Paper cpa iraq integrated security sector development.

Iraq: Integrated Security Sector Development December 4, 2003 Office of Policy Planning & Analysis UNC DECLASSIFIEDNY 1 of 25 Governance & Accountabinty 21 6 External Assistance .. 22 7 The Way Ahead. 23 ANNEX Conflict Assessment UNCLASSIFIED - FOR OFFICIAL USE ONLY 2 of 25 DECLASSIFIED This paper lays out a vision for the development of the Iraqi security sector to meet both immediate security needs and to lay the foundations for long-term stability. This vision has benefited from detailed input from a range of security sector actors across CPA and CJTF-7 but the paper has not formally been staffed for concurrence. The purpose of the paper is to provide a structured framework within which crucial, and urgent, policy and operational decisions can be made by CPA, CJTF-7, CENTCOM and national capitals. Security force roles and responsibilities There are five primary entities that will be employed to achieve internal security: the Iraqi Police Service (IPS), the Iraqi Civil Defense Corps (ICDC) and the New Iraqi Army (NIA); intelligence services; Coalition Forces/MNF.' • IPS. The IPS should have primacy not just for routine policing but also for internal security. (e.g. anti-terrorist branch, police intelligence, armed response and public order units). The IPS is being established as a national force with local accountability. Coordination with other security forces needs to be operationalized via regional and local operations centers. • ICDC. Locally recruited and deployed, the ICDC will have 36 battalions by the time of transition. Initially envisioned as auxiliary troops, the ICDC will be able to perform tasks at up to company level. Missions will involve patrolling, cordon and search, fixed-site protection, check points, and convoy escort. Until the IPS develops nation-wide and robust capabilities, the ICDC provide an interface between the IPS and the NIA. The ICDC should come under the NIA command and control structures and transition into an army reserve force. It needs to be made clear that the ICDC is a reserve force that has been mobilized under national authority for the emergency period. • NIA. The NIA will have three divisions by September 2004. It is being designed for • external defense but, during the emergency period, needs to help counter internal security threats. It is important to enshrine this role in legislation. The NIA brings two types of capabilities to bear. First. it can rapidly deploy formed units to provide a quick reaction capability. Second, it can bring to the table its C' and logistics assets. Though the Department of Border Enforcement will be important for border security and the Facilities Protection Service will be increasingly important for infrastructure protection. 3 of 25 nowever be Integrated mo the way secany seet the basis of a clear political-security strategy rather than as an ad hoc response to short-term operational requirements. Actions In order to achieve the vision laid out in this paper. the following actions will be required by CPA and CJTF-7. Defeat insurgents and terrorists Action: Create security architecture to run the COIN campaign. Action: Deploy other security forces, negotiate cross-border agreements and apply diplomatic pressure to support border control efforts. Build Iraqi security force capacity Action: Develop legal framework on the use of NIA for internal security. Action: Incorporate ICDC into the key actions concerning the NIA. Action: Manage Iraqi public perceptions of the ICDC and NIA through an Information Operation that makes clear their deployment for internal security is an interim measure. Action: Ensure the MOl has sufficient resources to build-out the IPS into a professional, nation- wide force. Action: Build Iraqi intelligence services and oversight mechanisms that balance effectiveness with accountability. Develop coordinated plans for TOA to Iraqi authorities Action: Develop detailed TOA plan between CJTF7 and CMATT over disposition of NIA & Action: Define command relationship between Iraqi Contingent Command Authority and Coalition Forces. Criminal Justice Action: Institute a workable prisons plan. Action: Ensure judicial security in the medium to long term. Resolve disposition of militias Action: Clarify policy and "red lines" on militias. Action: Enforce weapons control order. Action: Implement MOl structures across the country. Action: Recruit militia personnel into the IPS, DBE and NIA and phase out militia stipends. Action: Deploy the NIA into the Northern region. 4 of 25 UNDECLASSIFIED ONLY Action: Develop and implement a program of regional confidence building measures. Improve CPA security sector management processes Action: Designate a 'security sector coordinator' to chair an executive level security sector steering group, to produce an integrated strategy, and pursue an integrated planning process. Action: Undertake detailed planning, including gaming, to ensure seamless TOA to Iragi institutions in the security transition concept and resolution of command and control arrangements. Action: Coordinate planning and budgeting across the Iraqi security sector. Action: Re-examine investment priorities for the security sector. Action: Develop plans for external assistance to the Iraqi security sector that cover both MNF support for Iraqi security and wider security sector reform programs. UNC DECLASSIFIEDONLY 5 of 25 • there is a secure environment for people and property that chables criers to pare fully in political and economic life; • the Iraqi government has the means, including its own defense and police forces, to assume its responsibility for external and internal security, including policing of its borders: • relationships with regional states and with the international community have been established; • the roles and accountabilities of organizations providing security are clearly defined vithin a legal framework which governs. inter alia, the ownership of weapons. The goal is to help Iraq build legitimate and accountable systems of security to prevent violent conflict. This needs to be done by reforming the Iraqi security sector so that it supports the emergence of a stable, secure and democratic Iraq. The Problem 1.2 CPA & CJTF-7 activity in the security sector has often been driven by the short-term requirement to address pressing security needs. The current security sector strategy development process has the following weaknesses: We have not designed our security sector development program based on a thorough conflict assessment; • There is no overarching security vision for Iraq that joins up short-term current activities with long term goals: • We are focusing on building tactical and operational capabilities - the building of Iraqi governance and oversight capacity is proceeding more slowly: Local ownership of the security sector reform process and policy is in its infancy; We are focusing on "hard" security force development with limited attention being paid to building "soft" Iraqi capacity to prevent or manage conflicts. Considerations 1.3 The achievement of the security end-state is by no means only a function of the nature, size and shape of the recognized security forces that may be in place when transition to Iraqi sovereign control takes place. Some of the key factors influencing how the security sector develops are: • The need to ensure Iraqi buy-in to the policy decisions taken and institutional arrangements being constructed to ensure that decisions that pre-date the transfer of authority outlast the CPA. Iraqi security forces. UNCLASSIFIED - FOR OFFICIAL USE ONLY 6 of 25 DECLASSIFIED UNC DECLASSIFIEDONLY 7 of 25 population. Second, an understanding that security and development are inextricably linked. In particular, it is important to mainstream security as a governance issue, involving greater public scrutiny. Third. a recognition that security problems for the population often stem from the way in which security systems operate and are organized, regulated and resourced. It is important to note that SSR goes beyond the uniformed services. The "security system includes the armed forces, the police and paramilitary forces. intelligence services.... judicial and penal institutions, as well as the elected and duly appointed civil authorities responsible for control and oversight."? In developing countries such as Iraq, the overall objective of SSR is to create a secure environment that is conducive to development. This involves the development of state capacity "through its security policy and the various instruments at its disposal, to prevent. contain or address specific security threats" but also the building of state and societal capacities to generate conditions that mitigate the vulnerabilities to which people are exposed.' 2.1 Lessons for Iraq International experience with SSR has identified a number of best practice principles. SSR programs need to: • Be people-centred, locally owned. and based on democratic principles: • Integrate development & security policies through civilian oversight; Enhance institutional capacity; • • Adhere to transparency and accountability; • Take a whole-of-government approach. For international organizations or bilateral donors promoting SSR. there are a number of crucial lessons to keep in mind. These include: Balance short-term security requirements with long-term development objectives; : Develop strategic programmatic framework approaches rather than project by project approaches; 2 Security Sustem Reform: Polier and Good Practice. OECD, Development Assistance Committee, Network on Conflict. Peace and Development Co-operation | Oct 2003. * This broadens the agenda beyond state security forces to bring in, for instance, non-state organizations such as citizens groups, tribal councils and religious institutions which may help prevent or manage UNCLASSIFIED - FOR OFFICIAL USE ONLY 8 of 25 DECLASSIFIED UN DECLASSIFIEDONY 9 of 25 • Priorities 3.1 On the assumption that MNF will defend Iraq against external enemies, the threat of foreign invasion is a low priority for Iraq's security sector in the coming several years. Political violence, crime and the design of institutions that will underpin the civil government are the most important short-term issues. This prioritization is not currently reflected in the balance of investment between the NIA and internal security structures. Action: Re-examine investment priorities for the security sector. 3.2 Countering the Insurgency At least through the end of 2004, the Iraqi government will be fighting an insurgency that involves domestic insurgents (motivated by a range of grievances), external subversion, and We shall need to international terrorism, complicated by high levels of organized crime. implement emergency measures to restore stability. However, it is important to take these measures only within a framework of laws to ensure that they do not set bad precedents for the future development of the Iraqi security sector. Emergency measures need to include: Rapid build up of the ICDC as a local security force to augment Coalition Forces; • • Use of the NIA in internal security; • Combined command and control structures at national and regional levels; • Extra resourcing for specialist police units (e.g. anti-terrorist investigation branch; Special Intervention Unit); Rapid build-up of internal security intelligence capabilities; • militias: • Limited security cooperation with "compliant" Use of CF/MNF for internal and border security; • [Emergency powers legislation]. Long-term risks arising from these emergency measures that need to be avoided include: • Coups: the emergence of security sector actors (MOl, MoD, NIA or central intelligence service) that are more powerful and better organized than the civil government. • Authoritarian state: the perpetuation of emergency measures by the transitional or a Sunnis. Shia) as the internal enemy. i me a chen y he come it tea in tae i read to • Fragmentation of central authority: The empowerment of sub-state militias or tribes to assist with short term security needs. possibly reinforced by a territorially-based ICDC. would undermine central authority and run the risk of promoting warlordism. UNCLASSIFIED - FOR OFFICIAL USE ONLY 10 of 25 DECLASSIFIED which translates this into operational direction through a Joint Intelligence/Operations Centre (JOC). Direction goes down to the NIA HQs at the division/brigade levels who conduct operations in support of the ICDC and IPS. Coalition forces would remain in the background, with links into this chain of command. Likewise, the Mol and national police C2 structure would cascade down direction to local levels. JIOCs that direct operations 24/7, to include police, ICDC, NIA, intelligence services, DBE and CF/MNF would be established at each Coordinating policy and establishing priorities at the provincial and local level should be the function of Provincial and Local Council Security Committees. Committee members at the provincial level, for example, would include the Governor, members of the Provincial Council, the police chief, local NIA/ICDC commander and representatives of other key services (intelligence, DBE, local FPS, key ministries such as transportation). The local MS) commander and (up to the transition period), the Governorate Coordinator would also be members. Action: Create security architecture to run the COIN campaign. 3.3 A holistic security approach In addition to the development of the Iraqi security sector to address the symptoms of violent conflict, a holistic security approach would address the causes and motives for conflict. A holistic approach could address both internal and external factors. Civil society conflict management mechanisms are an important adjunct to "hard security" measures to manage internal security threats. These mechanisms have been proved in other conflict-torn societies; the aim is to empower Iraqis to take responsibility for preventing and to manage its own conflicts can assist in the short term by damping down violence and in the longer term can help build robust civil society institutions. Examples include: • Social and economic programs that address the roots of violence (e.g. youth unemployment and gun culture); • Religious outreach and interfaith dialogue; • Tribal outreach: • Neighborhood watch schemes to empower citizens to control crime in their own communities. In order to craft and implement strategies addressing the roots of violence, it is valuable to undertake a holistic conflict assessment, as outlined in the Annex. This will highlight the fact that UN DECLASSIFYEDONLY 11 of 25 Action: Develop and implement a program of regional confidence building measures. * Perhaps analogous to the military concept of the "deep" battle in a COIN campaign. UNCLASSIFIED - FOR OFFICIAL USE ONLY 12 of 25 DECLASSIFIED Overview of the Iraqi security sector To counter the threats outlined in section 3, Iraq requires the following capabilities: External defense • A combined arms force able to contribute to Iraq's defense, operating in conjunction with other national and regional forces • An external and military intelligence capability able to support national defense Crime • Accountable, impartial and effective local police forces • Specialist national police units able to deal with national and international organized crime * • Citizen trust and cooperation with the police force via community initiatives An efficient and fair judicial and penal system • Public or regulated private guard services • Effective and comprehensive border control services Political violence • Domestic intelligence capabilities • Capability to deal with armed insurgents and public order Border control services • These capabilities can be provided in many different ways. In pre-war Iraq, for instance, the intelligence and security services dealt with political violence and some crimes whilst the military undertook external defense as well as internal security. The "best practice" in SSR is to separate external defense forces (armed forces) from police-led internal security services and to ensure civilian primacy over security affairs." This is the approach the CPA has sought to follow. However, this does not preclude the external defense forces from being used to augment internal security forces, given a basis in law and regulation for military support to the civil authority. 4.2 New Iragi Army Current position: The NIA is at an early stage in its development. It will be the basis for a future By October 1 2004, 27 battalions, 9 Army for the defense of Iraq against external threats. brigades and 3 divisions will have been created. In the intervening period, CJTF-7 will assume operational control of brigade headquarters and battalions as they stand up. The first Brigade HQ will deploy to Mosul in January 2004: it is expected to be used for the command and control of UN DECLASSIFIED NY 13 of 25 operations would be necessary to defend Iraqi sovereignty. Developing such a capability would be dependent upon a serious 5-10 year investment program. We have no plans to develop such a capability since this depends upon future Iraqi decisions on investment priorities, the nature of regional threats and its relationship with external allies. Transitional issues: Although the NIA was originally envisaged for traditional defense-type missions, the key question concerns its role in the current emergency. This has to be enshrined in the 'Defense Force Aid to the Civil Authorities Act', being prepared by the General Counsel. Managed carefully, this should enable the right relationship with the IPS who should be in the lead for internal security. During the transition, MNF would increasingly remain in the background as reaction forces for demanding counter-terrorist operations, or hold the ring should law and order break down. The employment of the 2' Battalion will likely set the precedent for the use of the NIA in internal security. The second issue is the deployment plan for the NIA in relation to CJTF's TOA to Iraqi forces and whether sufficient command and control will exist to manage 36 ICDC battalions to meet the transition timetable. Action: Develop legal framework on the use of NIA for internal security. Action: Develop detailed TOA plan between CJTF7 and CMATT over disposition of NIA & ICDC. Action: Define command relationship between Iraqi Contingent Command Authority and Coalition Forces. 4.3 Iraqi Civil Defense Corps Current position: The ICDC is a locally recruited and deployed, lightly equipped force designed It should enable Coalition (and Multi-national) Forces to reduce to augment Coalition Forces. their presence, particularly in urban areas. Under plans for local control. it would mount urban and rural patrols, conduct cordon and search, protect fixed sites, establish check points, escort ICDC convoys, maintain public order, and help with emergency and disaster response.' expansion envisages 36 battalions being formed by end-April 2004. Desired end-state: Transform the ICDC into an army reserve under control of the NIA. Its employment in the current situation is as an activated reserve, task organized by the JFHQ to augment NIA and coalition forces. ' ICDC tasks currently include public order and disaster response. As ICDC units are thrust into the front-line in urban areas, it is a priority to ensure that they receive appropriate public order training and equipment. This role should be handed to thoroughly trained. specialist IPS units as soon as feasible. Disaster response, meanwhile, should be led by the Civil Defense Organization. UNCLASSIFIED - FOR OFFICIAL USE ONLY 14 of 25 DECLASSIFIED that makes clear their deployment for internal security is an interim measure. 4.4 Iraqi Police Service Current position: The IPS was one of the lowest status security forces under the previous regime and performed little in the way of modern policing duties. They had little presence outside urban areas. In the post-war period, they lost most of their personnel and equipment. The IPS are now being rebuilt in the major urban centers; a massive recruitment and training program is now Desired end-state: A single, nation-wide police service that combines centralized standards and policies with local accountability. The IPS will be the lead internal security and anti-crime The IPS will operate as a modern, capability and will serve all Iraqi citizens equitably. professional force according to international standards of human rights. Its 85,000 officers will be well-trained through a combination of basic mandate training, mentoring and specialist and leadership training Transitional issues: The CPA is engaged in an ambitious program to rebuild and enhance the IPS infrastructure and equipment base, to retrain existing officers, to recruit and train afresh new officers and to inculcate modern policing practices and procedures into the force. This program is being undertaken at a time when the IPS finds itself in the front-line of the insurgency campaign. The rate at which the IPS can be transformed into the leading security agency, can operate effectively against crime and political violence and can win the trust of the Iraqi people will be critical to the development of the Iraqi security sector. Action: Ensure the MOl has sufficient resources to build-out the IPS into a professional, nation- wide force. 4.5 Department of Border Enforcement Current position: The DBE was created by combining relevant capacities from a variety of government departments. Most border control functions are currently undertaken by Coalition Forces but they are being transferred to the DBE as the department recruits staff, acquires equipment and refurbishes border facilities.. The intention is to transfer authority for border points of entry to DBE during the first quarter of 2004. Desired end-state: A professional, fully-manned border protection agency that combines border policing, customs. passports and immigration. The DBE. assisted by cross-border agreements and visa regimes, that the MFA will negotiate, will be able to control flows of people and goods across Iraq's borders. UN DECLASSIFIEDONLY 15 of 25 and budgetary restrictions and the inability of the ministries to fully accept and understand the magnitude associated with the security aspects incorporated into their positions. Furthermore without a full time, permanent and dedicated individual in each ministry, or government entity. and criminal lawlessness in Iraq. Desired end-state: The FPS will be constituted as a professional, well-managed guard force, complemented by a well-regulated private security sector, which provides comprehensive protection to important public facilities and personnel. Each Iraqi ministry and local authority will fund and manage its FPS force, within a framework of standards provided by the MOl. Transitional issues: TOA of FPS to Iraqi entities will complete early in 2004 but decisions need to be made regarding funding scales and ministerial management of FPS, with oversight by MOI and CPA due to the inability of some ministries to take on their own security responsibilities. Antin: Near one / Rapid but inserts caps y to masarides oeferin options for 4.7 Intelligence Current position: The former Iraqi intelligence services have been disbanded and their personnel The Coalition has created a number of tactical and disqualified from government service. operational intelligence units to counter security threats. The IPS is developing basic criminal intelligence capabilities in Baghdad and a national criminal intelligence unit is planned by the MOI. Oversight capabilities at the executive level are planned in the MOD and MOI structures. Training opportunities for senior officials as future intelligence consumers and oversight providers are being looked at. The legal framework for subordination, coordination and oversight of the Intelligence community has yet to be developed. Desired end-state: Iraq will have a criminal intelligence [and security intelligence] capability within the police service, one or more apolitical, civilian intelligence services dealing with internal and external intelligence and a tactical and operational Military Intelligence capability. The exact structures and roles remain to be determined. There will be a legislative oversight committee and executive oversight functions at relevant ministries. There will be civil service capacity to provide a central intelligence coordination function, perhaps in the form of a Joint Intelligence Committee. At least during the insurgency period, intelligence coordination needs to cascade down to provincial and local levels via Joint Intelligence/Operations Centers. UNCLASSIFIED - FOR OFFICIAL USE ONLY 16 of 25 DECLASSIFIED limited cooperation with party intelligence services. Equally important, however, is long term and the building of oversight mechanisms and legal planning for Iraqi intelligence capacity frameworks to ensure the protection of human rights and to avoid future political misuse of the intelligence services. Action: Build Iraqi intelligence services and oversight mechanisms that balance effectiveness with accountability. 4.8 Criminal Justice nationwide, albeit at below their pre-wa Current position: Courts are back up and running apacity. Special security courts have been abolished. Fundamental revisions to the penal cod and procedures have been implemented, including suspension of the crime of "insulting the President" and a right to criminal defense counsel at every stage of investigation. Judges are being removed for past corruption, close ties to the Baath Party or the former regime, or complicity in atrocities. A Central Criminal Court. staffed with judges and prosecutors reputed for integrity, has been established to hear cases of national moment. Prisons, left decrepit by former-regime neglect and postwar looting, are being repaired or reconstructed. Desired end-state: A court system that is fair, impartial. and expeditious, that honors dué process and basic human rights, and that is so regarded by the public. A prison system with humane prisons that seeks to rehabilitate. and does not abuse, inmates. Transitional issues: The holistic reform of the criminal justice sector is vital to the building of durable security capacity. It is important to ensure that the justice and policing systems develop together and are mutually reinforcing. Progress is interdependent. There are four critical dependencies that will affect progress. • As coalition troops withdraw from supporting courts and prisons, it is vital to have in place civilian (contractor) personnel to operate the system and to build Iraqi capacity. • The judiciary is extremely vulnerable to violence, which will undermine the whole judicial process. Judicial personnel and courthouses are dependent on police protection. • The justice system requires a high level of skill in the investigation and preparation of cases for trial according to international standards. This is a joint police-judicial capability that needs to be developed early in 2004. • Judicial authority and credibility comes from the evenhanded administration of justice. This entails the fair application of the rule of law to free the innocent and appropriately punish the guilty. It also requires proper treatment of those persons held pending trial, the prompt resolution of the allegations made against them, and humane and rehabilitative treatment of those incarcerated after conviction. A considerable problem is IN DECLASSIFIEDONLY 17 of 25 and the transition from parochial political and security legitimate political empowerment structures to a modern national security structure with in built safeguards. There are over 30 known militias active in Iraq and it is estimated that there are between 30.000-60,000 militia personnel. Desired end-state: The long term goal of CPA is for armed militias to disappear or to be transformed into political parties. Militia personnel will be absorbed into state security forces as individuals, not as formed units. This may no longer be a viable objective. Transitional issues: An integrated DDR process has not been instituted but does inform a range of CPA policies (e.g. stipends, weapons control order. and targeted recruiting campaigns for new security forces). An integrated DDR strategy would require a concerted military effort by CJTF- 7 to force DDR of some militias, and for MOl to have sufficient trained IPS to fill the vacuums created by the removal of militias. A primary task would be enforcement of the weapons control order. Any re-integration process would require a concerted effort on behalf of many ministries. Notably, MoTrade & MoLSA (create jobs). MoEdn (to provide schooling). Mol and MoD for One important step will be the integration of militia personnel into the security sector. deployment of the NIA in the north and the opening of the Suleymaniya and Zakho NIA training centers. This must however be accompanied by a cut in peshmerga stipends or an increase in NIA salaries to make employment in the NIA attractive. Since the November 15 Agreement, there has been a tendency amongst the political parties to hold onto their militias to protect their interests during a volatile transition period. The creation of an ICDC "special battalion" and CT company from G-5 militias is a departure from the previous CPA policy of seeking to disband militias but may provide an alternative means of integrating the party militias. Action: Clarify policy and "red lines" on militias. Action: Enforce weapons control order. Action: Implement MOl structures across the country. plemen: MOl structures acre the. DE and NIA and phase out militia stipends. Action: Bely me NA no the Northem vesion. UNCLASSIFIED - FOR OFFICIAL USE ONLY 18 of 25 DECLASSIFIED VOIN. ni present, the institutionalization of CPA/Iraqi civil governance mechanisms is falling behind the development of fielded forces. 5.1 National oversight & civilian control On the national level, the institutionalization of civil governance is beginning with the MOI, MOJ, GC sub-committees and the OSA senior leadership program. It is not yet clear that these efforts will succeed in institutionalizing durable civil governance mechanisms. Political Oversight: National political oversight mechanisms are being developed in the form of the GC sub-committees on national security and foreign affairs but the Fundamental Law will have to go much further in creating legislative oversight mechanisms to hold the security ministries and forces to account. In addition to laying down the legal framework, CPA will have to support capacity building by educating Iraqi political leaders. Action: Build eas ape die right meshis in the fundamental Lov National Command Authoritv: [NSC or other structures] MoD and JFHQ: A MoD will be created by I July 2004. Its main function will be strategic policy-making and planning. It will be a civilian-led organization but will include civilians and military personnel. It will also disseminate strategic direction to the JFHQ. planned to operate by 1 June 04. It should link into the NSC and establish good liaison with the Mol. The JFHQ will serve two main functions: managing the capabilities of the New Iraqi Armed Forces and directing the conduct of operations. It is planned to combine the MoD and JFHQ Staffs. The challenge will be sourcing strong Iraqi leadership and good staff principals in time to start operating post- June 1" Civil Defense Organization. Governors will have responsibility for coordinating regional public safety mutual aid plans which, during the emergency period, will involve a leading role in the coordination of provincial security committees. Action: Create security architecture to run the COIN campaign. " The naming of the ICDC CPA/CJTF-7 has confused both CPA staff and Iraqis. The Civil Defense Organization refers to the nation-wide fire and rescue service operating under the MOI, not to the ICDC. UN DECLASSIFIEDNLY 19 of 25 A clear legal framework is required to govern the roles and relationships of iraqi security forces. Existing CPA Orders covering the NIA (Order 22 and Order 23), the FPS (Order 27) and the ICDC (Order 28) can be translated into the Fundamental Law and future Iraqi legislation. We assume the NIA orders can be extended to cover the ICDC. Additional work is needed to: • develop legislation covering the role of the armed forces in support of the civil power; • clarify the legal framework for policing to ensure consistency of Iraqi legislation with international human rights standards; develop legislation covering the establishment of intelligence services; develop or amend legislation covering the operations of intelligence and investigative services (e.g. surveillance, wiretapping, emergency detention). Action: Develop or amend legislation covering the security forces. UNCLASSIFIED - FOR OFFICIAL USE ONLY 20 of 25 DECLASSIFIED [NB: this section requires additional development by CENTCOM/CJTF7, OSA/CMATT, MOI, MOJ & MEA] Action: Develop plans for external assistance to the Iragi security sector that cover both MN support for Iraqi security and wider security sector reform programs. 21 of 25 UN DECLASSIFIEDONLY will have to focus upon. 7.1 Timetables and transition points The security transition concept lays down a conditions based schedule for building Iraqi security capacity and transitioning to Iraqi control. The concept involves moving to full local control (i.e. Iraqi capacity to police urban areas) by March 2004 and to regional control (i.e. Iraqi capacity to • → police provinces) by September 2004. Implementing the security transition concept will require detailed planning for hand-offs. Questions that need to be resolved include: what will be the respective roles of NIA/ICDC and IPS and how will they be integrated into CF/MNF command and control structures and how will Governorate Teams and Iraqi Local Government Institutions institutionalize control over security forces in the regions. Action: Undertake detailed planning, including gaming, to ensure seamless TOA to Iraqi in the security transition concept and resolution of command and control 7.2 Budgeting and Investment Integrated planning and budgeting across the Iraqi security sector is not yet in place. problems are now becoming evident as transfers of authority take place from CJTF-7 to ministries, notably in relation to the FPS.' Better integration of planning and budgeting activities would help avoid such problems. Action: Coordinate planning and budgeting across the Iraqi security sector. ' It is probable, once TOA is complete, that thousands of FPS personnel will he laid off by ministries since MSCs hired more guards than were catered for in ministry budgets. Lay-offs are likely to be concentrated There will also be significant salary cuts for FPS personnel after in the November-January timeframe. TOA as a result of new pay scales. This is leading to demoralization and possible security risks. UNCLASSIFIED - FOR OFFICIAL USE ONLY 22 of 25 DECLASSIFIED onel assessmell Process. This model seeks to help decision makers address conflicts at four levels. Motive (root causes) Most individuals do not engage in or support large-scale violence. Many may however have latent motives for supporting or engaging in violence. Grievances are those underlying factors that make people angry and willing to engage in violence. They can include ethnic and religious divisions, poverty, environmental scarcity, disputes over land or other resources. Greed is another type of motive. Violent conflict can be beneficial for conflict entrepeneurs who constitute a war economy. These entrepeneurs have a vested interest in instability from which they can profit (banditry, crime, smuggling, drugs, control of natural resources, protection rackets). Means (factors that facilitate mobilization & expansion of violence) An intention to commit large-scale violence remains latent unless the means are available. These include money, weapons, recruits, organizational networks and external backing. Without some combination of these means, then latent grievances will remain unexpressed. Opportunity (causes due to political or social institutions) Political and social institutions filter grievances and can serve either to provide or deny the opportunity for violence. Poor institutions may fuel discontent through repression, corruption and poor governance; they can fail to limit flows of recruits and arms or even provide resources to opposing factions; they can facilitate the emergence of violence-prone elites. institutions, in contrast, can address grievances in a responsive manner, they can block access to arms and funds and find alternative employment for potential recruits and they can constrain opportunistic elites. Regional & international causes Overt or covert military intervention by other states poses the threat of violence. Transnational networks are an important factor in sustaining internal conflicts; these may be economic networks (e.g. smuggling), ethnic or religious networks or criminal or terrorist networks. External state actors can also fuel a conflict directly or indirectly. Conflict Triggers Windows of vulnerability - events that threaten to fundamentally change the balance of economic or political power: & Conflict Assessment Framework. USAID January 7. 2002 UNCLASSIFIED - FOR OFF 23 of 25 DECLASSIFIEDONLY manifests itself along the causal chain (motive-means-opportunity-external). Motive There are many motives for violent conflict in Iraq. These include political and economic grievances and the interests of conflict entrepreneurs. One of the motives clearly present is relative poverty (especially amongst men employed by the previous regime). This overlaps with a youth bulge - i.e. a disproportionate share of 15-25 year olds in the population. At the same time, identity (e.g. tribal or religious) may provide a motive for violence as political leaders exploit fears of losing out in the new political dispensation. Means In order for violence to be any other than sporadic or localised, leaders need to be able to recruit, arm, finance and organize fighters. Organizational structures include networks of former regime or intelligence personnel; tribal structures; religious structures (e.g. the Wahhabi military movement) or political parties. Studies have shown that a very high level of ethnic fragmentation corresponds to a lower level of violence due to the difficulties in coordinating action even on shared grievances across groups - perhaps reflecting the validity of the old imperial concept of divide and rule. The other means (arms, finance, recruits and warfighters) are in ample supply in Iraq. Opportunity State and societal institutions can address or exacerbate root causes; they can block access to conflict resources; they can constrain elite behavior; and they can manage international pressures. phase or posures Unfortunately, Iraq has been left with very weak state institutions in this phase of political heen left with very wea transition. Of 152 countries studied over 50 years, partial democracies are four times more prone to civil war than democracies. The main issue driving recent civil conflicts has been contention for state power in the aftermath of efforts to democratize autocracies. Most violence has been by entrenched political elites seeking to hold onto power, often by inciting violence on ethnic lines. These types of conflicts have been associated with 50% more deaths and refugees than conflicts based on demands for autonomy or secession. External in vert iraniao the obvious roblem of es ternal state intervention in frag's case this would include UNCLASSIFIED - FOR OFFICIAL USE ONLY 24 of 25 DECLASSIFIED means Financial Arms Undermine group idently Disarm population - Build institutions Political transitions & partial democracies Opportunity External Transnational criminal. Foreign flows of fighters, arms smuggling networks Control borders Violent Conflict UNC DECLASSIFIEDONY 25 of 25