Letter owen to rycroft post conflict iraq uk us attaching six separate papers

bea Mation Post-Conflict Iraq: UK/US As requested in your letter to me of 3 April, I enclose six papers which cover: a) the timing of the post-conflict phases; b) a summary of the different tribes, regions and governorates; c) a summary of the various Iraqi opposition groups; d) our vision of how the UN Special Co-ordinator might work with the coalition forces; e) ORHA / IIA relationship with Iraqi Ministries; and f) the state of Iraqi civil service and bureaucracy. I am copying this to Peter Watkins (MOD) and Anna Bewes (DfID). here 4а (Kara Owen) Private Secretary 87 Matthew Rycroft Esq 10 Downing Street RECEIVED IN REGISTRY N8U/022/005/03 16 APR 2003 DECLASSIFIED work with the coalition until they are sure it is safe to do so. A swift and relatively clean collapse of the Saddam regime could produce a scenario in which Iraqi public officials and the Iraqi public more widely were co-operative. A messy outcome (protracted fighting in Baghdad or other cities, use of WMD, a humanitarian disaster, lack of clarity about the status of Saddam or his henchmen) could produce a scenario in which Iraqis were much less likely to co-operate with the coalition. Military - ORHA On cessation of hostilities, the role of the military changes to one of securing and maintaining a secure environment. Responsibility for civil administration (i.e. ensuring basic needs) will transfer rapidly from military commanders to ORHA - probably within days. ORHA will however continue to work formally within the military chain of command. ORHA Jay Garner's working assumption is that ORHA will fulfil this role for 30-90 days. During this time it is likely that a number of Iraqis would act alongside ORHA in an advisory role. The transition point from ORHA would be when a Baghdad Conference appointed an Iraqi Interim Authority and set out its powers. ORHA will have a limited shelf life. Over time its legitimacy in the eyes of Iraqis will decline. There will also be increasing pressure for it to get involved in reconstruction and reform that goes beyond what is legal for an occupying power. So we shall want a fairly rapid transition to an Iraqi Interim Authority - while allowing some time for credible leaders to emerge from within Iraq. Iraqi Interim Authority - Government of Iraq The IIA would take over - perhaps on a phased basis -executive functions. It would then take forward the agenda set by the Baghdad Conference: a programme of constitutional, political and economic reform. We envisage this leading in due course to elections, within 1-2 years depending on the circumstances. An international security presence will be needed in the early stages but force levels might draw down during this period as the security situation improves. Traq Planning Unit, 4 April 2003 DECLASSIFIED mate and laboures (and conscripts in the lower ranks of the army), but with quite sizeable higher strata of people with secondary or university educations, and some with advanced qualifications. Equally importantly there are many, particularly in the towns, who feel no particular tribal affiliation. 3. At various times in the past 100 years Iraq's rulers (Ottomans, British, Iraqis) have encouraged tribal power and autonomy. At other times they have been discouraged For many years the Baath worked to eliminate the tribes as a social and political force, but latterly Saddam has sought to co-opt and control them through threats and handouts, increasing their local autonomy on the one hand, but also implicating them in the system of control that Saddam has imposed on the state. 4. Key pro-regime tribes (Sunni Arab) are the Dulaym, Jibbur, Ubayd and Duri confederations, but members of the first three of these groups have, at different times, been involved in high-profile attempts to bring it down in the period since 1991. The southern (mainly Shia) tribes have traditionally been less cohesive and remain so. Providing numbers of tribes or tribal confederations gives little idea of their relative strength as supporters or opponents of the regime. While they may mobilise on one side or the other, the size of such mobilisation will be affected by the extent to which they are subsidised by the regime or competing countries; by the extent to which internal rivalries are played upon or resolved; and to a large extent by their desire to ensure that they end up on the winning side. 5. A question for the future has to be the extent to which (and manner in which) the role of the tribes is acknowledged. If, in the interests of establishing order quickly in post Saddam Iraq, they are given too much autonomy, and allowed, for instance, to maintain militias for local policing, they could become a rival to the state and prone to external manipulation (as in Yemen). If ignored, a potentially useful counterweight to religious leaderships with political ambitions could be lost in the period during which the new state will be forming. Regions 6. There is no formal intermediate structure between the state and the individual governorates (below), but Iraq nevertheless has some distinct regions. In the north and north east there is the mountainous region largely populated by Sunni Kurds. The foothills below (including the town of Kirkuk) are claimed by the Iraqi Turcomans as DECLASSIFIED Governorates 8. The modern state of Iraq is composed of the former Ottoman vilayets of Basra, Baghdad and Mosul. In 1925 Iraq was subdivided into 14 provinces (superseding the somewhat larger sanjaqs into which the vilayets had been divided in Ottoman times). 9. The boundaries of the 14 provinces were drawn up during the Mandate period (1918-1932) on principally tribal and ethnographic lines, although the northern provinces of Mosul, Irbil, Kirkuk and Sulaymaniya equally corresponded to . In the south, tribal factors influenced the provincial geographical features'. boundaries. 10. The present day division of Iraq into 18 governorates is not so different from the 14 provinces that existed previously. To account for the extra four, Dohuk has been carved out of Mosul (essentially dividing the mountainous Kurdish area from the Arab-occupied plain); al-Najaf and al-Muthanna in the central south cover the desert area that was not formally administered at an earlier time; and Salah al-Din has been separated from the town of Baghdad to form a separate governorate. R Wilson MENARG Research Analysts 4 April 2003 ' The most northerly province, Dohuk, was carved more recently out of Mosul (now Nineveh) province. DECLASSIPED nervous that the US is trying to sideline them and to pick technocrats and advisers individually. 3. We need to balance the views of external oppositionists who have experience of working in free democratic structures with the need to involve immediately the pcople still living in Iraq. Iraqis must choose any representative structure themselves from throughout the country and from those oppositionists in exile. This is vital to avoid accusations of being coalition appointees. 4. The following are some of the more important groups and trends: Iraqi National Accord 5. Led by Di Ayad Allawi who is based in the UK. In general the party follows a line of moderate Arab Nationalist without Saddam's excesses and as such contains many diplomats and junior Ministers from the 70s. Though Dr Allawi himself is Shi'a, much of the Iraqi National Accord is Sunni and it has an appeal for ex- members of the establishment from across the two communities. Many of its technocratic members worked with the US State Department's Future of Iraq project though they are scathing of ORHA's plans. Kurdistan Democratic Party and Patriotic Union of Kurdistan 6. Led by Massoud Barzani and Jalal Talabani respectively. Between them in control of the Kurdish Autonomous Zone in northern Iraq. At peace for the last five years in which time they have built up an impressive administrative infrastructure and have been active courting foreign support. Strongly pushing for a federal Iraq in which the Kurds have a large degree of self-governance, • See a role for themselves in central Baghdadi politics too. The Supreme Council for Islamic Revolution in Iraq (SCIRI) 7. The Tehran-based Iranian party led by Ayatollah Muhammad Baqir al-Hakim. Suspicious of coalition intentions in Iraq and supportive of Iraqis taking the lead in liberating their country. The most organised of the Islamist groups with a large Iranian-trained paramilitary (the Badr brigade). Distrusted by many as being an DECLASSIFIED Continues to be favoured by DoD hardliners but opposed by State Department. Adnan Pachachi 9. A former Iraqi Foreign Minister and Permanent Representative to the UN in the 1960s, an 80 year old Sunni with a nationalist background. Liberal, secular, strongly supporting the role of the UN in helping set up an interim administration in Iraq, he has so far spurned US efforts for him to join wider structures. Well- respected as an elder statesman within the opposition. But his political movement - the Democratic Centrist Tendency - has little mass support, though attractive to apolitical technocrats. Sherif Ali bin Hussein 10. One of the claimants to the Iraqi throne, mainly due to his mother's blood ties to the last King of Iraq, King Faisal who was killed in the revolution of 1958. Sunni married to a Shi'a from Karbala'. Has lived in exile since the age of 2. Closely tied to US efforts to bring the opposition together, the idea of him (or Prince Hassan of Jordan) uniting the country under a Monarchy came to the fore last year after the role of Zahir Shah in Afghanistan. Again his support base within Iraq is unclear: the Sunni Monarchy from the 1920s to the 1950s was unpopular amongst much of the Shi'a majority and derided as a British imposition. Other Islamist groups 11. Other Islamist groups have risen out of the 'quietist' tradition of Shi'a clerics who have shunned direct involvement in politics. Many are campaigning merely for full communal and religious rites in which the Shi'a - because they form the majority of the Iraqi population - will naturally have a large role. Religious leaders within Iraq such as Najafs Ayatollahs Ali al-Sistani, Said al-Hakim and Ishaq al- Fayyad will have an important role in shaping Shi'a public opinion. Other Kurdish groups 12. Relative political freedom over the past twelve years has seen Kurdish political parties proliferating in northern Iraq. Most important of these are Kurdish (Sunni) Islamist groups ranging from moderate groups who pride themselves on having no armed wing to extremist groups such as Ansar al-Islam. 14. Tribal leaders emphasise the importance that the tribes could have in the future of Iraq. Having been given large powers and in many cases arms to administer large sections of the Iraqi countryside, tribes must be brought on board to help bring security to these areas. However, much of Iraq is urban where tribal ties have either loosened or been artificially revived. There may be disadvantages of the continuing empowerment of the tribes if this gives them the ability to challenge the central state. Research Analysts April 2003 DECLASSIFIED The coalition would remain responsible for ensuring and maintaining security. Although this would take place under an overall UN mandate, coalition forces would not be subordinate to the UN Special Co-ordinator nor the Special Co-ordinator subordinate to the coalition chain of command. He would though need to co-operate closely with the coalition by virtue of the latter's responsibility for maintaining Regular consultation would be important to ensure that the coalition and UN operations were complementary. Over time it should be possible to identify areas of co-operation, e.g. disarmament and demobilisation, where some of the work will be done by the security presence and some of it (particularly helping ex-soldiers settle into civilian jobs) will need expertise from the UN, e.g. UNDP and international donors. We do not envisage an East Timor-style UN interim administration that directly governs Iraq (a red line for the US and, probably, the Iraqis themselves). We envisage a more informal arrangement between coalition forces and the UN, similar to those used in Afghanistan, Kosovo or Bosnia. An essential element, however, is that the respective roles of each body, and their relationship with the Iraqi Interim Authority, need to be clear. The personalities of key players also plays an important part. Iraq Planning Unit 4 April 2003 DECI ASSIEED Uvalton cloroloudl nanniusuiduon • Ims boay will have control over the civil administration of the country. The plan is to put a senior US official with a small group of Iraqi exiles into each of the ministries, after having removed any undesirable elements. The US officials will work as 'advisers' to the Iraqi ministries, which will be headed by Iraqi secretaries-general. They will, in practice, oversee the work of the ministries and, in due course, begin their reform and restructuring programme. The US understand the presentational importance of calling these people 'advisers', rather than 'shadow ministers'. 3. There is a dispute in Washington over lists of names of both the US officials and the Iraqi exiles to be put into the ministries. Both the DOD and State Department want "their people" in place. We have been invited to nominate British officials as advisers. But we have made clear that we need to be sure of the legal basis for their activities. 4. As well as policy and presentational concerns, this approach raises serious legal questions. Before there is specific UNSC authorisation for reform and restructuring of the Iraqi public administration, the Coalition does not have the powers, under international humanitarian law and the laws of armed conflict, to act in any more than a caretaker role of the administration in Iraq. Any steps to reform governmental or administrative structures or to appoint new officials would only be lawful if necessary for security or public order reasons, or in order to further humanitarian objectives. Existing officials may be removed, but the appointment of new officials to the Iraqi ministries would need to be considered against the test of necessity set out above. 5. We expect an Interim Iraqi Authority to be established after a number of weeks of the Coalition's provisional administration. We hope that the process of establishing it will enable it to be seen as a legitimate, provisional government for Iraq. The process must be one conducted by the people of Iraq albeit with international and UN support. Its executive powers and its relations to the Coalition and the UN remain to be defined. But we do not think the IIA would have credibility if it were subordinate or managed in any way by the Coalition. Some light supervision by the UN Special Co- ordinator will probably be desirable but is not, at present, acceptable to the US. 6. Once the IIA is established, direction of Iraq's ministries will transfer from the Coalition Provisional Administration to the IIA. Not all ministries should transfer immediately. At Camp David, Condi Rice set out 3 categories of ministries - those relatively straightforward ones that could be moved immediately to the IIA control eg DECLASSIFIED 8. Our model for how the IIA would function is based on the Supreme National Council for Cambodia. In that example, the Supreme National Council met about once a month to take policy decisions. The policy decisions were implemented provided that the UN Special Representative did not object to them. Members of the P5 were represented on the Supreme National Council though they did not have decision-making powers. 9. In Iraq's case, the IIA might need to meet more often than once a month. It will It is barely conceivable that the P5 might have seats effectively be a cabinet for Iraq, at the table, given US determination to keep France and Russia out for the game. All the evidence suggests that the IIA will assert its independence vigorously from the outset. A stately transfer of ministries' powers from the Coalition to it may not be politically possible. But a light supervisory role for a UN Special Co-ordinator may be acceptable as the price the Iraqis have to pay for the international community's support to nation building. This might finally convince the US too. IRAQ PLANNING UNIT 4 April, 2003 -DECLASSIFIED interests of the party before those of the state. Others will be members in name only and carry out their duties as competently as circumstances allow. 3. We have a fairly clear idea of how big the civil service is (about 1 million employees), how it is structured and how, for instance, its employees are paid. We do not have any deep knowledge about which levels of the administration are so highly politicised as to need immediate reform, nor which individuals might have to be retired or stood down. This in any case cannot realistically be assessed until after liberation. 4. Once Saddam Hussain's regime has been ousted, it will certainly be necessary to remove those who effectively enabled the regime to stay in power. Others, even if members of the Baath or guilty of minor transgressions, should probably be left in place, if possible in order to keep the machinery of the state running. However, our (as yet limited) experience inside Iraq gives the warning that officials may in any case abandon their posts, possibly to seek sanctuary with relatives or their tribes; or that local people will in any case refuse to cooperate with officials whom they see as agents of Saddam's regime. 5. Iraqis have reminded us that many competent people now in exile left the civil service, retired early, or were not promoted because they were not sufficiently Baathist. They may represent a pool of people who can be called upon if this can be done without causing resentments or new accusations of nepotism. R Wilson, MENARG Research Analysts 4 April 2003 DECLASSIFIED