Minute scarlett to powell iraq second possible mobile bw trailer

which we cannot sustain. 2. I passed these notes to David Manning last night in advance of his dinner with Condi Rice. 3. There are a number of leads to follow up in respect of both of the trailers which have now been discovered. Documents and a computer have been taken from the Company which manufactured the reactor vessels in the trailers. An individual was detained at the Company. We await the full results of the exploitation of this material. Sampling from the second vehicle is underway and the silo where this second vehicle appears to have been held needs to be examined. Extensive (and destructive) testing of the first trailer has just been started. 4. New information available today from imagery indicates a third suspicious trailer in the Mosul area. It appears to have been moved to Mosul Medical School. We are trying to arrange urgently for it to be examined to establish whether it is related to any possible BW activity. 5. It is not yet clear whether we will be able to prove that these trailers were used for BW agent production, ie by finding samples of agent. But our assessment is that the first trailer at least (and probably the second) were capable of producing micro-organisms as part of a biological process. It is not clear whether they form part of two or three trailer units, the other elements of which have not yet been found. It is not impossible that they were capable of producing a crude (liquid) form of agent of weaponisation on their own (ie as single trailer units). 6. A great deal of thought has been given to other possible applications for these trailers. So far none has been identified. It is worth noting that this is also the view of experts who have examined photographs of the first trailer discovered. 7. Whatever turns up (or does not turn up) regarding traces of BW agent, the purpose of these trailers should at some point be confirmed from consultation of documentation and personnel associated with their design and production. The DECLASSIFIED HOI340H87/404 which we have been looking. Whatever their function, our experts judge that these trailers could produce micro-organisms and should, therefore, have been declared under UNSCOM 1441. At the right moment, and once we have reached the fürmest judgement possible in the circumstances, it will be necessary to explain their significance in terms of the production capability of such mobile units. We have assessed that the units highlighted in the intelligence would be capable of producing a number of BW agents, including anthrax. JOHN SCARLETT 13 May 2003 DECLASSIFIED 2 SECRET claiming that this trailer could be the 'Smoking Gun'. As with the first trailer, while a link with the BW programme is probable, the evidence is not conclusive. A possible second transportable BW production system (TPS) was found in the vicinity of the al Kindi Military R&D, Test and Evaluation facility north of Mosul on 9 May. The trailer appears to be similar in configuration to the transportable BW trailer which is currently at Baghdad Airport, although in worse condition (rusted, and without wheels and tarpaulin cover). A civilian at al Kindi claimed that the trailer was brought from a nearby silo and parked outside another building in mid March, and that other trailers were in the silo perimeter. The silos and area was searched but no other trailers were found. Unidentified equipment was labelled "chemical equipment" was present and there was a pungent odour near a large compressor inside the silo compound. 2. We assess that, although there are many components missing on the second trailer, its configuration is similar to that of the first trailer from Irbil. From the information available to DIS, we cannot confirm that equipment for drying BW agent is present on the second trailer, and assess that the trailer is not an additional component of the two or three trailer systems, described in intelligence sources. We assess that the second trailer probably serves a similar function to the Irbil trailer, i.e. bioprocess. 3. Al Kindi, the site of the discovery, can be generally described as an engineering site associated with research, development, testing and evaluation of small arms, artillery and surface to air missiles. It is not a site that has previously been connected to CBW. 4. An NBC News feature of the discovery has claimed that the recent find could be the 'smoking gun'. This appears to be based on the views of David Kay, formerly nuclear Chief Weapons Inspector for IAEA, and now a consultant for NBC News. The claim made by Kay (and others) is that equipment capable of drying BW agent is present on the trailer. Iraq has previously weaponised liquid agent or slurry, which could equally have been weaponised at al Kindi. We have no collateral for the presence of drying equipment and, even if present, would not be proof of the 'Smoking Gun' without clear evidence of the presence of BW agent. 12 May 2003 DECLASSIFIED • Coalition Forces have three mobile trailers in their possession - 2 at BIAP and the one near Mosul; • We only have 2, one a BIAP and the find at the al Kindi site near Mosul. The third may be a reference to a decontamination vehicle found with the first trailer. • US forces claimed that they expected to find 8 more trailers; • It is not clear what this is based on. • The 2"* trailer has a dryer unit and can therefore produce dry anthrax. • Our initial assessment is that the configuration of the 2'* trailer is similar to the first and does not contain a dryer unit. The equipment referred to in the NBC report was identified as a cooling system. Our assessment is that the individual trailers found can only produce liquid agent. 2. The NBC News expert, David Kay, is described as a former UN weapons inspector. He was in fact an IAEA inspector attached to the UNSCOM teams. We are not aware that he has any detailed expertise in the biological weapons field. 12 May 2003 DEGLASSIFIED