Minute ps cdi to aps sofs mod etc a study of the provinces within the uk aor and attachment

MA/CIO MAI/DCDS(C) A STUDY OF THE PROVINCES WITHIN THE UK AOR At the Op COS on Tues 22 Apr, CDI was tasked with providing an assessment of the provinces within the UK AOR. A general assessment is attached, with details for each province/governorate contained in annexes. (signed on CHOTS] PS/CDI Enclosure Assessment of Provinces within UKAOR DECLASSIFIED City Population 1,337,600 Basrah An Nasariyah 535,100 Al Kut 381,500 Al Amarah 340,100 Az Zubayr 168,000 Sug ash Shuyukh 155,600 Ash Samawah 124,400 Tribal Dynamics in the UK AOR 3. The overwhelming majority of tribes in the UK AOR have welcomed the removal of the regime. A number of tribal leaders are actively co-operating with Coalition forces, and others have expressed a willingness to do so. Some tribes do, however, remain suspicious of Coalition intentions. There is potential for inter-tribal conflict in the aftermath period. The main axis for this will be between formerly pro and anti-regime tribes. Some southern Iraqi tribes have strong relations with Iran, and will be influenced by Iranian policy. Bedouin/non-Bedouin tensions, particularly over the Persian ancestry of some tribes, could be a cause of friction. Traditional tribal enmity over land or blood debt in the UK AOR is unlikely to be destabilising The most significant pro-regime tribes in the UK AOR are the Sunni Sa'dun tribe, located in the Basrah and Dhi Qar governorates, and the Shi' a Khafaji tribe, located in the Dhi Qar governorate. Members of these tribes are likely to be the focus of revenge attacks in the coming The Coalition should avoid favouring individual tribal groups, and need to co-opt major 6. groups into governance or face opposition. The large Shi'a tribes and confederations which have members distributed throughout the 5 governorates - namely the Albu Muhammad, Bani Hujaym, Bani Lam, Bani Malik, Bani Mansur, Bani Rabi'a, Bani Rikab, Bani Sa'id, Bani Tamim and Shammar Toga - should be SECRE ESAGSIFIED. However, there is strong evidence that Iranian-backed groups are attempting to increase their influence in southern Iraq. There is a possibility that latent anti-Coalition sentiment among the population, exacerbated by civil unrest and the humanitarian situation, will be utilised by these groups to increase their leverage during Phase IV. 11. A number of tribes have provided logistical support and personnel to Iranian-backed groups. There are now estimated to be at least 1,000 active members of the Iranian-backed Badi Corps in southern Iraq, located in the Maysan, Basrah and Dhi Qar governorates. There is some evidence that the Corps is attempting to undermine support for the Coalition among the populace. The Badr Corps - along with its political wing, the Supreme Council of the Islamic 12. Revolution in Iraq (SCIRI) - is judged to be working through certain members of the clerical establishment in order to gain leverage in the region. With the controls of the regime now lifted, further outbreaks of violence are likely as the various Shi'a factions attempt to gain political and social influence in the new Iraq. INFRASTRUCTURE ASSESSMENT In addition to the general overview below, specific infrastructure details of the 5 UK AOR 14. provinces are provided as separate annexes. There is insufficient detail available at this time to give a complete picture: General During the earlier phases of Op TELIC, the majority of Iraq's national critical infrastructure was placed on either the Restricted Target List (RTL) or the No Strike List (NSL). The notable exceptions were civilian and military telecommunication facilities, military logistics and buildings closely associated with the regime. However, we have received very little Battle Damage Assessment (BDA) and, of that received, the level of detail precludes a comprehensive significance assessment. Furthermore, the BDA received does not reflect damage caused by artillery or small arms fire. As a consequence the following assessments should be regarded as incomplete. Page 2 of 5 Of the 20 airfields, 12 have an assessed Load Classification Number (LCN) of 39 and are capable of sustained air transport operations by C-130 aircraft, whilst Basrah international has an LCN of 82 and is assessed as being capable of sustained operations by the heaviest of aircraft. Those airfields with a lower assessed LCN eg Basrah Maqal (25), may be capable of supporting C-130 aircraft under operational circumstances. Ports and Inland Waterways Until major clearance operations in the Shatt al Arab are conducted, Basrah will be unavailable for major port operations. Umm Qasr is currently Iraq's principal commercial port and is beginning to be used as a point of entry for humanitarian relief. However, its capacity is severely limited until wrecks are cleared and major dredging recommences. The port equipment is limited due to poor maintenance, however, no damage from the conflict was reported. Roads South-east Iraq has an effective all-weather, moder system of 2 and 3-lane roads linking 20. the southern ports and cities to the North. Roads are generally in good condition although recent heavy Coalition traffic and tracked vehicles on main supply routes may have caused some damage to surfaces. Although it has been reported that many bridges were prepared for demolition, only one on a major route has been destroyed (Route 6 on the southern approaches to Baghdad). Railways There is a key rail link of approximately 580 km which runs between the port of Umm Qasr and Baghdad, with an 18 km branch line into Al Basrah. It is a single track, non-electrified, standard gauge railway (1,435 mm). There are no reports of damage due to the conflict and it is assessed that the tracks remain in good operational condition. The small stretch of track from Umm Qast to Al Basrah was recently reactivated by UK forces with local assistance. Telecommunications and Broadcasting The current state of the Iraqi C3 and broadcasting networks is assessed to be in various 22. stages of degradation, with certain key networks rendered non-operational. Lengthy and costly The obvious means of reconstituting the Iraqi telecommunications system to a fully useable system would be to rebuild the backbone microwave network, the primary city telephone exchanges and the primary satellite ground-stations. However, to provide a "quick fix" to offer a communications capability within a matter of days, a GSM system could be put in place, similar to that introduced in Afghanistan. This could be so engineered as to afford connectivity from Baghdad to the nationwide PSTN. Oil and Gas The AOR is an extremely oil-rich region, incorporating over two thirds of Iraq's proven 25. oil reserves, significant export routes and a substantial refining capacity. Little of the southern oil infrastructure was damaged during Op TELIC. However, most of the oil-related installations ground to a halt as Coalition forces approached the southern oil fields and oil workers stayed away. The knock-on effect has been a virtual cessation in the movement of crude oil for export to Turkey and to the export terminals in the Gulf. It is also probable that Al Basrah's refining capability has, at best, been significantly reduced by the lack of manpower and movement of crude oil. There is significant storage capacity for both crude oil and refined products in the AOR. but again it is effectively redundant unless it can be accessed and transported. Electric Power The original power system in Iraq was well designed and contained a strong element of in- built redundancy. However, due to damage caused during the first Gulf War and compounded by a serious lack of maintenance since, the practical limit for generation and transmission prior to the recent conflict was around 40-50% capacity. Power cuts were widespread and prolonged, and continue to be so. It is assessed that whilst the power plants are operating (albeit at their reduced capacities), there may be problems with transmission of the power caused by conflict damage to powerlines. Many industrial and civilian facilities have their own power supplies, mainly in the form of diesel generators. Electricity is generated from a conventional mix of oil-fired thermal and gas turbine plants. There are no nuclear power plants. no assise SACRUSE Page 4 of'5 Prior to Phase IV, the medical care and supplies available from the medical system were known to be very limited and it was assessed that the infrastructure would be quickly overwhelmed by the consequences of any conflict. The shortages of medicines and other medical material that existed prior to the conflict have been aggravated by looting. However, NGOS have restocked most of the major hospitals although there remains the continuing problem of persuading Iraqi health professionals to return to their posts. Annexes: Bastah Governorate A. B. Maysan Governorate C. Dhi Qar Governorate Muthanna Governorate D. E. Wasit Governorate SECRE DECLASSIFIED Page 5 of 5