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2.
The ISG is now fully operational and actively pursuing investigations. Its focus is on interviewing seniot High Value Targets and lower ranking scientists and others and following up the resulting leads. They have also recovered a large amount of written material, paper and clectronic. hand written and typed, which is being translated and analysed.
Prohibited Missile Systems As you know, the most significant and complete story concerns the plans and designs for prohibited missile systems. A draft assessmen: has been prepared for the JIC to consider on 16 July (this may now be slightly delayed). This concludes, on the basis of interviews with senior officials and engineers involved with Iraq's ballistic missile programme, that:
* claims that Iraq produced designs of prohibited missile systems between 2000 and 2002 are credible and supported by an initial examination of the extensive technical data provided.
The missiles were designed to reach ranges between 500-600km and 900- 1000km):
• the designs produced, and the four to five year timeframe envisaged to reach full preduction, appear technically credible. It is not clear however, why further development of the designs was halted;
• claims that Iraq sought to conceal the design work for these prohibited missile systems are credible, and are supported by other intelligence. There was a clear intent to preserve the designs for possible future use. It is equally clear that at least two senior officials managed to deceive UNMOVIC inspectors during their interviews with them;
despite their apparent co-operation in providing information on prohibited missile designs, some of those interviewed are not being entirely open on issues which they may believe could carry more serious implications for them. These include the issue of chemical and biological warheads and the purpose of missile infrastructure such as the al- Rafah test stand. These areas need further investigation.
4.
The ISG also have a document, recovered from the NMD archive (the organisation responsible for implementing Irag's concealment policy), that possibly relates to the movement of SCUD components and warheads in 2001. Further comment awaits detailed assessment of the document.
DECLASSIFIED
• Tests
who said that he had been ordered to keep them safe and secret carried out so far have given positive results for clostridium botulinum and gas gangrene.
Final confirmation of these and other tests are awaited in the next few days. Further work will follow to establish how casily these samples could have been grown into a suitable quantity for use on the battlefield.
7.
A notebook covering the period from January to March 2003 has been found recording discussions about the concealment and destruction of anthrax. It is not yet clear whether this refers to concealing evidence of past destruction or something more recent. The provenance of the document has also to be established Comment
8.
The evidence revealed so far is pointing towards the maintenance of a capability to restart BW production but not (until more is found on the trailers) continuing production.
9.
David Kay aims to have a biological "package" ready for September to cover: the existence of a biological weapons programme; concealment; research and development; the retention of seed stock and mobile production. As of now, not all the component parts for this package are in place.
Chemical Weapons
Little has been found so far. A former head of chemical weapons research and development has claimed to know about the concealment of chemical weapons but the information provided so far has not checked out.
11.
DECLASSIFIED
as a
number of the missile officials were also interviewed by UNMOVIC. Further to this, the ISG have a document from February 2003 detailing concealment procedures, which they recovered from the recently discovered archive of the Revolutionary Command Council (RCC).
Presentation
14.
Now there is no longer to be a statement by the Prime Minister in the immediate tuture, the JIC sub-committee of Iraq discussed the option of briefing Jane Corbin on the lans for prohibited missiles, and making available an Iraqi witness for interview. We agreed as long as secured an embargo on publication before September, when Corbin's Panorama programme is scheduled to be aired. We will need to ensure we co- ordinate this action with the US.
ARLETT
so bles
16 July 2003
DECLASSIFIED