any more American dollars into Iraqi reconstruction. Mr. WOLFOWITZ. No, in fact, I think when we came up with the request for the supplemental, and I’m working from memory here, and I hope this doesn’t—if my memory is wrong, we don’t go back again and say I got it wrong—but it was—the estimate of Iraqi needs for reconstruction was something like $75 billion, based on the World Bank needs assessment and other requirements that the World Bank didn’t take account of, and that we said in testimony that we considered that an American contribution would on the order of the $20 billion that we requested and that it would apply initially—— Senator BOXER. So just yes or no, will we have to put more American dollars into reconstruction in Iraq, in your opinion? Mr. WOLFOWITZ. We don’t think that there will be any need for a supplemental of the enormous kind that we had last year. I would assume that there will probably be some kind of an Amer- ican economic assistance program in the future, but Iraqi revenues are running—— Senator BOXER. So you’re asking us for $25 billion for the mili- tary, for the troops, nothing for reconstruction, and that will be it until—we won’t need any more. Is that correct? Mr. WOLFOWITZ. First of all—— Senator BOXER. You won’t have to come back—— Mr. WOLFOWITZ [continuing]. The $25 billion for the troops is— it’s more complicated than—that’s not the amount for this year. It’s the amount to get us into early next year, when we’ll be able to request a supplemental. We have, thanks to the approval of Con- gress, some $18.6 billion, as you know, in appropriated funds avail- able for Iraqi reconstruction. In addition, as I had just mentioned, there’s $20 billion just in the last 12 months in Iraqi funds—some of it for operating the government, some of it for reconstruction. There is some $15 billion or so from international sources that Sec- retary Powell raised at the Madrid Conference. And we anticipate, I think—I’m going to be careful with my numbers—very substan- tial Iraqi contributions—— Senator BOXER. OK. Mr. WOLFOWITZ [continuing]. In coming years for their recon- struction. Senator BOXER. Mr. Chairman, maybe you followed all this. I don’t know exactly what they’re going to ask us for. Thanks. The CHAIRMAN. Thank you very much, Senator Boxer. Senator Brownback. Senator BROWNBACK. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. Gentlemen, glad to have you here. Secretary Wolfowitz or Armitage, just in following that line, is there a chance we’re going to get some money back from the U.N. Oil-for-Food Program? There’s been a huge controversy about the VerDate 11-MAY-2000 14:54 Jan 04, 2005 Jkt 000000 PO 00000 Frm 00044 Fmt 6633 Sfmt 6602 96371 SFORELA1 PsN: SFORELA1 41 number of dollars, and we were tracking that, the subcommittee I was on during the time period that that was operating for those years, the billions of dollars of oil revenues that were flowing out of Iraq then that were supposed to go into food that appears as if now there were billions that were skimmed off of that, either by Saddam or people on the other end of this. Do we know where that is in its investigation? I mean, is there a chance there’s going to be some substantial resources that should come back to Iraq for its reconstruction from that program? Mr. ARMITAGE. Mr. Volcker, of course, is running the investiga- tion for the U.N. Just as a sidebar, we have provided to the mem- bers of the committee, in an appropriate fashion, those documents which we had that might in any way refer to this. I think there will be, at the end of the day—my view is, you will find wrongdoing, and you will find moneys. And I hope the people who were involved, as I said in the House side the other day, are hung. But, having said that, I don’t think the moneys will be substan- tial, in terms of billions and billions of dollars. I don’t think it runs that high. But, you know, follow the trail and follow the money. Senator BROWNBACK. Let me ask you, on this sarin gas and mus- tard gas issue that’s come up—and I’m looking off of two news sto- ries that I just want to quote to you of some individuals. This is the Reuters story yesterday, where David Kay is asked about this sarin-gas weapon. He says it appears to be—this is just his direct quote, ‘‘ ‘It was probably just scavenged from one of the 125-plus ammunition storage points that still remain,’ Kay said.’’ And then the article goes on to say, ‘‘more forensic testing should determine with some confidence when it was produced.’’ Now, he speculated that it was probably left over from the 1980’s, produced either dur- ing the Iraq/Iran war or before the 1991 Gulf War. Now, that’s David Kay’s comments on this sarin gas that they found. Then this is General Mark Kimmitt. This is in a FOX News story on Monday. ‘‘The Iraq Survey Group confirmed today that a 155 millimeter artillery round,’’ which, as I understand, is a pretty good-size shell, ‘‘containing sarin nerve agent had been found.’’ This is another quote from him, ‘‘The round had been rigged as an IED, which was discovered by a U.S. Force convoy. The round detonated before it could be rendered inoperable, which caused a very small dispersal of the agent.’’ Then in this same story, they’re citing a senior Bush administra- tion official, which they do not give the name of, said, ‘‘Two weeks ago, U.S. military units discovered mustard gas that was used as part of an IED. Tests conducted by the Iraq Survey Group, U.S. or- ganizations searching for weapons of mass destruction, and others concluded the mustard gas was, ‘stored improperly,’ which made the gas, ‘ineffective.’ ’’ Now, we know that Iraq used sarin gas during the Iraq/Iran War. However, now Kimmitt—I’m going back to him—said ‘‘the shell belonged to a class of ordnance that Saddam’s government said was destroyed before the 1991 Gulf War. Experts believe both the sarin and mustard-gas weapons date back to that time.’’ Here’s, again, Kimmitt, ‘‘It was a weapon that we believe was stocked from the ex-regime time and thought to have been an ordi- VerDate 11-MAY-2000 14:54 Jan 04, 2005 Jkt 000000 PO 00000 Frm 00045 Fmt 6633 Sfmt 6602 96371 SFORELA1 PsN: SFORELA1 42 nary artillery shell set up to explode like an ordinary IED, and ba- sically from the detonation of that when it exploded, it indicated that it actually had some sarin in it. It was a binary type of shell in which two chemicals held in separate sections are mixed, after firing, to produce sarin gas.’’ And then they, quote, ‘‘Later, a former Iraqi nuclear scientist, Gazi George, is saying that Saddam stored these around the country.’ Can you react? You had this question a little bit earlier, but it appears as if there are people that are commenting on this to some extent, and I would appreciate it if you could comment on either the sarin gas or the mustard gas, to what we know has actually taken place or what’s happened with those to date. Mr. WOLFOWITZ. Senator Brownback, with your permission, I’d really like to reply for the record. It’s just very important that we be precise about what we know and what we don’t know, and there are some things we are still trying to find out about exactly the ori- gin of those shells, whether it was a failure of the Iraqis to account for them or whether they were simply stray shells, and so forth. They’re very key issues here, which I think would be important to give you a careful answer on. Senator BROWNBACK. Can you answer whether or not we know if sarin gas or mustard gas has been used in the Iraqi theater with- in the last 2 weeks? General SHARP. Sir, the tests that came back were field tests done by two different independent type of tests in the field. They have a good degree of reliability, but not near 100 percent. So right now, the shells and the substance are being sent back to the United States for conclusive tests back here. Senator BROWNBACK. OK, and what did the field tests reveal? General SHARP. That they were sarin, sir. But, again, that’s not 100 percent guaranteed. Senator BROWNBACK. And then apparently in this one article, the two soldiers are showing signs of a reaction to a chemical weapon, that they’re showing symptoms similar to a mild chemical-weapons exposure. Is that correct, as well? General SHARP. Yes, sir, that was correct. While they were trans- porting it back, they showed nausea and had some orientation problems. But they are well now, they have been treated, and they’re back to duty. Senator BROWNBACK. OK. Now, what about this mustard gas 2 weeks ago reported by the Iraqi Survey Group? General SHARP. Sir, the information I have is as you have laid out, that they found it and that it’s also being tested. I don’t have any further information on that round. Senator BROWNBACK. OK. Was there a field test as to whether this was mustard gas? General SHARP. I do not know, sir. Senator BROWNBACK. OK, now that’s by the Iraqi Survey Group that was reporting that. All right, but you don’t know anything fur- ther about the mustard-gas one? General SHARP. No, sir, not the earlier one. Senator BROWNBACK. OK. Do we—and, Secretary Wolfowitz, I’m presuming you’re going to say the same answer, but I do want to ask this—do we know any of the sources of these shells? Not nec- VerDate 11-MAY-2000 14:54 Jan 04, 2005 Jkt 000000 PO 00000 Frm 00046 Fmt 6633 Sfmt 6602 96371 SFORELA1 PsN: SFORELA1 43 essarily the gas, but the sources of these shells. Do we know any- thing about that yet? Mr. WOLFOWITZ. Not that I’m aware of, and that’s one of the im- portant questions to be answered. Senator BROWNBACK. OK. There’s a speculation in this article, from the Iraqi nuclear scientist, Gazi George was saying that lots of them have gone west to Syria and have been brought back with the insurgencies. And he was speculating this was a stepping up of the insurgency against the United States and against the Coali- tion forces. Do you have any reaction to that thought, or any that you can put forward? Mr. WOLFOWITZ. I’d say, at the moment, that’s a speculation. It’s another—it’s a hypothesis that certainly is something we’re looking at very hard, because it would be a—if it’s a systematic pattern, then it’s something that would cause us very great concern, obvi- ously. Senator BROWNBACK. And when you have a chance, I’m sure you will be issuing statements publicly about the full nature of whether this is sarin gas or mustard gas in this last instance. [The following information was subsequently provided:] The sarin nerve agent was found on 15 May in a 155 millimeter artillery round which had no particular markings. The round had been rigged as an improvised ex- plosive device (IED) along a roadside, when it was discovered prior to detonation by a U.S. military convoy. The round detonated before it was rendered inoperable, which caused a small dispersal of the agent. The other shell, found on 2 May in Baghdad, was also a 155 millimeter round configured as an IED, and it tested posi- tive for a sulphur mustard agent. Both shells are being returned to the United States for more extensive analysis and testing. Currently, there is no evidence link- ing the sarin IED with the mustard IED. These projectiles could be from a proving ground or a disposal site. The projectiles may have been deliberately not declared, or misplaced among conventional projectiles that were later looted. There is no indi- cation that the anti-Coalition forces knew these rounds were chemical projectiles or understood their proper functioning. In the 1990s, Iraq had declared sarin-filled ar- tillery shells, but said all were destroyed before the 1991 Gulf War. Some mustard shells were also declared, but UNSCOM was unable to locate or account for 550 of those projectiles. Senator BROWNBACK. If I could ask Secretary Armitage, when do you anticipate that Saddam Hussein will be going on trial? Mr. ARMITAGE. I saw speculation in the press from the Iraqis that it would happen before turnover. I think that’s very unlikely. This is an Iraqi determination. They are having a small debate among themselves as to whether they ought to try Saddam Hus- sein first, or whether they should try him in some lesser lights first. We are in—the U.S. Government, the Department of Jus- tice—in an advisory role to them to help them get their house in order so this will stand up to international scrutiny. Beyond that, there is no time set. Senator BROWNBACK. This year? Mr. ARMITAGE. There is no time set. Senator BROWNBACK. We just don’t know that. Secretary Armitage, if I could, you mentioned that you’ve made the trip in the region recently, and I know Secretary Powell has been over at the World Economic Forum, and I applaud all of those connections and move into the region. I’ve made that trip before, as well. I’m wondering how much OPEC is putting pressure back on us through gas prices because we’re pushing democracy and VerDate 11-MAY-2000 14:54 Jan 04, 2005 Jkt 000000 PO 00000 Frm 00047 Fmt 6633 Sfmt 6602 96371 SFORELA1 PsN: SFORELA1 44 open societies in the region. These are generally monarchies and dictatorships that are in the region. We are clearly standing for de- mocracy and open societies. There’s clearly a rub in the region of what’s taking place. Are they pushing pressure back on us through oil production? Mr. ARMITAGE. First of all, on OPEC, sir, it’s a mixed bag. The Kuwaitis, for instance, did not go along with the idea of cutting back on production. As far as I know, the Saudis, a month and a half or so ago, said they were going to cut back, and then didn’t. Now they are now saying that they may increase—they’ve got ex- cess capacity, they may increase it. I think—this is a personal opin- ion—I defer to those on the Energy Committee, but this is as much psychological as anything else, the spike in prices to $41-plus a barrel. I think there’s some argument to be made for the need for more refining capacity here in the United States. But, beyond that, I’m out of my league. The question of democracy and openness in the region is one that’s moving every country in the region at varying speeds and in varying ways. Paul mentioned that even the Saudis and the Egyp- tians have had some rather far-reaching statements, and it’s true. Other states have gone a lot farther, with women’s rights, trans- parency, et cetera. This is why the upcoming G–8 summit at Sea Island and its promise of some discussion of greater Middle East initiative and putting some wind in the sails of those reformers of the various countries is so important. Senator BROWNBACK. I think it’s one of the most dramatic moves toward democracy I’ve seen in that region at any time, and I cer- tainly applaud that. Mr. Chairman, thank you. The CHAIRMAN. Thank you very much, Senator Brownback. Senator Sarbanes. Senator SARBANES. Thank you very much, Mr. Chairman. Mr. Chairman, first of all I want to commend you and Senator Biden for these series of hearings you’ve been holding with respect to Iraq. I think they have really focused on important, substantive questions, and I think that’s obviously a very important responsi- bility of this committee, and I just want to underscore my apprecia- tion to you and the ranking member, Senator Biden, for under- taking that responsibility. Secretary Wolfowitz—then I’m going to direct this, as well, to the other members of the panel, but let me start with you—as we look ahead and make our calculations about the path that lies ahead, it seems to me we have to have some sense of what the miscalcula- tions were that have resulted in us confronting the situation we now have in Iraq. So the question I want to put to you—and then I’ll do it to the others, as well—is, because you’ve been a central player in all of this, what were the miscalculations? Mr. WOLFOWITZ. You know, Senator, when people start listing the miscalculations, they rarely bother listing all the things that we calculated on that didn’t happen, and I think, in part, didn’t happen because of the way in which the military campaign was conducted, which is to say with enormous speed, faster than I be- lieve Saddam or his people believed we could advance. I think that may be a reason why we didn’t face the enormous destruction of VerDate 11-MAY-2000 14:54 Jan 04, 2005 Jkt 000000 PO 00000 Frm 00048 Fmt 6633 Sfmt 6602 96371 SFORELA1 PsN: SFORELA1 45 Iraqi oil fields, for example. It may be a reason that we didn’t face extensive urban fighting, as we had anticipated. Indeed, in antici- pation of it, we decided on a plan that would emphasize speed over mass. One can go back and look at many things that maybe we needed to do differently, and we are doing that. And I agree with the spirit of your question, that if we want to set the course, going forward, then it’s important to figure out if we made some misjudgments in the past. And I would say one that we believe was done a bit too severely was the policy of de-Ba’athification. And that’s, in fact, why Ambassador Bremer announced, just a couple of weeks ago, that we were going to look at modifying it. I must say that as soon as we talked about modifying it, we heard very, very strong expressions, particularly from the Kurds and the Shia, that we might be abandoning them and that we might be opening the door to bringing the Ba’athists back to power. So there’s always a balance to be struck. I would say, of all the things that were underestimated, the one that almost no one that I know of predicted, with the exception of a retired Marine colonel named Gary Anderson, who wrote this in an op-ed in the Post, I believe it was April 2 of last year, was to properly estimate the resilience of the regime that had abused this country for 35 years, to properly estimate that Saddam Hussein would still be out there funding attacks on Americans until he was captured, that one of his principal deputies, Izzat Ibrahim al-Duri, would still be out there funding operations against us, that they would have hundreds of millions of dollars in bank accounts in neighboring countries to support those operations, that the old Iraqi intelligence service which had so much blood on its hands, which I believe is not reconcilable—we’re not talking about an ordi- nary person who joined the Ba’ath Party in order to get a pro- motion as a teacher—those are the people we’re trying to bring back in—but the real killers, who number in the thousands—were much tougher people, I think, than anyone imagined. And they are out there killing, and they are working with Mr. Zarqawi, who seems to have been associated with them from before the war. They’re bringing in foreign fighters, as they did in the early stages of the war. And they may not be good in large-scale, open battle, but they seem to have a dangerous capability for urban guerrilla tactics, and that’s what we’re up against. I think the great strength we have against them remains the fact that the Iraqi people don’t want these people back, and if they have confidence that they can stand up against those people, they do so. In fact, they do so even when they know they may be murdered for it, as the member of the Governing Council was, just yesterday, and as police chiefs are and as security officers are. The number of Iraqis that actually will stand up and fight for their country is considerable, and I think that is where success is going to lie for us, is empowering those people more rapidly. If anything, I would say we were slow in doing it maybe in part because we thought we’d have something like peacekeeping operations instead of a con- tinuing war. Senator SARBANES. Secretary Armitage. VerDate 11-MAY-2000 14:54 Jan 04, 2005 Jkt 000000 PO 00000 Frm 00049 Fmt 6633 Sfmt 6602 96371 SFORELA1 PsN: SFORELA1 46 Mr. ARMITAGE. No, I look at this question—or, to answer it, Sen- ator Sarbanes, by saying, ‘‘What would I do differently?’’ And the single thing I would have done differently after the splendid mili- tary victory was to more rapidly have brought in the sheikhs, tribal sheikhs. I think that—I’ll speak for myself—I’ve felt that, with the Shia and Sunni and Kurds and Turkmen and a couple of others, and we could deal with them in that way. It was wrong, I think. I think they’re a tribal society in a way that I didn’t fully appre- ciate, and I wish that I had been involved much more in bringing the tribal sheikhs into things earlier on. I think we’d be a lot far- ther down the pike now. Senator SARBANES. General. General SHARP. Sir, as you know, as the military looks at the sit- uation on the ground we continuously assess as to what changes need to be made based upon the circumstances that we’re under. As you know, we’re working very hard now to train the Iraqi secu- rity forces as a result of their performance in recent days. We’re looking at leadership training and specialized training in order to be able to get the leaders and the people in the security forces to be able to stand up. On the military side, we continue to assess the capabilities of both the Iraqi security forces and our Coalition partners and us, and to determine how to best defeat the threat that’s out there. So you see us adjusting boundaries, you see us integrating some of the Iraqi security forces and military into our military forces, and vice versa. We’re standing up a new headquarters in order to be able to best work in the new environment with a strategic situation with Am- bassador Negroponte going in. So we’re standing up a headquarters there, with General Sanchez to work on the military and political level, and then General Metz working on the tactical and oper- ational level. And we’re sending, for example, General Petraeus back to, again, take all of the Iraqi security forces and make sure that we are focusing the efforts on those to get the Iraqis enabled to be able to take over responsibility for their own security. Senator SARBANES. The difficulty I’m having here is, obviously, I would assume, none of you at the table calculated that we would be confronting the situation we are confronting there now. So the question becomes, what miscalculations? Let me ask a couple of specifics. Secretary Wolfowitz, you said that they were drawing money from the surrounding countries, that they had deposits in the sur- rounding countries and were now calling on those resources to carry out this insurgency that’s taking place, if I understood you correctly. Is that right? Mr. WOLFOWITZ. I’m saying that Saddam and his gang have ac- cess to enormous resources, and they are using those resources to pay for hired killings. Senator SARBANES. Now, those are coming from the surrounding countries—— Mr. WOLFOWITZ. I’m not sure where they’re coming from, Sen- ator. Senator SARBANES. Well, what cooperation are we getting from the surrounding countries? VerDate 11-MAY-2000 14:54 Jan 04, 2005 Jkt 000000 PO 00000 Frm 00050 Fmt 6633 Sfmt 6602 96371 SFORELA1 PsN: SFORELA1 47 Mr. WOLFOWITZ. I think that—— Senator SARBANES. I see the King of Jordan said, just yesterday, that he thought Iraq needed a ‘‘strongman,’’ as I understand it, and that that was what is now needed in the current situation, which, of course, is very much at odds, as I understand it, with what you’re projecting to do. Mr. WOLFOWITZ. Well, I would say we’re getting very excellent cooperation from Jordan. We may have—I mean, it’s the kind of ally which whom you can have differences of view that lead you to better policies. I think we need a lot more cooperation from Syria. Mr. ARMITAGE. The question of Iran is a more interesting one, in a way, because, during the time of the Arbayeen, where Zarqawi was threatening to bring about civil war—publicly he threatened it—the Iranians were actually quite helpful, because they kept many of their pilgrims home, and they made fewer targets and a much more manageable situation. At the same time, however, we find them, in the south particu- larly, trying to buy clerics with their money. So it’s a mixed view. Kuwait has been extraordinarily helpful, as well. Senator SARBANES. What is the legal status of the U.S. contrac- tors operating in Iraq, the non-military people that are in there, some of them apparently doing military-type activities? Mr. WOLFOWITZ. I’m not aware that it’s different from their sta- tus as contractors for us in Kosovo or Bosnia. We make extensive use of contractors everywhere, and we are doing so in Iraq, and they operate under—if they’re working for the U.S. military, they operate according to U.S. military regulations. And, of course, the status of everything in Iraq is under the overall authority of the CPA. Senator SARBANES. So the U.S. military, in effect, has the re- sponsibility for the conduct of the private contractors, is that cor- rect? Mr. WOLFOWITZ. No, those contractors that are working for us, I would—but there are many contractors that are working for CPA, or are working on their own, or working for the Iraqi Governing Council. There are contractors all over the country. Senator SARBANES. Now, is it your view that you don’t need an- other Status of Forces Agreement after June 30, when you transfer sovereignty, in order to ensure the legal status of American forces? Mr. ARMITAGE. Senator Sarbanes, as a legal matter, that would be the case. As a political matter, it might be something else again. The Security Council Resolution 1511, combined with CPA Order 17 gives us the sufficient legal cover, if you will, for Status of Forces Agreements. However, it clearly—if we do move forward, as we’re planning to, with a new U.N. Security Council resolution, we’d also want to put this in that resolution, as well, as an extra bit of protection. Our view of SCR 1511 is not universally shared by our allies, sir. Senator SARBANES. What will be the status of the private con- tractors after June 30, when sovereignty is transferred? Mr. ARMITAGE. I’ve got to take it for the record, Senator Sar- banes. I don’t know. [The following information was subsequently provided:] VerDate 11-MAY-2000 14:54 Jan 04, 2005 Jkt 000000 PO 00000 Frm 00051 Fmt 6633 Sfmt 6602 96371 SFORELA1 PsN: SFORELA1 48 UNITED STATES DEPARTMENT OF STATE, Washington, DC 20520, June 17, 2004. The Honorable PAUL SARBANES, Committee on Foreign Relations, United States Senate. DEAR SENATOR SARBANES, Deputy Secretary Armitage has asked that I respond to your question of May 18, 2004 regarding the status of private [military] contractors after June 30th, when sovereignty will be transferred to the Iraqi Interim Government. First, I would like to assure you that the State Department is well aware of the concerns that contrac- tors have for their security operations after June 30th. At present, Coalition Provisional Authority Order 17 (attached) regulates the sta- tus of contractors. This Order is currently being reviewed to determine how it should be revised to reflect the June 30 transfer of authority. The issue regarding the status of Americans who are working in Iraq, including contractors, is currently being discussed with Iraqi Prime Minister Allawi and the Iraqi Interim Govern- ment. In all of our discussions, we are examining how best to ensure the safety and security of Americans in Iraq now, and after June 30. When a decision has been made revising Order 17, I will be happy to convey it to you. Sincerely, PAUL V. KELLY, ASSISTANT SECRETARY, Legislative Affairs. Enclosure: As stated. COALITION PROVISIONAL AUTHORITY ORDER NUMBER 17 STATUS OF THE COALITION, FOREIGN LIAISON MISSIONS, THEIR PERSONNEL AND CONTRACTORS Pursuant to my authority as head of the Coalition Provisional Authority (CPA), and under the laws and usages of war, and consistent with relevant U.N. Security Council resolutions, including Resolution 1483 (2003), Recalling that under international law occupying powers, including their forces, personnel, property and equipment, funds and assets, are not subject to the laws or jurisdiction of the occupied territory, Conscious that states are contributing personnel, equipment and other resources to the Coalition in order to contribute to the security and stability that will enable the relief, recovery and development of Iraq, Noting that states are sending Foreign Liaison Mission Personnel to Iraq, Conscious of the need to establish and confirm the status of such Coalition and Foreign Liaison Mission Personnel in respect of the CPA and the local courts, I hereby promulgate the following: SECTION 1—DEFINITIONS 1) ‘‘Coalition Personnel’’ means all non-Iraqi military and civilian personnel as- signed to or under the command of the Commander, Coalition Forces, or all forces employed by a Coalition State including attached civilians, as well as all non-Iraqi military and civilian personnel assigned to, or under the direction or control of the Administrator of the CPA. 2) ‘‘Foreign Liaison Mission Personnel’’ means those individuals who have been issued Foreign Liaison Mission personnel identification cards by the Iraqi Ministry of Foreign Affairs under the supervision of the CPA. 3) ‘‘Legal Process’’ means any arrest, detention or legal proceedings in the Iraqi courts or other Iraqi bodies, whether criminal, civil, administrative or other in na- ture. 4) ‘‘Parent State’’ means the state providing Coalition Personnel as part of the Co- alition in Iraq or the state providing Foreign Liaison Mission Personnel. 5) ‘‘Coalition contractors’’ means non-Iraqi business entities or individuals not nor- mally resident in Iraq supplying goods and/or services to or on behalf of the Coali- tion Forces or the CPA under contractual arrangements. VerDate 11-MAY-2000 14:54 Jan 04, 2005 Jkt 000000 PO 00000 Frm 00052 Fmt 6633 Sfmt 6621 96371 SFORELA1 PsN: SFORELA1 49 6) ‘‘Coalition sub-contractors’’ means non-Iraqi business entities or individuals not normally resident in Iraq supplying goods and/or services to or on behalf of Coalition contractors and in respect of Coalition or CPA activities under contractual arrange- ments. SECTION 2—COALITION AND FOREIGN LIAISON MISSION PERSONNEL 1) CPA, Coalition Forces and Foreign Liaison Mission, their property, funds and assets of shall be immune from Iraqi Legal Process. 2) All Coalition personnel and Foreign Liaison Mission personnel shall respect the ‘‘Iraqi’’ laws applicable to those Coalition personnel and Foreign Liaison Mission personnel in the territory of Iraq and the Regulations, Orders, Memoranda and Pub- lic Notices issued by the Administrator of the CPA. 3) Foreign Liaison Mission personnel shall be immune from Legal Process. 4) All Coalition personnel shall be subject to the exclusive jurisdiction of their Parent States and, they shall be immune from local criminal, civil, and administra- tive jurisdiction and from any form of arrest or detention other than by persons act- ing on behalf of their Parent States, except that nothing in this provision shall pre- vent Coalition Forces personnel from preventing acts of serious misconduct by Coali- tion personnel, or otherwise temporarily detaining Coalition personnel who pose a risk of injury to themselves or others, pending expeditious turnover to the appro- priate authorities of the Parent State. In all such circumstances the national contin- gent commander of the detained person shall be notified immediately. 5) In respect of those Coalition personnel who commit an act or acts in Iraq for which there are no criminal sanctions in the Parent State, the CPA may request from the Parent State waiver of jurisdiction to try such act or acts under Iraqi law. In such cases, no Legal Process shall be commenced without the written permission of the Administrator of the CPA. SECTION 3—CONTRACTORS 1) Coalition contractors and their sub-contractors as well as their employees not normally resident in Iraq, shall not be subject to Iraqi laws or regulations in mat- ters relating to the terms and conditions of their contracts in relation to the Coali- tion Forces or the CPA. Coalition contractors and sub-contractors other than con- tractors and sub-contractors normally resident in Iraq shall not be subject to Iraqi laws or regulations with respect to licensing and registration of employees, busi- nesses and corporations in relation to such contracts. 2) Coalition contractors and their sub-contractors as well as their employees not normally resident in Iraq, shall be immune from Iraqi Legal Process with respect to acts performed by them within their official activities pursuant to the terms and conditions of a contract between a contractor and Coalition Forces or the CPA and any sub-contract thereto. 3) In respect of acts or omissions of Coalition contractors and sub-contractors as well as their employees not normally resident in Iraq, which are not performed by them in the course of their official activities pursuant to the terms and conditions of a contract between them and the Coalition or the CPA, no Iraqi or CPA Legal Process shall be commenced without the written permission of the Administrator of the CPA. SECTION 4—DURATION OF IMMUNITY FROM LEGAL PROCESS The immunity from Legal Process provided by the present Order to Coalition per- sonnel and Foreign Liaison Mission personnel as well as Coalition contractors, sub- contractors and their employees not normally resident in Iraq operates only in re- spect to acts or omissions by them during the period of authority of the CPA. SECTION 5—WAIVER OF LEGAL IMMUNITY AND JURISDICTION 1) The immunity from Legal Process of Coalition personnel, Foreign Liaison Mis- sion personnel, Coalition contractors and their sub-contractors as well as their em- ployees not normally resident in Iraq is not for the benefit of the individuals con- cerned and may be waived by the Parent State. 2) Requests to waive jurisdiction over Coalition personnel or Foreign Liaison Mis- sion personnel shall be referred to the respective Parent State. 3) Requests to waive the immunities with respect to Coalition contractors and subcontractors and their employees not normally resident in Iraq as set forth in Sec- tion 3 of this Order shall be referred to the respective Parent State with which the contractor has contracted. VerDate 11-MAY-2000 14:54 Jan 04, 2005 Jkt 000000 PO 00000 Frm 00053 Fmt 6633 Sfmt 6621 96371 SFORELA1 PsN: SFORELA1 50 SECTION 6—CLAIMS 1) Third party claims including those for property loss or damage and for personal injury, illness or death or in respect of any other matter arising from or attributed to Coalition personnel or any persons employed by them, whether normally resident in Iraq or not and that do not arise in connection with military combat operations, shall be submitted and dealt with by the Parent State whose Coalition personnel, property, activities or other assets are alleged to have caused the claimed damage, in a manner consistent with the national laws of the Parent State. 2) Third party claims for property loss or damage and for personal injury, illness or death or in respect of any other matter arising from or attributed to Foreign Liai- son Mission personnel shall be submitted and dealt with by the Parent State whose Foreign Liaison Mission personnel, property, activities or other assets are alleged to have caused the claimed damage, in a manner consistent with the national laws of the Parent State. SECTION 7—ENTRY INTO FORCE This Order shall enter into force on the date of signature. L. PAUL BREMER, ADMINISTRATOR, Coalition Provisional Authority. Senator SARBANES. Well, that would be quite a problem, could it not? Would they still be under the rules of the U.S. military? Mr. WOLFOWITZ. I repeat, they were under the rules of the Coali- tion Provisional Authority. And since that authority will transfer to the interim government, I assume they’ll be under the authority of the interim government. And if there are issues about how they conduct themselves—for example, I think, obviously, one of your concerns is, what are they allowed to carry in the way of weapons? I think those will be laws and regulations written by the interim government. I think, Senator, that the policies and regulations of the Coalition Provisional Authority, which governs them now—— Senator SARBANES. One final question. Are these issues going to be worked out before the transition date? I mean, are these people just going to be left—I don’t want to use the expression ‘‘high and dry’’—but left with a potential serious problem on their hands? I mean, what’s going to happen? Mr. WOLFOWITZ. Senator, I believe that the laws and regulations of the CPA will remain the laws and regulations of the interim gov- ernment unless further amended. And in the case of contractors, there may be some need for changes, which might be taken while the CPA is still in authority, or might be taken by the interim gov- ernment. General SHARP. And, sir, if I may—— Mr. WOLFOWITZ. It’s not going to be a vacuum of law, though. General SHARP. CPA 17, which, according to the Transitional Ad- ministrative Law, will continue after 1 July, includes the rights and the authorities and the obligations of contractors, not just mili- tary SOFA-type of requirements. So those authorities are in CPA 17 authority also, so that would continue on. Senator SARBANES. Well, my concern has not been alleviated here, and I think it’s a matter that needs to be looked into very carefully; otherwise, you’re going to have things occurring, and ev- eryone’s going to say, well, we never calculated for that to happen. That wasn’t part of our calculation. We have to do some tough- minded calculations here. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. The CHAIRMAN. Well, thank you, Senator Sarbanes. VerDate 11-MAY-2000 14:54 Jan 04, 2005 Jkt 000000 PO 00000 Frm 00054 Fmt 6633 Sfmt 6602 96371 SFORELA1 PsN: SFORELA1 51 Just to summarize, for the record, would you research—the wit- nesses research the answer to Senator Sarbanes question? I think you’ve given an answer, but it could well be that you might want to make additional comments. Mr. ARMITAGE. Absolutely. Mr. WOLFOWITZ. Absolutely. No, you deserve and answer, and we’ll get you one, Senator. Senator SARBANES. Thank you. The CHAIRMAN. Thank you very much. Senator Voinovich. Senator VOINOVICH. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. I would like to thank you for convening this meeting. We’ve been doing this now for over a year, and, at the time we started, we wanted to know, do we have a plan? Do we know what we’re doing? And the American people wanted to know that we’re not like a leaf meandering down a stream. And I am comforted by the testimony that we have had this morning. But my concern is that, are we really leveling with the American people? For exam- ple, we know—we were talking about troops commitments, and if we look at what we’ve done in Bosnia, if we look at what we’ve done in Kosovo, we’ve been there for quite some time. It seems to me that we ought to talk about what’s the future going to be, and have a rough estimate about the commitment that we’re going to be making, in terms of troops and the cost of it. I was somewhat comforted by the fact that you indicate that we might not be asking for more money for reconstruction. But my constituents are interested, Are we going to put more money into reconstruction in Iraq? The other issue that I am very concerned about is the issue of the involvement of religious leaders in Iraq, including Ayatollah al- Sistani, in terms of developing a transition plan. I think one of the things that we may have miscalculated—you’re talking about errors that you made—I think that one of the errors we made is, the militancy of Muslim fundamentalism. Several peo- ple said that—I think it was Senator Biden said 82 percent of the Iraq people would like to see us out of there. It’s like that was a change. Do we really know how many of them wanted us in there? I mean, they wanted to get rid of Saddam Hussein, there’s no ques- tion about that, but did they like us any more than—you know, do they want a secular Western democracy in that country? And what about Muqtada al-Sadr, 31 years old, and seems to have a great deal of support from some people—where is he getting his support? Is this an effort on his part to work with—I don’t know, is he work- ing with people up in Iran to have a Muslim type of regime where they control things? It just seems to me that there’s a lot more going on over there than what we anticipated. The American peo- ple thought, and we were led to believe, we will be looked upon as liberators and that they’ll be glad to have us there. But it appears to me that the sooner we get out, the happier they’re going to be. And I’m just real concerned that—you know, people ask me what’s going to happen come July 1, and I just tell them it’s going to be a jump-ball. We’re not really sure what’s going to happen. We hope there are some things that are going to happen, and I just wonder if we’re not being as candid as we should be with the American VerDate 11-MAY-2000 14:54 Jan 04, 2005 Jkt 000000 PO 00000 Frm 00055 Fmt 6633 Sfmt 6602 96371 SFORELA1 PsN: SFORELA1 52 people about what we’re into over there. And I think they would probably feel more comforted if maybe we leveled with them a little more than maybe what we’re doing right now. And I would like you to react to that. Mr. WOLFOWITZ. Senator, I think we are being candid. We try to be candid, and things change. We had a plan that anticipated, I think, that we could proceed with an occupation regime for much longer than it turned out the Iraqis would have patience for. We had a plan that assumed we would have basically more stable secu- rity conditions than we’ve encountered. In response to both of those changes, we have considerably speeded up the transition to sov- ereignty. And I share Senator Biden’s comments that I think we should put a lot of focus on successful elections. I think that’s going to be one of the keys to changing the way Iraqis view us. With respect to the security problem, we have enormously speed- ed up both the speed and the level of effort in equipping Iraqi secu- rity forces. I think it’s—I don’t remember the exact numbers, I could get them for you, some of those early polls were very striking, because they had overwhelming percentages of the Iraqis polled— I think in the neighborhood of 70-plus-percent—saying they wanted the Americans to leave, and equally large numbers wanted us to stay for at least 2 years. That’s not a contradiction; it’s people who genuinely welcomed us as liberators but did not want us owning their country or occupying their country. I think this label of occu- pying power is a very unfortunate one. It will be good, July 1, to be rid of it. Senator VOINOVICH. Actually, some people have exploited that, and that is why this transition to turn it over to them is very, very important. Do you believe that, because we’re doing that, that that’s going to lessen some of the ability of people like al-Sadr to ignite folks to be against us? Mr. WOLFOWITZ. Senator, you’re absolutely right, although it is not going to be transformational on July 1. That is why Senator Biden is so correct when he says the key thing I think is going to be not when they have a sovereign appointed government, but when they have a sovereign elected government. The issue of Mr. al-Sadr, I think, is—everything that I see suggests this is a man who is very young, exploited, a very distinguished family name. Both his father and, I think, his great uncle were distinguished re- ligious clerics and martyrs, but he’s basically intimated a large part of the country by putting together gangs of young people with heavy weapons and an ability to intimidate people. And as our op- eration has begun to shut down those operations, what we’re also seeing is a lot of Iraqis in the south, who I think were intimidated by him previously, coming out and saying, we’ve had enough of this lawlessness. And I’m told that AP has reported that Ayatollah al- Sistani has actually now come out publicly and said al-Sadr’s forces should get out of Najaf and Karbala. That’s an early report. I would be careful with it. But certainly we’re hearing many reports that as Iraqis see law and order being restored, they’re coming out much more openly against al-Sadr. So I think, in that case, we’re dealing with a fairly thuggish individual, who, with the power of the gun, was intimidating people. I think it is, by no means, as se- VerDate 11-MAY-2000 14:54 Jan 04, 2005 Jkt 000000 PO 00000 Frm 00056 Fmt 6633 Sfmt 6602 96371 SFORELA1 PsN: SFORELA1 53 rious a problem as the much more ruthless former elements of the old regime and terrorists that we’re dealing with up north. Senator VOINOVICH. Is he getting any encouragement from Mus- lims in Iran? Mr. WOLFOWITZ. My impression is that the Iranians are finding him an embarrassment. I don’t know, Rich, if you would want to comment. Mr. ARMITAGE. If I may, you used a sports analogy about a jump- ball, and I know this is not a game, it is very serious business, but if you will allow me, we’ve got a game plan, but we are going to have to audible from time to time. Muqtada al-Sadr is a case of an audible. This is a thug, just as Paul described. He has been unable to garner popular support, Shia support, in the south. They are turning on him. And as I said earlier, Senator Voinovich, when our forces come in with wisdom and determination carefully there, they’ve been welcomed by people. The situation is very complex. It is not good, but there are some signs that we ought to look at, and that is one of them. The Iranians actually came to Baghdad, and they met with the British and they met with us to talk about Muqtada al-Sadr, be- cause, as Paul suggests, they find him an embarrassment, and he is getting in their way. Senator VOINOVICH. Well, has any thought been given to some type of effort to—instead of having a kind of a democracy that we’re hoping for, that we’ll end up with something like we have in Iran? Mr. ARMITAGE. We’ve been very leery of it, very watchful of it. And we’re, thus far, quite satisfied that the most important cleric, Grand Ayatollah al-Sistani, has stated that he does not want a the- ocracy. If there’s another surprise in this area, it was the more sec- ular nature of Iraqi society than I had initially understood, though that is in no way a suggestion they’re not faithful to their beliefs. Mr. WOLFOWITZ. In fact, Senator, I think, before you came in, I mentioned that there was a report recently of some 17 local elec- tions in southern Iraq where the Islamists were defeated in most of those elections. Senator VOINOVICH. I heard that, and I was, quite frankly, sur- prised at that. So that you believe that there is enough support for some type of secular Western type of democracy there? Mr. WOLFOWITZ. I think, Senator, most Iraqis don’t want to go back to a tyranny, even the ones who are deeply religious. And if there’s a fair degree of local autonomy, it wouldn’t surprise me that in some parts of Iraq you find very conservative governments with respect to issues like what kinds of images you can show on tele- vision, for example. But I don’t think most Iraqis would—if they’re free to vote their conscience, would want to see a government that imposes a kind of tyranny they see in Iran. They’ve been through 35 years of a different sort of tyranny. Senator VOINOVICH. Well, certainly what has happened in that prison has really been ammunition for those who talk about us de- filing their country. Mr. WOLFOWITZ. Terrible ammunition. But I hope that the way in which we deal with it will be an example, that this is a country that doesn’t tolerate abuse and that punishes abuse, and that hope- VerDate 11-MAY-2000 14:54 Jan 04, 2005 Jkt 000000 PO 00000 Frm 00057 Fmt 6633 Sfmt 6602 96371 SFORELA1 PsN: SFORELA1 54 fully Iraq will be the first Arab country that has the same ap- proach to those things. Senator VOINOVICH. I would just like to also say—you say you need this resolution from the United Nations, but you’re not cer- tain you’re going to get it, and it just seems to me that one of the things—when we supported the $87 billion for Iraq, one of the con- ditions was that we would get support from other countries in terms of reconstruction, and we would get support from other coun- tries in terms of reducing their debt to the country. Are we getting any—we’ve got some help, but it seems to me that it is not very enthusiastic. Mr. ARMITAGE. Perhaps I misspoke. We’re going to get a U.N. Se- curity Council resolution. And the good news, from my point of view, is the consultations—the informal consultations, both in New York and, more recently, Secretary Powell’s consultations with the G–8, indicate that all of our thinking is within certain acceptable bounds. So it’s a matter of working out and accommodating every- one’s views. So I’m absolutely positive we’re going to get a U.N. Se- curity Council resolution, without question. Senator VOINOVICH. Again, can you repeat how much reconstruc- tion money have we got from other countries, and how many coun- tries have reduced their debts or eliminated them since we’ve made the $87 billion commitment? Mr. ARMITAGE. The international donors, I believe came up with $13.8 billion dollars, of which about a billion has been disbursed. We are into it for $20 billion, as you’ve indicated, sir. All the major debtors, except for Russia, I believe, have indicated a willingness to engage in substantial debt reduction. It hasn’t happened yet, but that’s the status, as I know it. Senator VOINOVICH. The question I have is that when we passed that—authorized the $87 billion, there was a requirement in there for a report. Have we ever received a report back from you yet on where we stand, in terms of that request? The report? Mr. ARMITAGE. I don’t know, and I’ll find out. Senator VOINOVICH. Well, I would like to see it, because I’ve asked this question several times, and I would like to see exactly how much money are we getting from our allies and how much are they cooperating with us. Because, again, you get back to the streets of Ohio, and people are saying, we are Uncle Sugar. We’re over there and we’re taking care of everything, and where are the rest of the people that should be interested in what happens in Iraq as we are interested in it? Where are they?’’ Mr. ARMITAGE. That’s the neighbors, you bet. I’ll find out where it is, Senator. [The following information was subsequently provided:] UNITED STATES DEPARTMENT OF STATE, Washington, DC 20520, March 11, 2004. The Honorable GEORGE VOINOVICH Committee on Foreign Relations, United States Senate. DEAR SENATOR VOINOVICH: VerDate 11-MAY-2000 14:54 Jan 04, 2005 Jkt 000000 PO 00000 Frm 00058 Fmt 6633 Sfmt 6621 96371 SFORELA1 PsN: SFORELA1 55 Pursuant to Section 2215(3)(b) of the FY 2004 Emergency Supplemental for Iraq and Afghanistan (P.L. 108–106), please find enclosed a report on Iraq and Afghani- stan. We hope you find this information useful. Please do not hesitate to contact us if we may be of assistance on this or any other issue. Sincerely, PAUL V. KELLY, ASSISTANT SECRETARY, Legislative Affairs. Enclosures: As stated. REPORT TO CONGRESS ON IRAQ AND AFGHANISTAN This report is submitted pursuant to Section 2215(3)(b) of the FY 2004 Emergency Supplemental for Iraq and Afghanistan (P.L. 108–106) (‘‘the Act’’). It details: 1. ‘‘The amount of debt incurred by the Government of Saddam Hussein in Iraq, the impact forgiveness of such debt would have on reconstruction and long-term prosperity in Iraq, and the estimated amount that Iraq will pay, or that will be paid on behalf of Iraq, to a foreign country to service such debt dur- ing fiscal year 2004.’’ 2. ‘‘The efforts of the Government of the United States to increase resources contributed by foreign countries and international organizations, including the United Nations, to the reconstruction and rehabilitation of Iraq and to increase international participation in peacekeeping and security efforts in Iraq.’’ 3. ‘‘The manner in which the needs of people with disabilities are being ad- dressed in the development and implementation of programs, projects and ac- tivities funded by the United States Government in Iraq and Afghanistan.’’ 4. ‘‘The progress being made toward indicting and trying leaders of the former Iraqi regime for war crimes, genocide, and crimes against humanity.’’ 5. ‘‘The efforts of relevant Iraqi officials and legal advisors to ensure that a new Iraqi constitution preserves religious freedom and tolerance of all faiths.’’ REPORT I. IRAQ’S DEBT Although efforts to reconcile data numbers are ongoing, we estimate Iraq’s exter- nal official debt to be approximately $120 billion, virtually all of which was incurred during the period of Saddam Hussein’s regime. The IMF’s Macroeconomic Assess- ment, done in October 2003 for the Madrid Donor’s conference, noted that Iraq is one of the most heavily externally indebted countries in the world. The Macro- economic Assessment added that Iraq’s fiscal situation would remain under strain for years even assuming increased oil production and domestic tax revenues and that Iraq would need ‘‘generous restructuring’’ of its external debt to achieve sus- tainability. The IMF is in the process of completing its Debt Sustainability Analysis for Iraq. The United States has been working to encourage the international community to forgive or at least substantially reduce the large amount of debt that Iraq accu- mulated under Saddam Hussein. On December 5, the President named former Sec- retary James A. Baker III as his Special Presidential Envoy to work with the world’s governments at the highest levels in seeking to restructure Iraq’s official debt. In December and January, Baker traveled to Europe (France, Germany, Italy, Russia, and the UK), Asia (Japan and China), and the Gulf (Saudi Arabia, Kuwait, the UAE and Qatar), and successfully secured commitments from the leaders of these nations to provide at least substantial debt reduction for Iraq in 2004. The United States will continue to work toward the goal of debt reduction for Iraq in 2004. The exact percentage of reduction is subject to further agreement among par- ties. II. INTERNATIONAL SUPPORT FOR RECONSTRUCTION AND PARTICIPATION IN PEACEKEEPING AND SECURITY A. International Support for Reconstruction The United States has been successful in raising support from the international community for the reconstruction and rehabilitation of Iraq. The U.S. played a major role in organizing the highly successful Madrid Donors’ Conference in Octo- VerDate 11-MAY-2000 14:54 Jan 04, 2005 Jkt 000000 PO 00000 Frm 00059 Fmt 6633 Sfmt 6621 96371 SFORELA1 PsN: SFORELA1 56 ber. Representatives of 73 countries and 20 international organizations attended the meeting as well as members of the Iraqi Governing Council. The official tally of the Conference’s results showed final pledges of at least $32 billion, including our own pledge of $18.4 billion in grants from the FY 04 supplemental; the highest ever ob- tained at an international pledging Conference. Non-U.S. pledges, around $13 billion, will be a mixture of grants and loans to be disbursed during 2004-2007. Not included in the pledge numbers for other donors are offers of trade credits, in-kind assistance, and technical assistance (including training). The World Bank and the United Nations Development Program have just estab- lished trust funds within an International Reconstruction Fund Facility for Iraq (IRFFI). Senior Iraqi officials, along with a U.S. Government team, will meet with other major donors in Abu Dhabi at the end of February to discuss the functioning of the trust funds and other aid coordination issues. B. International Participation in Peacekeeping and Security The United States has broadened international military participation in Iraq. There are now 34 countries contributing approximately 24,000 troops to the sta- bilization of Iraq, including two multinational divisions led by the United Kingdom and Poland. In addition, the Iraqis themselves now contribute to their own stabiliza- tion. There are over 200,000 Iraqi police, military, and civil defense forces on duty. In total, 65% of security forces in Iraq are non-U.S. We continue to seek additional international participation in the security and sta- bilization of Iraq. We anticipate new contributions, including pledges by the Korean and Japanese governments to increase their current contingents that will add a total of 4,000 troops. Armenia, Tonga, and Bosnia-Herzegovina have also recently made formal offers of forces, and we are continuing discussions with seven other na- tions on their informal contribution offers. IRAQ III. ADDRESSING THE NEEDS OF PEOPLE WITH DISABILITIES Department officials met with organizations representing the rights of the dis- abled during the summer of 2003. Discussions addressed the opportunity presented by reconstruction to ensure that the needs of the disabled are met in the new Iraq, both legally and in terms of infrastructure and services. These organizations re- ported that they had approached the Polish government with a proposal to conduct a conference in Warsaw in late 2003 that would result in a set of recommendations for the CPA. The Department forwarded this information to CPA representatives in Baghdad. The Ministry of Human Rights in Iraq, established pursuant to CPA order and opened on February 14, 2004, is mandated to protect and promote human rights. Concerns regarding the rights of the disabled and steps necessary to safeguard them have been brought to the Minister’s attention. The USAID/Mission in Iraq has adopted a formal, written policy on the rights of the disabled and has begun to im- plement that policy. USAID is refurbishing the Kirkuk Rehabilitation Center, which principally serves Iraqi veterans and others who have lost limbs, and has worked to accommodate disabled travelers at the Baghdad and Basrah airports. AFGHANISTAN Through the Leahy War Victims Fund (LWVF), the United States supports the United Nations Development Programme’s Comprehensive Disabled Afghan’s Pro- gram (CDAP). The program is constructing five community rehabilitation centers using ADA accessibility guidelines that will serve 1,000-1,500 persons. It also pro- vides technical assistance to the Government of Afghanistan to meet the needs of people with disabilities. The LWVF also supports international NGOs, such as Handicap International, which provides wheelchairs and wheelchair training to dis- abled persons in Kandahar. USAID is completing 92 handicap-accessible schools and 220 handicap-accessible clinics, expected to be operational by June 2004. IV. WAR CRIMES Our policy is to see Saddam Hussein and others who committed war crimes and crimes against humanity prosecuted by Iraqis. We are working closely with the Iraqis to help them create a fair, transparent and effective process, which will stand up to international scrutiny and conform to international standards of human rights and humanitarian law. The new Iraqi Government will decide how former regime VerDate 11-MAY-2000 14:54 Jan 04, 2005 Jkt 000000 PO 00000 Frm 00060 Fmt 6633 Sfmt 6621 96371 SFORELA1 PsN: SFORELA1 57 officials currently in detention under USG or Coalition control will be tried, and how proceedings will be conducted. Mass grave sites have been discovered all over the country; to date, approximately 263 sites have been identified, of which approximately 40 have been confirmed. Hundreds of thousands of people are missing—current estimates are that between 300,000 and one million people remain unaccounted for from the period of Saddam’s regime. The Iraqi Governing Council, with input from CPA and others, drafted the Stat- ute creating an Iraqi Special Tribunal. Ambassador Bremer delegated to them the authority to promulgate the Statute; it was issued on December 10, 2003. We be- lieve the Statute provides enough flexibility to achieve a fair process. Highlights of the Statute include: • Jurisdiction over crimes of genocide, crimes against humanity, war crimes, and specified violations of Iraqi law, committed between July 17, 1968 and May 1, 2003. • Judges, prosecutors, investigative judges, and the Administrative Director shall be Iraqi nationals; however, the Iraqi Governing Council can appoint non-Iraqi judges. • Non-Iraqis must be appointed to serve as observers/advisors to each of the Chambers. • Penalties that may be imposed by the Tribunal shall be those prescribed by Iraqi law. • Rights of the accused include a presumption of innocence, entitlement to a pub- lic hearing, representation of counsel, confrontation of accusers, right against self-incrimination and right to remain silent. V. PRESERVING RELIGIOUS FREEDOM President Bush recently reiterated our commitment to religious freedom in Iraq, calling in a nationally televised interview for an Iraqi constitution that ‘‘recognizes minority rights and freedom of religion.’’ Promoting an atmosphere of religious toler- ance and insuring the individual right of thought, conscience, and religion in Iraq, are important elements in creating a stable environment in which democracy can flourish. It is essential that the documents that will form the foundation of the new Iraqi government enshrine the principle of religious freedom. The November 15 agree- ment between the Iraqi Governing Council and the Coalition Provisional Authority established, in accordance with UNSC Resolution 1511, a timeline and program for the restoration of Iraq’s governmental authority and the drafting of a permanent constitution. The agreement calls for a fundamental law (currently referred to as the Transitional Administrative Law (TAL)), which will govern Iraq until it has rati- fied a permanent constitution, to include a provision guaranteeing religious freedom. CPA officials have repeatedly conveyed to Iraqis involved with the TAL drafting process our expectation that the final document will contain guarantees of religious freedom in accordance with international standards and Iraq’s international treaty obligations. Mr. WOLFOWITZ. I would say there’s $12 billion of Iraqi funds that have been applied to running the government and doing the reconstruction, and another $8 billion committed for the rest of this year. Senator HAGEL [presiding]. Let me announce, for the benefit of the members here, there’s a vote on. Chairman Lugar has gone to vote. He will be back, and he will continue this hearing. Senator Dodd. Senator DODD. Thanks, Mr. Chairman. And maybe if someone would call over and see if they would hold it up a couple of minutes so we can get a line of questioning in here. Senator BIDEN. They’ve already said they would hold it a few more minutes. There’s 6 minutes left. Senator DODD. Well, thanks. And thanks to our witnesses for being here. And let me echo the comments, by the way, of Senator Sarbanes, about you, Senator Biden and Senator Lugar. These VerDate 11-MAY-2000 14:54 Jan 04, 2005 Jkt 000000 PO 00000 Frm 00061 Fmt 6633 Sfmt 6602 96371 SFORELA1 PsN: SFORELA1 58 have been tremendously helpful, these hearings, and it’s exactly what the Congress should be doing. In the absence of legislating, holding oversight hearings on critical issues, both domestic and for- eign, are absolutely essential, and these have been worthwhile hearings. And I want the chairman and the ranking member to know how much all of us appreciate it very, very much. Let me begin by just expressing to you what I think is obvious, but probably needs to be stated again, and that is, anybody who ever thought this was going to be easy was deluding themselves. This is a difficult task. And so you all know that as we raise ques- tions about these matters here, at least I think for all of us on this side of the dais, there is an appreciation of how complicated and difficult this mission is. Second, I think, without exception, all of us want you to succeed, want the administration to succeed, want this policy to succeed, that it’s critically important that the present situation we find our- selves in—and the exact description, I think, that Senator Voinovich gave is one that is not narrowly held; there are a lot of people across this country who are very, very worried about how this is progressing, what the end game is, whether or not we’re going to achieve even a part of our goals here, and the growing fear that we may even be, in some ways, in a worse situation if we’re not careful at the end of all of this. So I raise that point with you. And to express what Senator Voinovich said, and it’s my view, as well, one of the concerns I have is the lack of candor and trans- parency about what is going on. And let me, if I can, jump to this issue of the prison abuses, if I may for a minute. I’m very inter- ested in knowing whether or not the State Department was aware of the situation at the prison. We know now that General Myers had asked CBS to delay using those photographs for several weeks. Was the State Department aware of this, Mr. Armitage? Mr. ARMITAGE. If I may, we were aware that there were some al- leged abuses, back in the January/February timetable, and Sec- retary Powell, as he said publicly, made this a subject of discus- sions with his colleagues, the principals, as well as the President. Senator DODD. Were you briefed on it, though? Were you actually briefed on the Taguba Report? Mr. ARMITAGE. No, we were not briefed on it, to my knowledge; we heard from the press that there were photos, about a week or so before they appeared. Senator DODD. So were you aware that a request had been made to a major network to delay the release of those photographs? Mr. ARMITAGE. I was aware, because the press person who told me worked for that network. Senator DODD. The reason I raise it, we had Mr. Negroponte here, and all of us supported his nomination, and he appeared here on the 27th of April. The reports came out the following day. And I’m just curious as to why, in the interest of candor and trans- parency, that either in direct testimony or a response to questions, the designee to be the Ambassador to Iraq wouldn’t have laid out to this committee a critical issue that was about to explode onto the public scene within 24 hours. Mr. ARMITAGE. I don’t think he knew anything about it. I don’t think any of us in the Department of State had any idea what were VerDate 11-MAY-2000 14:54 Jan 04, 2005 Jkt 000000 PO 00000 Frm 00062 Fmt 6633 Sfmt 6602 96371 SFORELA1 PsN: SFORELA1 59 on the pictures. I’ve told you the sum of our knowledge of this, that there were some photographs. Senator DODD. But, beyond that—— Mr. ARMITAGE. I don’t think he had any inkling. Senator DODD. Because Senator Feingold asked John Negroponte very specific question about the human rights issues, and it would have been a perfect opportunity, if not in direct testimony, to say, by the way, we’ve got a problem here that you ought to be aware of, whether or not he could give you the details, but certainly to lay it out to the committee would have been helpful at that point. Mr. ARMITAGE. I say, again, I don’t think he knew anything about pictures, Senator Dodd. Senator DODD. But he knew about the prison abuse. Mr. ARMITAGE. I’ll have to find out. We, in the Department of State, knew about, and I don’t know how much he was read into it as he went through his confirmation preparations. Senator DODD. Well, wouldn’t he have been briefed? Mr. ARMITAGE. He wouldn’t have been briefed in New York, sir. I don’t know if he was briefed down here on it. Mr. WOLFOWITZ. Senator, I think the whole world knew that there was prison abuse. Central Command announced the inves- tigation, I think, January 16, and, I believe, in March—I don’t know the exact date—they announced that criminal proceedings were being brought against some U.S. military personnel. The shocking part of it is when you see the pictures and you under- stand what is being talked about. Senator DODD. I understand that, Mr. Secretary. I’m not trying to get down to the details. I’m just—about the candor and trans- parency. Now, I know when particularly a sensitive issue, like the Ambassadorship to Iraq is coming up, there’s a Q&A period, and you go back and forth, and it goes to the point that Senator Voinovich is raising. This is where we begin to get ourselves in trouble. Sometimes it’s not the act, it’s the perjury that occurs. I’m not suggesting perjury was the case here, but it’s usually being candid about what is going on, and how all matters are revealed, how they become—the public becomes aware of things. So what I’m trying to get at is whether or not John Negroponte was aware of the abuses, whether or not he had seen the photographs or not, whether or not, during the question-and-answer period of training and preparation for him to come up here, these issues were raised in any way. Mr. ARMITAGE. I’ll ask him. Senator DODD. But you’re not aware of it. Mr. ARMITAGE. No, I’m not, sir. Senator DODD. Let me, if I can, pick up very quickly on a ques- tion that Senator Sarbanes raised and the chairman wisely asked you to possibly amend answers, particularly with regard to contrac- tors dealing with detainees or prisoners. How would you feel about just a direct prohibition of having contract employees involved in the interrogation of detainees and prisoners in Iraq? One of the problems, it seems to me here, is the lack of authority and direct control of some of these people. I guess there are 20,000 of them in the country. Do you have a quick response as to how you would VerDate 11-MAY-2000 14:54 Jan 04, 2005 Jkt 000000 PO 00000 Frm 00063 Fmt 6633 Sfmt 6602 96371 SFORELA1 PsN: SFORELA1 60 feel about such a prohibition against contractors being directly in- volved in the interrogation of detainees? Mr. WOLFOWITZ. Senator Dodd, there are so many people trying to look into this and fix the problem, I wouldn’t want to speculate. I do think it is absolutely essential—a lesson from this is not to have people involved in interrogation who aren’t thoroughly trained and disciplined and know the rules and follow the rules. And if you could have a contractor that meets those qualifications, it might be better than having a less-well-trained uniformed person. But I think it absolutely brings home the importance of having dis- ciplined, trained people doing the work. Senator DODD. Mr. Armitage. Mr. ARMITAGE. I don’t know what the military manpower situa- tion is, but to have this done without training and without over- sight and supervision is not acceptable. Senator DODD. Let me ask you about—there was apparently, in January of 2002, a memo from the legal counsel at the White House—Mr. Alberto Gonzalez, wrote a memo to the Department of State—wrote to the President and the Department of State, I guess—in which he says, ‘‘In my judgment, this new paradigm of terrorism renders obsolete Geneva’s strict limitation on questioning of enemy prisoners, and renders quaint some of its provisions of the Geneva Accords.’’ Were you aware of that memo? Mr. ARMITAGE. Yes, I was aware of it as I came here today, be- cause I saw our General Counsel look at it. I don’t remember see- ing it at the time, and I’ve heard, and I will have to check, and I think you will want to check, that that quote was disavowed, that it was in an earlier draft of a memo that was being prepared and was not in the final draft, particularly the comment about ‘‘obso- lete.’’ But you’ve now, or I’ve, adjusted my knowledge of this. Senator DODD. Do you want to comment on what’s your own re- action? I gather that the Secretary, the quote was, ‘‘hit the roof’’ on all of this. Now, this goes back to January 2002, more than 2 years ago. But it raises concerns on the part of many of us here that, in fact, prior to, actually, the commencement of hostilities in Iraq, that there was this preparation, a notion that we were going to sort of walk away from the rule of law. And I wonder if you might take an opportunity here, both of you, to comment on your general observations as to whether or not—whether he used the word ‘‘obsolete’’ or ‘‘quaint’’ here, and I’m not going to—if they say that’s an early draft—what is your view regarding the Geneva Con- vention, Geneva Accords, and whether or not the United States ought to be adhering to its principles and its letter? Mr. ARMITAGE. Whether you’re talking Geneva 2 or Geneva 3, it seems to me that what separates us and allows us to listen to a higher standard is, where principle is involved, or we’re deaf to ex- pediency. And so my view is, we ought to always do the principled thing, and we ought to embrace these. They are protections for us, as well as for others. Senator DODD. Mr. Secretary. Mr. WOLFOWITZ. I agree with that, Senator. In fact, I think the U.S. military would view us as having a greater practical interest in the Geneva Convention than any other country because we count on them to try to protect our prisoners when they’re de- VerDate 11-MAY-2000 14:54 Jan 04, 2005 Jkt 000000 PO 00000 Frm 00064 Fmt 6633 Sfmt 6602 96371 SFORELA1 PsN: SFORELA1 61 tained. I would emphasize that if we’re talking about January 2002, we’re in the context of post-September 11, and the issue of how you try to obtain information that could prevent a repetition of the September 11 attacks on the United States was not at all in anticipation of a war in Iraq. Senator DODD. I appreciate that. But you can certainly appre- ciate the fact that this is unsettling. This wasn’t a memo from some freshman law student who may have an ideological point of view; this is the counsel to the President of the United States in the White House. Were you aware of this memo? Mr. WOLFOWITZ. No, I wasn’t. Senator DODD. Did the Department of Defense receive a similar memo? Mr. WOLFOWITZ. I can’t tell you. I can find out. Senator DODD. I would appreciate it if you would. [At the time of publication no response had been received.] Senator DODD. General, do you have any quick comments on this? General SHARP. Sir, we are 100 percent behind the Geneva Con- vention and the importance of it. Senator DODD. Thank you. Mr. Chairman, thank you. The CHAIRMAN [presiding]. Thank you very much, Senator Dodd. On this issue, as well as in the earlier one, if you would clarify for the record any further research you have on the counsel’s memo, it is an important point, and we would appreciate your un- derlining that. Senator Coleman. Senator COLEMAN. Thank you. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. And, gentlemen, thank you for being with us today. These are challenging times, and we appreciate your efforts. There has been a lot of discussion about the course we’re on, changing courses. General Sharp, I think you described the ap- proach that I would like to see. It’s not about changing course; we need to stay on course with the transition on June 30, we need to stay on course with elections at the end of the year and the start of the next year. But we have to continue—I think these are your words—continually reassess, based on the circumstances on the ground. Let me first just raise the issue of security. Obviously, the tragic killing of President Salim yesterday, can you talk to me a little bit about security, then, for folks on the Governing Council, American officials? Does that incident cause us to reassess circumstances on the ground and to change our course of conduct? Mr. WOLFOWITZ. Senator, Iraq is a dangerous place. I mean, I visited in late October, and was staying in the Al Rashid Hotel, and we were rocketed. One American was killed, and four Ameri- cans and one Brit were seriously wounded. It’s going to keep hap- pening. I think this enemy we’re up against believes that if Iraq gets its own government, its own security forces, they’re finished, and so they’re going to be doing everything they can in the coming months—not just until July 1, but at least up until elections—to try to destabilize the country sufficiently to prevent that progress from happening. VerDate 11-MAY-2000 14:54 Jan 04, 2005 Jkt 000000 PO 00000 Frm 00065 Fmt 6633 Sfmt 6602 96371 SFORELA1 PsN: SFORELA1 62 There’s enormous heroism on the Iraqi side. These Governing Council members knew that they were targeted. One of their num- ber, Akila al-Hashimi, was brutally murdered last fall, or late last summer, so they’re real heroes. And, as I mentioned in my state- ment, some 350, by our count Iraqi security forces, police, civil de- fense corps have been killed fighting for a new Iraq, and my guess is the numbers are actually a lot higher. We keep very careful count, obviously, of our own numbers. I don’t think we have the ability to do the same on the Iraqi side. Senator COLEMAN. One of the—— Mr. ARMITAGE. If I may, there’s—something new will be intro- duced on 1 July, and that is that these Iraqi forces, who have fought, in many cases, valiantly, will no longer be fighting for the occupiers, they’re going to be fighting for Iraq. And I think many who are expert in the Middle East, and in Iraq particularly, have noted that this is a new situation, and it’s not as if the Iraqis don’t know how to fight, but they will have a little something different to fight for. Second, on security, this is not generally what a State Depart- ment official would be talking about, but as we prepare for 140 State officers out there, we’ve got about 130 armored vehicles ei- ther there or on the way, we’ve got body armor ordered that will be there before 1 July, not normally things that State officers are having to do. But because the security situation is as it is, we have to take these precautions. Senator COLEMAN. One of the enemies obviously still active is al- Zarqawi. Help me understand. Do we know where his dollars are coming from? Do we know where his support is coming from? Do we—kind of a multiple question here—have a sense of how he is perceived by Iraqis? Mr. WOLFOWITZ. I think all we can say is there’s money available both inside Iraq and some coming from outside. It goes to al- Zarqawi, among others. It comes from some of the same sources that fund al-Qaeda. Al-Zarqawi himself is called, I think, an al- Qaeda affiliate. I’m really not quite sure why we make these dis- tinctions. He ran a terrorist training camp in Afghanistan, under bin Laden’s direction, and then after the Operation Enduring Free- dom, he fled Afghanistan, went to Iraq, has a number of ties to Iraqi intelligence, which seem to have grown thicker, although I emphasize—I should emphasize we know a lot less about these peo- ple than we would like to. They operate in great secrecy. It was a huge breakthrough when we captured Mr. Hassan Ghul, who was one of al-Zarqawi’s senior lieutenants who was carrying a message from al-Zarqawi to one of his associates in Afghanistan. That’s this remarkable letter that I think you’ve heard about and that I quoted in my testimony. We’re pretty certain that al-Zarqawi has been working with former Iraqi intelligence officers and others in this fight in Fallujah, that he was probably there at least some of the time. And, unfortunately, the fact is that it doesn’t take large numbers of people, especially if some of them are willing to commit suicide, to do enormous damage. Senator COLEMAN. Yes, about a month ago, we read the papers that Iraq was in the middle of an uprising, a civil uprising, al-Sadr VerDate 11-MAY-2000 14:54 Jan 04, 2005 Jkt 000000 PO 00000 Frm 00066 Fmt 6633 Sfmt 6602 96371 SFORELA1 PsN: SFORELA1 63 on one side, Sunnis on the other. I don’t see much of that. I mean, my sense is that we’re killing al-Sadr’s folks, and he is not replen- ishing. Give me a sense of the situation in Iraq, vis-a `-vis, civil uprisings. Give me a sense of that. Mr. WOLFOWITZ. Let me make three points. No. 1, in al-Zarqawi’s infamous letter, where he expresses a sense of desperation that if they can’t destabilize the country before it gets its own govern- ment, they will suffer what he calls ‘‘suffocation,’’ he identifies his principal target as being attacks on the Shia in an effort to create a Shia/Sunni civil war. And that would explain a number of the at- tacks we’ve seen, including the horrendous bombings in southern Iraq on the Ashura holiday, and they’ve been totally unsuccessful in creating a Sunni/Shia civil war. No. 2, with respect to al-Sadr, we think it’s a very different situa- tion, that, in fact, as the Shia majority have come to understand, that there will be resolute action taken against him and his forces. Not only are we reducing his forces in number, but, equally impor- tantly, we’re getting more and more of the population coming out and speaking against him. On the worrisome side, I guess I would have to put on the table that up north, particularly in Kirkuk, which is a mixed Kurdish Arab city, we have had remarkable good luck over the last year in preventing what we’ve always feared could be a source of real eth- nic violence. It’s a little troubled right now, and it’s one of the situ- ations we’re looking at closely. You know, we always get—we come up here, we try to emphasize some of the positive things that are happening. We’re not trying to suggest, by any means, that this is a rosy scenario, but we do think that Iraq is moving forward to- ward self-government and self-defense, and that’s the key to win- ning. Senator COLEMAN. Do I have time for one more question, Mr. Chairman? The CHAIRMAN. Yes, you do. Senator COLEMAN. There was a statement by Ayatollah al- Sistani recently saying it would be permissible—and this is his the statement—‘‘permissible to demand the withdrawal of all military vestiges from the two cities and allow the tribal forces to perform their role in preserving security and order.’’ What do you make of that statement? Mr. ARMITAGE. We see a lot of statements attributed to Ayatollah al-Sistani, and if he made that one, I’m not sure—but we’ve looked at it as a not-very-veiled reference that Muqtada al-Sadr ought to get out of Najaf and Karbala, himself, and particularly stop using holy places to store weapons and to foment violence. Senator COLEMAN. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. The CHAIRMAN. Thank you very much, Senator Coleman. Senator Biden. Senator BIDEN. Thank you very much. The reason he’s going to me, I didn’t ask any questions yet. I apologize. General, let me ask you, if I may, to begin with, and this is a serious question, and I’ll put it in context, because if I just ask it, it will sound strange. I remember when General Joulwan, in the Clinton administration, was put in charge of our effort in the Bal- kans. And I remember being in a meeting and he was asked, and VerDate 11-MAY-2000 14:54 Jan 04, 2005 Jkt 000000 PO 00000 Frm 00067 Fmt 6633 Sfmt 6602 96371 SFORELA1 PsN: SFORELA1 64 I’m paraphrasing, do you have enough troops? And his response was, ‘‘That depends on my mission, Mr. President. So what is my mission?’’ President Clinton said, in effect, what do you think the mission should be? The general said, well, the mission is obviously force protection, No. 1. We have a mission to protect our own forces there. And, No. 2, do you want me, Mr. President, to go and cap- ture the war criminals who have been indicted? Do you want me to guarantee the security of several-hundred-thousand people who have come down from the hills? Do you want me to disarm the pop- ulace? Do you want me to—and he went down the list. And he said, for all of those, I’ll need x. And the President says, no, not all of those. So it’s x-minus. So what is the mission? Is the mission of our force in Iraq, does it include civilian policing of Iraqi neighborhoods? Does it include fighting street crime, preventing kidnaping, catching thieves, as well as fighting insurgents? I mean, what is our mission? What’s the mission statement you all have? General SHARP. Sir, the mission is to provide a secure and stable environment for Iraq. That encompasses several things right now. Clearly, killing terrorists and capturing terrorists. Second is work- ing with Iraqi security forces to provide a safe environment for the people of Iraq in and among the cities. So, as you know, right now we patrol with Iraqi security forces, we train Iraqi security forces, and we are moving, in some cities, to be able to hand off a lot of that to the Iraqi security forces. So if you have to define—— Senator BIDEN. Do you have enough forces for the mission? General SHARP. General Abizaid, General Sanchez, all the com- manders on the ground—and I was there as recently as 3 weeks ago—General Myers asked this very question to all the division commanders there, and their consistent answer was, across the board, ‘‘yes,’’ they have enough forces in order to be able to accom- plish that mission, and are working hard to be able to get the secu- rity responsibilities handed off to the Iraqi security forces, and that’s why you see—— Senator BIDEN. Well, who are you going to hand them off—ex- cuse me for interrupting you—who are you going to hand them over to, general? There’s no seriously trained Iraqi force now. I mean, this malarkey you guys came up with, that you’ve got 200,000 trained Iraqis, I mean, every single solitary expert, includ- ing your guys that we met with in Iraq, said, it’s going to take 3 years to train 40,000 Iraqi military, 3 to 5 years to get up to the 79,000 Iraqi police needed. And you point out you’re doing a good job now, you’re going out and trying to identify leaders to lead. You know, you haven’t had those folks. So you really don’t have except in some places—it’s spotty—some places, you have folks whom you can rely on. And that’s why, it’s been pointed out to me by our mili- tary, the insurgents are smart enough to go blow up the police sta- tions and blow up the policemen and blow up people who are in line signing up to become police officers and/or join the military. I mean, you know, these guys aren’t stupid. That’s their target. And I’m not suggesting there are not plenty of Iraqis who want to do this. But, right now, the military I speak with—you know that old thing, I know I’m going to be asked names, and, off the record, I’m happy to give you the names. There’s a number of Iraqi Americans VerDate 11-MAY-2000 14:54 Jan 04, 2005 Jkt 000000 PO 00000 Frm 00068 Fmt 6633 Sfmt 6602 96371 SFORELA1 PsN: SFORELA1 65 with families in Iraq who keep in touch with us. You know, I mean, all you’ve got to do is go to Detroit. And they say you still don’t let your daughter out of the house, you’re still not able to send her down to the corner store to get milk. You know, there is rampant crime. And all the evidence is, none of the Iraqis think that they have security. And it’s not just insurgents. I mean, they’re—every- body, like in Israel, is worried a bus is going to blow up. So I want to know for example, is disarming the militias part of the mission? General SHARP. Sir, let me—— Senator BIDEN. All militias? General SHARP [continuing]. Talk to a couple of things. First off, to be clear, we are not going to hand off security on 1 July, writ large, across the country to the Iraqi security forces. As you point out, those security forces will not be nearly trained by 1 July. In fact, by 1 July, we’ll have approximately 10 percent of the total re- quired Iraqi police academy-trained, and another 20 percent trained by the shorter 3-week program that our military does throughout the country. We will continue the—and are continuing to accelerate the training both in Jordan and in Baghdad and in Irbil and than at the different academies across the country. There’s been a recent change where we have really started focusing on training mid-level leadership, specialized training, so that Iraqis who want to take security responsibilities have the capability to be able to do that. There is a CPA regulation out that says that you are not allowed to carry weapons without a card—you know, a weapons card. That has to be issued by the CPA or the correct authority. And as sol- diers come and see people doing it, they are being arrested at doing it. Senator BIDEN. I believe you. If I could interrupt, in the interest of time, general. And by the way, I think you know, you’re on the right track. I’m not being critical of what you’re trying to do. What I’m trying to get at is, seeing someone with a weapon, and arrest- ing them, is very different than aggressively—— General SHARP. Yes, sir. Senator BIDEN [continuing]. Going and disarming the population. What about the militias? I don’t mean just al-Sadr’s militia. What about the other militias that exist within the country? Is it part of the mission—I’m not saying it should or shouldn’t; I want to know, though, is it part of the mission? Does a commander in the various regions in Iraq have, as a mission, to disarm the militias? Is that part of it? General SHARP. Sir, the militias, if they are active—let me start with—we actively go out to try to find weapons caches, and work on every tip that we get from the Iraqis to be able to get at—not just if we see weapons on the street, but the number of cordons and searches, the number of raids that we do, consistently brings in a lot of different weapons across the board. We are actively trying to get at all of those different weapons out there. Senator BIDEN. Do you have enough forces for that, general? I mean, we had 850,000 tons of open ammunition dumps that we didn’t have enough soldiers to guard. So we obviously didn’t have enough for the mission. I think that’s right, 850,000 tons, it may VerDate 11-MAY-2000 14:54 Jan 04, 2005 Jkt 000000 PO 00000 Frm 00069 Fmt 6633 Sfmt 6602 96371 SFORELA1 PsN: SFORELA1 66 have been 900,000. We had helicopters, guys with night-vision gog- gles watching people go in and out, but we didn’t have enough forces. Do we have enough forces now to be certain that—if there’s any ammunition dumps that are still there, that we can either con- trol them or destroy them? General SHARP. Sir, every time we find an ammunition dump out there, we assess, No. 1, how quickly can somebody take things out of that ammunition dump? If it looks like it’s the type of ammuni- tion and weapons that could go against Coalition forces, we imme- diately secure them. Is that to say that they are all completely se- cured across the country? No, there are some that have been cov- ered up so that they could not be stolen. But we find ammunition caches every day, and they’re using our forces to be able to try to destroy those and guard those. Senator BIDEN. Well, there are at least five major militias—the Da’wa Party, the Badr Brigade, the two Kurdish parties’ militias al-Sadr’s so-called army. Is it our policy, I’m not saying that we should or shouldn’t, and part of the mission of Abizaid in Iraq to disarm the militias? That’s my specific question for anyone to an- swer, including you, general. Is that part of the mission statement? General SHARP. Sir, the mission is to not allow any of the militia forces to be able to go against the rule of law in Iraq. Senator BIDEN. With all due respect, general, that’s not an an- swer. The question is, do we specifically include in the mission statement the disarmament of the Da’wa Party’s militia, roughly about 10,000 people, the Badr Brigade, roughly 10,000 militia—by your numbers; is that part of the mission? I’m not suggesting it has to be. Is that a mission? Is that part of the mission? Mr. WOLFOWITZ. Senator, I think the correct interpretation of the mission statement that General Sharp just gave you is, that is not part of the mission unless it is necessary to bring them under con- trol. And in the case of al-Sadr, it’s proving to be necessary. In the case of the Kurdish militias, for example, it would give us—frankly, it would be a source of instability if we were to try to go out and forcibly disarm them. And, in fact, they have been a source of sta- bility in many parts of the country—not one you want to rely on long-term, but the approach to those militias is to try, over time, to integrate them into new Iraqi security forces. And the real an- swer to disarming militias is to create an alternative security insti- tution, and then the militias can go away. Senator BIDEN. Just a real quick adjunct to that. Are we using the Badr Brigade or the Da’wa militia, allowing them to independ- ently engage al-Sadr in Najaf? Now, it’s one thing to integrate the militias into a U.S. command structure so that there is some co- operation. And it’s another thing—and I’m not saying one’s right or wrong; it’s just a different thing—to essentially give a green light to one of the militias to take on another militia in Iraq. With re- gard to Najaf and al-Sadr, are any existing Iraqi militia engaged, given the green light, to take on al-Sadr? Mr. WOLFOWITZ. You say engaged or given a green light. En- gaged, they may do on their own. Green light means, I think, under our direction, our command, and—— Senator BIDEN. No, not command. Just say, go to it, guys, any way you want. Not our command. VerDate 11-MAY-2000 14:54 Jan 04, 2005 Jkt 000000 PO 00000 Frm 00070 Fmt 6633 Sfmt 6602 96371 SFORELA1 PsN: SFORELA1 67 Mr. WOLFOWITZ. Senator, that is precisely what we’re trying to avoid, is—— Senator BIDEN. That’s why I’m asking the question. Mr. WOLFOWITZ [continuing]. We are trying to avoid it. I can’t say that some—I mean, we’re making a lot of—as Secretary Armitage has called them, audibles, and tactical commanders have to decide what is the best way to bring law and order, and I wouldn’t want to rule out if, at some point, in order to deal with what you understand is one of our fundamental dilemmas in Najaf, which is—— Senator BIDEN. I’m truly agnostic in this. I’m just trying to get at—— Mr. WOLFOWITZ. I understand. Senator BIDEN [continuing]. What the deal is. Mr. WOLFOWITZ. And I’m trying to say, we’re agnostic. The prin- ciple is to establish law and order in a disciplined way, and to do it without putting Coalition forces into the areas of the holy shrines in Najaf and Karbala. And that’s why we’re proceeding very care- fully. We want Iraqis to do it as much as possible. We want regular Iraqi security forces to do it as much as possible. If some com- mander came and said, there’s a militia force here that I would like to use, I’m sure it would be scrutinized pretty carefully, but I wouldn’t rule it out as a possibility. Senator BIDEN. Mr. Secretary, you look like you’ve got your uni- form back on. Mr. ARMITAGE. No, I don’t dare, but just—there have been some reports of the Badr Corps, as far as I know, independently have conducted some, what I’d call, low-level operations against the Medhi army. Senator BIDEN. Thank you. I thank you, Mr. Chairman. The CHAIRMAN. Thank you, Senator Biden. Senator Nelson. Senator NELSON. Senator Biden, I’m not nearly as agnostic. I think we’re going to have to have more troops. Senator BIDEN. Well, I’m not talking about the troops. I meant on the issue of whether or not we are engaging, using, and/or deal- ing with the militias of consequence in Iraq. That’s what I meant. I wasn’t making a statement. For purposes of the question, I’m ag- nostic on that issue. I’m not agnostic on the fact—as you may re- call, I am literally the very first person here to call for significant increase in the number of American troops a year and 2 months ago. Senator NELSON. Well, as you have been a mentor to so many of us, I agree with you on that issue. And that is a predicate to ask this question. Given the fact that we have seen, for example, when were ready to take on Fallujah, parts of the Iraq Civil De- fense force melted away—I know we are going through the train- ing; I’ve been to one of the training camps for the police in Jor- dan—but when it came time for the ICDC to perform, they sud- denly vanished. That’s one of the reasons that I think we’re going to have to have more troops, not less troops. And I was somewhat concerned when I saw, in the London Times of yesterday, that the shift of focus seems to be from talking about forces staying in Iraq VerDate 11-MAY-2000 14:54 Jan 04, 2005 Jkt 000000 PO 00000 Frm 00071 Fmt 6633 Sfmt 6602 96371 SFORELA1 PsN: SFORELA1 68 as long as it takes to now that there’s much of a focus on our forces leaving. And, specifically, the London Times is talking about that Blair and Bush are drawing up plans to speed the pullout. Mr. Secretary Wolfowitz, do you want to comment about that? Mr. WOLFOWITZ. I wouldn’t believe everything I read in the Lon- don Times, or certainly not that one. We are looking at sustaining pretty high levels of U.S. forces, and certainly higher than we an- ticipated earlier, for some time. And I would add, we knew there were problems with the ICDC in Fallujah, the locally recruited one. The 36th Battalion of the ICDC, by the way, which was not a local battalion, did come to Fallujah, did do some pretty serious fighting. If you go up to Mosul, where General Petraeus’ 101st Airborne Di- vision trained ICDC, I think, more effectively than anywhere else in the country, they stood their ground and fought successfully and defended the government house in Mosul. So it’s a mixed picture. What we believe is very important is that we think we know how to improve the picture in places like Mosul, from good to excellent, and in places like Fallujah, from terrible to, hopefully, at least moderate. Senator NELSON. How did they perform in Ramadi? Mr. WOLFOWITZ. Probably not very well. Senator NELSON. They melted away. Mr. WOLFOWITZ. And, in some cases, they helped the enemy. That’s one of our problems. Senator NELSON. Mr. Secretary Armitage, you know my—— Mr. WOLFOWITZ. Senator Nelson, if I might say, I mean, so every- one understands, Fallujah and Ramadi have been, since the begin- ning, the most difficult parts of the country with the most seriously embedded elements of the old regime there fighting us. Senator NELSON. Mr. Secretary, you know my personal affection and respect for you. I want to pick up on a question that Senator Dodd was asking, and follow that. The media has reported that Secretary Powell expressed concern about the prison abuses to Sec- retary Rumsfeld. Would you pick up on that and tell us what you know? Mr. ARMITAGE. I don’t think my job is to exactly say what Sec- retary Powell said to any of his Cabinet colleagues. However, since he himself has said that when he was informed of these by Mr. Kellenberger, of the ICRC, and laterally he actually received a re- port through CPA in February, he raised these with all the prin- cipals, not just Secretary Rumsfeld, as well as with the President. Senator NELSON. And that was when? Mr. ARMITAGE. February. Senator NELSON. Let me ask you, regarding Iran, Iran has been making some noise regarding the U.S. presence specifically fighting the Shi’ites. What have we communicated to and with Iran on this subject? Mr. ARMITAGE. I think yesterday or the day before, they made some very strong noises about this, opposed to any violence to any Shia. This was the loudest noise that they’ve made recently. We have communicated to them, in no uncertain terms, that the solu- tion to the question of Muqtada al-Sadr is one that doesn’t need their active involvement in any way. We’ve also said that we are watching their activities in the south, particularly provision of VerDate 11-MAY-2000 14:54 Jan 04, 2005 Jkt 000000 PO 00000 Frm 00072 Fmt 6633 Sfmt 6602 96371 SFORELA1 PsN: SFORELA1 69 money to certain clerics who try to win favor, and we view it with disfavor, and they would be judged by their actions in the south. Senator NELSON. Would you feel comfortable, in this setting or closed setting, of sharing with us some of the specific communica- tions and how it’s been received by Iran? Mr. ARMITAGE. We normally, except for the time—the recent event where the Iranians came to Baghdad and had a very busi- nesslike discussion with the British and our representative about the question of Muqtada al-Sadr. We normally communicate through the Swiss, and I’d be glad to come up and show you the tone and tenor. Senator NELSON. And would you also, at that time—and I would welcome that—also talk to us about to what degree are we getting through to Iran that they should be stopping their nuclear pro- gram? Mr. ARMITAGE. I’ll be glad to discuss that now. We, along with our European friends, have—we have been skeptical from the be- ginning about their willingness to stop the nuclear program. Our European friends have been somewhat less skeptical. But, in recent months, given the difficulty that the IAEA has had in getting Iran to do what they said they’d do, ratify the additional protocol and throw open to inspection those things which need to be thrown open for inspection, and say there’s a gathering feeling in Europe, that they’re hiding, and they’re holding something out. Senator NELSON. You are going to be getting a letter that Sen- ator Ensign and I are now circulating for signatures on this sub- ject. It’s addressed to the President, but I’m sure that you all will weigh in on it. And this is something that I would like to followup in detail, perhaps in a closed session. The concern of the interests of the United States being threatened by a nuclear Iran, of course, is enormous. Could you tell us something about, Mr. Secretary, the corruption in the ministries in Iraq? Mr. ARMITAGE. There is a lot of speculation in the very free Iraqi press about this. Anyone who’s seen participating in the Governing Council is, at one time or another, as far as I can see, accused of these matters. There are some investigations which are ongoing, which I would prefer not to mention here and would refer you to IGs and others. But I think there’s a lot of speculation that makes it seem that it’s a lot higher than it is. Having said that, there’s no question, some people have used their positions to enrich them- selves or people around them have used their position to enrich themselves without, necessarily, reference to the principal. Senator NELSON. Either you or Secretary Wolfowitz, would you care to comment about the cutting off of the payments to Mr. Chalabi? Mr. WOLFOWITZ. That was a decision that was made in light of the process of transferring sovereignty to the Iraqi people. We felt it was no longer appropriate for us to continue funding in that fashion. There has been some very valuable intelligence that’s been gathered through that process that’s been very important for our forces, but we will seek to obtain that in the future through normal intelligence channels. Senator NELSON. Mr. Chairman, thank you. VerDate 11-MAY-2000 14:54 Jan 04, 2005 Jkt 000000 PO 00000 Frm 00073 Fmt 6633 Sfmt 6602 96371 SFORELA1 PsN: SFORELA1 70 The CHAIRMAN. Thank you very much, Senator Nelson. Senator Corzine. Senator CORZINE. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. I appreciate the hearings you’re having. I think the topics on the table are abso- lutely essential for us to explore. I have to say, I’m a little out of sync with some of my colleagues. I think there is a basic question that I think needs answering, and it is, are we ready for anything that looks like a credible transfer of sovereignty on June 30? I just don’t understand how we can be so bent on it, when we don’t know—we’re told that sovereignty would include the ability of the Iraqis to formulate foreign policy and diplomatic relationships, and then I wonder how they’re going to deal with the Iranians post-June 30. I don’t understand what it means to transfer sovereignty when the command and control of prisons is not yet identified, if I heard a response to Senator Hagel’s questions earlier-on and questions about contracting and projects, which, at least under Secretary Armitage’s comments, said would be under the control of Chief of Mission that would as- sume the ultimate authority for all the projects and contracts as of July 1. Mr. ARMITAGE. For U.S.-appropriated money, sir. Senator CORZINE. Right. Well, are the Iraqis going to be able to make that distinction and understanding with regard to how that operates, either with regard to contractors or major projects that are going on? I think a failed transfer runs grave risks for the long- run potential of success of providing a stable and democratic Iraq over a period of time. And it may be good politics to make sure that we no longer have occupying power after our name, but if it is a puppet regime or if it is ineffectual, it may end up setting a frame- work for failure in the long term. So I’m really troubled by it, and I make that more of as a statement than—I do have serious ques- tions about how they formulate foreign policy and diplomatic rep- resentation in conjunction with how you’re going to deal with the Iranians if they get in. Mr. ARMITAGE. Thank you, Senator Corzine. I followed very closely your very excellent questions to my colleague, Marc Gross- man, and these are clearly a follow-on to that, so you’ve had these concerns for some time. You’re dead right, as far as I can see, an ineffectual or faulty transition would be a disaster for us. A puppet would even be worse. The TAL annex, which is to be written bu Iraqis, is going to contain the duties and the responsibilities of this caretaker gov- ernment until January 2005. It is not an elected government, which has been remarked upon by all concerned, including Aya- tollah al-Sistani. And as it’s not a truly representative government, it has to be somewhat careful and circumspect in what it actually does. Ambassador Brahimi envisions that this government will run the operations day to day. What does this mean in foreign policy? They’ll send out diplomatic communications. They could, in theory, establish relations with Iran over time. I’m sure they will. All the other neighbors have relationships with Iran. They make their own autonomous judgments, they run their budgets, they take their money from the oil, and they distribute it to meet their budget VerDate 11-MAY-2000 14:54 Jan 04, 2005 Jkt 000000 PO 00000 Frm 00074 Fmt 6633 Sfmt 6602 96371 SFORELA1 PsN: SFORELA1 71 needs. So in everything, I think, except the ability to make long- range, lasting agreements, which tie the hands of a legally elected or a democratically elected government, they will have full sov- ereignty. Now, that’s not Rich Armitage’s view. This is Secretary Brahimi’s view. This, I believe, is the view of the leading Iraqis who want to be sovereign, but don’t want to have binding agreements in the long-run signed by somebody who’s going to be there for 7 months. Senator CORZINE. Well, it may not be treaties and long-run poli- cies, but it is the opening for dialog that might be contradictory to establishing security and stability on the ground in southern Iraq, as we were just commenting on in another dialog. I just think my point really gets at that this transfer of sovereignty doesn’t feel, to this Senator, as fleshed out in detail in a way that the American people, or at least I could convey to the people that I represent, that it has been challenged. And I don’t know whether there are any contingency plans if it doesn’t work. You know, is there serious thinking about what happens if a lot of these questions, which are reasonable for indefinite answers at this point, although we are only 44 days from this so-called transfer. Are we dealing with con- tingencies if this comes unwound? Mr. ARMITAGE. I would—at the risk of being seen in your eyes as a wise guy, I’d say I prefer to look at this somewhat like people look at the music of Wagner; it’s better than it sounds. It may be better than it sounds, particularly if the people of Iraq buy it. That’s what’s important, by the way. Senator CORZINE. I couldn’t agree more. Mr. ARMITAGE. And if the leading lights in Iraq, and intellectuals and the academics, if they see it as a way forward, which dramati- cally makes the points that we’re not occupiers, we’re liberators, and as soon as they stand on their feet, we’ll remove ourselves as soon as they can provide for their own security. Regarding plan B, I guess is what we often hear, there have been a lot of speculations about what a team B might be, an expanded Iraqi Governing Council, the existing members can bring in some more to be a caretaker government. Each of these, in the words of our former Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff, Hugh Shelton, ‘‘have a lot of hair on ’em.’’ This has got the least hair on ’em. And I think we really need to try to see this thing through, particularly as we’ve got such a distinguished and able diplomat as Lakhdar Brahimi, backed up by the United Nations. Senator CORZINE. May I switch gears? I think I have time for an- other question. Yesterday, there was an article in the L.A. Times about a re- markable deal in Fallujah. A Fallujah Brigade now controls the city. I had a comment that, you know, I’d love to hear whether you all agree with, or don’t. I know you can’t believe everything in the papers. But Fallujah is, for all intents and purposes, a rebel town, complete with banners, proclaiming a great victory, and insurgents integrated into the new Fallujah Brigade. And, as we know, we haven’t accomplished bringing to justice those responsible for the killing of the contractors. Is this a model? As I read in the testi- mony, ‘‘Indeed, dialog in cooperation with Iraqi leaders about situa- tions in Fallujah and Najaf, it’s been essential in moving toward VerDate 11-MAY-2000 14:54 Jan 04, 2005 Jkt 000000 PO 00000 Frm 00075 Fmt 6633 Sfmt 6602 96371 SFORELA1 PsN: SFORELA1 72 resolution in both places.’’ Is this a model that we think is work- ing? Is this something that we can look forward to, to be imple- mented in how we integrate militia into future security arrange- ments in the Iraqi forces? Mr. WOLFOWITZ. Senator Corzine, I think it’s too soon to tell, and the marines on the ground would tell you it’s too soon to tell. And one hears reports like the one you described, and one hears some more positive reports—for example, what General Latif was doing just in the last 2 days. It will not be acceptable for Fallujah to be- come, again, a sanctuary for enemy fighters, and there are a num- ber of red lines that the marines have laid down, and we’ll have to see how that brigade performs. If I could go back to the question you asked Secretary Armitage, I think it would help the American people a lot if you explain that July 1 is just the first step in a process, and one of the most impor- tant steps is the one Senator Biden correctly identified, which is elections. That’s going to be one of the keys. I think it also helps if you think of it—at the risk of maybe—I don’t mean this at all condescending—but when you’re teaching a youngster to ride a bi- cycle, you don’t keep your hand on the seat the whole time. At some point, you have to take it off. In fact, the Iraqis have been assuming a great deal of responsibility already. I think 11 min- istries are under Iraqi direction. There are very talented Iraqis. Their Foreign Minister is a very impressive man—the current For- eign Minister. I don’t know if he will continue in that job. At some point, and sooner rather than later, it’s important for them to make their decisions, it’s important for them to feel it’s their country. I agree with what I think was the thrust of Senator Biden’s comments, that that will make the situation safer for our forces while they’re there, and make it possible for us to leave soon- er rather than later. I think it might also help the American people to realize that we’ve been in a similarly uncertain process in Afghanistan since December 2001, when a virtually unknown man named Hamid Karzai was selected by the same Ambassador, Lakhdar Brahimi, to lead the Afghan transitional administration, and it’s been success- ful—I think, remarkably successful, because that wasn’t the end of the process; it was the start of a process, and that process has led to a successful constitution for Afghanistan, a process that will lead to elections in Afghanistan. But let’s be clear, I mean, democracy doesn’t mean—— Senator CORZINE. It’s also been very flexible with respect to a time table, too. There have been slides and slippages and move- ments and changes. Mr. WOLFOWITZ. And we need to be prepared to call audibles, as Secretary Armitage said. But we also—the purpose of all of this is not to meet any timetable of ours; it’s to develop confidence on the part of the Iraqis that we’re not there to take over their country, we’re not there to seize their oil; we will stay while they need us, but they need to step up and take responsibility. And when they do so, they will make some decisions that we don’t like. You know, we have a terrific ally in South Korea, a democratic ally, that has its own views about security on the peninsula, its own views about how to deal with North Korea. We’re much better off for having a VerDate 11-MAY-2000 14:54 Jan 04, 2005 Jkt 000000 PO 00000 Frm 00076 Fmt 6633 Sfmt 6602 96371 SFORELA1 PsN: SFORELA1 73 democratic ally than having some American puppet that does ex- actly what we say. Senator CORZINE. I would concur with the analysis with regard to Korea. I think it took, what, 50 years, 30 years? It took—— Mr. WOLFOWITZ. It’s still in—very much in the—— Senator CORZINE [continuing]. A very long time. Mr. WOLFOWITZ [continuing]. Walking stage, but you’ve got to walk at some point. The CHAIRMAN. Thank you very much, Senator Corzine. Senator Biden and I have just a couple of questions each, and then we will conclude the hearing. Let me ask this basic question. Many scholars who have ap- peared before our committee have talked about the whole propo- sition of whether Iraqis feel like they want to be Iraqis, as opposed to Kurds or Sunnis or Shi’ites or members of Arab tribes. And this becomes a crucial question at the point that sovereignty passes on to the Iraqi people. As we turn over more authority, as we will be doing, to Iraq, what is your own basic assumption about the nation- hood status, as opposed to the worst-case scenario? In this worse- case scenario the Kurds or the Sunnis or others do not find the ar- rangements satisfactory, either in the interim period or in the con- stitutional formulation, and, as a result, want a carve-out, or want separatism, or want their own situation, and are prepared to fight about it and create if not a civil war, at least elements of instability purely by their desire to not be coopted? Mr. ARMITAGE. This possibility certainly exists, and we’re very alert to it. And during the whole discussion of federalism, we were alert to it—and federalism, which devolves power to more local communities, but one that’s based not on ethnicity, but on location, is where we went. I think we’re somewhat heartened that, thus far, even in the face of someone whose avowed intention was to bring about civil war—al-Zarqawi—that we haven’t had it. And even in very troubled places where the Sunnis had displaced the Kurds in various cities and taken their lands under Saddam Hussein’s rule, the violence that one would expect to occur after that has been somewhat lessened, partially because IOM and others have been in there working hard, but partially, I think, because most Iraqis are willing to give it a ride and see where it goes. Mr. WOLFOWITZ. Senator Lugar, I had a—actually, it was the same day that we were in the Al Rashid Hotel when it was at- tacked. That evening, we had dinner with Abdel Aziz al-Hakim, the head of the SCIRI organization, the younger brother of Mohammed Baqir al-Hakim, who was brutally assassinated in Najaf last Au- gust. This was late October. And I said to him that I thought there was a lot that Iraqis might profitably learn from our Constitution about the rule of law, separation of powers, and so forth; that I thought that they had two problems that are uniquely Iraqi that we probably couldn’t help them much on—one was the issue that you’re alluding to, of regional separation, and the other, I said, is the role of religion. And I was, frankly, surprised when he showed enormous knowledge of our Constitution. He said, ‘‘No, I think your Constitution has the answer to one and a half of our two prob- lems,’’ and he proceeded to explain that the answer, in his view, to maintaining the unity of Iraq is what they call ‘‘regional fed- VerDate 11-MAY-2000 14:54 Jan 04, 2005 Jkt 000000 PO 00000 Frm 00077 Fmt 6633 Sfmt 6602 96371 SFORELA1 PsN: SFORELA1 74 eralism,’’ federalism that’s based not on a Kurdish bloc and a Sunni bloc and a Shia bloc, but, rather much more local autonomy. And I do think a key part of holding that country together is to convince Iraqis that it’s not going to be held together in the old-fashioned way, it’s not going to be held together by a brutal central rule from Baghdad, that people will have a great deal of local autonomy. And I think the second part is to convince them that, nonetheless, there are real benefits to being Iraqis, that there are real benefits that flow from that relationship. And a Kurdish friend of mine, who is a prominent leader in the PUK, said, some time ago, ‘‘There’s no reason why I, as an Iraqi Kurd, shouldn’t be able to be a leader of this country.’’ I think the challenge is going to be to make sure that those sort of possibilities are open, and that it doesn’t become a monopoly of a single group, whether it’s the 65 percent Shia ma- jority or the old Sunni Ba’athist minority or any other single group. The CHAIRMAN. It’s a very important conclusion. And I think all of our hopes are that the Iraqis will continue to counsel with us, despite the polls that have been given that they don’t really care for us, and that they want us out of there. I hope, at least in this respect, that there will be some consultation, for our benefit. We want a stable, whole Iraq, and we think that they will, too. But ul- timately, as we’ve suggested, the Iraqis are going to have to decide what they want for themselves. There’s a lot of debate still to go on within the country. Now, let’s take the other side of this, that we don’t have civil war, but, in fact, there is a sense of being Iraqi. The compromises are made and a degree of federalism is achieved. For some time to come, as the army is vetted and trained, as arms and equipment come to them from whatever source, there will be external dangers to this country. One of the reasons for Coalition security forces has been to make sure that no one else intruded. Well, we’ve tried to do this—whether it be preventing terrorists from Syria or Iran from joining the insurgency. But we also must contemplate—leav- ing aside terrorists—that other countries, surrounding countries, because they don’t like the way things worked out in Iraq, decide to intrude, either formally or informally, covertly or overtly in the affairs of Iraq. At some point, the security situation takes on, then, a very different view. It’s not simply the taking down of insurgents of unstable people in cities in Iraq, but it then becomes a question of Iraq as an area that becomes an incubator for terrorism, or a no- man’s land or a nation that cannot become truly sovereign or self- determined. What sort of thought have you given to this? In other words, pinning down the worst scenario case, how does Iraq remain Iraq, at least as far as we’re concerned, as opposed to someone else’s playground or a target of invasion or incorporation by others? We’ve been through this many times, discussing the Kurds, but they’re not the only group that has thought of a greater expansion that doesn’t know the boundaries, or doesn’t respect them in the same way that we do. What kind of planning effort or thoughts on the security side come to this issue? Mr. WOLFOWITZ. I think—with respect to the danger of external invasion, I think this new Iraq can count on international guaran- tees of a kind that might not have been available in the past, and that certainly need a 400,000-man army—I shouldn’t say it VerDate 11-MAY-2000 14:54 Jan 04, 2005 Jkt 000000 PO 00000 Frm 00078 Fmt 6633 Sfmt 6602 96371 SFORELA1 PsN: SFORELA1 75 doesn’t—hopefully, there can be arrangements that avoid having to have a 400,000-man army to protect it from its neighbors. With respect to what you, I think, talked about as, sort of, covert influences from outside, which is one of the problems we’re dealing with today, most of those ultimately have to take the shape of an internal security threat of some kind. And I think what we’re counting on is that, as Iraqis develop the capacity to provide for their own internal security, very few of them, I think, want to see Syria influencing things, or Turkey influencing things, or Iran in- fluencing things, and certainly not doing it at the point of a gun. The CHAIRMAN. But we trust they will have the ability to repel that, I suspect. That’s axiomatic, to make sure it doesn’t happen. In the U.N. resolution that we’re attempting to work with, should there perhaps be a clause that indicates that the inter- national community would come to the rescue of Iraq in the event that there was an external effort to terminate this country or to in- vade it? In other words, you’ve mentioned that the international community would not look kindly on this. Well, that’s quite true. But isn’t this the time, really, to formalize what the international community is prepared to do about that? And by that, I mean the whole community, not just the United States. Mr. ARMITAGE. I think my initial impression of that idea, Mr. Chairman, is that somewhere in the hortatory language of the—or the preparatory paragraphs, if you will, of the U.N. Security Coun- cil resolution, you could express views about territorial integrity and all of that, and the need to respect it, and how we’d view with disfavor anything against that. But in the operative paragraphs, I think you’d find it very difficult to keep the Security Council on- board with some sort of ironclad, ‘‘We will do x if y happens.’’ I think that would actually complicate matters if we put that in one of the operative paragraphs. The CHAIRMAN. Well, I agree it would. I’m just concerned about the fact that we have already had great difficulty with the Security Council, in terms of responsibility. And clearly if we are to attempt to move on to Iraqi sovereignty and a lesser United States role, and others have not stepped forward, despite all the invitations, it would be well to discuss this in advance. Mr. ARMITAGE. Oh, indeed, it will be. I have no doubts that your comments will be viewed with great interest. I would note, Mr. Chairman, that, on Iraq particularly, we’ve had three 15–0 votes in the Security Council since our one failure prior to the war. So there’s a great deal of comity of views out there on the need to get it right. Mr. WOLFOWITZ. Mr. Chairman, it strikes me that what you’re suggesting certainly should be the goal, going forward. I’m not say- ing tactically. I can’t judge whether this next resolution will bear that load or not. But it seems to me putting that idea forward and moving toward it over time is certainly something that we ought to be trying to accomplish. The CHAIRMAN. Perhaps Ambassador Negroponte, in both of his hats, as it turns out, might offer this counsel during the course of his work at the United Nations, prior to his going to Baghdad. Mr. WOLFOWITZ. I might add, we’re very lucky to have him. The CHAIRMAN. I agree. VerDate 11-MAY-2000 14:54 Jan 04, 2005 Jkt 000000 PO 00000 Frm 00079 Fmt 6633 Sfmt 6602 96371 SFORELA1 PsN: SFORELA1 76 Senator Biden. Senator BIDEN. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. Gentlemen, I’ve been impressed with this hearing, more than any other that we’ve had, or other committees have had, at the more willingness to acknowledge things that we miscalculated. And I think that gives the American people some confidence, because ob- viously everybody knows things aren’t going as initially planned. And that’s an oversimplification, because, up to now, there has been, steady as we go, we’re doing great, things are OK. It’s like I said to the Secretary, I think it’s like that Calypso song that was popular years ago, ‘‘Don’t worry, be happy.’’ You know, I mean, ev- erything’s fine. And you guys, today, more than any time that I re- call here in the last several months, have said, well, you know, we need some changes, we miscalculated. For example, you said, Sec- retary Wolfowitz, you certainly are there—‘‘We’re going to be there longer, and with more forces than we thought initially,’’ and so on. I say that as a compliment. That’s not a backhanded criticism. I want to emphasize, but I think it leads people to say, OK, you know, these guys get it. They acknowledge there’s got to be some changes. But what I don’t get a sense of, because we didn’t get to specifics, and maybe it exists, is, for lack of a better phrase, there seems to be a little bit of a lack of imagination right now about doing what I hope we all agree needs to be done. We’ve got to change the mindset here of the American people about the possibilities of suc- cess; the Iraqi people, about the genuineness of us wanting to hand it over to them in an orderly way so they can succeed; about the region, looking at our motives; about the Europeans and Asians, how they think of us. And I understand we can make a legal case that existing U.N. resolutions give us essentially a Status of Forces Agreement already, authorize us to do a number of things. But what I’d like to plumb for just a few minutes here is the use of the resolution, the purpose of the resolution, not only substantively, but diplomatically in a much larger sense. What do we want to communicate—not just factually accomplish, but strategically, in the diplomatic sense, accomplish? And it seems to me that one of the things that would be very important is to get a new U.N. reso- lution that specifically authorized a multinational force and, if pos- sible, assuming we could do the preparatory work, under a com- mand that was not specifically U.S. command, but, in fact, U.S. command. I can only think of one outfit: NATO. It would seem to me it would be useful if we were able to, in that U.N. resolution, be able to get named, essentially, a referee, so the only major figure with whom there was any discussion was not the Iraqi acting government and Mr. Negroponte, so there’s somebody else in there—I mean, and not just generically, but somebody. It would seem to me to communicate this notion, Secretary Wolfowitz, that the elections are the grail we’re holding out to be accom- plished, that the more detail we can put into the resolution, the longer its political legs, the better our chances of success. In raw street terms, its going to be hard for these guys to be seen to co- operate with us in order to get it right, because of the nature of— a thousand reasons—culturally, all the way from there to the spe- cific incidents at Abu Ghraib prison, and everything in between. VerDate 11-MAY-2000 14:54 Jan 04, 2005 Jkt 000000 PO 00000 Frm 00080 Fmt 6633 Sfmt 6602 96371 SFORELA1 PsN: SFORELA1 77 And so in order to get those bigger pieces done in a resolution, it seems to me there is a practical need at various levels to give up some of the total control of the political situation and the polit- ical future of Iraq. That’s why I’ve been toying with this thing. I’ve been banging it around. I know State is banging around other con- cepts. I suspect Defense is, as well, whether you call it an inter- national support group, a board of directors, a contact group. But in order to do any of that, when I speak to these leaders, whether or not they’re foreign ministers of our European friends and friends in the region, or the heads of state that I’ve had the opportunity to speak to, they all basically come back with one thing, ‘‘Well, we want a piece of the action,’’ meaning the political decisions. They want to actually sit down general, and you actually work out a doc- ument that specifies what role they would play in Iraq. I mean, it’s not generic. It’s very specific. I mean, you know, you don’t fly spec everything, but it’s very specific. That same kind of interchange, with whomever I speak with, whether it’s the Brits, the Germans, the Belgians, the French, the Italians, the Jordanians, the Egyp- tians. They all are looking for a chance to sit at that table and ac- tually bang out with us, OK, here’s the deal. This is the political game plan. These are the steps, these are the objectives. As op- posed to being asked to sign on to a well-thought-out—arguably— plan that we’ve come up with that sets election dates, transition dates, you know, and so on. And so, for example , I was told, before I came in, one of the Sec- retaries indicated that we’ve already turned over de facto sov- ereignty to 17, 10, 12 Iraqi ministers. Mr. ARMITAGE. Eleven. Senator BIDEN. Eleven. And so, for the voters, our citizens who are listening to this, by that it’s kind of like turning over the Com- merce Department to, you know, control of the Iraqis, turning over the HHS to whatever. I mean, we’ve done that in 11 of the 25 or so ministries, correct? Mr. ARMITAGE. Yes, sir. Senator BIDEN. I think it would have been a pretty good idea if we had sat down with some of these other folks and said, how do we want to do this?—this, sort of, international board of directors. I’m not trying to make this rocket science here, but somehow we’ve got to get other folks in to get our face off of it. And so on July 1, or shortly thereafter, I don’t want it to be an American-led occu- pation force. I want it to be something else other than American- led occupation force. It will be de facto American. We’re going to be the only ones that have the troops there. Even if NATO comes on, we’re talking a handful, in relative terms—three, four, five, six, seven-thousand folks over several months. And I don’t trust ‘‘blue helmets’’ going in there. I don’t want to go through another Bosnia at the front end again. So I can’t come up with anything other than NATO. But I’m con- vinced, if we don’t come up with that, it ain’t gonna work if it’s just us. So that’s why I think we need some specific mention of some entity where there’s some political power, if you will, shared in the military occupation force. Am I making any sense? Not do you agree, but do you understand what I’m trying to get at? Mr. ARMITAGE. Yes. VerDate 11-MAY-2000 14:54 Jan 04, 2005 Jkt 000000 PO 00000 Frm 00081 Fmt 6633 Sfmt 6602 96371 SFORELA1 PsN: SFORELA1 78 Senator BIDEN. What are you thinking about along those lines? Mr. ARMITAGE. Well, I’m listening to you very carefully, and some of the things you mention we’ve discussed and others have discussed, such as a P5 plus the neighbors as a contact group, for openers. One of the difficulties we’ve had is, Lakhdar Brahimi is working night and day to fashion this interim government, and he’s not able to turn his attention to that. We’ve had discussions with him. Iraqis have had discussions with him. This is even more im- portant. Or maybe you want it P5, plus neighbors, plus EU. Senator BIDEN. Yes. Mr. ARMITAGE. We’ve recently had discussions with the EU on this. So I’m not sure that any of us are off the page. We’re all on the same page. Whether we’re going fast enough and are imagina- tive enough, I don’t know. We’ve had discussions with de Hoop Scheffer, in NATO, about this. And I would characterize him as very interested—the Secretary General—in this matter. Not ready to take it on, doesn’t think the body’s ready yet. Senator BIDEN. But here’s where I am. Mr. ARMITAGE. But we don’t let him walk away from it. Senator BIDEN. Well, look, and this is—I apologize, I’ll finish this in a second, Mr. Chairman. A high-ranking and by definition, the Foreign Minister is high-ranking—a Foreign Minister of one of our major NATO allies was here in recent weeks. We had a private meeting with him, and I raised NATO—— Mr. ARMITAGE. I’ll do the investigative work and figure out who this was. Senator BIDEN. You know, I mean, it’s pretty obvious, but I don’t want to—well, he told me, ‘‘No, no, NATO, we can’t do that, we can’t do that.’’ And I said, by the way, the President of the United States gets on a plane and went to your capital and said, Mr. Lead- er of this country, I want this. Could he say no? And he said, ‘‘Don’t do that.’’ The truth is, the only person that can do this now is the Presi- dent. Every single solitary person, from four-stars to Under Secre- taries to Secretaries, can’t do it. They’re going to get—— Mr. WOLFOWITZ. Not even Deputy Secretaries. Senator BIDEN. Deputy Secretaries can’t even do it. And you are an incredibly competent person. You can’t do it, be- cause they don’t want to do this, they don’t want to wear the jack- et, they don’t want to get into the deal, but they know they’re going to have to get into the deal. And so does the Defense Department support the notion of literally creating a contact group that actu- ally oversaw the political transition? Would you support that at De- fense? Or have you talked about it? Mr. WOLFOWITZ. It’s a general—let me put it this way. I certainly agree with the spirit of what you’re suggesting, and we have been eager to get a larger NATO role. We’d love to see a larger NATO role. I appreciate what you said earlier on, that it may only gen- erate three or four-thousand additional troops, but that it’s sym- bolically important. I think it is important, by the way, on that point, for people to be realistic. I don’t think anybody’s going to want to put a lot of troops into Iraq and—— Senator BIDEN. Absolutely not. Mr. WOLFOWITZ [continuing]. Until the killing stops. VerDate 11-MAY-2000 14:54 Jan 04, 2005 Jkt 000000 PO 00000 Frm 00082 Fmt 6633 Sfmt 6602 96371 SFORELA1 PsN: SFORELA1 79 Senator BIDEN. Absolutely. Mr. WOLFOWITZ. We and the Iraqis are stuck. But I think the symbolism is important. I think, especially at this stage, we ought to be careful about deciding, ourselves, who’s an appropriate con- tact group. The Iraqis have a lot to say about it, and—— Senator BIDEN. Well, no—by the way, you know, in the beginning I said I would include the Iraqis in determining who that should be. I don’t want to—— Mr. WOLFOWITZ. I think the spirit of it, we agree. And one of the reasons—we agreed very strongly that anything that puts U.S. troops in the background instead of the foreground, that reduces the appearance that we’re there as an occupying power, that re- duces the appearance that we’re there unilaterally, I think, im- proves our chances for success. Senator BIDEN. OK, well, I’ll conclude Mr. Chairman, because— and I’ll followup—— Mr. WOLFOWITZ. Let me just say, you know I—I mean, more than 30 countries are there with us, and—— Senator BIDEN. No, I know. Mr. WOLFOWITZ [continuing]. Those are the countries that really, I think, need to get pride of place in anything we do. Senator BIDEN. Look, I don’t give a damn about anybody else’s pride or place anymore. The only pride I’m worried about right now is the Iraqi pride, because unless we figure out how to satisfy the Iraqi pride, we’re all in deep, deep, deep, deep, deep, deep, deep trouble. And so what I mean by Iraqi pride—which is a way for me to conclude, Mr. Chairman—is that, guys, the new President, the new Prime Minister, the new Vice President, they ain’t gonna want to hang out with you. They’re not going to want to hang out with you. You need to give them an excuse. You need to give them a strawman. You need to give them something for them to say, some- thing’s changed here. You’re still going to have the same 140,000 American troops there. They’re still going to be your guys, general, and it’s still going to be their job. But you’ve got to have an excuse. You’ve got to have an excuse. Take it from a plain old politician, who got elected to this place when I was 29. I may not know much, but I know politics. You gotta give ’em an excuse. No kidding. I’m not joking about this. And so what happens here is, I think we think too much, to use a trite phrase these days, inside the box here. For example, if I could wave a wand, I’d find a NATO general who’s not an Amer- ican, who headed up the force in Iraq. He still has Jonesey looking over him. Jones still runs the show. He’s still the Supreme Allied Commander. I’d want to see somebody in a bright, different-color uniform standing there. I don’t care what country he’s from. Be- cause you’ve got to give these guys an excuse, fellows. If you don’t—if you don’t—I respectfully suggest this is not going to work. It’s a little bit like when, God forbid, a woman feels a lump in her breast, she knows, God, the best thing to do is immediately go to the doctor, immediately get it checked out. Or a guy’s having trou- ble, and they think it may be prostate cancer, he knows he should immediately get it checked out. But what do we do? Human beings go, aw, aw, it’s OK. It’s all right. Because if you go, you’re afraid of the answer you might get. That’s human nature. VerDate 11-MAY-2000 14:54 Jan 04, 2005 Jkt 000000 PO 00000 Frm 00083 Fmt 6633 Sfmt 6602 96371 SFORELA1 PsN: SFORELA1 80 Well, you know, that’s where most of our friends are, our Euro- pean powers; they know they’ve got to get in the game, but they’re going to do everything to not go to the doctor, and the doc has to show up at the house and say, you need the exam. The doc, his name is Bush. He’s the doc. He’s going to show up on the doorstep. He’s going to say, look, we need this. You need this. I’m willing to deal. Not on the essentials. I’m willing to lay out and be part of a negotiation of how we move from here. But this is a deal. Because, for example, a question—when we talk about Iraqi forces, can Iraqi forces opt out of an operation? I don’t worry about that, because I have no faith in their forces anyway. I worry when they can opt us out. Can a new Iraqi government say, whoa, boys. No, no, no, no, no. No Fallujah, no this, no that. That’s a different question. I won’t get into that now. But the point I’m making is, the President has to be the doctor here, fellows. Because each of these countries know they can’t af- ford us to lose. And I strongly recommend, for what it’s worth, that you’d better figure out—I don’t mean you, particularly—the admin- istration better get together in a game plan specifically—not ge- nerically—how we’re going to get other people in. And I know—I have great respect for the troops that are there, Paul, from the 29 or 30 other countries, I really do. But come home with me. Nobody knows they’re there. Come with me out to Missouri, where I was last week. Nobody knows they’re there. When they leave, they don’t even know they left. And so we’ve got to get some of the big dogs in the pit, even if they just hang out. Don’t do anything, just hang out. Because you’ve got to change the face of this. Anyway, I appreciate your time. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. And, with your permission, gentlemen, I may just drop you—not even for the record, but I’d like to importune you on the telephone about some specifics that we haven’t had a chance to get to here. Thank you. The CHAIRMAN. Well, thank you very much, Senator Biden. I agree with your earlier comment about the participation of the committee members today, the interesting questions that were asked, and the important responses that we received, which have furthered our understanding. We appreciate your time and your patience. I think this was a good example of congressional over- sight, and it will continue tomorrow. We look forward to another hearing on Iraq with people outside of our government who may offer us some constructive advice. We thank you, and the hearing is adjourned. [Whereupon, at 1:05 p.m., the committee adjourned, to reconvene at 9:30 a.m., Wednesday, May 19, 2004.] RESPONSES TO ADDITIONAL QUESTIONS FOR THE RECORD RESPONSES OF HON. RICHARD L. ARMITAGE TO ADDITIONAL QUESTIONS FOR THE RECORD SUBMITTED BY SENATOR RICHARD G. LUGAR Question 1. When the Senate calls up the State Department Authorization Bill, we hope to consider amendments that would target funds for Iraq. Until then, the Administration has indicated there are unfunded requirements to run the new U.S. Embassy in Iraq. Specifically, Secretary Grossman testified he would need between $1.1 to $1.4 billion to operate the new mission. (a) Is this estimate correct? VerDate 11-MAY-2000 14:54 Jan 04, 2005 Jkt 000000 PO 00000 Frm 00084 Fmt 6633 Sfmt 6621 96371 SFORELA1 PsN: SFORELA1 81 (b) Have you made a request for this funding to OMB? (c) Why has OMB not included this request for the U.S. Embassy operations in the President’s request to Congress for additional funds? (d) I understand there are no reconstruction funds for agriculture costs and several other areas are short funds. Will any of the $25 billion contingency fund be available for such unfunded reconstruction costs? (e) I note that a recent NSPD signed by the President directed the Director of OMB to make requests for necessary funding and authorities for Iraq. Have such requests been made? (f) How is State determining the allocations to be charged to other agencies for operations in Baghdad, and how will that affect the expenditures by the U.S. Embassy Baghdad? Answer. (a) Yes, the current estimated requirements for U.S. Mission Baghdad in FY 2005 are in that range. However, cost estimates remain subject to change due to the uncertainty of conditions in Iraq. (b) The full estimated requirements were not included in the regular FY 2005 budget request that was submitted through OMB last February. (c) The Administration will pursue a full FY 2005 supplemental request after Am- bassador Negroponte and his team have had time to assess the actual needs and provide more precise cost estimates. (d) The President has requested the $25 billion contingency fund to meet DOD’s requirements to continue operations in Iraq. None of the funding has been requested to provide further foreign assistance to Iraq. (e) No requests have been made by OMB for U.S. Mission funding and authorities in FY 2005 under the recent NSPD. (f) The Administration is not considering cost sharing at this time. It is believed that cost sharing should wait until all agencies have had an opportunity to budget for these costs. In the interim, the State Department will study how best to assign separate costs while paying for U.S. Mission activities and support. Question 2. Will Iraq continue to be a combat zone following the transition? If so, what will be our military objectives? How will this affect the role of the Ambassador and of the multinational force? Answer. Unfortunately, we expect that Iraq will continue to face serious security problems after the June 30, 2004 transition, and the Iraqis have said publicly that their security services are not adequately prepared to maintain security in Iraq. It is likely, if unfortunate, that violence will escalate in the short-term as transition nears as terrorists seek to derail the transfer of power and undermine the efforts of the Iraqi Government. The U.S. is committed to continuing our assistance, both military and otherwise, to support the Iraqi people as they work for an independent, united, democratic, prosperous and peaceful country. My colleagues at the Department of Defense would be better able to answer any questions regarding military objectives. The Ambassador (Chief of Mission) and the Commander of Multinational Force Iraq will work closely together, and with the Iraqis, on political-military issues. Joint State-DOD planning is underway which recognizes that the roles, missions, resources, responsibilities and authorities of our agencies are complementary, and must work jointly toward the goal of a stable and democratic Iraq. The security situation makes the closest partnership between the MNF-I and the Embassy all the more critical to our success. State and Defense personnel have for- mal joint teams in some 15 management sectors, including security, to establish the foundations of interagency teamwork at an operational level of detail. The Chief of Mission and the MNF-I commander will ensure the closest cooperation and mutual support in all their activities, in accordance with standing instructions from the President. On July 1, the Chief of Mission will assume full responsibility for the direction, coordination, and supervision of all USG Executive Branch employees and programs in Iraq, except for those under the command of the U.S. area military commander, and those seconded to an International Organization. The Secretary of State will be responsible for the continuous supervision and gen- eral direction of all assistance for Iraq. The Chief of Mission will provide policy di- rection for reconstruction projects funded by the Iraq Reconstruction and Relief Fund (IRRF). CENTCOM will take the lead on security assistance with the policy guidance of the Chief of Mission. Question 3. Have you appointed someone to look over prisoner issues following the transition from CPA? What will be the scope of his or her authorities? VerDate 11-MAY-2000 14:54 Jan 04, 2005 Jkt 000000 PO 00000 Frm 00085 Fmt 6633 Sfmt 6621 96371 SFORELA1 PsN: SFORELA1 82 Answer. CPA, Multi-National Forces-Iraq (MNF-I) and the Iraqi Interim Govern- ment (IIG) have been working together to decide the way forward for prisoner issues following the transition. Our goal is to transfer all detainees to Iraqi authority as soon as possible, given Iraqi capacity constraints. CPA and MNF-I have been work- ing to integrate Iraqi officials into detainee operations at all levels in the short- term, and are developing plans to build Iraqi capacity to take physical custody of the detainees in the longer term. Within the U.S. Government, the Department of Defense will remain the lead agency for detention operations and Major General Geoffrey Miller, Deputy Com- manding General for detention operations, will continue to oversee detainee issues for MNF-I. Question 4. Would you provide a briefmg to the committee on your plans regard- ing this at the soonest opportunity? Answer. As previously stated in our response to question #3, the Department of Defense will continue to be responsible for detention operations following the June 30 transition. Thus, we would refer you to our colleagues in DOD to provide a brief- ing on plans for detainees. Question 5. A National Security Presidential Directive (NSPD), signed last week by President Bush, defined the roles of the State and Defense Departments in Iraq in more detail. It institutionalized some of the organizational mechanisms the Com- mittee had been briefed previously. It institutes an Iraq Reconstruction Manage- ment Office (IRMO), whose director will be appointed by the Secretary of State . . . and a Program Management Office to provide acquisition and project management support. (a) Has Secretary Powell or Ambassador Negroponte made these appoint- ments yet? (b) What more can you tell us about this organization and the people who will populate the jobs? Answer. We are in the process of selecting a Director for IRMO. In the interim, David Nash, the current head of CPA’s Program Management Office, will serve as Director of IRMO. Under the supervision of the Secretary of State, IRMO will coordinate U.S. assist- ance activities in Iraq with a core staff of approximately 37. IRMO will principally develop and coordinate a strategic plan for U.S. assistance to Iraq, ensuring it re- mains consistent with overall U.S. policy goals. It will also coordinate implementa- tion of the Iraq Relief and Reconstruction Fund, and prepare reports (e.g. 2207) for the Department, OMB, Congress, and others as appropriate. The Project and Contracting Office (PCO), a temporary organization created under the Department of Defense, will operate in Baghdad under Chief of Mission author- ity. PCO will implement the on-going IRRF projects for which the Program Manage- ment Office (PMO) has been responsible, and undertake such other reconstruction- related activities as the Chief of Mission, IRMO, or other agencies may request. IRMO and PCO will be staffed with individuals hired in accordance with Title 5, U.S. Code, section 3161 as well as agency detailees; many of them worked in similar jobs for CPA. Questions 6 a. and b. A key sentence in the NSPD states: ‘‘The Secretary of State shall be responsible for the continuous supervision and general direction for all as- sistance for Iraq.’’ a. However, in a recent hearing before the Armed Services Committee, Army contracting officials stated that once the Embassy is opened, the Chief of Mis- sion will set priorities for contracts and requirements but the Department of Army will handle program management and contracting. This sounds confusing. Do you foresee any difficulties in this arrangement? b. Will the State Department handle contracting hereafter for reconstruction aid in Iraq? Answer. The Chief of Mission, through the Iraq Reconstruction Management Of- fice, will set priorities and requirements for all USG assistance programs in Iraq. Agencies implementing projects may let their own contracts or use the services of the Project and Contracting Office to carry out the assistance goals set by the Chief of Mission. Similarly, the Project and Contracting Office will implement the ongoing IRRF projects for which the Program Management Office (PMO) have been respon- sible, and undertake such other reconstruction-related activities as the Chief of Mis- sion, IRMO, or other agencies may request. VerDate 11-MAY-2000 14:54 Jan 04, 2005 Jkt 000000 PO 00000 Frm 00086 Fmt 6633 Sfmt 6621 96371 SFORELA1 PsN: SFORELA1 83 Question 6c. What will happen to contracts that have been let by CPA using other than U.S. appropriated funds, such as the DFI? Answer. U.N. Security Council Resolution 1546 (8 June 2004) states that DFI funds shall be utilized to satisfy outstanding obligations of the DFI after the transi- tion. From early July 2003 to May 2004, the CPA allocated approximately $4.8 billion from the DFI for contracts relating to relief and reconstruction services. The result- ing contracts will remain in full force and effect after the transition. Question 6d. Can you comment on the continuity and transparency of the over- sight mission—Inspector General functions, etc.? Who will have primary responsi- bility for Inspector General Oversight, how does the CPA-IG factor into the process? Answer. The State Department Office of Inspector General, along with the Inspec- tors General of the Department of Defense, U.S. Agency for International Develop- ment and the Coalition Provisional Authority have been working with each other on an administration position to ensure effective continued oversight of Iraq-related activities. The State Department OIG, consistent with legislation, is responsible for oversight of all State Department Iraq-related activities and is actively engaged in initiating a number of Iraq-related projects. The CPA IG, consistent with legislation, will remain in place for six months post-June 30. The State Department OIG, as well as the other agency Inspectors General, will coordinate with CPA IG and with each other in order to ensure vigorous oversight over all Iraq-related activities of their respective agencies. Question 6e. A key sentence in the NSPD states: ‘‘The Secretary of State shall be responsible for the continuous supervision and general direction of all assistance on Iraq.’’ What approach will the State Department take to reviewing current recon- struction priorities and revising them as needed? How will they make decisions regarding updated priorities? Is there any truth to a rumor that State is holding up all new programming until it takes the reigns? Answer. The State Department will undertake a thorough review of all recon- struction pro […display truncated here — the full text is in the download file]