Note blair to bush note on iraq

place before the new Government. We need as much as possible working well, or on a path to working well, so that this is an orderly withdrawal as the Iraqis take over the practical as well as the legal reins, rather than desperately trying to save the Iraqis from themselves, blamed by them if we intervene and blamed for chaos if we don't. 1. The Handover The key dilemma is: Iraq needs, internally and externally, to have a genuine transfer of power; but it also needs a security force capable of holding back the elements that would pervert that power. So the political imperative indicates full sovereignty; the security imperative indicates a robust MN presence, that might limit that sovereignty. Either way carries big risks. But in my judgment, ultimately, the risks of not appearing to transfer full sovereignty take precedence The reality is that if there was a clash between the wishes of the IIG and the MNF, and the MINF enforced its wishes, the fall-out would be uncontainable. So we have to recognise the inevitability of the MNF, post 30) June, being there by consent This will be the cruci question over the new UNSCR and, if resolved rightly. the UNSCR should be obtained. But we need a big and defining optic of what this means. I suggest the following timetable: DECLASSIFIED figures from all parts of Iraq, which endorses his plan. Then in the week of 31 May, the new Iraqi PM and Brahimi go to New York. There the new PM sets out his forward plan for Iraq; he is joined by the Coalition HOG in support: and then the nations in the Security Council, and the UNSCR is passed. We need this for the necessary strong visible expression of change At the same time. we publish with the Iraqi PM the plan for the future Iraqisation of the security forces and the comprehensive ISF of the future. There is then a huge media selling exercise by the Iraqi PM at home and abroad We follow that with a post-handover international conference of donors of the sort called for by Putin. 2. MNt and ISE joint arrangements We have provided a paper on this. It is difficult but not impossible. Of course neither UK nor US troops can be put in danger or be commanded by other than our one forces. But. subycet to this. we need a sustem of co-operation, starting with an enlarged NSC. which would have the crucial Tragi and MNF people on it. The red cand would, however. have to be retained by the iraqis ie they could, unless our DECLASSIFIED quanty becomes chateat. li truth, we have assembled the quantity but not the quality. General Petreaus is a big step forward. But this work is urgent and nothing can stand in its way. I enclose a short paper done for me by my military. In particular we need • more international police advisers, which presently is at only 50 per cent of requirement • rapid recruiting of more Iraqi army battalions • fix pay, equipment and IT problems of the police and civil defence • bringing in proper officers to lead, even if there is some Ba'ath connection. Entirely understandably, given the security environment, the focus of the MN has put the immediate security issues first. But this other work needs just as much leadership and attention in parallel. We should be able, in time, to pull all this together into a comprehensive plan for the gradual phasing in of ISF and phasing out of MNF 4. De-Ba'athification It is more and more clear to me that the root of our problem was the total lack of any indigenous Iraqi leadership in a country brutalised and stripped of strong voices. As a result, there is no alternative but to advance a discriminating not indiscriminate de-Ba'athification policy. Fallujah is the classic example: the DECLASSIFIED Obviously it needs to be checked out. But the point is: unless we start to bring these types of people in. the mountain is too steep to climb. § Protection of of and power Whatever else, we must get the oil refineries, pipelines and power plants protected This is in the category of "whatever it takes". At present we have had 48 hour blackouts in Baghdad and a serious disruption of oil supplies. This would be good work for a new Iraqi army battalion to do. But the terrorist strategy is to cause a summer of broken down infrastructure and we can't allow that. 6. Intelligence We are, again gradually building an tragi intelligence capability; but it needs huilding faster and extending to the Ministry of Defence with a proper system of MN-/MOD sharin: 7 Local Population Fallujah and Najal and other "hotspots" continue to cause real concern but one key thing is emerging. Where we have local civic buy-in and Iraqis policing, in whole or in part. its very much easier. There are all sorts of problems as the Fallujah DECLASSIFIED 8. Media The advent of Al-Iraqiya has made a difference. One Iraqi Minister told me it was all there was, keeping the IGC presentation of its case, afloat. But it is still not as good as it needs to be. I enclose a set of recommendations made by the former head of Murdoch's satellite TV in the UK, who went to Baghdad last week. All of these points need to be actioned. Above all, the new PM needs a tip-top media operation himself. He needs to be the face of the new Iraq; as do his Ministers. We must put one in place for him now. In addition, we should be commissioning constant internal polling on Iraqis and their attitudes. If our leading papers can do it in the US and UK, we can. 9. Iragi civilians and detainees It is repeated as fact that between 10-15,000 Iraqi civilians have died since "the occupation". This figure is doing a lot of damage. Yet it is (a) clearly a gross over-estimate; and (b) does not point out that the largest numbers have died through terrorism. The NGO - Iraq Body Count - estimate the number at 1500- 2000 once soldiers and dead terrorists are removed from the count. But we should DECLASSIFIED 10 Chalabi I believe he could be. potentially a big source of trouble. He needs to be talked to and made to realise he can't hold us to ransom. We need a strategy for him or he will try to de-rail the new PM. 11. Syria and Iran I think both are up for causing trouble; and need to be warned off. The report that Iran helped arm an anti CF attack; and Syria's attitude to the border are not acceptable We need to talk to them fimmly about the damage to any possibility of a different relationship if it persists We need to task our people, under Condi and Nigel, to work through each part of this systematically, checking it off, following it through, coming back to us to remove any obstacles. This can be done but "sort of" doing it won't work. DECLASSIFIED