Telegram 705 ukmis new york to fco london iraq unmovic

INFO IMMEDIATE EU ENLARGEMENT POSTS, EU POSTS, GULF POSTS INFO IMMEDIATE JAKARTA, KUALA LUMPUR, MIDDLE EAST POSTS, MODUK INFO IMMEDIATE NATO POSTS, NEW DELHI, OTTAWA, PRETORIA CAPETOWN INFO IMMEDIATE SECURITY COUNCIL POSTS, SEOUL, TOKYO INFO IMMEDIATE UKMIS GENEVA, SUBJECT: NOSEC: IRAQ: UNMOVIC: 22 APRIL SUMMARY Subdued Council discussion of UNMOVIC. Blix acknowledges UNMOVIC cannot return at present and that its role would need to change. Almost all Council members accept the need for UNMOVIC to return to Iraq and most highlight the link with sanctions lift. Sabliere announces French willingness But none press the US hard. to suspend sanctions for several months renewable with sanctions lift dependent on verified disarmament. DETAIL 2. This records developments on UNMOVIC on 22 April. Bolton 3. Bolton stressed that the US did not disagree with credible inspections and getting WMD finds into the public domain. But they were concerned about involving UNMOVIC too soon or too involving tan Particularly sensitive would be the Coalition's extensively. efforts to find out about WMD activities in other countries. The UNMOVIC issue should be left on the backburner - it would become I said the less of a problem as the Coalition made discoveries. UK was less neuralgic but would not force the issue. We wanted to ensure credible arrangements that left no doubt over Coalition discoveries. And other Council members would play on the link Bolton said French moves on between UNMOVIC and sanctions lift. sanctions suspension were a helpful way of dealing with sanctions without pushing UNMOVIC to a head. He added that the US was open NATO) I said that US reluctance to alternatives to UNMOVIC (e, g would be seen as a general reluctance to have the UN involved in We had not identified (this was manageable). post-conflict Irag any credible alternatives. I also stressed that if international verification emerged strengthened from the Irag issue it could be DECLASSIFIED -ULe unmove, the resolutions set out some central points: the need for independence to retain international credibility: the need for full rights of access to any Iraqi sites and persons; the need for assistance and co-operation from any Iragi authorities and the Coalition (including a new local counterpart to fulfil the role played by the NMD) ; the need for UNMOVIC/IAEA to report to the Council basis for its action related to sanctions; the need for ongoing monitoring and verification to provide longer-term assurances; and fact that disarmament in Iraq would contribute towards a Middle East zone free from WMD. The draft UNMOVIC work programme could be adapted to assume that UNMOVIC would verify and corroborate Coalition findings; continue to supervise destruction of WMD; and carry out longer-term monitoring. 6. Blix said that an initial inspections team of 30 headquarters staff would be able to return to Iraq within two weeks of Council decision. Another two weeks would be needed to resume limited operations at their (looted) Baghdad centre. inspectors on the roster, until mid-June 85 could be recalled at any time. After that, UNMOVIC would need some 4 weeks to call up new inspectors. said that some recent reports of his - translated from foreign languages into English - had contained serious errors. It was true that he had pointed to weaknesses in intelligence provided, but he had also always stressed the need for intelligence and the difficulties agencies faced. He had not suggested that any government had fabricated evidence. In addition, he had indeed said that US patience seemed to run out at the same time as the Iragis had become more proactive. But if asked about the causal link, his view would be seen that that the Iragis had become more active when they had time was running out. concluded by saying that he would not want to extend his contract beyond June. 7. Zlauvinen (IAEA) said the IAEA's findings on Iraq and El - Baradei's views on IAEA's mandate were set out in the 11 April IAEA bi annual report. El-Baradei's view was that IAEA inspections should resume as soon as possible and he awaited guidance from the Council. IAEA remained the only body with legal powers to verify nuclear disarmament. 8. Lavrov (Russia) underlined that UNMOVIC still had no proof Irag might have had WMD and prepared to resume operations as soon as the situation permitted. He hoped inspectors would be able to DECLASSIFIED sanctions. Pleuger (Germany) supported the return of UNMOVIC/IAEA as soon as possible. Workable arrangements would need to be found, be it through MOU, or working on the ground. UNMOVIC Council guidance, should remain independent and have the full rights of access under 1441. He stressed the link with sanctions lift. At the moment it was 11. I said we would very carefully reflect. not allow for UNMOVIC's obvious that conditions on the ground did return and we could not say when the situation would change. did in due course see a post-conflict role for UNMOVIC/IAEA in verifying disarmament and in long-term monitoring. If and when it did return it would be to an environment where it would finally be able to monitor and verify rather than be a detective agency. due course we would need to ask UNMOVIC to review its working methods, structures, and numbers. Coalition forces were fully aware of the need to be active, professional, and to treat all We would share with the UN any relevant WMD evidence responsibly. relevant information we uncovered. 12. Negroponte (USUN), in an intervention that did not mention UNMOVIC once (Duffy said the only reference had been excised by Bolton, said that the Coalition had been focussed on re-establishing security. The Coalition would now be intensifying the search for WMD. This would likely take time as hundreds of facilities needed carefully searching, thousands of pages examining, and interviews conducting. The US recognised the need for transparency so that the international community and Iraq could share the assurance that Iraq was disarmed. But we also had to recognise that the disarmament regime needed to be reassessed given the new facts on the ground. In conclusion, the Coalition was still very much in the stabilisation phase and the principle efforts in the search for WMD remained ahead of us. Arias (Spain) asked a couple of harmless questions. Ali other speakers agreed on the need for the inspectors to return, while most also mentioned the link with sanctions lift. Akram (Pakistan) (Syria) stressed the need for a WMD free zone. presumahly worried ahont the wider read-across, questioned whether long-term monitoring was really justified now that there would be Should the regular an Iragi government that was not a threat. non-proliferation mechanisms apply instead? Zinser (Mexico, President) proposed that we take forward the issue in informal DECLASSIFIED Desk Officer for Iraq: and on Firecrest GREENSTOCK YYYY 8833 ZILNAN NNNN DECLASSIFIED